Election Law Review
from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of
Case Digest
Maruhom vs COMELEC
GR No. 139357
May 5, 2000
Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." which intends to
give the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for
it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
Facts:
Maruhom and Dimaporo were both candidates for Mayor in
the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. During the
counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and
electoral frauds were committed at the instance of petitioner
or his followers in that votes actually casted for the private
respondent were not counted and credited in his favor thru
the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the Board
of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the
Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the
petitioner. Many official ballots were refused or rejected by
the machine. As a result of the foregoing irregularities,
anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally
proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have obtained
2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000
votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes. Private
respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true winner
for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition
to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom
as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
Subsequently, a Revision Committee was created and its
membership were duly appointed in open court which
committee was directed by the COMELEC to finish the revision
of ballots. After the Revision Committee was directed by the
respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner
Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the
dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot
boxes containing the ballots in the protested and counter-
protested precincts have been violated; (2) Automated
counting of ballots does not contemplate a manual recount of
the ballots.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC may order manual recount of ballots even
not mentioned in R.A. 8436
Held:
Yes. Although admittedly there is a lacuna leges in R.A. No.
8436 which prescribes the adoption of an automated election
system. However, while conceding as much, this Court ruled
in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, 42 that the Commission is
nevertheless not precluded from conducting a manual count
when the automated counting system fails, reasoning thus:
. . . In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously
failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine related for human foresight
is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the
1
vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC
Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC
the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this
provision is to give the COMELEC all the necessary
and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this
Court has not been niggardly in defining the
parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct
of our elections . . . In the case at bar, the
COMELEC order for a manual count was not only
reasonable. It was the only way to count the
decisive local votes . . . The bottom line is that by
means of the manual count, the will of the voters
of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick
away the will of the people by giving a literal
interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not
prohibit manual counting when machine count does
not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct
of an election which is under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC . . .
. . . Our elections are not conducted under
laboratory conditions. In running for public offices,
candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post.
Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments
to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to
subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the
actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable,
indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot,
however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these
actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should
take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the
principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of
the remedy." Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in
petitioner's counter-protest and private respondent's protest
already justified the determination of the issues through a
judicial revision and recounting of the ballots pursuant to
Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that
—
Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in election contest.
— Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant or whenever in the opinion of the court the interests
of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of
voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other
documents used in the election be brought before it and that
the ballots be examined and votes recounted.
Rulloda vs COMELEC
GR No. 154198
January 20, 2003
Facts:
In the Brgy. elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and
Remigio L. Placido were the contending candidate for
barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away at the
Mandaluyong City Medical Centre.
His widow, PetronilaRulloda, wrote a letter to the COMELEC
seeking permission to run as candidate in his stead. This
request was supported by the Appeal-Petition containing
several signatures of people purporting to be members of the
electorate of Brgy. Sto. Tomas.
In the election, even though she garnered more votes than
her opponent, her opponent was proclaimed the winner.
After the elections, she learned that COMELEC issued
resolution denying due course of her certificate of candidacy
and to direct the election officer to delete her name as a
candidate.
Petronila Rulloda filed petition for certiorari, seeking to annul
the resolution of the the COMELEC in so far as they prohibited
the petitioner from running as substitute.
Placido, the private respondent in his comment argued that
the Brgy. election is non-partisan, substitution of candidates
is not allowed. Moreover, he further states that petitioner did
not file any certificate of candidacy; hence there was only one
candidate for Brgy. Chairman of Sto. Tomas.
Issues:
Whether or not substitution of candidates is allowed in
barangay election
Held:
The absence of specific provision governing substitution of
candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a
prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive
construction cannot be read into the law where the same is
not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the
substitution of candidates where no political parties are
involved than when political considerations or party affiliations
reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in
petitioners favor can not be counted because she did not file
any certificate of candidacy. In other words he was the only
candidate for brgy. chairman. This claim was refuted by the
memorandum of the COMELC law department as well as the
assailed resolution no. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears
that petitioners letter request to be allowed to run as brgy.
chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was
treated as certificate of candidacy.
Saya-Ang vs Comelec
GR No. 155087
28 November 2003
Facts:
Petitioners Eduardo Saya-ang and Ricardo Lara were
candidates for the Office of Barangay Captain of Brgys.
Congan and New Aklan respectively for the July 15, 2002
Synchronized SangguniangKabataan and Barangay Elections.
On the day of elections, the Comelec issued En Banc
Resolution No. 5393, which denied due course to the
certificates of candidacy of petitioners herein, and to delete
their names from the certified list of candidates. Despite said
resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners on July
2
16, 2002. On July 31, 2002, petitioners took their oath of
office.
On August 9, 2002, Comelec issued a memorandum directing
all election officers to delete the names of those candidates
whose certificates of candidacy were denied due course
despite the fact that said denial did not arrive on time, and
also ordered the candidates concerned to desist from taking
their oaths and from assuming the ositions to which they have
been elected. On August 21, 2002, the Comelec en banc
promulgated Resolution 5666 re proclaimed candidates found
to be ineligible for being not registered voters in the place
where they were elected: “in the event that the disqualified
candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his disqualification
or despite the pending disqualification case filed before his
proclamation, but which is subsequently resolved against him,
the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is hereby
declared void from the beginning, with notice to the candidate
concerned, even if the dispositive portion of the resolution
disqualifying him or cancelling his certificate of candidacy
does not provide for such an annulment.”
Issue:
Whether or not the resolution issued by Comelec which denied
due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners is
patently erroneous for being without basis in fact and in law,
and the issuance of which is in grave abuse of discretion?
Held:
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec
has jurisdiction to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after the
elections, if for any reason no final judgment of
disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the
highest number of votes, and provided further that the
winning candidate has not been proclaimed or taken his oath
of office. Furhermore, a decision by the Comelec to disqualify
a candidate shall become final and executory only after a
period of five (5) days: “Sec. 3 - Decisions in petitions to deny
due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy or to
disqualify a candidate. . . . shall become final and executory
after the lapse of 5 days from their promulgation. . .”
Here, the assailed resolution denying due course to
petitioner’s certificates of candidacy was promulgated on July
15, 2002, or on the very day of the elections. On that day
therefore, the decision of the Comelec had not yet become
final and andexecutory since petitioners still had until June 20,
2002 to fil their motion for reconsideration. The Baranabay
Board of Canvassers rightly retained petitioners’ names in the
list of qualified candidates and could not be faulted from
counting the votes cast in favor of petitioners. The latter were,
therefore, validly proclaimed as winners of the elections on
July 16, 2002.
Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy
of the assailed resolution and were never given the chance to
present their evidence. It is clear, however, that under Sec. 3
Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure that a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily
after due notice.
Finally, the Court notes again that petitioners have already
been proclaimed as the winners in the elections. They have
already taken their oaths of office and are, already serving
their constituents in their respective barangays.
*While provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation
as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring
certain steps before elections will be construed as directory
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate.
For when voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified simply because the officers tasked
under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of
the ballot did not do their duty.
Salva v Makalintal
340 SCRA 506
September 18, 2000
Facts:
The Sangguinang Panlalawigan of Batangas enacted
Ordinance 05, which abolished Brgy. San Rafael and ordered
its merger with Brgy. Dacanlao. The Governer of Batangas
vetoed the ordinance as it was not shown that it complied
with the requisites in Sections 7 & 9 of the LGC. The
governor’s veto was overridden by Resolution 345. ·
Consequently, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2987 to
govern the conduct of the needed plebiscite. The petitioners,
officials and residents of Barangay San Rafael, filed for the
issuance of a TRO against the plebiscite with the trial court.
The trial court denied their petition, claiming that it had no
jurisdiction over acts, resolutions, or decisions of the
COMELEC. The trial court directed the petitioners to bring the
case to the Supreme Court.
Apparently, the plebiscite was conducted during the pendency
of the case. · The petitioners maintain that since their action
is based on the validity of Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345
(basis of COMELEC Res. 2987) the trial court had jurisdiction.
They further maintained that the Supreme Court only had
exclusive jurisdiction when COMELEC exercises its quasi‐
judicial functions. However, when the COMELEC acts in a
purely ministerial manner, the case may be subject to the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Yes, COMELEC Resolutions on
the conduct of plebiscites are administrative in nature and
subject to RTC Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
provides in part that: “SEC.7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.” In the case of Filipinas Engineering
v. Ferrer, it was held that what is contemplated by the term
‘final orders, rulings and decisions’ of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In this case, Resolution
2987 was only issued after the COMELEC took cognizance of
Ordinance 05 and Resolution 345. Resolution No. 2987 is thus
3
a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and
is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves
no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of the
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies
defining the rights and duties of party litigants, relative to the
conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of
the election laws. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which
provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct
of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
plebiscites, thus, Resolution 2987 may not be deemed as a
“final order” reviewable by certiorari by this court. Any
question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Brillantes Jr vs Comelec
GR No. 163193
June 15, 2004
FACTS:
By 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing
the COMELEC to use an automated election system(AES) for
the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections and required the COMELEC to acquire automated
counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said
automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections,
particularly in counting the votes collected from the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However,
the failure of the machines to correctly read a number of
automated ballots discontinued its implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that
even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
Ordersto allocate and release funds for such purpose. By
2003, The COmelec promulgated Resolution No. 6074
awarding the contracts for PHASE II of the AES to Mega
Pacific Consortium and correspondingly entered into a
contract with the latter to implement it. It further entered into
a separate contract with PMSIwhich contractpertains to Phase
III of the respondent COMELECs AES modernization program
ITFP then filed a petition in this Court for the nullification of
Resolution No. 6074 approving the contract for Phase II of
AES to Mega Pacific Consortium and while the case was
pending in this Court, the COMELEC paid the contract fee to
the PMSI in trenches.
By 2004 this Court promulgated its Decision nullifying
COMELEC Resolution No. 6074 .On the other hand, the
validation scheme under Phase I of the AES apparently
encountered problems in its implementation, as evinced by
the COMELECs pronouncements prior to the elections that it
was reverting to the old listing of voters. Despite the
scrapping of Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC nevertheless
ventured to implement Phase III of the AES through an
electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the
2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions,
also dubbed as an unofficial quick count.
ISSUE:
The Respondent COMELEC Committed Grave Abuse Of
Discretion Amounting To Lack Or Excess Of Jurisdiction In
Issuing Resolution No. 6712?
HELD:
YES.
REASONS:
1. Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole
and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. It is a grave error on the part of the
respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions
addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004
saying that such act would be in violation of the
Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on
said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only
would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but
would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."
Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436
confirms the constitutional undertaking of Congress as
the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President
2. The assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened
the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." It being “unofficial”, any
disbursement of public fund would be contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206,
which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act
3. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 8173,[49] and reiterated in Section 18 of
Rep. Act No. 8436,[50] the accredited citizens arm - in
this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a
copy of the election returns in the conduct of an
unofficial counting of the votes, whether for the national
or the local elections. No other entity, including the
respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy
of the election returns for purposes of conducting an
unofficial count. In addition, the second or third copy of
the election returns, while required to be delivered to the
COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not
intended for undertaking an unofficial count. The
aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and unsealed
only when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify
election results in connection with resolving election
disputes that may be imminent. However, in
contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution
authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open
the second or third copy intended for the respondent
COMELEC as basis for the encoding and transmission of
advanced unofficial precinct results. This not only
violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to
conduct an unofficial count, but also taints the integrity
of the envelopes containing the election returns, as well
as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain
4
of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the
COMELEC.
4. Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC
as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does
not cover the use of the latest technological and election
devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover,
the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized
representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty
days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices,
after failing to submit any document proving that it had
notified all political parties of the intended adoption of
Resolution No. 6712.
5. The assailed resolution has no constitutional and
statutory basis. That respondent COMELEC is the sole
body tasked to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recalland to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible electionsis
beyond cavil. That it possesses the power to promulgate
rules and regulations in the performance of its
constitutional duties is, likewise, undisputed. However,
the duties of the COMELEC under the Constitution, Rep.
Act No. 7166, and other election laws are carried out, at
all times, in its official capacity. There is no constitutional
and statutory basis for the respondent COMELEC to
undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of
results, whether manually or electronically. Indeed, by
conducting such unofficial tabulation of the results of the
election, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private
organization, spending public funds for the purpose.
Besides, it is absurd for the COMELEC to conduct two
kinds of electoral counts a slow but official count, and an
alleged quicker but unofficial count, the results of each
may substantially differ.Clearly, the assailed resolution is
an implementation of Phase III of the modernization
program of the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 8436.
Section 2 of the assailed resolution expressly refers to
the Phase III-Modernization Project of the COMELEC.
Since this Court has already scrapped the contract for
Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC cannot as yet
implement the Phase III of the program.
6. As correctly observed by the petitioner, there is a great
possibility that the unofficial results reflected in the
electronic transmission under the supervision and control
of the COMELEC would significantly vary from the results
reflected in the COMELEC official count. The latter
follows the procedure prescribed by the Omnibus
Election Code, which is markedly different from the
procedure envisioned in the assailed resolution.
Moreover, the Court doubts that the problem of dagdag-
bawas could be addressed by the implementation of the
assailed resolution. It is observed that such problem
arises because of the element of human intervention. In
the prevailing set up, there is human intervention
because the results are manually tallied, appreciated,
and canvassed. On the other hand, the electronic
transmission of results is not entirely devoid of human
intervention. The crucial stage of encoding the precinct
 results in the computers prior to the transmission
requires human intervention. Under the assailed
resolution, encoding is accomplished by employees of
the PMSI. Thus, the problem of dagdag-bawas could still
occur at this particular stage of the process.
Sandoval vs. Comelec
GR No. 133842
January 26, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for
the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative
district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After
canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district
board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected
congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the
same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a
petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's
proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from
the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and
proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board
of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation
despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was
non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which
would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns.
The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the
proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void.
Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and
reversal of the Comelec order.
Issues:
1.) Whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance
of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, both alleging the
existence 'of manifest error in the certificate of canvass issued
by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers and seeking to
reconvene said board of canvassers to allow it to correct the
alleged error
2.) Whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's
proclamation was valid
Ruling:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
over the petitions filed by private respondent. As
a general rule, candidates and registered political parties
involved in an election are allowed to file pre-proclamation
cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to
any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by, any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or
any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns.[24] The COMELEC has
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies.[25] As an exception, however, to the general
rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166[26]. prohibits
candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial
and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation
cases.
We find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with
illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation
of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due
process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice
5
and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its
ruling.[36] In other words, due process requires that a party be
given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his
side of the case and that the evidence should be considered
in the adjudication of the case.[37] The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner , without
the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the
questioned order based solely on private respondent's
allegations.
We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the
hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due
process requirement. The law requires that the hearing be
held before the COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the
public respondent first issued an order annulling the
proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of the
hearing.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for
annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not
merely performing an administrative function. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to
determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections, register political parties, organizations or
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President
the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action
upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or
disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the
Commission also has direct control and supervision over all
personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the
resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent
and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest
error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires
the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the
alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution
of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of
its quasi- judicial power. It has been said that where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial
nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than
a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.The COMELEC
therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving the
petitions filed by private respondent.
Faderanga vs Comelec
GR No. 55938
June 26, 1981
Facts:
The case arose from a petition filed on January 18, 1980 by
private respondents with respondent Commission on Elections
seeking the disqualification of petitioners from being
candidates respectively for mayor, vice mayor and members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Banton, Romblon. It was
alleged that they changed their party affiliation from KBL to
NP within six (6) months before the local election. On the
date of the election, such petition was still undecided.

It was not until February 28, 1980 that such petition for
disqualification was resolved. It was denied for lack of
sufficient evidence. Accordingly, on March 3, 1980, the
Registrar of Banton, Romblon, advised petitioners that all
winning candidates would be proclaimed anew on the
afternoon of that day. Thus, for the second time, on March
3, 1980, petitioners were proclaimed.
A motion for reconsideration was heard and submitted for
resolution on September 29, 1980. Then, three months to the
day, on December 29, 1980, as noted at the outset,
respondent Commission reversed itself. Hence this certiorari
and mandamus petition filed on January 19, 1981. A
temporary restraining order was issued on January 20, 1981
Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for COMELEC to reopen the
proceedings and reversing its decision in dismissing the
petition for disqualification of the petitioners?
Held:
In the cases of Venezuela v. Commission on Elections, as well
as in the succeeding cases of Villegas v. Commission on
Elections, the attempt to prolong a pre-proclamation
controversy even after the duly elected officials had been
proclaimed and had assumed office should not prosper. This
Court applied the doctrine, earlier noted, that such a stage
having been reached, the proper remedy would be an election
contest or a quo warranto petition as the case may be.
Respondent Commission should have denied the motion
considering that as far back as March 3, 1980, petitioners
were proclaimed and thereafter held and continue to hold the
offices in question
This is not to impugn the good faith of respondent
Commission. It is merely to stress that in a choice of
alternatives, what should guide its final disposition of a pre-
proclamation controversy after the lapse of a considerable
period is to accord respect to a proclamation made after due
deliberation but, as noted above, without prejudice to a
protest or quo warranto action to be filed, if the losing party
chooses to pursue such remedy.
Aguinaldo vs Comelec
GR No. L-53953
January 5, 1981
FACTS:
In the January 30, 1980 election, there were three candidates,
SaturninoTiamson of the Nacionalista Party, Cesar Villones of
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan and Edgardo Samson of the
National Union for Liberation. After the canvassing of the
election returns, it was shown that private respondent
Tiamson had more than 117 votes over the candidate Villones.
On February 29, 1980, he was proclaimed as Mayor by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and on March 3, 1980 assumed
such position. On March 10, 1980, as mentioned, Villones filed
a quo warranto petition based on the disqualification provision
of the Constitution prohibiting a change of political party
affiliation within six (6) months immediately preceeding or
following an election. The Commission on Election dismissed
the petition and the motion for reconsideration thereafter
6
filed. Petitioner then instituted this certiorari proceedings
against the respondent Commission.
This certiorari proceeding, as noted at the outset, was not
filed until May 30, 1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quo warranto petition has been timely filed
by the petitioner?
RULING:
NO. the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit, a quo
warranto petition having already been filed as far back as
March 10, 1980 by the losing party.
The ruling in Venezuela was applied in Villegas v. Commission
on Elections, Potencion v. Commission on Elections, Arcenas
v. Commission on Elections, and Singco v. Commission on
Elections. A citation from Arcenas finds pertinence:
This Court has invariably adhered to the principle that after
the holding of the January 30, 1980 election, and a
proclamation thereafter made, a petition to disqualify a
candidate based on a change of political party affiliation within
six (6) months immediately preceding, or following an
election, filed with this Court after January 30, 1980, arising
from a pre-proclamation controversy, should be dismissed
without prejudice to such ground being passed upon in a
proper election protest or quo warranto proceeding. Where,
however, such constitutional provision had been seasonably
invoked prior to that date with the Commission on Elections
having acted on it and the matter then elevated to this Court
before such election, the issue thus presented should be
resolved.
With a quo warranto petition having already been filed as far
back as March 10, 1980, by the party most interested, no less
than the losing candidate, Cesar Villones, the petition
for certiorari must be dismissed.
Alunan vs Mirasol
GR No. 108399
July 31, 1997
Facts:
1. LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be
composed of a chairman, 7 members, a secretary and a
treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections wereto be
held 30 days after the next local elections. The Local
Government Code was enacted January 1, 1992.
2. The first elections under the code were held May of 1992.
August 1992, COMELEC provided guidelines for the holding of
the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30, 1992, which also
placed the SK elections under the direct control and
supervision of DILG, with the technical assistance of
COMELEC. After postponements, they were held December 4,
1992.
3. Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363
people aged 15-21registered, 15,749 of them filing
certificated of candidacy. The City Council passed the
necessary appropriations for the elections.
4. September 18, 1992 – The DILG, through Alunan, issued a
letter-resolution exempting Manila from holding SK elections
because the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were
to be considered the first SK elections under the new LGC.
DILG acted on a letter by Santiago, acting President of the KB
(Kabataang Barangay) City Federation of Manila and a
member of the City Council of Manila, which stated that
elections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26,
1990. In this resolution, DILG stated that the LGC intended to
exempt those barangay chapters which conducted their KB
elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1, 1992 from the
forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would
be extended to coincide with the terms of those elected in the
SK elections
5. Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000
members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no
power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for
general elections for SKs, and that DILG denied them equal
protection of laws.
6. RTC – issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist
from implementing the order of the DILG Secretary, and
ordered them to perform the specified pre-election activities
in order to implement the general elections. The case was
reraffled to a different branch of the same court, and the new
judge held that the DILG had no power to exempt the City of
Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992
because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC
had already in effect determined that there had been no
previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for
SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the
exemption of the City of Manila was violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because, according to
the DILGs records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the
City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there
no elections held on December 4, 1992.
Issues:
1. Can the COMELEC validly vest the DILG with the power of
direct control and supervision over the SK elections with the
technical assistance of COMELEC?
2. Was there a violation of the equal protection clause when
some LGUs were exempted from holding SK elections by the
DILG?
Held:
1. Yes. COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not
unconstitutional. Election for SK officers are not subject to the
supervision of COMELEC in the same way that contests
involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdiction of COMELEC.
Justice Davide, in Mercado vs Board of Election Supervisors,
stated that the provision in the Omnibus Election Code that
states that COMELEC shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over contest involving elective barangay officials
only refer to elective barangay officials under the laws in force
at the time the Code was enacted, which was the old LGC.
Moreover, DILG was only acting or performing tasks in
accordance to the framework of detailed and comprehensive
rules embodied in a resolution of COMELEC. Although it is
argued that no barangays were named in the resolution, DILG
7
was not given discretionary powers because they merely used
the time period set by COMELEC as a reference in designating
exempted barangays. Likewise, the LGC of 1991 was held to
be curative, and thus should be given retroactive effect, giving
the mayor the authority to call elections; thus, the 1990 KB
elections were not null and void for being conducted without
authority.
2. The contention of violation of the equal protection clause
could not be determined from the records of this case. The
mere showing that there were other barangays that held KB
elections during the set period but were not exempted from
the 1992 SK elections is not sufficient to prove that violation.
An article in manila Bulletin stated that barangays in Bulacan
did not have elections in 1992 because they held elections on
January 1, 1988.
Galido vs COMELEC
193 SCRA 78
January 18, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates during the
18 January 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in
the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol.
Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-
Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
On 25 January 1988, private respondent Saturnino R. Galeon
filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, 7th Judicial Region, Branch I, Tagbilaran City. After
hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner
as the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority
of eleven (11) votes.
Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the
COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and
declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the
COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division.
The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same
precinct containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were
marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed
the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the
Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary
restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private
respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section
2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final
decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and
executory, and not appealable.
ISSUE:
WON a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s
decision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme
Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party.
RULING:
Yes, it may be brought to the SC by a petition for certiorari.
Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which
petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated:
"(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C),
Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides
that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
Elections in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that
decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on
Elections in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does
not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil
action of certiorari.
Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which
petitioner cites, it is stated, “Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt thereof.”
We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.
The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election
contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and
apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents
apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not
be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the
prejudice of either party. Petition is dismissed.
Relampagos vs Cumba
GR No. 118861
April 27, 1995
FACTS:
In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner
and private respondent were candidates for the position of
Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte.
The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to
accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the
RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial court,
per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have
won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent
and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the
COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the trial
court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion
for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal despite the
opposition of the private respondent.
The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued.
Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a
reconsideration which was later on denied. The private
respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial
8
court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and
the writ of execution.
The COMELEC granted the petition on February 9, 1995,
ordering the petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to
her position as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del
Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the
COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such
jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full
force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
ISSUE:
Does the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) have
jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction?
RULING:
YES. Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and
effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction.
Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Carlos vs Judge Angeles
GR No. 142907
November 29, 2000
Facts
Petitioner Carlos and respondent Serapio were candidates for
the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila during the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela.
Serapio filed with the Regional Trial Court an election protest
challenging the results. Petitioner filed with the trial court an
answer with affirmative defenses and motion to dismiss. The
court denied the motion to dismiss by order dated January 14,
1999.
In the recount, the final tally showed: (a) protestant Serapio
- 66,602 votes (b) protestee Carlos - 83,609 votes, giving the
latter a winning margin of 17,007 votes. Nevertheless, in its
decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes
because of its finding of significant badges of fraud, namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did
not fit into the padlocks of the ballot boxes that had to be
forcibly opened; 2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any
ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out of the seven (7) ballot
boxes did not contain any election returns; 3. Some schools
where various precincts were located experienced brownouts
during the counting of votes causing delay in the counting
although there was no undue commotion or violence that
occurred; 4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant
were not in their posts during the counting of votes. The court
held that the fraud was attributable to the protestee who had
control over the election paraphernalia and the basic services
in the community such as the supply of electricity.
Notwithstanding the plurality of valid votes in favor of the
protestee, the trial court set aside the proclamation of
protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers and declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the
duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.
Issue
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by
petition for certiorari as a special civil action, the decision of
the regional trial court in an election protest case involving an
elective municipal official considering that it has no appellate
jurisdiction over such decision
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the decision of the regional trial court in the election protest
case before it, regardless of whether it has appellate
jurisdiction over such decision.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
xxx
By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec)
has appellate jurisdiction over election protest cases involving
elective municipal officials decided by courts of general
jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX (C), Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
(1) x x x.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently,
both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction
(regional trial courts) in election cases involving elective
municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Sison vs COMELEC
GR No. 134096
March 3, 1999
Facts:
While the election returns were being canvassed by the
Quezon City Board of Canvassersbut before the winning
9
candidates were proclaimed, herein petitioner filed a petition
before the COMELEC seeking to suspend the canvassing of
votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City, and to declare a
failure of elections. However, while said petition was pending
before the COMELEC, the elected officials in Quezon City were
proclaimed. Later, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged
resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground that
the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient
evidence and that the grounds recited were not among the
pre-proclamation issues set forth in Sec. 17 of RA 7166.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition raised issues proper for a pre-
proclamation controversy
Ruling:
No.
Petitioner here anchored his initiatory petition on failure of
elections, then he built his case as a pre-proclamation
controversy. In any case, petitioner cannot succeed in either
remedies. In the petition for declaration of failure of elections,
there was nothing therein that could support the same as it
was never alleged therein that the elections were either not
held or suspended. Further, petitioner's claim stood as a bare
conclusion bereft of any substantive support. However, with
the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position
contested, the question of whether the petition raised issues
proper for a pre-proclamation controversy was already of no
consequence as the same was no longer viable. The more
appropriate remedy would be a regular election protest or a
petition for quo warranto. Further, it is already provided by
law that pre-proclamation cases are deemed terminated when
the term of office involved had already begun, as in the
casehere.
Mitmug vs COMELEC
GR No. 106270-73
February 10, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner Mitmug and private respondent
DatuGambaiDagalangit were among the candidates for the
mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during the 11 may 1992
election. There were 67 precincts in the municipality.The
turnout of voters during election was abnormally low. As a
result, several petitions were filed seeking the declaration of
failure of election in precincts where less than 25% of the
electorate managed to cast their votes. But a special election
was ordered in precincts where no voting actually took place.
COMELEC ruled that for as long as the precincts functioned
and conducted actual voting during electionday, low voter
turnout would not justify a declaration of failure of election.
In the interim, petitioner filed a petition seeking the
annulment of the special election conducted on 30 May 1992
alleging various irregularities such as the alteration,
tampering and substitution of ballots. Other petitions seeking
the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of
Lumba-Bayabao were also filed with COMELEC by other
mayoralty candidates. COMELEC dismissed the petition, ruling
that the allegations therein did not support a case of failure
of election.
Issue:
Did COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in denying motuproprio and without due
notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of
election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-Bayabao,
Lanao del Sur.
Ruling:
Incidentally, a petition to annul an election is not a pre-
proclamation controversy. Consequently, the proclamation of
a winning candidate together with his subsequent assumption
of office is not an impediment to the prosecution of the case
to its logical conclusion.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within 24 hours from
the filing of a verified petition to declare a failure to elect,
notices to all interested parties indicating therein the date of
hearing should be served through the fastest means available.
The hearing of the case will also be summary in nature.
Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a
petition of this nature must be acted upon with dispatch only
after hearing thereon shall have been conducted. Since
COMELEC denied the other petitions which sought to include
43 more precincts in a special election without conducting any
hearing, it would appear then that there indeed might have
been grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitions.
However, before COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election, 2 conditions must
concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or
precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting,
the election nevertheless results in failure to elect;
and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the
election.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes not cast
will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first
requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took place, or
even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a
failure to elect. Since actual voting and election by the
registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken
place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and
excluded. COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of
discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions outright.
There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged
therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the
relief sought. For, the language of the law expressly requires
the concurrence of these conditions to justify the calling of a
special election.
Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2)
conditions in the petitions seeking to declare failure of election
in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more need to
receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
Soliva vs COMELEC
GR No. 141723
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
 Petitioners and private respondents vied for local
posts in Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del
10
Norte during the 1998 elections. Petitioners
belonged to Lakas-NUCD party, while private
respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayan
Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) banner.
 After election day, all the LAKAS candidates were
proclaimed as winning candidates. Six days after
that, p.respondent Bacquial filed a petitions to
declare a failure of elections due to “massive fraud,
terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballot boxes,
delivery of ballot boxes by petitioner Soliva, his wife
and men from several precincts to the supposed
canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in
the precincts or polling places, and other anomalies
or irregularities. Baludio, one of Soliva’s men,
allegedly attempted to assassinate Bacquial when
he was about to case his vote. This petition was
amended to include the other candidates under
LAMMP.
 COMELEC granted the petition and declared a
failure of elections in RTR. COMELEC likewise
declared the proclamation of winners to be null and
void. COMELEC called for a special election.
 Petitioners filed this present petition for certiorari
and prohibition attributing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction to
COMELEC, when, without any formal proceedings
and absent any formal presentation of evidence and
witnesses, it declared a failure of elections. SolGen
maintains that the declaration is proper because of
the grounds stated by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC erred in declaring a failure of election in
the entire municipality of RTR
RULING:
The COMELEC did not err, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion; the petition was dismissed.
 The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC
the broad power to enforce all the laws and
regulations of the conduct of elections as well as
the plenary authority to decide all questions
affecting elections, except the question as to the
right to vote. (plenary – full, entire, complete)
 Section 4 of RA 7166 provide that the
postponement, declaration of failure of elections
and the calling of special elections shall be decided
by COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote.
 Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
contemplates 3 instances when the COMELEC may
declare a failure of election and call for the holding
of a special election:
o when the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed due to
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous cases
o when the election in any polling place
had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of voting
o when after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in
a failure to elect
 The SC agrees with the findings of COMELEC that
there was a failure of election. The counting of the
votes and the canvassing of election returns were
 clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism
and harassment. Findings of fact of administrative
bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are
afforded great weight and respect by the courts.
 Petitioners did not assail the claim that the counting
of votes was transferred from the polling place to
the multi-purpose gymnasium without the
knowledge of private respondents. They were done
without the accredited watchers or duly authorized
representatives of private respondents. They
likewise did not deny that the transfer of the
counting was without the authority of COMELEC as
required by law. The provisions in COMELEC
resolution no. 2971 state that the counting of votes
should be in the polling place and conducting
without interruption, and that if the counting of
votes were to be transferred to a safer place, it
should be effected through an unanimous approval
of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and
concurred by the majority of watchers present.
These sections were violated. These provisions
emphasize the need to safeguard the popular will.
 Petitioners did not submit any counter affidavits to
rebut the sworn statements submitted by the
witnesses for the private respondents. The
elections cannot be accorded regularity and
validity. The circumstances constitute a failure of
election, and thus, COMELEC is empowered to
annul the election and call for a special election.
Hadja Ardais vs COMELEC
GR No. 1578863
April 28, 2004
FACTS:
Ardais and Asmadun were mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Lugus during 2001 election. After the votes
were cast the ballot boxes where brought to the headquarters
of the 104th army brigade for centralized counting and
canvassing. After the canvassing was completed, as there was
no pending pre-proclamation controversy, Asmadun was
proclaimed as mayor-elect on May 17, 2001, the certificate of
canvass bearing 8701805 signed and thumbmarked by its
Chairman Bakri and Secretary Dammang but the BOC Vice-
Chairman Uddoh’s signature and thumbmark did not appear
in the first COC. Ardais, also on May 17, 2001, was proclaimed
as mayor-elect by virtue of a second COC bearing the same
serial number as that of the first COC, signed and
thumbmarked by all three members of the BOC.On May 19,
2001, respondent Asmadun took his oath of office and
assumed office on July 2, 2001.Ardais, on the other hand,
took his oath of office on June 23, 2001. On even date,
petitioners spouse former Mayor Mansur Aradais went to the
headquarters of the 104th Infantry Brigade and requested for
army escorts for the formal assumption of office of petitioner.
An Ad Hoc committee was then created by the COMELEC to
settle the matter of apparently two proclamation. Ad hoc
committee then recommended the affirmation of mayor-elect
Asmadun, a resolution adopted by the COMELEC second
division.
Petitioner Aradais contends that the COMELEC En
Banc gravely abused its power and discretion when it
11
delegated its constitutional duty to hear and decide pre-
proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee. She argues
that the COMELEC should have ordered a recanvass and
retabulation of the votes, instead of limiting itself to the
findings of the Ad Hoc Committee which did not actually
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.
Issue:
Did the COMELEC erred when it delegated its constitutional
duty to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases to a mere Ad
Hoc Committee.
HELD:
No, The findings and recommendations of the Ad Hoc
Committee are merely advisory in nature and do not bind the
COMELEC, especially in light of petitioners failure to present
any evidence that the COMELEC merely relied on said findings
and recommendations and did not go over the records of the
case to make its own assessment. Absent any evidence to the
contrary then, the presumption of regular performance of an
official duty stands.
It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of an election by means available to
it.In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELECs
discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as
requiring the parties to present their side through position
papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory hearing
wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light
on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a settled rule
that the COMELECs judgment cannot be overturned by this
Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Since the assailed resolution is supported by substantial
evidence, it cannot be considered whimsical, capricious or
arbitrary warranting this Courts power of review
Talaga vs COMELEC
GR No. 196804
October 9, 2012
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo respectively filed their
certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010
national and local elections. Ramon, the official candidate of
the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible
for the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with
the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having
Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor
of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing
that he had been elected and had served three consecutive
terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of
Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had
preventively suspended him from office during his second and
third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then
apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the
effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to
an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the
application of the three-term limit rule.

So in the series of events, Ramon was substituted by his wife,
Ruby, in the filing of the CoC. She won the mayoralty election.
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the
disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner
of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should
assume the office following the substitute's disqualification.
The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set
aside the En Banc Resolution issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).
ISSUE:
Is the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her
husband, valid?
Who among the contending parties should assume the
contested elective position?
HELD:
The petitions lack merit. Mayor Ruby Talaga’s contentions are
mistaken. The substitution was invalid. Castillo cannot validly
assume the position of Mayor as he is only a second-placer.
The law of filling up the vacancy through succession must
apply.
1. Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non
for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a
mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a
candidate in a national or local election.
Accordingly, a person's declaration of his intention to run for
public office and his affirmation that he possesses the
eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the
timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that
render the person making the declaration a valid or official
candidate.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from
running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for
disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public
office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the elections,
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Codeprovides the option
of substitution, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of
death, disqualification or withdrawal.
— If after the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew
or was disqualified. xxxxxx.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death,
withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an
12
official candidate of a registered or accredited party
may be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid
candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate
under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be
clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may
not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid
CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed aCoC is not at all a candidate.
2. Declaration of Ramon's disqualification rendered
his CoC invalid; hence, he was nota valid candidate to
be properly substituted
To be sure, the cause of Ramon's ineligibility (i.e., the three-
term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory
law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Codereiterates the
constitutional three-term limit for all elective local
officials, to wit:
Section 43. Term of Office.— (a) . . .
(b) No local elective official shall
serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions,
Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility
to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive
term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual
ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting
in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The
invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even
worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance
candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC
or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he
filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve in the
COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid,
considering that for all intents and purposes the
COMELEC's declaration of his disqualification had the
effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no
right to pass on to his substitute.
3. Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the
position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the
office

Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that
he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena
City for having obtained the highest number of votes among
the remaining qualified candidates.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a
second placer. Labo, Jr.should be applied. There, the Court
emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes for the contested office could not assume the
office despite the disqualification of the first placer because
the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will."
Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate
could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to be
no question that the second placer lost in the election, was
repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the
vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the
people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place
of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites
concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was
fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate's
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm
of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole
exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the
eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes
may be deemed elected. But the exception did not apply in
favor of Castillo simply because the second element was
absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least
aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby's ineligibility as the
substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20,
2011, or a full year after the elections.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly
disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of
Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid
candidate for her to substitute due to Ramon's ineligibility.
Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the
elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her
CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law.
Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City
thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to
the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC.
Aratea vs Comelec
GR No. 195229
October 9, 2012
Facts:
Romeo Lonzanida and Estela Antipolo were candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Prior
to the filing of Lonzanida of his COC, he was already convicted
13
of a crime of falsification which carried with it the accessory
penalty of disqualification to run for public office. Moreover,
he already served for three consecutive terms already thus he
was disqualified to run for public office. Despite this, he
declared in his COC that he is eligible to run. Elections came
and Lonzanida garnerned the highest number of votes
followed by Antipolo who was the second placer. Aratea won
the elections for the vice-mayor. Aratea subsequently
discharged the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales.
Issue:
Who between the Antipolo (second placer) and Aratea (vice
mayor) is entitled to the Offfice of the Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales?
Ruling:
Antipolo. The accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of
this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the
principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail
sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification."
Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is
immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may
be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon
finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes
ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became
ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any
elective public office from the time the judgment of
conviction against him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and
became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida
filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify
under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office
he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy
does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of
terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is
material in determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus
qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same
local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the
succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility
because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had
served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than
three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was
eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus,
Lonzanida’s representation that he was eligible for the office
that he sought election constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on
one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En
Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-
pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-
term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is
known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10)
counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. In other words, on election day, respondent
Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in
law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a
candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio,
Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray
votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the
sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained
the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he
was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the
elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such
ground means he was never a candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the
May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received the
highest number of votes.
Maquiling vs. COMELEC
GR No. 195649
July 2, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.
However, as a consequence of his subsequentnaturalization
as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the RP on10 July 2008. On
the same day an order of approval of his citizenship retention
and re-acquisition was issued in hisfavour. In 2009, Arnado
again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an
affidavit of renunciation of hisforeign citizenship. On 30
November 2009, Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, LanaoDel Norte. Respondent Linog
Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and presenteda record indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and
departing the Philippines.
Maquiling filed the instant petitionquestioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a USpassport, and praying that he be
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amount toundoing a renunciation earlier
made
Held:
Yes.The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
foreigncitizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as toone’s nationality and citizenship; it does
not divest Filipinocitizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath ofRenunciation required to qualify one to run
for an elective position
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run
for a public office.However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter
14
to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America. The renunciation of
foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted
the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not
one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,
it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath
of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a
local elective position.
Chua vs COMELEC
GR No. 216607
April 5, 2016
Facts:
On October 3, 2012, Chuafiled her Certificate of
Candidacy6 for Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila. The
Fourth District of Manila is entitled to six (6) seats in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.After the conduct of elections, Chua
garnered the sixth highest number of votes.8 She was
proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers on May 15, 2013.9
On the date of Chua’s proclamation, however, Fragata filed a
Petitioncaptioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a
nuisance candidate"11 and "to deny due course and/or cancel
[Chua’s] Certificate of Candidacy."12 Fragata was allegedly a
registered voter in the Fourth District13 who claimed that Chua
was unqualified to run for Councilor on two grounds: Chua
was not a Filipino citizen, and she was a permanent resident
of the United States of America.
Bacani filed a Motion to Intervene. Bacani alleged that she
likewise ran for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila, and
that after the canvassing of votes, she ranked seventh among
all the candidates, next to Chua.29 Should Chua be
disqualified, Bacani claimed that she should be proclaimed
Councilor30
According to Chua, Fragata’s Petition was belatedly
filed,20 whether it was treated as one for declaration of a
nuisance candidate21 or for denial of due course or
cancellation of certificate of candidacy.22 Fragata filed her
Petition on May 15, 2013, which was beyond five (5) days
from October 5, 2012, the last day of the filing of certificates
of candidacy.23 The Petition was also filed beyond 25 days
from October 3, 2012,24 the date Chua filed her Certificate of
Candidacy.25
Chua stressed that she had already been proclaimed on May
15, 2013, the same date that Fragata filed her Petition; hence,
Fragata’s proper remedy was to file a petition for quo
warranto
COMELEC annulled the proclamation of Chua and declared
Bacani as duly elected councilor.
Issue:
1. Whether or not private respondent Fragata filed a petition
for disqualification or a petition to deny due course or cancel
certificate of candidacy
2. Whether or not the rule on succession under Section 45 of
the Local Government Code applies to this case
Held:
1. It depends. Private respondent Fragata alleges in her
Petition that petitioner is a permanent resident in the United
States, a green card holder who, prior to the filing of her
Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor, has resided in the State
of Georgia for 33 years. She anchors her Petition on Section
40 of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies
permanent residents of a foreign country from running for any
elective local position.
It is true that under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,
persons who file their certificates of candidacy declare that
they are not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country. Therefore, a petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy may likewise be filed against a
permanent resident of a foreign country seeking an elective
post in the Philippines on the ground of material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.93
What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however, depends
on the petitioner. If the false material representation in the
certificate of candidacy relates to a ground for disqualification,
the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition
for disqualification, so long as the petition filed complies with
the requirements under the law.94
Before the Commission on Elections, private respondent
Fragata had a choice of filing either a petition to deny due
course or cancel petitioner’s certificate of candidacy or a
petition for disqualification. In her Petition, private respondent
Fragata did not argue that petitioner made a false material
representation in her Certificate of Candidacy; she asserted
that petitioner was a permanent resident disqualified to run
for Councilor under Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Private respondent Fragata’s Petition, therefore, was a
petition for disqualification.
It follows that private respondent Fragata timely filed her
Petition before the Commission on Elections. Under Rule 25,
Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, a
petition for disqualification "shall be filed any day after the
last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later that
the date of proclamation." Private respondent Fragata filed
her Petition on the date of petitioner’s proclamation on May
15, 2013. The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse
its discretion in taking cognizance of private respondent
Fragata’s Petition.
2. No. The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, annulling her
proclamation, and subsequently proclaiming private
respondent Bacani as the duly elected Councilor for the Fourth
District of Manila.
15
The rule on succession under Section 45 would not apply if
the permanent vacancy was caused by one whose certificate
of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically with respect to
dual citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio
because they possess "a substantive [disqualifying
circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing of their
certificate of candidacy."103 Legally, they should not even be
considered candidates. The votes casted for them should be
considered stray and should not be counted.104
In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio
certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the
vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next
highest number of votes among those eligible.105 In this case,
it is private respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to the
position of Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest
number of votes among the eligible candidates. The
Commission on Elections correctly proclaimed private
respondent Bacani in lieu of petitioner.
Petitioner may have garnered more votes than private
respondent Bacani. She may have already been proclaimed.
Nevertheless, elections are more than a numbers game.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed
by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law
that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates.
Diambrang vs Comelec
GR No. 201809
October 11, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Diambrang, and respondent Patad were candidates
for Punong Barangay. Patad obtained the highest number of
votes over Diambrang, but it was the latter who was
proclaimed by the Barangay BOC based on the assumption
that Patad was disqualified for being a fugitive from justice.
Arguing that there was yet no ruling by the Comelec on the
issue of his qualifications. Patad filed a petition to annul
Diambrang’s proclamation with the Comelec.
Meanwhile, the Comelec en banc finally denied due course to
Patad’s COC on the ground that he was a fugitive from justice
and thus was disqualified to run for public office. However,
the COMELEC en banc ruled that despite Patad’s
disqualification, Diambrang, who garnered the next highest
number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the elected
Punong Barangay. Having lost the elections, Diambrang is not
entitled to be declared elected and instead, it should be the
first ranking Kagawad to succeed.
ISSUE:
Is the ruling of the Comelec correct?
When does the second-placer rule apply?
HELD:
Clearly, the prevailing ruling is that if the certificate of
candidacy is void ab initio, the candidate is not considered a
candidate from the very beginning even if his certificate of
candidacy was cancelled after the elections.
Patad's disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from
justice. His certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. As such,
Diambrang, being the “first-placer” among the qualified
candidates, should have been proclaimed.
The second-placer rule applies when the COC of the candidate
with the highest votes is cancelled for being void ab initio.
Citing Jalosjos Jr. vs. Comelec (2012), the Court explained:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot
be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or
declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time
of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that took effect, or a legal impediment that
took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
On the other hand, if the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate
of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any
time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted.That the disqualified candidate has
already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
Veterans Fed. Party vs Comelec
GR No. 136781
October 6, 2000
Facts:
May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation
was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of
one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and
coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from
twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at
least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the
party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives
belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of
the votes.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for
Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty
and Social Advancement) filed with the COMELEC a "Petition
to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives
in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
16
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives
who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their
respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief
as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same
grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other
party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August
28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior
Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA,
AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU
and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-
ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would
thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled
up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which
should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be
filled up”.
ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. How should the seats be allocated?
RULING:
1. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a
policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election
of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order
to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in
the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of
Section 11(b) of the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.Considering the
foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown
presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
2. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to
determine the number of additional seats that
a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the
parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate
proportional representation into a mathematical formula that
will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-
mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step
by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners,
the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all
the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party
is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast
for all the parties participating in the system. All parties
with at least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The
party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number
of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
Bagong Bayani vs Comelec
GR No. 147589
June 26, 2001
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before
the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the
COMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the
2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification
17
of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-
list elections
b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and
organizations
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be
remanded to the COMELEC which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The
resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrain
proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election,
shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have compiled
and reported its compliance.
a. Yes
b. No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may
participate in the party-list elections. Under
the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C)
of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system. For its part, Section
2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly
states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections
does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system
is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided
by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the
lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was
enacted.
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs Comelec
GR No. 147589 and 147613
June 25, 2003
Facts
On the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec gave due
course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several
others in its 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 378. A petition was
filed praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents]
be deleted from the 'Certified List of Participants in the Party
List System for the May 14,
2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly
amended because the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is objectionable.
On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated a Decision providing
an eight-point guideline for the qualifications of party-list
participants. The Court required Comelec to conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated and
directed COMELEC to submit its compliance report.
Issue
Aside from those already validly proclaimed, are there other
party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners?
Held
Yes. In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001,
Comelec recommended the party-list participants that were
be deemed to have hurdled the eight-point guideline in a
Court Decision, and recommended the disqualification of a
number of party-list groups. After the Court had accepted and
approved this Report and its amendments, the following
nominees BAYAN MUNA, AKBAYAN, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC
were validly proclaimed winners by COMELEC. Comelec made
a Second Partial and Final Compliance Report to recommend
more qualified party-list participants and those to be
disqualified. Under its Resolution No. NBC 02-001, Comelec
motu proprio amended its Compliance Reports by, inter alia,
adding four more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED,
NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates
for the May 14, 2001 elections.
Court accepted Comelec’s submission of the qualifications of
the party-lists since these issues are factual in character, for
which the Court is inclined to adopt the Commission’s findings,
absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its
action.
Aklat vs Comelec
GR No. 162203
April 14, 2004
FACTS:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat-Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran
Ng Lipunan At Adhikan Para sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat) filed a Petition
for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization
for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its
petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was
disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have
complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case of
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong
Bayani case) for party-list organizations to qualify and
participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly,
Aklat re-organized itself (allegedly particularly for the benefit
of indigenous cultural communities, fisherfolk, farm and
factory workers and the youth) in order that it will comply with
18
the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
said case.
The Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot
be considered as an organization representing the
marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified
under Section 5 of R.A. 7941 as there was nothing in its
petition which identified the particular marginalized and
underrepresented group AKLAT was representing. The
Comelec held that AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups
imaginable under the classification of regular members just to
show that its defect has been cured. Comelec denied Aklat’s
motion for reconsideration on three grounds namely: (1) the
petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in
Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list
organizations; (2) the petition was not one for re-qualification
as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having
failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in
the Bagong Bayani case; and (3) that its decision not to
extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations
is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to make such
a determination.
Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for
registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later
than ninety (90) days before the elections. It therefore had
until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth day before the elections
on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its
petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed
within the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No. 6320
which requires the filing of such petitions not later than
September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A. 7941.
The OSG also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition
with the documents required under Section 7 of Resolution
No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and members
particularly showing that the majority of its membership
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it
seeks to represent, and a track record or summary showing
that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing Resolution No. 6320 as it requires the filing of
petitions for registration on September 30, 2003 or earlier
than the the prescribed 90 day period before elections, as
provided for under R.A 7941.
RULING:
No. R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of
the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than
ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations,
xxx.
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelec’s
position that the period stated therein refers to the prohibitive
period beyond which petitions for registration should no
longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it is simply the
minimum countback period which is not subject to reduction
since it is prescribed by law, but it is susceptible of protraction
on account of administrative necessities and other exigencies
perceived by the poll body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to enforce and administer
election laws. This power includes the determination, within
the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the
accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing petitions
for registration under the party-list system. This is exactly
what the Comelec did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320
declaring September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system.
It is also established that Aklat is not an organization
representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
but is actually a business interest or economic lobby group
which seeks the promotion and protection of the book
publishing industry.
The Court observes that Aklat’s articles of incorporation and
document entitled ‘The Facts About Aklat’ which were
attached to its petition for re-qualification contain general
averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups
such as the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and
farmers/fisherfolk. These general statements do not measure
up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani case for
screening party-list participants, i.e., that "the political party,
sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it must show—through
its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record—that it represents
and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must
demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is
likely to choose the interest of such sectors. However, it is
shown that Aklat has no track record to speak of concerning
its representation of marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies considering that it has been in existence for
only a month prior to the filing of its petition for re-
qualification.
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact by the
Comelec, or any other administrative agency exercising
particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the
Supreme Court.
Bantay Republic Act vs COMELEC
GR No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari
and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list
groups which have manifested their intention to participate in
the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic
Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-
LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition seeking to
disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations.
19
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed
2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department
requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007
virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net
effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.
According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and
that party list elections must not be personality oriented
according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-
LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously
determining whether or not their respective nominees possess
the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the
"Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta
Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated
April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec
to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private
respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be
enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating
in the elections.
ISSUES:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the
Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their
petition on the ground that these groups and their respective
nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to documents
as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.
Ruling:
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the
grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would
require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter
which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court
is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must
be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include
a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. Also, the
petitioner’s posture that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations
without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis, Nowhere in R .A. No. 7941 is there
a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization.
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate
demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the
party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec
to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition
imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in
scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage
of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The
Comelec obviously misread the limited nondisclosure aspect
of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before
the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the
Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the
last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly
DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to
compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations
accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the
same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are
GRANTED.
CIBAC vs Comelec
GR No. 172103
April 13, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a
total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and
ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28)
20
party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-
five (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. The petitioner
questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the
Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were
spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not
counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million
(7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the
Commission on Elections’ erroneous
interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded
votes according to petitioner ARARO).
On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on
Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers
is the following:
Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20
=Number of seats available to party-list representatives .80
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May
2010 elections is 57 as shown below:
229__x .20 =57 .80
The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009
applies the formula used in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to
arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed
seats, where:
Number of votes of party-list
______________________________=
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
Total number of votes for party-list candidates
The Commission on Elections through the Office of the
Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes
should not be counted in determining the divisor. The
Commission on Elections argues that this will
contradict Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v.
COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It
asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of
voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list
candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast
any vote "for the party-list system."24
Issues:
Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse
of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in BANAT
v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would
be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
HELD:
The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers
its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a
guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure
the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument
in this Court.
The Court agrees with the petitioner but only to the extent
that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause
attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor.
In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed
in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as
part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise
the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot
contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this
rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections
should not be included in the divisor.
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those
votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the
computation of the percentage of representation:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as
used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is
MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for
party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes
garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for
the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups
whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently
disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections
should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not
include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.
Torayno vs COMELEC
GR 137329
August 9, 2000
Facts:
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Emano ran was elected
and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was
his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his
Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence
was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental,
Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de
Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis
Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20
years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his
residence for the preceding two years and five months was in
Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioners filed a Petition before the COMELEC, in which they
sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on
the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year
21
residence requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and
proclaimed winner.
Issue:
Whether Emano failed to comply theresidency requirement
Held:
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of
the LGC of 1991, which provides for the qualifications of local
elective officials, as follows: An elective local official must be
a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x xx where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period
of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter from
seeking an elective office to serve that community. This
purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent
and his family had actually been residing in Cagayan de Oro
City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during
the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis
Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the
provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also
registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in
Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y.
Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of
time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein.
Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part
of Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de
Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot
participate in the provincial elections. Such political
subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for
the purpose of parity in representation. The classification of
an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city,
for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents,
politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire
province -- and vice versa -- especially when the city is located
at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the
province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more
important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As
a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their
functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less,
getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y.
Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for
three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City
within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or
newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when
he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.
In the instant case, private respondent was actually and
physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging
his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house
in the city and resided there together with his family. He even
paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter
therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and
the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible
to run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have
continued to qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue
before this Court is whether Emano's residence in the city
qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether
he could have continued sitting as governor of the province.
There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running
the province; hence, this Court cannot make any
pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process
prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to
us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before the
Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence
qualification required by law for the mayorship of the city.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of
herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is
substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of
mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the
mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this
simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the
residence requirement.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate. There is no question
that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the
people of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, we find it apt to reiterate
the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed
through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of
doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit
to the popular mandate.
BANAT vs COMELEC
GR No. 179271
April 21, 2009 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of
party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group
of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the
petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC
en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing
the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full
number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution
proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list
elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
22
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with
mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of the
COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
(2) Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 is constitutional
(3) Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is
constitutional
(4) How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
(5) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can
the major political parties be barred from participating in
the party-list elections?
RULING:
(1) The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely
a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-
list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections.
(3) The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives."
(4) In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
c) Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.
d) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
(5) Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
 clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Also,
in defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party,"
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections
is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However,
by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the
ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs Comelec
GR No. 190582
April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
(lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender) community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination,
and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that AngLadlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in AngBagongBayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections. AngLadlad laid out its
national membership base consisting of individual members
and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance. On August 17, 2009, AngLadlad filed a Petition
for registration with the COMELEC.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s
evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality
which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual
immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation
not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not
being truthful when it said that it “or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed
to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections.” Furthermore, states COMELEC, AngLadlad will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform
to the teachings of our faith. WhenAngLadlad sought
reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010,
upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, AngLadlad a Petition, praying that the
Supreme Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant AngLadlad’s application for
accreditation. AngLadlad also sought the issuance ex parte
of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC,
which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25,
2010.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the
23
establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not Public Morals is a proper ground to deny
petition for registration or accreditation in the party-list
system.
HELD:
1. Yes, COMELEC’s denial of accreditation violated the
constitutional guarantees against establishment of
religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” The Supreme Courtruled that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
AngLadlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the
legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
The government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects.
2. No, public morals is not a proper ground for denial in the
registration for party-list system.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt
immoral act performed by AngLadlad. Even the OSG agrees
that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that
the group's members have committed or are committing
immoral acts." 3The OSG argues:
...A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but
mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a
great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC
would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both
the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the
intendment of the law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought
to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner's admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize
that the government will and should continue to restrict
behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the
loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an
argument or another, without bothering to go through the
rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion
of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare
invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations
of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not
a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of AngLadlad's registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to
the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc. vs COMELEC
GR No. 190529
April 29, 2010
Facts:
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act, provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may motuproprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-
List System which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc
issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting
several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations
or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was
PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
24
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any
national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions
adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise
sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the
Party-List System Act.The COMELEC denied PGBIs
motion/opposition for lack of merit.
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same
positions it raised with the COMELEC when it moved to
reconsider its delisting. We initially dismissed the petition.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its
petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that the
dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and
existing jurisprudence.
PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its
situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1)
but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is
that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1)
but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.
2. Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
Ruling:
1. No. We are aware that PGBI’s situation a party list group
or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding
election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of
RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap
in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address.
We cannot and do not address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the
legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of
powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should
bring this concern to the legislatures notice.
2. No.PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due
process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity
to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing
x xx. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances
that PGBI was not denied due process.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs COMELEC
 GR No. 203766
April 2, 2013
FACTS:
Approximately 280 groups andorganizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the May 2013 party-
list elections.Fifty-two party list groups and organizations
were disqualified by the COMELEC in its assailed
resolutionsfor various reasons but mainlyfor not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresentedsectors of the society. The determination
was based on whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of RA No. 7941 and AngBagongBayani-OFW
Labor Party vs. COMELEC.
ISSUE:
What are the criteria for participating in the party-list system?
RULING:
The SC adopts new parameters in thequalification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
(AngBagongBayaniand BANAT) applied by the COMELEC
indisqualifying petitioners.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list
system of representation. It is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win
inlegislative district elections a chance to win seats in the
House of Reps. It is not for sectoral partiesonly, but also for
non-sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed
of three different groups: (1) national parties ororganizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties
ororganizations.
Sec 5(2), Art VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that,
during the first 3 consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the Constitutionone-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives wouldbe open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating theidea that the
party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the"marginalized and underrepresented." The
reservation of the other one-half to sectoral parties
appliesonly for the first 3 consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of said terms. After this period,
there will be no seatsreserved for any class or type of party
that qualifies under the 3 groupsconstituting the party-list
system.
Parameters in Qualifying Party- Lists
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May
2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate: (a) national parties
or organizations, (b) regional parties or organizations, and (c)
sectoral parties ororganizations.
2. National and regional parties or organizations do NOTneed
to organize along sectoral lines and do NOT need to represent
any"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
25
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register underthe party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. Apolitical party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
districtelections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that canseparately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself anindependent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized andunderrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enoughthat their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
theirsector.
The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented"
include labor,peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped,veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
politicalconstituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the"marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
andunderrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members ofsectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies"must belong to
the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties ororganizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or
thatrepresent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belongto their respective sectors,
or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizationsmust be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified ifsome of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least onenominee who
remains qualified.
Alliance for Rural & Agrarian Reconstruction Inc
(Araro) vs Comelec
GR No. 192803
December 10, 2013
Facts:
ARARO, a duly accredited party-list, garnered a total of
147,204 votes& ranked 50in the May 10, 2010 elections. The
COMELEC En Banc initially proclaimed 28 party-list
organizations aswinners 35 seats guaranteed and additional
seats. It was based on the COMELEC's count of 121
Certificates of Canvass or a total of 29,750,041 votes for the
Party-List System.It then filed an election protest before the
HRET questioning the Resolution of the COMELEC that
proclaimed the 28 party-list groups and without its resolution,
it filed this present petition review on certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction and TRO (no TRO was issued).
Subsequently, through a resolution, COMELEC proclaimed the
winning party-list and used the formula in Banat case for the
allocation of the 57 available party-list seats.
ARARO contends that:
 The formula used by the COMELEC is
flawedbecause votes that were spoiled or that were
not made for any party-lists were notcounted.
Around seven million (7,000,000) votes
weredisregarded as a result of the COMELEC’s
erroneous interpretation and being contrary to law.
 The correct interpretation of the provisions of
Republic Act No.7941 or the Party-list Law does not
distinguish between valid and invalid votes
o Votes of all the registered voters who
actually voted inthe May 2010 elections
should be included in the computation of
the divisor whether validlv or invalid.
Votes cast for the party-list candidates is
notthe same as the votes cast under or
for the party-list system
o Invalid votes include those votes that
were made for disqualified party-list
groups,votes that were spoiled due to
improper shading, erasures in the ballots,
and even thosethat did not vote for any
party-list candidate at all. All of the votes
should be included inthe divisor to
determine the 2% threshold
 The National Board of Canvassers' Resolution No.
10-009 applies the formula used in BANAT v.
COMELEC to arrive at the winning party-list groups
and their guaranteed seats, where:
Proportion or
Number of votes
of party-list Percentage of votes
——————————= garnered by party-list candidates
Total number of
votes for party-list
Issue:
For the correct computation of the divisor, should it include
both valid and invalid votes?
Ruling:
Yes but only to the extent that votes later on determined to
be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not
be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly
for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on
disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do
otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on
the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the
qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-
list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification
attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections
should not be included in the divisor.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the
divisor. Contrary to the argument of the petitioner, Section 11
(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast
for the party-list system shall be considered in the
computation of the percentage of representation
26
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid
votes, for the determination of the denominator, may be votes
that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following:
improper shading or having no shade at all; 51 existence of
stray or ambiguous marks; 52 tears in the ballot; and/or
ballots rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines under the paper-based 53 automated election
system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote
that can be attributable to the voter's action.
The divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list
groups that are subsequently disqualified for so long as they
were presented as a choice to the electorate. If his or her vote
is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount
to a disenfranchisement of a basic constitutional right to be
able to choose representatives of the House of
Representatives in two ways. First, his or her vote will be
nullifed. Second, he or she will be deprived of choosing
another party-list group to represent his or her interest should
the party listed in the ballot be declared disqualified.
However, there are instances when the Commission on
Elections include the name of the party-list group in the ballot
but such group is disqualifed with finality prior to the
elections. In applying and interpreting the provisions of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, we said in Cayat v.
Commission on Elections that votes cast in favor of a
candidate "disqualified with finality" should be considered
stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list
group in the ballot that has been disqualified with finality and
whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate
by the Commission on Elections should also not be included
in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification
as well as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage of
the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by
the party-list group would now henceforth be:
Number of votes of party-list Proportion or
——————————————----- = Percentage of votes
Total number of valid votes for garnered by party-list
party-list candidates
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast
for the party-list system including votes cast for party-
list groups whose names are in the ballot but are
subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the
ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the
elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made
known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to
such elections should not be included in the divisor. The
divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled
or invalid.
The refined formula shall apply prospectively to succeeding
party-list elections from the date of finality of this case.
Binhi Partido ng mga Magsasaka para sa mga
Magsasaka vs Comelec
GR No. 206988,
FebruarY 18, 2014
FACTS:
On August 7, 2009, petitioner BINHI filed with the COMELEC
its petition for registration and accreditation as a party
representing "peasants, farmers and farm tillers especially
those who are landless and in need of capital for
farming." The COMELEC granted BINHI's petition for
registration and accreditation. Thereafter, BINHI participated
in the May 10, 2010 elections but was unsuccessful in its bid.
On May 30, 2012, BINHI filed with the COMELEC its
manifestation of intent to participate in the party-list elections
set on May 13, 2013.
On August 9, 2012, the COMELEC issued an order setting, on
various dates, the summary evidentiary hearings of existing
accredited party-list groups which have manifested their
intent to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Accordingly, BINHI pre-marked its exhibits, appeared in the
summary evidentiary hearing through its Secretary General,
and formally offered its evidence.
On November 28, 2012, respondent COMELEC En Banc
promulgated a resolution cancelling BINHI's
registration/accreditation, thereby disallowing it from
participating in the May 13, 2013 elections. It noted that
BINHI was merely the party-list name of Cabanatuan City
Seed Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CCSGMPC), a
cooperative duly registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority pursuant to RA No. 6938 or
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
The COMELEC En Banc underscored that as a duly registered
cooperative, "the needs of CCSGMPC or BINHI is [sic] well-
attended to and there is no need for its members to be
represented in Congress." It added that BINHI/CCSGMPC
was among the seed growers cooperatives which were
beneficiaries of the Department of Agriculture's GMA Rice
Seed Subsidy Program in Region III. BINHI/CCSGMPC was,
thus, a recipient of (financial) assistance from the government
and that it was funded or assisted by the government.
Accordingly, per the fifth guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, BINHI was barred from
participating in the party-list system.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC En Banc was obliged to conduct a
summary evidentiary hearing.
2. Whether BINHI may validly participate in the party-list
system/party-list elections.
RULING:
No. The COMELEC is not obliged to conduct a summary
evidentiary hearing. Further, BINHI cannot participate in the
party-list elections.
The decision in Atong Paglaum did not place upon the
COMELEC an immutable obligation to conduct summary
evidentiary hearings where there were reasonable grounds for
foregoing the holding of the same. In this case, the
disallowance of BINHI relates to its alleged receipt of
government funds or otherwise being assisted by
government. Moreover, from the proceedings conducted in
August 2012, evidence had already been submitted to the
COMELEC. On the basis of this evidence, the COMELEC had
settled on findings relating to the factual matter of BINHI's
receipt of funds and/or assistance from the government. A
27
subsequent summary evidentiary hearing would, thus, have
been a superfluity. It would have been nothing more than a
rehash of the exercise made in August 2012.
As stated by the COMELEC: "[t]he purpose of this provision
[disallowing the participation in the party-list system of an
adjunct of, or a project or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government] is to avoid any groups [sic] that would be
beholden to the government in exchange for the assistance
received." Notwithstanding the six (6) parameters outlined
in Atong Paglaum, the rationale for this disallowance remains
valid and compelling.
The proscription against the participation in the party-list
system of an "adjunct of, or a project or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government," as articulated in Rule 2, Section
2, paragraph (c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 stands. As
"Cabanatuan City Seed Growers," otherwise known as BINHI,
was a beneficiary of the GMA Rice Seed Subsidy Program, it
is in clear violation of such resolution. Thus, the COMELEC
had ample ground to disallow BINHI from participating in the
May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
De Jesus vs People
GR No. L-61998
February 22, 1983
Facts:
Ananias Hibo a defeated candidate the office of mayor of the
Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a
complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then
COMELEC registrar of Casiguran for violation of the 1978
Election Code byintentionally tampering the number of the
registered voters.
Noting that petitioner was charged with an offense relating to
his office, the assistant fiscals as deputized Tanodbayan
prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter a
resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case against
petitioner for violation of section 89 and section 178 of the
Election Code was issued. Subsequently an information was
filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a motion t quash the information, contending
that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the
authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense.The
COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case,
entered its appearance as amicus curiae, submitted a
memorandum supporting petitioner's stand.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, hence a petition for
certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Which court has the jurisdiction to prosecute the election
offense committed a public officer?
Ruling:
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
election and the concomittant authority to investigate and
prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason.
The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power
to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair
its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
There is neither explicit nor implicit grant to the Sandiganbayn
and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed
by public officers in relation to their office, as contra-
distinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said
authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts
of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of
the Election Code of 1978.
People vs Inting
GR No. 88919
July 25, 1990
Facts:
Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor
Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly
transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in
the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay
and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law.
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo
Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City:
(1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2)
to prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to
handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a
prima facie case and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution
or dismissal as the case may be.
Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed with
the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of
section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-
Mayor.
The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused OIC Mayor but before the accused could be arrested,
the trial court set aside its order on the ground that Atty.
Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
court stated that it "will give due course to the information
filed in this case if the same has the written approval of the
Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall
be under the supervision and control of the latter."
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, the trial
court quashed the information. A motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial
Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be
coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial
Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not
probable cause exists?
Ruling:
28
The petition is impressed with merit.
Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes,
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violation of election laws, including acts or omission
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(Emphasis supplied).
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not
only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of
election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election
offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court. This
power is exclusive with COMELEC.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied
upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor
implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan,
of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office
as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical
bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC
and the courts of first instance under Section 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the
Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in
the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses committed by any person,
whether private individual or public officer or employee, and
in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is
committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality
of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an
election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively
with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over
the conduct of elections."
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the
prosecution of election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor
files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes
a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized
by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority
of his office. In the instant case, there is no averment or
allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the
Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal
to "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the
COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so,
because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made
and the information is filed with the court, the judge will then
determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
People vs Delgado
GR No. 93419-32
September 18, 1990
FACTS:
Receiving a report-complaint for an alleged violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. A preliminary investigation was
conducted by Election Supervisor and he submitted a report
finding a prima facie case and recommending the filing of an
information. COMELEC en banc, in a minute resolution,
resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended. 15 informations were filed
against each of private respondents in the RTC.
Respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the
suspension of the warrant of arrest with the court on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. An
order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC
to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases.
COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and
opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein
that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the
decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC.
This was denied.
Respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court
by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the
exercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial court
has authority to order a reinvestigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or
authority to order the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation
of Criminal Cases
HELD:
YES, the court has the power to order COMELEC to
reinvestigate
Under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC may "investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices." Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers,
"have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional
trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of
the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide
election contests and administrative questions, it is also
29
vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the
prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC,
through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon
a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information
in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of
said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The
COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case
without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the
court.
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be
produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC.
The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to
file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of
the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself
that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance
of a warrant of arrest.
Kilosbayan vs COMELEC
280 SCRA 892
(1997)
Facts:
Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, otherwise known
as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992 allocates a
specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and
other priority projects and activities. Pursuant to this, DILG
Budget Officer Rafael Barata confirmed the above allotment
as part of the amount of Three Hundred Thirty Million Pesos
(P330,000,000.00) that was released by DBM from the 1992
CDF, which Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development
Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI) under the chairmanship of
Reynato Puno, is a recipient.
On December 14, 1993, public respondent Commission on
Election (Comelec) received from petitioner Kilosbayan a
letter informing of two serious violations of election laws:
1. That Secretary of Budget Salvador Enriquez, in connivance
with Puno, have allowed the disbursements to be used in
election campaigns; and
2. That there was illegal diversion of the CDF funds released
shortly before the election in 1992.
Hence, Kilosbayan requested that such offenses and
malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly,
impartially, without fear or favor.
Investigations were initiated by the Law Department of
COMELEC but the informations were later dismissed for lack
of evidence. Petitioner Kilosbayan, however brushed off
responsibility for adducing evidence and adamantly
demanded that the Comelec perform its constitutional duty of
prosecuting election offenses upon any, even meager,
information of alleged commission of election offenses.
Issue:
Is COMELEC responsible for prosecuting election law
violations? And if it is, to what extent should they search for
evidence to prove the case before them?
Ruling:
Yes, but petitioners must be able to establish probable
cause with sufficient evidence.
Section 2 (7) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the Comelec shall exercise the power to investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices. This constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the Comelec finds statutory expression
under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall,
through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the
same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act
on any complaint within four months from his filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the office of the
fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation
and prosecution, if warranted.
Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned,
therefore, the Comelec is the public prosecutor with the
exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the
[Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court. This
constitutional and statutory mandate for Comelec to
investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election law
translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses
for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and
helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary
inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The Comelec, whenever any election offense charge is filed
before it, must have first, before dismissing the same or filing
the corresponding information, conducted the preliminary
investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal
prosecution, the primordial task of the Comelec is the
determination of probable cause.
It follows, therefore, that in the instant case, petitioner
Kilosbayan must have necessarily tendered evidence,
independent of and in support of the allegations in its letter-
complaint, of such quality as to engender belief in an
ordinarily prudent and cautious man that the offense charged
therein has been committed by herein respondents. Indeed
probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly
demands more than bare suspicion and can never be left to
presupposition, conjuncture, or even convincing logic. The
effort of petitioner Kilosbayan, thus, in order to successfully
lead to the judicial indictment of respondents, should have
gone beyond a largely declamatory condemnation of
respondents and diligently focused on its two-fold obligation
of not only substantiating its charges against respondents but
also proffering before the Comelec substantial evidence of
respondents utilization, through conspiratorial, cooperative
30
and/or interrelated acts, of Seventy Million Pesos from CDF
for electioneering activities in violation of its pertinent
provision on election offenses as enumerated in the Omnibus
Election Code.
In the dispensation of this obligation, however Kilosbayan
utterly failed. The encompassing narration of the pertinent
facts and circumstances of this case in the early part of
this ponencia indubitably shows the complacency, at the
least, and the gross and deliberate negligence, at most, of
petitioner Kilosbayan in presenting sufficient evidence in
support of its letter-complaint.
The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is the Comelec
that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-
complaint is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as
investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offenses
complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof
in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an
election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses
another person of having committed an act constituting an
election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to
follow through his accusation and prove his complaint. If the
complainant fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show
probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of denial or any
evidence in controversion, of the accusation, the complaint
must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is
presumed innocent and does not at all have to make a
response or reaction to charges against him.
The Comelec, acting upon an election offense complaint in the
course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the
confrontation process between the complainant and the
respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing,
their respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes
upon the contending parties' respective submissions and
proof and weighs the fact and circumstances established
therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner
Kilosbayan, the preliminary investigation is not an occasion
for Comelec to, as a duty, spoonfeed the complainant with
evidence needed to prove its case.
COMELEC vs Tagle
GR No. 148948
February 17, 2003
FACTS:
During the 11 May 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista,
running for mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite, filed
with the COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor
Atty. Federico Poblete, et al., for vote-buying in violation of
Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of forty-
four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of
the respondents and was docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-219.
COMELEC en banc issued a resolution directing the filing of
the necessary information against the respondents before the
RTC, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7034-99.
Before the trial of the criminal case, a complaint for vote-
selling was subsequently filed by Innocencio Rodelas and
Gerardo Macapagal with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, in violation of Section 261(a) of
the Omnibus Election Code against the witnesses in the
criminal case, docketed as I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor resolved to file separate
informations for vote-selling in the various branches of the
RTC.
Respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 appealed before the
COMELEC, where it declared en banc null and void the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, holding
that respondents therein are exempt from criminal
prosecution pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of
R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as “The Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987,” which grants immunity from criminal
prosecution persons who voluntarily give information and
willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-
selling.
COMELEC Law Department filed a motion to dismiss the
criminal cases but the RTC judge denied stating that, before
one can be exempt from prosecution under said provision, it
is necessary that such person has already performed the overt
act of voluntarily giving information or testifying in any official
investigation or proceeding for the offense to which such
information or testimony was given. It was thus premature to
exempt the respondents from criminal prosecution, since they
have not yet testified.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in peremptorily
denying the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the criminal
cases?
HELD: Yes
One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of
vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is the
grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party
whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will
encourage the recipient or acceptor to come into the open
and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the
successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter.
Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying
and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph: The giver,
offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor,
recipient and conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as
principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under
said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and
willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official
investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his
information and testimony were given: Provided,
further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from
criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the
vote-buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress
saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who denounce the vote-buying
that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should
they not tell the truth.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute
the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The
Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or
31
their respective assistants are, however, given continuing
authority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to
prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or
withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its
judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to
protect the integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the
common good, or when it believes that the successful
prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC.
In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation
granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation
was clearly in order, considering the circumstances obtaining
in these cases where those who voluntarily executed affidavits
attesting to the vote-buying incident and became witnesses
against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same
acts they had earlier denounced. What the Prosecutor did was
to sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the
vote-buyers and put in serious peril the integrity of the
COMELEC, which filed the said case for vote-buying. If the
Prosecutor had listened to the command of prudence and
good faith, he should have brought the matter to the attention
of the COMELEC.
Petitioner COMELEC found that the respondents voluntarily
admitted that they were the recipients in the vote-buying
done by the accused in said case. It was precisely because of
such voluntary admission and willingness to testify that the
COMELEC en banc declared null and void the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and held that the
respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.
Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that at the time the
complaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed
sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-
buying in the criminal case. It cannot then be denied that they
had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying
case. In fact, they had already willingly testified.
Clearly then, respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss the Criminal
Cases despite COMELECs determination that the accused
therein are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling
pursuant to the proviso in the fourth paragraph of Section 28
of R.A. No. 6646.
Bernardo vs Abalos
GR No. 137266
December 5, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of
Mandaluyong City and his son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a
candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998
elections. Petitioners herein interposed that respondents
conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon
Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers,
registered voters of the said city and who are members of the
Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said affair was
alleged to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr.,
where his political jingle was played all throughout and his
shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr.
also made an offer and a promise then to increase the
allowances of the teachers. In this regard, petitioners filed a
criminal complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and
Abalos Jr. for vote-buying, further alleging that they conspired
with their co-respondents in violating the Omnibus Election
Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director of the
Law Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court must
be given due course without the petitioners first submitting a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be
resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant
case, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive
recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to
give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed
to it. As the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies
available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their
instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have
not also raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse
to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was ruled
to fail.
BANAT PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B.
BRITANICO,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR No. 177508
August 7, 2009
FACTS:
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House
Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and
the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23
January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007
local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two
newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business
Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus
took effect on 10 February 2007.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral
organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA
9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of
Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to
petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application
and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions
of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed their respective Comments. At the outset, both maintain
that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save
for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as
unconstitutional.
32
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
1. Sections 37 and 38 - The 2 sections prescribe the
procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in
case of any discrepancy in the certificates of
canvass. The Congress and COMELEC in banc shall
determine the authenticity of the certificates of
canvass. No pre-proclamation contests shall be
allowed for the elections for the President, Vice
President, Senators, and members of the House of
Representatives. However, this does not preclude
the authority of the appropriate canvassing body to
correct manifest errors in the election returns.
2. Section 43 - Provides that Comelec has the power to
conduct preliminary investigations of election
offenses, and to prosecute the same.
3. Section 34 - Amended the old law by giving poll
watchers of the dominant majority and the
dominant minority parties a fixed per diem of
Php400. (Note that each registered political party
or candidate is allowed to have one poll watcher in
the polling place/ canvassing center).
ISSUES:
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI
of the Constitution;
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17,
Article VIand Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII6 of
the Constitution;
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-
C of the Constitution;and
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III
of the Constitution.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. It is settled that every statute is
presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law.
Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional
must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.In this
case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed
provisions should be declared unconstitutional.
1. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading
because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial
provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and
43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369.Both the COMELEC and the OSG
maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation
process but with everything related to its purpose
encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate
elections.The constitutional requirement that "every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given
a practical rather than a technical construction.The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough
to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve.The title of a law does not have to
be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title.Moreover, a title which declares a
statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient
and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be
further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending
Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election
System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in
Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy
of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas PambansaBlg.
881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related
Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes.’" Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas PambansaBlg. 881 (BP 881),
Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election
laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency,
credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The
provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with
amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881,
specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26,
30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA
9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed
provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369
which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.
2. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17,
Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s Arguments: that Sections 37 and 38 violate
the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET). According to petitioner, under the amended provisions,
Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election
of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC
en banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en
banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-
proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice
President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes that in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
COMELEC and OSG’s Arguments: The COMELEC
maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37
pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures
on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy,
incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of
canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide
that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain
pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.OSG argues
that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases
involving national elective posts. According to the OSG,only
Section 15 of RA 7166 expressly disallows pre-proclamation
cases involving national elective posts but this provision was
subsequently amended by Section 38 of RA 9369.
33
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC, we already discussed the
implications of the amendments introduced by Sections 37
and 38 to Sections 15 and 3019 of RA 7166, respectively and
we declared:Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of
the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to
Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-
proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in
elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The
intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30
of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth
paragraph of the said provision which adopts and applies to
such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17,
18, 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation
controversies.
In sum, in the elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are
still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are
recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1)
correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the
composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and
(3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of
certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic
Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.In the
present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do
not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the
SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the
powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one
hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are
exercised on different occasions and for different
purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the Senate. The
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked
once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the
other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall determine only the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall
exercise this power before the proclamation of the
winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial
candidates.
3. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6),
Article IX-C of the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution
vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate
and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner
and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional
because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the
government concurrent power with the COMELEC to
investigate and prosecute election offenses.We do not
agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the
Constitution gave the COMELEC the "exclusive power"
to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws.Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
vests in the COMELEC the power to "investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices." The grant of the "exclusive
power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP
881, which provides:The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission
may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with
the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the
COMELEC the "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise
authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC
was subsequently qualified and explained.The 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides in Rule 34 (Prosecution of
Election Offenses) Section 1: Authority of the Commission to
Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by
law.It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to
investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC
was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a
legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the
Constitution were to give the COMELEC the "exclusive power"
to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers
would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did
not.
In People v. Basilla, we acknowledged that without the
assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants
and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the
course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible.In
COMELEC v. Español, we also stated that enfeebled by lack of
funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did
not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such
investigation and to prosecute such cases.The prompt
investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses
constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.Thus, given
the plenary power of the legislature to amend or
repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending
Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not violate the
Constitution.
4. Section 34 does not violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution
Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties
to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of
the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner
adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds
which cannot be regulated by law. The OSG argues that
petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause
34
because this only applies to previously perfected contracts. In
this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no
obligation will be impaired.Both the COMELEC and the OSG
argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it
will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll
watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement
with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role
of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be
regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The
OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers
will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the
general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a
reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority
and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns
and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the
polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause.
a. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in
application to laws that derogate from prior acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties.There is
impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms
of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the
rights of the parties.As observed by the OSG, there
is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no
enforceable right or demandable obligation will be
impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three
months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence,
when the dominant majority and minority parties
hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May
2007 elections, they were deemed to have
incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of
RA 9369.
b. Second, it is settled that police power is superior to
the non-impairment clause.34 The constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community.
c. In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, we said:The
freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject to the police
power of the State and not only may regulations
which affect them be established by the State, but
all such regulations must be subject to change from
time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances
may change, or as experience may demonstrate the
necessity.
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34
would still be constitutional because the law was enacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the
general welfare of the people. We agree with the COMELEC
that the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest.
In fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only
guard the votes of their respective candidates or political
parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly counted.
Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll
watchers help ensure that the elections are transparent,
credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of
the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority
parties promotes the general welfare of the community and is
a valid exercise of police power.
Arroyo vs Department of Justice,
GR No. 199082, 199085, 199118
September 18, 2012
Facts:
The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases. In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and
South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It
recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and Mike Arroyo be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage
and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint
Panel.
Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec
has effectively abdicated its constitutional mandate to
investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of
violation of election laws including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices in
favor of the Executive Department acting through the DOJ
Secretary. Under the set-up, the Comelec personnel is placed
under thesupervision and control of the DOJ. The chairperson
is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly surrendered
its independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share its
exercise of judgment and discretionwith the Executive Branch.
Issue:
Does the creation of the Joint Committee, which fuses the
Comelec (a constitutionally independent body) with the
Department of Justice (a political agent of the executive),
demolish the independence of the Comelec provided in Article
IX (A), Sections 1 and 2 and IX (C) of the Constitution?
Held:
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates
the powers and functions of the Comelec.
Paragraph (6) thereof vests in the Comelec the power to:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion orexclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of electionlaws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to theenforcement
and administration of all election laws is intended to enable
the Comelec to effectively insureto the people the free,
orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The failure of the
Comelec to exercise thispower could result in the frustration
of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony
of thesacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.
35
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec
was reflected in Section 265 of BP Blg. 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:
SEC. 265.Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its
duly authorized legalofficers, have the power, concurrent with
the other prosecuting arms of thegovernment, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
underthis Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission
may availof the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That inthe event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with
the office of the fiscal or with the Ministryof Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the
Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law with the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
are given continuing authority as deputies to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same.
The complaints may be filed directly with them or may be
indorsed to them by the petitioner or its duly authorized
representatives.
Section 1, 95 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions
as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they
are not under the control of the President ofthe Philippines in
the discharge of their respective functions. 96 The
Constitution envisions a truly independentComelec committed
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred
right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a
peaceful change of government and in achieving and
promoting political stability.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
casesof election offenses to the Comelec was not by virtue of
the Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Codewhich was
eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the
DOJ now conducts preliminaryinvestigation of election
offenses concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere
deputies. If theprosecutors had been allowed to conduct
preliminary investigation and file the necessary information
byvirtue only of a delegated authority, they now have better
grounds to perform such function by virtue of thestatutory
grant of authority. If deputation was justified because of lack
of funds and legal officers to ensureprompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election offenses, the same
justification should be cited tojustify the grant to the other
prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent
jurisdiction.
The only arrangement constitutionally possible, given the
independence of the COMELEC anddespite Section 42 of RA
9369, is for the DOJ to be a mere deputy or delegate of the
COMELEC andnot a co-equal partner in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses WHENEVERTHE COMELEC
ITSELF DIRECTLY ACTS. While the COMELEC and the DOJ
have equal jurisdiction toinvestigate and prosecute election
offenses (subject to the rule that the body or agency that first
takescognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the others), 68 the COMELEC —whenever it
directly acts in the fact-finding and preliminary investigation
of elections offences — can stillwork with the DOJ and seek
its assistance without violating its constitutionally guaranteed
independence,but it can only do so as the principal in a
principal-delegate relationship with the DOJ where thelatter
acts as the delegate.
National Press Club vs Comelec
GR No. 102653
March 5, 1992
Facts:
Section 11(b) of Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that
“it shall be unlawful for any newspapers, radio broadcasting
or television station, other mass media, or any person making
use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes
except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and
92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for
any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from
his work as such during the campaign period.”
Petitioners argued that Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646 invades
and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising
freedom of expression. They maintained that the prohibition
imposed by said section amounts to censorship, and in
derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion
relevant to election issues. Moreover, petitioners contended
that the said section abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in
the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time
of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.
Issue:
Is Section 11(b) unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing
the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the
former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge
campaign “war chests”. Such objective is of special
importance and urgency in a country which is characterized
by extreme disparity in income distribution between the
economic elite and the rest of society.
Comelec, as provided in Article IX(C)(4) of the 1987
Constitution, has been expressly authorized by the
Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication and information. The fundamental
purpose of such supervision or regulation is to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, as well
as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
36
media facilities, in connection with “public information
campaigns and forums among candidates.”
It is frequently said that the rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are accorded preferred status in our
constitutional hierarchy. However, such are not unlimited
rights for they are not the only important and relevant values
even in the most democratic of polities. Equality of
opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard
to the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s
disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of
the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution
may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in
respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on
the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although
such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation
of the rights of free speech and free press.
Section 11(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods. First, it is limited in the duration of its applicability
and enforceability. Secondly, it is limited in its scope of
application- it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale,
including purchase and sale disguised as a donation; Section
11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary
other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by
candidates for political office, rather it should be read as
designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11(b) upon the right to free
speech of the candidates may be seen to be not unduly
repressive or unreasonable for there is nothing in the said
section to prevent media reporting of and commentary on
pronouncements, activities, written statements of the
candidates.
Osmena vs Comelec
288 SCRA 447
March 31, 1998
Facts:
Emilio Osmena and other petitioners are candidates in the
National Elections. R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987, prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. They
contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections “have called into question the
validity of the very premises of that decision. NPC v. COMELEC
upheld the validity of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it
abridged freedom of speech and of the press. In urging a
reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that experience
in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown
the “undesirable effects” of the law because “the ban on
political advertising has not only failed to level the playing
field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the
poor candidate[s]” by depriving them of a medium which they
can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can
always resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes,
boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. However, no empirical
data were presented by the petitioners to back up their claim.
They instead they make arguments from which it is clear that
their disagreement is with the opinion of the Court on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is
a reargument on the same issue already decided in that case.
Issue:
Whether or not upholding the validity of RA 6646 actually
worked in favor of richer candidates
Held:
No,
Petition DISMISSED
Ratio:
It is incorrect to claim that the purpose of RA 6646 is equality
of the candidates when what its provisions really speak of is
equality in opportunity.
The main purpose of the RA is regulatory. Any restriction on
speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary
to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in
the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction
on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time
and as to scope.
Assuming that rich candidates can spend for parades, rallies,
motorcades, airplanes and the like in order to campaign while
poor candidates can only afford political ads, the gap between
the two will not necessarily be reduced by allowing unlimited
mass media advertising because rich candidates can spend for
other propaganda in addition to mass media
advertising. Moreover, it is not true that §11(b) has
abolished the playing field. What it has done, as already
stated, is merely to regulate its use through COMELEC-
sponsored advertising in place of advertisements paid for by
candidates or donated by their supporters.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Phils. vs COMELEC
GR No. 132922
April 21, 1998
(289 SCRA 337)
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as,
among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to
suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the
subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had
the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881
which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which shall
37
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so
as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during
the period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law
requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election
and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to
do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each
day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking
of property without due process of law and without just
compensation
Held:
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as
there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there
are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio
and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise
without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of
print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the
airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Sarmiento vs Ong
212 SCRA 307
Facts:
This Special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the
Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal
from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac,
Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass
of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of
the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the
exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in
UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to
include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal
of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the
canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac,
excluding the returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to
the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur
which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain
election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case
for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which
rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some
certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's
appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of UpiNuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended
pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings
of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and
denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in
said amended petition.
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above saying
that they had been issued with grave abuse of discretion on
the ground that the commission took cognisance of the
appeals without first referring them to any of its divisions.
Issue:
Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC)
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that,
inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance
38
of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any
of it Divisions
Held:
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of
petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first
referring them to any of its Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set
aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before
the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special
Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its
Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order.
However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-
proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved.
The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject
of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These
cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution
would only be an exercise in futility.
Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without
prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections
protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved
in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already
been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests
shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases
before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
Ong, Jr. vs Comelec
GR No. 105717
December 23, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner Ong and private respondent Lucero were
candidates for the congressional seat of the 2nd district of
Northern Samar during the May 1992 elections. Ong garnered
204 more votes than Lucero. Subsequently, Lucero filed a
petition with the Comelec for the suspension of the
proclamation of Ong and for a recount of some precincts with
prayer for the holding of special elections. Acting on the
petition, the Comelec en banc ordered the Provincial Board of
Canvassers not to reconvene and to stop the canvassing of
votes, considering the “pendency of a pre-proclamation
controversy before the Comelec.” In a subsequent resolution,
the Comelec also granted Lucero’s prayer for a recounting of
votes. Hence, Ong filed a petition for certiorari on the ground
that the Comelec en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Northern Samar not to reconvene and in
granting a recount of the ballots.

Held:
Election cases involving pre-proclamation controversies must
first be heard and decided by a division of the Comelec, the
Comelec en banc having no authority to hear and decide them
in the first instance.
While we agree with petitioner with regard to the COMELEC
en banc's power to rule on the question of holding special
elections for precinct 13 as clearly provided by Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7166, we rule that the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its jurisdiction when it ordered a recount in
precincts 7 and 16 because these are matters which should
have been first referred to its division, thus contravening
Section 3 (c) Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly
provides: "Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in a division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc."
By now it is well-settled that election cases which include pre-
proclamation controversies must first be heard and decided
by a division of the Commission. The Commission en banc
does not have the authority to hear and decide it in the first
instance.
Canicosa vs COMELEC
GR No. 120318
December 5, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo Canicosa and private respondent
SeverinoLajara were candidates for mayor in Calamba,
Laguna during the May 8, 1995 elections. After the
canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvasser. Thereafter, petitioner filed with
the COMELEC a petition to declare failure of election and to
declare null and void the canvass and proclamation because
of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and
accounting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence,
threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting
and delay in the delivery of election documents and
paraphernalia from the precincts to the office of the Municipal
Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC En banc dismissed
the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not
justify a declaration of failure of election. Canicosa insists that
it was error on the part of COMELEC sitting En banc to rule on
his petition. He maintains that his petition should have first
been heard by a division of COMELEC and later by the
COMELEC En banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant
to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the petition of Canicosa should be first heard by a
division before raising it to COMELEC En Banc
Ruling:
39
The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of Sec. 3, Art. IX-
C, of the Constitutionapplies only when the COMELEC acts in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and
not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide
cases first by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional. In the instant case, the issues presented
demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions, because to reiterate the grounds
cited by Canicosa in his petition are that: (a) the names of the
registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their
respective precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate
registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting
in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he
actually received; (d) the control data of the election returns
was not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought
to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e.,
without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there
was delay in the delivery of election returns.
Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC
of its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the
1987 Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to
the COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections.
Ramirez vs Comelec
270 SCRA 590
FACTS:
Ramirez and Alfredo I. Go were candidates for vice mayor of
Giporlos, Eastern Samar in the election of May 8, 1995.
Petitioner was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) on the basis of results showing that he
obtained 1,367 votes against private respondents 1,235
votes.On May 16, 1995, private respondent filed in the
COMELEC a petition for the correction of what he claimed was
manifest error in the Statement of Votes. By August 1995, the
COMELEC en banc issued its first questioned resolution,
directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the votes in
the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate
for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar accordingly.
Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and public respondent Municipal
Board of Canvassers then filed separate motions for
clarification. By the COMELEC en banc issued its second
questioned resolution, reiterating its earlier ruling. It rejected
the MBCs recommendation to resort to election returns.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction over
SPC No. 95-198 because the case was resolved by it without
having been first acted upon by any of its divisions?
HELD:
Art. IX, 3 of the Constitution provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Comelec
en banc. (Emphasis added)
On the other hand, Rule 27, 5 of the 1993 Rules of the
COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation
controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the
tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with
the COMELEC en banc.Accordinglyin Castromayor v.
Commission on Elections, and Mentang v. Commission on
Elections,this Court approved the assumption of jurisdiction
by the COMELEC en banc over petitions for correction of
manifest error directly filed with it. Our decision today
in Torres v.COMELECagain gives imprimatur to the exercise
by the COMELEC en banc of the power to decide petition for
correction of manifest error.
In any event, petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc. Not only did he
participate in the proceedings below but he also sought
affirmative relief from the COMELEC en banc by filing a
Counter-Protest in which he asked that entr[ies] in the
statement of votes for Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7 and
10, be properly corrected for the petitioner, to reflect the
correct mandate of the electorate of Giporlos, Eastern Samar.
It is certainly not right for a party taking part in proceedings
and submitting his case for decision to attack the decision
later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the
decision turns out to be adverse to him.
Lazatin vs Comelec
GR No. L-80007
January 25, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his
oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of
Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. The petitioner
claims that the House Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
is the sole judge of all election contests. (Sec. 17 Art. 6 of the
1987 Constitution)
Issue:
May the petition be given due course because there was a
valid proclamation?
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has
been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the
first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such,
and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to
take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be
to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been
previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the
pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter
that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Lazatin vs HRET
40
GR No. 84297
December 8, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates
for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the
elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes,
private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain
election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers
did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the
Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of
Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the
canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27,
1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect.
On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's
proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the
COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition entitled
"Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections,
Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol," docketed
as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25,
1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of
petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private
respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "HRET") an election
protest, docketed as Case No. 46.
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on
the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the
HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in
accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.
Petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides:
Sec. 250. Election contests for BatasangPambansa, regional,
provincial and city offices. — A sworn petition contesting the
election of any Member of the BatasangPambansa or any
regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the
Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
On the other hand, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to
wit:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional
elections shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the
Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter
addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with
twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each
protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these
Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has
been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise,
the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date
of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987
Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House
of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of
the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the Tribunal as of the
date of effectivity of these Rules, subject to payment of filing
fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition was filed on time with HRET?

Held:
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on
time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous terms
and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions
filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any
Member of the BatasangPambansa, or any regional, provincial
or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together
with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the
COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the
BatasangPambansa, elective regional, provincial and city
officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973
Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973
Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal,
the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of
the BatasangPambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate
rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is
beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from
the general power granted it by the Constitution. The
inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well
within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within
which protests may be filed before it.
Sandoval vs Comelec
GR No.133842
January 26, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico S. Sandoval and private respondent
Canuto Senen Greta, together with Pedro Domingo, Mariano
Santiago, Symaco Benito and Warren Serna, vied for the
congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district
during the election held on May 11, 1998. On election day,
after the votes have been cast and counted in the various
precincts in the two municipalities, their respective board of
canvassers convened to canvass the election returns
forwarded by the board of election inspectors.
On May 17, 1998, the Malabon municipal board of canvassers
concluded its proceedings. The board issued a certificate of
canvass of votes stating that it canvassed 804 out of 805
precincts in the municipality. The certificate of canvass
showed that private respondent obtained the highest number
of votes in Malabon.
Private respondent filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Petition
entitled "In re: Petition to Correct Manifest Error in Tabulation
of Election Returns by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Malabon, NCR. Canuto Tito Oreta vs. Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Malabon." The petition was docketed as SPC
No.98-143. It alleged that while the certificate of canvass
showed that 804 election returns were canvassed and
tabulated, only 790 election returns were actually canvassed.
Private respondent contended that there was a manifest error
41
in the non-recording or copying of the results in 14 election
returns from 14 precincts into the statement of votes.
At 4:15 in the afternoon on May 28, 1998, the district board
of canvassers convened at the Philippine International
Convention Center. It took up private respondent's petition to
correct the manifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19
election returns in the canvass. After examining the statement
of votes by precinct and the certificate of canvass signed and
thumbmarked by three watchers from different parties, the
district board of canvassers found that a total of 804 election
returns were canvassed by the Malabon municipal board of
canvassers.
The district board of canvassers then proceeded to canvass
the certificates of canvass from the two municipalities. After
canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district
board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected
congressman of the legislative district of Malabon-Navotas.
Petitioner took his oath of office on the same day.
Private respondent filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Petition
docketed as SPC No.98-206. The petition sought the
annulment of, petitioner's proclamation as congressman. It
alleged that at about 4:00 in the afternoon on May 28, 1998,
the COMELEC Chairman directed the district board of
canvassers to suspend the canvass and proclamation pending
the resolution of the petition for correction of manifest error
in the municipal certificate of canvass of Malabon; that the
district board of canvassers still proceeded with the canvass
in spite of the order; that the proclamation was made despite
the non-inclusion of election returns from 19 precincts in
Malabon; and that the non-inclusion of these election returns
will materially affect the result of the election. Private
respondent prayed that the proclamation of petitioner as
congressman be annulled and that the municipal board of
canvassers of Malabon be ordered to reconvene to include the
19 election returns in the canvass.
The COMELEC en banc issued an order setting aside the
proclamation of petitioner. The COMELEC ruled that the
proclamation by the district board of canvassers was void
because: (1) it was made in defiance of the verbal order by
the COMELEC Chairman relayed through Executive Director
Resurrection Z. Borra to suspend the proclamation of the
winner in the congressional election until the Commission has
resolved private respondent's petition for correction of
manifest error in the certificate of canvass; and (2) it was
based on an incomplete canvass.
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment and reversal of said order
The COMELEC filed its comment invoked its power of direct
control and supervision over the board of canvassers, allowing
it to review, revise and reverse the board's actions. It said
that it rendered the questioned order upon finding that
petitioner's proclamation was illegal and therefore void ab
initio. It cited two reasons to support its findings: first, it was
made in disregard of the Chairman's verbal order to suspend
the canvass and proclamation, and second, it was based on
an incomplete canvass.
ISSUES:
I. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of
SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, both alleging the
existence 'of manifest error in the certificate of canvass issued
by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers and seeking to
reconvene said board of canvassers to allow it to correct the
alleged error; and
II. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's
proclamation was valid.
RULING:
I.
We uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. That
the Commission has jurisdiction over SPC No. 98- 143
and SPC No.98-206, both filed by private respondent seeking
to correct the alleged manifest error in the certificate of
canvass issued by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers.
As a general rule, candidates and registered political parties
involved in an election are allowed to file pre-proclamation
cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to
any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by, any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or
any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As
an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of
Republic Act (RA) 7166. prohibits candidates in the
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional
elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in
Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Members of the House of Representatives.-
- For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation
of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case
may be. However, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to
correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it."
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum
in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides
an exception to the exception. The second sentence of
Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction
of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns even in elections for president, vice- president and
members of the House of Representatives for
the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will
not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the
proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is
consistent with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to
"decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections."
Applying the foregoing rule, these petitions essentially allege
that there exists a manifest error in said certificate of canvass
as the board failed to include several election returns in the
canvassing. Private respondent prays that the board be
reconvened to correct said error. Section 15 of RA 7166
vests the COMELEC with jurisdiction over cases of this
42
nature. We reiterate the long-standing rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the petition regardless of whether
or not the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest
error is vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section 7 of Rule
27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if
the error is discovered before proclamation, the board of
canvassers may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any
candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political
parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors
committed. The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of
the board to the Commission and said appeal shall be heard
and decided by the Commission en banc. Section 5, however
of the same rule states that a petition for correction of
manifest error may be filed directly with the Commission en
banc provided that such errors could not have been
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due
diligence and proclamation of, the winning candidate had
already been made. Thus, we held in Ramirez vs.
COMELEC.
"Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC it was said that 'By now it
is settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of
the Commission' -- and a petition for correction of manifest
error in the Statement of Votes, like SPC 95-198 is a pre-
proclamation ; controversy -- in none of the cases cited to
support this proposition was the issue the correction of a
manifest error in the Statement of Votes under Sec. 231 of
the Omnibus Election Code (BP. Blg. 881) or Sec. 15 of R.A.
No.7166. On the other hand, Rule 27, Sec. 5 of the 1993
Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre -
proclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest
errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed
directly with the COMELEC en banc x x x."
Petitioner nonetheless contends that SPC No. 98-143 and SPC
No. 98-206 must be dismissed because private respondent
failed to raise the issue of manifest error before the
appropriate board of canvassers in accordance with the
second sentence of Section 15 of RA 7166.
We disagree. The issue of manifest error in the certificate of
canvass for Malabon has been raised before the district board
of canvassers before petitioner could be proclaimed and said
board has in fact ruled on the issue. We find this as sufficient
compliance with the law. The facts show that it was
impossible for private respondent to raise the issue before the
Malabon municipal board of canvassers as it still did not have
a copy of the statement of votes and the precinct list at the
time of the canvassing in the municipal level. At that time,
private respondent still had no knowledge of the alleged
manifest error. He, however, lost no time in notifying the
COMELEC Chairman and the district board of the alleged error
upon discovery thereof. We find petitioner's argument,
therefore, to be devoid of merit.
II.
Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the
subject matter and issue of SPC No.98-143 and SPC No. 98-
206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with
illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation
of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due
process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice
and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In
other words, due process requires that a party be given an
opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the
case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case. The facts show that COMELEC set
aside the proclamation of petitioner , without the benefit of
prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order
based solely on private respondent's allegations. We held
in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:
"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due
process of law. Although public office is not property under
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one
cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is,
nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings
before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions,
requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus,
although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the
power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate,
We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes
vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on
Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing."
Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
"Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all
pre-proclamation controversies.-- The Commission shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation
controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition,
and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or
annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been
made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the
succeeding sections."
The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of
proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings
to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers.
The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings
may be initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the
COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either
case, notice and hearing is required.
We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the
hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due
process requirement. The law requires that the hearing be
held before the COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the
public respondent first issued an order annulling the
proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of the
hearing. We explained in Farinas vs. COMELEC[ the
pernicious effect of such procedure:
"As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 'to sanction the
immediate annulment or even the suspension of the effects
of a proclamation before the petition seeking such annulment
or suspension of its effects shall have been heard would open
the floodgates of unsubstantiated petitions after the results
are known, considering the propensity of the losing
candidates to put up all sorts of obstacles in an open display
of unwillingness to accept defeat, or would encourage the
filing of baseless petitions not only to the damage and
prejudice of winning candidates but also to the frustration of
the sovereign will of the electorate.'"
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need
not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising
its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the
actions of the board of canvassers. It set aside the
43
proclamation made by the district board of canvassers for the
position of congressman upon finding that it was tainted with
illegality.
We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for
annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not
merely performing an administrative function. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to
determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections, register political parties, organizations or
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President
the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action
upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or
disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the
Commission also has direct control and supervision over all
personnel involved in the conduct of election. However , the
resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent
and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest
error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires
the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the
alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution
of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of
its quasi- judicial power. It has been said that where a
power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial
nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than
a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC
therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving the
petitions filed by private respondent.
Estrella vs COMELEC
GR No. 160465
(2004)
FACTS:
1. Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty
race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella,
filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest
which consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and
declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually
issued writ of execution.
2. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second
Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner
Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued.
However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself
and designated another Commissioner to substitute him.
3. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with
modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the
duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated
by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC
En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not
participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the
case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Can a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in
Division deliberations participate in its En Banc deliberation?
Ruling:
No. The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003
issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner
Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow
a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To
allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he
previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but
legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in
the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3)
members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four
(4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not
attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of
votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or
order.
Roces vs HRET
GR No. 167499
September 15, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Miles Roces (Roces) and former Congressman Harry
Ang Ping (Mr.Ang Ping) filed their respective certificates of
candidacy (COCs) for the position of Representative for the
3rd Congressional District of Manila in the May 2004 elections.
On January 5, 2004, a registered voter of Manila named
Alejandro Gomez questioned Mr.Ang Pings candidacy before
the COMELEC through a petition to deny due course or cancel
his COC. The petition alleged that Mr.Ang Ping
misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen, hence
was disqualified for the position.
Mr.Ang Ping filed with the COMELEC a Sworn Declaration of
Withdrawal of his COC. The next day, May 4, 2004, the
General Counsel for the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, the
political party of Mr.Ang Ping, sought that Mr.Ang Pings wife,
Ma. ZenaidaAng Ping (Mrs.Ang Ping), substitute for
him. Mr.Ang Ping also filed a motion to cancel the scheduled
promulgation and dismiss the petition to deny due course or
cancel his COC on the same date. On May 5, 2004,
Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra deferred the
promulgation for lack of quorum as he was the sole
Commissioner in attendance.
Despite all these developments, the COMELEC First
Division, through Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier,
Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Virgilio O. Garcilliano, issued
a resolution granting the petition to deny due course to
Mr.Ang Pings COC and ordering the Board of Election
Inspectors of Manila not to count any vote cast in his favor. It
ruled that the resolution which was originally scheduled for
promulgation by Commissioner Garcilliano on May 5,
2004 was instead promulgated on April 30, 2004, the same
44
date that the notice of promulgation was issued. The
resolution was served on Mr.Ang Pings counsel on May 8,
2004.
Compounding the woes of Mr.Ang Ping, and despite the
deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra at a
hearing on May 5, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued on
the same date an order denying Mr.Ang Pings motion to
dismiss. It held that the motion to dismiss was
filed after the promulgation of the April 30, 2004
resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr.Ang
Pings COC.
On May 9, 2004, and before the expiration of the five-day
reglementary period, Mr.Ang Ping moved for reconsideration
of the April 30, 2004 resolution and the case was elevated to
the COMELEC en banc.
While the case was still with the COMELEC First Division, or
on May 8, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No.
6823, declaring moot Mr.Ang Pings Affidavit of Withdrawal,
denying due course to the substitute COC of Mrs.Ang Ping and
ordering the Regional Election Director to delete Mr.Ang Pings
name from the certified list of candidates. Mr.Ang Ping had no
knowledge of the resolution.
Racing against time or on May 11, 2004, the spouses Ang
Ping repaired to this Court and filed a petition
for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order,
status quo order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
docketed as G.R. No. 163259, assailing COMELEC Resolution
No. 6823.The next day or on May 12, 2004, this Court issued
a resolution requiring Roces to comment and denied the
issuance of an order suspending the proclamation.
On the election day itself, the Manila City Board of
Canvassers resolved not to canvass the votes for Mr. or
Mrs.Ang Ping citing COMELEC Resolution No. 6823. On May
15, 2004, after counting only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387
registered voters in the district, it proclaimed Roces winner.
The spouses Ang Ping appealed the Board resolution to the
COMELEC en banc and filed a petition to annul the
proclamation but these were dismissed by COMELECs
Resolution No. 7257 and Omnibus Order of July 6, 2004.
On May 24, 2004, Mrs.Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which was docketed as HRET Case No. 04-
004. In her election protest, Mrs.Ang Ping alleged, among
others, that COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was a glaring case
of deprivation of Mr. and Mrs.Ang Pings right to elevate SPC
04-224 to the Commission en banc and that the COMELECs
April 30, 2004 resolution was irregularly promulgated. Roces
filed his answer alleging, among others, that the HRET has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Mrs.Ang Ping explained that the issue of whether the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 may be ventilated as one of
the issues to be settled in the HRET Election Protest since the
non-canvassing of the Ang Ping votes and the proclamation
of petitioner Roces were founded on COMELEC Resolution No.
6823 and were raised as the principal issues in the HRET
Election Protest.
On August 10, 2004, this Court dismissed G.R. No. 163259 in
view of the pending HRET protest filed by Mrs.Ang Ping. The
resolution eventually became final and executory. Thereafter,
Mrs.Ang Ping filed in the HRET a motion to convert the ad
cautelam protest to a regular protest. The HRET granted the
motion on September 9, 2004.
After extensive oral arguments, the HRET denied Rocess
motion to dismiss on March 3, 2005. It ruled that Mrs.Ang
Ping was a proper party to file the protest against Roces
since: (1) there was no final COMELEC resolution disqualifying
or denying due course to the COC of Mr.Ang Ping, thus her
substitution for the latter was legally permissible under the
Omnibus Election Code; (2) she was one of the candidates
voted for during election day in the 3rd District of Manila; and
(3) the COMELEC Order of May 5, 2004 was of questionable
validity for the reason that: (a) it was issued in violation of its
April 30, 2004 resolution setting the promulgation for May 5,
2004 and despite the fact that the records had not yet reached
the COMELEC en banc; and (b) there was no prior notice and
hearing in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Roces then filed the present petition for certiorari assailing
the two preceding resolutions of the HRET.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that
Mrs.Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest
despite the denial in due course and cancellation of her COC
under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 and WON HRET has
jurisdiction to review a resolution or order of the COMELEC
and/or declare the same as void and disregard or set it aside.
RULING:
HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss for the following reasons:
First. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate
procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. This
exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine
whether it has the authority to hear and determine the
controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that
state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all
other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it.
Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or
inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to
parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions,
whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to
determine the question of jurisdiction. One of the three
essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must
be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its
exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs.Ang Ping was a
proper party to contest the election of Roces.
Second. There is no dispute that to support his motion to
dismiss, Roces offered as evidence the COMELEC resolutions
denying due course to Mrs.Ang Pings COC. In doing so, Roces
submitted to the HRET the admissibility and validity of these
resolutions and the HRET cannot be faulted in reviewing the
said resolutions especially for the purpose of determining
whether Roces was able to discharge his burden of proving
that Mrs.Ang Ping is not the proper party to assail his election.
In passing upon the COMELEC resolutions especially for that
45
purpose, it cannot be said that the HRET usurped the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
On the merits of the HRET ruling, we hold that the HRET did
not abuse its discretion in holding that Mrs.Ang Ping is a
proper party to contest the election of Roces. Under COMELEC
rules, the procedure of promulgation of a decision or
resolution is as follows:
SECTION 5. Promulgation. The promulgation of a decision or
resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a
date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in
advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
Promulgation is important because it determines when
the reglementary period begins to toll. In the case at
bar, Commissioner Garcilliano fixed the promulgation of its
resolution whether to give due course to the candidacy of
Mr.Ang Ping on May 5, 2004.
For mysterious reasons, the COMELEC First Division of
Commissioner Garcillano did not promulgate the
resolution on May 5, 2004 in accordance with its notice of
promulgation. In violation of the abovecited rule, and despite
the deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra to
a date to be set by the COMELEC First Division, the resolution
was deemed promulgated by the COMELEC on April 30,
2004 when it was filed with the clerk of court. The April 30,
2004 COMELEC resolution was received by Mr.Ang Pings
counsel only on May 8, 2004.
This premature COMELEC Resolution No. 6823 was then
used on May 12, 2004, or on the election day itself, by the
Manila City Board of Canvassers as the basis of its
resolution not to canvass the votes for Mr. or Mrs.Ang Ping. It
then proclaimed Roces the winner despite having counted
only 6,347 votes out of the 150,387 registered voters of the
district. Following these highly suspect resolutions, Roces was
proclaimed winner on May 15, 2004. All told, it cannot be
denied that the effect of COMELEC en banc Resolution No.
6823 was to execute the April 30, 2004 resolution of its First
Division which, at that time, had not yet become final and
executory.
In the case at bar, it ought to be emphasized that the private
respondent was systematically denied the opportunity to be
heard. The resolution of the COMELECs First Division was
made before its priorily set date of promulgation, deemed
final and executory by the COMELEC en banc in Resolution
No. 6823 before expiry of the reglementary period, and
executed by the Manila City Board of Canvassers. The petition
for certiorari filed by Mrs.Ang Ping challenged these
resolutions and could not have cured these blatant violations
of her right to due process. In truth, this Court referred the
case of Mrs.Ang Ping to the HRET where she has filed a
protest ad cautelam.
There is no iota of doubt that the COMELECs resolutions
are void ab initio for violating Mrs.AngPings constitutional
right to due process. Judgments entered in a proceeding
failing to comply with procedural due process are void, as is
one entered by a court acting in a manner inconsistent with
due process. A void judgment is defined as one that, from its
inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect. A void
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to, and is
attended by none of the consequences of, a valid
adjudication. Indeed, a void judgment need not be recognized
by anyone, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be
given to it. Needless to stress, the HRET did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the
election protest as the COMELEC Resolution dated April 30,
2004, Order of May 5, 2004, and Resolution No. 6823
were void ab initio.
Third. Petitioner contends that the HRET cannot review
decisions of the COMELEC and that COMELEC decisions,
orders, or rulings may be solely reviewed by the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof. It is true that generally, the
method of assailing a judgment or order of the COMELEC
is via petition for certiorari. As aforestated, however, it was
petitioner who submitted these resolutions to the HRET as
proofs that Mrs.Ang Ping was not a proper party. These same
resolutions were collaterally attacked by Mrs.Ang Ping before
the HRET when she alleged that these violated her right to
due process. A void judgment or resolution may be
impeached through collateral attack.
Fourth. We hasten to add that judgments, orders and
resolutions should only be declared void in the most
exceptional circumstances due to detrimental effects on the
doctrine of finality of judgments. The circumstances of this
case, however, are unique in that the private respondent
was denied due process and was forced to seek justice in the
HRET. In fact, it was this Court that referred the private
respondent to the HRET when it dismissed the latters petition
in G.R. No. 163259 on the ground of the pendency of HRET
Case No. 04-004. To grant the petition now would effectively
foreclose the private respondents access to any remedy
despite violation of her right to due process.
Javier vs Tahoma
144 SCRA 194
FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in
Antique for the BatasangPambansa in the May 1984 elections.
On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of
the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter’s men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the
post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing
to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
Second Division of the said body proclaimed the private
respondent winner.
The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and
not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders.
46
On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board
to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.
On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which
the petitioner had seasonably made.
Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the
decision now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of
the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this
Court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis that it
should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.
The case was still being considered when on February 11,
1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in
broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was
abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to
be moot and academic.
ISSUES:
Is the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
HELD:
NO.The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C,
Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the
powerto:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of all member of the
BatasangPambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless
otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided
within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the
sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended
to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including
those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section
3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc
was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the
Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had
been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-
too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-
protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual
defeat of the real winners in the election.
The respondent’s theory would make this gambit possible for
the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature,
could be hastily decided by only three members in division,
without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise
been observed by the Commission en banc.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that
were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been
granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections
dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
Canicosa vs COMELEC
292 SCRA 512
(1997)
Facts
Canicosa and Lajara were candidates for mayor in Calamba,
Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections. After obtaining a
majority of some 24,000 votes Lajara was proclaimed winner
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Canicosa filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Declare
Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass
and Proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and
anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of
election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying,
unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of
election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. But the COMELEC en
banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations
therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.
Issue
WON there was failure of election
Ruling
The grounds cited by Canicosa do not warrant a declaration
of failure of election. There are only three (3) instances where
a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the election
in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections we ruled that before
COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a
failure of election, at least two (2) conditions must concur: (a)
no voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless
resulted in failure to elect; and, (b) the votes that were not
cast would affect the result of the election. From the face of
the instant petition, it is readily apparent than an election took
47
place and that it did not result in a failure to elect.
Canicosa finally insists that it was error on the part of
COMELEC sitting en banc to rule on his petition. He maintains
that his petition should have first been heard by a division of
COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for
reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the
Constitution. But this provision applies only when the
COMELEC acts in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial functions and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions. To reiterate, the grounds cited by
Canicosa in his petition require the exercise by the COMELEC
of its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987
Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the
COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration
of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
Likewise, Sec. 52 of BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.
- In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by
the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections x x x x
Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear
and decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional. In the instant case, as aforestated, the issues
presented demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions.
Lazatin v. COMELEC
GR No. 80007
January 25, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC toannul his proclamation after he had taken his
oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of
Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. The petitioner
claims that the House Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC
is the sole judge of all election contests. (Sec. 17 Art. 6 of the
1987 Constitution)
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed
office, and discharged the duties of Congressman
Whether or not COMELEC is the sole judge of all election
contests
Ruling:
No.
Petitioner has been proclaimedwinner of the Congressional
elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath
of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman.
For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest
against him would be to usurp the functions of the House
Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation
(which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself)
despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and
despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates,
is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises,
to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Lazatin vs HRET and Timbol
GR No. 84297
December 8, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates
for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the
elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes,
private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain
election returns. The COMELEC ordered the suspension of the
proclamation of the winning candidate. However, the
COMELEC later ordered to proceed with the canvassing of
votes and to proclaim the winner. As a result, petitioner was
proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus
filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioner’s
proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner assumed office on June
30, 1987.
On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's
proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the
COMELEC resolution before this Court. The Court set aside the
COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. Private
respondent filed HRET an election protest. Petitioner moved
to dismiss the protest on the ground that it had been filed
late. However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed
on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules.
Petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction
of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent.
Issue:
Was private respondent's protest filed seasonably?
Ruling: Yes
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on
time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have
been filed within fifteen (15) days from November 22, 1987,
or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September
15, 1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the
Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a
Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This
resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and
such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant
received a copy of the Supreme Court's decision annulling the
COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, Protestee's proclamation became
effective only on January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period
for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that
date.Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or
eleven (11) days after January 28. The protest, therefore, was
filed well within the reglementary period provided by the
Rules of this Tribunal.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate
rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is
48
beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from
the general power granted it by the Constitution.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election
contests has been trimmed down under the 1987
Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the
COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
Members of the BatasangPambansa and elective provincial
and city officials, the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the
COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate
jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal
and barangay officials. expressly makes the Electoral
Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well
within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within
which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only
on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more
importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having
been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter
cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
235. Dungog
Flores vs COMELEC
GR No. 89604
April 20, 1990
(184 SCRA 484)
FACTS:
Roque Flores was proclaimed as having the highest number
of votes as Barangay Kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum,
Abra and thus became punong barangay. However his
election was contested by second placer Rapisora who
garnered 1 vote less than Flores. MTC of Tayum sustained
Rapisora and installed him as Punong Barangay after
deducting two votes as stray from Flores. Flores appealed to
the RTC, RTC affirmed the MTC decision noting that the four
votes cast for "Flores" only, without any distinguishing first
name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead
of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio
Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The judge held that
the original total credited to the petitioner was correctly
reduced by 2, to 462, demoting him to second place.
Flores went to COMELEC but was dismissed on the ground
that COMELEC has no power to review the decision of the
RTC. This ruling, embodied in its resolution dated 3 August
1989, was presumably based on Section 9 of Rep. Act No.
6679, The COMELEC was obviously of the opinion that it
could not entertain the petitioner's appeal because of the
provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the regional
trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial
court in barangay elections "on questions of fact shall be final
and non-appealable
In this petition for certiorari, the Commission on Elections is
faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioner's appeal
and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes should
have been credited to him under the equity of the incumbent
rule in Section 211(2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The solicitor general while supporting the dismissal on the
other hand, would justify it under an entirely different and
more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2)
of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
The OSG submission is that MTC being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered
by the MTC of Tayum, Abra, should have been appealed
directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the decisions of MTC in barangay election
contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
HELD:
The decision of the MTC should have been appealed directly
to the COMELEC. The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but
on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit,
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that
the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan
Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in
barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted
section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the
COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep.
Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case
should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared
unconstitutional.
Garces vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 114795
July 17, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of
Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte. She was to replace
49
respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in
turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service Commission,
both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of
office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he
did not request for it. Garces, on the other hand, was directed
by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume
the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a
Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election
Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from
assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.
Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant Director
to defer her assumption of the Gutalac post. She received a
letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department,
with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on
construction of polling booths. Garces interpreted it to mean
as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since
respondent Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac
office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to
Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and
damages against Empeynado and Concepcion, among others.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution,
resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac, and ordered that the appointments of
Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled. In
view thereof, respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the
petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered
moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that
the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC. The RTC,
thereafter, dismissed the petition for mandamus. On appeal,
respondent CA affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the case.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
First, is petitioner's action for mandamus proper? And,
second, is this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme
Court?
HELD:
Petitioner Garces is mistaken considering that Concepcion
continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the
corresponding functions therefor, the proper remedy should
have been quo warranto and not mandamus. Quo warranto
vests the title to one's office claimed by another and has as
its object ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while
mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try
disputed titles.Mandamus, which petitioner filed, will not lie as
this remedy applies only where petitioner's right is founded
clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. It will not issue to
give him something to which he is not clearly and conclusively
entitled.
On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal
right to the Gutalac post which was deemed vacated at the
time of her appointment and qualification. Garces insists that
the vacancy was created by Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution. On the contrary, Concepcion posits
that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept
the transfer to Liloy.
Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution provides:
"All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973
 Constitution shall continue in office
until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or
upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors, if
such is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986."
The above organic provision did not require any cause for
removal of an appointive official under the 1973 Constitution.
The transition period from the old to the new Constitution
envisioned an "automatic" vacancy; hence the government is
not hard put to prove anything plainly and simply because the
Constitution allows it. Mere appointment and qualification of
the successor removes an incumbent from his post.
Nevertheless, the government in an act of auto-limitation and
to prevent indiscriminate dismissal of government personnel
issued on May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17. This
executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed
prior to the issuance of Concepcion's transfer order,
enumerates five grounds for separation or replacement of
elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III,
Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:
"1. Existence of a case for summary
dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the
Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of the probable cause for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in
the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan
political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing
that the incumbent is unfit to remain in
the service or his separation/replacement
is in the interest of the service."
Not one of those grounds was alleged to exist, much less
proven by petitioner when respondent Concepcion was
transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was
transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior
appointment. If the transfer was made without the consent
of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal
without valid cause contrary to the fundamental guarantee
on non-removal except for cause. Concepcion's transfer
thus becomes legally infirm and without effect for
he was not validly terminated. His appointment to
the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete because he
did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be
emphasized, is indispensable to complete an
appointment.Corollarily, Concepcion's post in Gutalac
never became vacant. It is a basic precept in the law of
public officers that "no person, no matter how qualified and
eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an
office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to
a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally
removed, or his appointment validly terminated before one
could be validly installed to succeed him. Further, Garces'
appointment was ordered to be deferred by the COMELEC.
The deferment order, we note, was not unequivocably
lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even
cancelled by the COMELEC en banc.These factors negate
Garces' claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to
the Gutalac post. On the contrary, her right to the said
office is manifestly doubtful and highly questionable.
50
On the second issue the jurisdiction of the RTC was
challenged by respondent Empeynado contending that this is
a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under the
1987 Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the
appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac, he
argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the
Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court
becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution
contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
The contention is without merit.This provision is inapplicable
as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On
the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered
this controversy. The "case" or "matter" referred to by the
constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., must pertain to an election dispute. The
settled rule is that "decision, rulings, order" of the
COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A are those relate to
the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powersinvolving"elective regional, provincial
and city officials". In this case, what is being assailed is the
COMELEC's choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post
which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-
up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not
an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Barbers vs Comelec
GR No. 165691
June 22, 2005
Facts:
Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for
re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections ("elections"). The
first 11 senators were first proclaimed. The 12th senator was
proclaimed later. Biazon was proclaimed the 12th Senator
despite an incomplete canvass. Barbers filed a petition to
annul the proclamation of Biazon with the COMELEC
contending that the proclamation was illegal and premature
because it was based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers said
that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the
results of the special elections, which were still to be
conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the
elections. Biazon filed an answer and contended that since the
COMELEC has proclaimed him on 2 June 2004 in Resolution
No. NBC 04-005 as the duly elected 12th Senator and he has
taken his oath of office on 30 June 2004, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, not the COMELEC, has jurisdiction to entertain the
present petition. The Comelec however rendered a decision in
favour of Biazon. Barbers went to SC by way of petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Who has jurisdiction over election contests relating to
members of the Senate?
Ruling:
Senate Electoral Tribunal. The word "sole" in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised
Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal ("SET") underscores the
exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred
upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear
that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the
12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.
In Pangilinan, we ruled that "where the candidate has
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral
protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives." In like manner, where as in the present
case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th duly
elected Senator, Barbers’ proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest with the SET.
Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering
that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to annul the COMELEC’s assailed proceedings.
We take pains to emphasize that after the proclamation,
Barbers should have filed an electoral protest before the SET.
The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a
dispute or contest relating to the election returns of members
of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute
falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to
take cognizance of the electoral protest against Biazon would
usurp the constitutional functions of the SET. In addition, the
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Resolutions affirming Biazon’s
proclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results
of the special elections to be held would not materially affect
the results of the elections.
[65] DOMINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999
Facts:
Domino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for representative in
a district. He indicated that he resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for 1yr and 2mos. Immediately
preceding the election, private respondent filed a petition to
see the cancellation of Domino’s COC on the ground that he
is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province
of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani
and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon
the whole world, including the Commission on Elections
Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject
congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
51
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner
Held:
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX
of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of
the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the
COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to
material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that
will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of Domino to
be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct
within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the
COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as
a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the
residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the
list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual
findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions
in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than
the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC.
Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may
pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised
including the questions of citizenship and residence of the
challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or
exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the
power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the
exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to
remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for
the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had
been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding,
even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of
res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any
future action that a party may take concerning the subject
passed upon in the proceeding.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would
neither be conclusive on the voter's political status,
nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its
18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
Domino a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and
ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct
No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct
14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within
the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings,
to declare the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right
of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precinct in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court
has no power to order the change or transfer of
registration from one place of residence to another for
it is the function of the election Registration Board as
provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.
The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding
the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election
Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to
remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding
book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and
thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
OTHER ISSUES:
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old
Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy
for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon
City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that
he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City
and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province
of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animusn on
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January
1997, does not adequately support a change of
domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's
intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house
and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January
1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence
in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering
as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting
is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
52
presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he
was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation
of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October
1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from
Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence
on 30 August 1997, Domino still falls short of the one year
residency requirement under the Constitution. In showing
compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and
actual presence in the district one intends to represent must
satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.
Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his
election to office null and void.
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art.
IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes
in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must
have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives.
Domino has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the
Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he
cannot be deemed a member of the House of
Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the
Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.
[66] PAPANDAYAN JR VS COMELEC AND BALT
GR. No. 147909 April 16, 2002
Facts:
In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the
position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely:
petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the
incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Bantuas.
Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner
alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay
Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident
of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran;
that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to
Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal;
that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he
filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of
Tubaran, which he later withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring him disqualified in a resolution by
having his name stricken off from the list of candidates for
mayor, on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective
official
Held:
No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was
formerly a resident of Bayang, he later transferred residence
to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical
presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001
elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA
7160) provides that an elective official must be a “…resident
therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least
1 year immediately preceding the day of the election…”
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence
as used in election law, imports not only an intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
couple with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business, pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return.
In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, the following
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi.
The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida
Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they resided in Tangcal,
Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the
part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to
be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that
he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran
shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former place of
residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his
place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private
53
secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran
everyday after work. This is proof of animus manendi.
Petitioner’s statement that [he] was living in Marawi City
cannot be read as saying he was a resident of Marawi City,
because, when asked whether he was residing in Bayang,
Lanao del Sur, he replied: No, Im in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur.
What he seems to be saying is that although he worked as a
private secretary of the Mayor of Bayang, he was not a
resident of Bayang, because he was living in Tubaran.
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence
qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law
would not be thwarted by upholding the victors right to the
office, the will of the electorate should be respected.[27] For
the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully challenge
petitioners disqualification, respondent must clearly
demonstrate that petitioners ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote. Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that
petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.
[67] MANUEL B. JAPZON VS COMELEC and JAIME S.
TY
G.R No. 180088. January 19, 2009
Facts:
Japzon and Ty were Mayoralty candidates of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the 2007 local
elections. Japzon questioned Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground of material misrepresentation. Allegedly, when Ty
filed his COC, he falsely represented that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for
one year before 14 May 2007 but Japzon averred that Ty
never actually resided in said address for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under
the law. In fact, Ty continued to make trips to the USA.
Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, he allegedly continued to
comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel
records.
Admittedly, Ty was a natural-born Filipino then residing in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
However, he left to work in the USA and eventually became
an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in
accordance with the provisions of RA No. 9225. Ty
subsequently applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was at A.
Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted
himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax
and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein
his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was
registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. It
was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American
citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a
pure Philippine citizen again.
Issue:
Did Ty comply with the one-year residency requirement under
the law?
Held:
Yes, Ty was already residing in the Philippines for more than
a period of one year immediately preceding the 2007 election.
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same
time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the
Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for
public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
While Ty complied with the second requirement when he
personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
before a notary public on 19 March 2007 and by the time he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his
Philippine citizenship.
The other requirement pertains to the qualifications required
by the Constitution and existing laws, i.e. the LGC of 1991,
and the law requires one-year residency in the municipality
where he run for office.
54
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the
USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of
his residence therein shall be determined from the time he
made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the
time of his birth.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his application that his
residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years
2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local
tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs
from the said municipality stating therein his address as A.
Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a
voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, since his
arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior
to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains that Tys
trips abroad during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand
(from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to the USA (from 31 October
2006 to 19 January 2007), indicate that Ty had no intention
to permanently reside in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, the fact that
Ty did come back to Philippines, after said trips, is a further
manifestation of his animus manendi and animus revertendi.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and
never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident
thereof. Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.
The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other
countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least
nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not
necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it
does strongly support and is only consistent with Tys avowed
intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
[68] OGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.
Facts:
Caballero and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of
Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Nanud Jr. questioned the candidacy of Caballero alleging that
the latter made a false representation when he declared in his
COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes
despite being a Canadian citizen and a non¬-resident thereof.
Per Caballero, prior to the filing of his COC on October 3,
2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto,
Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino
and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public
in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2)
of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile
of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian
citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a
brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back
to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
California, and finally in Canada.
Issue: Did Caballero comply with the one-year residency
requirement?
Held: No, Caballero did not comply with the one-year
residency requirement. RA No. 9225, which is known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.21 The
law does not provide for residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence
either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he
is also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with
dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency
in the Philippines now becomes material since the Local
Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least
one year immediately preceding the election day.
55
Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised
in Uyugan, Batanes and this may be considered as his domicile
of origin. However, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign country may
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines
(Coquilla v. COMELEC) and this holds true in Caballero's case
as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent
visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in
Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
Despite his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, it had no automatic impact or effect
on his residence/domicile (Japzon vs COMELEC). Thus,
Caballero must still prove that after becoming a Philippine
citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from
the time he made it as such.
But in this, he fails. The COMELEC found that it was only after
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on
September 13, 2012 that Caballero can rightfully claim that
he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was
accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an
actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the
period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even
less than the one year residency required by law.
[69] POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
Facts:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of
Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar. When petitioner was
five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and
Susan Roces filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. The trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Initially, the petitioner
enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.)
in 1988. In 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized
American citizen.
The untimely demise of her father (FPJ ran for president in
the 2004 elections but lost to GMA…months after the election,
FPJ died of a stroke) was a severe blow to her entire family.
In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the
petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter
of 2005.
The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be
transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester;
coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the
proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into
the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her
job in the U.S. Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines
on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a Tax
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Her three (3) children immediately followed while her
husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home
there. The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her
mother's place until she and her husband purchased a
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. Petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City
on 20 October 2010 and was appointed chairman of the
MTRCB by PNoy.
When petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections, she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question of period of
residence in the Philippines. She topped the senatorial
elections of 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months counted from 24 May 2005.
Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC has the power to
adjudicate on the qualifications of a
presidential candidate.
2. Whether Grace Poe, a foundling, is a natural-
born citizen.
3. Whether Grace Poe’s repatriation in 2006
resulted in her reacquisition of her natural-
born status.
4. Whether Grace Poe has satisfied the 10-year
residency requirement under the Constitution.
Held:
1. No, the COMELEC has no power to decide on
issues of qualifications of a presidential candidate. Such
power is lodged with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art.
VII sec.4, 1987 Constitution). The issue before the COMELEC
is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made
in the certificate a false material representation about her
citizenship and residency. The exclusivity of the ground should
hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from
going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for
56
the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification
or lack thereof of the candidate.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators
and the Members of the House of Representatives was made
clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions. There is an absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required,
to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to
be disqualified is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding
that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by
law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of
false representations regarding his or her qualifications,
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure
by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
2. Yes, Grace Poe is a natural-born citizen.
a. Statistics/Probability/Presumptions - The Solicitor
General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total
number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in
that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. A person
with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church
in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.
b. The Intent of the Framers of the 1935
Constitution (the fundamental law applicable during the birth
of Grace Poe) - As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show
that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. During the debates on this provision, Delegate
Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens
the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention
believed that the cases of foundlings, being too few, there is
no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so
recognized.
c. Adoption Laws - Domestic laws on adoption also
support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws
do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first
place to be adopted.
d. International Law - Foundlings are likewise
citizens under international law. The principles found in two
conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a
foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country
of birth,” The second is the principle that a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found,
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness. That the Philippines is not
a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean
that their principles are not binding. Current legislation reveals
the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law.
3. Yes, Grace Poe reacquired her natural-born
status upon repatriation. R.A. No. 9225 was passed in line
with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship
may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that
natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been
once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
4. Yes, Grace Poe has satisfied the residency
requirement to run for president. Petitioner's claim that she
will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true
beginning 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from
the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her
original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change
of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she
and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to
the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's
former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and
her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad.
The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken
together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the
freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess
items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and
permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying
property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for
good.
57
The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015
COC was false because she put six (6) years and six (6)
months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her
2012 COC for Senator. As explained by petitioner in her
verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned
residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the
U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the
Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in
2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to
period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, the candidate
mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence
where the required period was a minimum of one year.
[70] SINACA vs. MULA
G.R. No. 135691 September 27, 1999
Facts:
In the1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling
party LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD filled in separate candidates for the
position of mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del
Norte. One faction headed by Senator Robert Z. Barbers
nominated Grachil G. Canoy, while the other group lead by
Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS endorsed the candidacy of
Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr.
Miguel H. Mula, a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to
the "BARBERS Wing," filed before the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification against TEODORO. The Second Division of the
COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as
candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao
del Norte and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, an independent candidate,
withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan
Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS party
and was nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS Wing" as the
substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the basis of said nomination,
EMMANUEL filed his certificate of candidacy, attached thereto
is his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate
signed by Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter
MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman together with
EMMANUEL's written acceptance of the party's nomination.
Mula, likewise sought the disqualification of the substitute
Emmanuel. While the case was pending before the COMELEC,
Emmanuel won as mayor.
Issues:
1. Whether the substitution was valid.
2. Whether Governor MATUGAS has authority to
nominate a candidate without the concurrence
of Senator BARBERS.
3. Whether the decision as to which member a
party shall nominate as its candidate is a party
concern which is not cognizable by the courts.
4. Whether the validity of EMMANUEL's
nomination as substitute candidate has been
rendered moot and academic by his
 proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of
Malimono as the duly elected municipal mayor
and after he has assumed into office.
Held:
1. Yes, the substitution was valid. The rule on
substitution of an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy is governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides:
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging
to, and certified by, the same political party may file
a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy
for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the
day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day,
said certificate maybe filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to
be voted for by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the
above said requirements. EMMANUEL was properly
nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party
"MATUGAS wing" to which TEODORO, the disqualified
candidate, belongs, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance signed by MATUGAS, the Party's'
provincial chairman. That EMMANUEL is a bona fide member
of the LAKAS party is shown not only by the certificate of
membership, but more importantly by his certificate of
candidacy filed before the COMELEC stating therein that he
belongs to the LAKAS party.
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior
to his nomination is immaterial. What is more significant is
that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy
as independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he
filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO
at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already
deemed a member of the LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing."
There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which
requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate
must have been a member of the party concerned for a
certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that
a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party as the candidate to be
replaced.
2. Yes, Governor Matugas has authority to
nominate a candidate even without concurrence of Barbers.
MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National
Headquarters through its Deputy Secretary General and
National Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang,
as the party officer authorized to nominate, sign, attest under
oath, and issue Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance for
the Party's official candidates for the positions of Board
58
Members, City Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors and
councilors for the Province of Surigao del Norte. Both
BARBERS and MATUGAS were given separate and distinct
authorizations when the mother of BARBERS ran for governor
against MATUGAS.
3. Yes, the decision as to which member a party
shall nominate as its candidate is a party concern which is not
cognizable by the courts. Political parties are generally free to
conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision;
this common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the
constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the
public interest by allowing the political processes to operate
without undue interference. Thus, the rule is that the
determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with
the party, in the absence of statutes giving the court's
jurisdiction.
4. Yes, the validity of EMMANUEL's nomination as
substitute candidate has been rendered moot and academic
by his proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of Malimono
as the duly elected municipal mayor and after he has assumed
into office. The fact that the nomination of a substitute lacks
the signature of one of the authorized signatory is but a
technicality which cannot be used to frustrate the will of the
electorate.
It has been held that the provisions of the election law
regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and
swearing on the same, as well as the information required to
be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the
elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory.
Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed
or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation
of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such
ground. The defects in the certificate should have been
questioned before the election; they may not be questioned
after the election without invalidating the will of the
electorate, which should not be done.
[71] PLR - Vivero vs Murillo
1929 En Banc
Facts:
Mateo G. Murillo, the defendant-appellee, was born in the
barrio of Paliway, municipality of La Paz, of the Province of
Leyte, where he lived with his parents and received his
primary education. In order to continue his studies he
removed first to Tacloban, Leyte, and later to Calbayog,
Samar, and finally to Manila until the year 1927, at the same
time acting as private secretary to Senator Veloso. Every year
he return to his native town to spend his vacations which
usually lasted from two weeks to one month, remaining
alternately in his parents' house and in that of his brothers.
While he studied he was supported by his parents. With the
approach of the general elections of 1925 Senator Veloso
assigned him to Burauen, Leyte, for the purpose of
compaigning for him. While in that municipality, he registered
there as voter.
In December 1926, he went back to La Paz and formally,
though verbally, announced his candidacy for the office of
municipal president of said municipality at the general
elections of 1928. In the same year 1926, he ordered some
wood to be prepared or sawed to be used in the construction
of a house for his residence. Later on Murillo returned to
Manila and then wrote to his friends, relatives, and
acquaintances, telling them of his candidacy for the office of
municipal president of La Paz.
In the month of February, 1927, he brought his family there,
leaving them in his parents' house when he went back to
Manila. In the month of July of the same year he returned to
La Paz and lived there with his aforesaid family and later came
to manila. Lastly, in the month of November, 1927, he
returned to his said municipality, and did not leave it until the
general elections in, June, 1928.
On April 4, 1928, Mateo G. Murillo went to Pascual Esplanada,
a notary public in the town of the municipality of Burauen,
Leyte, to subscribe to a petition under oath which was
presented to the municipal treasurer of that municipality to
have his name as a voter in Burauen cancelled. On April 14 of
the same year, in registering as a voter in the second precinct
of La Paz, said defendant Mateo G. Murillo presented a copy
of his petition for cancellation to the chairman of the board of
inspectors of said municipality, Pedro Tubio. The municipality
of La Paz was formely a barrio of the municipality of Burauen,
having been organized as an independent municipality in
1918.
Issue:
W/N the defendant-appellee, Mateo G. Murillo, had a legal
residence in the municipality of La Paz before the general
elections of 1928 in order to be eligible to the office of the
president of said municipality.
Held:
Yes. The defendant-appellee, Mateo G. Murillo, had a legal
residence in the municipality of La Paz before the general
elections of 1928 in order to be eligible to the office of the
president of said municipality.
It will be seen that Mateo G. Murillo has always, since his
childhood, been a resident of La Paz, not only while it was still
a barrio of the Municipality of Burauen, but also after it
became an independent municipality, and he did not absent
himself therefrom except when studying, first in Tacloban,
Leyte, later in Calbayog, Samar, and finally in Manila. By the
mere fact of having lived in Tacloban, Leyte, In Calbayog,
Samar, and in Manila, as a student, the defendant-appellee
did not acquire legal residence in said towns, nor lose his
residence in La Paz, because, being single, and supported by
59
his parents while studying, he was dependent on them and
their residence was his and it does not appear that he
acquired an independent legal residence anywhere else.
While it is true that the defendant-appellee registered as a
voter in Burauen in the general elections of 1925, yet he did
so without any thereto, for it does not appear that he resided
in Burauen at any time after the separation of the barrio of La
Paz from said municipality and its organization as an
independent municipality, nor that he transferred his
residence to the former abandoning that of his parents. On
the contrary, having continued his studies in Manila,
supported by his parents, returning to the latter's home during
his vacations, it is presumed that he continued to reside with
them until the month of November, 1927, when he
established his residence in the town of La Paz.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and
so hold, that a student living with his parents in a certain
barrio of a municipality, which barrio is later separated to be
organized as an independent municipality, who for several
years pursues his studies in several provinces of the
archipelago, supported by his parents, returning to the latters'
home during his vacations in the newly organized
municipality, does not loose his residence in said municipality,
either on account of having resided in different provinces as
a student, or of having registered as a voter in the former
municipality and is eligible as municipal president of the new
municipality even if his registration as a voter in the
municipality to which the new one originally belong has not
been cancelled.
By virtue wherof, and finding no error in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in its entirely,
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
[72] PLR – Ramirez v. COMELEC
1997; En Banc
Facts:
Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and private respondent Alfredo I.
Go were candidates for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern Samar
in the election of May 8, 1995. Petitioner was proclaimed
winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) on the
basis of results showing that he obtained 1,367 votes against
private respondents 1,235 votes.
On May 16, 1995, private respondent filed in the COMELEC a
petition for the correction of what he claimed was manifest
error in the Statement of Votes (SPC No. 95-198). He alleged
that, based on the entries in the Statement of Votes, he
obtained 1,515 votes as against petitioners 1,367 votes but
that because of error in addition, he was credited with 1,235
votes.
In his Answer with Counter-Protest, petitioner Jose C. Ramirez
disputed private respondents claim. He said that instead of
the total of the votes for private respondent Alfredo Go, it was
actually the entries relating to the number of votes credited
to him in Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7, and 10 which
were erroneously reflected in the Statement of Votes.
According to petitioner, the entries in the Statement of Votes
actually referred to the number of votes obtained by Rodito
Fabillar, a mayoralty candidate, and not to the votes obtained
by private respondent.
On August 1, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its first
questioned resolution, directing the MBC to reconvene and
recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim
the winning candidate for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern
Samar accordingly.
Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and public respondent Municipal
Board of Canvassers filed separate motions for clarification.
On September 26, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its
second questioned resolution, reiterating its earlier ruling.
Petitioner contends that (1) the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction over SPC No. 95-198 because the case was
resolved by it without having been first acted upon by any of
its divisions, and (2) the MBC had already made motu proprio
a correction of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes in its
certification dated May 22, 1995, showing the actual number
of votes garnered by the candidates and it was a grave abuse
of its discretion for the COMELEC to order a recomputation of
votes based on the allegedly uncorrected Statement of Votes.
Issue:
W/N the Comelec en Banc has the jurisdiction over manifest
error in the tabulation or tallying of the results.
Held:
Yes. The Comelec en Banc has the jurisdiction over manifest
error in the tabulation or tallying of the results.
Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC it was said that By now it is
settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of
the Commission and a petition for correction of manifest error
in the Statement of Votes, like SPC No. 95-198 is a pre-
proclamation controversy in none of the cases cited to support
this proposition was the issue the correction of a manifest
error in the Statement of Votes under 231 of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) or 15 of R.A. No. 7166. On the
other hand, Rule 27, 5 of the 1993 Rules of the COMELEC
expressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies
involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or
tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC
en banc, thus
5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly
With the Commission. (a) The following pre-proclamation
controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors
in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the
canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or
certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two
or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two
or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the
figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of
canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts
were included in the canvass, and such errors could not have
60
been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of
due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidates had
already been made.
(e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commission
en banc.
Accordingly in Castromayor v. Commission on Elections, and
Mentang v. Commission on Elections, this Court approved the
assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc over
petitions for correction of manifest error directly filed with it.
Our decision today in Torres v COMELEC again gives
imprimatur to the exercise by the COMELEC en banc of the
power to decide petition for correction of manifest error.
In any event, petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc. Not only did he
participate in the proceedings below but he also sought
affirmative relief from the COMELEC en banc by filing a
Counter-Protest in which he asked that entr[ies] in the
statement of votes for Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7 and
10, be properly corrected for the petitioner, to reflect the
correct mandate of the electorate of Giporlos, Eastern Samar.
It is certainly not right for a party taking part in proceedings
and submitting his case for decision to attack the decision
later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the
decision turns out to be adverse to him.
[73] VILLANUEVA V. COMELEC
Facts:
During the 1980 local elections, a certain Narciso Mendoza,
Jr. filed, on the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy,
his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the
office of vice-mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon.
But later on the very same day, he filed an unsworn letter in
his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of
candidacy "for personal reasons."
Later on, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his
companion Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn
"Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the
said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket.
Villanueva won over Lirio with a margin of 452 votes, but the
Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in
favor of Villanueva as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial
Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's
name does not appear in the Comelec's certified list of
candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his
candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so that his
votes could not be "legally counted."
Respondent COMELEC also denied Villanueva’s petition for the
annulment of Lirio’s proclamation on the ground that
Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, as
required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no
legal effect. In addition, said withdrawal was made not after
the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of
candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but
on that very same day.
Issue:
Was Villanueva correctly disqualified?
Held:
No.
The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a
technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's
will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate.
In Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, the Supreme Court held
that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been
properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-
compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the
people have expressed their will, the result of the election
cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not
sworn to his certificate or candidacy."
Also, the Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's
substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in
consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Section
28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute
candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up
to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's
withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular
filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed
earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such
withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been
made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going
by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.
[74] MIRANDA V. ABAYA
Facts:
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago
City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
mayoralty post for the synchronized 1998 elections. However,
private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny
Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which
was granted by the Comelec in its resolution.The Comelec
further ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
However, way beyond the deadline of the filing of candidacy,
petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for
the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father,
Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private
respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner
garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private
respondent who got only 20,336 votes.
Abaya then filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, praying for
the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for
being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to
substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
Issue:
1) Was Joel Miranda qualified to substitute Jose
“Pempe” Miranda?
2) If not, was Abaya validly proclaimed as mayor?
Held:
1) No.
In Bautista vs. Comelec, the SC explicitly ruled that "a
cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy".
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person
who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by
any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall
be eligible for any elective public office unless he
61
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the
period fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is
absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say that any person
who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a
certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount
of votes would catapult him into office.
Also, in Gador vs. Comelec, the Court held that a certificate of
candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the
person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the
same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy
at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose
certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is
no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to
the elective office aspired for.
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a
valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the
disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably
filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at
all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted
under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the
so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate
of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would
be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act
abhorred by our Constitution.
2) No.
The Court recalled its ruling in Nolasco vs. Commission
on Elections, such that, “in a mayoralty election, the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner
in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
It also reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of
Reyes v. Comelec `That the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled.
The doctrinal instability caused by seesawing rulings has
since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question,
this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed.
The SC found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited settled
ruling consistently applied by the Court since the case of Labo
vs. Comelec, Aquino vs. Comelec, Reyes vs. Comelec , and
Nolasco vs. Comelec.
The Court noted that the election results point to the fact that
private respondent was not then the choice of the people of
Santiago City, Isabela. The Court has no authority under any
law to impose upon and compel the people of Santiago City
to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on
succession under section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, would then apply.
[75] VICTORINO SALCEDO II VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
August 16, 1999

FACTS:
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was
evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without
his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo
married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil
ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage
certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent
Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of
the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections,
both of them having filed their respective certificates of
candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a
petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's
certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a
false representation therein by stating that her surname was
"Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had
no right to use said surname because she was not legally
married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no
information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali
Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon
learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband
to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because
the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo
filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was
granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre
are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the
present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her
personal, commercial and public transactions.
Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing
valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the
subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is
null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of
the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation
and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of
candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned
its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's
certificate of candidacy did not contain any material
misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the
petition to review such promulgation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname
"Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material
62
misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD: No. Private respondent did not commit any material
misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her
certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when
not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's
identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is
absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were
deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent.
Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know
who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor
of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into
voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission
on Elections denying the petition to cancel private
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
[76] TECSON VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December
2003 for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to
be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider
as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe,
father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on
September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence
of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. Considering that the allegations of
petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo
Poe may have been benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902,
there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter
was born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the
Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,
Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or
illegitimate
[77] QUINTO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 December 1 2009
Facts:
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution
provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any
person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
63
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall
not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from
their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners, who
hold appointive positions in the government and who intend
to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the provisions as null and
void.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause
Issue:
Is the contested provision unconstitutional?
Held:
Yes. Four requisites of a valid classification:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso
facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment if it is not germane to the purpose of
the law. The last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential treatment is not germane to
the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent
the use of a governmental position to promote one’s
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence
on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty
would be motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency
in the performance of duty because they would be attending
to their campaign rather than to their office work. Glaringly
absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane
to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. With the fact that they
both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to
treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the
elections.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the
discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse
could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who
files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the
position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials
differently from the elective ones.
[78] QUINTO VS COMELEC
GR. 189698 February 22, 2010)
Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration from the 2009 case. An
individual sought to declare as unconstitutional the 2nd
proviso in the 3rd ar. Of Sec. 13 of RA 9369, Sec. 66 of OEC
and Sec. 4(a) of COMELEC resolution. Mainly on the ground
that they violate the equal protection clause because of the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices
and those holding elective positions and suffer overbreath in
so far as they prohibit the candidacy of civil servants holding
appointive post.
Sec. 13 of RA 9369 states that any person holding public
appointive office or position, including active members of the
AFP, and officers and employees in GOCCs, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his CoC. On the other hand, Sec. 14 of RA 9006 provides
that an incumbent elective official is only considered as
resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the positions they are running; hence, they
are not deemed resigned from office upon filing of CoC.
Issue:
WON such provisions are constitutional.
Held:
It is constitutional.
There is an unmistakable purpose of the law for the
distinction. To note, sec. 261 f OEC prohibits such acts of
intervention of public officers and employees. On the other
hand, Sec. 2(4) of Art. 9-B f the 1987 Constitution, bans only
political offices and thus does not cover elected officials. Such
is the case because elected public officials, by the very nature
of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all
year round, even outside campaign period.
Hence, the dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective
officials is therefore germane to the purpose of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency and disciplining of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the
sovereign will.
[79] RULLODA VS COMELEC
Facts:
In the barangay elections of July, 2002, Romeo Rulloda and
Remegio Placido were the contending candidates for
Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
Before elections were held, however, Romeo died and
petitioner, his wife, Petronila Rulloda sought to run as
candidate in lieu of her late husband. To do this, Petronilla
64
submitted only a letter requires to the COMELEC and did not
file a COC.
Petronila won the election, but the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Placido as the winner as it ruled that there was no
valid substitution.
Issue:
WON there can be a valid substitution in a barangay election
Held:
Yes.
Private respondent contended that under Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Elections Code, substitution of candidates is not
allowed; that inasmuch as the barangay election is
nonpartisan, there can be no substitution because there is no
political party from which to designate the substitute as the
provision requires.
The Court ruled that such interpretation, aside from being non
sequitur, ignored the purpose of election laws which is to give
effect to the will of the voters. The absence of a specific
provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay
elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in
petitioner's favor cannot be counted because she did not file
any certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only
candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the
Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the
assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears
that petitioner's letter-request to be allowed to run as
Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband
was treated as a certificate of candidacy.
Further, technicalities and procedural niceties in election
cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will
of the electorate. Petitioner should be proclaimed as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman.
Hence Petronilla Rulloda should be proclaimed winner.
[80] FEDERICO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Edna Sanchez ran for mayor against respondent Maligaya in
the May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
However, in April 2010, her husband, Armando Sanchez, who
was also running for governor died. She withdrew her COC for
mayor and filed a new COC substituting her husband for
governor.
Subsequently the petitioner, Federico, filed his COC
substituting Edna as candidate for mayor.
Respondent Maligaya moved to declare Federico as ineligible
because he filed his COC beyond the deadline for filing of
COCs se by Comelec Resolution 8678.
Federico however posits that the resolution cannot go against
the law under the omnibus election code which provides that
substitutes can file their COC up to midday of the election.
The Comelec ruled in favour of Maligaya and annulled
Federicos proclamation as the winner.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec can set the deadline for Filing of
COCs against the deadlines set in the Omnibus election code.
Held:
Yes. The Automation law gave Comelec the power to set new
deadlines for filing of COCs that can be different from the ones
set in the Omnibus election code.
The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in setting
the deadline for filing. The Comelec is empowered by law to
prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful
the conduct of the first national automated election. RA 9369
which governs the conduct of automated elections specifically
allows COMELEC to set deadlines for the filing of certificates
of candidacy etc.
Under Sec. 15, “the Comelec, which has the constitutional
mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be
made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.
Thus, the substitution of Petitioner Federico was made out of
time and was thus void.
[81] HARRY ROQUE V. COMELEC
GR No. 188456, September 10, 2009
RE: Automated Election System (AES)
Facts:
On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending the
first automated election law, RA 8436. Section 5 of RA 8436,
as amended by RA 9369, which amendment took effect on 10
February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:
“Use an automated election system or systems in
the same election in different provinces, whether
paper-based or a direct recording automated
election system as it may deem appropriate and
practical for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation and
transmittal of results of electoral exercises:
Provided, that for the regular national and local
election, which shall be held immediately after
effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at
least two highly urbanized cities and two
provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao,
to be chosen by the Commission…In succeeding
regular national or local elections, the AES shall
be implemented nationwide.”
On 10 July 2009, the Comelec on the one hand, and TIM and
Smartmatic (Provider), on the other, signed the Contract for
the automated tallying and recording of votes cast nationwide
in the 10 May 2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the
COMELEC leased for use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200
optical scanners (and related equipment) and hired ancillary
services of the Provider.
65
On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed a
Petition to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its
implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms of the
Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its
subcontractors. Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation
for non-compliance with the requirement in Section 5 of RA
8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an
automated election system before deploying it nationwide.
To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity,
petitioners alleged that (1) the optical scanners leased by the
COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities"
under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only
failed to submit relevant documents during the bidding but
also failed to show "community of interest" among its
constituent corporations as required in Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Comelec
(Infotech).
Issue:
Did Comelec gravely abuse its discretion in awarding the
automation project with Smartmatic TIM Corporation?
Held:
No.
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the
enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners
invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award
to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and
conditions of the corresponding automation contract in
question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a
distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementer of laws relative
to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with
restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an
organization of lesser responsibility. It should be afforded
ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising means
and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great
objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly,
honest and peaceful elections.
This is as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make
decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen
events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court
has steered away from interfering with the Comelec’s exercise
of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office
properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the
Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of
certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.
This independent constitutional commission, it is true,
possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable
latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however,
towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly
be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight
timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates
of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of
goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel
address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system.
Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated
elections to succeed, credibly.
[82] ROSALINDA PENERA V. COMELEC
GR No. 181613, September 11, 2009
RE: Automated Election System (AES)
Facts:
Penera and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica during the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 2, 2007,
Andanar filed a Petition for Disqualification against Penera for
unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan
political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign
period.
Penera averred that the charge of premature campaigning
was not true. Although she admitted that a motorcade did
take place, she explained that it was simply in accordance with
the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the
filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a
motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such
filing.
Later, Comelec issued a Resolution disqualifying Penera for
engaging in premature campaigning.
Issue:
Does the conduct of a motorcade prior to the campaign period
constitute premature campaigning?
Held:
Yes.
The prohibited act of premature campaigning is defined under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
“Section 80. Election campaign or
partisan political activity outside
campaign period. — It shall be unlawful
for any person, whether or not a voter
or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an
election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the campaign
period.”
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not
just by Andanar's evidence, but also those of Penera herself,
that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their COCs on 29
March 2007, participated in a motorcade which passed
through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their
hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.
Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles,
consisting of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were
festooned with multi-colored balloons; the motorcade went
around three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her
partymates waved their hands and threw sweet candies to the
crowd. With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand,
Penera can hardly persuade us that the motorcade was
spontaneous and unplanned.
In view of the foregoing admissions by Penera and her
witnesses, Penera cannot now be allowed to adopt a
conflicting position. For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan
66
political activity outside the campaign period, Penera must be
disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
*Note: This decision was reversed upon Motion for
Reconsideration by Penera. See next case dated
November 25, 2009.
[83] PENERA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 181613, Novermber 25, 2009
Facts:
This case is pursuant to motion for reconsideration of the
earlier decision of the Supreme Court disqualifying petitioner
Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte. This was ruled after the court’s finding that
she engaged in premature campaigning as she participated in
a motorcade after filing her COC but before the start of the
campaign period. Petitioner argues that she was not yet a
candidate based on Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by
Section 13 of RA 9369.
Issue:
Does a person commit premature election campaigning
should she engage in a motorcade after filing her COC but
before the start of the campaign period?
Held:
No. This later decision granted the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed the earlier decision of the court.
In the original automated election law, RA 8436, there was no
express provision stating that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. However, when Congress amended the law through
RA 9369, it expressly provides that any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within such period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his COC.
In this case, when petitioner participated in the motorcade,
she was still not deemed a candidate for purposes other than
the printing of the ballots. As a result, any act committed by
her prior to the campaign period, even if constituting election
campaigning or partisan political activities, is not punishable
under the Omnibus Election Code. It is rather within the realm
of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression.
[84] BATABOR V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 160428
July 21, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner ran for Punong Barangay but lost to his opponent.
He filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare a failure of
election in 3 precincts, alleging that during the election, the
voting in those precincts were stopped at 1pm and
subsequently, the Chairman of the BEI tore all the unused
ballots. Allegedly, the latter did not allow the remaining voters
to vote. Thus, the petitioner’s relatives and followers,
numbering more than 100, were not able to cast their votes.
Issue:
Is there failure of election?
Held:
None. For there to be failure of elections, 2 conditions must
exist: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts
due to fraud, force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the
votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the
election. The cause of such failure may arise before or after
the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
In this case, while the alleged 100 votes of petitioner’s
relatives and supporters, if cast during the election, are
sufficient to affects its result, however, he failed to prove that
the voting did not take place in the 3 precincts. As found by
COMELEC, the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes show that out of the 316 registered voters,
at least 220 actually voted. This simply shows that there was
no failure of election in the subject precincts. Moreover,
petitioner’s allegation that the voting was not resumed,
preventing 100 voters, is better ventilated in an election
contest.
[85] CARLOS V. ANGELES
GR No. 142907, November 29, 2000.
Facts:
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, proclaimed petitioner Jose
Emmanuel L. Carlos as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela
having obtained 102,688 votes, the highest number of votes,
over that of respondent Antonio M. Serapio who obtained
77,270 votes. On June 1, 1998, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, an election
protest challenging the election results. The RTC of Caloocan
City, Branch 125, rendered its decision and set aside the final
tally of valid votes because of its finding of "significant badges
of fraud and failure of election." Despite the plurality of valid
votes in favor of protestee Carlos, the trial court set aside his
proclamation and declared protestant Serapio as duly elected
mayor of Valenzuela City.
Issue:
Was the RTC correct in declaring a failure of election?
Held:
No. In this case, the petitioner admittedly received 17,007
valid votes more than the protestee, and therefore the
nullification of the election would not lie. The power to nullify
an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a
view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under
circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial
measure.
In a petition to annul an election under Section 6, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, two conditions must be averred in order
to support a sufficient cause of action. These are: (1) the
illegality must affect more than 50% of the votes cast and (2)
the good votes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is
only when these two conditions are established that the
67
annulment of the election can be justified because the
remaining votes do not constitute a valid constituency. We
have held that: "To declare a failure of election, two (2)
conditions must occur: first, no voting has taken place in the
precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there
were voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to
elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result
of the election." Neither of these conditions was present in
the case at bar. More recently, we clarified that, "Under the
pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there
are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may
be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes.”
Moreover, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure
of election. It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc
that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election, the extent of that power is limited
to the annulment of the election and the calling of special
elections. The result is a failure of election for that particular
office. In such case, the court can not declare a winner. A
permanent vacancy is thus created. In such eventuality, the
duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as provided by law. We
find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[86] POE V. ARROYO
PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
Facts:
Election protest was filed by FPJ against GMA. In the middle
of the case, FPJ died and Susan Roces filed a motion to
substitute FPJ in the election protest. GMA asserts that Susan
cannot substitute since a public office is personal and not a
property that passes on to the heirs and that it is only the 2nd
and 3rd highest votes for the presidency who may contest the
election and Susan did not receive such votes nor she even
ran for presidency.
Issue:
May a widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died
during the pendency of the protest?
Held:

No. Under Rule 14 of PET Rules, it is only the 2nd and 3rd
highest voters who can contest the election. This Tribunal,
however, does not have any rule on substitution nor
intervention but it does allow for the analogous and
suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of
Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative.
However, in our application of this rule to an election contest,
we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to
the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs
upon death. This is not to say that death of the protestant
necessarily abates the pending action. We have held as early
as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public
office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an
election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either
would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party
in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of
the suit. Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit
from the outcome should it be determined that the declared
president did not truly get the highest number of votes and
thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-
presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come
forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased
protestant.

68