Subject: Sales

Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie

Title: Dizon vs. Court of Appeals
Citation: G.R. No. 122544

Facts:

 Overland Express Lines, Inc. (lessee) entered into a Contract of Lease with option to but
with Dizon (lessor) involving a 1,755.80sq parcel of land for 1 year commencing from May
16, 1974 up to May 15, 1975. During this period, Overland was granted an option to
purchase for P3,000 per square meter. The lease shall be on a per month basis with a
monthly rental of P3,000.00
 June 20, 1975, Overland allegedly paid P300,000 as partial payment for the leased
property, which an Alice Dizon accepted and for which an official receipt was issued.
 June 1976, Dizon increased rental of P8,000 per month was made effective and to which
Overland failed to pay.
 Upon non-payment of rental, petitioners filed an action for ejectment against Overland
which was granted by the City Court.
 Overland contended that it has exercised its option to buy the land when it paid P300,000
to Alice Dizon, petitioners’ agent, as partial payment for the land.
 Overland files an action for Specific Performance and Fixing of Period for Obligation to
compel the execution of a deed of sale pursuant to the option to purchase and the receipt
of the partial payment, and to fix the period to pay the balance which was dismissed by
the RTC but was granted by the CA.
 CA also recognized the perfection of the contract of sale between petitioners and
Overland.

Issue:
 Whether there was a perfect contract of sale when Overland Express Lines actually paid
the alleged P300,000 to Alice Dizon, as the agent of Fidela Dizon in consideration of the
option to buy?

Ruling:

No. There was no perfected contract of sale between petitioners and private respondent.

Under Art. 1475 of the New Civil Code, “the contract of sale is perfected at the moment
there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions
of the law governing the form of contracts.” Thus the elements of a contract of sale are consent,
object, and price in money or its equivalent. It bears stressing that the absence of any of these
essential elements negates the existence of a perfected contract of sale. Sale is a consensual
contract and he who alleges it must show its existence by competent proof.
 There was no valid consent by the petitioners on the supposed sale entered by Alice Dizon
as petitioners’ alleged agent, and private respondent. The most prudent thing private respondent
should have done was to ascertain the extent of authority of Alice A. Dizon. Being negligent in
this regard, private respondent cannot seek relief on the supposed agency.

Principle:

 Art. 1475 of the New Civil Code, “the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there
is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to
the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.”
 Elements of a contract of sale: consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent. It
bears stressing that the absence of any of these essential elements negates the existence
of a perfected contract of sale.
 Sale is a consensual contract and he who alleges it must show its existence by competent
proof.
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Gaite v. Fonacier
Citation: G.R. No. L-11827

Facts:
 Fonancier, owner of mineral claims known as Dawahan Group, constituted Gaite as his
attorney-in-fact. Gaite was authorized to enter into a contract with other persons with
respect to the mining clams.
 Gaite entered into a contract with Larap Iron Mines, a company Gaite solely owned, to
develop the mining claims. Later, Fonancier abruptly decided to revoke Gaite’s authority
as attorney-in-fact.
 Afterwards, Gaite sold the developments his company made in the mining claims areas
and the ore already mined for a sum of money to Fonacier.
 Fonacier secured the sale with a surety company.
 Part of the money was paid upon sale while the other part was payable out of the first
loan of credit covering the first shipment of iron ore and the first amount derived from
the local sale of the iron ore.
 After the surety expired, Gaite demanded payment of the remainder of the purchase
price but Fonacier refused arguing no sale of iron ore had yet taken place.

Issue:
 Whether or not the selling of the iron ores is a suspensive condition for paying Gaite.

Ruling:
No. The sale is not a suspensive condition but is only a suspensive period or term.

The stipulation in a contract of sale on the payment of the balance of the purchase price
must be deemed to cover a suspensive period rather than a condition.

The contract expresses no contingency in the buyer’s obligation to pay. The contract
recognizes the existence of an obligation to pay and only the maturity deferred. Gaite never
desired or assumed to run the risk of losing his right over the ore without getting paid for it as
shown by his insistence on a surety.

Treating the condition as a suspensive condition would leave payment at the debtor’s
discretion because the ore will be sold only when the debtor wants it to be sold. In onerous
contracts the rule of interpretation favor the greater reciprocity of interest and because sale is
onerous this rule applies. Greater reciprocity is obtained if the buyer’s obligation to pay is
deemed existing compared to such obligation non-existing until the ore was sold.

Principle
 Sale is an onerous contract because it imposed a valuable consideration as a prestation,
which ideally is a “price certain in money or its equivalent
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Acap vs. Court of Appeals
Citation: G.R. No. 118114

Facts:
 Teodoro Acap has been a tenant of a portion of land of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre since 1960.
 The said lot was formerly under the names of Spouses Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma.
 Upon their death, Felixberto, their only son, inherited the lot. Felixberto sold the lot to Cosme Pido.
 Acap continued to be the tenant of the portion of the said land and paid rentals to Pido, and upon his
death, thereafter to his widow Laurenciana.
 When Pido died, his surviving heirs executed a notarized “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights”
of the lot in favor of Edy de los Reyes.
 De los Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement whereby Acap accepted to
pay him 10 cavans of rice per year as lease rental.
 In defense, Acap denied having entered the said agreement with de los Reyes and that he did not
recognize de los Reyes’s ownership over the land.
 De los Reyes filed a suit of recovery and possession against Acap and or the payment of rentals accruing
to him as owner of the said lot.
 The lower court rendered a decision in favor of de los Reyes which was eventually affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is a recognized mode of
acquiring ownership by private respondent over the lot in question

Ruling:
No. Private respondent cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document.

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership may be through
Original mode (occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and Derivative
mode (mortis causa– sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).

In a contract of sale, a party obligates himself to transfer ownership and to deliver a

determinate thing while the other pays a price certain in money or its equivalent. On the other
hand, a Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights operate as a public instrument when filed
with the Registry of Deeds whereby the heirs decide and divide the estate left by decedent among
themselves as they see fit.

Therefore, “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” executed by the heirs waiving
their inheritance rights in favor of non-heir cannot be deemed a proper mode to affect title to
the land involved because waiver of inheritance right can only be done in favor of another heir.
Principle:
 Sale is a Form of “Title” and Not a “Mode.”
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: De Santos vs. City of Manila
Citation: G.R. No. L-21677

Facts:
 A Contract of Exchange was executed between City of Manila and Arellano University.
 Five parcels of land of City of Manila, 2,400 sq. meters in exchange for 3 parcels of land
of Arellano University.
 The parcels of land of Arellano were needed for the Azcarraga Extension.
 Antonio de Santos went forward and asked that such contract be declared null and void
because he has a claim over Lot 1. In his claim, he also asked that he be given the right to
preemption and redemption.
 The predecessor in interest of de Santos is Lopez. Lopez’ land, lot 4 was a subject of
expropriation because of the Legarda widening. Lopez be requested that he be given the
estero adjoining Lot 4 instead. The request was however held in abeyance when the
Legarda widening project was stopped.
 The lower court ruled in favor of the City of Manila.
 The same was affirmed by CA.

Issue:
 Whether or not de Santos has the right to preemption or redemption

Ruling:
No. De Santos has no right to pre emption or redemption.

Under Article 1622 of the New Civil Code, the right of legal redemption granted by law to
an adjoining owner of an urban land, cover only “resale” and does not cover exchanges of
properties.

There is no element under Article 1622 that was proven by de Santos. He did not acquire
any right to Lot 1 when Lopez sold him Lot 4, at most he only acquired the right to the latters
claim.

Principle:
 Article 1622 of the New Civil Code, the right of legal redemption granted by law to an
adjoining owner of an urban land, cover only “resale” and does not cover exchanges of
properties.
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Lo vs. KJS Eco-Formwork System Phil
Citation: G.R. No. 149420

Facts:
 Lo is a building contractor doing business under the name “San’s Enterprises”.
 On February 1990, Lo ordered P540,425.80 worth of scaffolding equipments from KJS. Lo
paid P150,000 as downpayment and the balance was made payable in 10 monthly
installments.
 KJS delivered the scaffoldings to Lo, but Lo was only able to pay the first 2 monthly
installments as his business encountered financial difficulties and he was unable to settle
his obligation to respondent despite oral and written demands made against him.
 On, October 1990 petitioner and respondent executed a Deed of Assignment where Lo
assigned to KJS his receivables in the amount of P335,462.14 from Jomero Realty
Corporation.
 However, when KJS tried to collect the credit from Jomero Realty, the latter refused to
honor the DOA because it claimed that petitioner was also indebted to it.
 When KJS demanded from Lo the payment of his obligation, Lo refused to pay claiming
that his obligation have been extinguished when they executed the DOA.

Issue:
 Was the obligation to pay extinguished by the DOA?

Ruling:
NO. The obligation to pay was not extinguished by the DOA.

Under the Civil Code, in order that there be a valid dation in payment, there must be:
1. Performance of the prestation in lieu of payment (animo solvendi) which may
consist in the delivery of a corporeal thing, real right, or a credit against the third
person;
2. Some difference between the prestation due and that which is given in
substitution (aliud pro alio); and
3. An agreement between creditor and debtor that the obligation is immediately
extinguished by reason of the performance of the prestation.

The assignment of credit, which is in the nature of a sale of personal property, produced
the effects of a dation in payment which may extinguish the obligation. However, as in any
contract of sale, the vendor or assignor is bound by certain warranties. The petitioner, as
vendor/assignor, is bound to warrant the existence and legality of the credit at the time of the
sale or assignment. When Jomero claimed that it was no longer indebted to Lo because of debt
compensation, Lo have breached his obligation under the DOA in warranting the existence of the
credit.
Principle:
 Article 1245 of the New Civil Code. Dation in payment shall be governed by the law on
sales.
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Celestino Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Citation: G.R. No. L-8506

Facts:
 Celestino Co & Company is a duly registered general co-partnership doing business under
the trade name of “Oriental Sash Factory”.
 From 1946 to 1951 it paid percentage taxes of 7% on the gross receipts of its sash, door
and window factory, in accordance with sec. 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code
which is a tax on the original sales of articles by manufacturer, producer or importer.
However, in 1952 it began to claim only 3% tax under Sec. 191, which is a tax on sales of
services.
 Petitioner claims that it does not manufacture ready-made doors, sash and windows for
the public, but only upon special orders from the customers, hence, it is not engaged in
manufacturing under sec 186, but only in sales of services covered by sec 191.
 Having failed to convince BIR, petitioner went to the Court of Tax Appeal where it also
failed.
 CTA, in its decision, holds that the “petitioner has chosen for its tradename and has
offered itself to the public as a “Factory”, which means it is out to do business, in its
chosen lines on a big scale.
 As a general rule, sash factories receive orders for doors and windows of special design
only in particular cases but the bulk of their sales is derived from a ready-made doors and
windows of standard sizes for the average home.. Even if we were to believe petitioner’s
claim that it does not manufacture ready-made sash, doors and windows for the public
and that it makes these articles only special order of its customers, that does not make it
a contractor within the purview of section 191 of the national Internal Revenue Code…
there are no less than fifty occupations enumerated in the aforesaid section…and after
reading carefully each and every one of them, we cannot find under which the business
of manufacturing sash, doors and windows upon special order of customers fall under the
category” mentioned under Sec 191.

Issue:
 Whether the petitioner company provides special services or is engaged in
manufacturing.

Ruling:
The important thing to remember is that Celestino Co & Company habitually makes sash,
windows and doors, as it has represented in its stationery and advertisements to the public. That
it “manufactures” the same is practically admitted by appellant itself. The fact that windows and
doors are made by it only when customers place their orders, does not alter the nature of the
establishment, for it is obvious that it only accepted such orders as called for the employment of
such material-moulding, frames, panels-as it ordinarily manufactured or was in a position
habitually to manufacture. The Oriental Sash Factory does nothing more than sell the goods that
it mass-produces or habitually makes; sash, panels, mouldings, frames, cutting them to such sizes
and combining them in such forms as its customers may desire.

Appellant invokes Article 1467 of the New Civil Code to bolster its contention that in filing
orders for windows and doors according to specifications, it did not sell, but merely contracted
for particular pieces of work or “merely sold its services”. In our opinion when this Factory
accepts a job that requires the use of extraordinary or additional equipment, or involves services
not generally performed by it-it thereby contracts for a piece of work — filing special orders
within the meaning of Article 1467. The orders herein exhibited were not shown to be special.
They were merely orders for work — nothing is shown to call them special requiring extraordinary
service of the factory. The thought occurs to us that if, as alleged-all the work of appellant is only
to fill orders previously made, such orders should not be called special work, but regular work.

The Supreme Court affirms the assailed decision by the CTA.

Principle:
 Article 1467 of the New Civil Code.
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Engineering Equipment and Supply Co.,
Citation: G.R. No. L-27044

Facts:
 EEI, which was engaged in the design and installation of central type air-conditioning
system, was assessed the advance sales tax for its important parts and materials as a
manufacturer and seller of the central air-conditioning system, instead of the
compensating tax it paid as a contractor.
 In countering the assessment, EEI claimed that it is not a manufacturer and seller of air-
conditioning units and spare parts or accessories thereof but a contractor engaged in the
design, supply, and installation of the central type of air-conditioning system, “which is
essentially a tax on the sale of service or labor of a contractor rather than on the sale of
articles subject.”

Issue:
 Whether or not EEI is a contractor for a piece of work thus only liable for 3% tax.

Ruling:
Contractor– a person who, in the pursuit of the independent business, undertakes to do
a specific job or piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods without
submitting himself to control as to the petty details.

True test of contractor – he renders service in the course of an independent occupation

representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means
by which it is accomplished.

The SC found that EEI was not a manufacturer of air-conditioning units. While it imported
such items, they were not for sale to the general public and were used as mere components for
the design of the centralized air-conditioning system, the designs and specifications of w/c are
different for every client. Various technical factors must be considered and it can be argued that
no two plants are the same; all are engineered separately and distinctly. Each project requires
careful planning and meticulous layout. Such central air-conditioning systems and their designs
would not have existed were it not for the special order of the party desiring to acquire it.

EEI is thus not liable for the sales tax. In comparison with Celestino case: Engineering
advertised itself as Engineering Equipment and Supply Company, Machinery Mechanical
Supplies, Engineers, Contractors while Oriental used “Oriental Sash Factory”. It also paid the
contractors tax on all the contracts for design and construction of central system unlike Oriental
who did not pay contractors tax. Engineering did not have ready-made air conditioning units for
sale unlike oriental whose bulk of their sale came from ready-made doors and windows As for
their liability for violation of Tax Code, they should pay the whole amount not the one suggested
by the commissioner
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Myrna Ramos vs. Sarao
Citation: G.R No. 149756

Facts:
 Spouses Jonas Ramos and Myrna Ramos executed a contract over their conjugal house
and lot in favor of respondent for and in consideration of P1,310,430.
 Entitled “DEED OF SALE UNDER PACTO DE RETRO,” the contract, inter alia, granted the
Ramos spouses the option to repurchase the property within six months plus an interest
of 4.5 percent.
 Petitioner tendered to Sarao the amount of P1,633,034.20 in the form of two manager’s
checks, which the latter refused to accept for being allegedly insufficient.
 Myrna filed a Complaint, and she deposited with the RTC two checks that Sarao refused
to accept.
 Sarao filed against the Ramos spouses a Petition “for consolidation of ownership in pacto
de retro sale”.
 Both RTC and CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint and appeal respectively in favor of
respondent Sarao.

Issue:
 Whether or not the pacto de retro sale was in reality an equitable mortgage?

RULING:
Yes. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art.1371, NCC).

Under article 1602 of the New Civil Code. The contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (1) When the price of a sale with right to
repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise; (3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser
retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the
taxes on the thing sold; (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention
of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of
any other obligation.

Therefore, the pacto de retro sale was an equitable mortgage.

Principle:
 Article 1602 of the New Civil Code.
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Sps. Roberto and Adelaida Pen vs. Sps. Santos and Juliam
Citation: G.R. No. 160408

Facts:
 On April 9, 1986, the appellees (the Julians) obtained a P60,000.00 loan from appellant
Adelaida Pen. On May 23, 1986 and on the (sic) May 27, 1986, they were again extended
loans in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively by appellant Adelaida.
The initial interests were deducted by appellant Adelaida, (1) P3,600.00 from the
P60,000.00 loan; (2) P2,400.00 from the P50,000.00 loan; and (3) P600.00 from the
P10,000.00 loan. Two (2) promissory notes were executed by the appellees in favor of
appellant Adelaida to evidence the foregoing loans, one dated April 9, 1986 and payable
on June 15, 1986 for the P60,000.00 loan and another dated May 22, 1986 payable on
July 22, 1986 for the P50,000.00 loan. Both Joans were charged interest at 6% per month.
As security, on May 23, 1986, the appellees executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their
property covered by TCT No. 327733 registered under the name of appellee Santos Julian,
Jr. The owner's duplicate of TCT No. 327733 was delivered to the appellants.
 When the loans became due and demandable, appellees failed to pay despite several
demands. As such, appellant Adelaida decided to institute foreclosure proceedings.
However, she was prevailed upon by appellee Linda not to foreclose the property because
of the cost of litigation and since it would cause her embarrassment as the proceedings
will be announced in public places at the City Hall, where she has many friends. Instead,
appellee Linda offered their mortgaged property as payment in kind. After the ocular
inspection, the parties agreed to have the property valued at P70,000.00. Thereafter, on
October 22, 1986 appellee executed a two (2) page Deed of Sale duly signed by her on
the left margin and over her printed name. After the execution of the Deed of Sale,
appellant Pen paid the capital gains tax and the required real property tax. Title to the
property was transferred to the appellants by the issuance of TCT No. 364880 on July 17,
1987. A reconstituted title was also issued to the appellants on July 09, 1994 when the
Quezon City Register of Deeds was burned.
 By reason of the foregoing discoveries, appellee filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on
January 1993. Counsel for the appellees, on August 12, 1994, formally demanded the
reconveyance of the title and/or the property to them, but the appellants refused. In the
process of obtaining other documents; the appellees also discovered that the appellants
have obtained several Declarations of Real Property, and a Deed of Sale consisting of two
(2) pages which was notarized by one Atty. Cesar Ching. Said document indicates a
consideration of P70,000.00 for the lot, and was made to appear as having been executed
on October 22, 1986. On September 8, 1994, appellees filed a suit for the Cancellation of
Sale, Cancellation of Title issued to the appellants; Recovery of Possession; Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The complaint alleged that appellant Adelaida, through
obvious bad faith, maliciously typed, unilaterally filled up, and caused to be notarized the
Deed of Sale earlier signed by appellee Julian, and used this spurious deed of sale as the
 vehicle for her fraudulent transfer unto herself the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
327733.
 RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and CA affirmed.

Issue:
 Whether or not the deed of sale was valid?

Ruling:
It is partly meritorious.

Article 2088 of the Civil Code prohibits the creditor from appropriating the things given
by way of pledge or mortgage, or from disposing of them; any stipulation to the contrary is null
and void. The elements for pactum commissorium to exist are as follows, to wit: (a) that there
should be a pledge or mortgage wherein property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for
the payment of the principal obligation; and (b) that there should be a stipulation for an
automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-
payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. The first element was present
considering that the property of the respondents was mortgaged by Linda in favor of Adelaida as
security for the farmer's indebtedness.

As to the second, the authorization for Adelaida to appropriate the property subject of
the mortgage upon Linda's default was implied from Linda's having signed the blank deed of sale
simultaneously with her signing of the real estate mortgage. The haste with which the transfer
of property was made upon the default by Linda on her obligation, and the eventual transfer of
the property in a manner not in the form of a valid dacion en pago ultimately confirmed the
nature of the transaction as a pactum commissorium.

Principle:
 Article 2088 of the Civil Code. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of
pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
Subject: Sales
Case Digest by: Taala, Deirdre Jo Marie
Title: Cabales V. Court of Appeals
Citation: G.R. No. 162421

Facts:
 Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte
to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino,
Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold
the property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972,
prior to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son,
Nelson, herein petitioner.
 Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in
lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and
her four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses
Feliano. It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being
minor at the time of the sale, will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon them
reaching the age of 21.
 In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his
share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson
learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property
in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the
Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from
denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender
the total amount of the redemption price.
 The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson
was no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon
the death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem
since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with
the right to alienate the same.
 The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made
by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were
binding upon them.

HELD:
With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96
“A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of
his estate, or the management of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has the
plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of
alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner
Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do
so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable. However, when he
received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the
sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the
time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather
it was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said
property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption
period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

Principle:
 Article 320 of the New Civil Code
 Article 326 of the New Civil Code
 Article 1403 of the New Civil Code