ATTY. LINSANGAN v. ATTY.

TOLENTINO

Thou shall not ‘steal’ another lawyer’s clients.

The Supreme Court has cracked the whip on a lawyer who had encroached on the professional practice
of another lawyer and in doing so, contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain.

In a the 12-page resolution penned by Justice Renato B. Corona, the Court suspended from the practice
of law for one year Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the Rules of Court.

The Court found that Tolentino committed an “unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal
practice.” Specifically, Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02, and 16.01, and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services.

In his complaint, Linsangan alleged that Tolentino, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced three of Linsangan’s clients, who are all overseas seafarers, to transfer legal representation.

One of the said seafarers attested that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to switch to Tolentino’s services
in exchange for a loan of PhP50,000. Labiano’s calling card had the words “with financial assistance” on
the front, and “services offered: consultation and assistance to overseas seamen repatriated due to
accident, injury, sickness, death and insurance benefit claims abroad” on the back.

In his defense, Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of
the said calling card, but later on admitted it during the mandatory hearing held by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. It found that respondent encroached on the professional service of Linsangan, violating
Rule 8.02 and other Canons of the CPR. Tolentino also contravened Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which prohibits solicitation of cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers, it
added. Rule 8.02, on the other hand, provides that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.

While the Court adopted the findings of the IBP, it raised the recommended penalty from reprimand to
suspension.

The Court said Linsangan presented substantial evidence to prove that Tolentino benefited through
Labiano’s actions, enticing hapless seamen to transfer representation due to Labiano’s promise that
Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.

The Court pointed out that the phrase “with financial assistance” contained in Labiano’s calling card was
clearly to lure clients who already had the services of another lawyer to change counsels with a promise
of loan to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled the clients, taking advantage of their financial
distress and emotional vulnerability, it said. The Court cited Rule 2.03 of the CPR, which provides that
“(A) lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.” Thus,
lawyers are not allowed to solicit cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers as such constitutes malpractice, which is a ground for disbarment.
The suspension takes effect immediately from Tolentino’s receipt of the Court’s resolution. The Court
also sternly warned Tolentino that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

COJUANGCO JR. v. ATTY. PALMA

Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo
J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a
lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.

Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent
was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. He hired respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently,
respondent’s relationship with complainant became intimate. On June 22, without the knowledge of
complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa, the complainant’s daughter in Hongkong. Complainant
came to know that, a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainant’s) office and airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hongkong; b)
respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor in the Hongkong authorities to facilitate his marriage
with Lisa; and c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children. Complainant
filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa. The complainant
contented that with the moral ascendancy of the respondent over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation
that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage, respondent
succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements of
the Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth
H. Palma and that the “advice” of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-
two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong in June 22,
1992 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a “bachelor.”

The respondent contented that “….. and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral
man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.”

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of respondent to Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.

Held: To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.

Respondent admits that he married Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a bachelor; however, he
claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no different from the term “spinster” with
respect to Luisa. There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well
that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he
married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at the Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand,
the Certificate of Marriage from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages in Hongkong proves respondent’s
subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s
second marriage was confirmed. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot
be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of
marriage. In such relationship, the man and woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity. How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to
Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Furthermore, (not stated in the case) under Article 35 paragraph 3 of the Family Code, “a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license is void ab initio except those covered by the preceding chapter”.
Though the marriage was solemnized in Hongkong, the intrinsic validity of the marriage is governed by
the national law of the contracting parties. In the case at bar, since both of the parties are Filipino
citizens, the validity of their marriage shall be governed by the Philippine law. Under the Philippine law,
absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage shall make the marriage void ab initio. Their
marriage was contracted without the valid marriage license, thus, the marriage of respondent and Ma.
Luisa is void ab initio.

OVERGAARD v. ATTY. VALDEZ

Facts: The complainant, engaged the services of respondent as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him
and two cases filed against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees, the respondent
refused to perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the
complainant’s request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the
complainant’s demands for the return of the money paid to him. Complainant Overgaard filed a
complaint for disbarment against Valdez before the IBP. During the investigation, respondent Valdez did
not participate despite due notice. He was declared in default for failure to submit an answer and attend
the mandatory conference. He did not submit a position paper or attend the hearing. The Court held
that respondent Valdez committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Issue: Whether respondent’s abandonment of his client constitutes a violation of his oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility?

Held: Yes, the court find that respondent’s disbarment should be upheld. From the facts of the case, and
based on his own admissions, it is evident that he has committed multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and without
making sure that the cases he was handling for his client were properly attended to during his absence,
and without making arrangements whereby he would receive important mail, the respondent is clearly
guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and abandon his clients and then rely on
the convenient excuse that there were threats to his safety. Even assuming that there were serious
threats to his person, this did not give him the permission to desert his client and leave the cases
entrusted to his care hanging. He should have at least exercised reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence by taking steps to ensure that the cases he was handling were attended to and that his client’s
interest was safeguarded. If it was not possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his care, he
should have informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed to withdraw
from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who could properly
represent him. Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot about the
cases entrusted to his care, to the complainant’s damage and prejudice. The respondent’s disbarment is
not anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the cases entrusted to his care, but on his
abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved from liability on the basis alone of these
inconsequential acts which he claims to have accomplished because the glaring fact remains that he has
failed to perform his essential obligations to his client, to the courts and to society. As the complainant’s
lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.30 This includes
not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and giving the complainant sound legal advice, but
also properly representing his client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required
pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his care with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for his client or the court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and
leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.

RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY RAQUEL G. KHO

Facts: Atty. Kho is a former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar. She was found guilty of gross
misconduct for her failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in her custody. She was fined
P10k. Since her malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Supreme Court ordered her to show cause why she should not be disciplined as a
lawyer and as an officer of the court. In her explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that her failure to make a
timely remittance of the cash deposited with her was inexcusable. She maintained, however, that she
kept the money in the court’s safety vault and never once used it for her own benefit.

Issue: Whether Atty. Kho is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01.

Held: Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and her ready admission of the infraction, although certainly
mitigating, cannot negate the fact that her failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was
contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission is a breach of her oath to
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of her duties under
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing
and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. By
definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although it is broad enough to include it. Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the
lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which
specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

Atty. Kho’s conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, she must be called
to account. Atty. Kho is ordered to pay FINE of P5,000.00.

TAN v. ATTY. GUMBA

Facts: Atty. Gumba obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and offered the parcel of land registered
in her father’s name as security. She even showed Special Power of Attorney that she was authorized to
sell or encumber the property. However, Atty. Gumba defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay
the same despite repeated demands. So, Mr. Tan went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only
to find out that the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered
respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should be subject to disciplinary actions considering that the deception
was made in her private capacity.

Held: Yes, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the case at bar, Atty. Gumba’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money
to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education
and complainants ignorance in legal matters.

However, suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.

ATTY. DIZON v. ATTY. LAMBINO

Facts: Dennis Venturina (Venturina), Francis Carlo Taparan (Taparan) and Raymundo Narag (Narag) were
taken as suspects in the killing of a UP student. They were taken into the custody of Col. Eduardo
Bentain, head of the UP Security Force. Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group,
requested that Taparan and Narag be taken into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino (Lambino), Legal
Counsel of UP Diliman, opposed Atty. Dizon’s move, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest.
After what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students
were allowed to go back to their dormitories. Atty. Villamor committed to accompany them to the NBI
the following morning.

Atty. Dizon filed a complaint against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
violation of Canon 1. Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty. He also earlier filed a
criminal complaint against Atty. Lambino before the Ombudsman for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes
it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses.

Atty Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Upon Atty. Lambino’s motion, the administrative cases were consolidated.

Issues: Whether or not Atty. Lambino or Atty. Dizon acted within their official duties.

Held: By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005,
CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she ―acted within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights
of the students in accordance with the school’s substitute parental authority and ―within the bounds of
the law as the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest.
With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in ―recklessly trying to arrest the suspects without
warrant.

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and approved the
Commissioner’s Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution, together
with the records of the cases which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006.

When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor
Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court addressing in the
negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:

(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No.
1829. x x x,

held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students ―cannot be construed as a
violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional, they having ―a right to
prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.

By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule
1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides, among others that a lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

SORIANO v. ATTY. DIZON

Facts: While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven by
herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An
altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent fired and shot complainant
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter pushed him out and sped off.

Issue: WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

Held: Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is
also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.

ABELLA v. BARRIOS

Facts: Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a Labor Case.
Complainant then filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration
Branch which the respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainant’s
motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there
was no action until the complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of the monetary award thereof
after the latter asked from the former how much would be his share. Thereafter, respondent issued a
writ of execution but the employer of the complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a
new writ of execution wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the effect that it
modifies the DECISION of the CA. Complainant now filed the instant disbarment complaint before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b)
issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03,
Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.

Held: YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the
lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from
engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from
encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest;
meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from
using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow
private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government
office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The infractions of the respondent constitute gross misconduct. Jurisprudence
illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads
the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper
or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." In
this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.However, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled
Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes theCourt from duplicitously decreeing
the same. In view of the foregoing, the Courtdeems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount of
P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondent’s transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future.

PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it
to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK
failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA
Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres
Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al
are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of
an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

Held: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza,
it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents
et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he
made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice
given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing
that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and
cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while
SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is
used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government
lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the
court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the
role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held
public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a
public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the service.