Argument estafe

In this case, the transaction subject of the criminal case for estafa against the
respondent is the receipt of the amount of P12,000,000 from the private
complainant, Ng, which was intended for the purchase of 120,000 shares of
stocks of MI. According to the Information in Criminal Case No. 167-MD, the
respondent used the money for his personal benefit instead of purchasing the
said shares in behalf of Ng.
It appears, as claimed by private respondent, that the amount of P12 million subject of the instant
Criminal Case for Estafa was given to petitioner to be diverted into shares of stocks from Mediserv,
Inc., while the petitioner averred that the amount was given as a loan. Thus, it is clear that the
nature of the transaction involving the P12 million of private respondent in the criminal case is the
same as the cases before the SEC and

Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation
through estafaunder Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements
of estafa are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit;
and

(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third person.

The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As
this Court previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable."35 Our law abhors the
act of defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this
kind of fraud.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which constitute estafa. Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence —

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) - x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.

In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or
conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa.
In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil
liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when
an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or
conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove
fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the
act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof
justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists.

In this case, the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner because the prosecution failed to establish by
sufficient evidence the element of misappropriation or conversion. There was no adequate evidence
to prove that Mandy gave the checks to petitioner with the instruction that she will use them to pay
the ICBC loan. Citing Mandy's own testimony in open court, the RTC Manila held that when Mandy
delivered the checks to petitioner, their agreement was that it was a "sort of loan."36 In the
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision, the RTC Manila ruled that the prosecution "failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."37 It then proceeded to order petitioner
to pay the amount of the loan.

11. What are the elements of Estafa with abuse of confidence, under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code?

The elements of Estafa under

Article 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,

(a) That money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same; (b) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (c) That such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; (d) That there is demand by the offended party
to the offender.

(Asejo v. People, 555 Phil. 106, (2007))

The second element establishes three ways in which estafa may be committed under this category:
1.

Misappropriation of the thing received

the act of taking something for one’s

own benefit; 2.

Conversion of the thing received

–
the act of using or disposing of another’s

property as it was o

ne’s own;

3.

Denial of the receipt of the thing received.

12.

What do you mean by “Misappropriation” or “conversion”?

The words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used in the aforequoted

Article 315,

connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s

own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To

"misappropriate" a thing of value for one’s own use or benefit, not only the conversion to one’s
personal advantage but also every attempt to dispose

of the property of another without a right.

(Sy v. People, G.R. No. 85785, 24 April 1989)

It is well-settled that the essence of estafa thru misappropriation is the appropriation or conversion
of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner

(U.S. vs. Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67).

Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by

circumstantial evidence.

(Lee v. People, G.R.No. 157781, 11 April 2005)

Failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.

(People v. Sullano, G.R. No. L-18209, 30 June 1966)

13. What do you mean by denial of the receipt of the thing received?

It means that a person who has possession of a thing, does not return or denies receiving the thing
to the owner. There are two kinds of possession: a) Material Possession
–

The actual physical possession of personal property, where the possessor cannot claim a better right
to such a property than that of its owner. b) Juridical Possession

It is present when the possession of the personal property arises from a lawful causation, contract
or agreement, express or implied, written or unwritten or by virtue of a provision of law. When the
money, goods, or any other personal property

is received

by the offender from the offended party (1) in

trust

or (2) on

commission

or (3) for

administration

, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and

juridical possession

of the thing received.

(Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 1990)

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owne

After a careful study of the records, we find that the petitioners cited exceptional circumstances are
more imagined than real.

complainants testified as to how they were prejudiced when they failed to receive their allotted

Paluwagan

funds. Given the totality of evidence, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner of the crime
charged.

The Penalty

The decisive factor in determining the criminal and civil liability for the crime of

estafa

depends on the value of the thing or the amount defrauded.

[21]

With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the petitioner filed a manifestation
[22]

which showed the satisfaction of her civil monetary liability with six (6) out of the seven (7) private
complainants. Anent her criminal liability, the evidence shows that the amount of money remitted
by the private complainants to the petitioner all exceeded the amount of P22,000.00. In this regard,
the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the appropriate
penalty if the value of the thing or the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00:

1st.

The penalty of

prision correccional

in its maximum period to

prision mayor

in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. [italics ours]

As provided by law, the maximum indeterminate penalty when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00 is pegged at

prision mayor

in its minimum period or anywhere within the range of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years, plus one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 of the amount defrauded but not
to exceed twenty years. In turn, the minimum indeterminate penalty shall be one degree lower from
the prescribed penalty for

estafa,

which in this case is anywhere within the range of

prision correccional

in its minimum and medium periods or six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months.

[23]

Applying this formula, we affirm the penalty imposed by the CA as it is fully in accordance with the
la

ntrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article315,
paragraph 1(b) of the
RPC:1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by theoffender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under anyother obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return,
thesame;2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offende
r or denial on his part of such receipt;3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on theoffender .

[23]

All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.

Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a businesstransaction with SPI
wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for thelatter. Under their agreement,
SPI would provide the necessary components to be used inthe fabrication as well as the electronic
devices while work would be done at petitioners premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to
having received from SPI an electronictransformer, electronic box and a computer box.

[24]

When petitioner, however, was not able

to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded for the returnof its
properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand and simply kept
the properties as lien for his claims against SPI.

[25]

From petitioners own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of
the aforementionedelements is very clear. SPIs properties were received by the petitioner in trust.
He receivedthem for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and
spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioners allegeddismissal
therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.The Court cannot agree with petitioners
postulation that he did not acquire juridical possession of SPIs properties since his relation with the
same was only by virtue of hisofficial function as SPIs corporate officer. As borne out by the records,
the equipmentsubject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized
in thefabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to
use themwithout any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only
physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held in

Chua- Burce v. Court of Appeals

:
[26]

When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by theoffender from the
offended party (1) in

trust

or (2) on

commission

or (3)for

administration

, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and

juridical possession

of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right
over thething which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x

With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was

able to prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved b
y the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.

[27]

The failure to

account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence
ofmisappropriation.

[28]

As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the

properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutescircumstantial
evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitionersown personal use. Even
if petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien over them,
same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure toreturn upon demand the properties which one
has the duty to return is tantamount toappropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly
noted by the CA:We are not impressed by appellants excuse. We note that SPIsdemand for the
return of the properties subject of this case was made onJanuary 14, 1997. At that time, appellant
was no longer the managingdirector of SPI, he having been terminated from his position on
November19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPIs demand for the return of itsequipment and
materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain thesaid properties and the fact that he
failed to return or at least account forthem raises the presumption of misappropriation and
conversion. x x x

[29]

Lastly, it is obvious that petitioners failure to return SPIs properties valued at P191,665.35

caused damage and prejudice to the latter.In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims
that the controversy betweenhim and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was
a stockholder of thelatter.Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has no
basis.Contrary, however to petitioners stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Courtconsider
the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. Ascorrectly pointed out by
the CA:

Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would supportappellants allegation that
the acts complained of in this case were corporateacts. His allegation without more that he had an
agreement with Mr. BernieKelly of SPI to the effect that his (appellants) share in SPI would be
increasedto 40% in exchange for two bending machines does not give his act ofretaining the
properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is also noevidence that he acted on behalf of TAC
Manufacturing Corporation, muchless of SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that appellants
actuationshould be considered as a corporate act, for which he claims he could not beheld
personally liable. x x x

[30]

Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses to be credible and
therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for
its part, did not disturb the trial courts appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched doctrinethat
factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, areaccorded the
highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties.

[31]

Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them

obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the Courtaccords
deference to the trial courts appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly, theRTCs finding of
petitioners guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.

The proper imposable penalty

The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is

prisioncorreccional

in its maximum period to

prision mayor

in its minimum period if the amountof the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00.
If the amount involved

exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in itsmaximum
period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment forevery P10,000.00 but in no
case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years

imprisonment.

In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved whichis
P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable

should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)days to
eight (8) years of

prision mayor
.

[32]

[A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the

penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case

shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.

[33]

Hence, sixteen

(16) years must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of

prision mayor

. And sincesame exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged at twenty (20)
yearsof

reclusion temporal

. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty nextlower than that prescribed by law
which is

prision correccional

in its maximum to

prisionmayor

in its minimum is

prision correccional

in its minimum to medium periods. Thus, theminimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere from six (6) months andone (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x.

[34]

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly peggedthe penalty in
its maximum term of twenty (20) years of

reclusion

temporal
but erred inimposing the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of

prision mayor

as same is beyond the lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of
the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of

prision correccional.

Accordingly, petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two(2) months of

prision correccional

as minimum to twenty (20) years of

reclusiontemporal

as maximum.

WHEREFORE

, the petition is

DENIED

. The Decision and Resolution of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006
and August 17, 2006,respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
issentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)months
of

prision correccional

as minimum to twenty (20) years of

reclusion temporal

asmaximum.

it is contrary to humanexperience for one not to require a document or receipt for thedown
payment of P100,000.00 for the sale of a property.

The foregoing findings clearly support private complainant's claim regarding the purpose of the
money, that is, that petitioner received the money in trust to be used as proof of her financial
liquidity. The Trust Undertaking, which was regularly executed, shows that the agreement was not a
loan. This places the transaction within the purview of Art. 315, the relevant paragraphs of which
read:

Art. 315

Swindling (estafa)

. Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of

prisiόn correccional

in its maximum period to

prisiόn mayor

in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed

prisiόn mayor

or

reclusiόn temporal

, as the case may be; x x x provided that in the x x x cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any
of the following means: 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: x x x x (b) By
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under Art. 315 1(b) are:

1. That the money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same; 2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; 3. That such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and 4. That there is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender. All these elements are present in the case at bar. Petitioner
admitted having received in trust the amount of PhP 100,000 from Castro; the amount was
misappropriated or converted; such misappropriation or conversion was to the prejudice of Castro;
and Castro demanded payment from petitioner. Petitioner asserts that upon receipt of the amount,
it was transferred to her and she was not prohibited to use or spend the same.

[16]

The very same money cannot be returned but only the same amount. This makes the transaction a
loan and not a trust agreement; thus, her liability is merely civil and not criminal. Petitioners
arguments are not meritorious. Art. 315 1(b) explicitly includes money in its scope. The nature of
money, that is, the exact bills and coins received in trust cannot be returned, was already considered
by the law. As long as the money was received in trust, on commission, for administration, or under
an obligation to return, failure to account for it upon demand is punishable under Art. 315 1(b). The
Solicitor General added:

In a trust agreement, the transfer of the property to the trustee is mere

physical possession

and not juridical possession. Unlike in a contract of loan where the debtor acquires juridical
possession and is technically the owner of the amount, in a trust, the obligation of the trustee is

fiduciary in nature

, i.e. to take care of the thing strictly for the benefit of the trustee in accordance with the purpose of
the express trust.

[17]

In the case at bar, the amount was received by the petitioner for the sole purpose of using it as
show money to the bank

. The money was entrusted to her for a particular purpose. Hence, she did not acquire the right to
dispose or spend the amount as she sees fit; she had the obligation to account for said amount.
Furthermore, the Trust Undertaking expressly states that the amount was received by the petitioner
not as a loan or credit. Under the parol evidence rule,

[18]

petitioner cannot vary the terms of the written agreement by claiming that the amount was
received pursuant to a contract of sale of their lot. With regard to the necessity of demand, we ag

imilarly in this case, there was a demand for petitioner to pay private complainant. This was
admitted by petitioner and the private complainant in their testimonies. Castro stated that she went
to the house of petitioner in Pangasinan to demand the return of the money, while petitioner stated
that Castro demanded the return of the down payment because allegedly, the sale did not
materialize. In both versions, the fact remains that demand was made upon petitioner.

"The prescribed penalty for estafaunder Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount
defrauded exceeds ₱22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The
minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional
minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). xxx

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall
not exceed 20 years. xxx To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions
oftime each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of
the RPC. Following this procedure,the maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental
penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court.

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by ₱22,000.00,
and the difference shall be divided by ₱10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded as
was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance with the settled rule that
penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. xxx"25

In the recent case of Lito Corpuz v. People of the Philippines,26 we recognized the "perceived
injustice" brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property, such as estafa, committed today based on the amount of damage measured by
the value of money eight years ago in 1932. This Court, however, cannot modify these range of
penalties in our decisions, as such action would be an impermissible encroachment upon the
power of the legislative branch of government and would constitute proscribed judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
decision dated September 10, 2007 and the resolution dated March 18, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29371, finding petitioner Nenita Carganillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa penalized under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC states:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property;

xxxx

The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or
property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4)
demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.17 In the
case of Pamintuan v. People,18 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of
the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit: 15 See
Motion for Reconsideration dated April 17, 2006; id. at 98-10 I.
16
Id.at107-108.
17
Pamintuan v. People, 635 Phil. 514, 522 (2010).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See ro/lo, pp. 22-27.
21
See id. at 36-37 and 111-112.
22
See PDCP Check amounting to P120,000.00 payable to Rowena R. Rodriguez; records, p. 62.
23
See id., including dorsal portion.
24
See id.
25
Guevarrav. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384, 394-395.

The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver
the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts. 19 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as defined
and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered the
jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to
either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c)
Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez
attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored twice for
being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez demanded that
Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand; (j) Cheng's acts clearly
prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.

In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng insists that Rodriguez admitted in her
own testimony that the transaction between them is not an agency on commission basis, but a plain
sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller and Cheng as the buyer.1âwphi1 As such, Cheng's non-
payment of the purchase price of the jewelry would only give rise to civil liability and not criminal
liability.20 The pertinent portion of Rodriguez's testimony is as follows: