SECOND DIVISION requested Rosalina to bring the land title which she was
given as collateral for the said loan.
[G.R. No. 187534, April 04 : 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO
CHUA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For consideration of this Court is the Decision[1] dated April
22, 2008 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC No.
00499, affirming with modification the Decision[2] dated
October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City, Branch 171, finding Appellants Dima
Montanir, Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The records bear the following factual antecedents:
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia "a.k.a. Alice" Buenaflor,
together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua,
on December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael
Mendoza, and after several days of conducting surveillance
on their intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided
to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City. However,
the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael did not show
up at the said place. On February 5, 1998, a second
attempt was made, but they encountered an accident
before they could even execute their original plan.
Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up
Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she
wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela
City to settle the former's loan of P350,000.00. She
Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia.
Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia
showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was with
appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and
Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as requested.
While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant Ronald
as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed Rosalina and Rafael
that she would pay them at her place.
When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was
located, Rosalina asked the former where they were going.
Alicia answered that they had to drop by the house of her
financier who agreed to redeem her title and substitute as
her creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not
protest. They finally reached a house in Ciudad Grande,
Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and
talked to a man inside a store, later identified as Jonard
Mangelin. The gate of the house was then opened by
appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage and
Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go inside the house.
Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed Rosalina as
they entered through a kitchen door. They passed by a
man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink.
While Rosalina was walking behind Alicia, she suddenly
heard a dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping feet.
She looked back at the direction where the sounds came
from and saw Rafael being forcibly dragged inside a room.
She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw
"Jessie Doe" place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a
gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded
with "Jessie Doe" to have pity on Rafael because of his
existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald rushed towards
her, poked a gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and
warned her not to make any noise. He told her that all they
want is her money, upon which, Rosalina said that if they
really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then
appeared to be on the verge of having a heart attack.
Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael
and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had
just entered the room, to help her pump Rafael's chest
while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told.
While CPR was being administered, appellant Dima started
removing all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include
his ring, wallet, watch and other items inside his pocket,
and passed them on to appellant Ronald.
Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take
Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where she
was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to help her escape.
Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help
her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that
two women had tipped them off as the kidnap victims.
When asked who they were, Jonard refused to reveal their
identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around
12:00 noon because certain female visitors arrived. After
the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to the room where
she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about
Rafael's condition, to which he replied that Rafael would be
brought to the hospital. A little later, at around 1 p.m.,
Jonard went to check on Rafael and confirmed that he was
still alive.
Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone
being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she asked Jonard the
whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he was brought to
the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died
and his body was placed inside the trunk of a car.
Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be
brought to another safe house. She was taken to a car and
placed at the back seat, together with Jonard and three
other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The
driver of the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald
instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with a jacket
which Jonard did. As they were about to leave, the man
seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized
the voice of Robert. She then lifted the jacket covering her
head and was able to confirm that the one talking was
Robert. Rosalina cried, "Robert, Robert, why did you do this,
we did not do anything to you" and Robert responded,
"Pasensiyahan na lang tayo."
By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi,
Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit
candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house familiar
and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to
a room on the second floor and while inside the room, she
was told by one of the men guarding her that one of the
leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's instruction,
the guard put out the candle light. The man then seated
himself beside Rosalina and warned her against escaping as
they were a large and armed group. Rosalina recognized
the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room,
Robert gave instructions to Jonard and the other men
inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the
back of the same house near the swimming pool.
Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the
group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert
instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that the latter
should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do.
Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the others to
guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her upon
his return.
Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same
day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her, Rosalina
begged him again to help her escape for the sake of her
children.
When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the
men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the room.
The room was only illuminated by a light coming from the
hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig and
sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as
Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by modulating his voice,
Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital and that he
could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the whereabouts
of the other land titles and the identities of the other
financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the
negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted,
"That's impossible," and then left the room. He gave
instructions to his members and left.
At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about
Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter to panic
and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard for her
escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions Larry,
Jack and Boy and told them that he would help Rosalina
escape. His companions immediately cocked their guns and
an argument ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged
them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told
Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape, they too
would get into trouble. Taking advantage of the situation,
Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all
agreed to escape in the early morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left
the safe house. They walked through a rice field for about
30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas,
Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao
and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of
jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave the P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack
and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay with Rosalina so
that she would have a witness and, in case Rosalina would
further need their help, left their address with Jonard.
When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's
brother Tito, and related what happened to her and his
brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital Rafael was
brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at
the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina
called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet
them at Farmer's, Cubao. When Atty. Agbi arrived, she
accompanied them to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted.
The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG
were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and
Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes, while
appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the residence
of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively
identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her kidnappers.
Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the police authorities to the
safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where the
body of Rafael was buried. The remains of Rafael was later
on exhumed.
Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of
Valenzuela City (Branch 171), with the following allegations:
Criminal Case No. 123-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, being then
private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA REYES against her will
and detained her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a
period of two days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
 Criminal Case No. 124-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, being then a
private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL MENDOZA against his will
and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and
on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard
and appellants Ronald, Dima and Eduardo, pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice Buenaflor
and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of the
case. Jonard was later on discharged as a state witness.
Afterwards, the trial on the merits ensued.
On October 28, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment
against the appellants for the crime of kidnapping, the
dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused DIMA
MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of kidnapping and in accordance with Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes
the penalty of DEATH on accused NORVA and MONTANIR.
As regards accused CHUA, this Court hereby imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held
jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Mendoza the
amount of Php 71,000.00 in actual damages and Php
50,000.00 as moral damages.
As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS
her on reasonable doubt of the charge of kidnapping.
Consequently, The Jail Warden of Valenzuela City Jail is
hereby ordered to cause the immediate release of the said
accused from detention unless she is otherwise being
detained for some other legal and lawful cause.
With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and
one JESSIE DOE, let the cases against them be ARCHIVED
pending their apprehension. Meantime, let an alias warrant
issue for their apprehension.
Considering the penalty imposed on accused MONTANIR,
NORVA and CHUA, let the entire records of these cases be
elevated to the Court of Appeals for appropriate review of
the judgment herein rendered.
SO ORDERED.
On automatic review, the CA affirmed the conviction with
modification on the penalty imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned
Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty
of death imposed on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby
modified to reclusion perpetua to conform to and in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants
Montanir, Norva and Chua are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the
heirs of the victims.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal.
In their respective Briefs, appellants raised the following TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF
assignment of errors: THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

DIMA MONTANIR: II.

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DIMA MONTANIR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT
WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
EDUARDO CHUA:
I.
APPELLANT RONALD NORVA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT
WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed
by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court and affirmed by
the CA, is the special complex crime of Kidnapping with
Homicide. After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code
on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
EVIDENCE. than three days.

II. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public

authority.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
CHUA A CONSPIRATOR TO THE COMMISSION OF upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
KIDNAPPING. him shall have been made.

RONALD NORVA: 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,

except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
I. public officer;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of
the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
As expounded in People v. Mercado:[3]
In People v. Ramos,[4] the accused was found guilty of two
separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to
death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found
the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of
kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last
paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes
the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction
drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing
of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed
under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No.
7659.
This Court further discussed the nature of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide in People v.
Larrañaga,[5] thus:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the resulting crime
is called a special complex crime. Some of the special
complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are
(1) robbery with homicide,[6] (2) robbery with rape,[7] (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries,[8] (4) kidnapping
with murder or homicide,[9]and (5) rape with homicide.[10] In
a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily
prove each of the component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A.
No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise
to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly
Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically
alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion
and in connection" with her detention and was killed
"subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof."
Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of
the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the
overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a
"direct relation, and intimate connection"[11] between the
kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be
considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a
component offense forming part of the herein special
complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs.
Ramos,[12] and People vs. Mercado,[13] interpreting Article
267, we ruled that "where the person killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle
applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention
can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated
as separate crime but shall be punished as a special
complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of
the crime is of no consequence in the imposition of
the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious
illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or
rape, still, the maximum penalty of death shall be
imposed.
In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges
that the appellants wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will and
detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on
the occasion thereof, the death of the victim
resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the
dispositive portion, merely stated that the appellants were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping, however, its mention of the phrase, in
accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH
on accused Norva and Montanir, clearly refers to the crime
committed as that of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants, therefore, were
correctly punished under the last paragraph of Article 267
as the evidence presented during the trial, in its entirety,
undoubtedly proves that the death of Rafael Mendoza,
although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the
kidnapping.
Delving on the arguments presented by the appellants in
this Court, their corresponding briefs pose a single common
argument - the prosecution did not present sufficient
evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed the crime charged against them. In particular,
they questioned the inconsistent testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution. According to them, the said
inconsistent statements from the witnesses, tarnish their
credibility.
This Court finds otherwise.
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the
trial court to determine.[14] For this reason, its observations
and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.
[15]
This rule is variously stated thus: The trial court's
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
been considered.[16] Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the
case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of
the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by
appellate courts.[17]
Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution,
stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was the one who
whispered to appellant Ronald to transfer Rosalina to
another room so that the latter would have no idea that
Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard
testified that it was Ronald who instructed him to transfer
Rosalina to a different room. Appellants also point out that
in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he
resided in Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to
what he testified in court that he resided in that same place
since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in her
testimony, Rosalina declared that she was with four men
seated at the back of the car when she was brought to
Pandi, Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own testimony,
stated that there were four of them including Rosalina
seated at the back of the car.
A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the
appellants show that the same refer only to minor details
and collateral matters and do not affect the veracity and
weight of the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. What really prevails is the consistency of the
testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the appellants.
Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies
are not rehearsed.[18] They are thus safeguards against
memorized perjury.[19]
Anent the inconsistencies of the contents of the affidavits
and that of the testimonies in court, this Court has already
ruled that testimonies in court are given more weight than
affidavits, thus:
x x x x Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court
due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may
have attended their formulation.[20] In general, such
affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but
by another person (i.e., investigator) who may have used
his own language in writing the statement or misunderstood
the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and
impatience that usually attend the preparation of such
affidavits. As this Court has often said:
An affidavit, "being taken ex-parte, is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from
partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of
suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction
of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the
subject."[21]
We have too much experience of the great infirmity of
affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and
ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it
is; and must be, the language of the person who prepares
the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression
of that person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of
the language used by the witness himself; and however
carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he
may not understand what is said in a language so different
from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed
his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated
by a person on whom he relies, into language not his own,
and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to
acquiesce; and testimony not intended by him is brought
before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p.
1105; People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299).[22]
For this reason, affidavits have generally been
considered inferior to testimony given in open court.
[23]
Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was
able to explain and reconcile the minor discrepancies in his
testimony by saying that he whispered to appellant Ronald
that Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it was
appellant Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to
another room, thus:
Atty. Basco:
Referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, on page 20
of the TSN dated February 24, 1999 referring to the same
statement, Mr. Witness, in your statement here when
asked:
Q. Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when you
answered in the manner? And your answer was:
A Ronald Norva told me, "Pare, the old man is in bad
 condition, you better transfer Mrs. Reyes to another
room so that she could not see the condition of the
old man."
Q So which is which Mr. Witness? It was you who
gave order or instruction to Mr. Ronald Norva or it
was he who gave instruction?
Atty. Can we have the translation of that statement?
Gabi:
Atty. That is a very inconsistent statement of the witness?
Basco:
A: This is like this, ma'am.
Atty. Just answer my question. Which is which, Mr.
Basco: Witness? Which is the truth, your salaysay or your
testimony on February 24 in open court?
A: The two are true, ma'am, because when I
whispered to him that the old man was in a bad
condition he gave me instruction to transfer
Mrs. Reyes to another room.[24]
The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding
his time of residence in Taguig, thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you said in your Sinumpaang
Salaysay of February 19, 1998 that you were
residing in Taguig at Maharlika Village sometime in
October 1987? Do you confirm that?
Atty.
Mendoza:
May we ask for the translations, Your Honor.
A No, sir, the actual year is 1997, not 1987.
Q So you are correcting your answer in your
salaysay of February 19, 1998 under paragraph
No. 13 wherein you answered: "Ako po ay
nakikitira sa kaibigan kong si Ting sa Muslim Area,
Maharlika Village, Taguig, Metro Manila nuong
buwan ng Oktubre, 1987." You are changing the
1987 to 1997?
A The truth is 1997, sir.[25]
Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was
not able to establish his participation in the commission of
the crime because he was merely the house helper of the
safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, when the
kidnappers and the victims arrived. In the same vein,
appellant Ronald asserts that there was no convincing
evidence presented by the prosecution that will point to his
clear participation in the crime because he was just the
driver of the car that brought the victims to the place where
the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also insists that he
was not a participant in the offense charged in the
Information. Basically, the appellants deny any
participation in the kidnapping.
In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the
evidence presented, naturally found the existence of
conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[26] Verily,
when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the
conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of
them equally liable regardless of the extent of their
respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be
the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the
felony.[27] Each conspirator is responsible for everything
done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the
execution of a common design as one of its probable and
natural consequences even though it was not intended as
part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator
is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended.[28] Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law,
chargeable with intending that result.[29] Conspirators are
necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless
such act differs radically and substantively from that which
they intended to commit.[30] As Judge Learned Hand put it
in United States v. Andolscheck,[31] "when a conspirator
embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he
takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it
that they fall within the common purposes as he
understands them."
A scrutiny of the records show that the trial court did not err
in finding conspiracy among the appellants, as they each
played a role in the commission of the crime. The trial court
correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that he had
knowledge of the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellant's
bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in
the face of the prosecution witnesses' positive identification
of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive
narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative
testimonies of the defense.[32] The trial court ruled:
As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible than his
testimony applying the same principle that evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from a mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself, such that the common
experience and observation of mankind can show it as
probable under the circumstances.
Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's
claim that he was at Ciudad Grande because he was a
house boy of accused Chua after he admitted the
circumstances under which he has to live there a few days
before the victims were brought there.
To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's
explanation that he transferred to Chua because he was
looking for a permanent job is hardly credible because he
himself admitted that when he was brought by accused Uy
to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was
the understanding that it would be accused Uy who would
be paying his salary. Why would accused Uy pay the salary
of accused Montanir if he was to work as a house boy of
accused Chua? Evidently, the only plausible reason why
accused Uy would pay the salary of accused Montanir is
because he was actually working for the former and only
posted in the house of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande to
play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping.
This conclusion is bolstered by accused Montanir's
admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua
during all those times that he stayed at accused Chua's
residence as in fact, he took orders from accused Uy.
Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused
Montanir would suddenly go back to the house of accused
Uy on 19 February 1998 on the shallow reason that he had
no companion at Ciudad Grande when precisely he said he
was hired as a caretaker thereat while the regular boy was
on vacation.[33]
The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive
identification of the same appellant and his exact
participation in the execution of the crime, by the witnesses
for the prosecution, thus:
WITNESS JONARD
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what happened,
Mr. Witness?
A When the four (4) entered after ten (10) minutes I
heard like a commotion inside the house.
Q Then when you heard the commotion, Mr. Witness,
what did you do?
A What I did was I went out of the store to peep thru
the window near the lavatory.
Q And what did you see, Mr. Witness?
A I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr.
 Mendoza.
Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when they poked a
gun?
A When they poked a gun and placed the hands of Mr.
Mendoza at his back they forcibly entered the room.
[34]
WITNESS ROSALINA
Q And then what happened, Ms. Witness?
A And suddenly Jonard Mangelin entered.
Q And what happened?
A I pleaded to him to help me in pumping.
Q What did he do?
A And he helped me.
Q After helping you pumping Mr. Mendoza (sic), what
happened to Mr. Mendoza?
A While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest,
Dima Montanir was busy removing the things of
Mr. Mendoza.
Q When you said things to which are you referring to?
A His wallet, watch, ring and all the things in his pocket
and gave it to Ronald Norva.[35]
xxx
x Q
A When we returned to the DILG, the persons arrested
were already there and when I saw them I recognized
them that they were the ones.
Q Could you tell us the people whom you said were
there?
A Dima Montanir.
Q Can you point to him?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom, whom
when asked his name, answered: Dima Montanir).
Q And who else, Ms. Witness?
A Ronald Norva.
Q Can you point to him also?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom whom
when asked his name, answered: Ronald Norva).
Q Then what happened, Ms. Witness, after you were
able to recognize them?
A I told that they were the ones.[36]
In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he
participated in the offense charged does not outweigh the
testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying him as
one of the culprits, thus:
WITNESS JONARD
Q Did you follow the instruction, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Why did you follow the instruction?
A Because they are my Boss.
Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr.
Witness, are you referring to?
A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice
Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q You mentioned the name of Josie Herrera, was she
there at the vicinity?
A She was not there when the incident happened on
February 17, 1998.
Why did you include the name of Josie Herrera as one
of your bosses, Mr. Witness?
A Because, ma'am. On December 19, 1997 at the
middle of that month, Josie Herrera tipped to the
group that Mr. Rafael Mendoza is a good victim
because he has lots of money and engaged in a
lending business.
Q Were you there when she tipped the person of Mr.
Mendoza?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Where was this, Mr. Witness?
A At the house of Robert Uy.
Q Where was the house of Mr. Robert Uy, Mr. Witness?
A Candido Homes Subdivision, West Fairview, Quezon
City.
Q That was on (sic) the middle of December, 1997?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Mr. Witness, if this Josie Herrera whom you have
referred as one of your Bosses is around this
courtroom, could you please point to her?
(Witness pointing to a lady inside the Courtroom
whom when asked her name, answered: Josie
Herrera).
Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua
as one of your bosses, why do you say so that
he was one of your bosses?
A Because they were the ones planning how they
could get Mr. Mendoza.
Q And who were these people planning, Mr. Witness?
A The five (5) of them, ma'am.
Q Who are these five (5), Mr. Witness?
A Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice, Josie Herrera and Eduardo
Chua.
Q And where did this happen, Mr. Witness?
A When Josie Herrera tipped to the group on that
December, the group made a surveillance to be
familiarized with the face of Mr. Mendoza and Mrs.
Reyes.
Q And all the time, Mr. Witness, where was (sic) this
happened when you said they were planning?
A At the house of Robert Uy.
Q Did the surveillance took (sic) place, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.[37]
xxx
x them, we were not able to get them because in Ali
Q And where did you count the surveillance, Mr.
Witness?
A Ali Mall, at Cubao, Quezon City.
Q And what was the result of your surveillance, Mr.
Witness?
A They saw the victims Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes.
Robert Uy pointed to the two (2) as our victims.
Q Aside from the planning and the surveillance, Mr.
Witness, what else took place?
A On January 3, 1998 the first stage of the kidnapping
will took (sic) place on January 5, 1998 because they
want to make it quick.
Q Was (sic) the kidnapping take place at that time, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q On January 5, 1998?
A No, ma'am, January 5, that was the first try to kidnap
them when we went to Ali Mall but we were not able
to see them.
Q You said that there was a first try, was there another
try, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998.
Q What happened? Was that agreed upon by the group,
Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Who were these people in the group, Mr.
Witness?
A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy, Ronald Norva,
Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.
Q And did the kidnapping take place on the second try,
Mr. Witness?
A We were not able to take them, ma'am.
Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998, on our second try to kidnap
Mall the car of Alice Buenaflor was bumped by a taxi.
Q Was there another try after the February 5 try, Mr.
Witness?
A On that February 5, when we were not able to take
them; they changed the plan.
Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness?
A Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice
 Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q Is she the same Josie Herrera whom you identified
earlier, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Then what happened, Witness?
A After the second try, we were not able to take them,
so the plan was changed.
Q What was the plan that was changed? What was the
new plan?
A They were the ones who knew it. They were the ones
planning and I was only being utilized by the
syndicate.[38]
It must always be remembered that between positive and
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the
one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former
generally prevails.[39]
It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande,
Valenzuela, where the victims were brought was owned by
appellant Eduardo. The trial court was also correct in
dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely
lent his car to Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his
house because Robert had been so accommodating to him
and had facilitated his loan, thus:
Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is
conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the actual
scene of the incident, this Court nonetheless finds the said
accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the conspirators to
the commission of the felony who participated by furnishing
the vehicle used in abducting the victims and the house
where they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that
evidence to be believed must come from the mouth of a
credible witness which accused Chua is not. Indeed, this
Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation of accused
Chua that he knew nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is
simply too good to be true that he allowed Mangelin and
accused Montanir to stay at his house to guard it and attend
to his store while his caretakers were having a vacation.
Neither could this Court find cogent reason why accused
Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle and house
totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of accused
Uy. Nor is it credible that accused Chua would allow accused
Uy to use his vehicle just to follow up his loan application
and then after the same had been released he (accused
Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria, Bulacan or
to Ciudad Grande, instead, he went straight to the residence
of accused Uy, waited for him until the wee hours of the
morning of the following day, 18 February 1998, only to tell
accused Uy he was going home.
It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after
receiving the money he borrowed, he would spend it in
going to Davao with his daughter on 18 February 1988,
without any previous plan whatsoever and suspiciously,
upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that
one of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of the
kidnapping.
Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with
the testimonies of Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally
indicate accused Chua's complicity with the criminal design
of accused Uy and dissolves the said accused's plea of
innocence.[40]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of
the original design.[41] Responsibility of a conspirator is not
confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.
[42]
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences
of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which
necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that
they are in contemplation of law, charged with intending the
result.[43]Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of
another conspirator even though such act differs radically
and substantively from that which they intended to commit.
[44]

Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that

conspiracy existed in the perpetration of the crime. Thus, all
of the appellants, having been proven that they each took
part in the accomplishment of the original design, are all
equally liable for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

Lastly, this Court finds no error in the CA's modification of

the penalty imposed by the trial court. The penalty imposed
by the trial court, which is Death is now reduced
to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346.[45]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the

Court Appeals, affirming with modification the Decision
dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with
further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein are
equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38674 September 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. ALFREDO REGULAR and ARTURO DE
LARA, Defendants-Appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
Before this Court for automatic review is the decision of the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District in
Pasig, Rizal, which was promulgated in open court on April
22, 1974, sentencing the above-named accused Alfredo
Regular and Arturo de Lara to suffer the penalty of death for
the killing of prisoner Felipe Ladoy and the penalty of
imprisonment from reclusion temporal minimum
to reclusion temporal maximum for seriously wounding
prisoner Emilio Esparza.
Here is one of those unfortunate cases that have arisen due
to, among other factors, the wretched and deplorable
condition of prison life and confinement which have
destroyed the sense and sanity of many of the inmates,
goading them to violence, riots, and even killing fellow
prisoners. And thus, this Court had taken a considerate
understanding of their plight, their misery and despair in
order that they may not be "reduced to the level of animals
and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow
death." (See People vs. De los Santos, 14 SCRA 702; also
People vs. Alicia, 95 SCRA 227; People vs. Garcia, 96 SCRA
497; People vs. Abella, 93 SCRA 25; People VS. Dahil 90
SCRA 553).
The information dated August 5, 1972 filed against Alfredo
Regular, Arturo de Lara and Clemente Valeriano, charges
said accused with murder and frustrated murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of November, 1970 in the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused while then confined at the said institution,
conspiring, confederating and acting together, with
treachery and evident premeditation with intent to kill, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assaulted, attacked and stabbed with improvised deadly
weapons, Felipe Ladoy, No. 50600P and Emilio Esparza, No.
50092P, both sentenced prisoners serving prison sentences
in the same institution, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Ladoy,
multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body,
which wounds necessarily produced the latter's death and
simultaneously inflicting upon Emilio Esparza stab wounds
on the different parts of the body thus performing all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder nevertheless did not produce by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is by the timely and able
defense by Esparza which prevented the consummation of
the offense of murder.
Contrary to law.
One of the accused, prisoner Clemente Valeriano, bolted out
of jail before he could be arraigned. 1During the
arraignment of the two remaining accused, Alfredo Regular
and Arturo de Lara, held on August 7, 1972 and with the
assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Jose O. Galvan, the
following transpired:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Galvan
Your Honor, I have conferred with the accused Arturo de
Lara and Alfredo Regular and after I have explained to them
the contents of the information and having advised them of
the consequence of their act they both manifested that they
are entering a plea of guilty.
Court
Arraign the accused.
Atty. Galvan
The accused Valeriano is not here, your Honor.
(At this juncture, the Court Interpreter, after having read
the information in tagalog (Pilipino) to the accused, they
pleaded guilty.) Court (Court addressing to accused de
Lara)
Q Are you aware that the Court has no other alternative
except to impose capital punishment upon you? The only
thing that the Court has to do for you is to recommend you
from death to life?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Since when did you sole-search (sic) about your pleading
guilty?
A For a long time already, your Honor.
Q When was that?
A More than a year already, your Honor.
Q Are you a member of the Sigue-Sigue, Sputnik or any
other gang?
A Sputnik, Sir.
Q You are from what province?
A Pampanga, Guagua Court (Addressing to accused Alfredo
Regular)
Q Are you aware that by pleading guilty you will be
punished in accordance with the law and that is death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That the only thing that the Court can do for you is to
recommend you from death to life?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Since when did you have a sole-search (sic) of your
pleading guilty?
A That was a long time ago, your Honor.
Immediately after the arraignment, the Court proceeded in
open court to render sentence on the two accused, thus -
WHEREFORE, in view of the spontaneous and voluntary
confession of guilt of the accused Alfredo Regular and
Arturo de Lara, the Court finds them guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder as defined in Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 50
thereto, as charged in the information and hereby
sentences them to the penalty of Death as far as the crime
of murder is concerned and to suffer the penalty of
seventeen (1 7) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum for the crime of frustrated murder,
to indemnify the heirs of Felipe Ladoy the amount of
P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P12,000.00 as moral
damages and another P12,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and to pay their proportionate share of costs.
However, in view of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt made by the
accused as provided for, under paragraph 7, Art. 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court believes that the imposition
of the death penalty be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in
the case of People vs. Flores, State Prosecutor Francisco M.
Guerrero is hereby ordered to present evidence to
substantiate the charge of Murder and Frustrated Murder in
order to determine the degree of the culpability of the
accused.
In compliance with the directive of the Court "to
substantiate the charge of Murder and Frustrated Murder in
order to determine the degree of the culpability of the
accused, " the prosecution presented four witnesses. Briefly,
the prosecution evidence may be related, thus:
At about 12:30 in the afternoon of November 16, 1970,
prisoners Felipe Ladoy, member of Batang Cebu Gang and
Emilio Esparza, member of Batang Samar Gang, were
gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4 of the New
Bilibid Prisons. While they were thus preoccupied, the two
accused, Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara, together with
Clemente Valeriano and Reynaldo Castro, all members of
the rival Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang, suddenly stabbed Ladoy
and Esparza, as a result of which Ladoy died on the spot
while Esparza, who was able to parry the thrust of his
assailant, was immediately brought to the New Bilibid
Hospital for treatment of his injuries.
Upon investigation by the prison guards, it was learned that
the assailants surreptitiously went out from Dormitory 4-D
after sawing the iron grills at the south end of Building 4.
The day before, members of the Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang
were the targets of darts thrown by the Visayan group
composed of Batang Cebu and Batang Samar gangs. The
alleged treacherous attack by the rival group rankled in the
minds of the Sigue-sigue members who planned immediate
and swift reprisal to avenge the injuries of their gangmates.
Thus, armed with improvised bladed weapons, the
assailants pounced upon the unsuspecting victims Ladoy
and Esparza) until the former died and the latter was
seriously wounded.
After the stabbing spree, the malefactors returned to their
respective dormitories. Later, prisoners Regular, de Lara
and Castro gave up and admitted the killing. They executed
extrajudicial confessions acknowledging participation in the
incident. In the meantime, Esparza was treated by Dr.
Argente Alejandro who found the following wounds in the
different regions of the body:
1. Lacerated wound left shoulder, 3 inches long.
2. lacerated wound anterior aspect, left upper arm, 2 inches
long.
3. Lacerated wound, lateral aspect, left upper arm, 2-
inches long.
4. Two lacerated wounds at left chest, size 1 inch each.
5. Lacerated wound, medial aspect, upper arm, 1 inch long.
6. Lacerated wound, medial aspect, 1 inch long.
Ladoy's autopsy, conducted by Dr. Ibarrola proved that his
death was caused by massive loss of blood resulting from
multiple stab wounds found in his body,
On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is as
follows:
On the eve of November 15, 1970, while de Lara was in his
brigade, he heard Rodulfo Patuga say to his gangmates,
Valeriano and Castro, "Babawi tayo. Abe Castro, Menting ito
hindi na malalaman ng mga kasama natin itong
pangyayaring ito at hindi natin ipaaalam sa ating mga
kasamahan," 2
About past 12 o'clock noon, Noli Patuga saw Ladoy and
Esparza gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4.
The group approached the victims stealthily. Valeriano
stabbed Ladoy first. Patuga and Castro followed suit.
Accused de Lara thrust his improvised weapon into the body
of Ladoy only once, upon the command of Patuga, but he
did not know whether he hit the victim.
Accused Alfredo Regular testified that he did not know
either Ladoy or Esparza. On November 16, 1970, he alleged
that he was inside his brigade the whole day. During that
day, according to this accused, no unusual incident
happened inside the prison walls. He stayed in his brigade
up to the 18th of that month. He was called that day to the
investigation section of the New Bilibid Prison. He was
investigated by one Ignacio Ferrer. He was made to sign a
piece of paper, the contents of which he had not read. He
denied any participation in the killing of Ladoy and the
wounding of Esparza. He claimed that he was maltreated by
Ferrer so that he would sign a piece of paper. The room in
which he was brought was dark.He was boxed and was
beaten with a rubber stick and a big book.
On being confronted with the fact that de Lara mentioned
him as one of those who killed Ladoy and wounded Esparza,
Regular alleged that de Lara implicated him because he
bore a grudge against him. Regular alleged that when they
were still free, the girlfriend of de Lara transferred her
affection to him. This, according to Regular, made de Lara
angry vowing to revenge such outrage.
After several hearings of these cases, the trial court
imposed the same principal penalty it imposed during the
arraignment. The Court found three aggravating
circumstances present in the commission of the crime,
namely, treachery, evident premeditation, and recidivism,
necessitating the imposition of the appropriate penalties in
the maximum period.
In his appeal, appellant Arturo de Lara assigned two errors
committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that appellant Arturo de
Lara employed treachery and evident premeditation in
killing the victim Felipe Ladoy and wounding prisoner Emilio
Esparza.
2. The lower court erred in finding defendant-appellant
Arturo de Lara guilty of the crime of murder and frustrated
murder instead of completely exempting him from any
criminal liability on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Appellant Regular contends that the lower court erred in
imposing the death penalty based on the allegations of
treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism, which were
not fully supported by evidence. The appellants further
maintain that they were only acting in defense of their
gangmates, hence the penalties imposed in both cases are
not in accordance with law.
At the outset, it must be stated that the plea of guilty by
the two accused were improvidently laid. During the
arraignment, the trial judge did not adhere strictly to the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan 3 where We
postulated the guideline in cases where there is a plea of
guilty by the accused. In the instant case under review, We
observe that the trial judge failed to explain fully to the two
accused the meaning and the far-reaching effect of their
plea. It was not explained to them the meaning of the term
"treachery," an aggravating circumstance which qualified
the crime to murder and frustrated murder respectively.
Neither did the judge explain the terms "evident
premeditation" and "recidivism", both aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information which had legal
significance and consequences not ordinarily understandable
to a layman.
The trial judge asked the appellants whether they were
aware that the court had no other alternative except to
impose the capital punishment on them without explaining
why it had to be so. In People vs. Solacito. 4 We had the
occasion to say that, "(j)udges are duty-bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty,
he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import
of an inevitable conviction."
The trial judge immediately rendered sentence in open court
after the arraignment. As an afterthought or as a
justification for the imposition of the capital punishment, the
trial judge conducted several hearings and called for
presentation of evidence by the prosecution.
The hearings subsequently held proved that the appellants'
plea were not unconditional admissions of guilt and they
were not of such nature as to foreclose appellants' right to
defend themselves. Their plea of guilt became ambiguous
and qualified in the light of what transpired during the
presentation of evidence that followed.
In their extrajudicial confessions, both accused admitted
their participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding
of Esparza. 5
We have gone over thoroughly the extrajudicial confessions
of the two accused. In these extrajudicial confessions,
nothing is said on how the crimes were committed. The only
thing that these extrajudicial confessions had brought out of
the two accused is the fact that they had participated in the
stabbing spree. In open court, the accused de Lara made
explanatory statements on how he became involved in the
case, while the accused Regular completely repudiated his
confession.
It is true, of course, that under the Rules and in the spirit of
fair play, the whole of the confession must be put in
evidence. An extrajudicial confession may be accepted in its
entirety or only a part thereof. 6To accept fragments of the
confession which limits or modifies the criminality of the
accused and suppresses others which aggravates such
behavior is utterly inconsistent with justice.
Nevertheless, the aforecited rule admits of certain
exceptions, for it is not absolute. There are instances,
occasions and circumstances which can make it justifiably
imperative to believe or accept only a part of the confession
and reject the rest. One such instance is when an accused,
in his testimony, makes some explanatory statements
tending to mitigate his participation in the crimes committed
and the prosecution fails to rebut such testimony.

During the hearings that followed, the prosecution failed to
prove that the two accused committed the crime charged in
the information with the attending aggravating
circumstances alleged therein.
De Lara's testimony, which was unrebutted, showed that he
was only invited to join the group, an invitation which he
hesitantly accepted. Thus, he testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q The next day, November 16, 1970, where have you been
throughout that day, rather, where were you during that
day?
A Inside the brigade.
Q From what time did you stay there?
7
A Up to 1:00 o'clock.
Q Were you there when the incident happened?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us what happened on that day?
A In the morning, Noli Patuga called up Clemente Valeriano,
Reynaldo Castro and then they went to the "buyong".
Q Did they go to that "buyong" you are referring to?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Were you invited to join them?
8
A Yes, Sir.
There could be no treachery on the part of de Lara
considering that he was only invited to join the group
immediately before the incident took place. He had no time
to meditate, calculate and reflect in resolving to commit the
crime imputed to him. In order that treachery or alevosia
may be considered as a qualifying circumstance that would
change the nature of the crime or as an aggravating
circumstance that would augment the penalty, it must be
shown that the treacherous acts were present and had
preceded the commencement of the attack which caused
the injury complained of. 9 There is treachery when the
following requisites concur: (1) the culprit employed means,
methods or forms of execution which tends directly and
specially to insure the offender's safety from any defensive
or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party which
means that no opportunity was given the latter to do
so." 10 (2) that such means, method or manner of execution
was deliberately or consciously chosen. 11
The mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected
does not of itself suffice for a binding of alevosia if the mode
adopted by the accused does not positively tend to prove
that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the
accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk
to themselves arising from the defense that might be
offered. 12
Neither can evident premeditation be appreciated against de
Lara. While it is true that he heard of the plan to kill some
members of the rival gang the night before the incident
took place, he was not part of the group who made the
plan. He was just an
eavesdropper. 13He only knew that he was about to
participate in the stabbing of Ladoy and Esparza just
immediately before it took place. Given such situation, it
cannot be said that de Lara had sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow him to reflect recourse but to join them having eavesdropped the night
the consequences of his act. On this, de Lara testified: before, knowing what his fellow prisoners and gangmates
might do in case he refused to join.
xxx xxx xxx
The illegal acts committed by others in the group could not
Q Tell us what happened on that day? be considered against de Lara because conspiracy had not
been clearly established. If there was any conspiracy at all,
A In the morning, Noli Patuga called up Clemente Valeriano, it was limited to Patuga, Valeriano and de Castro. The plan
Reynaldo Castro, and then, they went to the "buyong". to kill any member of the rival gang was hatched by these
three men.
Q Did they go to the "buyong" you are referring to?
With regards to this, de Lara testified as follows:
A Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about you, did you go with them?
Q But the fact remains that you planned together with the
others to avenge the alleged wrong doing that was made to
A I went near them and told them I heard what they were
your game.
talking about last night.
15
A I was not included in the plan, your Honor. (Emphasis
Q Were you invited to join them?
supplied)
A Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you accept their invitation?
Q What time was the plan made by this Clemente and his
companion?
A I was still thinking of it and Patuga told me not to think
about it anymore because I'm already an "aburido".
A It was in the evening.
Q So at last you joined the group?
Q Were you there?
14
A Yes, Sir.
A No, Sir, Noli Patuga called the two. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing statements that de Lara had
Q How did you know that there was a plan to kin
no inkling that he would be joining the group before he was
somebody?
invited to do so. There is reason to believe that he accepted
the "invitation" with the knowledge that he had no other
A Because our kubol is near them. The evidence to prove the elements of conspiracy must be
positive and convincing. Pursuant to this rule, it has been
Q Did you tell somebody about the plan? held in U.S. vs. Magcomot 17and People vs. Caballero 18that
neither joint nor simultaneous action per se is a sufficient
A No, Sir. indicium of conspiracy; a common design must further be
shown to have motivated such action.
Q How did you come to know about the plan of this
Valeriano to kill somebody? From the testimonial evidence adduced above, it is clear
that de Lara was not included in the plan to retaliate against
the injuries suffered by their gangmates in the hands of
A I heard what they were talking about.
their rival gang who caught them unaware that Sunday
before Ladoy was slain.
Q From whom did you hear?
While it cannot be said that de Lara was acting under the
A From Noli Patuga. impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury,
it is reasonable to conclude that what happened was not
Q Will you tell us the exact words you hear as far as Noli entirely his own will and volition for he was more or less
Patuga is concerned? forced by his gangmates to participate in the stabbing
spree.
A I hear him, "Abe Castro, Clemente Valeriano and Menting
ito ay hindi na malalaman ng mga kasama natin itong We come now to the other accused, Alfredo regular. It
nangyayaring ito at hindi natin ipaalam sa ating mga appears that during the taking of testimonial evidence, this
kasamahan. accused evaded answering questions relating to his
participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of
Q What did you do upon hearing these words? Esparza. He claimed that on November 18, 1970, a certain
Ignacio Ferrer of the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid
A I just kept quiet. Prison brought him into a room wherein he was investigated
and was made to answer some questions. He further
Q What time did you hear those words? alleged that he was boxed and beaten. The room which he
was brought was dark, according to him, despite the fact
A Past twelve in the evening. that he was there from ten in the morning up to three in the
afternoon. Then he was made to sign a piece of paper
without reading it so he does not know its contents. The
Q That was November 15, 1970?
paper he was referring to turned out to be his confession.
16
As to where he was on that fateful day, Regular testified, to
A Yes, Sir. wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you tell us where were you on that fateful day?
A Inside the brigade.
Q Did you remain through the day on November 16, 1970?
A I was inside, Sir.
Q While you were inside the brigade, did you observe any
incident that happened?
19
A None, Sir.
In People vs. Catalino, 20We held that, "(i)t would be
unsound practice for the court to disregard the confession of
an accused simply because the accused repudiates it during
the trial." It cannot be believed that the confession was
coerced from Regular considering that the confession is
replete with details which can only be given by the person
who had experienced the same or had taken part in the
execution of the acts narrated. 21
From the extrajudicial confession of both accused, it
appears that Regular was not one of the men who planned
the killing incident. As mentioned earlier, the prisoners
Valeriano, Patuga and de Castro engineered the stabbing
spree and since Regular was not a co-conspirator, the acts
done by the three named prisoners cannot and would not
prejudice the appellant.
The same aggravating circumstances, namely, treachery,
evident premeditation and recidivism were imputed against
Regular. Treachery cannot be presumed. Like all other
circumstances which aggravate or qualify the commission of
the crime, the existence of treachery must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution to present evidence to prove such allegation.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed miserably to prove
that the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of Esparza was
attended with treachery. There were no witnesses who saw
how the stabbings were done. Nothing was mentioned in
the extrajudicial confessions of the accused as to the
means, methods, or manner of execution of the crimes. This
being the case, it cannot be established by mere
suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the
aggression, that the accused had employed means tending
to insure the success of their dastardly act without any
danger to his person. The circumstances specifying an
offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved
as conclusively as the act itself, mere presumptions being
insufficient to establish their presence according to law. No
matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions
may seem, they must not and they cannot produce the
effect of aggravating the crimes of the defendant. 22
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
cannot also be appreciated against the accused Regular. It
is a proven fact that Regular was not with the group of
Valeriano, Patuga and de Castro when the latter planned the
retaliation for the dart-attack made upon their gangmates.
The circumstances of deliberate premeditation exist only if it
could be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
intervened a period of time long enough in a judicial sense
to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection thus
enabling the conscience of the accused to overcome the
resolution of his will if he would only pay heed to its
warning.
There is no proof that Regular had known of the plan to kill
and/or stab any member of the rival gang. The records of
the case are scanty with regards to circumstances prior to
the event. While it is true that de Lara, in his confession,
alleged that Regular was one of the men who sawed the
iron grills in the window of their brigade, this part of his
confession was repudiated by him in open court. He testified
that he implicated Regular because he had a grudge against
him for taking away his girlfriend while they were still free."
Regular's own confession do not narrate the events prior to
the killing. While this Court is convinced that Regular
participated in the stabbing spree, It is not convinced that
he did it with treachery and evident premeditation simply
because the prosecution had failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that indeed the commission of these
crimes were attended by the alleged aggravating
circumstances. In the absence of treachery and
premeditation, the crimes committed by the two accused
are homicide and frustrated homicide.
Regular and Arturo de Lara, are hereby found guilty of
homicide and frustrated homicide and each is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty consisting of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum for the killing of Ladoy. Each is also sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum for the
stabbing of Esparza. All awards for damages are affirmed
without modification Both accused must bear the
proportionate share of the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Both accused are quasi-recidivists. De Lara was serving

sentence for robbery 24while Regular was serving sentence
for robbery and theft. 25In accordance with Article 160 of
the Revised Penal Code, they shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new
felonies which are homicide and frustrated homicide.
Although they entered a voluntary plea of guilty, they are
not entitled to the benefits of this ordinary mitigating
circumstance because the imposition of the maximum
penalty under Article 160, Revised Penal Code is
mandatory. (People vs. Bautista, et al., 65 SCRA 460). The
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal (Art. 249, R.P.C.)
and that for frustrated homicide is one degree lower, (Art.
50, R.P.C.) although the courts, in view of the facts of the
case, may impose upon the accused a penalty lower by one
degree than that which should be imposed under the
provisions of Art. 50. (Art. 250, R.P.C.).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of

the lower court is hereby MODIFIED. Both accused, Alfredo

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 78853. November 8, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ROEL PUNZALAN, JOSE BESIDA @ "JOSE VESIDOR",
MARIETA MENDOZA and DOMINGO
MENDOZA, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for Accused-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS;
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT; NOT DISTURBED BY
APPELLATE COURT; REASON THEREFOR. — The general rule
is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and will not lightly be
disturbed by an appellate court. The underlying reason for
this rule is that the trial judge had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, an
advantage not enjoyed by an appellate court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY DELAY IN BRINGING
THEM TO THE FISCAL’S OFFICE. — The fact that witnesses
Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez were brought to the
Fiscal’s Office by counsel of the heirs of the victim three (3)
months after the killing of the victim, does not by itself
impair their credibility. An obvious explanation for this
delay, if delay it was, is that it took sometime before those
two (2) individuals overcame their natural reluctance to
become involved in the investigation of a brutal crime and
to testify in court when co-accused Roel Punzalan and Jose
Besida were, and are, still at large.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CO-
CONSPIRATORS; CASE AT BAR. — It is possible that the
conspiracy did not originally extend to the killing of Mrs.
Fule, and that such killing was resorted on the spur of the
moment to counter unexpected resistance on the part of
Mrs. Fule or to prevent any outcry on her part. The general
rule, however, is that where conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all and that the extent of the specific participation of
each individual conspirator becomes secondary, each being
held liable for the criminal deed(s) executed by another or
others.
4. ID.; ID.; PRESENCE THEREOF NOT NEGATED BY SIMPLE
REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO FLEE WITH CO-ACCUSED. — The
simple refusal or failure to flee with her co-accused does
not, by itself, necessarily imply that she had never
conspired to rob the victim. Taking the totality of the
evidence presented against appellant Marieta in the light
most favorable to her, her failure to flee may be considered
as indication that she had been shocked that what had
begun as a plan to rob Mrs. Fule of her jewelry and money
culminated in her brutal slaying, and that appellant Marieta
sought to disavow the conspiracy to rob which she had
initially joined. So viewed, the ultimate issue may be seen
to be whether her "disavowal" or disengagement through
failure or refusal to flee was sufficient to extinguish or
negate criminal liability for the robbery and the killing. We
believe and so hold that such "disavowal" through failure to
flee was not sufficient to discharge appellant Marieta from
liability for the robbery and the killing. One who joins a
criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the
common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal
conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his
fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that
things may go awry and that the offended party may resist
or third persons may get killed in the course of
implementing the basis criminal design. To free himself
from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act
on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent
commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or
dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial
felony.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. — In
the instant case, while the failure to flee may perhaps be
regarded as a negative overt act, such "disavowal" crime
too late, having manifested itself after, and not before or
during, the consummation of the robbery and the slaying.
In legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to
be repudiated nor an unlawful killing which could have been
prevented since the conspiracy and the killing had already
materialized. The locus penitentiae, i.e., appellant’s
opportunity to purge herself of criminal liability, had already
passed. Appellant insists that her life was threatened by
Roel Punzalan who poked into her back what she believed
was a sharp instrument, when she discovered the robbery
and assault being carried out. She says that that
circumstance effectively prevented her from doing anything
to forestall or prevent the perpetration of the crime. The
difficulty with this defense is not merely that there is
nothing to support it except Marieta’s own word. That word,
when taken in the context of all the other circumstances,
especially her failure to raise the alarm long after the doers
of the crime had left, is simply insufficient to nullify the
prosecution’s case.
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION; PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. —
Marieta assails the finding by the trial court of the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation. However, the record
shows not only the time when the accused determined or at
least last conferred on the commission of the crime, but
also acts which manifestly indicated that the appellant and
her co-accused had clung to their determination to commit
the crime. An interval of seven (7) or eight (8) hours had
taken place between the meeting of the co-accused and
Marieta’s summoning of Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida into
the Fule house, an interval of time sufficient to allow
appellant and her co-conspirators to reflect upon the
consequences of their acts.
7. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; NOCTURNITY;
APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — Nocturnity was correctly
appreciated because it was purposely sought by the
conspirators to afford impunity and to facilitate both the
execution of the crime and their escape. 19 They not only
timed the robbery to coincide with the absence of Judge
Fule; they also chose to strike late that night to ensure that
the victim would be alone in her bedroom and unable to
resist or to flee.
8. ID.; ID.; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; APPRECIATED
IN CASE AT BAR. — Abuse of superior strength was
similarly correctly appreciated. There was great variance in
the relative physical condition of the assailants and of the
victim: two adult males as against an old lady suffering
from hypertension; the assailants were armed with bladed
and blunt instruments while the victim was alone and
unarmed and in no position to defend herself; and the great
violence inflicted upon the victim, as indicated by the
number and location of her wounds, all indicate the
presence of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSORBS DISREGARD OF AGE, RANK AND
SEX. — Disregard of age, rank, or sex was incorrectly
appreciated by the trial court. This circumstance was
absorbed in abuse of superior strength. Moreover, disregard
of age, rank, or sex is relevant only in crimes against
persons; the instant case involves robbery with homicide, a
felony classified as a crime against property, the homicide
being regarded as incidental to the robbery.
10. ID.; ID.; DWELLING; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT
BAR. — Dwelling should also have been disregarded
because the accused (except Domingo Mendoza) all resided
in the servants’ quarter of Mrs. Fule’s residence. The
servants’ quarter may be assimilated to the victim’s house,
the former being an appendage of, or attachment to, the
latter.
11. ID.; ROBBERY WITH USE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE
INTIMIDATION OF PERSON; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — Under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death when, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed. Article 63
paragraph 2 of the same Code provides, among other
things, that when there is at least one aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the
imposable penalty is death. Since death is not an
enforceable penalty under our Constitution, the appropriate
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
The accused, Marieta Mendoza, appeals from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30,
San Pablo City, convicting her of the crime of robbery with
homicide and imposing on her the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The appellant, together with Roel Punzalan, Jose Besida,
and Domingo Mendoza, were charged in Criminal Case No.
4578-SP in an information which read as follows:
"That on or about July 11, 1985 at Poblacion, Alaminos,
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, Accused MARIETA MENDOZA, in conspiracy with her
husband DOMINGO MENDOZA and ROEL PUNZALAN and
JOSE BESIDA alias ‘Jose Vecidor’ who are also still at large
and whose case is still pending in the Municipal Trial Court,
except Domingo V. Mendoza, were all employed as domestic
helpers in the house of Judge Conrado Fule and Mrs.
Lourdes Fule located in aforesaid municipality, while
conveniently provided with bladed weapons, taking
advantage of night time with treachery and evident
premeditation, with abuse of superior strength, in disregard
of the respect due the offended party and dwelling,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
forcibly entered the bedroom of Mrs. Lourdes Fule where
the latter was sleeping and once inside therein, with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
jointly attack, assault and stab Mrs. Lourdes Fule with the
weapons they were provided, inflicting upon the latters
mortal stab wounds on different parts of her body which
caused her instantaneous death and on the same occasion
and by reason thereof, with intent to gain, ransacked the
bedroom of the victim, Mrs. Lourdes Fule and did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take steal and
carry away cash money in the sum of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS and assorted pieces of jewelry worth
ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND
(P1,636,000.00) PESOS, belonging to the victim Lourdes
Fule, to the damage and prejudice of the victim and the
surviving heirs, in the amount of ONE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND (P1,646,000.00) PESOS,
representing the total amount unlawfully taken and carried
away and damages by reason of the death of aforenamed
victim.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Contrary to law." 1
Appellant’s co-accused have remained at large up to the
present time. Consequently, the prosecution of the case
proceeded only against appellant; the case was archived by
the trial court with respect to her co-accused. 2
Appellant proceeded to trial after entering a plea of not
guilty on 7 May 1986. 3 On 17 September 1986, after the
prosecution had presented four (4) of it’s six (6) witnesses,
Judge Benedicto Paz inhibited himself on the ground that his
landlady was the sister-in-law of the victim. 4 The case was
then re-raffled to the sala of Judge Salvador P. de Guzman
Jr. From there the case was re-raffled again to another sala
because Judge de Guzman could not maintain a weekly
schedule of trial hearings for the case. 5 The case was
eventually assigned to the sala of Judge J. Ausberto
Jaramillo Jr., who tried the case to completion and wrote
the judgment of conviction dated 22 May 1987. 6
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds
accused Marieta Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide punishable
from reclusion perpetua to death aggravated by the
circumstances of dwelling, in disregard of the respect due to
the offended party, abuse of superior strength, evident
premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence without
any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences her to
the applicable penalty of death. Fortunately, for accused
Marieta Mendoza, however, the death penalty has to be
reduced to life imprisonment in accordance with Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Accused Marieta Mendoza shall indemnify the heirs of Mrs.
Lourdes Fule the sum of P30,000 as civil liability for her
death and shall also indemnify them the peso equivalent of
the US$5,000, P70,000 and P1,500,000.00 representing the
stolen items, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
x x x
SO ORDERED." 7
The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as
follows:
"The accused Marieta is married to accused Domingo
Mendoza. Since two years prior to the incident in question,
the former, was employed on an off-and-on basis with the
family of the Fules until the time when the daughter of the
family cook Nieves Garcia Santos left when accused Marieta
became a permanent househelp. Accused Marieta’s primary
duty was to attend to the needs of Mrs. Lourdes Fule who
was then 66 years old, sick with hypertension. To be able to
promptly administer to the needs of her mistress, the
accused Marieta was made to sleep immediately outside the
door of her mistress so that medicines could be given to her
as the need arises. The accused Roel Punzalan was one of
the houseboys of the Fules since about 4 to 5 months prior
to the incident while accused Jose Besida alias ‘Jose Vecidor’
was hired two months prior, at the instance and effort of
accused Domingo Mendoza. A week prior to the incident all
the accused plotted to rob Mrs. Fule who had a collection of
jewelries and certain amount of cash.
On 9 July 1985 accused Domingo Mendoza arrived at 9:00
a.m. and stayed at the servants’ quarters of the Fule
compound located at corner Del Pilar and Rizal Avenue,
Alaminos, Laguna. He was seen in close huddle with the
other said accused. He spent the night until the next day of
July 10, 1985 (sic). After the master of the house, Judge
Conrado Fule left for Manila at about 4:00 p.m. all the
accused were seen to be in secret and close conversation.
Accused Domingo Mendoza was heard to have uttered
"Ituloy na natin wala si Judge Fule." Accused Domingo
Mendoza left at 6:30 p.m. that day. At about 7:30 p.m.
Gregorio Fule had supper at his mothers house while being
served by Nieves Garcia Santos and accused Marieta. After
eating, mother and son were talking about their health
while the son was fixing the betamax unit. After fixing the
betamax, the son, Gregorio Fule left his mother watching a
betamax tape together with the accused Marieta, Roel
Punzalan, Jose Besida, a child of Marieta and Nieves Garcia
Santos. At about 11:30 p.m. of July 10, 1985, Accused Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida went out of the house for their
servants’ quarters while the victim, Lourdes Fule and
accused Marieta locked up all the doors to the house. At
12:30 a.m. of July 11, 1985 accused Marieta was seen at
the door of the servant’s quarters calling (sutsot) for Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida after which the three of the
accused went up to the house. Accused Marieta Mendoza
knocked on the door of the victim and woke her up on some
pretext. When the door was opened by the
victim, Accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida went rushing
in and inflicted the injuries and stab wounds on the victim.
They put cloth on her mouth to prevent her from making an
outcry. When the victim was still lying on her bed bleeding
to death, the accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida
ransacked her drawers and scooped up the jewelries and
cash money. At this juncture, Accused Domingo Mendoza
was waiting in a parked jeep outside the Fule compound.
While all these were going on accused Marieta did not do
anything to help the victim. She did not also prevent the
killing of the victim. When the crime was consummated, the
accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida told accused Marieta
that they would meet at Del Remedio, changed their
bloodied clothes at the staircase and under the oliva (sic)
tree on the ground of the Fule
compound.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
At 6:00 a.m. of July 11, 1985, Accused Marieta woke up
June Murillo, another houseboy and Nieves Garcia Santos
without telling any of them about anything unusual that
transpired previously or what had happened to the victim.
Murillo started cleaning the Fule compound until he noticed
that the front iron gate of the Fule compound was open. He
reported this to accused Marieta and Nieves Garcia Santos
and the three of them went up to the adjoining house of
Gregorio Fule to report the matter. Accused Marieta
informed Gregorio Fule that Napasukan tayo ng
magnanakaw’. Murillo was instructed to fetch the police.
Gregorio Fule saw the bloodstained clothing near the oliva
(sic) tree and other personal items on the stairs leading to
her mothers room. When he went up, he saw the sleeping
mat, pillow and blanket of the accused Marieta immediately
outside the door of her mother’s room and when he was
already inside he saw [his] mother already covered with
blood, blood was all over the room, in pillows, boxes, etc.
The drawer where the valuables were kept was open
emptied of the $5,000.00, P70,000.00 cash and P1.5 million
worth of assorted jewelries. He went out of his mother’s
room and confronted accused Marieta on what happened.
Accused Marieta responded that she knew nothing allegedly
because ‘Tulog na tulog po ako’. The police arrived and an
investigation was conducted. Accused Marieta was initially
treated as a possible witness until later on when she was
suspected of having an involvement in the crime." 8
Appellant Marieta Mendoza narrated in court a different
story. Her story, as set out in her Brief, was the following:
1aw library
She "had been working as a housemaid of Mrs. Lourdes Fule
for five (5) years at the time the incident happened
although not on a continuous basis. There was (sic) times
when she was borrowed by Mrs. Fule’s daughter, Marilou.
On the first week of July, 1985, she was with Marilou but on
the second week thereof, she was with Mrs. Fule. On the
night of July 10, 1985, after all the members of the
household had taken their supper and after fixing the
kitchen, Marieta joined Mrs. Fule in watching a television
program together with two children, ore of whom was her
son. Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida also came and joined
them. After a while, she noticed Jose Besida went to the
kitchen and inside her room. She did not notice Roel
Punzalan left (sic) the place where they were watching
television. The doors were then all open including the door
at the room of Mrs. Fule and the door et her room. They
have finished watching television at around 11:00 o’clock in
the evening of July 10, 1985 after which Mrs. Fule and she
locked all the doors. She was the one who put up the
mosquito net or the bed of Mrs. Fule and she did not notice
anybody inside the room. She slept with her son outside the
room of Mrs. Fule, around three meters from the door of
Mrs. Fule’s room outside of the white mark, shown in Exhibit
‘F-1’. When lying down, the cabinet in her room was at her
right side and so with the way leading to the comfort room.
At her left side was the aparador and the room where rice
and iron (sic) clothes are kept. The door of the room of Mrs.
Fule has a lock both inside and outside. Until the time she
went to sleep, she did not notice Besida went out of the
room. Mrs. Fule’s schedule of taking her medicine was after
each meal, thus she does not have to wake up Mrs. Fule for
the medicines.
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of July 11, 1985,
Marieta was awakened by sounds of moaning from Mrs. Fule
but when she stood up, she was blocked by Roel Punzalan
and was told to just lie down or else she will be killed at the
same time poking something at her back which she
presumed to be a bladed instrument because it pierced
through her skin. Because of the threat, Marieta just lay
down facing the cabinet. After around three minutes,
Punzalan went out of the room but she did not notice
whether he was carrying something or whether his shirt had
bloodstain. After three minutes, another person passed by
and because of fear for her life, she just lay down facing
sidewise towards the cabinet with her back against the
passage from the door of the room of Mrs. Fule to the other
door. It was about 2:15 to 2:30 o’clock in the morning that
these two persons went out of the room of Mrs. Fule and
her room. The door of the room of Mrs. Fule was slightly
open and she saw scattered things but she did not see Mrs.
Fule. From the time she was ordered to lie down by
Punzalan, she did not sleep, she just lay down. Much as she
wanted to inform the other occupant, of the house, she was
not able to do so because of fear that Punzalan might still
be in the house, so she waited until around 6:00 o’clock in
the morning. She crawled going to Nieves Santos and
inquired about Roel Punzalan whom she saw at the room of
Mrs. Fule. She told Nieves that she heard Mrs. Fule moaning
and that she saw Roel Punzalan in the room of Mrs. Fule at
around 2:00 o’clock that morning. Upon knowing that Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida were not there, she and Nieves
together with Jun Murillo went to Gregorio Fule who is just
living in the house adjacent to the house of Judge Fule.
When they told Gregorio that Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida
were no longer there, they were told by Gregorio to call a
(sic) police and Gregorio went directly to the room of his
mother. Until such time, she had no knowledge of what
actually happened to Mrs. Fule because the first thing she
did in the morning was to inquire from Nieves Santos the
whereabouts of Punzalan because of what she had
witnessed a few hours ago and later she was told by
Gregorio to report the incident to the police.library
Marieta further testified that her husband, Domingo visited
her days before the incident. They talked about the children
and he drinking and nothing else. When Judge Fule left for
Manila on July 10, 1985, Domingo was no longer there
having left that day at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
She did not notice her husband talked (sic) with Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida. She knew nothing of the plans of
Punzalan and Besida. Neither did she knew (sic) of the
presence of these jewelries and money inside the room of
Mrs. Fule.
Marieta was investigated several times. The first statement
was in her own handwriting which was dictated to her by Ma
Ading (Nieves Santos’ nickname) and Francisco Fule
(Gregorio’s brother) with a threat to kill every member of
her family if shell make a mistake. Another statement was
in typewritten form prepared by the police when she was
interrogated at the police station on July 11, 1985 (Ex.’H’).
She did not fully understand every question asked of her by
the police officer. She signed said statement because she
was told that there was nothing wrong in signing said
statement. On July 15, 1985, another statement was
prepared at the police station of Alaminos, Laguna with her
signature appearing thereon (Exh.’C’)." 9
Appellant, in her Brief, made the following assignment of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I
The trial court gravely erred in giving much weight and
credence to the evidence for the prosecution and in
disregarding totally the evidence for the defense.
II
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant as
a co-conspirator granting without admitting that conspiracy
existed in the commission of the offense.
III
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged in
the information.
IV
The trial court gravely erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, abuse of superior strength,
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account
of his rank, age or sex, dwelling and evident
premeditation." 10
Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to establish
that she was a conspirator in respect of the robbery or the
slaying.
To this end, she seeks to impugn the credibility of some
prosecution witnesses who gave testimony indicating her
adherence to the plan of robbing the victim. She points out
that since the Judge who had observed the demeanor of
witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez in court was
not the same Judge who wrote the decision under review,
the Supreme Court is not hound by the latter judge’s
findings on the credibility of these witnesses.
The general rule is that findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and will
not lightly be disturbed by an appellate court. The
underlying reason for this rule is that the trial judge had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying, an advantage not enjoyed by an appellate court.
Appellant’s contention has merit in the sense that the Court
cannot rely solely on the aforestated rule with respect to the
two witnesses mentioned, (Nieves Santos and Pepito
Hernandez) and must make its own evaluation of the
testimony of these witnesses. 11
But the Court must also emphasize that the circumstance
pointed out by appellant, taken alone, does not render
erroneous the trial court’s reliance upon the testimony given
by Santos and Hernandez. 12 The continuity of a court and
the efficacy off its proceedings are not affected by
interruptions in the service of the judge(s) presiding over it.
13 In this case, the Judge who wrote the decision had
presided over the latter half of the trial. 14
Appellant contends that the trial court should not have
found Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez as credible
witnesses, considering that both were employees of the
victim’s husband and considering further that their sworn
statements tending to incriminate the appellant were
submitted to the Fiscal’s Office only three (3) months after
the commission of the crime. Appellant suggests that Judge
Fule exercised considerable influence over these two
witnesses.
It may well be true that Judge Fule had asked and
persuaded Santos and Hernandez to testify for the
prosecution. However, this Court is not prepared to believe,
for that reason alone, that Judge Fule led those two
witnesses to testify falsely against appellant. There simply is
no basis for such an insinuation.
The fact that witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez
were brought to the Fiscal’s Office by counsel of the heirs of
the victim three (3) months after the killing of the victim,
does not by itself impair their credibility. An obvious
explanation for this delay, if delay it was, is that it took
sometime before those two (2) individuals overcame their
natural reluctance to become involved in the investigation of
a brutal crime and to testify in court when co-accused Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida were, and are, still at large.
Appellant then contends that the testimony of Santos and
Hernandez was incredible in itself. Appellant’s claim is that
it was improbable that Pepito Hernandez saw Domingo
Mendoza (husband of appellant Marieta) in front of Fule’s
house at 4:30 A.M. on 11 July 1985 because this would
place him (Domingo Mendoza) approximately 2 1/2 hours
behind the time when Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida left
the room of the victim. It does not seem to the Court
necessary to deal with this contention. That particular
statement of Hernandez i6 not directly relevant to the
establishment of Marieta’s culpability. Whether or not
Domingo Mendoza had furnished the getaway vehicle for
Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida, does not impact upon other
evidence on record tending to show that Marieta had indeed
conspired to rob the victim.
Marieta impugns the testimony of Nieves Santos as
improbable. Marieta claims, first, that it is unlikely that
Nieves had chanced upon and heard a discussion among the
several accused relating to a plan to perpetrate the robbery
during the absence of Judge Fule, considering that the
accused would, (if they were true conspirators) have taken
great pains to conceal their criminal plan from a third party
who might denounce them. Secondly, Marieta questions
why Nieves Santos was able to hear and recall only
incriminating remarks from the alleged discussion. Finally,
Marieta asks why, if Nieves Santos had indeed seen her
(Marieta) summon Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida from the
servants’ quarters an hour or so before the crime was
committed, Nieves found nothing unusual in such summons
and chose casually to go back to sleep.
Once more, we consider that it is unnecessary to deal with
these speculative arguments in any detail. We do not think
it impossible that Nieves Santos should have overheard only
fragments of a discussion among the co-accused who,
presumably, were not interested in broadcasting their
intentions to the whole world. The summons by Marieta of
her co-accused did not alarm Nieves Santos who thought
that the house boys had been called for by the victim. That
Nieves Santos did not volunteer to get up and help in
whatever chore may have been needed to be done for Mrs.
Fule, does not appear unusual at all when one recalls that
Nieves Santos was a cook rather than a house-girl or an all-
purpose domestic servant. Further, the acts and words that
Nieves Santos testified she had seen and overheard do not
appear unambiguous indications of some evil intent or act.
Only after the discovery of the bloody killing of Mrs. Fule
and the taking away of valuable jewelry in addition to cash,
did those acts and words appear significant.
Appellant next seeks to assail the testimony of prosecution
witness Gregorio Fule, son of Judge Fule and the victim Mrs.
Lourdes Fule. Marieta contends it was unnatural that
Gregorio Fule had failed to mention having discovered some
pieces of jewelry belonging to his mother in or under
appellant’s pillow on her sleeping mat in the corridor
immediately outside Mrs. Fule’s bedroom on the morning
that he found his mothers body. Gregorio Fule first made
written mention of such pieces of jewelry three months after
the killing and robbery. Marieta also contends that Gregorio
contradicted himself when he stated in court that he had
placed the jewelry he accidentally found on the floor outside
the bedroom in a bank vault, considering that Gregorio also
testified that Judge Fule had refused to permit the opening
of Mrs. Fule’s or the family’s vault or safety deposit box in
the Prudential Bank Branch in Alaminos. Marieta asks why,
if she was indeed involved in the crime, she would conceal
the fruits thereof in a place so open to discovery.
Once more, we do not think these arguments significantly
affect the testimony of Gregorio Fule. An ordinary person
suddenly confronted with the bloodly corpse of his mother
would be so shocked and disoriented, as Gregorio Fule was,
as to forget or overlooked confronting appellant Marieta
about the stray pieces of jewelry on the floor near her
sleeping mat. That he had executed his statement referring,
among other things, to such stray pieces of jewelry only
three (3) months later does not necessarily imply that he
had merely fabricated such statement. Moreover, whether
or not the said pieces of jewelry were in fact placed by
Gregorio Fule in the bank vault (possibly in a vault of the
Rural Bank of Alaminos, whose offices were on the first floor
of Judge Fule’s house) has no necessary bearing on the
truth or falsity of his statement concerning his inadvertent
discovery of such stray pieces of jewelry on the floor. As for
the supposed improbability of Marieta ineffectually hiding
those pieces of jewelry in or near her pillow, it seems
sufficient to note that she may well have been unable to
think of a more secure hiding place for the stray pieces of
jewelry on the spur of the moment that brutal and bloody
night. In any case, Judge Jaramillo who wrote the decision
of the trial court had in fact observed witness Gregorio Fule
as he testified in court and Judge Jaramillo found his
testimony worthy of credence.
Since there was no direct evidence that appellant Marieta
had actually participated in the physical assault and
stabbing of the victim Mrs. Lourdes Fule, her conviction
rests upon the conclusion of the trial court that she had
participated in a conspiracy to commit the robbery in the
course of which the homicide had occurred. The factors
which lead the trial court to this conclusion are set out in
repetitive detail in the following portion of the trial court’s
decision:
"It is undisputed that accused Marieta was already aware
that Lourdes Fule was moaning that fateful night and had
glimpsed inside the victim’s room seeing scattered things.
But she did not do anything to assist her or prevent her
killing. Neither did the accused Marieta relate what she
witnessed that night to Nieves Garcia Santos and Gregorio
Fule. Her suppression of such information is highly
suspicious, to say the least.
Her claim that Roel Punzalan prevented her from entering
the room of the deceased is unbelievable. If it was really
true that Roel Punzalan blocked her way at the door and
ordered her to lie down otherwise she would be
killed, Accused Marieta could have rushed out of her room
and summoned help. Her excuse that she was allegedly
paralyzed by her fear is not worthy of credence because of
her allegation that from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. she was
awake lying down on her sleeping mat while the victim was
already dead or perhaps bleeding to death. No person who
is only three (3) meters away from the body of another, a
victim of foul play could have the nerve to stay alone at
right for four hours. An innocent person under such
circumstances would have not lasted five (5) minutes
staying in that room for four (4) hours without doing
anything. The fact that accused Marieta was able to show
how coldblooded she is and suggested her complicity. She
knew Mrs. Lourdes Fule moaned that night and could have
reasonably thought that she was hurt and needed help. But
when Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida left the victim’s room,
she did not even bother to check and see why her mistress
was moaning so strong enough to have awakened her.
Moreover, the fact that she suppressed the information
about what happened to her mistress to Nieves Santos and
Gregorio Fule was obviously intended to feign innocence.
But if she was really innocent and was not a co-conspirator,
she could have easily told Nieves Santos and Gregorio Fule
what happened to her mistress at the first opportunity. At
that particular time Jose Besida and Roel Punzalan were
already gone and the members of the Fule family were
there to offer her protection. She had nothing to fear from
Jose Besida and Roel Punzalan since they were already
gone. Instead, she only told Gregorio Fule that "Napasukan
tayo ng magnanakaw" when they reported to him about the
open front iron gate.
If it was also true that while watching TV she saw Jose
Besida enter her room leading to the victim’s room, her
failure to report this to the victim, to Gregorio Fule or others
leads one to believe that she was part of the conspiracy and
lends support to the existence of a criminal plan.
x x x
[S]he was not tied or bound by the other two accused, if the
accused Marieta was not a conspirator, since she was an
eye witness to the heinous crime she could have been killed
by the said two accused to eliminate an eye witness. Or, at
least they could have tied and gagged her to immobilize her
to give them ample time to escape in the darkness of the
night. She was not hurt by them. The fact that she was not
tied gagged, hurt or killed by accused Roel Punzalan and
Jose Besida militates against her claim of innocence.
The room of the victim is such that no one can enter inside
without passing through accused Marieta. The victim had
jewelries and cash inside her room, for which reason she
would not just open her door to anybody especially in the
middle of the night. Anyone planning to rob her must
contend with the presence of accused Marieta who slept
outside the room of the victim. Roel Punzalan and Jose
Besida could not have consummated the crime without the
involvement and in dispensable cooperation of accused
Marieta. If she was not involved or a co-conspirator she
would have been eliminated first, immobilized or neutralized
before the other accused could break-in the door of the
victim. It is significant to note that the door of the victim
can not be opened by a false key from the outside. It could
only be opened from the inside by releasing or sliding the
iron bolt which is installed inside. The fact that the victim’s
door was not forcibly opened shows that the victim opened
the door herself. The victim would not have opened for
accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida who were relatively
newly hired househelpers. But she would have opened the
door for accused Marieta, her sort of nursemaid and
security.
x x x
She could not explain how come Roel Punzalan was found
inside the room of the victim inspite of the fact that she,
together with the victim, closed and locked all the doors
prior to retiring to bed. The only persons that night in the
house were the victim and accused Marieta. The victim
could not have opened the doors leading to her room. The
accused Marieta admitted that the victim never allowed any
of the househelpers to enter the house at night. Accused
Marieta expressed ignorance on how the other accused were
able to enter the room of the victim. All these circumstances
put together definitely established the guilt of the accused
Marieta." 15
Examining the above excerpt, the elements consisting either
of affirmative acts or failure to act which led the court to
conclude that appellant had acted in concert with Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida, may be summarized as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. She had participated in the discussion among her
husband Domingo Mendoza, Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida
in the afternoon before the robbery and the killing, when
Domingo Mendoza had declared that the time to carry out
their plan had arrived with Judge Fule gone;
2. Marieta had unlocked doors and summoned Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida from the servants’ quarters and
brought them inside Judge Fule’s house an hour or so
before the robbery and the killing were committed;
3. Appellant Marieta had, by her own testimony, seen Jose
Besida enter her room leading to Mrs. Fule’s room while
Mrs. Fule and others were watching a video film, but failed
to report that fact to Mrs. Fule or to anyone else in the
household then watching the video film;
4. After hearing the moaning of Mrs. Fule through the open
bedroom door and after she was aware that Roel Punzalan
and another person had left Mrs. Fule’s room in the corridor
in which Marieta slept, she, per her own testimony, stayed
in the floor for four hours without attempting to find out
what had happened to Mrs. Fule and without attempting to
awaken Nieves Santos or any body else and to raise the
alarm;
5. Marieta had not been harmed in any way by Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida although she obviously recognized
them; they had not even tied or gagged her to prevent her
from raising an alarm.
We believe that the above multiple factors, when considered
together, lead to the conclusion, constituting moral
certainty, that appellant Marieta had acted in concert with
Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida at least in respect of the
robbery. It is possible that the conspiracy did not originally
extend to the killing of Mrs. Fule, and that such killing was
resorted on the spur of the moment to counter unexpected
resistance on the part of Mrs. Fule or to prevent any outcry
on her part. The general rule, however, is that where
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design
is shown, the act of one is the act of all and that the extent
of the specific participation of each individual conspirator
becomes secondary, each being held liable for the criminal
deed(s) executed by another or others. 16
Appellant insists that she was unaware of any plan to rob
the victim and that the fact that she did not flee with her
co-accused shows that she had not joined the
conspiracy.library : red

The simple refusal or failure to flee with her co-accused
does not, by itself, necessarily imply that she had never
conspired to rob the victim. Taking the totality of the
evidence presented against appellant Marieta in the light
most favorable to her, her failure to flee may be considered
as indication that she had been shocked that what had
begun as a plan to rob Mrs. Fule of her jewelry and money
culminated in her brutal slaying, and that appellant Marieta
sought to disavow the conspiracy to rob which she had
initially joined. So viewed, the ultimate issue may be seen
to be whether her "disavowal" or disengagement through
failure or refusal to flee was sufficient to extinguish or
negate criminal liability for the robbery and the killing.
We believe and so hold that such "disavowal" through
failure to flee was not sufficient to discharge appellant
Marieta from liability for the robbery and the killing. One
who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his
will into the common felonious intent. A person who
embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast
his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his
chances that things may go awry and that the offended
party may resist or third persons may get killed in the
course of implementing the basis criminal design. To free
himself from such criminal liability, the law requires some
overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent
commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or
dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial
felony. 17
In the instant case, while the failure to flee may perhaps be
regarded as a negative overt act, such "disavowal" crime
too late, having manifested itself after, and not before or
during, the consummation of the robbery and the slaying.
In legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to
be repudiated nor an unlawful killing which could have been
prevented since the conspiracy and the killing had already
materialized. The locus penitentiae, i.e., appellant’s
opportunity to purge herself of criminal liability, had already
passed. Appellant insists that her life was threatened by
Roel Punzalan who poked into her back what she believed
was a sharp instrument, when she discovered the robbery
and assault being carried out. She says that that
circumstance effectively prevented her from doing anything
to forestall or prevent the perpetration of the crime. The
difficulty with this defense is not merely that there is
nothing to support it except Marieta’s own word. That word,
when taken in the context of all the other circumstances,
especially her failure to raise the alarm long after the doers
of the crime had left, is simply insufficient to nullify the
prosecution’s case. Appellant’s word was not believed by the
trial judge. Judge Jaramillo, who was presiding when the
defense presented its case and who wrote the decision with
the benefit of observing her demeanor in court, 18 was
unable to accept appellant’s statement that she had been
coerced into silence by Roel Punzalan. There is no basis in
the record for setting aside this conclusion on the part of
the trial judge, a conclusion to which we must accord
appropriate deference.
We turn to the appreciation of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime. Marieta assails the finding by the trial court of the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. However,
the record shows not only the time when the accused
determined or at least last conferred on the commission of
the crime, but also acts which manifestly indicated that the
appellant and her co-accused had clung to their
determination to commit the crime. An interval of seven (7)
or eight (8) hours had taken place between the meeting of
the co-accused and Marieta’s summoning of Roel Punzalan
and Jose Besida into the Fule house, an interval of time
sufficient to allow appellant and her co-conspirators to
reflect upon the consequences of their acts.

Nocturnity was correctly appreciated because it was
purposely sought by the conspirators to afford impunity and
to facilitate both the execution of the crime and their
escape. 19 They not only timed the robbery to coincide with
the absence of Judge Fule; they also chose to strike late
that night to ensure that the victim would be alone in her
bedroom and unable to resist or to flee.
perpetua to death when, by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed. Article 63 paragraph 2 of the same Code
provides, among other things, that when there is at least
one aggravating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime, the imposable penalty is death. Since death is
not an enforceable penalty under our Constitution, the
appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.library : red

Abuse of superior strength was similarly correctly WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 22 May
appreciated. There was great variance in the relative 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the civil indemnity
physical condition of the assailants and of the victim: two for the victim’s death is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in
adult males as against an old lady suffering from line with recent jurisprudence of the Court. 21
hypertension; the assailants were armed with bladed and
blunt instruments while the victim was alone and unarmed SO ORDERED.
and in no position to defend herself; and the great violence
inflicted upon the victim, as indicated by the number and
location of her wounds, all indicate the presence of the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Upon the other hand, disregard of age, rank, or sex was

incorrectly appreciated by the trial court. This circumstance
was absorbed in abuse of superior strength. Moreover,
disregard of age, rank, or sex is relevant only in crimes
against persons; the instant case involves robbery with
homicide, a felony classified as a crime against property,
the homicide being regarded as incidental to the robbery.
20

Dwelling should also have been disregarded because the

accused (except Domingo Mendoza) all resided in the
servants’ quarter of Mrs. Fule’s residence. The servants’
quarter may be assimilated to the victim’s house, the
former being an appendage of, or attachment to, the latter.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, any person

guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons shall suffer the penalty of reclusion

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 218570, November 22, 2017
BEN MANANGAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeks to reverse the 20 May 2014
Decision2 and the 1 June 2015 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals. in CA-G.R. CR No. 33280 which affirmed with
modification the 22 January 2010 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22.
The Charge
Criminal Case No. 22-1597, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ben Manangan, John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard
Doe, Paul Doe, and Albert Doe, was filed against Ben
Manangan (petitioner) for the crime of robbery by a band
under Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 2001, in the
[M]unicipality of Tumauini, [P]rovince of Isabela, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Ben Manangan, together with John Doe, Peter Doe,
Richard Doe, Paul Doe and Albert Doe, whose identities are
still to be determined, conspiring, confederating together
and helping one another, all armed with assorted firearms,
with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation
against person, that is: by poking their firearms towards the
persons of Ocampo U. Denna and members of his family
including one Felix Denna and at gun point, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and
bring away cash money in the amount of P50,000.00,
belonging to the said Ocampo U. Denna, against his will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner, in
the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.6
Version of Facts of the Prosecution
The RTC Decision narrated the prosecution's version of the
facts as culled from the testimonies of two eyewitnesses,
Jolita Denna and Fortunata Denna:
Jolita Denna told the Court [that] Ben Manangan, the herein
accused, is the nephew of her husband, Ben being married
to her husband's niece. She knows Ben since the time the
latter married his wife. She positively identified Ben
Manangan in open court.
On February 5, 2001 in the evening, she together with her
daughter Jesusa Denna, her brother-in-law Mariano Denna,
and Mariano's daughter Fortunata Denna were inside their
house [in] San Vicente, Tamauini, Isabela. At around 7:30
o'clock in the evening of said date, her husband arrived.
When she and her husband were about to sleep and after
[turning] off the light, she heard somebody [call], "Uncle
Ampoy, Uncle Ampoy." Ampoy, according to her, is her
husband Ocampo Denna. She responded by saying to the
caller, "Please wait, I will just put on the light." She lighted
an improvised gas lamp and thereafter opened the door and
saw Ben Manangan's face. However, Ben who was in front
of the door, put off the light by blowing it. Thereafter, the
armed group of about six (6), wearing masks (bonnets),
instructed her to cook. She obliged. After cooking, they ate.
After eating, three (3) of the armed group went to the
house of his brother-in-law while the other three (3)
remained. Then, the remaining three (3) wearing masks
(bmmets) ask[ed] for their money by saying, "Hold up, hold
up, iyawa nu y kwartu" which means "Give me your
money." She and her husband replied to them, [saying]
they [did] not have money. They angrily reacted by saying,
"You are lying," at the same time letting them choose "Give
your money or be killed?" Threatened and afraid, she told
her husband to just give their money. Her husband refused
but [Jolita] pleaded to him to give their money because of
fear. Then, she told the armed men wearing mask[s] to
wait. She went to get their money amounting to Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos of different denominations
and gave it to them. Thereafter, the armed group left.
xxxx
Fortunata Derma narrated to the Court [that] she knows
Ben Manangan. On February 5, 2001 in the evening, she
was in the house of her uncle Ocampo "Ampoy" Denna
married to Jolita Derma [in] San Vicente, Tumauini, Isabela.
When she, her aunt Jolita Derma and Jesusa Derma were
about to sleep, someone called for her Uncle Ampoy and
heard her aunt [say] "Ben." Therafter, her Aunt Jolita
lighted a gas lamp. She saw what her aunt was doing
because she was lying just opposite the door where her
aunt was. Later, her Aunt Jolita opened the door and
afterwhich, somebody put off the gas lamp. The distance
between the place where she was lying and the door was
only about a meter. Then, she heard [someone] in an
[I]locano dialect [say], "Mabalin ti makipangan?" which
means "Can we eat?" Her aunt responded by calling her
child to bring the kettle. While her aunt Jolita and daughter
Jesusa were cooking, and while the armed men were
roaming around, she was able to identify Ben Manangan
who was not wearing [a] mask while she [could not identify
the others] because they were all wearing masks and
jackets. Then, she went out to help her aunt cook. After the
[food was] cooked, the armed [men] including Ben
Manangan ate. After eating, one of the armed men
announced, "Hold up, hold up." Ben Manangan was with
them when the hold up was declared. With their
announcement, she [cowered] in fear and was chilling.
Later, she heard her Aunt Jolita [say], "We do not have
money," which was seconded by her Uncle Ampoy.
However, the armed men insisted that they have the money
and told her uncle and aunt "Give your money or we will kill
you all." Moments later, she heard her Aunt Jolita tell her
husband Ampoy, "We should give now our money."
Thereafter, her aunt went inside the house, took the money
and gave it to the armed persons by saying "Here is the
money." Then, the armed men after receiving the money
left.
x x x x7
Version of Facts of the Defense
The RTC Decision also narrated the defense's versiOn of the
facts based on the testimony of petitioner, as follows:
Ben Manangan, the herein accused, narrated to the Court
that he knows Jolita Derma, she being a neighbor. He
[likewise knows] Fortunata Derma but [is] not too familiar
[with her]. He denied [having] participated in robbing Jolita
Derma on the night of February 5, 2001, he being inside his
house [in] San Vicente, Tumauini, Isabela. Before 7:30
o'clock in the evening of said day, he was having a drinking
session with his brother-in-law Johnny Mamauag. They
stopped drinking at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and
slept. The following morning, he was taken by police officers
and brought to the Tumauini Police Station. At the police
station, he saw his Uncle Ampoy and Aunt Jolita.
The proffered testimony of Johnny Mamauag, to wit:
"That Johnny Mamauag will corroborate the earlier
testimony of the accused that on February 5, 2001 from
7:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening at the residence of the
accused [in] San Vicente, Tumauini, Isabela, they were
drinking together. That Johnny Mamauag left after drinking
at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening."
was admitted by the Public Prosecutor (Order dated
November 20, 2009).
x x x x8
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated 22 January 2010, the RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery by a band and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of six years of prision
correccional as minimum to ten years of prision mayor as
maximum period, and ordered petitioner to pay the private
complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial9 dated 15 February
2010, reiterating his innocence and showing evidence which
could not have been found by petitioner during the first
trial. Attached to the Motion is the Affidavit of Maria
Manangan,10 petitioner's wife.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion for New Trial in its
Resolution dated 26 February 2010.11
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.12
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 20 May 2014, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the RTC Decision by reducing the
penalty imposed by the RTC to the indeterminate penalty of
four years and two months of prision correccional as
minimum to ten years of prision mayor as maximum period.
The Court of Appeals also found that the RTC was correct in
ordering petitioner to indemnify private complainant the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as the
amount unlawfully taken from private complainant.
Petitioner sought reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied in its Resolution13 dated 1 June 2015.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
affirming the decision of the RTC in finding, based on its
"honest belief," that there was "implied conspiracy";
2. Whether or not the corpus delicti was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution; and
3. Whether or not the denial of the Motion for New Trial by
the RTC was proper.14
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The quantum of proof required to prove implied
conspiracy is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner questions whether the RTC and the Court of
Appeals were correct in finding that there was implied
conspiracy in the commission of the crime of robbery by a
band based merely on the RTC's "honest belief."
In its Decision dated 22 January 2010, the RTC found,
based on its honest belief, that implied conspiracy existed in
the crime of robbery by a band. It held that:
Expressed conspiracy was not shown by the prosecution. It
means that there is no evidence showing that the co-
accused Does had an agreement with accused Ben
Manangan to commit robbery and decided to commit it.
However, it is the honest belief of the Court that
implied conspiracy exist[s].15(Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
However, in the same Decision, the RTC further held that it
was convinced beyond moral certainty that conspiracy was
shown. It held that:
This being the factual milieu of the case, the Court
is convinced beyond moral certainty that conspiracy
was shown, hence, Ben is equally guilty with the others as
a co-conspirator to the crime of robbery.16 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
"Honest belief" is a term rarely used in criminal cases.
In Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus,17 "honest belief"
was loosely defined as "the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage."18
A trial court's "honest belief" cannot be the basis of a
finding of implied conspiracy because a finding of conspiracy
must be supported by evidence constituting proof beyond
reasonable doubt.19 In People v. Bokingo,20 this Court ruled
that "conspiracy must be established with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime."21
We hold that a finding of implied conspiracy must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, and must not be merely based on
the trial court's "honest belief." The use of the term "honest
belief' in the RTC's Decision did not refer to the quantum of
proof used to prove a finding of implied conspiracy. In fact,
the RTC clarified in the next paragraph that it was
"convinced beyond moral certainty that conspiracy was
shown."
The real issue now is whether the RTC and the Court of
Appeals were correct in finding beyond reasonable doubt
proof of implied conspiracy.
Petitioner argues that there is no implied conspiracy
between him and the other accused. He points out that
eyewitnesses Jolita and Fortunata Denna testified that
petitioner did not do anything that may be considered
conspiratorial since he merely stood outside the house and
did not receive the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) himself. Petitioner further alleges that his
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply
conspiracy.
Petitioner's argument is unmeritorious.
An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are
shown to have aimed their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative. Their
acts must indicate a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment.22 It is proved not by direct
evidence or mere conjectures, but through the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts
of the accused before, during, and after the commission of
the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert
of action, and a community of interest.23
When the RTC and the Court of Appeals found, through the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, that the crime of
robbery by a band was committed, it meant that implied
conspiracy existed. In People v. Peralta,24 this Court held
that the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy in the
crime of robbery by a band such that "any member of a
band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults
committed by the band, unless it is shown that he
attempted to prevent the same."25 Thus, conspiracy need
not even be proven as long as the existence of a band is
clearly established.
The corpus delicti was proven be,yond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution.
Petitioner defines corpus delicti as the body or substance of
the crime, and in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime has actually been committed. As applied to a
particular offense, it means the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged.26
In the present case, petitioner alleges that the corpus
delicti was not proven because "[petitioner's] participation
in the supposed felonious act is based on lackadaisical
application of 'circumstantial evidence.'"27 Petitioner
claims that there was no concrete showing that the victims
were in possession of the property or object-matter of the
offense. Petitioner asserts that "it should have been x x x a
cause for wonder how a lamp-lit house in a rural area could
so casually hold such amount-huge even by middle-family
standards."28
We disagree with petitioner. Contrary to petitioner's
contention that the corpus delicti was not proven, the
prosecution sufficiently established through direct
evidence that the crime of robbery by a band was
committed.
Direct evidence is different from circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the
existence of a fact in issue without inference or
presumption.29 It is evidence from a witness who actually
saw, heard, or touched the subject of questioning. On the
other hand, circumstantial evidence is evidence that
"indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the factfinder draws from the evidence established."30
In this case, the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses
constitute direct evidence that proved the corpus delicti of
the crime of robbery by a band because both were actually
at the scene of the crime. They saw with their own eyes
that a group of armed and masked men led by the
unmasked petitioner entered their house, ate their food,
robbed them of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and
left.
The prosecution proved the corpus delicti because all of the
elements of the crime of robbery by a band were proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It was proven that petitioner, a
member of the band, was liable for his acts because the
following requisites concurred:31
First, petitioner was proven to be a member of the band.
Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code defines a "band" as a
group of more than three armed malefactors who take part
in the commission of a robbery. In this case, petitioner was
proven to have led in entering the complainant's house five
other men who were all armed with long or short firearms
when the robbery was committed.32
Second, petitioner was proven to be present at the
commission of the robbery by the band because of the
positive identification by the two eyewitnesses. Petitioner
cannot raise the defense of alibi that he was drinking in his
house with his brother-in-law and was afterwards sleeping
in his house beside his wife and child at the time the crime
happened. Such alibi is not entitled to much weight, even if
such alibi was corroborated by his brother-in-law and his
wife, because the positive identification by the two
eyewitnesses still prevails.
Well-settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently
weak and cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution witnesses, unless the
accused shows that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime.33
In this case, it was physically possible for petitioner to be at
the scene of the crime because petitioner and the spouses
Denna were just neighbors, as alleged by the prosecution
witnesses and petitioner himself. Petitioner's wife is also
Ocampo's niece; thus, they are related by affinity.34 The
RTC and Court of Appeals aptly found that the eyewitnesses
were familiar with him and knew him personally.35
Third, the other members of the band committed an assault
which is the use of force and threats against the victims to
force them to part with their personal property, money
amounting to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The RTC
found, to wit:
Jolita Denna emphatically expressed to the Court that she
handed their money to the group of the accused against her
will and out of fear, due to the actual and physical threat
to them to be killed because the armed men were
then poking their long and short firearms at
them.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Last, the petitioner did not prevent the assault. It was clear
from the allegations and testimonies of the eyewitnesses
that petitioner did not do anything to stop the other armed
and masked men from committing the robbery.
Petitioner is correct that to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime of robbery by a band, the lawful possessor of the
object-matter of the offense must be proven. However,
petitioner cannot allege that the spouses Denna could not
possibly be the lawful possessors of the Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) simply because of their living and
economic conditions. They bear no legal relation to
the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery by a band.
Furthermore, the RTC found that the personal property
subject of the instant case belongs to the spouses Derma. It
held:
x x x [T]he taking by the accused and his armed
companions of the P50,000.00 belonging to the Dennas is
unlawful. When the armed men of which accused Ben
Manangan was a member announced a hold up and telling
the Dennas to give their money, they did it to force them to
hand their money as [the armed men did] not have
any color of authority to ask for that personal
property - [that] money x x x.37 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court has consistently held that the findings of the RTC
are not generally disturbed by the appellate courts since the
RTC is in a better position to pass on issues of credibility,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
manner of testifying, unless it is shown that the RTC
overlooked certain facts or circumstances that could affect
the outcome of the case.38
The RTC's denial of petitioner's Motion for New
Trial was proper.
In its Resolution dated 26 February 2010, the RTC denied
petitioner's Motion for New Trial. The RTC held that:
The motion asserts that there is a need to grant a new trial
in order for the defense to present additional witnesses.
xxxx
It is the humble opinion of the court that witnesses desired
to be presented by the defense are witness[es] [who] are
available at the time of trial. In fact, these witnesses are
living in the same Barangay as that of the accused. In
short, the testimonies of said witnesses are not considered
newly discovered evidence but forgotten evidence, hence,
not a valid ground for the grant ofa new trial.
Finally, even if these witnesses are allowed to testify, it will
not materially affect the outcome of the judgement because
the basis of the judgement is the positive identification and
affirmative statements of two (2) eyewitnesses that accused
was among the robbers who robbed the private
complainant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is denied
for lack of merit.39
We agree with the Resolution of the RTC.
Under paragraph 2, Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of
Court, one ground for a Motion for New Trial is "that new
and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused would not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the judgement."
In Velasco v. Ortiz,40 the Court summarized the requisites
for a Motion for New Trial grounded on newly discovered
evidence. These are: (a) the evidence had been discovered
after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered
and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and
not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching, and is
of such weight that, if admitted, would probably alter the
result. The Court further held:
In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded as "newly discovered" for purposes of a grant of
new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when
the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time
when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is, rather, that the
offering party had exercised diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but
nonetheless failed to secure it. Thus a party who, prior
to the trial, had no means of knowing that a specific piece
of evidence existed and was in fact obtainable, can scarcely
be charged with lack of diligence. It is commonplace to
observe that the term "diligence" is a relative and variable
one, not capable of exact definition and the contents of
which must depend entirely on the particular configuration
of facts obtaining in each case.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, petitioner sought to present his wife, Maria
Manangan, and six other persons.42 What these persons will
testify to, as shown by the statements attached to
petitioner's Motion for New Trial, are mere reiterations of
petitioner's defense that no robbery was committed. The
statements merely allege that there was no news in their
barangay about the robbery "which is unusual in a place
where when a visitor of a friend [or] a relative arrives, the
whole place knows."43
Petitioner's Motion for New Trial was correctly denied by the
RTC because the statements sought to be presented by the
six persons were already available before and during the
trial. The statements merely corroborate petitioner's alibi
and defense, which will not alter the result of the trial. Most
importantly, the statements of these six persons could have
been discovered, accessed, and produced during the trial
with the exercise of reasonable diligence because all six
persons were living in the same barangay as petitioner. The
offering party, petitioner in this case, failed to secure the
statements of the additional six persons not because
petitioner had no means of knowing that the pieces of
evidence existed, but because petitioner was not diligent
from the beginning.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 122766. June 20, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. FELIPE
ESPONILLA and SAMSON ESPONILLA, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal by appellants Felipe Esponilla and Samson
Esponilla from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. 36890
convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them
to reclusion perpetua.
In the Information dated October 15, 1991, the appellants
were charged with murder committed as follows:
INFORMATION
The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, through the undersigned,
accuses FELIPE ESPONILLA and SAMSON ESPONILLA of the
crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1991, in the
Municipality of Igbaras, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another to better realize their purpose, armed
with a firearms (sic) of unknown Caliber, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill and with treachery and/or
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jose
Eumag with the firearms with which they were then
provided, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter gun
shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused
his death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
At their arraignment, the appellants, with the assistance of
their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Evidence of the Prosecution[3
Spouses Jose Eumag, 61 years old,4 and Enriqueta Eumag,
69 years old, lived in their farm at the outskirts of Barangay
Igtalongon, Igbaras, Iloilo,5 about a kilometer away from
the farm of Felipe Esponilla and his brother Samson
Esponilla at Barangay Pinaopawan, Igbaras, Iloilo. The
Spouses Eumag and the Esponilla brothers had known each
other for a long time. Felipe in particular used to pass by
the house of the Eumags and had borrowed money from
Jose.6 The Eumags had known Samson, Felipes brother,
since his childhood.7cräläwvirtualibräry
But neighborliness metamorphosed into resentment when
Jose testified against Dionisio Esponilla, a first cousin of
Felipe and Samson, in an arson case filed by Gerardo
Eumag,8 a brother of Jose. While the case was pending trial,
Dionisio was detained at the Municipal Jail of Igbaras9 where
he committed suicide on February 5, 1989. Consequently,
the case was dismissed. On September 14, 1989, Jose was
shot on his right thigh but he survived. Felipe and Samson
were charged with frustrated murder in an Information filed
in the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 36, docketed as Criminal Case Age : 61 years old
No. 34297, for the shooting of Jose.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Sex : Male
As of June 1991, the trial was ongoing. On June 28, 1991,
at about 9:30 a.m., Spouses Jose and Enriqueta were in C.S. : Married
their rice field, which was about nine hundred meters away
from their house, for another days work of farming.11 Jose Address : Sitio Tarugan, Brgy. Igtalongon, Igbaras, Iloilo
was plowing the field with his carabao while Enriqueta, who
was about four arms length away from her husband, was
Occupation : Farmer
cutting the grasses. Felipe, Joses brother, was
threshing palay in his farm about one hundred arms length
from where Jose and Enriqueta were. Suddenly, Enriqueta Nature of Incident : Shooting
heard a gunshot. She saw her husband fall to the ground,
face down. She instinctively looked at the direction from Date of Incident : June 28, 1991
where the gunshot rang out and saw Felipe and Samson
beside the dike, about seven meters away from Jose, each Time of Incident : 9:30 A.M.
holding a firearm still aimed at the victim. She rushed to her
husband and helped him stand up, to no avail. She shouted Place of Incident : Brgy. Igtalongon, Igbaras, Iloilo
for help. Felipe and Samson backtracked and hurriedly ran
away.12cräläwvirtualibräry Place of Autopsy : Igbaras, Iloilo

Enriqueta frantically waved to Felix, shouting that Jose had Date of Autopsy : June 28, 1991
been shot. Felix rushed to where Enriqueta was and was
aghast to see his brother Jose bloodied all over. Felix and Time of Autopsy : 12:05 p.m.
Enriqueta carried Jose to a drier portion of the rice
field.13 By then, Jose was already dead. They decided to
Post-mortem examination done by: Dr. Priscilla C. Gallo
bring the victims body to the poblacion for autopsy.14 Felipe
rushed to the Igbaras Police Station and reported the
incident. His report was entered by SPO2 Antonio G. Medical Officer
Emboltorio in the police blotter.15 At 12:00 noon, Dr. Igbaras, Iloilo
Priscilla C. Gallo, Medical Officer of Igbaras, Iloilo,
conducted a post-mortem examination of the cadaver of the Informant: Enriqueta M. Eumag
victim and made the following findings:
Wife
Post-Mortem Examination
Findings:
Name : JOSE EUMAG Y MORALES
 Victim wearing maong pants, blue black T-shirt
and maroon/white stripped (sic) polo shirt
Trunk:
Gunshot wound, entrance 5 cm. above the
right pelvic rim, 10 mm in size,
midscapular line right with multiple exit.
Gunshot wound entrance, right upper outer
quadrant of right buttocks
Fracture of the right hipbone noted
Cause of death:
Cardio-Pulmonary Arrest
Severe Hemorrhage secondary to gunshot
wounds
(SGD.) PRISCILLA C. GALLO,
M.D.
Medical Officer
Igbaras,
Iloilo.16cräläwvirtualibrär
y attributed to them, considering their strained relationship
Dr. Gallo found two gunshot entrance wounds at the right
portion of the pelvic bone, each wound about two inches
apart. The first entrance wound had multiple exits at the
abdominal area, while the second entrance wound had no
exit wound. She recovered two pellets at the upper outer
quadrant of the buttock. According to Dr. Gallos report, two
wounds could have been caused by a single shotgun
blast.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Joses wake lasted for almost a month.18 He was finally laid
to rest on July 25, 1991.19 Enriqueta testified that when her
husband was still alive, he earned at least ten cavans
of palay per cropping. During the extended wake, she spent
at least P80,200: P7,500 for funeral services and burial
expenses, P600 for religious services, and P72,100 for food
and other expenses.20 All expenses were, however,
unreceipted.21cräläwvirtualibräry
During the trial, Felipe pleaded on many occasions to
Enriqueta for her to agree to settle the case amicably, and
offered to pay her P6,000; but Enriqueta declined.22 Felipe
and Samsons mother also offered to settle the case
amicably but Enriqueta was adamant and rejected the offer
outright.
The Defenses of the Accused
Felipe and Samson interposed twin defenses of denial and
alibi.23 Felipe testified that he was a farmer who lived in his
farm located right at the middle of the boundary of
Barangays Tigbanaba and Pinaopawan, Igbaras, Iloilo.24 He
denied shooting Jose. While he admitted that he was not in
good terms with the Eumags, Felipe stated that he and his
brother Samson, who was at that time in a distant Barangay
Anono-o, Guimbal, Iloilo, could not have harmed Jose
because if they did, the incident would definitely be
with the Eumags. Felipe claimed that the charge against
them was but a concoction of Enriqueta for refusing her
demand of P10,000 for the settlement of the frustrated
murder case filed by Jose against them.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Felipe testified that in the morning of June 28, 1991, he was
busy at work in his farm the whole day. He went to the
nearby farm of Santiago Flores, the President of the
Communal Irrigation System and NIA water master, and
asked permission to irrigate his farm. He also asked
Santiago to help him clear his farm. Santiago agreed. The
two cleared and cleaned the two-kilometer irrigation canal
for two hours. At about 10:30 a.m., they went back to the
farm of Santiago and took a respite. Thereafter, Felipe
checked the flow of the canal and returned to his farm. He
took his lunch at his nearby house. He then continued on
working the canal and at 6:00 p.m., he called it a
day.26cräläwvirtualibräry
Felipes neighbor Santiago Flores, a relative of the victim
and a kagawad of Barangay Tigbanaba, corroborated his
alibi. He testified that he was with Felipe irrigating the
latters farm the whole day on June 28, 1991. He testified
that at about 7:30 a.m. that day, he was seeding the farm
when Felipe arrived and sought his assistance to irrigate his
rice field. Santiago obliged and, after thirty minutes, the
two went to his house and ate breakfast. Thereupon, the
two proceeded to the main irrigation canal and cleared and
cleaned it. They diverted the flow of the water towards the
rice field of Felipe. The two returned to Santiagos farm at
about 10:30 a.m., after which they parted ways.27Santiago
said that he was persuaded by Felipe and Samsons parents
to testify28 and that at no time did he attend the wake of his
deceased nephew.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Samson, for his part, likewise denied any involvement in the
killing of Jose. He testified that on June 23, 1991, he was at
Delfin Estaols poultry farm at Barangay Anono-o, Guimbal,
Iloilo, and left the farm only on June 28, 1991. It was
impossible for him to have killed Jose, as he was fifteen
kilometers away from where the killing took place. He never
left Delfins farm until he was picked up by five policemen on
June 29, 1991 who brought him to Igbaras for investigation.
After the investigation, he proceeded to Pinaopawan and
helped his father in his farm. When he learned from his
brother Felipe that a warrant of arrest had been issued
against them, Samson immediately went to the police
station and surrendered himself.30 He and his brother Felipe
bore no grudge against Jose despite what had happened to
their cousin Dionisio.31cräläwvirtualibräry
Delfin Estaol corroborated appellant Samsons alibi. Delfin
said that he had engaged the services of Samson on May 5,
1991 as helper in his poultry. As helper, Samson
received P400 per month plus free board and lodging. From
that day on until June 29, 1991, Samson had been staying
in his place, taking care of his 500 chickens. Delfin averred
that at no time did Samson leave his place much less on
June 28, 1991. On June 29, 1991, Samson was arrested
and stopped working for Delfin.32 When Delfin confronted
Enriqueta about Samsons arrest, she replied that she
lodged the charge against Samson and Felipe for refusing to
pay her.33cräläwvirtualibräry
Roque Emague testified that at the time of the shooting, he
was at the nearby farm of Mario Eurolfan34 grazing his four
goats. He was about ten arms length away from Jose whom
he noticed to be all alone. As he was untangling the ropes of
his goats that got intertwined, Roque heard a shot and
simultaneously noticed a person whom he did not know,
shoot Jose at point blank range with a shotgun. Afraid for
his life, Roque hid. When he saw the assailant walk towards
the creek en route to the mountains, Roque dashed home.
Roque described the assassin as tall, small-built, with white
complexion, and in his mid-thirties. He said that he never
saw Felipe and Samson or Aquilino within the
vicinity.35cräläwvirtualibräry
Aquilino Estremera, for his part, testified that at about 9:00
a.m. of June 28, 1991, he was walking along Barangay
Igtalongon on his way to his cousin, Juanito Espinosa. As he
passed by the farm of the Eumags, he saw Roque tying his
goats. Suddenly, a man whom he saw for the very first time
shot Jose. He was about ten arms length away from the
victim. Aquilino ran, but stopped and looked back. He saw
the assassin flee to the mountains. He also saw Roque
scampering. Aquilino described the assailant as tall, skinny,
with curly hair, and fair in complexion. He added that he
never noticed Enriqueta at the crime
scene.36cräläwvirtualibräry
On October 28, 1994, the trial court convicted Felipe and
Samson of murder, qualified by treachery. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Felipe
Esponilla and Samson Esponilla are hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined
and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The accused are further ordered to pay jointly and severally
actual damages to the wife of the deceased the total
amount of P40,000, and to his legal heirs, the amount
of P50,000 for his wrongful death, P30,000 as moral
damages and the costs.
The accused Samson Esponilla who is detained is credited
with the number of days he spent under detention if he is
qualified, otherwise, he shall be credited only with four-
fifths (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment.
Pursuant to the case of People vs. Ricardo C. Cortez, G.R.
No. 92560, October 15, 1991, the bail bond put up by the
accused Felipe Esponilla is cancelled and said accused is
hereby ordered detained at the Iloilo Rehabilitation Center,
to be transmitted to the National Penetentiary (sic) or
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, together
with the other accused Samson Esponilla, even if they
appeal.
SO ORDERED.37cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court ruled that the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove their guilt of the
crime charged. It held that although the prosecution failed
to prove who between the two shot Jose, nevertheless, the
prosecution proved that Felipe and Samson conspired to kill
Jose, and that one of them shot Jose to death. The court
concluded that both of them are liable for the death of
Jose.38cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court said that the appellants failed to prove their
twin defenses of denial and alibi. It ratiocinated that it was
not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission thereof. It
took into consideration the geographical proximity of the
places where the appellants alleged they were at the time.
Besides, according to the trial court, alibi crumbles upon
positive identification.39cräläwvirtualibräry
In their brief, Felipe and Samson, now the appellants, assert
that:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
OF MURDER BASED ON ONE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
II
GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED
ARE GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING A
CASE OF MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE40cräläwvirtualibräry
On the first assignment of errors, the appellants assert that
the prosecution failed to present any eyewitness to the
actual killing of the victim. The testimony of Enriqueta does
not constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It would be the height
of folly for them to have remained at the situs criminis, still
toting their guns after one of them had already fired a shot,
knowing that it was broad daylight, and Enriqueta could
have easily seen and identified them, thus ensuring their
prosecution and conviction.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part,
contends that the prosecution had adduced a chain of
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the culpability
for the death of Jose:
i. On June 28, 1993 at around 9:30 a.m., Jose Eumag was
plowing his ricefield while his wife Enriqueta was pulling
weeds or grasses;
ii. Suddenly, a gunshot was fired which hit Jose and caused
him to fall on the ground face down;
iii. Enriqueta shouted for help; looked at the place where
the gunshot came from; and, saw the appellants Felipe and
Samson still pointing their guns on her fallen husband Jose;
iv. Immediately after Enriqueta saw the appellants still
pointing their guns at her fallen husband, appellants Felipe
and Samson ran away.
The combination of all the abovementioned circumstances
produces the needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that
indeed the appellants are guilty of killing their victim Jose.
Said circumstances are further corroborated by the
testimony of prosecution witness Dra. Priscilla C. Gallo to
the effect that the victim Jose suffered two (2) gunshot
wounds caused by one (1) gunshot blast (tsn., Dra. Priscilla
C. Gallo, April 20, 1992, p. 26).
It is to be observed that the testimony of prosecution
witness Enriqueta as to the circumstances surrounding the
shooting of her husband Jose to death by the appellants
was direct, clear and straight-forward.
Besides, no motive on the part of prosecution witness
Enriqueta to falsely testify against the appellants was
established (People v. Laurora, 211 SCRA 202; People v.
Bechayda, 212 SCRA 336).41
The Court agrees with the ruminations of the OSG. It is not
absurd for the appellants to have committed the crime in
broad daylight and brazenly tarry before fleeing from
the situs criminis. Such devil-may-care attitude is not
uncommon for criminals. Indeed, some criminals
intentionally reveal their identities to witnesses to sow fear
in them, and demonstrate defiance of the law. In this case,
the appellants killed Jose in broad daylight in full view of
Enriqueta. The appellants wanted Enriqueta to know that
they and no one else killed Jose for testifying against
Dionisio and for charging them for frustrated murder. Even
as Jose was already mortally wounded, the appellants still
pointed their guns at Jose and made it clear to Enriqueta
that they had shot Jose. Jose may have survived when he
was shot on September 14, 1989; they saw to it that Jose
will not survive the second time around.
Admittedly, Enriqueta Eumag did not actually see any of the
appellants shoot her husband. Nonetheless, direct evidence
is not a condition sine qua non for the conviction of an
accused. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime and
the perpetrators thereof is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt.42 Under the Rules of Court43 and pursuant to settled
jurisprudence, conviction may be had even on
circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.44cräläwvirtualibräry
Wharton suggests four basic guidelines in the appreciation
of circumstantial evidence, to wit: (1) it should be acted
upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must
exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and (4) the
facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused
as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused is the one who committed the
offense.45 The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that
the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing
just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle
which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture
pointing towards the conclusion that the accused is the
author of the crime.46cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, the prosecution adduced sufficient testimony
and physical evidence, albeit circumstantial, to prove that
indeed the appellants killed the victim.
First. Enriqueta narrated the lurid details of how the
appellants killed the victim in broad daylight at a relatively
close range:
FISCAL BARRIOS:
Q In the morning of June 28, 1991, about 9:30 oclock more
or less, can you still recall where were you?
A I was at the farm.
Q Do you have companion when you said you were in your
farm that morning of about 9:30 oclock of June 28, 1991?
A My husband, who is plowing our farm at that time.
Q Where is that farm of yours located, what barangay?
A At Barangay Igtalongon.
Q You said you were together with your husband who was
then plowing your farm or field, can you tell the Court how
far were you at your husband at that particular time of June
28, 1991?
A About four arms length.
Q Now, where were you sitting in relation to your husband
who was then . I withdraw the question.
Q Now in relation to your husband, who was then plowing
the field, where were you situated?
A I was at the right side.
Q And while you were at the right side, what were you
doing then at that particular time?
A I was pulling grasses.
Q And at that particular moment, about four arms length to
the right side of your husband, was there any unusual
incident that happened?
A I heard a shot.
Q And what happened when you heard a shot?
A My husband fell down on his stomach.
Q How many shots did you hear?
A One.
Q And when you saw your husband fell down on the ground
on his stomach, what else happened or what did you do?
A I tried to help my husband and I was shouting for help.
Q Before you went to your husband to let him stand and
before you shouted for help, did you see anybody within the
premises where your husband fell?
A Felipe and Samson Esponilla.
Q Where were they in relation to your husband before your
husband fell?
A At the side of the dike at the back of my husband.
COURT:
At the side of what?
WITNESS ANSWER:
At the side of the dike at the back of my husband.
FISCAL BARRIOS:
When you saw these Samson and Felipe Esponilla to the
direction or rather at the back towards the direction at the
back of your husband, what were they doing?
A I saw them pointing their gun to my husband.
Q Who was holding the firearm?
A Two of them.
Q When you saw them still pointing their firearms, your
husband had already fallen on the ground?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were they from your husband from the place
where your husband was, when you saw them still pointing
with their firearms?
A Five arms length.
Q Now, when you saw them still pointing their firearm, your
husband had already fallen on the ground, to whom or what
direction were they pointing their firearm?
A At my husband.
Q You said that you then went to your husband to let him
stand up and shout for help, can you tell us what did these
two accused do when you shouted for help?
A They run away.
Q To what direction did you see them run away?
A At the back of my husband.47cräläwvirtualibräry
Second. Enriqueta testified that aside from her, there was
no other person in the periphery where her husband was
shot:
Q Immediately before and after your husband was shot to
death by the two accused, Felix and Samson Esponilla, can
you tell if there were persons within or near the premises
were (sic) you and your husband (were) at the time, aside
from the accused Felix and Samson Esponilla?
A No more, sir.
Q When you look to the direction where you saw the two
accused Felipe and Samson Esponilla, you saw them still in
the position of pointing their firearm towards your husband,
what was or what were their position, were they standing or
sitting or squatting?
A They are standing.48cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court concluded that Enriqueta was a credible
witness and her testimony entitled to full probative weight.
So does this Court. It is the trial court and not this Court
that had the opportunity to observe Enriquietas manner of
testifying, her furtive glances, her calmness, sighs, or the
scant or full realization of her oath.49 The trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
respect.50 After all, it is well-settled that where there is no
evidence that the witness against the accused was actuated
by any improper motive, and absent any compelling reason
to conclude otherwise, her testimony will be given full faith
and credit.51cräläwvirtualibräry
Third. The prosecution convincingly established that the
appellants were driven by a personal grudge against the
victim. There was no love lost between the victim and the
appellants, who ascribed to Jose the death of their cousin
Dionisio. The criminal case for frustrated murder against the
appellants for the shooting of Jose was pending in the RTC,
Branch 36, Iloilo City. Aside from the appellants, no one
was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.
Motive is a key element when establishing guilt through
circumstantial evidence. Coupled with enough circumstantial
evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred
that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.52cräläwvirtualibräry
Fourth. Dr. Priscilla C. Gallo, who conducted the post-
mortem examination on Jose, testified that the wounds
sustained by the latter could have been caused by a single
gunshot blast at the back. This dovetailed with the
testimony of Enriqueta that she heard one gunshot and that
immediately after Jose was shot, she saw the appellants,
each armed with a gun, only seven meters behind Jose.
Fifth. When Enriqueta shouted for help, the appellants fled
from the situs criminis. Flight is an implied admission of
guilt. It betrays a guilty conscience; it is silent yet a
resounding admission of guilt.53cräläwvirtualibräry
Sixth. Enriqueta testified that appellant Felipe and
appellants mother repeatedly offered to settle the case for
the appellants to escape prosecution and conviction for the
crime charged. The appellants never offered a morsel of
evidence to controvert the testimony of Enriqueta. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be amicably
settled or compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused is an implied admission of guilt.54cräläwvirtualibräry
The above-cited circumstances taken together constitute
one unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable
conclusion that the appellants, to the exclusion of others,
shot the victim to death.55cräläwvirtualibräry
It does not matter who of the two appellants actually shot
Jose. As correctly held by the trial court, the appellants
conspired to kill Jose. The act of one is the act of
both.56cräläwvirtualibräry
Case law has it that conspiracy need not be established by
direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally
must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
and circumstances which vary according to the purpose
accomplished. Previous agreement to commit a crime is not
essential to establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the
condition attending its commission and the acts executed
may be indicative of a common design to accomplish a
criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of
circumstances to that effect, conspiracy has been
established.57cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, the rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by
direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and
convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of direct
proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves, when such acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. Hence,
it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed
some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt
act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy
over the other co-conspirators.58cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, it was established that the appellants
suddenly arrived at the farmland of the victim, each armed
with a gun. Even as Jose was shot, both the appellants
tarried at the scene, their firearms pointed at the fallen
victim, ready to finish him off. They left the situs
criminis together after Enriqueta had shouted for help.
There is no evidence that one prevented the other from
shooting the victim. The acts of the appellants before,
during and after the commission of the crime indicated a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest. If one of the two shot the victim, the other,
armed with a lethal weapon, was nonetheless present at the
scene of the crime, undoubtedly to lend moral and material
assistance to the actual assassin another badge of
conspiracy. Thus, the appellants as conspirators are equally
liable as the principals for the crime. As the State Supreme
Court of Hawaii held:
Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they
speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that
the acts, words and declarations of each, while in the
pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.59cräläwvirtualibräry
It is pointless for the Court to still ascertain who among the
appellants shot the victim.
The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defenses of
denial-alibi. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the defense
must establish positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it
was physically impossible for the appellants to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and
not merely that they were somewhere else.60 Alibi is one of
the weakest, if not the weakest, of defenses in criminal
prosecution because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. The appellants barefaced denial of the crime
charged which is merely negative and self-serving, cannot
prevail over the straightforward, positive and spontaneous
testimony of Enriqueta. As regards appellant Felipe, his
evidence would indicate that Barangay Tigbanaba, where he
allegedly spent the whole day, was only two kilometers
away61 from the scene of the crime and could be negotiated
by a trek.62 The same is true with appellant Samson,
Barangay Anono-o, Gimbal, Iloilo, where he was allegedly
working as helper for Delfin Estaol, was only less than an
hour away from Barangay Igtalongon by jeep.63 Thus, even
if the appellants were respectively seen at these locations, it
was not physically impossible for them to have gone to
the locus criminisat the time the crime was committed, and
thereafter return to the said places.
The Court is not impervious to the testimony of appellant
Felipe Esponilla, that Enriqueta demanded P10,000 for the
settlement of Criminal Case No. 32497 and threatened that
if he refused, she will file another criminal case against him:
Q According to you, you were not in the farm of Jose Eumag
in the morning of June 28, 1991, and you were not also in
the company of your brother Samson Esponilla, and
furthermore, you said you have not shot Jose Eumag that
morning of June 28, 1991, can you tell us if you were in
good terms with Enriqueta Eumag on June 28, 1991?
A No more.
Q Can you tell us the reason why you were not in good
terms with Enriqueta Eumag on June 28, 1991?
A Because she was asking me the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos for the dismissal of the case she filed against me, the
case of frustrated homicide, but I told her that I have not
done this crime and you have to dismiss it. I told her that it
was not true, that she was just daydreaming and she got
angry of me.
Q This other case, this frustrated homicide case, in what
court is this case pending?
A In branch 36.
Q When you said that Enriqueta Eumag asked for Ten
Thousand Pesos to be paid by you and you refused, can you
tell us what did Enriqueta Eumag answer in reply to you?
A She told me that if I am not going to pay her she will file
again an additional case.64cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court finds the testimony of the appellant incredible.
For one thing, the appellant never claimed in the counter-
affidavit he filed with the Office of the Investigating
Prosecutor that Enriqueta demanded P10,000.65 This Court
does not believe that Enriqueta, who was 69 years old when
the crime was committed, would tergiversate the truth and
falsely charge the appellants for murder, a quasi-heinous
crime, in consideration of P10,000.
The Crime Committed by the Appellants
On their second assignment of error, the appellants assert
that if found guilty, they should only be made liable for the
crime of homicide and not for murder. They claim that the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
The Court does not agree. The trial court correctly
appreciated treachery as having qualified the killing of the
victim to murder. Treachery is present when the shooting
was unexpected and sudden, giving the unarmed victim no
chance whatsoever to defend himself. The two conditions
for treachery to be present are (1) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself,
and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular
means, method, or form of attack employed by
him.66cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the victim was shot at the back. Though
the Court is not unmindful that a shot at the back of the
victims body is not conclusive proof that there was
treachery, nonetheless, in this case, the victim was in a
wide open field, plowing his farm. The attack was a
complete surprise and was unprovoked. There was hardly
any risk at all to the appellants. The victim was plowing his
farmland, completely impervious that death was at hand.
He was unarmed and was not in a position to defend himself
against the assault of the appellants. Clearly, he was killed
in a treacherous manner.
The appellants are therefore guilty of murder, the
prescribed penalty for which, under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. There
being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that
attended the killing, the lesser of the two indivisible
penalties shall be imposed, i.e., reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 which needs no
proof other than that of the death of the victim.67 However,
the amount of P30,000 moral damages should be increased
to P50,000 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.68 The Court
cannot sustain the award of actual damages in the amount
of P40,000 considering that there were no receipts
presented to support them.69 Nevertheless, the heirs are
entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.70cräläwvirtualibräry
Finally, the trial court was correct in not awarding damages
for lost earnings. The prosecution merely relied on
Enriqueta Eumags self-serving statement, that her husband
was earning at least ten cavans of palay per cropping as
farmer. Compensation for lost income is in the nature of
damages and requires due proof of the amount of the
damage suffered. For loss of income due to death, there
must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income.
Also, the award for lost income refers to the net income of
the deceased, that is, his total income less his average
expenses. In this case, Enriqueta gave only a self-serving
testimony of her husbands income. No proof of the victims
expenses were adduced; thus, there can be no reliable
estimate of his lost income.71cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. 36890, is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellants Felipe
Esponilla and Samson Esponilla are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Eumag civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the
amount of P50,000, and temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 81563. December 19, 1989.]
AMADO C. ARIAS, Petitioner, v. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 82512. December 19, 1989.]
CRESENCIO D. DATA, Petitioner, v. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
Paredes Law Office for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; PROOF OF
EXISTENCE THEREOF. — A conspiracy need not be proved
by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and
generally must be proven by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances (People v. Maralit, G.R. No.
71143, Sept. 19, 1988; People v. Roca, G.R. No. 77779,
June 27, 1988).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHED BY THE SILENCE AND
INACTION OF ACCUSED. — This case presents a conspiracy
of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should
have been vigilant to protect the interest of the Government
in the purchase of Agleham’s two-hectare riceland, accepted
as gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates, and
approved without question the million-peso purchase which,
by the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked
their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to
verify the authenticity of the documents presented to them
for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should
have asked questions; they looked the other way when they
should have probed deep into the transaction. Since it was
too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were
negligent at the same time over the same transaction, the
Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they
connived and conspired to act in that manner to approve
the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the
land and defraud the Government.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; STATE AUDIT CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; ASPECTS OF THE AUDITIONAL FUNCTION OF
AN AUDITOR. — The primary function of an auditor is to
prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds. The auditorial function
of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on
Audit, comprises three aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit:
and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial
transactions and resources of the agencies under their
respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing
Code of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to auditing,
means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other
documents; review procedures, and question persons, all
for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy,
propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the
Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1 982 Ed., p. 57.)
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; EMINENT
DOMAIN; TAX DECLARATION; A GUIDE OR INDICATOR OF
THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. — The
acquisition of Agleham’s riceland was not done by
expropriation but through a negotiated sale. In the course
of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor
proof that the price of P80 per square meter was its fair
market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the
accused did was to prove the value of the land through fake
tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J,
D and E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and
fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by
the accused in support of the deed of sale. Because
fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that
the State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its
fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived
concerning the reasonable value of the land. When Ocol
testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the
Agleham’s land, he did not clarify that was also its
reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig
soared as a result of the implementation of the Mangahan
Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol’s testimony was insufficient
to rebut the valuation in Agleham’s genuine 1978 Tax
Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland
then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a
guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property
(EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305).
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; PARTIALITY; MAYBE PROVEN BY
ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT
EVIDENCE. — Partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be
inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to
the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor
and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to
check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them
for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or
predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be
proved by the attendant circumstances.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which follows this majority
opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report
prepared by Justice Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the
Court’s deliberations when the case was being discussed
and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on
the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The
division of the Court is on the conclusions to be drawn from
those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are
concerned. The majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias
and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed
to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable
doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue
injury to the Government through the irregular
disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been
satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the
Solicitor General 1 who, in 80 pages of his consolidated
manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias
and Data be acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de
oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F.
Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from
the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and
convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding
out and construction of public works and highways
synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public
eye. However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every
person who may have ordered the project, who signed a
document incident to its construction, or who had a hand
somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the
conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the
criminal minds who engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan’s decision in this case, a
department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman,
agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally
culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which
they have approved. The department head or chief auditor
would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the
last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon
or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be
premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate
participation of each individual who is charged with others
as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were
convicted in connection with the overpricing of land
purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan
Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the
perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square
meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been
assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as
"residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The
land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated
purchase.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor’s tax
valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in Rosario,
Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary
as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged
with conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or
preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is
causing undue injury to the Government and giving a
private party unwarranted benefits through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government
purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a square meter
instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in
the tax declarations and fixed by the municipal assessor,
not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for
doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter
value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the
correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the
Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter,
it follows that it must have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is
erroneous:
"1. No undue injury was caused to the Government. —
a. The P80. 00 per square meter acquisition cost is just, fair
and reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired
through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor, nothing more
than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price
had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and
could never be left to the discretion of one of the
contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is
the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a
meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon
the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the
parties have to negotiate the reasonableness of the price,
taking into consideration such other factors as location,
potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the
foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have,
thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence to prove that the true and fair market value in
1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square
meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration
(Exhibit W). On the contrary, the prosecution’s principal
witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of
Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per
square meter paid for the Agleham property as stated in the
Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is ‘reasonable’ (tsn, August 19,
1983, p. 20) and ‘fair’ (Ibid, p. 76); that ‘the value of lands
within the town of Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00’
(Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is ‘around 300
meters’ from Ortigas Avenue, ‘adjacent to the existing
Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision . . . end near Eastland
Garment Building’ (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is
surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and
residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per
square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham property
appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on
actual use only (Ibid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate
for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid,
pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the existence of
many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-
27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from
and always lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp.
22-23)." (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying
price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation
proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA
305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law decree
that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to
the assessed value stated by a land owner in his tax
declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is
lower. Other factors must be considered. These factors must
be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal
employees.
In the instant case, the assessor’s low valuation, in the
fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was
used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere
expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal
conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a
square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair
valuation. The value must be determined in eminent domain
proceedings by a competent court. We are certain,
however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence,
the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is
P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that
petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice
to the Government because of gross overpricing, is
grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal
conviction where no proof adduced during orderly
proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court’s decision, however, is based on a more basic
reason. Herein lies the principal error of the respondent
court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office
plagued by all too common problems — dishonest or
negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or
positions, or plain incompetence — is suddenly swept into a
conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step
from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the
final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that
documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key
tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being
machine numbered. The registration stampmark was
antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of
ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the
falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue
injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed
records, inspected documents, received procedures, and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly
sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be
asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to
a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains
important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to
call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question
each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire
whether the correct amount of food was served, and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher’s
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some
added reason why he should examine each voucher in such
detail. Any executive head of even small government
agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers
that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents,
letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that
routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger
offices or departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or
approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and
perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the
government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The
negotiations for the purchase of the property started in
1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978.
Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In
other words, the transaction had already been
consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to
payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first week of
October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his
signature on the voucher, there is no evidence linking him
to the transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused
testified they did not know him personally and none
approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him
to personally investigate the smallest details of the
transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter.
However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a square
meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have
sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the
way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a
square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by
changing "riceland" to "residential" was done before Arias
was assigned to Pasig. Besides, there is no such thing as
"riceland" in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in outlying or
easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong
but this is only until the place is dedicated to its real
purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If
the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six
years, the decision should be based on firmer foundations.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents
from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained that
the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to
keep these documents and under no circumstance to
relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the
Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1 , 1981.
The seven months delay in the formal turnover of custody
to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness
Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as auditor and who took
over the custody of records in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the
finding of undue injury and damage to the Government is
the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the
floodway project. Assuming that P80.00 is indeed
exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
"Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the
reasonableness of the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction
had been consummated and the corresponding Transfer
Certificate of Title had been issued and transferred to the
government of the Philippines.
The auditors have no more leeway to return the papers and
then question the purchase price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is
given by the government to private individuals there should
be a pre-audit of the papers and the corresponding checks
issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of
transaction there is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were
transferred to the government without paying the price. Did
you not consider that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17,
April 27, 1987)
A No,, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is
a condition that no payments will be made unless the
corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is
committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name
of the government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine
whether there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said
specification. As of the price it is under the sole authority of
the proper officer making the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a
piece of property to be bought by the government; the sale
was consummated; the title was issued in favor of the
government without the price being paid first to the seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payment made by
the government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way
transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27, 1987).
Q And of course as auditor, ‘watch-dog’ of the government
there is also that function you are also called upon by going
over the papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27, 1987) . . .
vouchers called upon to determine whether there is any
irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?

A Yes, Ma’am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also,
not only the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr.
Jose and Mr. Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma’am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No.
296.
A They are not required documents that an auditor must
see. (TSN, page 23, April 27, 1987).
and continuing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. . . . . The questioning of the purchase price is now
beyond the authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch
as the amount involved is beyond his counter-signing
authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987)." (At pp. 15-16,
Petition. Emphasis supplied)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of
petitioner Data as follows:
"As regards petitioner Data’s alleged participation, the
evidence on record shows that as the then District Engineer
of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee,
headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion,
Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos
Jose, all employees of the district office, as members,
specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project,
gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate
with the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and
prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any
direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the
Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which
determined the authenticity of the documents presented to
them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the
corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee
submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting
documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of
the supporting certified documents which appeared regular
and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the
office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed
but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the
approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of
Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the signed deed of
sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who in turn recommended approval
thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of sale
was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a
review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the
approval of the deed of sale by the higher authorities the
covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which
petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not know
Gutierrez and had never met her during the processing and
payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14,
16-24, 31-32)." (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
"It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise
has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of
conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused.
There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent
Court’s inference on the alleged existence of conspiracy
merely upon the purported ‘pre-assigned roles (of the
accused) in the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in
question’ is not supported by any evidence on record.
Nowhere in the seventy-eight (78) page Decision was there
any specific allusion to some or even one instance which
would link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused
in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of
the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the
Information. That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be
officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed
the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general
voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does not
raise any presumption or inference that they were part of
the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed
there was none. It should be remembered that, as
aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the
Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham
property was made at the fair and reasonable price of
P80.00 per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words
and figures of the purchase price in the deed of sale from
P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy.
It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected
area from the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004
square meters as approved by the Land Registration
Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction
in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00.
The erasures in the deed of sale were simple corrections
that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court’s suspicion,
there was nothing irregular in the use of the unapproved
survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale
because the approval of the survey plan/technical
description was not a prerequisite to the approval of the
deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment
is made by the Government under the deed of sale the title
of the seller must have already been cancelled and another
one issued to the Government incorporating therein the
technical description as approved by the Land Registration
Commission, as what obtained in the instant case." At pp.
273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no
adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners,
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable
doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not sufficient
to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan
insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners Amado C.
Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Arias and Data are acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Bidin, Cortés and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:cvirtual 1aw library
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is
whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in
convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D.
Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the
Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway
Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-
Graft Law reads as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. — In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
"x x x
"(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions."
The amended information against them, to which they
pleaded not guilty, alleged:
"That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October
1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, Accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district
Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works,
and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of
private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan
Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan,
Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando,
then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District
Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as
assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior
Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works, who was charged with the
acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway
Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of
the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the
Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer’s
Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers
and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the
Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal
Engineering District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon
and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the
payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway
Project all taking advantage of their public and official
positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating
with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of
Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel
of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused
Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose and Claudio Arcaya acting
with evident bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data,
Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with
manifest partiality in the discharge of their official public
and/or administrative functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and
prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving the illegal
and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds
in favor of and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the
amount of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-
047, supported by a certification, dated September 14,
1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of Tax
Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-00911, both in the
name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and an alleged owner’s copy
of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, said supporting documents having been
falsified by the accused to make it appear that the land
mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers is a
residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square
meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were
transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in
truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland
with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square
meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and
officially registered in the names of spouses Moises
Javillonar and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the
Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig,
Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by
the accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual
price of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P.
Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the Government
by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials
herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway
project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00
only; and finally, upon receipt of the over priced amount,
the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the
excess of the true and actual value of the above-mentioned
land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses
and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the amount of P1,428,800.00." (pp. 29-31,
Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at
large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan
Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting the
towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project
would traverse the northern and southern portions of
Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1).
An announcement was published in leading newspapers
advising affected property owners to file their applications
for payment at the District Engineer’s Office (p. 29,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was
entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by the
District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee
composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando,
as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for
acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos
Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53,
Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by
the project of the impending expropriation of their
properties and to receive and process applications for
payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan
Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.).
Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to Data
on August 27, 1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio
Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by the
Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from
reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD,
Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision,
p. 97, Ibid.).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion
of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered in the
name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of
Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land
was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo
Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the
Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3) lots
under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the
Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No.
27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square
meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad
Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the
Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham’s property, classified as a
"ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared for
taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh. Y). Its
assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter (p.
10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.).
On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895
(Exh. Y-1) was issued for the same "ricefield" with a revised
area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value
was P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed
value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax
Declaration No. A-018-00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market
value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690 (P10 per
square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680.
The description and value of the property, according to
Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was
based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its
potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.).
The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to
the Municipal Assessor’s office by the Register of Deeds,
from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average
valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF
and FF-1) at the District Engineer’s Office was the accused,
Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of
Attorney allegedly executed on February 24, 1978 by
Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She
submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No.
47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15, 1973
(instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham’s
30,169-square-meter property as "residential" (instead of
riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per
square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter).
Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of
P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham’s Original Certificate
of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the technical description of the
property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the
True Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property"
required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. I) The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the
Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham’s claim were
"examined" by the Administrative Officer, AccusedClaudio
Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to
accused Ladislao G. Cruz. A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1
(19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter)
was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting
documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20, 1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and
G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-fact
of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director
Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works
the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the
documents were returned to Data’s office for the transfer of
title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was
registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071
(Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated
"9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore four (4)
certifications of: (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2)
Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3)
Cresencio Data as District Engineer I; and (4) Cesar V.
Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting
documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by
the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering
District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB
checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs.
X to X-15), for the total sum of P1,520,320.00 were issued
to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham’s 19,004-square-
meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the
Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham’s property. During the investigation, sworn
statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant
Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused
Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or
signed the certification dated September 14, 1978 (Exh. J),
attesting that Agleham’s property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520
and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to 1978.
Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of
his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax
Division) that was affixed below Prudencio’s typewritten
name in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned
the typewritten certification. They declared that such
certifications are usually issued by their office on
mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and
identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No. 47895
dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh.
Y-1). Therein, Agleham’s property of 30,169 square meters
was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per
square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a
market value of P150,850. Ocol testified that the supposed
xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which
Gutierrez submitted as one of the supporting documents of
the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the
following tell-tale signs:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not
machine-numbered as in the genuine tax declaration,
Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to
December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
— February 27, 1978 — in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential,"
instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and
(4) the lot was overpriced at P80 per square meter in the
fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of only
P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and K-1).
The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2)
was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the names of the
spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-
square-meter residential property with a declared market
value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of
the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who approved
the payment of P1,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning
the fact that the amount of the purchase price therein had
been altered, i.e., "snowfaked (sic) and later superimposed
by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the
veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of
the General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all,
among which were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the
value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K);
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio
that the fair market value of the land was P100 per square
meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978
signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando, certifying that
the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them,
found to be "residential;
"(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was
erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh. E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant
to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had examined
the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the
last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1)
attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was not
an approved technical description for the subdivision survey
executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was verified
and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May
28, 1978 only. There were "substantial variations" noted by
the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical
description and the technical description of the land in the
deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978,
supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1)
bore a fictitious residence certificate of Agleham (p. 64,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair
Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably
made by Gutierrez herself. The Sandiganbayan observed
that Agleham’s supposed signature "appears to be identical
to accused Gutierrez’ signatures in the General Voucher
(Exh. S), in the ‘Release and Quitclaim’ which she signed in
favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her
affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan
Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting
documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been
replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as
auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over
the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982,
after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and the
trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh.
T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987, whose
dispositive portion reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz,
Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section
3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum
to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional
costs of this action." (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan’s
decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the court’s
findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he
was grossly negligent are based on misapprehension of
facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data’s main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham
property was the work of the committee of Precillo Fernando
in which he did not take an active part, and that the price
which the Government paid for it was reasonable. Hence, it
suffered no injury in the transaction.

In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the
Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the
petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not
grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no
error in the decision under review. The Sandiganbayan did
not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their
co-accused to cause injury to the Government and to
unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the
acts charged, but may and generally must be proven by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances
(People v. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19, 1988; People
v. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction
where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to
protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of
Agleham’s two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth
the certifications of their subordinates, and approved
without question the million-peso purchase which, by the
standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their
curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify
the authenticity of the documents presented to them for
approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have
asked questions; they looked the other way when they
should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners
were negligent at the same time over the same transaction,
the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they
connived and conspired to act in that manner to approve
the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the
land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias’ excuse that because the deed of
sale had been signed and the property transferred to the
Government which received a title in its name, there was
nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher for
payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of
the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts,
funds, financial transactions and resources of the agencies
under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43,
Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as
applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect
securities or other documents; review procedures, and
question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an
opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like."
(State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico,
1 982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers
supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him
for payment of P1,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-
fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any person
for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of
the documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of
the price that the Government was paying for the less than
two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation
that since his subordinates had passed upon the
transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular
for, if he would be a mere rubber stamp for his
subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and
unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer
Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he allegedly
did not take any direct and active participation in the
acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the blame on
the committee which he created, composed of Fernando,
Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that negotiated
with the property owners for the purchase of properties on
the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He in effect
would hide under the skirt of the committee which he
himself selected and to which he delegated the task that
was assigned to his — office to identify the lots that would
be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify
documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for
the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to
be responsible for the implementation of the project. Under
the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible
for the manner in which the committee performed its tasks
for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared
by the committee. By signing the deed of sale and
certifications prepared for his signature by his committee,
he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore,
equally guilty with those members of the committee
(Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax
declarations and made false certifications regarding the use
and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but
did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham’s property
because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the
Secretary of Public Works. It should not be overlooked,
however, that Data’s signature on the deed of sale was
equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair,
honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task
of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his
engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General’s argument that
the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the price
of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was
reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of having
caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor
of having given unwarranted benefits to the property owner
and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues
that the valuation in the owner’s genuine tax declaration
may not be used as a standard in determining the fair
market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464
(making it mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price
at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were
declared null and void by this Court in the case of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305,
and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and
464 (before they were nullified) applied to the expropriation
of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham’s
riceland was not done by expropriation but through a
negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was
absolutely no allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per
square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven
(11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the
value of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F,
K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the real
property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of
the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used,
it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on
the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact
deceived concerning the reasonable value of the
land.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable
valuation for the Agleham’s land, he did not clarify that was
also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values
in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation of the
Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol’s testimony was
insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham’s genuine
1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of
the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax
Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of
the property (EPZA v. Dulay, supra).

The petitioner’s partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be

inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to
the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor
and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to
check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them
for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or
predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be
proved by the attendant circumstances.

WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the

Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs
against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.

Endnotes:

EN BANC
G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), Respondents.
G.R. No. 220953
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought
to assail and annul the resolutions issued on April 6, 20151 and
September 10, 2015,2 whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied
their demurrer to evidence, and their motions for reconsideration,
asserting such denials to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in
the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA);
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman
Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio O.
Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L.
Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S.
Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and
COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B.
Plaras with plunder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-
12-CRM-0174 and assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan.
The information3 reads:chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O.
VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. VALDES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO
A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as
defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE,
then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then
Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R.
TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. VALDES, then
members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget
and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS,
then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of
the Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or
influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the
operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be
accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, and converting,
misusing, and/or illegally conveying or

transferring the proceeds drawn from said
fund in the aforementioned sum, also in
several instances, to themselves, in the guise
of fictitious expenditures, for their personal
gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing
and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's
accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and
control through irregularly issued
disbursement vouchers and fictitious
expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official
positions, authority, relationships, connections
or influence, in several instances, to unjustly
enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum,
at the expense of, and the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired
jurisdiction over GMA, Valencia, Morato and Aguas. Plaras, on the
other hand, was able to secure a temporary restraining order (TRO)
from this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan docketed as G.R. Nos.
203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned,
the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of
2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained at large.
Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective
petitions for bail. On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan granted the
petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and Roquero upon finding that the
evidence of guilt against them was not strong.4 In the case of
petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the resolution
dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground
that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.5 The motions for
reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were denied by
the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014.6 Accordingly, GMA assailed
the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her challenge has
remained pending and unresolved to date.
Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by
the Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said accused sought to be
granted bail, and their motions were granted on different dates,
specifically on March 31, 20147 and May 9, 2014,8 respectively.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta
Tolentino as its main witness against all the accused.
The Sandiganbayan rendered the following summary of her testimony
and evidence in its resolution dated November 5, 2013 denying the
petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of
the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and
a lawyer for 20 years. She has practiced accountancy and law. She
became accounting manager of several companies. She has also
taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas, Manuel L. Quezon
University, Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila Graduate
School. She currently teaches Economics, Taxation and Land Reform.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The
Board appointed her as Chairman of an Audit Committee. The audit
review proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the
PCSO for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and "G",
respectively), and the annual financial statements contained therein
for the years 2005 to 2009. The reports were given to them by the
COA. These are transmitted to the PCSO annually after the subject
year of audit.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the
PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and the
operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were
maintained in only one main account. This violates Section 6 of
Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting
principles.
The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive
disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There
were also excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The
internal audit department was also merged with the budget and
accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was
given only P10 million in 2002, i.e. P5 million for the Office of the
Chairman and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such
allocation was based on the letters of then Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I")
and then General Manager Golpeo (Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million
intelligence fund each. Both were dated February 21, 2000, and sent
to then President Estrada, who approved them. This allocation should
have been the basis for the original allocation of the CIF in the PCSO,
but there were several subsequent requests made by the General
Manager during the time of, and which were approved by, former
President Arroyo.
The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO
Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this. They were working on a
deficit from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue
as operating fund, which was already exceeded. The financial
statements indicate that they were operating on a deficit in the years
2006 to 2009.
It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional
funds from the President, but there should be a budget for it. The CIF
should come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no
more operating fund, the other funds cannot be used.
The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO
did not have a registry of budget utilization. The excess was not taken
from the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, P1,000,078,683.23.
One of the causes of the deficit for 2006 was the CIF expense of P215
million, which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million.
The net cash provided by operating expenses in 2006 is negative,
which means that there were more expenses than what was received.
In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds. The COA made a recommendation
regarding the deposits in one main account. There were also excessive
disbursements of CIF amounting to P77,478,705.
She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB) for
the year 2008 in 2010 because she was already a member of its Board
of Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of
the actual budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It is stated there that the
budget for CIF in 2007 is only P25,480,550. But the financial
statements reflect P77 million. The budget was prepared and signed by
then PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It had accompanying
Board Resolution No. 305, Series of 2008, which was approved by then
Chairperson Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato, Domingo,
and attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.
In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds, adverted in the 2007 COA report. There
was already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or
funds in 2007. But the COA noted that this was not followed. The
financial statements show the Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary
Miscellaneous Expenses account is P38,293,137, which is more than
the P10 million that was approved.
In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008
Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was approved for P28 million.
The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the
account being used for confidential and intelligence expenses. The
amount in the financial statements is over the budgeted amount of
P28 million. Further, the real disbursement is more than that, based
on a summary of expenditures she had asked the treasurer to prepare.
In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the
2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the budget for CIF and expenses was
P60 million.
In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to
the prize and charity funds, despite the instruction or recommendation
of COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA
observation in 2007 states that there is juggling or commingling of
funds.
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to
the Board of Directors in one of their executive meetings. The Board
instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements
of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements
in excess of P10 million. He explained that there were board
resolutions confirming additional CIF which were approved by former
President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one of their meetings with
the directors and corporate secretary. The board secretary, Atty. Ed
Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte
would ask for additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it
by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were
seven letters or memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject
"Request for Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary
of all the disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010. The total of all
the amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked
Hinayon to give her the checks or copies thereof. She also asked
Dorothy Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the
corresponding vouchers. Only two original checks were given to her,
as the rest were with the bank. She asked her to request certified true
copies of the checks.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which
was then investigating the operation of PCSO, including the CIF. She
was invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman
Tcoilsto Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the hearing, the Committee
Chairman went to the PCSO and got some documents regarding the
subject matter being investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all
the documents needed by the Committee. These documents included
the CIF summary of disbursements, letters of Uriarte and the approval
of the former president.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those
who also attended were the incoming members if the PCSO Board
Directors and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also
present in some hearings as resources speakers. They were invited in
connection with the past disbursements of PCSO related to advertising
expenses, CIF, vehicles for the bishops, and the commingling of funds.
The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a
copy of the transcript of stenographic notes from the Office of the Blue
Ribbon Committee. In the proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. "EE"),
Uriarte testified. The witness was about two to three meters away
from Uriarte when the latter testified, and using a microphone.
According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential
intelligence projects she had proposed were approved by President
Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were approved and
signed by the latter personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the
documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted to President Arroyo.
On the other hand, Valencia and Taruc said they did not know about
the projects. Statements before the Committee are under oath.
After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and
regulations involved to check whether the disbursements were in
accordance with law. One of the duties and responsibilities of the audit
committee was to verify compliance with the laws.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO
Charter); P.D. 1445 (COA Code); LOI 1282; COA Circular 92-385, as
amended by Circular 2003-002, which provides the procedure for
approval of disbursements and liquidation of confidential intelligence
funds. She made a handwritten flowchart (Exh. "II") of the
allocations/disbursements/liquidation and audit of the CIF, based on
LOI 1282 and the COA Circulars. A digital presentation of this
flowchart was made available.
The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF
fund can be disbursed without the allocation. This is provided in the
second whereas clause of Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying
Circular 2003-002, there must be allocation or budget for the CIF and
it should be specifically in the corporate operating budget or would be
taken from savings authorized by special provisions.
This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The
disbursement for that year was P86,555,060. The CIF budget for that
year was only P28 million, and there were no savings because they
were on deficit. This was also not followed for the year 2009. The CIF
disbursement for that year was P139,420,875. But the CIF budget was
only P60 million, and there was also no savings, as they were in
deficit. For the year 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010,
was P141,021,980. The budget was only P60 million.
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and
the approval of the President. If the budget is correct, the President
will approve the disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the
President approved the release of the fund without a budget and
savings. Also, the President approved the same in violation of LOI
1282, because there were no detailed specific project proposals and
specifications accompanying the request for additional CIF. The
requests for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 were uniform and just
enumerated the purposes, not projects. They did not contain what was
required in the LOI.
The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request
for allocations must contain full details and specific purposes for which
the fund will be used. A detailed presentation is made to avoid
duplication of expenditures, as what had happened in the past,
because of a lack of centralized planning and organization or
intelligence fund.
There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was
approved by then President Arroyo.
The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case,
the Board of Directors designated Uriarte as Special Disbursing Officer
(SDO) for the portion of the CIF that she withdrew. For the portion
withdrawn by Valencia, there was no special disbursing officer
designated on record.
The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is
the responsibility of the department head, as required by Section 3 of
Circular 2003-002. When she went through copies of the checks and
disbursement vouchers submitted to her, she found out that Uriarte
was both the SDO and the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and
checks. She was also the payee of the checks. All the checks
withdrawn by Uriarte were paid to her and she was also the signatory
of the checks.
Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the
funds withdrawn by Valencia, he was also the authorized officer to sign
the vouchers and checks. He was also the payee of the checks.
The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She
identified the vouchers and checks pertaining to the disbursements
made by Uriarte and Valencia in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
The checks of Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as cosignatory.
The treasurer who signed depends on when the checks were issued
She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they
have their signatures on the records.
Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity
and legality of the vouchers; they also signed to approve the same,
signify they are "okay" for payment and claim the amount certified and
approved as payee. Gloria P. Araullo signed as releasing officer, giving
the checks to the claimants.
Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate
funds and budgetary allotment, that the expenditures were properly
certified and supported by documents, and that the previous cash
advances were liquidated and accounted for. This certification means
that the cash advance voucher can be released. This is because the
COA rule on cash advance is that before any subsequent cash advance
is released, the previous cash advance must be liquidated first. This
certification allowed the requesting party and payee to get the cash
advance from the voucher. Without this certification, Uriarte and
Valencia could not have been able to get the cash advance. Otherwise,
it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing Code).
The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board
Resolutions No. 217, Series of 2009 (Exh."M"), No. 2356, Series of
2009 (Exh."N"), and No. 029, Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to
designate Uriarte as SDO for the CIF. These resolutions were signed
and approved by Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and
Morato. The witness is familiar with these persons' signature because
their signatures appear on PCSO official records.
Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA
Auditor Plaras. There was no board resolution for this designation.
There was just a certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z 4"). This
certification was signed by Valencia himself and designates himself as
the SDO since he is personally taking care of the funds which are to be
handled with utmost confidentiality. The witness is familiar with
Valencia's signature because it appears on PCSO official documents.
Under COA rules, the Board of Directors has authority to designate the
SDO. The chairman could not do this by himself.
Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears
in the letter that to substantiate the liquidation report, Plaras told
Valencia to designate himself as SDO because there was no disbursing
officer. It was the suggestion of Plaras. Plaras is the head of the CIF
Unit under then COA Chairman Villar. Liquidation vouchers and
supporting papers were submitted to them, with corresponding fidelity
bond.
COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one
must be a special disbursing officer or SDO. All disbursing officers of
the government must have fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the
government from and answer for misappropriation that the disbursing
officer may do. The bond amount required is the same as the amount
that may be disbursed by the officer. It is based on total accountability
and not determined by the head of the agency as a matter of
discretion. The head determines the accountability which will be the
basis of the bond amount.
The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of
Directors, headed by the Chairman. But now, under the Governance of
Government Corporation law, it is the general manager.
Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances
because there was no fidelity bond and the disbursing officer was not
authorized. There was no bond put up for Valencia. The records show
that the bond for Uriarte was only for the amount of P1.5 million. This
is shown in a letter dated August 23, 2010, to COA Chairman Villar
through Plaras from Aguas (Exh. "B5"), with an attachment from the
Bureau of Treasury, dated March 2, 2009. It appears there that the
bond for Uriarte for the CIF covering the period February 2009 to
February 2010 was only P1.5 million.
Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on
August 24, 2010, late, because under the COA Circulars, it should
have been submitted when the disbursing officer was designated. It
should have been submitted to COA because a disbursing officer
cannot get cash advances if they do not have a fidelity bond.
Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be
submitted to COA, together with the fidelity bond and the signatories
for the cash advances.
The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget,
not its allocation. She thinks the action of the Board was done because
there was no budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it
was in excess of the budget that was approved. They were trying to
give a color of legality to them approval of the CIF in excess of the
approved corporate operating budget. The Board approval was
required for the amount to be released, which amount was approved in
excess of the allotted budget for the year. The President cannot
approve an additional amount, unless there is an appropriation or a
provision saying a particular savings will be used for the CIF. The
approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.
Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to
get a cash advance, one must state what the project is as to that cash
advance. No subsequent cash advance should be given, until previous
cash advances have been liquidated and accounted for. If it is a
continuing project, monthly liquidation reports must be given. The
difference in liquidation process between CIF and regular cash
advances is that for CIF, the liquidation goes to the Chair and not to
the resident auditor of the agency or the GOCC. All of the liquidation
papers should go to the COA Chair, given on a monthly basis.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just
say cash advance from CIF of the Chairman or from the GM's office in
accordance with her duties. There is no particular project indicated for
the cash advance. Also, the requirement that prior advances be
liquidated first for subsequent advances to be given was not followed.
The witness prepared a summary of the cash advances withdrawn by
the two disbursing officers covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010
(Exh. "D5"). The basis for this summary is the record submitted to
them by Aguas, which were supposedly submitted to COA. It shows
that there were subsequent cash advances, even if a prior advance has
not yet been liquidated. Valencia submitted liquidation reports to
Villar, which consists of a letter, certification and schedule of cash
advances, and liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh.
"G5") and another is dated February 13, 2009 (Exh. "H 5").
When she secured Exhibit "G5", together with the attached documents,
she did not find any supporting documents despite the statement in
Exhibit "G5" that the supporting details of the expenses that were
incurred from the fund can be made available, if required. Aguas, the
person who processed the cash advances said he did not have the
details or supporting details of documents of the expenditures.
Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the
agency is necessary. If there were vouchers or receipts involved, then
all these should be attached to the liquidation report. There should
also be an accomplishment report which should be done on a monthly
basis. All of these should be enclosed in a sealed envelope and sent to
the Chairman of the COA, although the agency concerned must retain
a photocopy of the documents. The report should have a
cover/transmittal letter itemizing the documents, as well as liquidation
vouchers and other supporting papers. If the liquidation voucher and
the supporting papers are in order, then the COA Chairman or his
representative shall issue a credit memorandum. Supporting papers
consist of receipts and sales invoices. The head of the agency would
have to certify that those were all actually incurred and are legal. In
this case, there were no supporting documents submitted with respect
to Valencia's cash advances in 2008. Only the certifications by the SDO
were submitted. These certifications stated that he has the documents
in his custody and they can be made available, if and when necessary.

When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the
supporting documents which were indicated in Valencia's certification
and Aguas's own certification in the cash advance vouchers, where he
also certified that the documents supporting the cash advance were in
their possession and that there was proper liquidation. Aguas replied
that he did not have them.
She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well
as a transmittal letter by Uriarte for August 1, 2008, a certification and
schedule of cash advances and an undetailed liquidation report. Among
the attachments is Board Resolution 305, a copy of the COB for 2008,
a document for the second half of 2008, a document dated April 2,
2009, and a document for liquidation of P2,295,000. She also
identified another letter for P50 million, dated February 13, 2009,
attached to the transmittal letter. There is a certification attached to
those two letters amounting to P2,295,000. Also attached is the
schedule of cash advances by Aguas and a liquidation report where
Aguas certified that the supporting documents are complete and
proper although the supporting documents and papers are not
attached to the liquidation report, only the general statement. These
documents were submitted to them by Aguas.
She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M 5", "N5", "O5"
and "P5") attached to the transmittal letter and was asked whether
they were properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they
were couched in general terms and the voucher for which the cash
advance was liquidated is not indicated and only the voucher number
is specified. She adds that the form of the liquidation is correct, but
the details are not there and neither are the supporting papers.
The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted
only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and it supposedly covered the cash
advances of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her
summary of liquidation that was earlier marked. There were no
supporting papers stated on or attached to the liquidation report.
She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from
the CIF for the second semester of 2008 by Uriarte. The transmittal
letter of Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon
inquiry with Aguas, he said that he did not have any of the supporting
papers that he supposedly had according to the certification. According
to him, they are with Uriarte. Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during
the Senate hearing, that she gave them to President Arroyo.
When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back
on behalf of Valencia, who had designated himself as SDO. However,
their designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are not
stated. Among the attachments is also a memorandum dated April 2,
2008 (Exhibit "P5"), containing the signature of Arroyo, indicating her
approval to the utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated
August 13, 2008, indicating the approval of Arroyo was also attached
to the transmittal letter of Aguas on April 4, 2009. These two
memoranda bear the reasons for the cash advances, couched in
general terms. The reasons were donated medicines that were sold
and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The reasons stated
in the memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any
accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas
submitted an accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were
not indicated in definite fashion or with specificity.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in
2009, that the total cash advance made by Uriarte was P132,760,096.
Arroyo approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009
and April 27, 2009, and then P50 million in May 6, 2009 in July 2,
2009, P10 million or a total of P70 million. In October 2009, P20
million or a total of P90 million. The amount that was cash advanced
by Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore, the total cash advances by
these two officials were P138,420,875, but all of these were never
liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a liquidation
voucher and a report to COA on April 12, 2010. For the January 22,
2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was June 30,
2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness
identified the transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated
October 19, 2009, which was received by the COA only on April 12,
2010, with an accompanying certification from Uriarte as to some of
the documents from which the witness's Summary of Liquidation was
based.
The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. 1, Sec.
4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. 1445 and par. 2, III, COA Circular No. 92-385.
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in
effect, they were disbursed without any appropriation. These cash
advances were also made without any specific project, in violation of
par. 2 of COA Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the cash advances
were not for a specific project. The vouchers only indicate the source
of the fund. The vouchers did not specify specific projects.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused
Uriarte and Valencia is more than P366,000,000. Valencia cash
advanced P13.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte.
The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems
encountered by the PCSO. These problems, as stated in each
memorandum, included donated medicines sometimes ending up in
store for sale, unofficial use of ambulances, rise of expenditures of
endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for programs of the
PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No projects were mentioned.
As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly
issued by the COA. The credit notice is a settlement or an action made
by the COA Auditors and is given once the Chairman, in the case of
CIF Fund, finds that the liquidation report and all the supporting
papers are in order. In this case, the supporting papers and the
liquidation report were not in order, hence, the credit notice should not
have been issued. Further, the credit notice has to follow a specific
form. The COA Chairman or his representative can: 1) settle the cash
advance when everything is in order; 2) suspend the settlement if
there are deficiencies and then ask for submission of the deficiencies;
or 3) out rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are illegal,
irregular or unconscionable, extravagant or excessive. Instead of
following this form, the COA issued a document dated January 10,
2011, which stated that there is an irregular use of the price fund and
the charity fund for CIF Fund. The document bears an annotation
which says, "wait for transmittal, draft" among others. The document
was not signed by Plaras, who was the Head of the Confidential and
Intelligence Fund Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead, she
instructed her staff to "please ask Aguas to submit the supplemental
budget." This document was not delivered to PCSO General Manager
J.M. Roxas. They instead received another letter dated January 13,
2011 which was almost identical to the first document, except it was
signed by Plaras, and the finding of the irregular use of the prize fund
and the charity fund was omitted. Instead, the work "various" was
substituted and then the amount of P137,500,000. Therefore, instead
of the earlier finding of irregularity, suddenly, the COA issued a credit
notice as regards the total of P140,000,000. The credit notice also did
not specify that the transaction had been audited, indicating that no
audit was made.
A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras, states
that the credit notice is hereby issued. Thus, it is equivalent to the
credit notice, although it did not come in the required form. It merely
stated that the credit notice is issued for P29,700,000, without
specifying for which vouchers and for which project the credit notice
was being given. It merely says "First Semester of 2008". In other
words, it is a "global" credit notice that she issued and it did not state
that she made an audit.
Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly
covers all the cash advances in 2009, but only up to the amount of
P116,386,800. It also did not state that an audit was made.
There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the
certification issued is not in conformity with the required certification
by COA Circular 2003-002. The certification dated July 24, 2008 by
Valencia was not in conformity with the certification required by COA.
The required form should specify the project for which the certification
was being issued, and file code of the specific project. The certification
dated July 24, 2008, however, just specified that it was to certify that
the P2 million from the 2008 CIF Fund was incurred by the
undersigned, in the exercise of his functions as PCSO Chairman for the
various projects, projects and activities related to the operation of the
office, and there was no specific project or program or file code of the
intelligence fund, as required by COA. Furthermore, the certification
also did not contain the last paragraph as required by COA. Instead,
the following was stated in the certification: "He further certifies that
the details and supporting documents and papers on these highly
confidential missions and assignments are in our custody and kept in
our confidential file which can be made available if circumstances so
demand." No details or supporting documents were reviewed by the
witness, and though she personally asked Aguas, the latter said that
he did not have the supporting papers, and they were not in the
official files of the PCSO. Two people should have custody of the
papers, namely, The Chairman of COA and the PCSO or its Special
Disbursing Officer. The witness asked Aguas because Valencia was not
there, and also because Aguas was the one who made the certification
and was in-charge of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly certified
by Aguas, as Budget and Accounting Department Manager, each time
cash advances were issued, stated that the supporting documents are
complete, so the witness went to him to procure the documents.
A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was
incurred by Valencia in the exercise of his function as PCSO Chairman,
related to the operations of his office without the specific intelligence
project. In the same document, there is a certification similar to one in
the earlier voucher. No details of this certification were submitted by
Aguas.
Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also
did not specify the intelligence and confidential project, and it did not
contain any certification that the amount was disbursed legally or that
no benefits was given to any person. Similarly, the fourth paragraph of
the same document states that Uriarte certified that details and
supporting papers of the cash advance that she made of P27,700,000
are "kept in their confidential" (sic). The same were not in the PCSO
official records.
The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of
P2,498,300, was submitted to the witness by Aguas. It also did not
conform to the COA requirements, as it also did not specify the use of
the cash advance, did not contain any certification that the cash
advance was incurred for legal purposes, or that no benefits to other
people were paid out of it. Again, no supporting documents were found
and none were given by Aguas. Similarly, a certification dated
February 8, 2010 for the amount of P2,394,654 was presented, and it
also does not conform with the COA circular, as it only stated that the
amount was spent or incurred by Valencia for projects covering the
period of July 1 to December 31, 2009 to exercise his function as
PCSO Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was
stated. As in the other certifications, though it was stated that the
details were in the confidential file, it appeared that these were not in
the possession of PCSO. Another certification dated October 19, 2009
submitted by Uriarte was examined by the witness in the course of her
audit, and found that it also did not conform to the requirements, as it
only stated that the P25 million and P10 million intelligence and
confidential fund dated January 29, 2009 and April 27, 2009 were used
in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice Chairman and General
Manager.
All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the
audit of the financial transactions of PCSO. Other documents given by
Aguas include a letter by Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was
attached to the letter dated July 24, 2008. For the Certification issued
by Valencia for P2,857,000, there was also a certification attached
dated February 13, 2009. As to Exhibit "J5", together with the
certification, there was a letter but no other documents were
submitted. Similarly, as to Exhibit "M6", it was attached to a letter
dated October 19, 2009 and was submitted to the witness by Aguas.
Exhibit "N6" was attached to the letter of Valencia dated February 8,
2010, the October 19, 2009 certification was attached to the October
19, 2009 letter to Chairman Villar.
The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the
amount of P2,075,000, also does not conform with the COA
requirement as it only specifies that the fund was disbursed by
Valencia under his office for various programs in the exercise of his
function as Chairman. Though there was a certification that the
supporting papers were kept in the office, these papers were not found
in the records of the PCSO and Aguas did not have any of the records.
The certification was attached to the letter of Valencia to Villar dated
June 29, 2010.
In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the
amount of P137,500,000, the witness also said that the certification
did not conform to the COA Circular because it only stated that the
amount was disbursed from a special intelligence fund, authorized and
approved by the President under the disposition of the Office of the
Vice Chairman. Despite the statement certifying that there were
documents for the audit, no documents were provided and the same
were not in the official files of PCSO. The certification was attached to
a letter by Uriarte dated July 1, 2010 addressed to Villar.
In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the
amount of P2,500,000, the witness made the same finding that it also
did not conform to the COA Circular, as it did not specify the project
for which the cash advance was obtained and there were also no
records in the PCSO. It was attached to the letter dated October 19,
2009.
Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in
the amount of P73,993,846, the witness likewise found that it did not
conform with the requirements of the COA, as all it said was the
amount was used for the exercise of the functions of the PCSO
Chairman and General Manager. The documents related to this were
also not in the PCSO records and Aguas did not submit the same. It
was attached to a letter dated February 8, 2010 from Uriarte to Villar.
There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds:
pre-audit and post-audit. Both are defined in COA Circular 2009-002.
Pre-audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction,
before these are paid for and recorded. The auditor determines
whether: (1) the proposed expenditure was in compliance with the
appropriate law, specific statutory authority or regulations; (2)
sufficient funds are available to enable payment of the claim; (3) the
proposed expenditure is not illegal, irregular, extravagant,
unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the transaction is approved by
the proper authority and duly supported by authentic underlying
evidence. On the other hand, the post-audit requirement is the
process where the COA or the auditor will have to do exactly what was
done in the pre-audit, and in addition, the auditor must supplement
what she did by tracing the transaction under audit to the books of
accounts, and that the transaction is all recorded in the books of
accounts. The auditor, in post-audit, also makes the final
determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular,
extravagant, excessive, unconscionable or unnecessary.
In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009
signed by Plaras, it was stated that a credit advice was given.
However, the letter did not conform to the requirements or form of a
credit notice. Such form was in COA Circular 2003-002, and should
specify the liquidation report number, the amount, check numbers,
and the action taken by the auditor. The auditor should also include a
certification that these have been audited. In this instance, no
certification that the transaction was audited was given by Plaras.
Other similar letters did not conform with the COA Circular. All
transactions of the government must be subject to audit in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the requirements
for audit are the same.
The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the
agency will take it up in the books and credit the cash advance. This is
the seventh step in the flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the
liability of the officers who obtained the cash advance would be
recorded in the books. The credit notice, when received, would indicate
that the account was settled. The agency will credit the receivable or
the cash advance, and remove from the books as a liability of the
person liable lor the cash advance. The effect of this was that the
financial liabilities of Uriarte and Valencia were removed from the
books, but they could still be subject to criminal liability based on Sec.
10 of COA Circular 91-368 (Government Accounting and Auditing
Manuals, Vol. 1, implementing P.D. 1445), which states: "The
settlement of an account whether or not on appeal has been made
within the statutory period is no bar to criminal prosecution against
persons liable." From the 2008 COA Annual Audited Financial
Statements of PCSO, it was seen that the procedure was not followed
because the liability of the officers was already credited even before
the credit notice was received. In the financial statements, it was
stated that the amount due from officers and employees, which should
include the cash advances obtained by Uriarte and Valencia, were not
included because the amount stated therein was P35 million, while the
total vouchers of Uriarte and Valencia was P86 million.
The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund
(since such was no longer stated as a receivable), and reviewed
whether it was recorded as an expense in 2008. She found out that
the recorded CIF fund expense, as recorded in the corporate operating
budget as actually disbursed, was only P21,102,000. As such, she
confronted her accountants and asked them "Saan tinago itong
amount na to?" The personnel in the accounting office said that the
balance of the P86 million or the additional P21 million was not
recorded in the operating fund budget because they used the prize
fund and charity fund as instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry Voucher
No. 8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer Camba,
Aguas (Head of the Accounting Department), and Hutch Balleras (one
of the staff in the Accounting Department), showed that this procedure
was done.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other
funds. This means that the amount of
P63,750,000 was credited as confidential
expense from the operating fund. The amount
was then removed from the operating fund,
and it was passed on to other funds.
(b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L
P41,250,000 and CF Miscellaneous for 424-2-
G for P22,500,000. PF Miscellaneous means
Prize Fund Miscellaneous and CF stands for
Charity Fund Miscellaneous. This means that
funds used to release the cash advances to
Uriarte and Valencia were from the prize fund
and charity.
Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads
"Allocation of Confidential and Intelligence Fund Expenses", and was
the basis of Camba in doing the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same
document, there was a written annotation dated 12-31-2008 which
reads that the adjustment of CIF, CF and IF, beneficiary of the fund is
CF and PF and signed by Aguas.
The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording
of the credit notice at the end of 2009, and despite the absence of the
credit notice, the Accounting Department removed from the books of
PCSO the liability of Uriarte and Valencia, corresponding to the cash
advances obtained in 2009. She based this finding on the COA Annual
Audit Report on the PCSO for the year ended December 31, 2009. It
was stated in the Audit Report that the total liability due from officers
and employees was only P87,747,280 and it was less than the total
cash advances of Uriarte and Valencia, which was P138 million. As a
result, the witness checked the corresponding entry for the expenses
in the corporate operating budget and found out that the same was
understated. The CIF expenses were only P24,968,300, as against the
actual amount per vouchers, which was P138,420,875. Upon checking
with the Accounting Department, the department showed her another
Journal Entry Voucher No. 9121157, dated December 29, 2009, where
the personnel removed immediately the expense and recorded it as
expense for the prize fund and charity fund by the end of December
31.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation "due
from", means the accountability of those who had cash advance was
instead credited. It was removed, and the amount was P106 million.
The entry was confidential expense for P15,958,020 and then the due
to other funds was P90,428,780. The explanation for "424" was found
in the middle part, stating: "424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was
used in the amount of P58,502,740 and the charity fund was used in
the amount of P31,916,040. The total amount of the receivables from
Uriarte and Valencia that was removed was P106,386,800 and
P90,428,780 respectively which came from the prize fund and charity
fund.
The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of
R.A. 1169, Sec. 6, which provides for the different funds of PCSO
namely: prize fund (55% of the net receipts), charity fund (30% of the
net receipts), and operating fund (15%). The proceeds of the lotto and
sweepstakes ticket sales provide the money for these different funds,
removing first the printing cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided
among the three funds mentioned. The prize fund is the fund set aside
to be used to pay the prizes for the winnings in the lotto or
sweepstakes draws, whether they are jackpot or consolation prizes.
Incentives to the lotto operators or horse owners are also drawn from
this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the winnings of the
draw. On the other hand, the charity fund is reserved for charity
programs approved by the board of PCSO, and constitutes hospital and
medical assistance to individuals, or to help facilities and other
charities of national character. Operating expenses are charged to the
expenses to operate, personnel services, and MOOE. One kind of fund
cannot be used for another kind, as they become a trust fund which
should only be used for the purpose for which it was authorized, not
even with the approval of the board.
The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008
was P63,750,000, and in 2009 P90,428,780. The Board of Directors
was given a copy of the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and 2009.
The Board of Directors for both years was composed of: Chairman
Valencia, and Board Members Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Valdez.
Uriarte was the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. The witness
did not know whether the Board checked the COA reports, but there
was no action on their part, and neither did they question the
correctness of the statements. They also had the Audit Committee
(which was composed of members of the board) at that time, and one
of the duties of the Audit Committee was to verify the balances.
The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by
the Board of Directors of PCSO of the GIF. Board Resolution No. 217,
approved on February 18, 2009, confirms the CIF approved by the
President. It did not state which CIF they were approving. They also
assigned Uriarte as the Special Disbursing Officer of the CIF, but it did
say for what year. The signatories to the same Board Resolution were
Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The same were
the witness's findings for Board Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009,
approved on December 9, 2009. As for Board Resolution No. 29, S.
2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board confirmed the fund
approved by the President for 2010, though the approval of the
President was only received on August 13, 2010 as shown in the
Memorandum dated January 4. In effect, the Board was aware of the
requests, and because they ratified the cash advances, they agreed to
the act of obtaining the same.
Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed
that the President directly dealt with the PCSO, although the President,
by Executive Order No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and Executive
Order No. 455 dated August 22, 2005, transferred the direct control
and supervision of the PCSO to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of Health (DOH). A
project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling
Secretary of the Secretary of Health; that the President had
transferred her direct control and supervision, and lost the same. The
witness said her basis was administrative procedure. In this regard,
President Aquino now has transferred the control and supervision of
the PCSO back to the Office of the President through Executive Order
No. 14, S. 2010, dated November 19, 2010.
Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the
latter's approval for allocation. Nonetheless, the release of the CIF
must still be approved by the President.9
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of
officers coming from different law enforcement agencies 10 to
corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the effect that the PCSO had not
requested from their respective offices any intelligence operations
contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz
Gonzales, Office-in-Charge and Department Manager of the Human
Resources of PCSO; Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence
and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of the COA; and Noel Clemente,
Director of COA were presented as additional witnesses.
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato,
Taruc V, Roquero and Villar separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to
evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the
charge against them. It held that said accused who were members of
the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any
PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by
conveying and transferring into their possession and control any
money or funds from PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been
no clear showing that his designation of Plaras had been tainted with
any criminal design; and that the fact that Plaras had signed "by
authority" of Villar as the COA Chairman could not criminally bind him
in the absence of any showing of conspiracy.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and
Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they
had conspired to commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had
sufficiently established a case of malversation against Valencia,
pertinently saying:
chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency
of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court then
ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
xxxx
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is
such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the
judicial or official action demanded to accord to circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365
[1999]).
xxx xxx xxx
A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:
It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We
found strong evidence of guilt against Arroyo and Aguas, only
as to the second predicate act charged in the Information,
which reads: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing
and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's
accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and
control through irregularly issued
disbursement vouchers and fictitious
expenditures.
In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:
chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the
enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the commission of
plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public
treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear
that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a
"raid on the public treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru
the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse,
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain
or profit to the raider. Otherwise stated, once a "raider" gets
material possession of a government asset through improper
means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is
completed. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is
obviously a government asset, will amount to a raid on the public
treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted
authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during the period
2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate during that period
CIF funds in the total amount of P352,681,646. This was through
a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the
PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks
issued and encashed by her, through her authorized representative.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently
characterize the series of withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte
as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public
treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted
government funds and appears to have not been able to
account for it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly,
she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended for,
thus, amounting to "misuse" of the same. Therefore, the additional CIF
funds are ill-gotten, as defined by R.A. 7080, the PCGG rules,
and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the checks,
which named her as the "payee," gave Uriarte material
possession of the CIF funds which she disposed of at will.
As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50 million
was met by the prosecution's evidence, the Court believes this to have
been established. Even if the computation is limited only to the cash
advances/releases made by accused Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had
approved her requests and the PCSO Board approved CIF budget and
the "regular" P5 million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman
and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash
advances through accused Uriarte's scries of withdrawals will
total P189,681,646. This amount surpasses the P50 million
threshold.
The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for
P150 million additional CIF funds, and Arroyo granted such request
and authorized its use. From January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010,
Uriarte made a series of eleven (11) cash advances in the total
amount of P138,223,490. According to Uriarte's testimony before
the Senate, the main purpose for these cash advances was for the
"roll-out" of the small town lottery program. However, the
accomplishment report submitted by Aguas shows that P137,500,000
was spent on non-related PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat,
kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and security relations." All the cash
advances made by Uriarte in 2010 were made in violation of LOI 1282,
and CO A Circulars 2003-002 and 92-385. These were thus improper
use of the additional CIF funds amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers
and were ill-gotten because Uriarte had encashed the checks and
came into possession of the monies, which she had complete freedom
to dispose of, but was not able to properly account for.
These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by
Uriarte of the crime of Plunder under the second predicate act
charged in the Information. As to Arroyo's participation, the
Court stated in its November 5, 2013 Resolution that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request
for additional CIF funds in 2008-2010, but also authorized the latter to
use such funds. Arroyo's "OK" notation and signature on
Uriarte's letter-requests signified unqualified approval of
Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the
last paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this
phrase: With the use of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its
image and integrity of its operations.
The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit because it
categorically asked for: "The approval on the use of the fifty percent of
the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence Fund will greatly help PCSO in the
disbursement of funds to immediately address urgent issues."
Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved
were only the request for the grant or allocation of additional CIF
funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation was unqualified and,
therefore, covered also the request to use such funds, through
releases of the same in favor of Uriarte.11
The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for
Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas, observing that: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's
bank account or was used to acquire real or personal
properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit
the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already illegally
amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government
funds and just decided to keep it in his vault and never used such
funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if
immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames
or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the person to
actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases,
a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of
personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.
Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving
the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She
further stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy between
accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was
unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused
Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any
"overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving
not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided
and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public
treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-
conspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the
performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
conspirator is the mastermind.12
Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence
of GMA and Aguas, they have come to the Court on certiorari to assail
and set aside said denial, claiming that the denial was with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues
GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent
and flagrant violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the law on plunder,
and was consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave
abuse of discretion but rendered without jurisdiction because: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First Ground
On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has
denied petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence and
considering the reasons for doing so, would find petitioner
Arroyo guilty of the offense of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080 as charged in the Information notwithstanding the
following:
While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of
plunder under R.A. No. 7080, and as charged in the
Information, is that the public officer . . . "amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the
offense of plunder;
In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered
by the prosecution nor a single testimony of the 21 witnesses
of the prosecution was offered by the prosecution to prove that
petitioner amassed, accumulated or acquired even a single
peso of the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to
P365,997,915.00 or any part of that amount alleged in the
Information;
Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on
the basis solely of petitioner Arroyo's authorization of the
release of the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's
accounts, the Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the
offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her
release of CIF funds to the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec.
1(d) [1] of R.A. No. 7080 which reads, as follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the
public treasury", thereby disregarding the gravamen or
the corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No.
7080.
Second Ground
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the
Resolutions, with absolutely no justification in law or in the
evidence, purportedly as the "mastermind" of a conspiracy, and
without performing any overt act, would impute to petitioner
Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF
funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids on the PCSO
coffers, which is part of the public treasury" and "in every
sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and appears
to have not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte
has not been arrested, was not arraigned and did not
participate in the trial of the case.
Third Ground

That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of
petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer To Evidence for the reasons
stated in the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to
convicting her on the basis of a disjointed reading of the crime
of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the
extirpation in the process of its "corpus delicti" - the amassing,
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, hence, of a
crime that does not exist in law and consequently a blatant
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in
Crim. Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, namely: Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio O. Valencia, Manuel L.
Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima
A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B.
Plaras . . . all public officers committing the offense in relation
to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire,
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN
PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means, described as follows . . . or each of them,
P36,599,791.50 which would not qualify the offense charged as
"plunder" under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten (10) accused
together, for which reason the Information docs not charge the
offense of plunder and, as a consequence, all proceedings
thereafter held under the Information are void.13
On his part, Aguas contends that:
chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
A. In light of the factual setting described above and the
evidence offered and admitted, does proof beyond
reasonable doubt exist to warrant a holding that
Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that
there is legal reason to deny Petitioner's Demurrer?
B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and
properly support the allegations in the Information?
PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED
TO ESTABLISH BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE
EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF
PLUNDER.14
On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions
for certiorari should be dismissed upon the following grounds,
namely: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN
ORDER OR RESOLUTION DENYING DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE
THE SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY INTERPRETED WHAT
CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS OF THE CASE. IT
DID NOT JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.
1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR
ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF PLUNDER
UNDER R.A. NO. 7080.
2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY
INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, CONSPIRED
WITH HER CO-ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN
THE COMPLEX, ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH
DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS
OF PESOS, WHICH CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.
3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH
ACCUSED PCSO BOARD MEMBERS AND CANNOT
THUS DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DISMISS THE PLUNDER CASE AGAINST HER.
C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
INFORMATION CHARGING HER AND CO-ACCUSED FOR
 PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS
LATE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING.
1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE
CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO
SB- 12-CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS
ALWAYS KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD THE
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST HER.
D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IN SB-12-CRM-0174 CANNOT BE
ENJOINED.15
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the
decisive issues to be considered and resolved, as follows:
Procedural Issue:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper
to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive Issues:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence
of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the
elements of the crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not
less than P50,000,000.00?
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury
alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.
I.
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to correct grave
abuse of discretion
The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was
improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence; that she
also thereby failed to show that there was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying her demurrer to evidence;
and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only interpreted what
constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the
established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively
discussing how she had connived with her co-accused to commit
plunder.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions
for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be
demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail
such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of
law.17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable
obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not
terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they
may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the
errors to be reviewed.18 Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited,19 because
to do so -
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So
wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over
other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.20
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other
courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following
provision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one
side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to
strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the
accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.21 As we shall soon
show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse
of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence
despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual
bases to expect a guilty verdict.22 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence
of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. 23 In
this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means
to commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime,
and prescribes a penalty for it.24The exception is exemplified in Article
115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article 136
(conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or
insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of
the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a
crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime
among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal design must
be alleged and competently shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense
must be a conscious one.25 Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in,
or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.26 Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture,
but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first
is the express form, which requires proof of an actual agreement
among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However,
conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed
upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An
implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment.27 Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a
community of interest.28 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused
must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance
or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so
none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be
held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection, the
character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:29
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act
is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his
declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be
a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt
act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been
committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the
equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what
the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act
should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the
design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that
the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.
In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate
and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis)
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her
having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional
CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of
plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder
by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular. However,
the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration of GMA
and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the feet of
amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of approving
the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She
further stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy between
accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was
unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused
Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any "overt
act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the
additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused
Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is
therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who
accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act
is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind.30
It is in this regard that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with,
its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was
plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the
information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind;
hence, the Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her
handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely
unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid
practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President.
Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct
becomes an overt act of a crime only when it evinces a causal
relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be
an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,31 the Court recognized two nuances of
appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel
conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group
(the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather
than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a
common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in
the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the
other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.32
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one
conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for
plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators.
Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the
other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United
States33 illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple conspiracies
were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon
Brown, the hub, assisted 31 independent individuals to obtain separate
fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all the defendants
were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no
common purpose or overall plan among them, and they were not liable
for involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself,
separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar
illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator
was interested in whether any loan except his own went through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate
conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy.34 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists
when there is successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.35 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a
criminal objective.36 Illustrative of chain conspiracy was that involved
in United States v. Bruno,37 of the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import,
sell, and possess narcotics. This case involved several smugglers who
had brought narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics
to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired was
a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the
middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to addicts, and the
retailers knew that the middle men must purchase drugs from
smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at one end of
the chain knew that the unlawful business would not and could not,
stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not
begun with their sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of
that part with which he was immediately concerned was dependent
upon success of the whole." This means, therefore, that "every
member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal transaction
carried out by other members of the conspiracy in Texas and in
Louisiana."38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime,
each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of
one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in
every detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact
part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal
act.39 Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and
independent.
The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA,
Uriarte, Valencia and the Members of the PCSO Board of Directors,
Aguas, Villar and Plaras. The Sandiganbayan agreed with the
Prosecution as to the conspirators involved, declaring that GMA,
Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed plunder.
A review of the records of the case compels us to reject
the Sandiganbayan's declaration in light of the information filed
against the petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature,
forms and extent of conspiracy. On the contrary, the Prosecution did
not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas
and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought
to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the
accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and
after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not
allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express
agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit
or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by
Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise
or material possession of any person within the purview of Section two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gilt, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be
identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten
wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a combinationor series of overt criminal acts
as described in Section 1(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the
criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must
be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of
her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the
wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in
either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the
main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly
proven by the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,40 where
the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the
necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment,
accumulation and acquisition was made, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made up of a
complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended
Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is
not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal
gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares
of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that
each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks;
rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of
and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis]
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing,
accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating
P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was
plunder if none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As
such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of
only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-
gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten
wealth required for plunder.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan41 to
the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the
information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the
word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc.; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking
about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of
conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main
plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element
of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was
not only necessary because the law required such identification, but
also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made
answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of
the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the
accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the
offense charged.42 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or
the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in
its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite
the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect.
Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer
should be fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for
violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges
against each of them.
Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas
committed acts showing the existence of an implied conspiracy among
themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. On this
score, the Prosecution points out that the sole overt act of GMA to
become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the marginal
note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of
additional intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by
approving Uriarte's requests in that manner, GMA violated the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional
confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied with
detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and
COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the
release of additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover
the request.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of
Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part
of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass,
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the specific
allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof
thereon, GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests, even if unqualified,
could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder
or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any
means irregular or illegal.
The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request
despite the requests failing to provide "the full detail [of] the specific
purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the
circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the
particular aims to be accomplished." It posits that the requests were
not specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.
LOI 1282 reads: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. 1282
To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned
In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various
ministries and certain offices have been, as reports reaching me
indicate, spent with less than full regard for secrecy and prudence. On
the one hand, there have been far too many leakages of information
on expenditures of said funds; and on the other hand, where secrecy
has been observed, the President himself was often left unaware of
how these funds had been utilized.
Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of
intelligence funds shall indicate in full detail the specific purposes for
which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances
giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims
to be accomplished.
The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the
President personally.
It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the
President in order to avoid such duplication of expenditures as has
taken place in the past because of the lack of centralized planning and
organized disposition of intelligence funds.
Full compliance herewith is desired.
Manila, January 12, 1983.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
However, an examination of Uriarte's several requests indicates their
compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly worded,
furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the
funds would be spent; (b) the explanations of the circumstances
giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c) the particular
aims to be accomplished.
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the
expenditures were laid down as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a
number of fraudulent schemes and nefarious activities on a continuing
basis which affect the integrity of our operations, to wit:
Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if
they were labeled "Donated by PCSO - Not for Sale";
Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiary-donees;
Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients and
organizations;
Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning
the jackpot and selling tampered tickets as winning tickets;
Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance Donation
Project, Endowment Fund Program and Individual Medical Assistance
Program;
Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad
light.43
A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs
requested were to be used to protect PCSO's image and the integrity
of its operations. The Court thus cannot share the Prosecution's
dismissiveness of the requests for not being compliant with LOI No.
1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any
qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence,
we should not make any other pronouncement than to rule that
Uriarte's requests were compliant with LOI No. 1282.
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs
would be approved only when there was available budget. In this
regard, the Prosecution suggests that there was no longer any budget
when GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the budget had
earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out and
used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the
funds of the PCSO were co-mingled into one account as early as 2007.
Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO's revenues was
appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could be
sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled
with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In
short, there was available budget from which to draw the additional
requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling
of funds, did not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the
requested additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal.
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad
faith has led it to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte would raid
the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This
knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her power of control over
PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command
responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to GMA as
the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA
under those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible.
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited,
and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo44 that command responsibility pertains to the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found
application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this case
involves neither a probe of GMA's actions as the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As
such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in
the absence of any conspiracy between them.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as
much a member of the implied conspiracy as GMA was, and detailed
his participation in this manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash
advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds, Aguas certified that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the
amount of P_________; expenditure properly certified; supported by
documents marked (X) per checklist and back hereof; account codes
proper; previous cash advance liquidated/accounted for.
These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.)
there were no documents which lent support to the cash advances on
a per project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw
cash advance form the CIF Fund of the Office of the Vice-Chairman
and General Manager". No particular purpose or project was specified
contrary to the requirement under CO A Circular 2003-002 that cash
advances must be on a per project basis. Without specifics on the
project covered by each cash advance. Aguas could not certify that
supporting documents existed simply because he would not know what
project was being funded by the cash advances; and 2.) There were
no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when Aguas
made the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash
advances be liquidated within one (1) month from the date the
purpose of the cash advance was accomplished. If the completion of
the projects mentioned were for more than one month, a monthly
progress liquidation report was necessary. In the case of Uriarte's cash
advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made was wholesale,
i.e. these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly
liquidation or at least a monthly liquidation progress report. How then
could Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were accounted
for? Aguas's certification also violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which
states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be given unless
for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be
reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was
given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to
any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to
him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made.
There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action
aided and abetted Uriarte's being able to draw these irregular CIF
funds in contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's
certification, the disbursement vouchers could not have been
processed for payment. Accordingly, the certification that there were
supporting documents and prior liquidation paved the way for Uriarte
to acquire ill-gotten wealth by raiding the public coffers of the PCSO.
By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances
and the staggering amounts involved, Aguas should have been alerted
that something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to
something. If Aguas was not into the scheme, it would have been easy
for him to refuse to sign the certification, but he did not. The
conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in the case of Aguas.
Moreover, Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of these CIF
funds in his accomplishment report only contributed to unmasking the
actual activities for which these funds were utilized. Aguas's
accomplishment report, which was conformed to by Uriarte, made it
self-evidence that the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were
allegedly spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g. bomb threats,
kidnapping, terrorism, and others.45
Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the
implied conspiracy when he signed the disbursement vouchers despite
the absence of certain legal requirements, and issued certain
certifications to the effect that the budgetary allotment/funds for cash
advance to be withdrawn were available; that the expenditures were
supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had
been liquidated or accounted for.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and
signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases to
conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any
other crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not release any
money because there was then no budget available for the additional
CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount
to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the
existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder was unsustainable. It
then becomes unavoidable for the Court to rule that because the
Prosecution failed to properly allege the elements of the crime, as well
as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit plunder or any
other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no
conspiracy to commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and
Aguas could be criminally responsible only for their own respective
actions, if any.
III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50 Million was adduced against GMA and
Aguas
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict
the petitioners for plunder on the basis that the Prosecution
established all the elements of plunder.
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had
no case for plunder against the petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State
must allege and establish the following elements, namely: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in
connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
 2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill- gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following overt
or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the
illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines; and.
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00.46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00.
The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal
of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that
either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was
also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the
PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and
decisive aspect of the criminal prosecution was explicitly noted in the
concurring and partial dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan, to wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of
the crime of plunder as no evidence was presented that any of the
accused, accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the
principal witness of the prosecution when asked, said that she does
not know the existence or whereabouts of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-
gotten wealth are (sic) now?
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether
they saved it, squandered it or what? We
don't know, Your Honor.47 [bold Emphasis
supplied]
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack
of any knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-
gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of
the criminal prosecution for plunder. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should
have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas, and dismissed the
criminal action against them.
IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the
public treasury
The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary
benefit" are only mentioned in the predicate acts mentioned in par. 2,
5 and 6 of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same
section where "raids on the public treasury" is mentioned did not
mention "unjust enrichment" or "personal benefit". Lastly, the
predicate act covering "raids on the public treasury" is lumped up with
the phrases misappropriation, conversion, misuse and malversation of
public funds. Thus, once public funds, as in the case of CIF funds, are
illegally accumulated, amassed or acquired. To the tune of P50 Million
or more, there will be no need to establish any motive to gain, or
much more establish where the money eventually ended up. As stated
in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:

It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the
enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the commission of
plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public
treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear
that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a
"raid on the public treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru
the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse,
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or
profit to the "raider" gets material possession of a government asset
through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or
pillage is completed.
xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is
obviously a government asset, will amount to a raid on the public
treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted
authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during the period
2008-2010. Uriarte was able to accumulate during that period CIF
funds in the total amount of P352,681,646. This was through a series
of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO
coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued
and encashed by her, through her authorized representatives.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently
characterize the series of withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as
"raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These
were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds
and appears to have not been able to account for it. The monies came
into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes
other than what these were intended for, thus amounting to "misuse"
of the same. x x x
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank
account or was used to acquire real or personal properties or used for
any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd.
Suppose a plunderer had already amassed, acquired or accumulated
P50 Million or more of government funds and just decide to keep it in
his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him,
would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such
amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police,
negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually benefit, would
that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could
still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should
still be evidence-based must fail.48
The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act
of raids of the public treasury, the Prosecution need not establish that
the public officer had benefited from such act; and that what was
necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public
coffers. In support of this, it referred to the records of the
deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.
We do not share the Sandiganbayan's contention.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080, which provides: chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary
Section 1. Definition of Terms. - x x x
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public
treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the
company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with
which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may,
therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.49 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property
as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one's own benefit;50misuse means "a good, substance,
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as
intended;"51 and malversationoccurs when "any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially."52 The common thread that binds all the four terms together
is that the public officer usedthe property taken. Considering that raids
on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that
require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere
accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on
the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids
on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations
removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not
requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following
exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or
person who conspired or knowingly benefited". One docs not have
to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he
"knowingly benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who
received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the
contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from
the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life
imprisonment?
Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we
have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a
way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these
questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court
will have to . . .
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree
with the plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful
wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to
the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder.
Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of plunder
simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the
plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee
amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5
were stricken out in the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the
camples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the
Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have just
to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the
case and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been
stricken off.53
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal,
therefore, that what was removed from the coverage of the bill and
the final version that eventually became the law was a person who
was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who
personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of
personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money
went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally
benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
V.
Summation
In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that
the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the information to
sufficiently charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the
petitioners; and ignored the lack of evidence establishing the corpus
delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in
the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the
predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus
gravely abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.54 To justify the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without
jurisdiction.55
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions

for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6,
2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective
demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-
0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said
petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen and attach my Separate

Dissent.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, and Jardeleza, concur.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see my Separate Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
Caguioa, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 181084 : June 16, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA
MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas
Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification,
the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida
Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the
commission of rape.
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1)
Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus
(Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC4 on
April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No.
013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995
at 1:00 a.m.
The Information5 in each case reads as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6
That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o'clock
[sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in
deep slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with [sic] the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13)
years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused
Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Bartolome
Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 o'clock
[sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic]
[ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against
her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida,
and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked
as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City.
On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room
in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1,
1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the
house with Ida and Tampus9 who were both drinking beer at
that time. They forced her to drink beer10 and after
consuming three and one-half (3 ') glasses of beer, she
became intoxicated and very sleepy.11 While ABC was lying
on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus
requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to
"remedyo"12 or have sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant
Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he
finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went
to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep
and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her
panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She
suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and
vagina, and noticed that her panties and short pants were
stained with blood which was coming from her
vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from work the
following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida
ignored her.15
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she
was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at
the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and
threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual
assault to anyone.17 He then forcibly removed her panties.
ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again
threatened to kill her if she shouted.18 He undressed
himself, spread ABC's legs, put saliva on his right hand and
he applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into
ABC's vagina and made a push and pull movement.19 After
consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC
told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again
ignored her.20
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC
sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie).
She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold
her.21 ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic
enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May
9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator, M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the
Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime
Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical
examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report.22 Dr.
Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC
revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) o'clock
position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1)
o'clock position on ABC's hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She
accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having
carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was
intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She
declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy
with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape
her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was
threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her
will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed
that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to
the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home
at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually
go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.23 He denied
forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to
allow him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.24 Appellant
Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at
4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m.
the following day.25 She said that she always brought her
daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an
instance when she left her daughter alone in the
house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m.
of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.27
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He
testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod
Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3,
199528 and that his actual duty time shift was from midnight
to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a
defense witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus
reported for duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left
at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance
logbook. However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not
tell whether the signature appearing on the logbook really
belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the
handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April
2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April
3, 1995.29 It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is
just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the
barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on
duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without
permission.30
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the
Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which
showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at
the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry
Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995
and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia,
paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as
principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case
No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an
accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court
appreciated in Ida's favor the mitigating circumstance of
illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power
without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts,
pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.33 The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals
[sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No.
013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion
Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00
in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.34
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of
Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 200035 and
his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this
Court.36 Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt
only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave
credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial
court's decision with modification. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found
that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of
intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical
report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida's
schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her
will-power though it did not deprive her of the
consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape
and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay
moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php
50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of
twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).37
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of
ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal
accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we
agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that
the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is
sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an
accomplice in the same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and
respect and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn
said findings unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision
or affect the result of the case.38 The rule finds an even
more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.39
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of
complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to
her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that
the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly
inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape,
implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an
examination of her private parts and subject herself to
public trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was
impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit.40
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who
had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1,
1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive
and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC
was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual
debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial
evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who
raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.41 In cases
like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the
events that transpired before and after the victim lost
consciousness in order to establish the commission of the
act of coitus.42
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that
accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC]
on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article
335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is,
when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.
x x x
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus'
defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against
the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her
[on] two occasions.
x x x
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC]
did not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was
the aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up.
Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following
circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the
complainant was forced to drink beer by both accused; (2)
The conversation between the two accused when accused
Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was
granted by the latter, permission to have sexual intercourse
with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the
complainant were the only persons left in the house when
Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request
of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood
in complainant's vagina and the pain in her head, groin and
buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the
complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill
her if she would tell about the previous incident on April 1,
1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that immediately
ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to
accused Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal
knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated
condition.43
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial
court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was
charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as
an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or
intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the
request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual
intercourse with ABC did not prove their conspiracy.44Hence,
it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated
in the commission of the crime by previous acts but her
participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a
principal. She is liable as an accomplice."45
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human
nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped. She
maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC
alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed
appellant Ida's appeal as it also gave credence to the
testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA
MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF RAPE
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.46
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is
liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The
following requisites must be proved in order that a person
can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design
of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.48
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the
execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of
rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she
agreed to Tampus' request for him to have sexual
intercourse with ABC. Ida's acts show that she had
knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her
daughter.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty.
Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually
drink beer?
A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only
on April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1,
1995?
A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
x x x
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not
complain that you had not been used to drinking beer and
then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that
time?
A No, sir.
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer,
so, I would not drink beer"?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that
time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her
at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was
she already threatening to maltreat you if you would not
drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might
maltreat you if you would not drink that beer that she
proposed for you to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a
wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was
offering the glass of beer to you?
50
A Yes, sir.
x x x
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome
went out of the house and you overheard Bartolome asking
or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual
intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect
"remedyo", Bartolome would want to have a "remedyo" with
you. When [sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear
this statement, while you were drinking beer or after you
had finished drinking beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we
were renting.51
x x x x
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you
were quite sure that it was you who was being referred by
Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the
Visayan dialect that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he
wants to have sexual intercourse with you?
A Yes, sir, but I don't know the meaning of "remedyo".
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of
"remedyo"?
A Not yet, sir.52
x x x
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the
word "remedyo"?
A Yes, sir53
x x x
Q And when your mother came back from work at about
7:00 o'clock [sic] in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you
not also bother to tell her of what you suspected that
something serious or bad had happened to you in the
previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have
sexual intercourse with her, leave her immediately!"55
x x
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of
the word, "remedyo", when your mother arrived in the
morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother,
did you not tell her that, "Is this what you mean by
"remedyo", as what you had agreed with Bartolome Tampus
that he would do something to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an
accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
ABC shows that there was community of design between
Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had
knowledge of and assented to Tampus' intention to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to
drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC
alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her
express consent to Tampus' plan to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of
cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable
to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be
liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The
evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not
indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to
drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the
intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could
have consummated the act even without Ida's consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual
commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to
drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked
Ida if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida
gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with
Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an
Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as
would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without
depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for
schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his
expert opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence
at the time of the incident; but, she may have poor
judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City
Prosecutor Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you
said, is provisional, would you say that the patient [sic]
totally deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the
principals in the commission of the crime of rape for having
given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-
accused, allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first
day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then under treatment,
Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995,
would you say, Doctor, that having taken this diagnosis for
[sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12,
1995, she must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness
even with the treatment, and even without any medication,
it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get
back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be
yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much
concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally deprived of
intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of
her act, she or he may be exempted from any criminal
liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for the
purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with
discernment and with certain degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own
daughter to somebody, I think there is a motive, she wants
to gain financial or material things from the daughter if no
material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness.
This is my opinion.57
x x x A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the
right or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is
impaired to discern between right or wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say
at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I
think, although the mother alleged that the sickness could
be more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because
she was allegedly destroying everything in the house
according to the mother, so she was in acute stage.58
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas
testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida
Montesclaros affected her sense of judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while
in that stage, the patient lost contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of
argument, the alleged accusation against her is true, being
an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable
Court as a mother, who would allegedly do such an offense
to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper
mental sane [sic]?
motivation if she want [sic] to gain some material things, if
not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter
allegedly to be rubbished by another person, then there
must be something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from
scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be
considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the
exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the
testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was
diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived
of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the
basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and
was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the
incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida's
schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the
exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of
the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida
is the mother of ABC who was 13 years old at the time of
the incident could have been considered as a special
qualifying circumstance which would have increased the
imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.'
x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
x x x Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship
of the offender to the victim, either as the victim's parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the
information and proved during the trial in order for them to
serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code.61
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was
alleged and established, her relationship with the accused
as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the
Information, and even though this was proven during trial
and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as
a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to
increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive
effect following the rule that statutes governing court
proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and
the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of
the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.63 Since in the case at bar, the Information in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the
mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated
as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be
convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape,
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event,
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was
signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered
offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L."64 The Court of Appeals, however, did
not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded
moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and
proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of
rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon
such finding without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral
injuries entitling the victim to such award.65
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in
simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages.66 However, Tampus' civil indemnity ex delicto has
been extinguished by reason of his death before the final
judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which
remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for
which each accused is liable when they have different
degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime
and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a
crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in
the commission of the crime and though all the persons who
took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the
liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an
accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or
accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for
depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the
commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon
the principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is
only given the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by the law for the crime committed69 and an
accessory is given the penalty lower by two
degrees.70 However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he
is likewise civilly liable.71 Apart from the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to
indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused
by his act or omission through the payment of civil
indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the
accused. Although, unlike criminal liability in which the
Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding
penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessory
the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified
in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to
determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which
the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively
liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the
allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f
there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the
courts shall determine the amount for which each must
respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the
respective liability of the principals, accomplices and
accessories within their respective class, they shall also be
subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in
the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be
liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their
quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons
liable."72
As courts are given a free hand in determining the
apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing
with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States
v. Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v. Irinea,77 People v.
Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v.
Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People v. del
Rosario,82 People v. Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and People v.
Tamayo,85 the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay
jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity
awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,86 the accomplice
was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity
imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for
the other half. In People v. Toring,87 the principal,
accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice
were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity. This
makes the accomplice who had less participation in the
commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for
the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the
crime was not taken into account in the apportionment of
the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the
principle behind the treble division of persons criminally
responsible for felonies, i.e., that the liability must be
commensurate with the degree of participation of the
accused in the crime committed. In such a situation, the
accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the
offense but whose participation is not indispensable to the
commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount
of civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation who
took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act. It is
an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not
commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender;
for criminal responsibility is individual and not collective,
and each of the participants should be liable only for the
acts actually committed by him.88 The proportion of this
individual liability must be graduated not only according to
the nature of the crime committed and the circumstances
attending it, but also the degree and nature of participation
of the individual offender.
In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v.
Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v. Bato,93and
People v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily
liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the
amount adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the
accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the civil
indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral
damages of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In
Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was
held solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the
civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz,
the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the
principal for half of the actual damages, and in Garalde the
accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the principal
for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and
moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and
severally liable with the principal for only half of the amount
of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes
of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the
offended party. When the liability in solidum has been
enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by
whom payment has been made shall have a right of action
against the other persons liable for the amount of their
respective shares.95 As against each other, whoever made
the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share
that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment
already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment is made
by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made
the payment to the victim could demand payment of the
part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for
example the principal paid the victim the entire amount of
the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for
one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and
damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half
(1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was
solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since
the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is
solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that
amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would have
become ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total
amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the
accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of
such amount.
In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v.
Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal was ordered to
pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity.
In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for
which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable
for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the
accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the
accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases
cited above where the principal and accomplice were held
solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity
or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the
amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent with
Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which
require that the courts should determine the amount for
which the principals, accomplices and accessories must
respond to and upon specifying this amount, the principals
are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the
accomplices are solidarily liable among themselves for their
quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their
quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its
respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota
of the other classes, which shall be enforced first against
the property of the principals; next, against that of the
accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories.101
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay
more than double the amount that the accomplice is liable
for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00
was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily
liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily
liable in solidum among themselves for the other half of the
indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was
answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth
(1/8) of the entire amount of civil indemnity, which is
P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices
should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices
were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in
case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily liable
for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay
one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity, while
the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths
(3/4).
In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and
damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to
P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay
P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire
civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay
the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to
P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by
which the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and damages
among the principal, accomplice and accessory is
determined. Though the responsibility to decide the
respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the
courts, this does not mean that this amount can be decided
arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to
grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and
caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the
moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among
the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degree of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act.
Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the
opinion that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in
all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil
liability among two or more persons civilly liable for a
felony, either because there are different degrees of
culpability of offenders, or because of the inequality of their
financial capabilities.106 On this note, he states in his
commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law
should leave the determination of the amount of respective
liabilities to the discretion of the courts.107 The courts have
the competence to determine the exact participation of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of
the crime relative to the other classes because they are able
to directly consider the evidence presented and the unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts' discretion should
not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle
behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in
the commission of the crime. The person with greater
participation in the commission of the crime should have a
greater share in the civil liability than those who played a
minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in
the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal
should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each
accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as
against every accessory. Care should also be taken in
considering the number of principals v. that of accomplices
and accessories. If for instance, there are four principals
and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity
and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-
thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals
and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the
principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as
against the accomplice - - since one-third (1/3) of
P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00
is P4,000.00 - - when the civil liability of every person is
computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be
greater than that of each principal. This is so because the
two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals'or P4,000.00 is still
divided among all the four principals, and thus every
principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice
is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of
the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous
apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does
not take into account the difference in the nature and
degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, v.
the accomplice, Ida. Ida's previous acts of cooperation
include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But
even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC.
It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who
should have the greater liability, not only in terms of
criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability.
Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that
the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for
every class for which members of such class are solidarily
liable within their respective class, and they are only
subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The
Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability
among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in
the case at bar.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in
participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal,
Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total
amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and
appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of
the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly
set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The
total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus
and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for
P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and
Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of
P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of
P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However,
since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil
indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death
before the final judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity
and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida,
because Tampus' share of the civil liability has been
extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the
promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been
subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity of
P66,666.67. However, since Tampus' civil liability ex delicto
is extinguished, Ida's subsidiary liability with respect to this
amount is also eliminated, following the principle that the
accessory follows the principal. Tampus' obligation to pay
P66,666.67 - his quota of the civil indemnity - is the
principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable.
Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is
no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it;
thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that
exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court
of Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the
offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.109 Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive"
damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct.110 Exemplary damages may be
awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances
are alleged in the information and proved during the trial.111
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating
circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the
minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the
offender is the parent of the victim could have served to
qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring
circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary
damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the
victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information.112 The
minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the
offender must both be alleged in the information and proved
during the trial in order to be appreciated as an
aggravating/qualifying circumstance.113 While the
information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a
minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida
was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and
appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary
damages is not warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape
and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil
indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred
sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and
moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six
hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos
(P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 172707, October 01, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y
USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y
SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y
NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN
PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND
JOHN DOES,Accused-Appellamts.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the
Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding
accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y
Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal
y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y
Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil,
Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person,
were charged under the criminal information3which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the
evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there by force and intimidation, and the use of high
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty
against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in
fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her
release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L.
Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the
case:4cralaw virtualaw library
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She
usually expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by her
suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of
11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified
as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence
at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain
passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a
box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said
passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen,
together with another companion identified as Tony Abao
(Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she
was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan
informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan
offered instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve
the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen
and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back
later that evening.5cralaw virtualaw library
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who
remains at large, returned to Chan’s residence that evening.
Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by
the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of
Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy),
and the house companions.7 As the unidentified man
forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man
by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen
pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to release
his grip on Chan’s feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the
Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.9cralaw
virtualaw library
Chan was forced to board a “Tamaraw FX” van.10 After
travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a
certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman
(Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun
pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two
women,11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants
Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad).12 Chan was
brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed,
guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol
(Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she
would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14cralaw
virtualaw library
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was
asked to board the “Tamaraw FX” van. After travelling for
about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted.
Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the
house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan
identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil
Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as
Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00
o’clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as
Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun
and asked Chan “Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa
pulis?”17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as
Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room.
Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask
her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk
to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to
her son to get the P75, 000.00 she kept in her
cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chan’s son and
negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s
release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver
P400,000.00 at the “Chowking” Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue.20cralaw virtualaw library
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar
Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the
Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the
kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and
demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s
release.21 During their surveillance the following day,
Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport
taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s
residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of
the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house.
The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until
Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that
the woman the team saw in the cottage was the victim,
they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.22cralaw
virtualaw library
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector
Arnado) received information that the abductors acceded to
a P400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at
“Chowking” Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00
am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately
and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity
of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue “Tamaraw
FX” van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the
ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon
Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted
the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as
Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also
able to recover the P400,000.00 ransom.23cralaw virtualaw
library
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the
police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe
rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her
abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal,
Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24cralaw
virtualaw library
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her
son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his
earlier plea of “not guilty” to “guilty.” The presiding judge
then explained the consequences of a change of plea,
stating: “It would mean the moment you withdraw your
previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the
court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it has
received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will
[outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law
after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation of
its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the
consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still
desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?” Eddie Karim
answered, “Yes.”25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who
had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of
them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to
change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately
asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they
understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of
them answered in the affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman
manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the
trial court that he understood the consequences of such
change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-
arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial court
directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting
Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for
Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court
affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding
accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM
y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA,
RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them
the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly
and severally the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission
of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by
Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court
certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the
elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. The
issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective
briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be
discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this
Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to
positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due
to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial
court and the CA found Chan’s testimony credible and
straightforward. During her testimony, she positively
identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them
before, she could not have positively identified them in open
court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants
was further established through the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question
of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions
are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive
and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence has not been considered.31 In People
v. Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling
that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they
testified in court.33 It can be observed that the briefs
submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with
generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this
reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her
conviction is insufficient. We also find her argument bereft
of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian
as one of the seven people apprehended when they
conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in
the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive
identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate
evidence working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the
accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is established
jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’
positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so
where the defense did not present convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for them to have been present
at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the
crime.35cralaw virtualaw library
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by
Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the
absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the
defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of
the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for
ransom is death. A review of the records36 shows that on 7
October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of
“not guilty” and were re-arraigned. They subsequently
entered pleas of “guilty” to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v.
Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is
mandated:
(1)to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
 full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of
guilt,
(2)to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in
its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial
purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of
an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might
be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea.39Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court
on appellate review in determining the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.40cralaw virtualaw library
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines
whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed
judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of
the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of
the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating
from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus,
adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a
trial judge must conduct a “searching inquiry,” we have held
that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law;chanroblesvirtualaw1ibrary
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is
intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress
either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge’s intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to
whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment
or nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not
infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also
of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he
is charged and fully explain to him the elements of
 the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure
of the court to do so would constitute a violation of
his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of
his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused,
in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must
be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the
crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have
not been fully complied with. The questions propounded by
the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants
fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is
readily apparent from the records43 that Karim had the
mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate
the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his
counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will
not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial
court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and
indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court
judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional
plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say
Ferrer something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim
: we manifest and petition this court that he be
allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please,
considering that he will plead guilty as charged but
the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court: You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is
what the law says. You plead guilty, no condition
attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is
Ferrer already repenting
:
Court: Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of
guilty there should be no condition attached. We
cannot make that condition and dictate to the court
the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were
improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the
condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s
shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-
appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea
of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If
the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged.45 The manner by which
the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not,
loses legal significance where the conviction can be based
on independent evidence proving the commission of the
crime by the accused.46cralaw virtualaw library
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were
convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of
guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial
court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond
reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in
their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were
concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman
hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of
those arrested during the rescue operation based on the
testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas
and Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no
participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom
money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those
apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation,
the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently
established that he was one of the four people apprehended
when the police intercepted the “Tamaraw FX” at the
Nichols Tollgate.49Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector
Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were
two of those who were arrested during the rescue
operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others
in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the
accused-appellants and placed all of them at the crime
scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It
has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of
the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the
parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.53 The testimonies,
when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the
accused-appellants and how they were all united in its
execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies
proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-
appellants kept coming back to the victim’s house; (2)
during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in
guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were
those present when the ransom money was recovered and
when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman,
Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and
Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on
the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s
attention to the manifestation made by the prosecution
regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was
concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court
in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed,
any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more
so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the
prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave
inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath
during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details
such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she
saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied
several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be
included or identified with the other accused-appellants. The
lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she
knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She
knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being
committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent
that she was fully aware of the consequences of the
unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to
proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a
principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had
was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August
1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding
stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that
Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but
rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in
order that a person may be considered an accomplice,
namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the person charged
as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to
exonerate her criminal liability. Assuming arguendothat she
just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it
was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal
design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded
in the room. A rational person would have suspected
something was wrong and would have reported such
incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep
quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the
cottage. It has been held before that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed will
make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-
appellant’s presence and company were not indispensable
and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for
ransom; hence, she is only liable as an
accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling
in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in
case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be
considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and considering the evidence
presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’
participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to
their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of
kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the
supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However,
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed
by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion
Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability
of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a
determination of whether she acted with or without
discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted
with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense, her minority should be
appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a
privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be
applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no
longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under
Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence
can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This
leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce
judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form
part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant
to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping
for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree
lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion
Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower
than that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be
imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the
maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range
of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be
within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any
aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating
circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an
agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance
with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v.
Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at
the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in
view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual served term has
already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For
such reason, she may be immediately released from
detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial
court admitted the documentary evidence offered by the
counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian
Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this
case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary penalties
attendant to the crime, his death72 having occurred before
rendition of final judgement.73cralaw virtualaw library
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising
from the commission of kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons
convicted were held liable for P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of
indemnity and damages, where, as in this case, the penalty
for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be
imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity;chanroblesvirtualaw1ibrary
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is
assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example
for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and
damages where death is the penalty warranted by the facts
but is not imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is
instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all
the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil
liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and
actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant
should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged
as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their
participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount
of P300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be
liable for P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian
who shall be liable for P12,000.00. This is broken down into
P10,666.67 civil indemnity, P10,666.67 moral damages and
P10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal; and
P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral damages and
P4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO,
EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL
UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and
NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-
appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the
crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total
amount of P288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the
victim P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to
immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty
imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted
for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate
implementation to the Director of the Correctional Institute
for Women by personal service. The Director of the
Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision,
the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., no part.
Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave.
Villarama, Jr., J., on sick leave.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 124977. June 22, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ISABELO RAGUNDIAZ y AUREGUE and
ROLANDO FLORES y SAN MIGUEL, accused.
ROLANDO FLORES y SAN MIGUEL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Before usis theappeal interposed by accused-appellant
Rolando Flores y San Miguel from the decision1dated
February 16, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 4425-V-94
finding him and co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz y Auregue
guilty of acting in conspiracy with one another in killing
BILLY CAJUBAN on July 9, 1994. The appeal of accused-
appellant Isabelo Ragundiaz y Auregue was dismissed in a
Resolution2 of the Court dated October 22, 1997 which
became final and executory on December 4, 1997 and
recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.3cräläwvirtualibräry
The Amended Information4 filed on July 27, 1994 by State
Prosecutor Esteban A. Molon, Jr. before Branch 75 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, charged Isabelo
Ragundiaz y Auregue and Rolando Flores y San Miguel, both
detained, and John Doe, Peter Doe, and Jack Doe, all at
large, of the crime of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 9th day of July 1994 in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause,
with treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot on
the head one BILLY CAJUBAN, thereby inflicting upon said
victim serious physical injuries which directly caused his
death."
When arraigned, both accused entered separate pleas of not
guilty. Thereafter, upon motion filed by the accused and
hearing conducted thereon by the trial court, an
order5 dated November 9, 1994 was issued granting bail to
both accused in the amount of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos in cash each which was later reduced to
a cash bond of P20,000.00 each. Only accused Isabelo A.
Ragundiaz posted a cash bond of P20,000.00 and was
provisionally discharged from police custody. Accused-
appellant Rolando Flores remained detained at the
Valenzuela Municipal Jail.
During the trial, the prosecution presented seven (7)
witnesses, namely: Alberto Castillo, Lito Salinas, Lina
Cajuban, Ludivino Lagat, SPO1 Josefino Canary, Jr.,
Honorato A. Flores, and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro, while the
defense had as witnesses accused Isabelo Ragundiaz, his
common-law wife Rachelle Ragundiaz and accused Rolando
Flores.
The trial court summed up the evidence adduced by the
parties, and stated its findings as follows:
"From an evaluation of the records, prosecution established
that the victim Billy Cajuban was murdered on July 9, 1994,
whose body was found at De los Reyes St., Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in a muddy portion of the
roadside. The victim died of gunshot wound on the head
(Exh. Q). Prosecution witnesses SPO1 Josefino Canary and
SPO1 Edgar Lim who immediately responded to the report
found fresh blood on the body of the victim, which bring to
point the probability that the killing might have been
perpetrated at same place.
While admittedly, there is no eyewitness of the killing per
se, the Court nonetheless appreciates the finding of
conviction on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty
beyond reasonable doubt on accused (Article III, Sec. 12
(1), 1987 Constitution). This is so because crimes are
usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly improbable. To require direct
testimony in all cases would result in the acquittal of guilty
parties leaving them free to once more wreak havoc on
society (People vs. Lavuzo, 175 SCRA 47, cited in People vs.
Gonzaga, G.R. No. 90036, August 21, 1992).
Prosecution witness Alberto Castillo saw on July 9, 1994 at
12:30 early morning Isabelo Ragundiaz having an
altercation with Billy Cajuban, the former boxed, poked a
gun and dragged the latter and boarded him in a taxicab (El
Salvador) then driven by Rolando Flores. They had three (3)
other companions, who were not identified.
Prosecution witness Lito Salinas testified that while on duty
as waiter at Skyblue Beerhouse located at 8th Avenue cor.
Rizal Avenue, Kalookan City, at around 3:30 in the morning
of July 9, 1994, he saw Rolando Flores, Isabelo Ragundiaz
and three others entered the beerhouse. He noticed that the
shirt of Flores was stained with blood and that there was
wound on his left hand. They boarded an El Salvador taxi.
A post-mortem examination conducted on the victim shows
that the victim died of gunshot wound (Exh. Q).
The statement of Isabelo Ragundiaz that he was at his
common law wifes place of work in Makati is corroborated
by no less than his common law wife Rachelle Ragundiaz.
Accused Rolando Flores, on the other hand, testified that he
went to his residence at 8th Avenue, Kalookan City at 9:00
in the evening of July 9, 1994 to sleep after plying his route
and woke up at 5:00 oclock the next morning. No other
witness was presented to corroborate his testimony. In fact,
the distance from his residence at 8th Avenue to the place
where he was seen together with Isabelo Ragundiaz and
three (3) others boarded Billy Cajuban in an El Salvador taxi
at 3rd Avenue does not render impossible his participation
in the commission of the crime.
With the turn out of events, from the time accused Isabelo
Ragundiaz, Rolando Flores and three others were seen
along 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City, with Ragundiaz poked a
gun and dragged Billy Cajuban inside an El Salvador taxi
around 12:30 early morning of July 9, 1994 up to the time
the group arrived at Skyblue Beerhouse at 8th Avenue cor.
Rizal Avenue, Kalookan City boarding the same taxi, with
Rolando Flores sporting a stained shirt and wounded hand
at around 3:30 that morning, added the fact that SPO1
Josefino Canary and SPO1 Edgar Lim responded to the
report at around 2:00 oclock that morning and saw the
dead body of Billy Cajuban along De los Reyes St., Gen. T.
de Leon, Valenzuela, these circumstances are consistent
such that the Court is convinced that accused in conspiracy
are the perpetrators of the crime.
xxx
Circumstances established by the prosecution are consistent
and if collated constitute an unbroken chain of events
leading to a reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of
the accused.
The allegation of the defense that prosecution witnesses
Alberto Castillo and Lito Salinas are relatives of the victim
Billy Cajuban does not render inadmissible their
testimonies. In fact, even the testimony of accused Isabelo
Ragundiaz is corroborated by no less than his common-law-
wife, while the testimony of Rolando Flores remained
uncorroborated. In People vs. Libungan, G.R. No. 102351,
March 22, 1993, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Relationship alone is not a ground for
discrediting a witness testimony. It is
a well-established rule that the mere
fact that the witness is a relative of
the victim is not a valid on (sic)
sufficient ground to disregard the
formers testimony nor does it render
the same less worthy of credit. In
People vs. Cuyo, 196 SCRA 447
(1991), we held that the closeness of
the prosecution witnesses relationship
to the victim should not be deemed
erosive of their credibility as
witnesses. The weight of their
evidence must be assessed by the
same norms applicable to other
witnesses."
Absence (sic) proof of ulterior motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify against the accused, such
testimonies are admissible. In fact, after observing the
demeanor and deportment of said witnesses together with
the variations of their expressions while on the witness
stand, the Court concludes that their testimonies are
credible.
The killing perpetrated on the victim having been qualified
by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the
charge of murder is in order. The felons having taken
advantage of their collective strength to overwhelm their
comparatively defenseless victim, the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is
present. The culprits used their dominance in number to
over power the deceased. They also used force entirely out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the
victim who was unarmed unsuspecting of his impending fate
and left alone at the mercy of his tormentors (People vs.
Waggay, et al., G.R. No. 98154, February 9,
1993)."6cräläwvirtualibräry
On February 16, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the prosecution
having established by proof beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of both accused of the crime of Murder punishable by
Article 248(1) of the Revised Penal Code, accused ISABELO
RAGUNDIAZ y AUREGUE and ROLANDO FLORES y SAN
MIGUEL are hereby found GUILTY as charged acting in
conspiracy and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided
by law and to indemnify the family of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 each as death indemnity, P70,000.00
as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Accused Rolando Flores shall be credited with the full term
of his preventive imprisonment.
The cash bond posted by accused Isabelo Ragudiaz for his
preventive imprisonment is hereby ordered forfeited in favor
of the government.
SO ORDERED."7cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused Rolando Flores and accused Isabelo Ragundiaz filed
separate notices of appeal, the former on February 20,
19968 and the latter on March 5, 19969. As stated earlier,
the appeal of accused Isabelo Ragundiaz was dismissed by
the Court for jumping bail pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the judgment against
Isabelo Ragundiaz finding him guilty of murder is now final.
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant Rolando Flores raises
the following assignment of errors10 :
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED
THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE DEFENSE OF ACCUSED.
Appellant avers that only two of the prosecution witnesses
provided the court with circumstantial evidence which were
used as basis in rendering a judgment of conviction against
the accused. These two witnesses, Alberto Castillo and Lito
Salinas, testified only on matters which transpired before
and after the killing and as such, there was no eyewitness
to the actual killing of victim Billy Cajuban. Thus, it is the
contention of accused-appellant Flores that the testimonies
of these two witnesses do not constitute circumstantial
evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of accused Rolando
Flores beyond reasonable doubt.
As previously stated, the court a quo convicted accused-
appellant Flores as co-principal of the crime of murder for
the killing of Billy Cajuban. The conviction was based purely
on circumstantial evidence because there was no
eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim. Thus, the core
issue in the instant appeal is whether or not the
circumstantial evidence linking accused-appellant to the
killing is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based
purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.11 The corollary rule is that the
circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person;12 i.e. the circumstances proven must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent and with any other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.13cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
trial court appreciated the following two pieces of
circumstantial evidence in convicting accused-appellant of
the crime of murder:
(1) Accused-appellant Rolando Flores was present and
witnessed the altercation between accused Isabelo
Ragundiaz and Billy Cajuban which took place at the
basketball court located at 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City at
about 12:30 A.M. on July 9, 1994. Appellant Flores stood by
and watched his co-accused Ragundiaz box Cajuban on the
face and then a poke a gun at him. Finally, appellant Flores
allegedly helped Ragundiaz drag Cajuban into an El
Salvador Taxi and Flores drove the taxi away from the
basketball court with Billy Cajuban, accused Ragundiaz, and
three (3) other companions on board;
(2) At around 3:30 of that same morning of July 9, 1994,
accused-appellant Rolando Flores entered the Sky Blue
Beerhouse in Caloocan City together with co-accused
Ragundiaz and three other companions but without Billy
Cajuban. They arrived at the beerhouse on board an El
Salvador Taxi. At that time, the white T-shirt of accused-
appellant Flores was stained with blood and he had a wound
on the thumb of his left hand.
These two circumstances, coupled with the fact that the
dead body of the victim Billy Cajuban was found at around
2:00 A.M. of that same day, were deemed sufficient by the
trial court to convict the accused-appellant of the crime of
murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, these circumstances cited by the trial court in
justifying the conviction of the accused-appellant satisfies
the first two requisites for judgments of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence. There was more than one
circumstance and these circumstances were duly proven by
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Castillo
and Lito Salinas. We are not prepared to say however that
the combination of these circumstances is sufficient to
convict accused-appellant as co-principal for the crime of
murder beyond reasonable doubt.
The principals in the commission of a crime are (1) those
who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those
who directly force or induce others to commit it; and (3)
those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it could not have been
accomplished.14 As such, in order to convict accused-
appellant as principal in the crime of murder, the
prosecution must prove specific acts done by him which fall
under any of the abovementioned acts.
From the evidence presented by the prosecution, it is
apparent that accused-appellant Rolando Flores was not
involved in and had no participation in the verbal jousting
and physical altercation between co-accused Isabelo
Ragundiaz and Billy Cajuban that took place in the early
morning of July 9, 1994. The pertinent portions of the
testimony of witness Alberto Castillo on this point are
reproduced hereunder as follows:
"PROS. NOCHE:
Q: Now, on July 9, 1994, at about 12:30 in the evening, did
you have any opportunity to see Billy Cahuban?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: In 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And what was he doing along 3rd Avenue, Caloocan
City?
A: He alighted from the taxi and wiping the taxi, sir.
Q: And what is the name of the taxi being driven by Billy
Cahuban at that night?
A: El Salvador, sir.
Q: And did you have any opportunity to confer Billy
Cahuban at that night.
A: No, sir.
Q: While(pause) Now when you saw Billy Cahuban that
night, did you notice any unusual incident that happen that
night?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us?
A: When I was washing car that night, at about 12:30 in the
evening of July 9, 1994 I saw Billy Cahuban and another
person (witness pointing to a person at the Gallery, whom
latter identified as Isabelo Ragundiaz) having an altercation
with each other, sir.
Q: How far were you from the place where Isabelo
Ragundiaz and Billy Cahuban were having altercation with
one another?
A: More or less ten (10) armslength, sir.
Q: And this altercation took place at nighttime. How were
you able to recognize that this two (2) persons having
altercation were Isabelo Ragundiaz and Billy Cahuban?
A: Because the place was bright due to a lighted Meralco
post, sir.
Q: Now were you able to overhear the altercation between
Billy Cahuban and Isabelo Ragundiaz?
A: No, sir.
Q: How were you able to know that Isabelo Ragundiaz and
Billy Cahuban were having an altercation?
A: Because they were shouting at each other, sir.
Q: And how long did this altercation between Isabelo and
Billy last?
A: Just a short time, sir.
Q: Would you kindly approximate the duration of this
altercation?
A: About five (5) minutes, sir.
Q: And in the meantime that they were having altercation
with each other, what were you doing?
A: I was washing taxi, sir and watching them.
Q: Were there other people around, other than Isabelo, Billy
and you at that time, at that place along 3rd Avenue
Caloocan City?
A: We were the only onces (sic) but there were other people
passing by at that time, sir.
Q: After this altercation, what happened?
A: Billy was boxed "sinapak" and was dragged inside the
taxi and drove away with him, sir.
XXX XXX XXX
PROS. NOCHE:
Q: Of course you recognize the persons, who delivered the
blow on Billy?
A: Yes sir. (Witness pointing inside the court room, a man
wearing yellow orange-t-shirt, whom he identified as
Isabelo Ragundiaz) and when asked his name answered
Isabelo Ragundiaz).
Q: And where was Billy Cahuban hit by that blow?
A: On the right side of his face, sir.
Q: How far were you from Billy Cahuban, when you saw
Isabelo delivering blows on the face of Billy?
A: More or less about ten (10) armslength, sir.
Q: Earlier you stated in open court that "sinapak nila at
tinulak nila sa loob ng taxi." What do you mean by "nila"?
A: Because they were three (3) persons sir. The two were
at the corner, sir.
Q: So how many times did you see Isabelo delivering that
kind of blow at the person of Billy?
A: Once sir.
Q: Alright, did you recognize the companions of Isabelo
Ragundiaz at that night?
A: I only know the two (2), sir.
Q: One of the two. What are the names of these two (2)
persons that you know?
A: I recognized them only by the face, sir.
Q: Now, if you will be given the chance to see that person
again, will you be able to recognize them?
A: Yes, sir.
XXX XXX XXX
PROS. NOCHE:
Q: Do you know a person in the name of Rolando Flores?
A: I saw him at the Municipal Hall of Valenzuela, sir.
Q: Okey, let us go back to the time when Isabelo delivered
a blow on the face of Billy. So what happened to Billy when
he was hit by that blow?
A: He fell down, sir.
Q: Where?
A: At the side of his taxi, sir.
Q: And was Isabelo the only person who delivered that
blow, on the person of Billy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So after Billy fell beside his taxi, what happened next?
A: They dragged him inside the taxi and boarded him and Q: When was the first time you came to know the name of
drove away with him, sir. Rolando Flores?

XXX XXX XXX A: Only last July 26, at the municipal hall of Valenzuela, sir.

Q: To which direction . . . (pause) By the way, who was XXX XXX XXX
driving that taxi where Isabelo boarded Billy that night?
PROS. NOCHE:
A: Rolando Flores was the one driving the taxi, sir.
Q: At that time, the incident happened, were Ragundiaz and
XXX XXX XXX his companion armed with anything?

PROS. NOCHE: A: There was sir.

Q: Now, during the incident at that time (sic), there was an Q: And who among these persons did you see in possession
altercation between Isabelo Ragundiaz and Billy Cahuban, of a weapon?
(what was Rolando Flores doing) up to the time Billy was
forcibly entered (sic) inside the taxi and driven away? A: Isabelo Ragundiaz, sir.

A: He was just standing sir. And when Isabelo boxed Billy, Q: Who else if any?
he helped in dragging Billy inside the taxi, sir.
A: No more, sir.
XXX XXX XXX
Q: What kind of weapon did you see, in possession of
Q: You said that one of those who assisted Isabelo Ragundiaz at that time?
Ragundiaz in this incident was Rolando Flores. Do you
remember testifying that? A: As I see, it was a gun, sir.

A: Yes sir. Q: And where was it placed?

Q: Prior to the incident, did you already know the person, A: He was holding it and poked it to Billy Cahuban, sir.
Rolando Flores?
COURT:
A: No sir.
How far were you, when you saw that?
A: More or less ten (10) armslength,
sir."15cräläwvirtualibräry
From, this testimony, it is clear that accused-appellant
Flores was a mere bystander when the altercation between
accused Ragundiaz and Billy Cajuban was taking place.
Likewise, it was accused Isabelo Ragundiaz and not accused
Rolando Flores who boxed Billy Cajuban on the face, poked
a gun at him and dragged the victim to the El Salvador taxi.
As such, from Castillos testimony, it cannot be inferred that
accused-appellant took a direct part in the execution of the
crime or that he forced or induced others to commit it. The
only participation of accused-appellant Flores was that he
allegedly helped in dragging the victim to the taxicab and
that he allegedly drove the taxicab away from the
basketball court. These acts however have not been shown
to be indispensable to the commission of the crime so as to
consider him as a principal by indispensable cooperation.
With respect to the second piece of circumstantial evidence
allegedly linking accused-appellant Flores to the killing, we
note that witness Lito Salinas only testified that he saw
accused-appellant, in the company of Ragundiaz and three
others, arrive at the Skyblue Beerhouse at 3:30 A.M. of that
same day. They arrived on board an El Salvador Taxi and
accused-appellant Rolando Flores was sporting a blood-
stained shirt. However, he also saw that accused-appellant
Flores had a wound on his left hand thumb. Witness Salinas
did not see the actual killing of Billy Cajuban nor did he
witness any act of accused-appellant Flores done in
furtherance of the crime.
Thus, the evidence adduced by the prosecution points only
to accused Isabelo Ragundiaz as the principal in the murder
of Billy Cajuban. Ragundiaz was seen by a witness as
having a fight with the victim and that he was in the
possession of a gun. Moreover, as testified by witness
Rachelle Ragundiaz, the common-law wife of accused
Isabelo Ragundiaz, it was Ragundiaz who had a probable
motive to kill Billy Cajuban. She testified that prior to the
incident, accused Ragundiaz had a misunderstanding with
Billy Cajuban as the latter was suspected of stealing
Ragundiazs wristwatch a week earlier16. This case of theft
was the subject of a complaint17 which she had earlier filed
with the Barangay authorities on July 4, 1994 and which
caused a confrontation between the victim and Ragundiaz
before the Barangay Captain of 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City.
In contrast, the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant
Flores was likewise a principal to the killing of Billy Cajuban.
The acts performed by accused-appellant are not, by
themselves, indispensable to the killing of Billy Cajuban. As
aforesaid, to be considered as a principal by indispensable
cooperation, there must be direct participation in the
criminal design by another act without which the crime
could not have been committed. We note that the
prosecution failed to establish that the accused-appellants
acts were of such importance that the crime would not have
been committed without him or that he participated in the
actual killing. As such, the acts of accused-appellant only
raise the suspicion that he was somehow involved in the
killing of Billy Cajuban. These circumstances however do not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that he is guilty as co-
principal in the perpetration of the crime.
Similarly, the circumstantial evidence that accused-
appellant Flores, who was sporting a bloody t-shirt, together
with accused Ragundiaz, and two other unidentified
companions, arrived at the Sky Blue Beerhouse at 3:30
A.M. of July 9, 1994, does not conclusively indicate that
accused-appellant actively participated in the commission of
the crime. It must be noted that the witness also testified
that accused-appellant had a wound on the thumb of his left
hand and as such, the blood on the t-shirt may have come
from the said wound. This circumstance however does not
in any way shed light on the actual degree of his
participation in the killing.
Finally, accused-appellant Flores did not have any motive to
kill Billy Cajuban. While we are aware that the motive of the
accused in a criminal case is generally held to be
immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive
becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence on
the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive.18cräläwvirtualibräry
At best, therefore, the evidence before us merely shows
that accused-appellant Flores was somehow involved in the
commission of the crime. However, the evidence does not
clarify the actual degree of his participation in the killing of
Billy Cajuban.
To justify its conviction of accused-appellant as a principal
to the crime, the trial court appreciated the existence of an
alleged conspiracy between him and Isabelo Ragundiaz
without stating however, how it came to such a conclusion.
At this point, It is well to recall here the rule established by
this Court to the effect that conspiracy must be shown to
exist, by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.19 Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it or if at the time of the commission of
the offense, the offenders have the same criminal purpose
and were united in its execution. Therefore, in order to hold
an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or in furtherance of the conspiracy.20 The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself or it may consist of moral assistance to his
co-conspirators or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the conspiracy.21cräläwvirtualibräry
In the light of these legal principles, the Court finds that
proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as
to the existence of conspiracy between Isabelo Ragundiaz
and accused-appellant Rolando Flores. While direct proof is
not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be shown by
acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred
the existence of a common design among the accused to
commit the offense charged, the evidence to prove the
same must be positive and convincing considering that
conspiracy is a facile device by which an accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold.22cräläwvirtualibräry
In the instant case, there was no adequate proof presented
that accused-appellant Rolando Flores conspired with the
other accused to commit the crime of murder. The evidence
merely points out that he helped in dragging the victim to a
taxicab and that he was the one who drove the said taxicab.
These acts of accused-appellant show some degree of
participation on the part of the accused-appellant on the
criminal design of Isabelo Ragundiaz but it is now well-
settled that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se
sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have
been motivated by a common design.23And independent of
these acts of accused-appellant, there appears to be no
proof adduced by the prosecution that he was motivated by
the same criminal design entertained by his co-accused
Isabelo Ragundiaz. Likewise, the fact that accused-appellant
was seen later that day in the company of Isabelo
Ragundiaz and three other persons is not sufficient
indication that the former conspired with the latter in killing
Billy Cajuban as conspiracy transcends mere
companionship.24cräläwvirtualibräry
As such, the prosecution failed to present evidence
sufficient to establish accused-appellants conspiracy with
the evil designs of co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz. Neither
was it established that the accused-appellants acts were of
such importance that the crime would not have been
committed without him or that he participated in the actual
killing. However, the actions of accused-appellant as proven
by the evidence do not totally clear him from any criminal
liability for the death of Billy Cajuban.
We have previously held that the liability of one whose
participation in a crime was limited to driving for the
killers25 , or one who himself tied the victims hands and
joined armed men in taking the victim to the hills26 , is only
that of an accomplice. The rationale for these rulings is that
where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy
is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as
principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of
the milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere
accomplice.27cräläwvirtualibräry
In the instant case, the trial court erred in holding accused-
appellant equally liable with his co-accused Isabelo
Ragundiaz. Accused-appellants conspiracy with the criminal
design of Ragundiaz was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Neither has it been shown that the acts committed
by accused-appellant were indispensable to the commission
of the crime. Thus, the lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, which creates the doubt whether he has acted
as a principal or as an accomplice, impels this Court to
resolve the question as to his liability in his favor by holding
that he is guilty of the minor form of
responsibility.28 Accordingly, accused-appellant Rolando
Flores should be convicted as an accomplice to the murder
of Billy Cajuban.
As an accomplice, Rolando Flores should be imposed the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony.29 The penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty one degree
lower is reclusion temporal and there being no aggravating
nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty should
be reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused-appellant Rolando Flores should
therefore be meted out the penalty of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.30cräläwvirtualibräry
We sustain the trial courts grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex
delicto, which may be awarded without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime. We likewise affirm the
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. We
reduce however, the award of actual and compensatory
damages from P70,000.00 to P11,500.00 as it is only the
latter amount which was properly supported by
receipts.31 As an accomplice, accused-appellant is solidarily
liable with Isabelo Ragundiaz for one-half of the said
amount, or P55,750.00, and is subsidiarily liable for the rest
in case the latter is found insolvent.32cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE , premises considered, accused-appellant
Rolando Flores is hereby found guilty as an accomplice to
the murder of Billy Cajuban. He is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is likewise held solidarily liable with co-
accused Isabelo Ragundiaz for one-half of the amounts of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P11,500.00 as actual
damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages or a total
amount of P55,750.00 and he is held subsidiarily liable for
the other half, in case of the latters insolvency.
SO ORDERED.