GARCIA v.

DRILON

G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review
or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a
subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts: On March 23, 2006, the private respondent filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order against the petitioner pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. As a result of
the said petition, the regional trial court issued a temporary protection order against the petitioner. The
petitioner is now questioning the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection
and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Issue: Whether or not R.A 9262 is in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
constitution and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials?
 Held: No. First, RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws since equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Second, R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution especially on the issuance of the protection order. The purpose of the
protection order is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. Last, there is no
undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials since the preliminary investigation conducted
by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function and that the same holds true with
the issuance of a barangay protection order.

GARCIA vs DRILONG.R. No. 179267June 25, 2013

Equal Protection

Doctrine

the VAWC law is constitutional because there is a substantial distinction between men andwomen as
well as children

!AC"#

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against womenand their
children VAWC! "er"etrated b# women$s intimate "artners% i.e% husband& former husband& or an#
"erson who has or had a se'ual or dating relationshi"% or with whom the womanhas a common child.
(he law "rovides for "rotection orders from the baranga# and the courts to"revent the commission of
further acts of VAWC& and outlines the duties and res"onsibilities of baranga# officials% law enforcers%
"rosecutors and court "ersonnel% social workers% health care"roviders% and other local government
officials in res"onding to com"laints of VAWC or re)uestsfor assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionalit# of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the
e)ual "rotection and due "rocess clauses% and an undue delegation of *udicial "ower tobaranga#
officials.
$AC%GRO&ND

+etitioner ,esus -arcia husband! a""ears to have inflicted violence against "rivate res"ondent wife and
daughter!. +etitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. e callousl#boasted about their
se'ual relations to the household hel". is infidelit# emotionall# wounded"rivate res"ondent. (heir
)uarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. +etitioner alsounconscionabl# beat u" their daughter%
,o/ann% whom he blamed for s)uealing on him.

All these drove res"ondent Rosalie -arcia wife! to des"air causing her to attem"t suicide on0ecember
1 % 2334 b# slitting her wrist. 5nstead of taking her to the hos"ital% "etitioner left thehouse. e
never visited her when she was confined for seven ! da#s. e even told his mother/in/law that
res"ondent should *ust acce"t his e'tramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his"aramour and has
not sired a child with her.

(he "rivate res"ondent was determined to se"arate from "etitioner. ut she was afraid he wouldtake
awa# their children and de"rive her of financial su""ort. e warned her that if she "ursuedlegal battle%
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair% heforbade her to
hold office. (his de"rived her of access to full information about their businesses.

(hus% the R(C found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violenceagainst
res"ondent and her children and issued a series of (em"orar# +rotection 7rders (+7!ordering
"etitioner% among other things% to surrender all his firearms including a .988 caliber firearm and a
Walther ++ .

US v. FELIPE BUSTOS ET AL., GR No. 12592, 1918-03-08

Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and
signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman

Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
asking for his removal.

The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges.

The judge of first instance found the first count... not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of
this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby,
recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of
the peace of

Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case
be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."

Later the justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial... the judge of first instance granted the
motion and reopened the hearing;

"That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the
said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano

The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan S.
Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10
and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary... imprisonment in case of insolvency.

"1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a new trial.
"2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection inadvertently interposed
by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.

"3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the introduction in evidence by the
accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.

"4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly privileged.

"5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on the defendants to show
that the alleged libelous statements were true and free from malice.

"6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.

"7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt This is
especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes."

Issues:

This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of
a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga.

Ruling:

Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution, further, although the charges are probably not
true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the... petitioners.
Good faith surrounded their action.

Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent.

The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be
venal were justifiable. In no... way did they abuse the privilege.

We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather... commend them for their good
citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.

Principles:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public...
affairs.

Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.

criticism does not authorize defamation.

Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common
good.

Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the

Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.

The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment.

If the people... cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled.

it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged...
misconduct.

Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified
privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.

A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the chLracter or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or
a board having some interest or duty in the matter.

Even when the... statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the individual.

But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a... self-seeking motive is destructive.

The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.

As a general rule... words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or
incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we
do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press,... but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged

Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged.

406United States vs. Bustos [GR L-12592, 8 March 1918]

First Division, Malcolm (J): 5 concur

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, the
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien,
and 5 individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Crossfield & O'Brien
submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition
transmitted by these attorneys was signed by 34 citizens. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to
the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action and
report. The Honorable Percy M. Moir, recommended to the Governor-General that Punzalan be
removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga,
and ordered that the proceedings had in the case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary. Later the
justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and
reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president
and is councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of
prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for
personal reasons; and the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan
and acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-
General. On 12 October 1916, Felipe Bustos, et. al. (the petitioners against Punzalan) were charged for
libel. The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan
S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10
and 1/32 of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the
defense, coming into the case, after the handing down of the decision, filed on 16 December 1916, a
motion for a new trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by then
counsel for the defendants
to the admission of the document consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial court
denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed.

Issue: Whether the intemperate allegations set forth in the information against the public official may
be the basis of a libel case against the petitioning citizens.

Held: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These
paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language carries with
it all the applicable jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. The interest of
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile
and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorized
defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for
the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended
over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all know of any official dereliction on
the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so
largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in
whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." The right to assemble and
petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to
the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling
and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. Public policy, the welfare of
society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.
The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to
qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or
a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if
there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle
of

privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an
honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons
have an interest in

the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believe he is acting
in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that
the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the
person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person
through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such
unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. Hence, the Court find the defendants
entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
guaranties in our bill of rights.

US Vs. Bustos Case Digest

US Vs. Bustos

37 Phil. 731

G.R. L-12592

March 8, 1918

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law
office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from
persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free
speech and free press.
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a
duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate
or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to
inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for
the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of
public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it
is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the
peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable
cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.
CASE DIGEST : Estrada Vs Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA,
Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related
either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that
she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor
testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died
in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in
good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and
immoral conduct."

HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a

different reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to
formal interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct
or indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the
programs placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court,
showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist -
Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life of the
United States as shown by many traditional government practices which An accommodationist holds
that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious
and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the strict
neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the
accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second,
the accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions
from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt
hostility to the minority Fourth, the accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way
to deal with the various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different
effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand,
and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
burden on her free exercise of religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely
using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure
the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much
less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against herIndeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of
the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.

this live-in arrangement. Escritor is the court interpreter of RTC Branch 253. Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. She was
charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Section 46 (b) (5) of
the Revised Administrative Code.

Escritor was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999. She started living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was
still alive but living with another woman. They have a son. After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in conformity with their religious
beliefs and has the approval of her congregation, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society.

Once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases and the
couple should legalize their union. Insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral
about the conjugal arrangement and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

Escritor appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. Ministers from her
congregation testified on the authenticity of this practice and that this is to make the “union” of their
members under such circumstances “honorable before God and men.”

The court could not rule on the issue of whether or not Escritor was to be held administratively
liable so the case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and ordered the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Escritor’s religious belief and practice should warrant her claim of religious
freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution.

HELD:

The administrative complaint was dismissed. The OSG categorically concedes that the sincerity
and centrality of Escritor’s claimed religious belief and practice are beyond serious doubt. Her request to
be exempt from attending the flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovah’s Witnesses contrary belief
and practice was duly noted. The OSG failed to demonstrate “the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests” which could limit or override Escritor’s fundamental right to religious freedom.

In this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor’s conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental
right to freedom of religion. Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997

Per Curiam

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994,
during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. This was dismissed.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained
the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and
legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio:

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and
actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these
laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.

Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136
U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.

Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is
either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language,
while rather awkward, is still plain enough

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than
the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing
the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of
policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill
re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair
declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not
completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave
Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659
has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in
R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than
those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the
heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A.
No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives
reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower
House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying
certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in
the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the
compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the
foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the
heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental,
there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the
death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress
define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death,
only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize
the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."

It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely
applied.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact,
interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to
violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications
and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-
political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and
altogether eradicated.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.

It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such
crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes."

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam

Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment

Date: February 7, 1997

Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.

The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that
can disturb the verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained
the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
(FLAG)

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant

aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and
legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for
lack of merit.

Ratio:

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however,
that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures
by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on
the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S.
Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the
intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and
sentencing juries.

accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for
the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.

In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which
does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime,
rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:

first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the
crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death
penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;

Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine
experience and in the context of our own culture.

second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity,
physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.

Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the
death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a
premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth".

The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal
system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the
enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with
homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with
homicide, and arson resulting in death.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning
of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.

People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society

what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law,
and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was
committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the
law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness
and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.

The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is
obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own
physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs.

Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in
the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide,
rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.

SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized
a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry

they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so

People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does
injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity
to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always
an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the
society itself.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:

JULY 8, 2014 / ARDYESGUERRA

FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same
and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.

The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.

When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.

Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:

a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date
when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only
original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at
the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment
to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?

No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was
committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering
that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense.

What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal;
it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, the query was tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?

Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect
to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts,
which merely rely on the records of the case.

The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed
by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies,
for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.