Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
00 as attorney’s
fees;
G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004
4. Cost of suit."4
Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners,
vs. The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
The Facts
DECISION
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under amply summarized by the trial court:
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and
‘On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at
(3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This
Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration
provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered
No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said
under the Torrens system.
sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between
the vendor and the vendees.
The Case
‘On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise
seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision2 and the Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria
July 22, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise
No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows: Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would
mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E C I S
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria
I O N of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001,
Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees]
is SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in
declared the lot in their name.
part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from,
as follows:
‘Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved
"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the
[on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free
rightful owner and with better right to possess the
patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.
property in question, being an innocent purchaser
for value therefor;
‘On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie
"2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the
Abrigo].
following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to
[Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to
wit: ‘On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to
Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:
‘On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible
1. ₱300,000.00 plus 6% per
Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before
annum as actual damages;
the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil
Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that
damages; neither of them can physically take possession of the property in
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case
was dismissed.’5
3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of
4. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and
fees; and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].
5. Cost of suit. "After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed
Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to
As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and [petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was
Julie] Abrigo: ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and
attorney’s fees.
1. ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; "Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to
the CA]."6
2. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA "Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera. 7 Since and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno- oldest title, provided there is good faith."
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was
deemed void.
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables
transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in the application of
and attorney’s fees. this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 152914 which
Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument --
and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.8 effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration.15 Thus, if
the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the
buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.16
Hence, this Petition.9
"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens
purchaser for value in good faith.
system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs
under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice
"3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better Edgardo L. Paras:
title over the property in question."10
"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration
In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the
and respondent has a better right to the property. subsequent sale is registered not under the Land
Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale
is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under
The Court’s Ruling Art. 1544 x x x."20
The Petition is bereft of merit. We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been
issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
Main Issue: No. P-30522.21 The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name. 22 As a consequence
of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No.
Better Right over the Property 22515 thereafter issued to respondent.
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the
property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute
her.11 They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system,
respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. 12 petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for
purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Law on Double Sale
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the
sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to
to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act
petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 3344. In that case, the "priority in time" principle was not applied,
1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the
Romana de Vera. time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same
reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De
Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus: be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-
Spouses Abrigo.
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens
faith, if it should be movable property. system in this wise:
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall "Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third party with a
recorded it in the Registry of Property. better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this
Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor
was not anymore the owner of the land having previously regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not
unrecorded. recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.37
"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals26 is a case in Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners contend that their
point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent
has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. and negates her good faith at the time she registered the
Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of sale. Santiagoaffirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C.
the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the Vitug:
original owners and was unrecorded while the second was
an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in
money filed against the said original owners. Applying
time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the
[Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,27 this
second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except
Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be
when the second buyer first registers in good faith the
invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale
second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33).
though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this
Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
second sale was registered. It was explained that this is
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since
because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s
such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26
debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the
December 1984) InCruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to
merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the
"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA
because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
as of the time of the said execution sale."28
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into
believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once
"Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing
registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.29 All persons must
for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered
take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.30
by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act
496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself
Good-Faith Requirement expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice
prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals,
31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer
under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive
to acquire the immovable in good faith andto register it in good
notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
faith.31 Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur
such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code;
with the registration.32We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of
see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs.
Appeals,33 which we quote:
Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be
inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since
"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is
ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see
requires that such registration must be coupled with good alsoFabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there
faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘(t)he governing is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA
principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger 138)."39 (Emphasis supplied)
in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second
sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,40 which
second buyer registers in good faith the second
held:
sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of
her rights under the law, among them, to register first her "Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by
purchase as against the second buyer. But inconverso, petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act
defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the
sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On
bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No.
Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good
first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for
over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith which they had been issued certificates of title in their
throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first names. x x x."41
buyer’s rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers
delivery of possession.’"34 (Italics supplied)
registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from
the issuance of the TCT in their names.42 There was no registration
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered under Act 3344. InBayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale
owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land. 43 Such
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such registration was therefore considered effectual.
certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not
certificate.35 Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required
on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not
to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property,
register the sale.44 In Taguba, registration was not an issue.45
since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of
title.36 Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the SO ORDERED.
second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the
property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago*, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On April 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision sustaining the
right of Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel over the lot covered by TCT No.
Born of the need to protect our land registration system from being 72707 (now TCT No. T-160391), thus:
converted into an instrument of fraud, this Court has consistently
adhered to the principle that a mere registration of title in case of WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations judgment is
double sale is not enough, good faith must concur with the registration. hereby rendered:
In this petition for review on certiorari, Alejandro Gabriel and Alfredo 1. DECLARING Exhibit A, the deed of sale with assumption of
Gabriel assailed the Decision1 dated March 30, 1999 of the Court of mortgage executed by the spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33941 modifying the Decision2 dated April
Colobong (in favor of Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel) valid and
12, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago, Isabela in subsisting.
Civil Case No. 0399 for specific performance, reconveyance and
damages with application for preliminary injunction.
2. ORDERING the plaintiff Alejandro Gabriel to pay to the spouses
Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong the sums of P5,000.00
The facts are as follows: plus P34,426.05 (representing the loan with the DBP which plaintiff
assumed) within 30 days from receipt hereof.
Spouses Pablo and Escolastica Mabanta were the registered owners
of two lots located in Patul and Capaltitan, Santiago, Isabela, with an 3. DECLARING the deed of sale executed by the spouses Pablo
area of 512 and 15,000 square meters, covered by Transfer Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong in favor of Zenaida Tan Reyes
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 72705 and 72707, respectively. On as null and void.
October 25, 1975, they mortgaged both lots with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as collateral for a loan
of P14,000.00.3cräläwvirtualibräry 4. ORDERING the intervenor Zenaida Tan-Reyes to reconvey the land
covered by T.C.T. No. T-160391 in favor of Alejandro Gabriel.
Five years thereafter or on September 1, 1980, spouses Mabanta sold
the lots to Susana Soriano by way of a Deed of Sale of Parcels of Land SO ORDERED.
With Assumption of Mortgage.4 Included in the Deed is an agreement
that they could repurchase the lots within a period of two (2) years.
In declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale (or second sale)
of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707 between spouses Mabanta and
Spouses Mabanta failed to repurchase the lots. But sometime in 1984, Zenaida Tan-Reyes, the trial court ratiocinated as follows:
they were able to convince Alejandro Gabriel to purchase the lots from
Susana Soriano. As consideration, Alejandro delivered to Susana a
But Zenaida (Tan) Reyes professes that she is a buyer in good faith
500-square meter residential lot with an actual value ofP40,000.00 and
and for value. In her testimony she said that the spouses Mabanta
paid spouses Mabanta the sum of P5,000.00. On May 15, 1984,
offered to sell the land to her on August 19, 1985. She was informed
spouses Mabanta executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
that the land was mortgaged in the DBP. She readily agreed to buy the
Mortgage5 in favor of Alejandro. For her part, Susana executed a
land on that same day. She did not inquire further into the status of the
document entitled Cancellation of Contract6 whereby she transferred to
land. She did not go and see the land first. What she did was to
Alejandro all her rights over the two lots.
immediately go to the DBP the following day and paid the mortgage
obligation in the amount of P16,845.17 andP17,580.88 (Exhibits 1 and
Alejandro and his son Alfredo cultivated the lots. They also caused the 2). The following day August 21, a deed of sale in her favor was
restructuring of spouses Mabantas loan with the DBP. 7 However, when prepared and on October 17, 1985 she secured a certificate of title
they were ready to pay the entire loan, they found that spouses Benito (Exhibit 5). Under the above circumstances, it cannot be said that she
and Pura Tan had paid it and that the mortgage was already is a purchaser in good faith. She should have first made a thorough
cancelled.8cräläwvirtualibräry investigation of the status of the land. Had she inquired, she should
have been informed that the land was previously sold to at least two
persons Susana Soriano and Alejandro Gabriel. She should also have
On August 18, 1985, Benito Tan and Alejandro Tridanio, a barangay first visited the land she was buying. Had she done so she should have
official, approached Alejandro to refund to him the P5,000.00 he paid discovered that the land was being cultivated by the Gabriels who
to spouses Mabanta. Alejandro refused because Tan was unwilling to
would have informed her that they already bought the land from the
return the formers 500-square meter lot delivered to Susana as Mabantas. The reason why she did not do this is because she
purchase price for the lots. Thereafter, spouses Tan tried to eject already was appraised of the status of the land by her father
Alejandro from the lot covered by TCT No. 72707. Benito Tan. For reasons known only to her, she decided to buy
the land just the same.
On September 17, 1985, Alejandro and Alfredo filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago, Isabela a complaint (involving the lot
xxxxxx
covered by TCT No. 72707) for specific performance, reconveyance
and damages with an application for a preliminary injunction against
spouses Mabanta, spouses Tan, the DBP and barangay officials Zenaida Tan therefore is not a purchaser in good faith and she
Dominador Maylem and Alejandro Tridanio. In due time, these cannot seek refuge behind her certificate of title. True, Article
defendants filed their respective answers. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that should immovable property
be sold to different vendees, the ownership shall belong to the
person who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of With respect to respondent spouses Mabanta, this Courts Resolution
property. Unfortunately, the registration made by Zenaida (Tan) dated June 14, 2000 requiring them to file comment on the present
Reyes of her deed of sale was not in good faith. For this reason in petition was returned unserved. Thus, in its Resolution dated January
accordance with the same Article 1544, the land shall pertain to 22, 2001, this Court resolved to consider the Resolution of June 14,
the person who in good faith was first in possession. There is no 2000 deemed served upon them.10cräläwvirtualibräry
question that it is the Gabriels who are in possession of the land.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Unsatisfied, spouses Mabanta and Zenaida Tan-Reyes interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The issue for our resolution is whether or not respondent Zenaida Tan-
Reyes acted in good faith when she purchased the subject lot and had
On March 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision the sale registered.
modifying the trial courts Decision, declaring as valid the second sale
of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707 between spouses Mabanta and
Settled is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. In the
Zenaida Tan-Reyes on the ground that a person dealing with
exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of
registered land may simply rely on the correctness of the certificate of
Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our
title and, in the absence of anything to engender suspicion, he is under
function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.11 This rule,
no obligation to look beyond it. The dispositive portion of the Appellate
however, is not an iron-clad rule.12 In Floro vs. Llenado,13 we
Courts Decision reads:
enumerated the various exceptions and one which finds application to
the present case is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
Wherefore the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the following contrary to those of the trial court.
modification:
We start first with the applicable law.
1. DECLARING Exhibit A, the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage executed by the defendants-appellants spouses Pablo
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong over lots covered by TCT Nos. T-
72705 and T-72707 valid and subsisting;
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
2. Ordering spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong to
have first possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
surrender TCT No. 72705 to plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Gabriel;
property.
3. Declaring the deed of sale executed over lot with TCT No. 72707
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
(now T-160391) by spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Colobong in favor of intervenor-appellant Zenaida Tan Reyes as
Registry of Property.
valid;
(c) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises within 10 days after
In fine, the main issue is who has the superior right to the parcel of
the decision has become final, and to perpetually refrain from
land sold to different buyers at different times by its former owners.
disturbing plaintiff in his peaceful possession thereof;
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the
premises. (at pages 104-105, Records)
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the
vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:7cräläwvirtualibräry effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his
right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, civil Code; see
also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
SCRA 700)." (Spouses Honorio Santiago versus Court of Appeals,
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
et al., 247 SCRA 336, at page 346)
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
On the other hand, the sales of portions of the property to the
Appellants, by Preciosa Canino and her siblings, occurred during the
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
period from June 21, 1971 to October 13, 1989 or long after the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Appellee had purchased the property (Exhibits 1, 13, 8, 5, 14, and
Property.
10). Inscrutably, too the sale to the Appellee was registered with the
Registry of properties much earlier than the registration, if any, of the
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the sales to the Appellants and that the Appellee took possession of the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the said property much earlier than the Appellants considering that
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is a public deed. It bears stressing that
there is good faith. possession, under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, includes
symbolic possession:
Following the above-quoted law, in the double sales of immovables,
ownership is transferred in the order hereunder stated to - We are of the opinion that the possession mentioned in article 1473
(for determining who has better right when the same piece of land has
been sold several times by the same vendor) includes not only the
(a) the first registrant in good faith;
material but also the symbolic possession, which is acquired by the
execution of public instrument. (Narcisa Sanchez versus Roque
(b) the first in possession in good faith; and Ramos, 40 Phil. 614, at page 617, underscoring supplied).
(c) the buyer who presents the oldest title in good Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners
faith.8cräläwvirtualibräry of the second sale in their favor. As stated in theSantiago case,
registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
Based on the foregoing, to merit protection under Article 1544, second such buyer,11 On account of the undisputed fact of registration under
paragraph, of the Civil Code, the second buyer must act in good faith Act No. 3344 by respondent Nogales as the first buyer, necessarily,
in registering the deed.9 Thus, it has been held that in cases of double there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the
sale of immovables, what finds relevance and materiality is not petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso
whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names. It
or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that follows that their title to the land cannot be upheld. As for petitioners
is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register the
sold.10cräläwvirtualibräry portions of the property sold to them, and merely rely on the fact that
they declared the same in their name for taxation purposes. Suffice it
Good faith on petitioners part, as the second buyers of the subject to state that such fact, does not, by itself, constitute evidence of
property, was not found by the appellate court, thus its decision ownership,12and cannot likewise prevail over the title of respondent
adverse to them. The Court of appeals ratiocinated thus: Nogales.
Appellants insistence that they were purchasers in good faith is an Enlightening in this regard is the following commentary:
exercise in futility. What, to our mind, is decisive of the issue of who,
between the Appellee, on the one hand, and the Appellants, on the The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time,
other, is the owner of the property is Article 1544 of the New Civil Code stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale
x x x: cannot defeat the first buyers rights except when the second buyer first
registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159
xxx. SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such
knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs.
After all, the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon had already decreed, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs.
under its Decision (Exhibit B) which the appellants did not assail, that Cabaa (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held
the Appellee was the owner of the property under the Deed of Absolute that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
Sale (Exhibit G) executed, by Julia Deocareza, in his favor. paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in
registering his deed of sale) citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69
The evidence on record shows that, on January 31, 1951, Preciosa SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
Canino and her siblings sold the property in favor of Julia Deocareza
under the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase (Exhibit H), the xxx.
culmination of the deeds of sale with right to repurchase (Exhibits I, J
and K). the latter, in turn, sold the said property to the Appellee under
the Deed of Absolute Sale, on April 29, 1968, (Exhibit G), Julia Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the
Deocareza obliging herself to cause the eviction of her brothers, registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish
Ambrosio and Emilio Deocareza and their families from the property, Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his
who were at the time in possession of the property by her and standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder
Appellees tolerance (Exhibit L). The appellee had the said Deed would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of
of Absolute Sale (Exhibit G) registered with the Registry of Deeds Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
and entered in the Registry Records as Entry No. 47052, page 51, under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second
Volume 14 of the Registry Record under Act 3344 (Exhibit G-1). The buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts.
registration of the deed, under Act 3344, constitutes constructive notice 708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480;
of said sale to the whole world: Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). x x x.13cräläwvirtualibräry
SO ORDERED.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN THE SALE IS MADE THROUGH A PUBLIC
INSTRUMENT, THE EXECUTION THEREOF SHALL BE TORRES, JR., J.:
EQUIVALENT TO THE DELIVERY OF THE THING WHICH IS THE
OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT. — With respect to the non-delivery of
the possession of the subject property to the private respondent, Petitioner Clara M. Balatbat instituted this petition for review pursuant
suffice it to say that ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
the time of delivery thereof, either actual or constructive. Article 1498 decision dated August 12, 1992 of the respondent Court of Appeals in
of the Civil Code provides that — when the sale is made through a CA-G.R. CV No. 29994 entitled "Alejandro Balatbat and Clara Balatbat,
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the plaintiffs-appellants versus Jose Repuyan and Aurora Repuyan,
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed defendants-appellees", the dispositive portion of which reads: 1
the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred. The execution of
the public instrument, without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the "WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the
ownership from the vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise modification that the awards of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
the rights of an owner over the same. In the instant case, vendor P5,000.00 as costs of litigation are deleted.
Roque delivered the owner’s certificate of title to herein
privateRespondent. It is not necessary that vendee be physically SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
present at every square inch of the land bought by him, possession of
the public instrument of the land is sufficient to accord him the rights of The records show the following factual antecedents:chanrob1es virtual
ownership. Thus, delivery of a parcel of land may be done by placing 1aw library
the vendee in control and possession of the land (real) or by
embodying the sale in a public instrument (constructive). The provision It appears that on June 15, 1977, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for
of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for partition docketed as Civil Case No. 109032 against Corazon Roque,
convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for Alberto de los Santos, Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque and Osmundo
the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be Roque before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX. 2
embodied in a public instrument. Defendants therein were declared in default and plaintiff presented
evidence ex-parte. On March 29, 1979, the trial court rendered a
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES. decision in favor of plaintiff Aurelio A. Roque, the pertinent portion of
— A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere which reads: 3
consent of the parties. Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the
price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of "From the evidence, it has been clearly established that the lot in
the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51330 was
make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their
in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise conjugal union and the house constructed thereon was likewise built
his legal remedies. during their marital union. Out of their union, plaintiff and Maria Mesina
had four children, who are the defendants in this case. When Maria
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN CASE OF DOUBLE SALE OF AN Mesina died on August 28, 1966, the only conjugal properties left are
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY. — Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides the house and lot above stated of which plaintiff herein, as the legal
that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall spouse, is entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof. With respect
be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first to the one-half share pro-indiviso now forming the estate of Maria
recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the Mesina, plaintiff and the four children, the defendants here, are each
person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default entitled to one-fifth (1/5) share pro-indiviso. The deceased wife left no
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is debt.
good faith. This is an instance of a instance of a double sale of an
immovable property hence, the ownership shall vests in the person Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of properties, subject matter of this case consisting of the house and lot,
Property. Evidently, private respondents Repuyan’s caused the in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property
denominated as Entry No. 5627/T-135671 on July 21, 1980. The 1. Of the house and lot forming the conjugal properties, plaintiff is
annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. 135671 in the Registry of entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof while the other half forms
Property is sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves the estate of the deceased Maria Mesina;
notice to the whole world.
2. Of the Estate of deceased Maria Mesina, the same is to be divided
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE VENDEE TO ASK FOR into five (5) shares and plaintiff and his four children are entitled each
THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF THE to one-fifth share thereof pro-indiviso.
Court to sign the deed of absolute sale for and in behalf of defendants
Plaintiff claim for moral, exemplary and actual damages and attorney’s pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order to effect
fees not having been established to the satisfaction of the Court, the the partition of the property involved in this case.
same is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Without pronouncement as to costs.
A deed of absolute sale was executed on February 4, 1982 between
SO ORDERED.” Aurelio S. Roque, Corazon Roque, Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque
and Osmundo Roque and Clara Balatbat, married to Alejandro
On June 2, 1979, the decision became final and executory. The Balatbat. 12 On April 14, 1982, Clara Balatbat filed a motion for the
corresponding entry of judgment was made on March 29, 1979. 4 issuance of a writ of possession which was granted by the trial court on
September 14, 1982 "subject, however, to valid rights and interest of
On October 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a Transfer third persons over the same portion thereof, other than vendor or any
Certificate of Title No. 135671 in the name of the following persons in other person or persons privy to or claiming any rights or interest under
the following proportions: 5 it." The corresponding writ of possession was issued on September 20,
1982. 13
Aurelio A. Roque 6/10 share
On May 20, 1982, petitioner Clara Balatbat filed a motion to intervene
in Civil Case No. 134131 14 which was granted as per court’s
Severina M. Roque 1/10 share
resolution of October 21, 1982. 15 However, Clara Balatbat failed to
file her complaint in intervention. 16 On April 15, 1986, the trial court
Osmundo M. Roque 1/10 share
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, the pertinent portion of
which reads: 17
Feliciano M. Roque 1/10 share
"The rescission of contracts are provided for in the laws and nowhere
Corazon M. Roque 1/10 share
in the provision of the Civil Code under the title Rescissible Contracts
does the circumstances in the case at bar appear to have occurred,
On April 1, 1980, Aurelio A. Roque sold his 6/10 share in T.C.T. No. hence, the prayer for rescission is outside the ambit for which
135671 to spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan as rescissible [sic] could be granted.
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale." 6
"The Intervenor — Plaintiff, Clara Balatbat, although allowed to
On July 21, 1980, Aurora Tuazon Repuyan caused the annotation of intervene, did not file her complaint in intervention.
her affidavit of adverse claim 7 on the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
135671, 8 to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Consequently, the plaintiff having failed to prove with sufficient
preponderance his action, the relief prayed for had to be denied. The
"Entry No. 5627/T-135671 — NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM — Filed contract of sale denominated as "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exh. 7 and
by Aurora Tuazon Repuyan, married, claiming among others that she sub-markings) being valid and enforceable, the same pursuant to the
bought 6/10 portion of the property herein described from Aurelio provisions of Art. 1159 of the Civil Code which
Roque for the amount of P50,000.00 with a down payment of says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
P5,000.00 and the balance of P45,000.00 to be paid after the partition
and subdivision of the property herein described, other claims set forth "Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
in Doc. No. 954, page 18, Book 94 of _________________ 64 contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."cralaw
__________________ PEDRO DE CASTRO, Notary Public of Manila. virtua1aw library
has the effect of being the law between the parties and should be
Date of instrument — July 21, 1980
complied with. The obligation of the plaintiff under the contract being to
have the land covered by TCT No. 135671 partitioned and subdivided,
Date of inscription -July 21, 1980 at 3:35 p.m. and title issued in the name of the defendant buyer (see page 2 par. C
of Exh. 7-A) plaintiff had to comply thereto to give effect to the contract.
TERESITA H. NOBLEJAS
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against the plaintiff, Aurelio A.
Acting Register of Deeds Roque, and the plaintiff in intervention, Clara Balatbat, and in favor of
the defendants, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, and
By:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1980 as valid and
enforceable and the plaintiff is, as he is hereby ordered, to partition
RAMON D. MACARICAN and subdivide the land covered by T.C.T. No. 135671, and to
aggregate therefrom a portion equivalent to 6/10 thereof, and cause
Acting Second Deputy" the same to be titled in the name of the defendants, and after which,
the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P45,000.00. Considering
further that the defendants suffered damages since they were forced to
On August 20, 1980, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for "Rescission litigate unnecessarily, by way of their counterclaim, plaintiff is hereby
of Contract" docketed as Civil Case No. 134131 against spouses ordered to pay defendants the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages,
Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan before Branch IV of the attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
then Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint is grounded on
spouses Repuyan’s failure to pay the balance of P45,000.00 of the Costs against plaintiff.
purchase price. 9 On September 5, 1980, spouses Repuyan filed their
answer with counterclaim. 10 SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the meantime, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. On March 3, 1987, petitioner Balatbat filed a notice of lis pendens in
109032 (Partition case) dated February 2, 1982, to wit: 11 Civil Case No. 109032 before the Register of Deeds of Manila. 18
"In view of all the foregoing and finding that the amount of P100,000.00 On December 9, 1988, petitioner Clara Balatbat and her husband,
as purchase price for the sale of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. Alejandro Balatbat filed the instant complaint for delivery of the owners
51330 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila consisting of 84 square duplicate copy of T.C.T. No. 135671 docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
meters situated in Callejon Sulu, District of Santa Cruz, Manila, to be 47176 before Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
reasonable and fair, and considering the opportunities given private respondents Jose Repuyan and Aurora Repuyan. 19
defendants to sign the deed of absolute sale voluntarily, the Court has
no alternative but to order, as it hereby orders, the Deputy Clerk of this On January 27, 1989, private respondents filed their answer with
affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaim. 20 reason that there was no delivery of the subject property and that
consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as
On November 13, 1989, private respondents filed their memorandum consummated, hence, valid and enforceable. In a decision dated April
21 while petitioners filed their memorandum on November 23, 1989. 15, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IV in Civil Case
22 No. 134131, the Court dismissed vendor’s Aurelio Roque complaint for
rescission of the deed of sale and declared that the sale dated April 1,
On August 2, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, 1980, as valid and enforceable. No appeal having been made, the
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of decision became final and executory. It must be noted that herein
which reads: 23 petitioner Balatbat filed a motion for intervention in that case but did
not file her complaint in intervention. In that case wherein Aurelio
"Considering all the foregoing, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have Roque sought to rescind the April 1, 1980 deed of sale in favor of the
not been able to establish their cause of action against the defendants private respondents for non-payment of the P45,000.00 balance, the
and have no right to the reliefs demanded in the complaint and the trial court dismissed the complaint for rescission. Examining the terms
complaint of the plaintiff against the defendants is hereby DISMISSED. and conditions of the "Deed of Sale" dated April 1, 1980, the
On the counterclaim, the plaintiff are ordered to pay defendants the P45,000.00 balance is payable only "after the property covered by
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos by way of attorney’s fees, Five T.C.T No. 135671 has been partitioned and subdivided, and title
Thousand Pesos as costs of litigation and further to pay the costs of issued in the name of the BUYER" hence, vendor Roque cannot
the suit. demand payment of the balance unless and until the property has
been subdivided and titled in the name of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library Devoid of any stipulation that "ownership in the thing shall not pass to
the purchaser until he has fully paid the price", 26 ownership in the
Dissatisfied, petitioner Balatbat filed an appeal before the respondent thing shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon actual or
Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision on August 12, constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has
1992, to wit: 24 not yet been fully paid. The failure of the buyer to make good the price
does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest to the seller unless the
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the bilateral contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved pursuant to
modification that the awards of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. 27 Non-payment only creates a
P5,000.00 as costs of litigation are deleted. right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to rescind the
contract.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
With respect to the non-delivery of the possession of the subject
On March 22, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals denied property to the private respondent, suffice it to say that ownership of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.25cralaw:red the thing sold is acquired only from the time of delivery thereof, either
actual or constructive. 28 Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that
Hence, this petition for review. — when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
Petitioner raised the following issues for this Court’s object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
resolution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library cannot be inferred. 29 The execution of the public instrument, without
actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the vendor to
the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over
I the same. 30 In the instant case, vendor Roque delivered the owner’s
certificate of title to herein private Respondent. It is not necessary that
vendee be physically present at every square inch of the land bought
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED SALE TO THE PRIVATE by him, possession of the public instrument of the land is sufficient to
RESPONDENTS WAS MERELY EXECUTORY AND NOT A accord him the rights of ownership. Thus, delivery of a parcel of land
CONSUMMATED TRANSACTION? may be done by placing the vendee in control and possession of the
land (real) or by embodying the sale in a public instrument
II (constructive). The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a
public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DOUBLE SALE AS sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.
CONTEMPLATED UNDER ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE? 31
"If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHICH WERE NOT OFFERED?
"Should it be movable property, the ownership shall belong to the
Petitioner asseverates that the respondent Court of Appeals committed person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in Property.
affirming the appealed judgment considering (1) that the alleged sale in
favor of the private respondents Repuyan was merely executory; (2) "Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
that there is no double sale; (3) that petitioner is a buyer in good faith person who in good faith was first in the possession and in the
and for value; and (4) that private respondents did not offer their absence thereof, to the person who present the oldest title, provided
evidence during the trial. there is good faith."cralaw virtua1aw library
Contrary to petitioner’s contention that the sale dated April 1, 1980 in Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an
favor of private respondents Repuyan was merely executory for the immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first
in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith. 34
In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share
in TCT No. 135671 to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980.
Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque
(6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4,
1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
In fine, petitioner had nobody to blame but herself in dealing with the
disputed property for failure to inquire or discover a flaw in the title to
the property, thus, it is axiomatic that — culpa lata dolo aequiparatur —
gross negligence is equivalent to intentional wrong.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Defendants' evidence (Exh- 3) on the other hand shows that True, Exhibit 3 could have been objected to because the affiant did not
in January, 1944 Maximino Mamorno in turn sold said testify and hence could not be cross-examined by the adverse party as
Northeastern portion back to Modesta Calimlim for
to its contents. But no such objection having been interposed, the right
P5,000.00, but instead of executing a formal deed of sale, of cross-examination was waived; and having thus been admitted in
merely delivered to said Modesta Calimlim the muniment of evidence, the document is entitled to some probative value as to the
title over said land, among which were the original of the
fact of the verbal sale. Since this fact is categorically stated in Exhibit
deed of sale of July 28, 1939 by the spouses Domingo 3, it is not a mere inference from, but rather antecedent to and
Magali and Modesta Calimlim in favor of the spouses Tomas therefore justified the consideration of, the corroborative circumstantial
Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in (Exh. 1), and the original of
evidence presented by appellees, to wit: (1) actual possession of the
the deed of sale of January 7, 1951 by the spouses Tomas land by appellees since 1944; (2) possession by them of the originals
Cerezo and Segunda Soriano in favor of said Maximino of the first two deeds of sale (Exhibits 1 and 2); (3) tax declaration in
the name of appellees; (4) receipts of tax payments made by them;
and by contrast, (5) possession by appellants of only a carbon copy
and a true copy of exhibits 1 and 2 (Exhs. A and B), respectively, as
well as their failure to declare the land in their names or to pay the
taxes thereon.
While it is true that the judgment in an action for forcible entry is not
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action, the rule does not say that such
facts shall have no probative value whatsoever. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary — as in the case at bar there is none — the
previous judgment on the question of material possession carries a
persuasive effect. The logic of the situation is that if Modesta Calimlim
purchased the land, albeit verbally, in 1944, the corroborative
circumstances pointed out above would not have existed. The originals
of the two deeds of sale (Exhibits 1 and 2), would not have been in the
hands of the appellees, nor would they have declared the lands in their
names nor paid the taxes thereon.
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for "(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
Rules). indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required "(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of
and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for "(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
not more than 25 years; and Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
No. 2, series of 1998;
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected "(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
areas, forest cover or reforestation."2 Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and "(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3 Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law
natural resources."7
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.4 After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted
as follows:
These provisions are:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part
domains and ancestral lands;
II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples; violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
Vitug.
indigenous peoples; and
Petitioners pray for the following: Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, opinion
63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
On September 11, 1982, the Supreme Court finally resolved G.R. No. 7) That the claim of defendant landless association for possession of a
L-41115 annulling OCT No. 0-257 and declaring the land covered portion of said Lot No. 1982, subject-matter hereof, is predicated or
thereby as public land. anchored upon the fact that said lot was declared a public land;
On October 8, 1982, the Solicitor General furnished the Bureau of 8) That on January 3, 1990, however, plaintiff National Housing
Lands, Manila, with a copy of the Supreme Court decision prompting Authority became the absolute owner of said Lot No. 1982, now the
the Director of the Bureau of Lands to order the District Land Officer in site of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Project, by virtue of
Cagayan de Oro City to take appropriate action for inventory of each Special Patent No. 3551 issued by Her Excellency, the President of the
and every portion of Cadastral Lot No. 1982. In response thereto, the Philippines, for which Original Certificate of Title No. P-3324 was
Regional Land Director of Region 10 informed the Director of Lands issued in its name; . . .
that the members of COCLAI were occupying portions of the said lot
by virtue of the Survey Authority issued on March 19, 1964 and the 9) That the claim of defendant landless association has created a
COCLAI’s subdivision survey had already been submitted to the cloud on plaintiff’s title to Lot No. 1982 aforementioned, which claim is
Central Office for verification and approval but was held in abeyance. apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective
and unenforceable and prejudicial to plaintiff’s title, the land, subject-
On May 10, 1983, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation matter hereof, having ceased to be a public land;
No. 2292 reserving the entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982 for the
Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Project to be implemented 10) That defendants Solomon, Et. Al. threatened or are about to
by the NHA. Under the said proclamation, the NHA was granted the enforce the decision in said Civil Case No. 11204 in violation of
authority ‘to develop, administer and dispose of Lot No. 1982 located plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, in accordance with the guidelines render the judgment herein ineffectual, unless restrained or enjoined
of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program and the approved by this Honorable Court;
development plan of the area’.
11) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
On May 19, 1983, the Bureau of Lands, through its Regional Director, or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission of the act
issued an order rejecting the subdivision survey previously submitted herein complained of;
by the COCLAI.
12) That the commission of the act herein complained of during the
Sometime in November, 1986, the NHA, through its agents, Virgilio litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
Dacalos and Engr. Vicente Generalao, the area manager and project
engineer, respectively with the help of the policemen and claiming 13) That the plaintiff is willing and ready to file a bond executed to the
authority under P.D. 1472, demolished the structures erected by the defendants in an amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court, to the
COCLAI members. This action prompted the COCLAI to file a forcible effect that the plaintiff will pay to said defendants all damages which
entry and damages case against the NHA employees and police they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally
officers with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cagayan de decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
Oro City docketed as Civil Case No. 11204.
Acting on the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
After due hearing, the MTCC on November 17, 1988 rendered and/or preliminary injunction, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
judgment ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 11204 to restore on July 24, 1990 stating thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the COCLAI members to their respective actual possession of the
portions of Lot No. 1982 but the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for ‘. . . let a RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to Defendants Pablo
damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court in Cagayan de Oro City Salomon and Cagayan de Oro Landless Association, Inc. and the City
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Thereafter, the prevailing Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of MTCC, Branch 3, or anybody acting in their
party, the COCLAI members, moved for the issuance of a writ of behalf or acting as their agent or representative. And until further
execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990. orders from this court, they are enjoined to refrain or desist from
enforcing the decision of Civil Case No. 11204 until this court resolves
While Civil Case No. 11204 was pending before the courts, the this complaint.’
President of the Philippines issued on July 1 1988 Special Patent No.
3551 covering the entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982, and by virtue Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint stating,
thereof, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City issued on among others, as a ground therefor that the cause of action is barred
January 3, 1990 an Original Certificate of Title No. P-3324 in the name by a prior judgment in another case. (Apparently, the NHA has filed an
of NHA. action for ‘Injunction with Damages’ against COCLAI and its President
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City 3324 in the name of NHA had entrusted only the administration of the
docketed as Civil Case No. 89-399 to prevent the MTCC from disputed lot to the said agency but not the ownership thereof. It also
executing its decision in Civil Case No. 11204, but this was dismissed alleges that, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2290, issued on May 10,
by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 19, 1990 on the 1985, declaring the land situated at Barrio Macabalan, Cagayan de
ground that the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204, had Oro City, as Slum Improvement Settlement (SIR) area, it is illegal for
been upheld by the Supreme Court when it denied NHA’s petition NHA to claim ownership over the said land. Furthermore, petitioner
for certiorari. The RTC, Branch 17, further stated that ‘. . . (I)f plaintiff also claims that "respondent Court overlooked the fact that the issues
believes that it is the owner of the property subject of that civil case on ownership and possession are subjudice before RTC, Branch 25,
(No. 11204), then it should ventilate its claim in some other case but Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case;No. 90-337 . . ." 10 Hence, it
not in a simple case of injunction.)’ concludes that the appellate court cannot pass upon these issues as
there is still no final judgment on said civil case.
On August 10, 1990, the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-337
issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss as well as plaintiff Petitioner’s contentions are bereft of merit.
NHA’s prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204. The motion for The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent NHA
reconsideration filed by plaintiff NHA was likewise denied by the serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to
Regional Trial Court in its Order dated August 17, 1990." 1 the property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under
the Torrens systems and the one year period from the issuance of the
Aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the NHA decree of registration has lapsed, without said decree being
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and
lower court. The decretal portion of the said decision, cannot later on be questioned. 11
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED the issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding
questioned Orders of respondent judge are hereby declared null and pursuant to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus. it is as indefeasible as a
void and respondent judge is ordered to issue a writ of preliminary certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the
injunction to respect the possession of the petitioner over the land land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
subject of the dispute . . ." 2 contemplation of the Public Land Law. 12 Moreover, the said certificate
of title was not controverted by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor
Hence, this petition. did it show that the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the
register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad faith or fraud. Hence
The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the Court of said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having been issued by
Appeals erred in ruling (a) that the National Housing Authority (NHA) is the register of deeds in the regular performance of its official duty. 13
entitled to the injunction prayed for; and (b) that NHA has a better right
to the possession of Lot No. 1982, as a necessary consequence of Also, OCT No. P-32324 issued in the name of respondent NHA, clearly
ownership. states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said parcel of land with all the
maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent appurtenances thereunto of right of belonging unto the NATIONAL
actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. 3 HOUSING AUTHORITY and to its successors-in-interest or assigns
As such, injunction is accepted as the "strong arm of equity or a forever, subject to private rights, if any there be." 14
transcendent remedy" to be used cautiously, as it affects the
respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the Clearly the certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but
part of the court of its extreme necessity. 4 Its issuance rests entirely also the right of possess on as a necessary consequence of the right
within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is of ownership.
generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. 5
Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot be
protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the denied that Proclamation No. 2290 gave authority to the NHA to
pendency of the principal action. 6 Before an injunction can be issued, dispose of Lot No. 1982. In the said Proclamation the President of the
it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be Philippines granted to NHA the authority to "develop, administer and
a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and 2) the act dispose" of Lot No. 1982, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City,
against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. "in accordance with the guidelines of the Slum Improvement and
7 Hence, it should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly Resettlement Program and the approved development plan of the
entitled thereto. 8 In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals was area.
justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction. The
reason is that, while Civil Case no. 11204 for forcible entry was On the other hand, petitioner’s only basis for claiming the disputed lot
pending on appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No. is lawful entry and possession for an extended period of time and, as a
3551 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino which covered the matter of fact, there is a final judgment in its favor in the case for
lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an Original Certificate of forcible entry before the MTCC. As to this, settled is the rule that, in an
Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of Deeds of action for forcible entry, the only issue involved is mere physical
Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when petitioner moved possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession
for the issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, (possession de jure) nor ownership. 15 As the case filed before the
1990, a certificate of title had already been issued to NHA. In view of lower court is only one for forcible entry, it is indicative that the legal
this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title title over the said property is not disputed by the petitioner. There has
before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was been no assertion of ownership over the land, only that of prior
only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court, possession. At any rate, the judgment rendered in the ejectment case
9 where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of is effective only with respect to possession and "in no wise bind the
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision of the title or affect the ownership of the land." 16 Indeed, petitioner has no
MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material change in the legal leg to stand as regards ownership because its Miscellaneous
status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the Sales Application was not acted upon nor favorably considered by the
government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending Bureau of Lands. The Bureau, through its Regional Director, rejected
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the the subdivision survey previously submitted by COCLAI, in an Order,
said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their respective dated May 19, 1983.
possession on portions of Lot No. 1982.
In effect, petitioner’s occupation of the land in question, after the denial
Petitioner claims that Special Patent No. 3351 issued by then of its application for Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently
President Corazon Aquino on July 1, 1988 and the corresponding illegal. Petitioner’s members have, as a consequence, become
issuance by the Register of Deeds of Original Certificate of Title No P- squatters whose continuous possession of the land may now be
considered to be in bad faith. This is unfortunate because squatters
acquire no legal right over the land they are occupying. 17
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED."
DECISION
The Facts
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as
Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and
follows:5
disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed.
Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer "On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an
ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such application for registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-
property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the 340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three
Solicitor General (OSG). parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140
[PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land
identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square
The Case
meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN]
with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben,
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28, Mariveles, Bataan, and having a total area of 401,159 square meters
1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, or 40.1159 hectares.
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:2
"Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and
"ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application
challenged Decision dated 26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of
Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, is AFFIRMED. No costs." Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their
ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298
and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase
The affirmed Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the from the government through sales patents.
following: (1) Land Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for
confirmation of respondent’s title to three parcels of land; and (2) Civil
Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners’ Sales "The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application,
Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots. contending that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:4 interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered: parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
I. In Civil Case No. 4739 -
"Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando
1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration.
5388 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298
and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner-]spouses "Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be
Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x
exact, on 20 February 1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary
Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos. Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio,
filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of
2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is,
No. 3769, which ordered the cancellation of Free Patent Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1,
Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2,
Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area
final and executory; of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title
of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No.
297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065
3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of
de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos to defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo
pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is,
sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of
suit. 225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with
an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares.
II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 -
"In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga,
1. Confirming [herein respondents’] title [to] the land subject Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739 which was then assigned to said Branch
of registration and ordering the registration thereof in the was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases assigned to
names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age, Branch 2.
Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of
Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - ½ share; and Cecilia P. "Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme
Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of Court dated 26 April 1989 in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769
entitled ‘Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al.’ which annulled "III
the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the
sales patent title issued in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that
spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal."
petitioners committed an act of misrepresentation in their Application
for Sales Patent.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
"IV
Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that
petitioners had failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering
required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and
petitioners to pay private respondents the amount of ₱50,000.00
cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which
representing attorney’s fees."
were "incongruous with reality," bolstered the "finding that [they had]
never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property." It
explained: In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the
registration of respondents’ title under the Public Land Act and (2) the
cancellation of petitioners’ Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of
"On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the
Title (TCTs).
evidence presented, concluded that [herein respondents] and their
predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the subject lands
in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered The Court’s Ruling
testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in
possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the actual
occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their The Petition is meritorious.
favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114
SCRA 946) that ‘the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he First Issue:Registration of Respondents’ Title
had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to
nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.’
Respondents’ application for registration of title to the three parcels of
land that were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public
"On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual Land Act,11 the pertinent portion of which reads:
findings of the trial court. x x x."6
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
Debunking petitioners’ reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,7 the occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or
CA ratiocinated as follows: an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
"[Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
dated 26 April 1989 in GR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
titles of defendants-appellants Manalos and granted the issuance of Act, to wit:
sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses.
xxx xxx xxx
"What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the
subject property in favor of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their part by have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
properties when in fact the subject properties were being actually fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land still immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
declared to be public agricultural land. x x x."8 conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
Hence, this Petition.9 the provisions of this chapter.
Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our
consideration:10 Bernardo and Arsenio Obdin,12 who in turn had been in possession of
the property since 1947. Hence, when the former filed their application
for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had
"I been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said
parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the Public Land
Act.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in
disregarding the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753
entitled, ‘Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under
and Amparo de Ocampo, et al.,’ wherein the validity and legality of Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of
petitioners’ TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the the public domain.13 Unless such assets are reclassified and
land in dispute were upheld. considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 107314 clarified
"II
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the
latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the domain.15
cancellation of petitioners’ Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298
and T-44205 considering that private respondents are not the proper
In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a
party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners’ titles [to] the
US military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine
lots.
government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in
1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,16 a suit involving Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners’ Titles
the same parcel of land and instituted by herein petitioners against
other claimants, the Court held:
Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because
"it is a rule that the Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent
"As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon
decision: registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of
patent."17
‘x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in
Bataan, of which the land in question forms part, was turned over to Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their
the Philippine government, the same automatically became a Sales Patents and TCTs should have been initiated by the solicitor
disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the
said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its Public Land Act, which we quote:
nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels of
land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19, 1971,
"SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of
per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map
the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the
No 26-40). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in question became
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines."
immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government
in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in
1971. This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for
continued to be a military reservation land while in the custody of the reversion, but for reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to
Philippine government until it was certified alienable in file the present suit.
1971." (Emphasis supplied.)
We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument. In an action for
Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have reconveyance, "the decree of registration is respected as
occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property,
declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with
or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about."18
Act, which provide as follows:
Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because
"SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture they have not shown a title better than that of petitioners. As earlier
and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any shown, the former have not proven any title that may be judicially
tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use confirmed.
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of
the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for
Moreover, respondents’ invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA19 must be
this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public
interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way rejected. In that case, the Court noted that the allegations in the
for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving
the Motion to Dismiss, were "an assertion that the lot is private land, or
pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public
fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private
benefit. respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section
48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x." Hence, the Court ruled that respondents,
not the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit.
SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of
section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the entitlement to the land.1âwphi1 They have not established that they
President." (Emphasis supplied.) are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not
petitioners, have a better right thereto.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable, in accordance with the District Forester's Certification
dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an
alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of
Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first
requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol
had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since
1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands
of the pubic domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the
same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over
the land in dispute.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of
title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been
Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,1which was reversed by in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of
CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand, it is the
denied by respondent court on September 30, 1992.3 respondents' position that since the subject parcels of land were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, 13 petitioner did
not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Piñas, Metro
Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married
to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the We agree with respondents.
Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which
corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria
In Republic vs. Doldol,14 the requisites to acquire title to public land
Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of
were laid down, as follows —
land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was
duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of . . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
Cailles. since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.4 The case was
January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
docketed as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the
Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed
petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor his (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
domain.5 preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally
chapter. (emphasis in the original).
disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 51263 where the rights of Maria
Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo.6
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that
the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his
forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court 7where it was docketed as
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted
occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or
his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985, 8 this time alleging the
for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
the lands applied for.
title being issued.
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were
classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not
be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable.17 In the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to
disposition.18 Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.19
SO ORDERED.
It would be the height of injustice if the Court will THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
countenance the annulment of the homestead tract of land situated at
patent granted the defendants forty five (45) years Matain, Subic, Zambales
ago and the cancellation of OCT No. 727 issued covered by O.C.T. No. 727 of
way back in 1941 simply on the unsubstantiated the Heirs of Antonia Labalan,
basis that the homestead patent and the title were containing an area of 6.5030
granted and issued when the land was still within hectares as shown and
the forest zone. Even if it were true as contended described in the attached
by the plaintiff that at the time of the granting of sketch as verified and plotted
patent and the issuance of OCT No. 727 in 1941 by Forester Marceliano P.
to the defendants, the land was not yet released Pobre based on the technical
from the forest zone and therefore not yet descriptions appearing at the
disposable and alienable, although Certification back of the title was found to
No. 282 of District Forester Rogelio Delgado (Exh. be within
10) states otherwise, yet such error committed by the Alienable and Disposable
the government thru the Bureau of Land in Land, LC Project No. 13-G,
granting the homestead patent to a land not yet Subic, Zambales, certified as
alienable and disposable, was rectified by the such by then Director of
same government thru the then Bureau of Forestry Forestry, Manila on January
when it released the said land covered by the 31, 1961 per LC Map No.
homestead patent from the forest zone and 2427 (Exh. "C;" emphasis
proclaimed it alienable and disposable in 1961 as supplied);
per Certification No. 65 (Exh. "C"). If there was an
error committed by the Bureau of Land in granting
and
the homestead patent of a land not yet disposable
at that time, the patentees should not be made to
suffer the consequence, it appearing that they THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the
acted in atmost (sic) good faith and complied with area described in the attached
all the requirements of the Public Land Laws in Plan as surveyed/prepared by
their acquisition of the homestead patent. Equity Geodetic Engineer Teodoro
demands that the government must not annul and Victoriano for Heirs of Antonia
cancel the homestead patent issued in 1941 even Labalan of Subic, Zambales
if the land was not yet alienable and disposable containing an area of 65,030
then, for after all the said land became alienable square meters located at
and disposable in 1961. 5 Matain, Subic, Zambales after
compiling the same in our
control map was found to be
The Republic appealed 6 to the respondent court arguing that the trial
within theAlienable and
court erred in ruling that: (a) Homestead Patent No. 64863 and the
Disposable Land, Block I,
corresponding OCT No. 727 issued to petitioners (appellees below)
Project 13, Subic, Zambales
are valid and binding; (b) the petitioners have complied with all the
certified as such by then
requirements of cultivation and occupation as required by the Public
Director of Forestry, Manila on
Land Law; (c) the subsequent release of the land as alienable and
June 7, 1927 per LC Map No.
disposable in 1961 rectified or validated the grant to them or at least
6656 (Exh. "10"); (emphasis
gave them priority over the land; and (d) the government is estopped
supplied).
from impugning the titles.
A: No, your Honor, a portion Q: And even that time there was
only. already a Naval Reservation?
After carefully reviewing the testimony of Forester Pobre, we are convinced Petitioners' contention that the government is now estopped from
that his testimony is worthy of credence. Forester Pobre actually went to the questioning the validity of OCT No. 727 issued to them, considering that it
disputed area and conducted the verification survey on the subject lot. His took the government 45 years to assail the same, is erroneous. We have
report on the survey was used as basis of Certification No. 65 issued and ruled in a host of cases that prescription does not run against the
signed by Rogelio Delgado in his official capacity as District Forester. government. In point is the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, wherein
23
Although Rogelio Delgado was not presented as a witness, his testimony we declared:
would not be of much use since his certification was anchored on the
survey report of Forester Pobre who had actual verification on the status of
the questioned land. And in so far as the timeliness of the action of the
Government is concerned, it is basic that prescription
does not run against the State. . . . The case law has
Petitioners' contention that the testimony of Forester Pobre is partial in that also been:
his survey and verification of the subject land was made at the instance of
Mary Agnes Burns who is interested in ousting them is erroneous. Forester
Rogelio Delgado conducted the verification survey on the subject lot upon When the government is the real party in interest, and
District Forester Delgado's order. He testified thus: is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and
recover its own property, there can be no defense on
the ground of laches or limitation. . . .
Q Mr. Pobre . . . you conducted
a verification survey of the land
in question at the instance of Public land fraudulently included in patents or
Mary Agnes Burns is that certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
correct? State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State
in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not
A Yes sir, because she came to run against the State. The right of reversion or
our office requesting for the reconveyance to the State is not barred by
status of that land in Matain.19
prescription. (Emphasis Ours)
xxx xxx xxx Finally, petitioners argue that the subsequent release of the land as
alienable cured any defect in the grant thereof.
Q So it was not personally thru
you that the verification was We do not agree.
requested?
The rule is that a void act cannot be validated or ratified. The subsequent
A It was thru Mr. Rogelio release of the subject land as alienable and disposable did not cure any
Delgado sir . . . then Mr. defect in the issuance of the homestead patent nor validated the grant. The
Delgado ordered me to conduct hard fact remains that at the time of the issuance of the homestead patent
the verification survey. and the title, the subject land was not yet released as alienable. While we
sympathize with the petitioners, we nonetheless can not, at this instance,
COURT: yield to compassion and equity. The rule must stand no matter how harsh it
may seem. Dura lex sed lex.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, Forester Pobre was merely performing his official duty as a forester
when he surveyed the land in question. Moreover, the testimony of Forester
Pobre was never rebutted by herein respondents. Hence, in the absence of Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
any evidence showing that Pobre was biased towards any party, his
verification survey report should be accorded the presumption of regularity Regalado, J., is on leave.
in the performance of his duties as a public officer.
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