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Memo on Falsification and Libel

Venue of Falsification of private document is at the place where the


supposedly falsified document was prepared.

1. In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place


where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to
prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified document is put to
the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. (Navaja v. Hon. De Castro,
G.R. No. 182926, 22 June 2015)

2. Improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases


is an essential element of jurisdiction. Unlike in a civil case where venue may be
waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of
jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him
except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. (Ibid)

3. It is erroneous to argue that the separate filing of the falsification


cases she allegedly committed in different jurisdictions would result in multiplicity
of actions. Such separate filing of cases is only consistent with the principles that
there are as many acts of falsification as there are documents falsified and that the
venue of such cases is where the document was actually falsified. (Ibid)

4. In Lopez, et al. v. Paras, et al., [G. R. No. L-25795, 29 October 1966]


the Supreme Court resolved the question of when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed. In U.S. vs.
Infante, 36 Phil. 146, it had been ruled that the crime of falsification of a private
document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph
2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is
actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified
document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended.

In U.S. vs. Barreto, 36 Phil. p. 207, the Supreme Court ruled:

The contention of counsel would seem to be that the


information was defective, in that it fails to set forth expressly the
place where improper and illegal use was made of the falsified
document, an allegation which counsel for appellant insists was
absolutely essential for the proper determination of the court clothed
with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the definition of
the crime of falsification of a private document as set forth in article
304 of the Penal Code, the offense is consummated at the time when
and at the place where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or
with the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether the
falsified document is or is not put to the improper or illegal use for
which it was intended. It is evident, therefore, that the place where the
crime is committed is the place where the document is actually
falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document
thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of
falsification of a private document;

Applying the above ruling, it would appear that if the private document
subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of
falsification - the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause
damage - was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was thereafter
put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the
other contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in
no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of the private
document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification
charged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus,
that the City Court of Angeles has no jurisdiction over the offense charged is
beyond question. (Ibid)

Damage as an element of Falsification

1. From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman
suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders
actually delivered was P18 ,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the
additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations
suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is
obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith;
there was no criminal intent. "The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea - a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of
be innocent." (U.S. vs. Catolico , 18 Phil. 504, 507 [1911].) There can be no
conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the
defendants "maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injuring the
complaining witness." (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 344 [1902].) Thus the learned
Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino has said, " there is no falsification of a public
document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith. Thus, it has been
held that 'a conviction for falsification of a public document by a private person
will not be sustained when the facts found are consistent with good faith on the
part of the accused.' In other words, although the accused altered a public
document or made a mistatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be
guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced
by the alteration or error." [Amora v. CA, G.R. Nos. 58973-76, 20 July 1982]

2. In Sevilla v. People [G.R. No. 194390, 13 August 2014], it was held


that criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means
of dolo, such as falsification. Such intent is a mental state, the existence of which is
shown by the overt acts of a person. Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed,
with moral certainty, his intention to pervert the truth before he is adjudged
criminally liable. In these cases of falsification, the criminal intent to pervert the
truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the accused did not benefit from the
falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the government or to a third
person.

3. In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-58973-76 , 20 July


1982], the accused construction contractor was absolved even if he had admittedly
falsified time books and payrolls. The Court appreciated the fact that he did not
benefit from the transaction and was merely forced to adjust the supporting papers
in order to collect the piece of work he had actually constructed. On that occasion,
the Court explained at length the nuanced appreciation of criminal intent in
falsification of documents, viz.:

Although the project was truly a contract for a piece of work,


nevertheless he used the daily wage method and not the contract
vouchers. This was not his idea but by the municipal mayor and
treasurer to prepare a payroll and list of laborers and their period of
work and to pay them the minimum wage so that the total payment
would equal the total contract price. This is the so-called bayanihan
system practiced by former Mayor Bertumen and Engineer Bertumen
of the 2nd engineering district. In the payrolls only some 20 names of
the 200 laborers were listed as not all of them could be
accommodated. Those not listed received their wages from those
listed. As all of the utilized laborers were duly paid, not one
complained. Neither did the municipality complain.

From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of
Guindulman suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the
cost of the boulders actually delivered was ₱18,285 .00 but Murillo
was paid only ₱13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged
complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no
damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is
obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in
good faith; there was no criminal intent. x x x. In other words,
although the accused altered a public document or made a
misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of
falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was
prejudiced by the alteration or error. (Emphasis supplied)

Libel charge for the libelous remarks in Complaint-Affidavit

1. Statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely


privileged statements regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice
if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the
inquiry. The person who makes these statements such as the judge, lawyer, or
witness does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.

Sarcastic, pungent, and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to


detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice,
are absolutely privileged statements, if relevant to the issue. (Navarette v. CA,
G.R. NO. 124245, 15 February 2000)

2. In People v. Alvarez [G.R. No. L-19072, 14 August 1965], it was held


that it does not matter, therefore, whether or not there was malice on the port of the
herein appellee in making the statements complained of, since said statements are
contained in a judicial pleading and protected by the mantle of privileged
communication. But in further interpreting the above-quoted provision of the
Revised Penal Code, this Court in the case of Tolentino v. Baylosis, G.R. No. L-
15741, January 31, 1961, held that counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted
from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the
course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or
relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry.

The test of relevancy has been discussed in the aforecited case of Tolentino
v. Baylosis, supra, to wit:
As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make
alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal
rule. The matter to which the privileged does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy
that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In
order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not
be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It
must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the
subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
the course of the trial. ... ."(Ruling Case Law, Vol. 17, p. 366; quoted
with approval in Smith Bell & Co. v. Ellis 48, Phil. 475, 481-482).
(Emphasis supplied)

[Ibid]

Venue in Libel cases

1. It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is
a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended
Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second.
Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be
equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. [Bonifacio v.
RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, 5 May 2010]

2. It was observed that "venue of libel cases where the complainant is a


private person is either in any of only two places, namely: (1) where the subject
article was printed and first published; and (2) where complainant of the
commission actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense." The
Information, it was noted, did not indicate that the libelous articles were printed or
first published in Manila, or that petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the
publication of the articles. [Chavez vs. CA, G.R. No. 125813, 6 February 2007]

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