Case no.

1
Luzon Dev. Bank v. Association of LDBE
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: Whether or not the
company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA on promotion. At a conference, the parties
agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary
Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper
despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. Without LDB’s Position Paper,
the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision finding that the Bank has not adhered to the CBA provision
nor the MOA on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA.

HELD: The Court resolved to refer this case to the Court of Appeals. The court ruled that:
1. The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite
limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the
NLRC for that matter.
2. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals
shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions
xxx.

Case no. 2
Iron & Steel Authority v. CA
G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in
order to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a
term of 5 years, and when ISA’s original term expired, its term was extended for another 10 years. The National Steel
Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, embarked
on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in
Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by
the President on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land
located in Iligan City and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSCs. Since certain
portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI
No. 1277 was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for
the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land. LOI No. 1277 also directed
that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of the
LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate
expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the
subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. Negotiations
between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISA’s term.

HELD: Trial court's decision is hereby reversed and set aside and the case is remanded to the court a
quo. The Supreme Court ruled that:
1. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as,
e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties,functions, etc. to some other identified successor
agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of that agency and,
by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.

Case no. 3
Solid Homes v. Payawal
G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

FACTS: Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc. She alleged that Solid Homes
contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot. She had already paid in monthly installments and interest.
Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the certificate of title as it
appeared that it was mortgaged in bad faith to a financing company. Solid Homes contended that
jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344
granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.

ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction.

HELD: The challenged decision is reversed. The court held that:

1. In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the
dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special
law. NHA has jurisdiction.

Case no. 4
Christian Gen. Assembly v. Ignacio
G.R. No. 164789 August 27, 2009

FACTS: Owners of subject property in Pulilan , Bulacan, Spouses Ignacio, and CGA entered into a
Contract to Sell for the said subdivision lot with stipulations on downpayment, installment terms and
period. CGA paid the downpayment and religiously paid its monthly installments until it was discovered
that subject property had flaws and defects in its title; that said lot was a property under litigation. CGA
filed an action before the RTC against Ignacio for fraudulent concealment of property under litigation.
Ignacio moved to have the action dismissed contending that the HLURB has jurisdiction over their
claims.

HELD: The petition is denied. The court ruled that:

1. The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of
the complaint and the law governing at the time the action was commenced. The jurisdiction of the
tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’
consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of an action.

Case no. 5
Dadubo v. CSC
G.R. No. 106498 June 28, 1993

FACTS: Dadubo and Cidro of DBP were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The charges were based on reports on the unposted withdrawal of P60,000.00
from a certain Savings Account. Veloso, an authorized representative of the Tius, presented an undated
withdrawal slip for P60,000.00. Dadubo, as acting teller, prepared the needed preliminaries and the
money was subsequently released to Veloso. The Received payment portion of the withdrawal slip was
signed Veloso but Cidro, who disbursed the amount, failed to initial the passbook. After banking hours,
another withdrawal slip was presented by another employee of the Tius. This was the second
P60,000.00 withdrawal. Veloso did not know about it. The withdrawal slip was processed and approved
on the same day. It was indicated in the slip that it was posted but it wasn't actually made, absent
presentation of passbook. The following day, prior to the payment of the ABH withdrawal, Veloso
presented another undated withdrawal slip for P60,000.00. This was the third P60,000.00 withdrawal.
The withdrawal slip was received by Dorado, who handed it to Dadubo. At that time, Cidro was
encashing the check at PNB to satisfy the ABH withdrawal. When she returned from the bank, she paid
this withdrawal to Veloso, who thought that what she was collecting was the P60,000.00 corresponding
to the withdrawal slip she presented that morning. When Dadubo informed Cidro about the third
withdrawal, till money of P100,000.00 was made to service it. Prior to the payment of the third
P60,000.00 withdrawal, Veloso came back and presented another withdrawal slip for P40,000.00. The
petitioner claimed she disbursed P100,000.00 to Veloso, covering the third P60,000.00 and the
P40,000.00 withdrawals. On the other hand, Veloso testified that she received only P40,000.00 from the
petitioner. She acknowledged receipt of the amount by signing the withdrawal slip and indicating
opposite her signature the amount of P40,000.00. That left the balance of P60,000.00 unaccounted for
and directly imputable to Dadubo. She was then charged and subsequently found guilty for
embezzlement of bank funds.

HELD: The petition dismissed for lack of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Civil Service Commission. The Court futher held that:
1. The petitioner's challenges are mainly factual. The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative
bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is
not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the
sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters
within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law.
Case no. 6
Lianga Bay v. Enage
G.R. No. L-30637
July 16, 1987

FACTS: The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common
boundary. Reports of encroachment by both parties on each other’s concessions triggered a survey to
establish the common boundary of the respective concession areas and was held that the claim of Ago
Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of the Office granting the Timber License Agreement
to Lianga Bay Logging. Ago Timber appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in favor of Ago. Lianga Bay Logging
elevated the case to office of President and ruling of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed.
On Motion for Recon, decision was reversed and reinstated decision of Director of Forestry. A civil
action was instituted by Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary line of license timber areas. TRO
was set in place. Lianga brought the case to SC on certiorari.

HELD: The petition is granted. The Court held that:

1. Bureau of Forestry has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, reforestation, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the
granting of licenses for game and fish and for taking of forest products.
2. Decisions of Administrative Officers shall not be disturbed by the Courts except when the former
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Case no. 7
Larin v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997

FACTS: Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He was in
charge of the office of the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave
misconduct. His conviction was reported to the Office of the President, at the same time, an
administrative complaint was filed with the same office. The President then, based on the Sandiganbayan
conviction, created a committee to investigate Larin. Eventually, Larin’s removal was recommended. The
President dismissed Larin.
ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.
HELD: The petition is granted. The court held that:
1. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil Service. Although it is a
general rule that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such power to remove is with
limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer
and under the Administrative Code of 1987, such officers who fall under career service are characterized
by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified
by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career
service officer, Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can only be removed from his office on
grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987.

Case no. 8
Dario v. Mison
G.R No. 81954 August 8, 1989

FACTS: President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 Declaring a National Policy to implement the
reforms mandated by the people, protecting their basic rights, adopting a provisional constitution and
providing for an orderly transition to a government under a new Constitution. Then the President issued
a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various other government offices, which led to
EO No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing
pattern. The petitioner was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau of Customs. The petitioner was one of
the personnel that were terminated from office.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s dismissal was legal.

HELD: The Commissioner of Customs is ordered to reinstate the employees separated. The court further
held that:
1. With respect to EO No. 127, Commissioner submits that under Section 59 thereof, those incumbents
whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from
the service. He submits that because the removed personnel have not been reappointed they are
considered terminated. To begin with the Commissioner’s appointing power is subject to the provisions
of EO No. 39. Under EO No. 39 the Commissioner of Customs may appoint all Bureau personnels except
those appointed by the President.

Case no. 9
Buklod ng Kaw EIIB v. Zamora
G.R. No. 142801 July 10, 2001

FACTS: On June 1987 President Cory Aquino issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of Finance. Aquino issued another memo providing
that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations in all land areas
and inland water and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On
January 2000 Pres. Estrada issued EO 191 entitled “Deactivation of the EIIB.” The order of deactivation
was motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the
other exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223 providing for the
separation from the service of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting in
the abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.

RULING: The petition is denied. The court ruled that:

1. the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus, agencies, or offices
in the executive department are under the President’s power of control. Hence he is justified in
deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in carrying out reorganizations when a certain law
grants him such power. Sec. 31, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President with
the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in
order to achieve economy and efficiency. The reorganization should be carried out in good faith.
2. The EOs issued by Estrada was motivated by the fact that the functions of EIIB are also being
performed by other agencies. The Court also pointed out that the deactivation of EIIB was intended to
lessen the expenses of the government.

Case no. 10
Bagaoisan v. NTA
G.R. No. 152845 August 5, 2003

FACTS: President Joseph Estrada issued E.O. no. 29 entitled Mandating the Streamlining of the National
Tobacco Administration (NTA). It was followed E.O. no. 36 amending E.O. no 29 , insofar as the new
staffing pattern was concerned. The rank and file employees of NTA Batac, among whom included
herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the Civil Service Commission and sought its assistance in
recalling the OSSP. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining order with the regional trial court of
Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and from ousting the
petitioners in there
respective offices. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration
to appoint the petitioner to the OSSP to position similar to the
one that they hold before. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who
reversed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the supreme court.

HELD: The petition is denied. The court ruled that:

1. The president has the power to reorganized an office to achieve simplicity ,economy and efficiency as
provided under executive order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of
executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer essential for the delivery of public service.

Case no. 11
Domingo v. Zamora
G.R. No. 142283 Feb 6, 2003

FACTS: Former President Estrada issued EO no. 81 entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and
Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and
Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, issued Memorandum No. 01594
reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS. Petitioners
were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their
reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and
unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners also challenge the DECS
Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure. During the pendency of the case, RA 9155
otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted. It expressly abolished
the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports
competition to the PSC.

ISSUE: whether or not EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.

HELD: The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that:
1. EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the
President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

Case no. 12
Makati Stock Exchange v. SEC
G.R. No. L-23004 June 30, 1965

FACTS: The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to operate a stock
exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock
Exchange. Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that the Commission has
no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commission’s order
or resolution would make impossible, for all practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to
operate, such that its “permission” amounted to “prohibition”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question?

HELD: The license of the petition to operate a stock exchange is approved. The court ruled that:
1. The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It
suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it. It argues that said
rule was approved by the Department Head before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of
the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation.
The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it
empowers the Commission to prohibit.
2. The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in
discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has
such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against
double listing.

Case no. 13
Taule v. Santos
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

Facts: On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members, including Taule,
in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. The group decided to hold the
election despite the absence of five (5) of its members. The Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and
seeking its nullification due to flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. The Secretary
nullifed the election of the officers of the FABC and ordered a new one to be conducted to be presided
by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Taule, contested the
decision contending that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the respondent
Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC and that the Constitution
provides that it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay
officials.
HELD: The petition is granted. The Court ruled that:
1. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn petition contesting the
election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10
days after the proclamation of the results.

***SKIP CASE NO. 14***

Case no. 15
Carino v. CHR
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and
decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended
from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others.
The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed
an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case.
Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.

HELD: The petition is granted. The court ruled that:

1. Commission on Human Rights to have no such power to try and decide certain cases and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country.
2. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.

Case no. 16
Villaluz v. Zaldivar
G.R. No. L-22754 December 31, 1965

FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960,
Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the
government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar
suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was
recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing
Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.

HELD: The petition is denied. The court ruled that:

1. Petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of
the government and is such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing the
President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.

Case no. 17
Ruiz v. Drilon
G.R. No. 101666 June 9, 1992

FACTS: President Aquino issued Admin Order no. 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz from his office as
President of the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with
prayers for temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals. Eight days later, petitioner filed with
the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose of
annulling AO no. 218.

HELD: The petition was dismissed. The Court ruled that:

1. Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendation of any investigating
committee. He is only entitled to an administrative decision that is based upon substantial evidence
made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidences
presented against him during the hearing.
2. AO no. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from office.

Case no. 18
Sec of Justice v. Lantion
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present
the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

HELD: The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that:

1. Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound
by it in all circumstances.
Case no. 19
Pefianco v. Moral
G.R. No. 132248 January 19, 2000

FACTS: Secretary Erlinda Pefianco of the Department of Eductation, Culture and Sports seek to nullify
the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by former DECS Secretary
Ricardo Gloria for lack of merit. Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against Maria Luisa Moral then Chief
Librarian od National Library for dishonest, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for the commission of pilferage of historical documents and keeping in her
possession without authority some historical documents. The DECS investigating committee conducted
several hearings. Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding Moral guilty and ordered dismissal. Moral
did not appeal but instead instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts
against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS investigation committee
report and that the secretary be enjoined from enforcing the dismissal until she received the copy.
Secretary moved to dismiss the case but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court.

HELD: The petition is granted. The court ruled that:

1. A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He
is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee.

Case no. 20
Camara v. Municipal Court
387 US 523 June 5, 1967

FACTS: An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public
Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the
city’s Housing Code. The inspector was informed that the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a
personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises
because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did
not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant.. A complaint was filed against the
Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition.
The court of Appeals held the housing section does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it is
part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that
section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under
unreasonable conditions.

HELD: The Court ruled that:

1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code
enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is
enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable"
searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials.
Case no. 21
Salazar v. Achacoso
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with
illegal recruitment. After knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It
stated that there will be a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be
used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New
Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said
Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioner’s
residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,
because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also
alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will
and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

HELD: The petition is granted. The court ruled that:

1. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process.
2. Under the new Constitution, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Case no. 22
Catura v. CIR
G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971

FACTS: Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador are the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association. A complaint against them under Section 17 of
the Industrial Peace Act was filed by the CIR and the principal complainants, being Celestino Tabaniag
and other employees constituting more than 10 percent of the membership of the labor organization
(respondents). Petitioners were charged of “unauthorized disbursement of union funds.” Complainants
demand a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to make the book of
accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the members.
The demands were refused. Members were the forced to elevate the matter to the Department of Labor
which issued subpoenas for the presentation of the account books, but to no avail. The complaint
sought to declare petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice under the Industrial Peace Act. Private
respondents sought an injunction to prevent Catura, who turned out to be re-elected as President, from
taking oath of his office Then came the order by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which, instead of
granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing the petitioners to deliver and
deposit documents related to finances at the hearing of the petition. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioners alleging that they were not heard before such order was issued. The order was
sustained.

HELD: The petition is denied. The court ruled that:

1. The power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into
existing facts and conditions. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of CIR
to call for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation. All the challenged order did was to
require petitioner to “deliver and deposit” the documents. The documents required to be produced
constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether there was a failure to comply with the
mandates of law. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force
and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless such is arbitrary.

Case no. 23
Evangelista v. Jarencio
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

FACTS: Evangelista is head of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations(PARGO)
created by Executive Order No. 4, which, among others, provides: The agency is hereby vested with all
the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to theinvestigation. Respondent Manalastas (Asst. City Public Service
Officer of Manila) was issued a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to appear as witness at the
office of the PARGO to testify in a certain investigation pending therein. Instead of obeying it, he filed a
petition with the CFI of Manila for prohibition, certiorari and restraining order assailing its
legality. Judge Jarencio issued a restraining order.

HELD: The order of respondent Judge is hereby set aside. The court ruled that:
1. Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not
adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a
complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation
of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a
pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.

Case no. 24
Office Court Admin v. Canque
A.M. No. P-04-1830 June 4, 2009

FACTS: In a complainant the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), acting through informed RTC
Presiding Judge Villordon that the April and May 2009 bundy cards of her staff, namely, Capistrano,
Canque , and Terrado, Jr. contained irregular entries. OCA observed that their respective times of arrival
in the morning bore overbars, thus, indicating that the bundy cards were punched in the evening. OCA,
in the same letter, required them, as well as the RTC Clerk of Court V, Atty. Mendieta to submit a written
explanation on the matter. Atty. Mendieta explained that his signatures on the subject bundy cards
were affixed in good faith, with the concomitant presumption that the entries thereon were regular and
made in the usual performance of their duties. OCA requested the Court's Office of Administrative
Services for the original copies7 of the subject bundy cards. Thereafter, it directed Capistrano to file a
formal comment. Capistrano expressly admitted falsifying her bundy cards. She further appealed for
judicial clemency and pleaded for another opportunity to serve the judiciary, considering her length of
service and dedication to her work. Meanwhile, the administrative complaints against Canque and
Terrado, Jr., have been docketed separately as A.M. Nos. 11-4-80-RTC and 11-4-79-RTC, respectively,
leading the OCA to resolve Capistrano's case on its own. OCA recommended that Capistrano be held
administratively liable for dishonesty and thereby be suspended for a period of six (6) months without
pay. The OCA found that Capistrano actually punched her bundy cards in the evening, but made it
appear that it was the time of her arrival in the morning. Despite her infractions, however, the OCA,
deemed it apt not to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal, considering that Capistrano admitted her
fault and that she had never been charged with a similar offense.

HELD: The respondent is found guilty of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty.
The court ruled that:
1. Administrative due process cannot be equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not required.

Case no. 25
Carmelo v. Ramos
G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962

FACTS: Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies
involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of
the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office. Petitioner is the chairman of the
committee. The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a
bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it. Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended
"to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which
petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower
court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue
subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It appears that in a statement given to
investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on several occasions,
sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-
1959 and that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in
the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above.

HELD: The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed. The court ruled that:
1. The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case,
unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in
paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Case no. 26
Masangcay v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962

FACTS: Masangcay was being punished with contempt by the COMELEC for violating its resolution
prohibiting the opening of ballot boxes without the presence of the required authorized officers.
Masangcay questions the constitutionality of the pertinent statutory provision, questioning the exercise
of the COMELEC of the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure
and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said
section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is
unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the
three departments of our constitutional form of government.

HELD: The decision appealed from as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration are hereby reversed. The court ruled that:
1. Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and administer all laws to the conduct of
elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified a
court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by
express provision law come under its jurisdiction.

Case no. 27
Bedol v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179830 December 3, 2009

FACTS: Bedol was the chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of
Maguindanao. He also was charged with the duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor
for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao. Bedol failed to attend the
scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao. Due to certain
observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was
held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of
elections in his area. Bedol explained before the Task Force fact finding activity that, while in his custody
and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen fifteen days after the elections. Due to absences
in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit a written
explanation of his absences, Bedol was issued a contempt charge by Comelec. Petitioner was later
arrested by members of the PNP. Petitioner questioned the Comelec’s legal basis for issuing the warrant
of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges.

HELD: The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that:

1. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
Case no. 28
Gaoiran v. Alcala
G.R. No. 150178 November 26, 2004

FACTS: A letter-complaint was filed with the CHED against petitioner Gaoiran. Respondent Edmond
Castillejo charged the petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his duties. The incident
allegedly took place inside the school premises. The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs
Service of the CHED. Thereafter, Atty. Dasig, fact-finding investigation. After the fact-finding
investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case against the petitioner for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the Formal
Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension. The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit
or answer to the charges against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to restrain the enforcement of the said preventive suspension order. However, considering
that the petitioner had already served the suspension, the case was dismissed for being moot and
academic. The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive suspension order.
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire Mayo, who was later appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of the
CHED, issued the Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint. However, respondent Hon. Angel
C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED, apparently unaware of the existence of Director Mayo’s
resolution, issued another Resolution finding the petitioner guilty. The petitioner then filed with the a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. In its decision the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner but CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

HELD: The petition is denied. The court ruled that:

1. It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not concededly
verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as
well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be considered as
constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator,
investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed
against court employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct.Indeed, it is not totally
uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its
investigative powers.After all, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied.

Case no. 29
Ang Tibay v. CIR
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the
said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National
Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio
was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

HELD: The motion for a new trial is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the CIR. The court ruled that:
1. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they
attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.