G.R. No.

124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS: FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. Fe
sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On
31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan
(also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter.

ISSUE: WON Fe Quita be entitled to a share of the testate of the decedent as a surviving spouse.

RULING: Fe Quita is not entitled to the share of surviving spouse as she lost her Filipino Citizenship since 1954.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in
fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was
a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth
of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed
that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14Petitioner opposed the motion
but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce
that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from Arturo

When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree
of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year
 G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA, a practicing lawyer, and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA) had
initially marriage in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947
and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. After
almost two (2) decades of marriage, they eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD LAVADIA. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as
husband and wife until 1987.

ISSUE: WON the divorce between Atty Luna and Eugenia had dissolved their marriage.
RULING: The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of
bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued
the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule,
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It
affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a
ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 139868 : June 8, 2006]
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, v. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Audrey O Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979,
Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The
will was admitted to probate before the Orphan's Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
executor due to Richard's renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of
the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly
and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the
Orphan's Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn,
designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as
ancillary administrator.
Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey's estate, where Richard and Kyle had
given ¾ and ¼ shares respectively on the estate of Audrey.

ISSUE: WON the wills of both Audrey and W. Richard of both American Citizens be prevailed over the Philippine Law

RULING: The wills of the deceased shall prevail.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her
will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey's death, she was residing in
the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed
and probated before the Orphan's Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the
Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan's
Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed
by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the
testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided
by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to
the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408
expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other
hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and
distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as
expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey's conjugal share in the
Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey's death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he
left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This,
of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the
entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.
Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court
took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on
October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit
"2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the
counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950
before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State
of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially
Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law
having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of
partition of Richard's estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute
the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed according to their respective
wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court
as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will.
That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished
to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts
must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner's motive in equitably distributing Audrey's estate cannot prevail over Audrey's and
Richard's wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47
 G.R. No. 160273 January 18, 2008
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS
L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-
stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are
members of its Board of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent
Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-
proprietary member. The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The application was indorsed by CCCI’s
two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to
sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for
only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to
respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent’s
application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent’s
application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI’s
corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not
answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5,
1997, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again,
CCCI did not reply.

ISSUE: WON the CCCI has abused its right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership.

RULING: In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners violated the
rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of social order.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an
application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,5 we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
(Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules governing
human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident
bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence,
petitioners are liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the
directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to
CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of
votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons. We find this
excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in
1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and
exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the
printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not
even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an
inquiry whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did
not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary
member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have
informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is
exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.6 It bears reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners’
disapproval of respondent’s application is characterized by bad faith.
 A.C. No. 4697 November 25, 2014
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 4728
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a "Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with rightof repurchase) to complainant a parcel
of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for
₱15,000.00. Under the said deed, respondent represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple"
the subject property and that the said property is "free from all liens and encumbrances." 3 The deed also provided that
respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased within the
said period, "the parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement."4
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the
contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase
the property. Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989 when he received letters
from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to
RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should therefore vacate the
property.5
ISSUE: WON the respondent is guilty of abuse rights when he executed the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase

RULING: The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent from
the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the ₱15,000.00 consideration, plus
interest.
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de
retroor of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the present
administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion." 18He gravely
violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent caused
the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as he was the one who prepared or drafted the
said instrument. Respondent could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself
and complainant as "mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If
only respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy
between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading
wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to
"conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations as embodied in Article
19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to
it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the contracting
parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the
contracting parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain, which
opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation
of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and
complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that the property was covered by TCT
No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that
the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not
even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on

January 4, 1982,21 or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of
gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under Canon 1, a lawyer is
not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and
obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law
is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad
enough to include such element.23
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking inintegrity,
honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that is "deceitful"
means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is
ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must
either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not
on equal terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of
the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.24The actions of respondent in connection with the
execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for Section 63 of the Land
Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be
sanctioned.