LADECO vs.

ANGALA
LADECO vs. ANGALA
G.R. No. 153076 - June 21, 2007

FACTS:
On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was driven by Apolonio Deocampo bumped into a 1958
Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala and driven by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural
Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver
and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang,
Davao City. The left door, front left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.

Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry
Berenguel and Deocampo. Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and
was making a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60
to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the
impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer when the accident took place. Respondent
testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.

Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he incurred because of the accident but he did not
receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and Deocampo.

In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of defendant and ordered LADECO and
Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the
crewcab. LADECO and Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 13, 1995.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its March 11, 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of
merit. Hence, the present petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.

RULING:
Yes.

Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that
of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid
the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much
slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he
was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the
brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
Canlas v. CA
G.R. No. 112160 February 28, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

Laws Applicable: Article 1173

FACTS:

 August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Vicente Mañosca to mortgage 2 parcels of
land situated in BF Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife Angelina Canlas.
 Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the lands to Mañosca for P850K, P500K payable within 1 week, and the balance
serves as his investment in the business. Mañosca issued 2 checks P40K and P460K. The P460K lacked sufficient funds.
 September 3, 1982: Mañosca mortgage to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with the help of impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the Spouses Canlas.
 September 29, 1982: Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) for P500K with the parcels of land
as security and with the help of the same impostors. The loan was left unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.
 January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter informing ASB that the mortgage was without their authority. He also requested the
sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the auction. Both parties refused.
 The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction
 RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing a Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale and annulled the mortgage
 CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for coming to the bank with Mañosca and letting himself be introduced as Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the doctrine of last clear chance

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED

 Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith,
the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply
 The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family
 not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity
 acted simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a
previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno
 previous deed of mortgage did not bear the tax account number of the spouses as well as the Community Tax Certificate of
Angelina Canlas
 doctrine of last clear chance
 where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where
it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom
 the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence
 Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Mañosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by
entrusting him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land
 Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to
ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them - ASB bears the loss
 Canlas went to ASB with Mañosca and he was introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't correct Mañosca. However, he did not know
that the lots were being used as a security for he was there to make sure that Mañosca pays his debt so he cannot be estopped
from assailing the validity of the mortgage
 But being negligent in believing the misrepresentation by Mañosca that he had other lots and that the lot were not to be used as a
security, Canlas was negligent and undeserving of Attorney's fees.
 the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete nullity

Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA

GR. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

 May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his
secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC)
 They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido
Cotas
 Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on PBC
 Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and both are always validated and stamped by the
teller Azucena Mabayad :
 original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number - retained by the bank
 duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank
 After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account
number to RMC's account number
 This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge
 Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its money and later on filed in the RTC
 RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
 CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury by not exercising the proper validation
procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC

1. YES.
 The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the PBC of
responsibility
 The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information (Name of the account holder) should have
already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
 Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lack in selection and
supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
 Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while
he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of
the bank's validation procedures until 7 years later
 last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril
 where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof
 antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
 Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru
its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed
validation procedure.
 Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith,
the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good
father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care
2. YES.
 it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had
it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The
damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that
may be awarded to the private respondent
 Article 2179 of the New Civil Code
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Pantranco North Express v. Baesa

G.R. 79050-51 November 14, 1989
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico
to go to a picnic in Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses
 While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a
route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
 As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from
injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
 PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver.
 CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to
utilize with reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages
 For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert
the accident was aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it
 there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger
 When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to
the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
jeepney approaching form the opposite direction
 Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to
avoid it
 last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered

Bustamante v. CA
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del
Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
 front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the wall
from the driver's seat to the last rear seat
 several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
 1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all
surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina
 The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and
Serrado
 before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of
the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling.
He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of
the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which
was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along
the shoulder of the highway
 RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
 CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to
overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.

 the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an
injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
 a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent
or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
 since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of
the cargo truck from liability

Philippine National Railways v. Brunty

G.R. No. 169891, 02 November 2006
Rhonda Brunty, who came to the Philippines for a visit is the daughter of complainant Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, died due
to an accident when the car she was in collided with a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train. Previously, Rhonda, along with her
Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia and their driver, was on their way to Baguio on a Mercedes Benz sedan. Around 2:00 am,
approaching a railroad crossing, the driver speeding at 70km/hr overtook a vehicle. Unaware, they collided with the train. Rhonda and
the driver died, with Juan suffering severe injuries.

Brunty’s heirs filed a Complaint for damages claiming that PNR was negligent for not having placed no flag bar, red light signal, and
other mechanisms in the railroad classing where the accident happen. PNR claimed that the law did not require it to put such alarms.

HELD: PNR was liable. PNR’s business is impressed with public interest; hence, it is expected from them to exercise utmost diligence in
the performance of their work. Thus, even if the law did not require it to put such alarms, it was still required to do so as a matter of
public duty or public safety.

“It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to
persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.
Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any
public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free
passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway,
and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.

“This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or
switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.”

Ong v. Metropolitan water district

G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
Lessons Applicable: Neglignce (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 July 5, 1952 1:45 p.m.: For the 4th or 5th time, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy scout, and his
brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to Metropolitan Water District's recreational swimming pools charging a nominal fee (P0.50 for
adults; P0.20 for children)
 4:35 p.m.: Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke
 Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the
latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke.
 Lifeguards Manuel Abaño (8 am - 12 nn;2 pm - 6 pm) and Mario Villanueva (7:30-11:30 am;2:30 to 4:30 pm) were on duty
 4-5 pm: there were about 20 bathers inside the pool area and Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in
compliance with the instructions of his chief
 4:40-4:45 p.m: some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was
swimming under water for quite a long time
 Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening so he immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and
retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom
 The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately applied manual artificial respiration
 Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after
being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a
medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil
 After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines
 Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until
the two oxygen tanks were exhausted
 Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but the same became of no use because he found the boy
already dead. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.
 The autopsy of Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos, Chief, Medico Legal Division of the NBI found that the death was due to asphyxia by
submersion in water.
 lower court: dismissed the complaint
 Mr. and Mrs. Amador C. Ong: failure of the lifeguard Abaño to immediately respond to their call may and even if it be assumed
that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, defendants may still be held liable under the doctrine of "last
clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so
ISSUE: W/N the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of Metropolitan Water District and/or its
employees

HELD: NO. decision appealed from is affirmed

 Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be observed is that the person
claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the
damage is claimed, or of one of his employees
 The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury
 Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we find supported by the evidence: "There is
(also) a strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived
where the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the
pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which to his drowning. As a boy scout he must have received instructions in
swimming. He knew, or have known that it was dangerous for him to dive in that part of the pool."

Assumption of Risk

The Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-53401, 06 November 1989

Complainants, heirs of deceased Isabel Lao Juan, initiated a Complaint to recover damages from defendant The Ilocos Norte Electric
Company. Previously, Isabel Lao Juan was on her way to her store to check for damage to her merchandise when she was electrocuted
while wading through waist-deep water caused by recent typhoon “Gening.” There was a dangling electric wire “moving in snake-like
fashion in the water.” As a defense, the company claimed that the unfortunate incident was a result of fortuitous event and that the
decedent assumed the risk when she waded through the water.

HELD: Ilocos Norte Electric was liable. The cause of the death of the decedent was the failure of the Company to repair the damage
brought by the typhoon. When a storm occurs that is liable to prostate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and
repair broken lines. No assumption of risk attributable to Isabel since she was responding to an emergency to protect her property.

“Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, [the Company] was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public…
‘considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be‘ x x x. The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from
liability by arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous event. ‘When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission’ x x x”

As for the defense on assumption of risk, the same was not tenable. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria means that when someone
voluntarily assents to a known danger then he must abide by the consequences. These are the exceptions: (1) when there is an
emergency; (2) protection of one’s life and property; and (3) protection of life and property of another. Here, the decedent was moved
to act to protect her property.

Afialda v. Hisole
G.R. No. L-2075, 29 November 1949

Margarita Afialda, heir of decedent Lorito Afialda, instituted a Complaint to recover damages against defendant Basilio Hisole.
Previously, defendant tasked decedent Afialda to take care of a carabao. The decedent Afialda was gored to death by the said animal.

HELD: Defendant Hisole was not liable. Being injured by the animal was one of the risks of the occupation which Afialda had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. When damage is an assumed risk from plaintiff’s (voluntarily
assumed) occupation, he alone is liable.
“In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously,
it was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being
injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.”

Emergency Rule

MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG

211 SCRA 517DAVIDE; July 16, 1992

FACTS:
A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries
to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered
the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on
the said bridge.- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime
of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.

Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC.IAC
affirmed decision. Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded private respondents moral damages and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fee. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of the trial
court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was Galang's
inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence
on the part of the defendants, as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising the said employee.- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUES
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolutionare supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures
and presumptions.

HELD
YES

Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the
evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was
stated in its judgment. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the
truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the
lane of the car.- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence I na particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.- Assuming,
Arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause
has been defined as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.-
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the
same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency
signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and
swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver
continued at full speed towards the car.- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was
running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed bylaw on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.

Force Majeure

NAPOCOR vs CA
GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC and a particular Chavez. Plaintiffs filed a
complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction of properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water
from Angat dam during the typhoon “Kading”. Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric
plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam.

NPC’s allegations were as follows:

1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant;

2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of
typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions;

4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and
property;

5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted and;

6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and
character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued
because it performs a purely governmental function.

The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be
sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and
credible evidence."

Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private respondents. Based on the findings
that From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was
caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-
appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is negligent?

Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?

Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?
HELD:

We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein — who were similarly situated
as the private respondents herein — was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice"
supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.

The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and
operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but
products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."

To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the
following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must
be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court
of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v.
Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).

Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained
by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act
of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in
question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.

Art. 2177 (Option as to where to file)

ACE HAULERS CORP. vs. CA Civil Law/ Civil Liability/ Damages: Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases,
the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission. Consequently, a
separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO DY (for herself and behalf of the minors
Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy) Facts:

Appeal via certiorari -On October 10, 1989, Patricio Durian, Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed in the RTC of Isabela an information
charging Romeo Dunca y Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. On June 20, 1989, in
Cauayan, Isabela, Dunca being the driver and person-in-charge of a White Trailer Truck Tractor with Plate No. N2A-867 registered in
the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande. -Dunca was driving the
said vehicle along the National Highway of Brgy. Tagaran in Cauayan bound to San Fernando Pampanga. The truck approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck’s right lane. The surfaces of the road were uneven because of potholes
of about 5-6 inches deep. Domingo, Dunca’s pahinante, narrated that they used to evade the rough road by taking the other lane, but
at that moment, seeing the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it and caused the truck to bounce wildly. -Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved and said trailer truck hit and bump a

Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. which caused the death of Balcita
and Dy and damages to their heirs. -Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. The offended parties made a reservation
to file a separate civil action against the accused. -They also filed a complaint against Rafael Reyes Trucking Corpo as employer of
Tumol based on quasi delict. -The respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate
civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver. -the trial
court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same. -Trial court rendered a joint decision finding
Dunca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136). -He was also ordered to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses; -plaintiff was ordered in Civil Case
No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and Ordering the dismissal of the complaint
in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424. -Petitioner and accused filed a notice of appeal and the private respondents moved for amendment of the
joint decision to hold the petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages in the event of insolvency of the accused which was granted by
the court. -Petitioner filed a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision. -During the pendency of the appeal, the
accused jumped bail and fled to another country. CA dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case. -CA rendered a decision
affirming the decision of RTC so petitioner filed for MR. CA denied the MR of the petitioner for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the
employer of the truck driver? -May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil
action against the employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property?

HELD:

-The SC granted the petition, ordering the cases to be remanded to the RTC for the determination of the civil liability of the petitioner
as the employer of the accused. -In negligence cases, the aggrieved has the option between (1) an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (CIVIL LIABLITY EX DELICTO); and (2) a separate action for quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. (CIVIL LIABILITY QUASI DELICTO). Once the choice is made, he cannot avail of the other
remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused in keeping with rule against
double recovery. -in this case, the parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against the petitioner as employer of the
accused based on quasi delict based on Art. 2176 in relation to 2180 of NCC which only necessitates a preponderance of evidence. -
Here, the liability of the employer is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to
be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee is solidary. -The second, predicated on Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee
in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and
is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. -

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was
not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

-Pursuant to Rule 111 of Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they
waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission. -

CA and RTC erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising
from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on
quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.

-It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against
the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the
withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil
action against petitioner based on quasi delict.

In such a case, it is clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil
actions arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between
the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. -The trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the
criminal case and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the
dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render
decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence. -the award of damages in the criminal case was
improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action
against the employer. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed
against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.

MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, respresented by its president, ANG CHO HONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
TY TECK SUAN substituted by his heirs, ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH, EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY,
EVELYN T. LIM, EDWIN TY and EDISON TY, and SIY GUI, respondents.

G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995

FACTS: Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered numerous canons of nutria-wafer
biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation, before the delivery of the goods on November 12, 1981, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho
Hong, president of Mansion Biscuit Corp., four postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as payment for the nutria-wafer biscuits. Four
other postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each were issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the
same year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp. delivered the goods. When the first four checks were deposited, they were all
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Ang Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the dishonor and requested him to replace the
checks with good cash or good checks. Ty Teck Suan failed to heed said request. Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of
1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion Biscuits plus cash advance by Suan and the amount paid was applied as payment for the
first postdated check. Hong sent Suan a formal demand letter requesting the latter to make good the value of the remaining
dishonored checks within five days from the receipt thereof. Thereafter, the second batch of checks were issued by Suan and Gui but
were all dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit Corporation filed a case against Suan and Gui for violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law)

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the subject checks were issued merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment
of the agreement with the complaint.

HELD: The court concludes of the above-mentioned checks by the accused subject to these two criminal cases, and their subsequent
dishonor, cannot be considered in violation of the Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one important element of the offense is missing:
that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value and because these were issued to guarantee the
fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by complaint when accused Suan would place orders. Accused are hereby declared not
guilty of the offense charged.