POLITICAL SCIENCE

Analysis of the Political Theory

of Confucius

Submitted To:
Ms. Ayesha Rehman
(Faculty – Political Science)

Submitted By:
Aditya Krishnamoorthy
Semester 2
Roll Number: 6
Section B (Political Science Minor)
 Hidayatullah National Law University,
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my teacher Ms. Ayesha Rehman for showing faith in me by
trusting me this topic and for extending all the support that she could offer me in course of
the preparation of my project. I would also like to thank the library and the IT lab staff for the
providing their resources in the most convenient and efficient manner. Lastly, I would like to
thank my parents who are always there to support me.

Aditya Krishnamoorthy
Semester 2

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Table of Contents
1. Research Methodology....................................................................................3

2. Introduction.....................................................................................................4

3. Life of Confucius.............................................................................................6

4. Confucius Ethics............................................................................................7

5. Confucius Political Philosophy: Central Themes ..................................10

a. Theodicy ...........................................................................................10

b. Harmonious Order ..........................................................................11

c. Moral Force......................................................................................12

d. Self-Cultivation.................................................................................13

6. Conclusion........................................................................................................16

7. Bibliography & Webliography..........................................................................17

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Research Methodology
This project is concerned with the life and the various eminent works of Confucius. All data
has been obtained from secondary sources. Various books written by acclaimed authors
relating to political ideologists and political thinkers have been used. The internet has also
been used for to obtain extra information. All information is from credible sources.

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Introduction

“Ignorance is the night of the mind, but a night without moon and star.”
- Confucius

Confucius (551?-479? BCE), according to Chinese tradition, was a thinker, political figure,
educator, and founder of the Ru School of Chinese thought. His teachings, preserved in
the Lunyu or Analects, form the foundation of much of subsequent Chinese speculation on the
education and comportment of the ideal man, how such an individual should live his life and
interact with others, and the forms of society and government in which he should participate.
Fung Yu-lan, one of the great 20thcentury authorities on the history of Chinese thought,
compares Confucius' influence in Chinese history with that of Socrates in the West.

As with the person of Confucius himself, scholars disagree about the origins and character of
the Analects, but it remains the traditional source for information about Confucius’ life and
teaching. Most scholars remain confident that it is possible to extract from the Analects
several philosophical themes and views that may be safely attributed to this ancient Chinese
sage. These are primarily ethical, rather than analytical-logical or metaphysical in nature, and
include Confucius’ claim that Tian(“Heaven”) is aligned with moral order but dependent
upon human agents to actualize its will; his concern for li (ritual propriety) as the instrument
through which the family, the state, and the world may be aligned with Tian’s moral order;
and his belief in the “contagious” nature of moral force (de), by which moral rulers diffuse
morality to their subjects, moral parents raise moral children, and so forth.1

1
Chin, A., 2007, The Authentic Confucius: A Life of Thought and Politics, New York: Scribner.

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Life of Confucius

The sources for Confucius' life were compiled well after his death and taken together paint
contradictory pictures of his personality and of the events in his life. The early works agreed
by textual authorities to be relatively reliable sources of biographical material are:
the Analects, compiled by Confucius' disciples and later followers during the centuries
following his death; the Zuozhuan, a narrative history composed from earlier sources
sometime in the fourth century; and the Mengzi or Mencius, a compilation of the teachings of
the well-known eponymous fourth century follower of Confucius' thought put together by his
disciples and adherents. The Confucius of the Analects appears most concerned with
behaving morally even when this means enduring hardship and poverty. Mencius' Confucius
is a politically motivated figure, seeking high office and departing from patrons who do not
properly reward him. A third Confucius is found in the pages of the Zuozhuan. This one is a
heroic figure courageously facing down dangers that threaten the lord of Confucius' native
state of Lu.

Politics in Confucius' native Lu were extremely unstable because of the challenge to the ruler
posed by the “three Huan families” which had the hereditary right to occupy the most
powerful ministerial offices in the Lu government. In 517 Duke Zhao of Lu moved against
the head of the most powerful—and the wealthiest— of the families: the Ji clan. But the
attack failed and the duke was forced to flee from Lu and spend the remaining years of his
reign in exile, first in Lu's large neighbor Qi and then in a town in the state of Jin where he
died in 510.

According to Sima Qian, when Duke Zhao was first forced into exile, Confucius also went to
Qi to serve as a retainer in the household of the nobleman Gao Zhaozi. The Analects
mentions how, during this period in Qi, Confucius heard for the first time a performance of
the sacred Shao music and was overwhelmed by the experience and then had an audience
with Duke Jing of Qi in which Confucius observed that what Qi required was that “The ruler
should be a ruler, his subjects subjects, the father should be a father, and his son a son” .

5
He was no doubt commenting on politics in Qi where—as was also the case in Lu—power
rested not in the hands of the ruler but instead in the hands of the powerful ministerial
families who were supposed to serve him. Some unidentified adversity probably precipitated
Confucius' departure from Qi.

And it seems that back home in Lu he was fairing poorly in locating employment. So
noteworthy was this failure that a passage in the Analects comments on it: “Someone asked
Confucius, ‘Why is it that you are not in government?’ Confucius replied,
‘The Documents say, ”Be filial, oh, only be filial! Be friendly toward your brothers and
extend this to governing.“ Practicing this is also to govern. Why must one be in office to
govern?’”. As noted earlier, what mattered to the Confucius of the Analects was not winning
an official position but remaining faithful to the moral behavior he valued.2

Our best source for understanding Confucius and his thought is the Analects. But
the Analects is a problematic and controversial work, having been compiled in variant
versions long after Confucius' death by disciples or the disciples of disciples. Some have
argued that, because of the text's inconsistencies and incompatibilities of thought, there is
much in the Analect sthat is non-Confucian and should be discarded as a basis for
understanding the thought of Confucius. Benjamin Schwartz cautions us against such radical
measures: “While textual criticism based on rigorous philological and historic analysis is
crucial, and while the later sections [of the Analects] do contain late materials, the type of
textual criticism that is based on considerations of alleged logical inconsistencies and
incompatibilities of thought must be viewed with great suspicion… . While none of us comes
to such an enterprise without deep-laid assumptions about necessary logical relations and
compatibilities, we should at least hold before ourselves the constant injunction to mistrust all
our unexamined preconceptions on these matters when dealing with comparative
thought.”The difficulties in reading and interpreting the text of the Analects have given rise to
numerous extensive commentaries that struggle to untangle the complexities of its language
and thought.

2
Ames, R. & D. Hall, 1987, Thinking Through Confucius, Albany: State University of New York.

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Book X of the Analects consists of personal observations of how Confucius comported
himself as a thinker, teacher, and official. Some have argued that these passages were
originally more general prescriptions on how a gentleman should dress and behave that were
relabelled as descriptions of Confucius. Traditionally, Book X has been regarded as providing
an intimate portrait of Confucius and has been read as a biographical sketch. The following
passages provide a few examples of why, more generally, it is difficult to glean from the
Analects a genuinely biographical, let alone intimate, portrait of the Master.

2. Confucius' Ethics

Confucius' teachings and his conversations and exchanges with his disciples are recorded in
the Lunyu or Analects, a collection that probably achieved something like its present form
around the second century BCE. While Confucius believes that people live their lives within
parameters firmly established by Heaven—which, often, for him means both a purposeful
Supreme Being as well as ‘nature’ and its fixed cycles and patterns—he argues that men are
responsible for their actions and especially for their treatment of others. We can do little or
nothing to alter our fated span of existence but we determine what we accomplish and what
we are remembered for.

Confucius represented his teachings as lessons transmitted from antiquity. He claimed that he
was “a transmitter and not a maker” and that all he did reflected his “reliance on and love for
the ancients” (Lunyu 7.1). Confucius pointed especially to the precedents established during
the height of the royal Zhou (roughly the first half of the first millennium BCE). Such
justifications for one's ideas may have already been conventional in Confucius' day. Certainly
his claim that there were antique precedents for his ideology had a tremendous influence on
subsequent thinkers many of whom imitated these gestures. But we should not regard the
contents of the Analects as consisting of old ideas. Much of what Confucius taught appears to
have been original to him and to have represented a radical departure from the ideas and
practices of his day.

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Confucius also claimed that he enjoyed a special and privileged relationship with Heaven and
that, by the age of fifty, he had come to understand what Heaven had mandated for him and
for mankind. Confucius was also careful to instruct his followers that they should never
neglect the offerings due Heaven. Some scholars have seen a contradiction between
Confucius' reverence for Heaven and what they believe to be his skepticism with regard to
the existence of ‘the spirits.’ But the Analects passages that reveal Confucius' attitudes
toward spiritual forces do not suggest that he was skeptical. Rather they show that Confucius
revered and respected the spirits, thought that they should be worshipped with utmost
sincerity, and taught that serving the spirits was a far more difficult and complicated matter
than serving mere mortals.

Confucius' social philosophy largely revolves around the concept of ren, “compassion” or
“loving others.” Cultivating or practicing such concern for others involved deprecating
oneself. This meant being sure to avoid artful speech or an ingratiating manner that would
create a false impression and lead to self-aggrandizement. Those who have cultivated ren are,
on the contrary, “simple in manner and slow of speech” . For Confucius, such concern for
others is demonstrated through the practice of forms of the Golden Rule: “What you do not
wish for yourself, do not do to others;” “Since you yourself desire standing then help others
achieve it, since you yourself desire success then help others attain it” He regards devotion to
parents and older siblings as the most basic form of promoting the interests of others before
one's own. Central to all ethical teachings found in the Analects of Confucius is the notion
that the social arena in which the tools for creating and maintaining harmonious relations are
fashioned and employed is the extended family.

Among the various ways in which social divisions could have been drawn, the most
important were the vertical lines that bound multigenerational lineages. And the most
fundamental lessons to be learned by individuals within a lineage were what role their
generational position had imposed on them and what obligations toward those senior or
junior to them were associated with those roles. In the world of the Analects, the dynamics of
social exchange and obligation primarily involved movement up and down along familial
roles that were defined in terms of how they related to others within the same lineage. It was
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also necessary that one play roles within other social constructs—neighborhood, community,
political bureaucracy, guild, school of thought—that brought one into contact with a larger
network of acquaintances and created ethical issues that went beyond those that impacted
one's family. But the extended family was at the center of these other hierarchies and could
be regarded as a microcosm of their workings.3

One who behaved morally in all possible parallel structures extending outward from the
family probably approximated Confucius's conception of ren.

It is useful to contrast this conception of ren and the social arena in which it worked with the
idea of jian ai or “impartial love” advocated by the Mohists who as early as the fifth century
BCE posed the greatest intellectual challenge to Confucius' thought.

The Mohists shared with Confucius and his followers the goal of bringing about effective
governance and a stable society, but they constructed their ethical system, not on the basis of
social roles, but rather on the self or, to be more precise, the physical self that has cravings,
needs, and ambitions. For the Mohists, the individual's love for his physical self is the basis
on which all moral systems had to be built. The Confucian emphasis on social role rather than
on the self seems to involve, in comparison to the Mohist position, an exaggerated emphasis
on social status and position and an excessive form of self-centeredness. While the Mohist
love of self is also of course a form of self-interest, what distinguishes it from the Confucian
position is that the Mohists regard self-love as a necessary means to an end, not the end in
itself, which the Confucian pride of position and place appears to be. The Mohist program
called for a process by which self-love was replaced by, or transformed into, impartial love—
the unselfish and altruistic concern for others that would, in their reckoning, lead to an
improved world untroubled by wars between states, conflict in communities, and strife within
families. To adopt impartial love would be to ignore the barriers that privilege the self, one's
family, and one's state and that separate them from other individuals, families, and states.4

3
Riegel, Jeffrey, "Confucius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4
ibid

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In this argument, self-love is a fact that informs the cultivation of concern for those within
one's own silo; it is also the basis for interacting laterally with those to whom one is not
related, a large cohort that is not adequately taken into account in the Confucian scheme of
ethical obligation.

Confucius taught that the practice of altruism he thought necessary for social cohesion could
be mastered only by those who have learned self-discipline. Learning self-restraint involves
studying and mastering li, the ritual forms and rules of propriety through which one expresses
respect for superiors and enacts his role in society in such a way that he himself is worthy of
respect and admiration. A concern for propriety should inform everything that one says and
does:

3. Confucius' Political Philosophy

Confucius' political philosophy is also rooted in his belief that a ruler should learn self-
discipline, should govern his subjects by his own example, and should treat them with love
and concern. “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity among them be sought by
punishments, they will try to escape punishment and have no sense of shame. If they are led
by virtue, and uniformity sought among them through the practice of ritual propriety, they
will possess a sense of shame and come to you of their own accord” (Lunyu 2.3; see also
13.6.). It seems apparent that in his own day, however, advocates of more legalistic methods
were winning a large following among the ruling elite. Thus Confucius' warning about the ill
consequences of promulgating law codes should not be interpreted as an attempt to prevent
their adoption but instead as his lament that his ideas about the moral suasion of the ruler
were not proving popular.

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Most troubling to Confucius was his perception that the political institutions of his day had
completely broken down. He attributed this collapse to the fact that those who wielded power
as well as those who occupied subordinate positions did so by making claim to titles for
which they were not worthy. When asked by a ruler of the large state of Qi, Lu's neighbor on
the Shandong peninsula, about the principles of good government, Confucius is reported to
have replied: “Good government consists in the ruler being a ruler, the minister being a
minister, the father being a father, and the son being a son” (Lunyu 12.11). I should claim for
myself only a title that is legitimately mine and when I possess such a title and participate in
the various hierarchical relationships signified by that title, then I should live up to the
meaning of the title that I claim for myself. Confucius' analysis of the lack of connection
between actualities and their names and the need to correct such circumstances is often
referred to as Confucius' theory of zhengming. 5

Elsewhere in the Analects, Confucius says to his disciple Zilu that the first thing he would do
in undertaking the administration of a state is zhengming. (Lunyu 13.3). In that passage
Confucius is taking aim at the illegitimate ruler of Wei who was, in Confucius' view,
improperly using the title “successor,” a title that belonged to his father the rightful ruler of
Wei who had been forced into exile. Xunzi composed an entire essay entitled Zhengming.
But for Xunzi the term referred to the proper use of language and how one should go about
inventing new terms that were suitable to the age. For Confucius, zhengming does not seem
to refer to the ‘rectification of names’ (this is the way the term is most often translated by
scholars of the Analects), but instead to rectifying the behavior of people and the social
reality so that they correspond to the language with which people identify themselves and
describe their roles in society.

Confucius believed that this sort of rectification had to begin at the very top of the
government, because it was at the top that the discrepancy between names and actualities had
originated. If the ruler's behavior is rectified then the people beneath him will follow suit. In a
conversation with Ji Kangzi (who had usurped power in Lu), Confucius advised: “If your
desire is for good, the people will be good. The moral character of the ruler is the wind; the
moral character of those beneath him is the grass. When the wind blows, the grass bends” .

5
Riegel, Jeffrey, "Confucius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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For Confucius, what characterized superior rulership was the possession of de or ‘virtue.’
Conceived of as a kind of moral power that allows one to win a following without recourse to
physical force, such ‘virtue’ also enabled the ruler to maintain good order in his state without
troubling himself and by relying on loyal and effective deputies. Confucius claimed that, “He
who governs by means of his virtue is, to use an analogy, like the pole-star: it remains in its
place while all the lesser stars do homage to it” .

The way to maintain and cultivate such royal ‘virtue’ was through the practice and
enactment of li or ‘rituals’—the ceremonies that defined and punctuated the lives of the
ancient Chinese aristocracy. These ceremonies encompassed: the sacrificial rites performed at
ancestral temples to express humility and thankfulness; the ceremonies of enfeoffment,
toasting, and gift exchange that bound together the aristocracy into a complex web of
obligation and indebtedness; and the acts of politeness and decorum—such things as bowing
and yielding—that identified their performers as gentlemen. In an influential study, Herbert
Fingarette argues that the performance of these various ceremonies, when done correctly and
sincerely, involves a ‘magical’ quality that underlies the efficacy of royal ‘virtue’ in
accomplishing the aims of the ruler.

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Central themes of political philosophy

1. Theodicy

Those familiar with Enlightenment-influenced presentations of Confucius as an austere

humanist who did not discuss the supernatural may be surprised to encounter the term
“theodicy” as a framework for understanding Confucius’ philosophical concerns. Confucius’
record of silence on the subject of the divine is attested by the Analects (5.3, 7.21, 11.12). In
fact, as a child of the late Zhou world, Confucius inherited a great many religious
sensibilities, including theistic ones. For the early Chinese (c. 16th century BCE), the world
was controlled by an all-powerful deity, “The Lord on High” (Shangdi), to whom entreaties
were made in the first known Chinese texts, inscriptions found on animal bones offered in
divinatory sacrifice. As the Zhou polity emerged and triumphed over the previous Shang
tribal rule, Zhou apologists began to regard their deity, Tian (“Sky” or “Heaven”) as
synonymous with Shangdi, the deity of the deposed Shang kings, and explained the decline of
Shang and the rise of Zhou as a consequence of a change in Tianming (“the mandate of
Heaven”). Thus, theistic justifications for conquest and rulership were present very early in
Chinese history.

By the time of Confucius, the concept of Tian appears to have changed slightly. For one
thing, the ritual complex of Zhou diviners, which served to ascertain the will of Tian for the
benefit of the king, had collapsed with Zhou rule itself. At the same time, the network of
religious obligations to manifold divinities, local spirits, and ancestors does not seem to have
ceased with the fall of the Zhou, and Confucius appears to uphold sacrifices to “gods and
ghosts” as consistent with “transmitting” noble tradition. Yet, in the Analects, a new aspect of
Tian emerges. For the Confucius of the Analects, discerning the will of Tian and reconciling
it with his own moral compass sometimes proves to be a troubling exercise:

As A. C. Graham has noted, Confucius seems to be of two minds about Tian. At times, he is
convinced that he enjoys the personal protection and sanction of Tian, and thus defies his
mortal opponents as he wages his campaign of moral instruction and reform. At other
moments, however, he seems caught in the throes of existential despair, wondering if he has
lost his divine backer at last. Tian seems to participate in functions of “fate” and “nature” as

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well as those of “deity.

” What remains consistent throughout Confucius’ discourses on Tian is his threefold

assumption about this extrahuman, absolute power in the universe: (1) its alignment with
moral goodness, (2) its dependence on human agents to actualize its will, and (3) the variable,
unpredictable nature of its associations with mortal actors. Thus, to the extent that the
Confucius of the Analects is concerned with justifying the ways of Tian to humanity, he tends
to do so without questioning these three assumptions about the nature of Tian, which are
rooted deeply in the Chinese past.

2. Harmonious order

The dependence of Tian upon human agents to put its will into practice helps account for
Confucius’ insistence on moral, political, social, and even religious activism. In one passage ,
Confucius seems to believe that, just as Tian does not speak but yet accomplishes its will for
the cosmos, so too can he remain “silent” (in the sense of being out of office, perhaps) and
yet effective in promoting his principles, possibly through the many disciples he trained for
government service. At any rate, much of Confucius’ teaching is directed toward the
maintenance of three interlocking kinds of order: (1) aesthetic, (2) moral, and (3) social. The
instrument for effecting and emulating all three is li (ritual propriety).

Do not look at, do not listen to, do not speak of, do not do whatever is contrary to ritual
propriety. (12.1)

In this passage, Confucius underscores the crucial importance of rigorous attention to li as a

kind of self-replicating blueprint for good manners and taste, morality, and social order. In
his view, the appropriate use of a quotation from the Classic of Poetry (Shijing), the perfect
execution of guest-host etiquette, and the correct performance of court ritual all serve a
common end: they regulate and maintain order. The nature of this order is, as mentioned
above, threefold. It is aesthetic — quoting the Shijing upholds the cultural hegemony of Zhou
literature and the conventions of elite good taste. Moreover, it is moral — good manners
demonstrate both concern for others and a sense of one’s place. Finally, it is social — rituals
properly performed duplicate ideal hierarchies of power, whether between ruler and subject,

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parent and child, or husband and wife. For Confucius, the paramount example of harmonious
social order seems to be xiao (filial piety), of which jing (reverence) is the key quality:6

The character of this threefold order is deeper than mere conventions such as taste and
decorum, as the above quotations demonstrate. Labeling it “aesthetic” might appear to
demean or trivialize it, but to draw this conclusion is to fail to reflect on the peculiar way in
which many Western thinkers tend to devalue the aesthetic. As David Hall and Roger Ames
have argued, this “aesthetic” Confucian order is understood to be both intrinsically moral and
profoundly harmonious, whether for a shi household, the court of a Warring States king, or
the cosmos at large. When persons and things are in their proper places – and here tradition is
the measure of propriety – relations are smooth, operations are effortless, and the good is
sought and done voluntarily. In the hierarchical political and social conception of Confucius
(and all of his Chinese contemporaries), what is below takes its cues from what is above. A
moral ruler will diffuse morality to those under his sway; a moral parent will raise a moral
child:

Let the ruler be a ruler, the subject a subject, a father a father, and a son a son. (12.11)

Direct the people with moral force and regulate them with ritual, and they will possess
shame, and moreover, they will be righteous. (2.3)

3. Moral force

The last quotation from the Analects introduces a term perhaps most famously associated
with a very different early Chinese text, the Laozi (Lao-tzu) or Daodejing (Tao Te Ching) –
de (te), “moral force.” Like Tian, de is heavily freighted with a long train of cultural and
religious baggage, extending far back into the mists of early Chinese history. During the early
Zhou period, de seems to have been a kind of amoral, almost magical power attributed to
various persons – seductive women, charismatic leaders, etc. For Confucius, de seems to be

6
"Confucius", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

15
just as magically efficacious, but stringently moral. It is both a quality, and a virtue of, the
successful ruler:

One who rules by moral force may be compared to the North Star – it occupies its place and
all the stars pay homage to it. (2.1)

Confucius’ vision of order unites aesthetic concerns for harmony and symmetry (li) with
moral force (de) in pursuit of social goals: a well-ordered family, a well-ordered state, and a
well-ordered world. Such an aesthetic, moral, and social program begins at home, with the
cultivation of the individual.

4. Self-Cultivation

In the Analects, two types of persons are opposed to one another – not in terms of basic
potential (for, in 17.2, Confucius says all human beings are alike at birth), but in terms of
developed potential. These are the junzi (literally, “lord’s son” or “gentleman”; Tu Wei-ming
has originated the useful translation “profound person,” which will be used here) and the
xiaoren (“small person”):

The character for ren is composed of two graphic elements, one representing a human being
and the other representing the number two. Based on this, one often hears that ren means
“how two people should treat one another.” While such folk etymologies are common in
discussions of Chinese characters, they often are as misleading as they are entertaining. In the
case of ren – usually translated as “benevolence” or “humaneness” – the graphic elements of
a human being and the number two really are instructive, so much so that Peter Boodberg
suggested an evocative translation of ren as “co-humanity.” The way in which the junzi
relates to his fellow human beings, however, highlights Confucius’ fundamentally
hierarchical model of relations:

16
The moral force of the profound person is like the wind; the moral force of the small person
is like the grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend. (12.19)

D. C. Lau has pointed out that ren is an attribute of agents, while yi (literally, “what is fitting”
— “rightness,” “righteousness”) is an attribute of actions. This helps to make clear the
conceptual links between li, de, and the junzi. The junzi qua junzi exerts de, moral force,
according to what is yi, fitting (that is, what is aesthetically, morally, and socially proper),
and thus manifests ren, or the virtue of co-humanity in an interdependent, hierarchical
universe over which Tian presides.

Two passages from the Analects go a long way in indicating the path toward self-cultivation
that Confucius taught would-be junzi in fifth century BCE China:

The Master’s Way is nothing but other-regard and self-reflection. (4.15)

The first passage illustrates the gradual and long-term scale of the process of self-cultivation.
It begins during one’s teenaged years, and extends well into old age; it proceeds
incrementally from intention (zhi) to learning (xue), from knowing the mandate of Heaven
(Tianming) to doing both what is desired (yu) and what is right (yi). In his disciple Zengzi
(Tseng-tzu)’s summary of his “Way” (Dao), Confucius teaches only “other-regard” (zhong)
and “self-reflection” (shu). These terms merit their own discussion.

The conventional meaning of “other-regard” (zhong) in classical Chinese is “loyalty,”

especially loyalty to a ruler on the part of a minister. In the Analects, Confucius extends the
meaning of the term to include exercising oneself to the fullest in all relationships, including
relationships with those below oneself as well as with one’s betters. “Self-reflection” (shu) is
explained by Confucius as a negatively-phrased version of the “Golden Rule”: “What you do
not desire for yourself, do not do to others.” (15.24) When one reflects upon oneself, one
realizes the necessity of concern for others. The self as conceptualized by Confucius is a
deeply relational self that responds to inner reflection with outer virtue.

17
Similarly, the self that Confucius wishes to cultivate in his own person and in his disciples is
one that looks within and compares itself with the aesthetic, moral, and social canons of
tradition. Aware of its source in Tian, it seeks to maximize ren through apprenticeship to li so
as to exercise de in a manner befitting a junzi. Because Confucius (and early Chinese thought
in general) does not suffer from the Cartesian “mind-body problem” (as Herbert Fingarette
has demonstrated), there is no dichotomy between inner and outer, self and whole, and thus
the cumulative effect of Confucian self-cultivation is not merely personal, but collectively
social and even cosmic.

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Conclusion

The major part of Confucious political philosophy is simply a manifestation of the beliefs of
the people of the east during his time. In fact, the strong system of morals which he
advovated can been seen in the code of conduct for warriors of that period.
Similar beliefs are mirrored in other east asian countries. In fact, the code of the samurai or
“bushido” follows the basic principles on Confucious teachings. So, to completely understand
Confucious political theory, it is pertinent to first understand the context in which he wrote.
Now, in my personal opinion, while Confucious spoke of certain morals and ethics which
should be upheld, he could not possibly forsee the moral degradation that society is plagued
with at this point in time.Hence, i believe that in the current global scenario, Confucious ideas
are too idealist and far fetched.

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Webliography
1. www.sparknotes.com
2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
3. www.forum.libvirox.org
4. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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