MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, the RTC Branch 80 rendered judgment in a civil case in favor of Pililla and against Phil.
Petroleum Corp. (PPC), ordering PPC to pay the following:

a. P 5.3 million in taxes due from PPC under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of Pililla from
1979 – 1983,
b. P 3.3 million in storage permit fees under Section 10, Paragraph Z(13)(b-1-c) of the same municipal tax
ordinance from 1975 – 1986,
c. Mayor’s permit fee due from the same tax ordinance amounting to P 12,120.00,
d. Sanitary inspection fee amounting to P 1,010.00, and
e. Costs of suit.

On June 3, 1991, the SC affirmed the judgment of the RTC, with some modification regarding business taxes
accruing prior to 1976 to not be paid by PPC. The judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991, with the
records remanded to the RTC for execution.

On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of the judgment of the SC, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a
motion on behalf of Pililla with the RTC Branch 78 of Morong, Rizal for the examination of PPC’s gross sales for the
years 1976 – 1978 and 1984 – 1991 for the purpose of computing taxes on businesses as imposes under the Local
Tax Code. Meanwhile, on October 21, 1991, PPC filed a manifestation that it had already paid the sum of P11.45
million to Pililla’s mayor in full satisfaction of the judgment of the SC. As evidence, it presented release and
quitclaim documents signed by the mayor. Accordingly, the RTC denied Atty. Mendiola’s motion.

Atty. Mendiola filed an Motion for reconsideration to the RTC, stating that total liability of PPC actually amounted
to P24.2 million, while the amount paid to the Municipality was less than half of that, and that the mayor could not
waive the balance which represents taxes due under the judgment of the muncipality. It must be noted that the
law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens over the judgment of the municipality for alleged consultancy
services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which, when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million.
The RTC Branch 78, however, denied the MR.

Atty. Mendiola then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which was remanded to the CA for disposition. The
PPC afterwards filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola’s authority to represent the Municipality. The CA
subsequently dismissed the petition of Atty. Mendiola for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law
and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the
proper provincial or municipal legal officer. A subsequent MR was similarly denied.

ISSUE: whether or not Atty. Mendiola may represent the Municipality of Pililla.

HELD: NO.
The CA is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of
the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled
in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
where the SC ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the RAC, complemented by Section 3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Law) provides that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The
provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to apply,
the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record.

As applied to the case at hand, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal was disqualified
to act as counsel for Pililla on appeal, therefore the appearance of Atty. Mendiola was without authority of law.

The SC did not sustain Atty. Mendiola’s argument that the exception is broad enough to include situations
wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case. A fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a
legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special
attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in
place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679
of the RAC.

Atty. Mendiola’s argument that PPC cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the
municipality was also held as untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings, as provided in the aforementioned jurisprudence.

It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola was even raised by the municipality itself.
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized,
said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when Pililla, through the mayor and without
Atty. Mendiola’s participation, entered into a compromise agreement with herein private respondent with
regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court two pleadings
constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".

A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have impliedly dismissed
his lawyer. Counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the municipality since the latter is
entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client may
dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings, and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from
appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation.
 ANTONIO C. RAMOS, ROSALINDA M. PEREZ, NORMA C. CASTILLO and BALIUAG MARKET VENDORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 19, and MUNICIPALITY OF BALIUAG, Respondents.

FACTS: petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors
Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No.
91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the
municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.

On April 27, 1980, during the hearing on the petitioners' motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction, the
Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the petition. Whereupon, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer
in (sic) behalf of respondent municipality.

At the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 1990, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he
was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date, and on June 15, 1990, respectively, Atty. Romanillos
filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended Answer with motion to dismiss.

On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos.
The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to- petitioners' Opposition to
respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of
evidence on July 17, 1990 for respondent municipality.

During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as
counsel of (sic) the respondent municipality, which opposition was reiterated on August 15, 1990, and was put in
writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for
respondent municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty.
Romanillos.

Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion dated August 22, 1990 stating, among others,
that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his
collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by
Atty. Romanillos.

On September 19, 1990 respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which, as already stated, denied
petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and
void the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion
'to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence'. In support of his foregoing action,
respondent Judge reasoned:

'Petitioners' motion for the disqualification of Atty. Romanillos as respondent municipality's counsel is deemed
moot and academic in view of his withdrawal as counsel of said municipality pursuant to a joint motion dated
August 22, 1990, although he shall remain as counsel on record of private respondent Kristi Corporation. Atty.
Oliviano Regalado under the same joint motion moved for the adoption of the entire proceedings conducted by
collaborating counsel, Atty. Romanillos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Romanillos may represent the Local Government.

HELD: NO
In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals,this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for
or against it, thus:ha

The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.,15 and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where we ruled that private attorneys
cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

'Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic)
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the
same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed,
the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council.

Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, 18 only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly

limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality's case must appear on record. 20 In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the
Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law."

The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of the
municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney. ir

The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and
municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private
attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. These exceptions are enumerated in the case of
Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, to wit:c

"Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is
an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province.

EDGARDO MANCENIDO FOR HIMSELF AND OTHER TEACHERS OF CAMARINES NORTE HIGH SCHOOL, Petitioners,
v. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD, PROVINCIAL SCHOOL BOARD, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR,
PROVINCIAL TREASURER AND PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, ALL OF THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE,
Respondents.

FACTTS: Petitioners, who are public school teachers, filed a case against the provincial officials to compel them to
pay their claims for unpaid salary increases. In this petition for review on certiorari, they argue that the CA erred in
recognizing the authority of the council of the provincial officials to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the council of petitioners in this case may represent the latter.

HELD: No

Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the appointment of a
legal officer, whose function is:
"(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government
unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a
component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or
municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;"

The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local government unit by a private attorney. In
Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, 93 Phil, 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we held that only when the
provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of a special attorney. We
reiterated this in De Guia v. Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169 (1972)..6In Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez, 107 Phil 932 (1960),
we enumerated the instances when the provincial public prosecutor is disqualified from representing a particular
municipality, i.e., when the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with the Supreme Court, when the
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province,
and when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a
creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise.

But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), we laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a local government official may
secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action
and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 102 Phil. 211 (1957), we approved the
representation by private counsel of a provincial governor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint
contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied
by them in their private capacity. In Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, we declared that
where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.

The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, for
mandamus and damages. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court granted mandamus, petitioners appealed to
the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not award damages. In view of the damages sought which, if granted,
could result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to have been improperly represented by private
counsel. No error may thus be attributed to the appellate court when it recognized the right of respondents to be
represented by private counsel.

DIVISION

[ GR No. 191691, Jan 16, 2013 ]

ROMEO A. GONTANG v. ENGR. CECILIA ALAYAN

FACTS:Respondent Engr. Cecilia Alayan (respondent) was appointed in
2000 as Municipal Government Department Head (Municipal Assessor) on
temporary status. In May 2001, she applied for change of status from
temporary to permanent, which the Civil Service Commission-Camarines
Sur Field Office (CSC-CSFO) denied for lack of relevant experience. On
appeal, the CSC-Regional Office in its August 13, 2001 Order approved her
application effective May 22, 2001. Thus, she reported for work and sought
recognition of her appointment and the grant of the emoluments of the
position from petitioner, then incumbent Mayor Romeo A. Gontang
(petitioner). Her requests having been denied, she filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on February 5, 2002 a petition for
mandamus, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019, against
petitioner, in his official capacity as Municipal Mayor of Gainza, Camarines
Sur. However, the RTC dismissed the petition for having been prematurely
filed as the Order of the CSC-Regional Office had not attained finality due
to the pendency of the appeal before the CSC. Respondent appealed to the
CA which, in its June 20, 2003 decision, ruled in her favor holding that the
pendency of an appeal is not a justification to prevent her from assuming
office. Said decision attained finality on August 10, 2007 with the denial of
petitioner's petition before the Supreme Court. However, prior to the CA
decision, the CSC set aside the August 13, 2001 Order of the CSC-Regional
Office on May 8, 2003 upon a finding that there was no permanent
appointment as the concurrence of the local Sanggunian was not obtained.
Respondent's appeal of the CSC decision was denied by the CA and such
denial became final on October 6, 2006.On March 17, 2008, respondent
moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution by the RTC in Special
Civil Action No. 2002-0019 for the alleged unsatisfied judgment award in
the amount of P837,022.50 representing her unpaid salaries and
allowances from May 8, 2003 to October 6, 2006 during the pendency of
her appeal of the CSC Resolutions. Petitioner opposed the motion claiming
full satisfaction of the judgment after having already paid respondent the
net sum of P391,040.60 covering all benefits for the period from the date
the CSC-CSFO approved her request for change of status on August 13,
2001 to May 7, 2003, the day before the CSC denied her application for
permanent appointment.