Explanation and Emancipation in Marxism and Feminism

Author(s): Erik Olin Wright

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 39-54
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 Explanation and Emancipation in Marxism and Feminism*
ERIK OLIN WRIGHT

University of Wisconsin

This paper explores a contrast between the Marxist and feminist traditions of eman-
cipatory social theory: whereas in the Marxist tradition theorists have spent consid-
erable time and energy discussing the problem of the viability of classlessness as an
emancipatoryproject, feminists have spent relatively little time defendingthe viability
of a society without male domination. The paper argues that this difference in preoc-
cupations reflects, at least to some extent, differences in the relationship between
prefigurativeegalitarian micro experiencesand macro institutionalchange with respect
to gender oppression and class oppression. The paper also explores the implications
of this contrastfor the kinds of explanatorytheorydevelopedwithin the two traditions.
Marxists' greater tendency thanfeminists to seek relatively deterministicaccounts of
the demise of theform of oppression on which theyfocus is viewed as at least partially
a way of contendingwith the difficultyin establishingthe viabilityof the emancipatory
project of classlessness.

Both Marxism and feminism are emancipatory theoretical traditions in that they envision
the possibility of eliminating certain forms of oppression from social life. The two
traditions differ, however, in the extent to which theorists within each take for granted
the viability of their core emancipatory projects. Marxists often have treated the viability
of communism-a society without class oppression-as problematic; feminists rarely
question the viability of a society without male domination. Of course, feminists frequently
engage the problem of the social, political, and cultural obstacles to eliminating male
domination, and different feminists have different visions of life in a world without male
oppression. What is not generally discussed, however, is the viability of a society in which
male domination has been eliminated. For reasons that we will explore below, people
who share the Marxists' radical egalitarian values express much skepticism that a classless
society with advanced technologies is viable; people with feminist values seem to be much
less skeptical that a society without male domination is viable. Feminists generally take
it for granted that social life does not require male domination; Marxists are forced to
defend the claim that social life under conditions of developed technology does not need
some form of class domination.
The central objective of this paper is to explore this contrast between these two traditions
of emancipatory social theory. My motivation for doing so comes primarily from the
Marxist side of the comparison. At the core of the project of reconstructing Marxism as
a social theory is the problem of the relationship between its emancipatory vision and its
explanatory structure. I hope that a comparison with the feminist theoretical tradition will
help to give greater precision to our understanding of the dilemmas that Marxism faces
today. Therefore the point of the comparison between Marxism and feminism in this paper
is not to indict feminists for their relative silence on the problem of the viability of

* I would like to
express my thanks to Robin Blackburn,Michael Burawoy, G. A. Cohen, Dian Elson, Perry
Anderson, Nancy Fraser, Linda Gordon, Rhonda Levine, Philippe von Parijs, and Robert van der Veen for
helpful comments on various aspects of the argumentsin this paper. This paper was originally presentedat the
1990 Analytical Marxism Conference at University College, London.

Sociological Theory 11:1 March 1993

40 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
feminism's emancipatoryproject, or to show thatMarxistsare somehowmore sophisticated
because they worry about these issues. Rather, the point is to use the contrast between
the theoreticalpreoccupationsof these two traditionsas a way of revealing certain salient
propertiesof the theoreticalterrainson which they work.
Before we approachthese issues, however, we need to clarify several key concepts that
we will be using throughoutthe analysis: Marxism, feminism, oppression, and emanci-
patoryviability.

MARXISM AND FEMINISMAS EMANCIPATORYTHEORIES

It is far from easy to produce compact, noncontroversialdefinitions of "Marxism"and
"feminism." The boundaries of each are contested, both by intellectuals committed to
these traditionsand by their critics. For the purposes of this essay, I do not think that it
is necessary to provide complete definitionsof either; it will be sufficient to work with a
fairly stylized description of their underlying theoretical structures.Accordingly, I will
treat Marxism and feminism as emancipatorytraditionsof social theory built aroundthe
criticalanalysis of particularforms of oppression-class oppressionand genderoppression
respectively-rather than as well-bounded, integrated explanatory theories.' They are
emancipatorytheoriesin thatboth theoreticaltraditionsbelieve thatthe forms of oppression
on which they focus should be and can be eliminated;both see the active struggle of the
oppressed groups at the core of their theory as an essential part of the process through
which such oppression is transformed;and intellectuals working within both traditions
believe thatthe centralreasonfor botheringto do social theoryand researchis to contribute
in some way to the realization of their respective emancipatoryprojects. Where they
differ, in these terms, is in the kind of social oppressionthat anchorstheir emancipatory
and theoreticalprojects.
In distinguishing between Marxisms and feminisms in terms of their pivotal concern
with differentforms of oppression, I am making no assumptionsabout the independence,
one from the other, of these two forms of oppression in the world. Clearly, in actual
societies there are all sorts of systematic, reciprocaleffects between gender relations and
class relations. Understandingsuch reciprocaleffects between class and gender is at the
heart of much socialist feminism, whether in the form of "dual systems theory" or of
moreunitarytheoriesof class and gender.2Nevertheless, unless one is preparedto abandon
the separatecategories "class" and "gender"altogetherand to replace them with a new
amalgamatedcategory, "clender,"I believe that it is importantto distinguish class and
gender as two dimensions of social relationsthat interact,ratherthan to treatclass/gender

' It may be controversialto some people to characterizefeminism as an emancipatorytraditiondirectedagainst

gender oppressionratherthan simply against the oppressionof women. Certainlyuntil recently feminists did not
explicitly embed their understandingof the oppression of women in a theory of gender relations. Thus earlier
feminisms generally characterizedtheir struggles as strictly against the oppression of women as such. Many
contemporaryfeminists, however, understandthe ramificationsof male dominationwithin genderrelationsmore
broadlythan simply men dominatingand oppressingwomen. Male homosexuals, for example, also are generally
viewed as oppressedunder existing gender relations, and althoughit is a more complex (and more contentious)
argument,I think that many heterosexualmen also can be viewed as oppressed within gender relations. There
is no need to work throughthese issues in the presentcontext.
2 In the
presentdiscussion, socialist feminism can be regardedas a hybridof the two emancipatorytraditions
we are examining. Throughoutthis discussion I will not make a distinction between "socialist feminism" and
"Marxistfeminism"because both of these attemptto take seriously the problemof the connectionbetween class
and gender. The classical statement of "dual systems theory"is Heidi Hartman's(1981) essay "The Unhappy
Marriageof Marxismand Feminism." A critiqueof dual systems theory which attemptsto frame a more unitary
theory of class and gender is offered by Iris Young (1981). For a general discussion of varieties of feminism
that addresses the difference between socialist feminism and Marxist feminism, see Jaggar (1983) and Jaggar
and Struhl (1984).
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 41
as a unitarycategory. Once such a distinctionis made, then the question of the feasibility
of eliminating each of these aspects of social oppressioncan be posed. The answer may
be that one cannot be eliminated without the other, as some socialist feminists have
emphasized, but that point should be a discovery ratherthan a premise of the categories
themselves.
Defining Marxismsas emancipatorytheoriesfor the eliminationof class oppressionand
feminisms as emancipatorytheories for the eliminationof gender oppressionleaves open
precisely what is packedinto the concept of "oppression"within each tradition.Obviously,
dependingon how oppressionis defined, the projectof eliminatingoppressioncan become
a utopian fantasy or a practicalpolitical program.If, for example, we define oppression
in typical liberal terms as a situationin which differentcategoriesof people have different
formal rights, then it would be a relatively noncontentiousmatterto argue that class and
gender oppressionscan be eliminated. Once workershave the franchiseand the full rights
to organize collectively, and once ascriptive barriersto equal opportunityhave been
eliminated, class oppression would disappear.Once women are accordedfull citizenship
and reproductiverights and once antidiscriminationproceduresare firmlyin place, gender
oppression would be eliminated.3On the other hand, if one takes a maximalist view of
what it would mean to eliminate oppressions,then eliminatingparticularforms of oppres-
sion may indeed seem utopian. In the Marxist tradition,for example, some people have
claimed that class oppressionwill exist as long as thereis any division of laborwhatsoever
between mentaland manuallabor,between conceptionand execution. It is hardto imagine
how a technologically advanced society could function under such principles.
For the purposes of this paper, I adopt a conception of eliminating oppression that is
more radicalthan the liberalconceptionbut less extravagantthana maximalistunderstand-
ing. I define oppressionhere as a situationin which the relevantcategoriesof social actors
(people within the social relations of productionand within gender relations) differ sys-
tematically in social power and in materialwelfare.4The emancipatoryproject of elimi-
nating oppression then means the equalizationof power and welfare across the relevant
social categories.5 In the rhetoric of the Marxist tradition,this equalizationcorresponds
to the elimination of alienation and exploitation-eliminating power differentialslinked
to the social relationsof productionand eliminatinginequalitiesin income that go beyond
differences in needs. This amountsto the eliminationof classes. The emancipatoryfuture
envisioned in traditionalMarxism-communism-is a classless society. In the case of
gender oppression this definition of emancipationimplies eliminatingpower and welfare
differentials between men and women. Such a definition goes far beyond equal rights
because it entails institutinga wide range of social changes (e.g., public provisionof child
care, equality of labor marketposition, changes in work organizationto eliminate gender
differences in the burden of childrearing)necessary to give men and women equal real
power.
Many feminists, of course, hold much more complex visions of gender emancipation

3 For a discussion of liberal feminism, see Jaggar(1983), chapters3 and 7.

4 The problem of defining oppression is aggravatedin the present context because we are comparing the
emancipatoryprojectsof eliminatingtwo differentkinds of oppression,class and gender. In orderto make sense
of the comparisonwe need to discuss these two oppressions in analyticallycomparableterms. It would make
no sense, for example, to comparea liberal conception of gender oppression(eliminatinggender inequalitiesof
rights) with a more radical conception of class oppression(eliminatingclasses altogether).
5 The idea of
equality of "welfare" is complicated because people differ so greatly in their nonmaterial
endowments and needs. Therefore the normative ideal of equality of welfare usually takes the more modest
practicalform of equalityof income (or access to externalresources),modifiedby some provisionsfor inequalities
of income to deal with various kinds of disabilities (i.e., "to each accordingto need"). For the presentpurposes
of comparingMarxism with feminism as emancipatoryand explanatorytheories, we can bracketthese difficult
philosophicalproblems.
42 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
than simply equality of power and welfare. Some believe in the possibility of dismantling
gender relations altogether;others see emancipationas centered on making certain pur-
ported "female differences" the central organizing principles of social life (e.g., nurtur-
ance); and still others place issues of sexuality, especially the problemof homophobia, at
the center of the emancipatoryproject. All of these issues are interestingand important,
and a fully elaborateddiscussion of varieties of feminist emancipatoryideals would have
to explore the implications of these alternatives. Nevertheless, all of these different
feminisms share the thin notion of emancipationas the eliminationof gender inequality
of power and welfare; thus, for the purposesof our comparisonwith Marxism, I will rely
on this understandingof emancipatoryobjectives.
With this working definition of oppression, the question of the viability of an emanci-
patoryproject can be restatedas follows: could a society in which power and welfare are
not differentiatedby class and/or gender be sustainable?Or would such a society neces-
sarily contain self-destructivecontradictionsthat would tend to unravelthe emancipatory
objectives or simply make them unattainablein the first place? The goal of this paper is
to explore the relationshipbetween the explanatorytheories characteristicof the Marxist
and feminist traditions and the nature of these emancipatoryprojects. Again, this is a
stylized and limited characterizationof the emancipatoryvision of Marxismand feminism.
Each theoretical traditioncontains many emancipatoryissues that are not encompassed
directly within this definition:the problem of autonomyand self-realizationin Marxism,
and questions of sexuality, identity, and difference in feminism. Nevertheless, equality of
power and welfare are sufficiently central to the emancipatoryagenda of all Marxisms
and feminisms so that comparing the two traditionsin these terms will help to clarify
certain importantdifferences in the explanatorytasks that they confront.

THE SILENCE ON THE "VIABILITY"OF EMANCIPATORYOBJECTIVES

IN FEMINISM
In order to establish the credibility of the project of gender emancipation, feminist
intellectualshave focused primarilyon three tasks. First, much writing has been devoted
to demonstratingthat genderrelationscan be describedproperlyas relationsof domination
and oppression. A great deal of feminist empiricalwork is devoted to providingevidence
that women are harmedsystematicallyin many ways by the genderrelationswithin which
they live, and thereforethose relations can be describedas oppressive. Second, feminists
have been concerned with establishing that these relations are not given unalterablyby
biology, but are socially (or culturally,as some theoristswith prefer)constructed.Clearly
the indictment of gender relations as oppressive would be vitiated if the disadvantages
sufferedby women were determinedcompletely by biology. Much attentionthereforehas
been devoted to demonstratingthe great variabilityin the forms of oppressionof women
across time and place in order to give credibility to the claim that such oppression is
socially generated. Third, modem feminists have analyzed the various social, economic,
and cultural processes in contemporarysocieties which undermineand/or reproduceex-
isting forms of gender oppressionand thus create the context for transformativestruggles,
especially through the agency of women. Discussions of these three clusters of issues
have been at the heart of the developmentof modernfeminism.
Very little direct attention has been given, however, to the problem of the practical
viability of a society in which gender oppressionhas been eliminated. As noted already,
much effort has been devoted to demonstratingthat gender relations are socially con-
structed, but this is not equivalent to demonstratingthat gender emancipationis viable.
Indeed, it is possible that male domination could be biologically based and that male
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 43
domination can be eliminated. Biologically, human beings are omnivores, but this fact
does not prevent people from adopting a strictly vegetarian diet. Biologically, human
beings have sexual drives, but this does not preventthe social creationof celibate religious
orders. Whatever one's judgment regardingthe biological roots of gender relations, the
problem of demonstratingthe eliminabilityof male dominationis not equivalentto dem-
onstratingthat male dominationis socially constructed.
Of course, much discussion has gone into the analysis of the obstacles to creating such
a society. It is important,however, not to confuse a claim that the obstacles to achieving
an emancipatoryalternativeare enormous, perhapseven insurmountable,under contem-
poraryconditions, with the claim that the alternativeitself is not viable.6 Feminists differ
considerably in the extent of their beliefs that such obstacles are located primarily in
culturaland sexual practices that shape the formationof deeply rooted gendered subjec-
tivities or are located mainly in economic and political institutionsof power and privilege.
Feminists also disagree as to whethergender dominationcan be eroded graduallythrough
an incremental process of reform or whether radical rupturesin the system of male
domination are needed.7 Yet the viability of the emancipatoryobjective itself is not
subjectedto systematic, critical scrutiny.8Feminists do not ask "Are there contradictions
within egalitariangender relations that might render a society without male domination
nonreproducible?"It is as if demonstratingthat existing gender relations are oppressive
and socially constructedwere equivalent to showing that a society in which male domi-
nation has been eliminated would be viable.
This silence on the part of feminists occurs in an ideological context in which people
who hold radical egalitarianvalues have relatively little skepticism about the viability of
eliminating male domination. This is the case even among leftist radicals who are not
particularlysympathetic to feminism as a traditionof theory. To be sure, nonfeminist
leftists often are very skepticalaboutthe viability of distinctivelyfeministpolitics, because
many Marxistsbelieve that the liberationof women can succeed only if it is subordinated
to the allegedly "more fundamental"task of transformingclass relations. Certainlythere
is skepticism about some radical feminist claims concerning the ramificationsof elimi-
nating gender oppression (for example, the claim that bureaucratichierarchyis a distinc-
tively male form of administrativeorganization,and thus thateliminatingmale domination
would imply-and require-an eliminationof all hierarchy).At least in the contemporary
period, however, relatively little skepticismis expresseddirectly towardthe possibility of
eventually eliminating differences in welfare and power based on gender.

THE VIABILITYOF CLASSLESSNESS

There is a strikingcontrastbetween the relative silence on the problemof the viability of
genderemancipationand the extensive discussions of the viability of communism(under-

6
Considerthe contrastbetween achievabilityand viability for socialism. It could be the case 1) that counter-
factually, if capitalism were destroyed and if workers democraticallycontrolled the means of production, the
economy would run efficiently and equitably, and thus socialism would be deemed viable, and also 2) that
capitalists would ratherdestroy the world throughnuclear suicide than give up power. Under these conditions,
socialism is viable but unattainable.
7 For a discussion of the
history of feminist thought which touches on the problem of incrementalreform
versus rupturesin male domination, see Eisenstein (1983).
8 The one context in which the issue of the viability of gender emancipationis posed, though indirectly,is in
socialist feminist discussions about whether capitalist society is viable without gender oppression. It is often
argued that capitalism needs male domination for various reasons, and therefore that this particularform of
society is not reproduciblewithout gender oppression. All such arguments,however, concern the viability of
capitalism without male domination;there is no discussion of whether a postcapitalistsociety without male
dominationis viable.
44 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
stood as a fully classless society) and even of socialism (understoodas a society in which
the working class democratically controls the means of productionand in which class
divisions are declining). Many radical intellectuals on the left, including Marxists com-
mitted to radically egalitarianvalues, are skeptical that class inequalities ever could be
eliminatedcompletely. Variousfamiliarargumentshave been advancedagainstthe viability
of classlessness. First, it is often argued that if a complex economy is to maintaineven
minimal efficiency, significantmaterialincentives (and sanctions)are needed, particularly
for people occupying positions of great responsibility that require high levels of skill.
Although logically such incentive inequalities might not have to threatenclasslessness,
the recipients of such incentives would strongly tend to use their positions as leverage to
extort economic premiums from the larger community.9Although perhaps less onerous
than the inequalities based on property ownership in capitalism, such extortion in a
"socialist" society would constitute exploitation rooted in command over productive re-
sources (skills and responsible jobs, in this instance) and thus would challenge the
emancipatoryproject of classlessness.10
Second, skepticism often is expressed about the possibility of genuinely democratic
control over the means of production. Although in quite small firms it might be possible
for ordinaryworkersto play an active role in organizationaldecision making, many people
arguethat in large firms such involvementwould necessarilybe superficialat best. Perhaps
workerscould have a say in choosing managers,but the actualrunningof large, complex
corporations-including the practicalexercise of much operationalpower-would have to
be under the control of managers and executives. This situation again would tend to
generateclass inequalities.
Finally, particularlyin the aftermathof the stagnationand collapse of the state socialist
economies, many leftist intellectualsargue that because of the massive informationprob-
lems in a complex industrialsociety, centralizedplanning of the details of productionis
not possible. Given that centralized allocation of capital is not possible, some kind of
market mechanism for allocating capital goods is needed to coordinateproduction. Yet
once marketsin investments(ratherthansimply in consumergoods) are allowed to function
even in limited ways, they will tend to generateclass inequalities. Although considerable
democraticsocial controlcould be exertedover the parametersof the system of production,
somethingvery much like capitalismwould tend to reemerge, once marketswere allowed
to play a significant role in allocating capital. This would be the case even if firms took
the form of workers' cooperatives, because under conditions of marketcompetition such
cooperativeswould behave much like capitalistfirms.
A range of plausible argumentscan be used to defend the emancipatoryproject of a
classless society against these attacks. Against the first claim it can be argued that
gradually,over time, the balance between extortionand incentives could shift in favor of
incentives, particularlyas people's economic security increases and high-quality public
goods replace importantelements of privateconsumption.Against the second claim it can
be argued that through education, work teams, shorterwork weeks, and other changes,
meaningful democratic participationcould become much more possible even in large

9 An "incentive"is an amountof extra income necessary to compensatea person for the extra effort involved
in acquiringskills or performingarduousand stressful work (which, for example, might accompanyhigh levels
of responsibility). An "extortion,"on the other hand, is an increment of income above and beyond what is
necessaryto compensate a person for this extra effort. Strictly speaking, incentive paymentsare needed in order
to maintainrough equality in overall welfare across persons (i.e., people need to be compensatedfor the extra
"disutility of labor"), whereas extortion generates inequality in real welfare. In these terms, "extortion"is
equivalent to "exploitation."For a discussion of these conceptualissues, see Wright, et. al. (1990).
10 The characterizationof the incomes of people who command high levels of skill or responsibility as
"exploitation"is derived from the work of John Roemer (see especially Roemer 1982a, 1982b).
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 45

organizations;thus the effective power differentialsassociatedwith hierarchymightdecline

over time. Finally, against the third claim it could be argued that although market
mechanisms might of necessity play an importantinformationrole in allocating capital,
the inegalitarianconsequences of such allocations could be neutralizedsystematicallyby
an activist, socialist state. Taxation, redistribution,and regulationcould be designed in
such a way as to prevent the relatively decentralizedcooperativelymanaged firms from
degeneratinginto capitalist enterprises.
My point here thus is not that the argumentsagainstthe possibility of eliminatingclass
oppression are convincing. Rather, the point is that these doubts are raised by people on
the left, people sympathetic to the emancipatoryegalitarianvalues themselves. At this
time in history, parallel argumentsgenerally are not made by egalitarianswith respect to
gender oppression. Of course, there may be anti-egalitariansof various sorts who would
regarda society without male dominationas nonviable. Certainlymany right-wing reli-
gious fundamentalistswould view such a society as destroyingthe basic fabric of social
life, leading to chaos and disintegration.Within the communityof people sharingegali-
tarian emancipatoryvalues, however, there is little skepticism about the viability of a
radical emancipatoryproject for eliminating gender dominationand inequality, whereas
there is considerableskepticism about the eliminationof class oppression.
One hundredyears ago the situationwas quite different. Radical class theoriststook it
as obvious that class inequality and dominationwere becoming increasinglyunnecessary
and could be supersededin a postcapitalistsociety. Capitalistdevelopmentwas envisioned
as creating such high levels of concentrationand centralizationof production,with such
high levels of surplus, that workers would be able to transformthe solidarities and
interdependenciesthey experiencedwithin productioninto an egalitarianreorganizationof
the society as a whole. All that they needed to accomplish this was power. Feminists in
the last century, on the other hand, rarelyenvisioned a society without a quite substantial
gender division of labor or even without gender inequality.While recognizing that wom-
en's potentials were blocked by the forms of male dominationexisting in their society,
particularlyas these were embodied in legal restrictionson the rights of women, the
emancipatoryprojectgenerallydid not pose the possibilityof radicallyegalitarianrelations
between men and women."I
At the close of the twentieth century, second-wave feminism envisions a future that
ranges from complete equality of rights between men and women to the eliminationof all
gender inequalities in power and welfare (althoughnot necessarily the eliminationof all
gender differences). No feminists imagine that male dominationin even vestigial form is
essential for social life. Many Marxists, on the other hand, have come to doubt the
feasibility of the most egalitarian forms of their historic emancipatoryclass project,
partiallyas a result of the failures of authoritarianstate socialist systems and partiallyas
a result of theoreticaldevelopmentswithin Marxismitself.
Why is the viability of the feminist emancipatoryalternativeto male dominationviewed
as so unproblematicin comparisonto the Marxist emancipatoryproject?One possibility
is that this difference simply reflects the historical contexts for the development of the
two intellectualtraditions.Marxismnot only has had one hundred-plusyears of sustained
debate, but also has witnessed a massive historical"experiment"in applyingcertainof its
core ideas to the actual design of social institutions.Whetherone endorses or condemns
these experimentsas authenticembodimentsof Marxistideals, they have deeply affected
the intellectual climate in which the problem of class emancipationcan be discussed.

1 This characterizationof
nineteenth-centuryfeminism was suggested to me by Linda Gordon (personal
communication).
46 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY

Perhapsafter a hundredyears of developmentof systematic feminist social theory and in

the aftermath of an equivalent attempt at instituting radical gender equality, similar
skepticism about the viability of gender emancipationwould exist.
Although leftists' currentskepticism about classlessness has been shaped significantly
by the historical experience of the authoritariansocialist states, I do not think that the
silence on the problemof viability within feminism can be attributedmainly to the absence
of massive societal experimentsin gender emancipationor to the relatively recent vintage
of systematic feminist theory. Rather,I believe that there is a crucial difference between
the characterof the emancipatoryprojectsthemselveswhich providesa plausiblegrounding
for feminists confidence that gender emancipationis a viable social project. In particular,
class and gender differ in the relationshipbetween lived micro experienceswithin existing
relations and the macro institutionalchanges requiredfor emancipation.

MICROAND MACRO CONTEXTSOF EMANCIPATORYPROJECTS

In the everyday practices of living in patriarchalsocieties, people can experience prefig-
urative forms of gender equality in a variety of ways.12 First of all, in the historical
experience of contemporarywomen, gender relations have been transformedsteadily in
an egalitariandirection. Although this does not mean that male dominationis on its last
legs, or even that new forms of gender inequality have not emerged, the opening up of
greater personal opportunitiesand political possibilities for women is a critical part of
women's experience in the twentieth century."3Furthermore,in the more recent past, the
experience of the collective political efficacy of women engaged in transformativepolitics
has been addedto this trajectoryof social change. The women's movementitself generates
a range of experiences of solidarities among women, which prefigurea society in which
women are not dominatedby men. Therefore,if for no otherreason, a simple extrapolation
of trendsof the recent past into the futuresuggests the viability of a world withoutgender
oppression.
This is not all, however. Gender oppression itself has a peculiar structurein that even
the existing relations, in which men dominate women, contain elements prefiguring
symmetry and equality. Women have male children, whom they nurture;boys have
mothers, whom they love. Even between husbandsand wives within traditional"patriar-
chal" relations, alongside oppressive practices that reflect relations of domination, there
are elements of reciprocityand companionshipwhich prefigurethe potentialfor egalitarian
relations, if only in a limited way. This is part of the specific complexity of gender
domination-the way it packages togetherin variabledegrees and forms, dominationand
equality, oppression and reciprocity.14The elimination of gender oppression thus can be
12
To say that a person experiences a "prefigurativeform" does not imply that in a male-dominatedsociety
either men or women can really experience "what it would be like" to live in a gender-egalitariansociety. To
experience a partial form of X is not the same as experiencing a fully developed form of X for a limited time
or in a limited context. The point here is that within oppressive gender relations it is possible for people to
experience glimpses of more egalitarianrelations, glimpses that contributeto the credibilityof the alternative.
13 Some feminists insist that male domination
"simply"has been reconstitutedin a new and equally oppressive
form-from private patriarchyconstructedparticularlywithin the family to public patriarchyconstructedpartic-
ularly in the labor marketand the state. In this view, the transformationsthat have occurredin the past 50 years
do not represent any real progress towards more egalitariangender relations. Although new forms of male
dominationundeniablyhave emerged, as reflectedin such phenomenaas the feminizationof poverty, new forms
of job segregation, and the double shift of paid and domestic labor, I believe that in terms of the overall
distributionof welfare and power in capitalist democracies, the trajectoryof gender relations has been in a
generally egalitariandirection in recent decades.
14 The
way in which this internalcomplexity of gender relations, which combines oppressionwith reciprocity,
prefiguresegalitariangender relations was emphasizedto me by LindaGordonin a discussion of an earlierdraft
of this paper.
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 47

experienced partially in micro contexts in a society within which gender domination

remains. Therefore, the practicalplausibilityof eliminatinggender oppression altogether
is experienced, even if still only in partialand limited ways, within existing societies.
It could be objected that the same is true about the elimination of class domination.
After all, in the practical cooperation among workers on the shop floor and in the
solidaristic struggles against bosses, workers could be said to experience prefigurative
forms of socialist-or even communist-relations. Such solidaristic and cooperative ex-
periencescertainlyhave been importantin drawingpeople to the socialist movement, and
they provide some existentialbasis for the plausibilityof the Marxistemancipatoryproject.
Why, then, are such experiencesnot a practicaldemonstrationof the viability of a classless
society?
Two issues distinguishprefigurativeemancipatorygenderexperiencesfrom prefigurative
emancipatoryclass experiences. First, in the case of gender, the prefigurativesymmetrical
experiences include experiences that bind people togetheracross gender categories. In the
case of class, the prefigurativeemancipatoryexperiences are not between workers and
capitalists, but exclusively among workers. Second, and more importantfor the present
context, the relationshipbetween micro experiences and macro changes are not the same
for class as for gender: whereas it is relatively easy to extrapolatefrom the micro setting
of prefigurativenonoppressivegender interactionsto an image of a society without gender
oppression, it is much more problematicto extrapolatefrom the micro settings of class
solidarityto a model of society without class domination.The reason is that socialist (and
communist) productionrequires active macro-level coordination, with macro-level insti-
tutional arrangementsthat generate distinctive macro-level dynamics. Therefore, the sol-
idarities experienced in the interpersonalpractices of class struggle and in the micro
settings of the labor process, do not translatein any simple way into the institutional
mechanismsof planning, informationflows, allocation of capital, or price setting. There
is nothing comparableat the macro institutionallevel for gender practices.
This is emphaticallynot to suggest thatmacroinstitutionalarrangementsare unimportant
for gender relations. Gender is not simply a micro interpersonalphenomenonin contrast
to class, which is both a micro and a macro social phenomenon. The laws of the state,
the structureof labor markets, and the division of labor, to cite several examples, all
affect gender practices in significantways and are shaped systematicallyby gender rela-
tions. In addition, in order to create and reproducea society without gender domination,
state institutionswould have to enforce various laws against discriminationand violence
structuredaround gender. The society would requireextensive public provision of child
care services and reorganizationsof work to eliminate genderdifferencesin the burdenof
child care, because child rearingplays such a centralrole in sustaininggenderinequalities.
Particularlyin a period of transitiontowardsa society withoutgenderoppression, it would
be necessary to have quite pervasive forms of state interventioninto issues aroundgender,
althoughperhapsmuch of this interventioncould be extremelydecentralized.All of these
interventions imply that gender egalitarianismrequires certain kinds of macro social
arrangements.
Nevertheless, even though gender relationsare not simply equivalentto micro practices
and experiences (so that their transformationrequires various kinds of macro structural
arrangements),this situation differs in an importantway from the parallel situation of
eliminatingclass oppression. All of the emancipatorygender interventionsof the state are
directed at the micro settings of gender practices; they would not have to solve any
problems of system-level coordinationof different gender practices as such in order to
makethe society reproducible.Whatis the genderequivalentof long-termmacroeconomic
planning of investments? Of internationalflows of commodities? Of coordination of
48 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
intermediategoods in a highly interdependentproductionprocess? All of these macro
institutionalissues potentially call into question the idea of a classless society. Gender
equality does not seem to pose any parallel system-integrationdilemmas. For this reason
the extrapolationfrom particularmicro experiences of eliminating gender oppression to
the society as a whole seems plausible: macro institutionalarrangementsmay have to
intervene systematically at the micro level, but the macro coordinationas such contains
no distinctive gender contradictions.
In principle it could be the case, contraryto what I have just argued, that the extrapo-
lation from the micro to the macro is illegitimate in the case of emancipatorygender
practices, just as it seems to be for class practices. Two kinds of possibilities are worth
considering. First, the kinds of state interventionsand other institutionalarrangements
discussed above-work reorganization,child care, real labormarketequality, and so on-
could be possible (for financial and other reasons) only under socialist conditions. Capi-
talism may be incompatible with the institutionalconditions for complete gender eman-
cipation.15If, then, it turns out that socialism itself is not viable for the reasons adduced
earlier, an extrapolationfrom the micro prefigurativeexperiences of gender equality to
society as a whole also would be illegitimate. This outcome, however, would not be due
to any distinctive contradictionin the projectof gender emancipationas such. Rather,the
nonviability of gender emancipation would be due to a macro failure in the project of
class emancipation.
There is a second possibility, however, in which the macro institutionaldilemmas of
eliminating gender oppression are rooted directly in gender relations. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that if male domination were eliminated, biological reproductionwould decline
drastically. For reasons that are not now understood(according to this concocted argu-
ment), the cultural values that support having children require gender inequality to be
sustained. Therefore, in a society without gender oppression, few women would have
children, and demographiccollapse would occur. The very reproductionof society there-
fore would be threatenedby the eliminationof gender oppression. Under such conditions,
gender-based macro institutional arrangementswould have to be organized to ensure
adequatebreeding, and such arrangementsmight well contradictthe emancipatoryobjec-
tives of the feminist project.
Although this argument may be ridiculous, it has the same form as the efficiency-
collapse effects postulatedby the absence of class inequality:the unintendedconsequences
of eliminating a form of oppression undermine the material conditions necessary for
sustainingthe society and thus for sustainingthe emancipatoryproject itself. The critical
point is that whereas in the Marxistcontext, class egalitariansraise credible argumentsof
this sort that call in question the viability of the Marxist emancipatoryproject, such
argumentsare not raised (at least not by egalitarians)against gender equality.
It is importantto be very clear about what is being claimed here. I am not denying that
macrosocial phenomenaare deeply genderedin the sense thattheirform and consequences
are shaped by gender relations in a variety of ways. Nor am I saying that there are no
gender obstacles to transformingmacro institutions.The power that men wield economi-
cally, politically, and culturally constitutes a large obstacle to the transformationof the
macro institutions that contribute to sustaining male dominance, just as the power of
capitalists constitutes a significant obstacle to transformingthe macro institutions of
capitalism. None of this implies, however, that any inherentgender dilemmas are posed

15 Such a claim need not

imply that male domination serves some essential function for capitalism. Male
domination-like pollution and environmentaldegradation-could even be harmful for capitalism. Yet elimi-
nating male dominationcould be impossible in capitalist societies because of cost and other constraints.
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 49
by the transformationof those macro institutions. In the absence oftredible arguments
thatmacroarrangementsfree of genderdominationwould self-destructforgender reasons,
it is perfectly reasonable to extrapolate from the prefigurativeexperiences of gender
equality at the micro level to the society as a whole. With such extrapolationsin hand,
the core feminist theses-that existing relationsare oppressiveand that these relationsare
socially constructed-seem to imply the practicalviability of the emancipatorytransfor-
mation of the relations.

CLASSICALMARXISM AND THE VIABILITYOF SOCIALISM/COMMUNISM

Unlike the issue of the viability of a society without male domination, socialist theorists
have never been able to bypass completely the problem of the feasibility of socialism.
Marxistsoften have felt it necessary at least to make gestures towards argumentsfor the
viability of communism (complete classlessness). In classical Marxism, this issue was
handled in a particularlyelegant-if ultimately unsatisfactory-way through the devel-
opment of a theory of history, generally referred to as "historicalmaterialism."Even
though most Marxists today reject the rather deterministic cast of classical historical
materialism,it is worth reviewing the core argumentsof the classical theory because the
way in which it solves the problem of linking the emancipatoryprojectto an explanatory
theory remains an importantpart of the Marxist intellectualterrain.16
Historical materialismcan be divided into what might be called the "generaltheory of
history,"which attemptsto chart and explain the overall trajectoryof humanhistory, and
the "specialtheoryof capitalisthistory,"which moremodestlytries to explain the trajectory
of capitalist development from its emergence to its demise. Although the special theory
is more relevant for understandingthe problems faced by contemporaryMarxism in
defending its emancipatoryproject, it will be helpful first to briefly review the general
theory.
Because the internallogic of the general theory of history recently has been subjected
to such rigorous scrutiny by G. A. Cohen (1978), I will only sketch out the contours of
the argument.17Within historical materialism,the history of humankindis seen as devel-
oping in a systematic way through a series of stages. Each stage is characterizedby a
particularcombination of forces of productionand relations of production;the central
dynamics of the system are based on the ways in which the forces and relations of
productioninteract. More specifically, Cohen elaboratesthis interactionin the following
functionalform:
1. The forces of productiontend to develop in history. Cohen calls this the "development
thesis."
2. At any given level of development of the forces of production,some set of relations
of productionwill be optimal for the furtherdevelopmentof the forces of production.
3. Those relations of productionwhich are optimal for the developmentof the forces of
productionwill tend to be selected (throughan unspecifiedprocess of class struggle)
because they are optimal.
16
To avoid misunderstanding,it is importantto avoid equating "Marxism"with "historicalmaterialism."
Historical materialismis a particularway of theorizing the overall trajectoryof historical development. Much
of what is intellectuallyvaluable in the Marxisttraditiondoes not dependupon the validity of this generaltheory
of history. Marxism also is a form of class analysis of social institutions. Although Marxist class analysis is
embedded in an understandingof historical variation, it need not presupposea theory of historical trajectory
(i.e., a theory of the inherenttendencies for historicalvariationsin class relationsto follow some developmental
path). For a furtherdiscussion of the relationshipbetween class analysis and historicalmaterialism,see Wright,
Levine, and Sober (1992, part I).
17 See Cohen
(1978). For an appreciativecritique, see Wright, Levine, and Sober (1992, ch. 2).
50 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
4. Therefore the relations that exist have the form they have because that form best
facilitatesthe developmentof the forces of production.18 This is the essential statement
of the functionalexplanationof the relationsof productionby the forces of production.
5. Within all class-based relationsof production,there is a limit to the maximumpossible
developmentof the forces of production;thus the furtherdevelopmentof the forces of
productioneventually will be blocked (or, to use Marx's term, "fettered").
6. When such fettering occurs, the now-dysfunctionalrelations of production will be
replaced (according to Thesis 3 above) with new relations of productioncapable of
unfetteringthe subsequentdevelopmentof the forces of production.
If the general theory of historicalmaterialismcould be shown to be true, it would offer
a powerful analytical tool for sustaining the Marxist emancipatoryproject. Capitalism,
after all, is a class-based mode of production;thus, accordingto Thesis 4, eventually it
will fetter the development of the forces of production. When it does so, according to
Thesis 5, those relations eventually will be replacedby new ones, which will unfetterthe
forces. Therefore the theory predicts a society without class exploitation because class
modes of productioneventuallyexhausttheircapacityto develop the forces of production.19
The problem is that there is little reason to believe the general theory as such. That is,
at the level of abstractionof "relationsof production"and "forces of production,"it is
hard to imagine what mechanism could exist which guaranteesthe eventual fettering of
forces of production by all class-based relations of production. Marx certainly never
providedan actual argumentfor an inherenttendency for fetteringat that level of abstrac-
tion; neither does Cohen in his reconstructionof Marx's argument.
The validity of the generalizationswithin the general theory therefore depend on the
validity of the various special theories of the history of the differentmodes of production
that constitute the trajectoryof the general theory. That is, there is a special theory of
preclass society history, a special theory of feudal history, a special theory of capitalist
history. For each of these theories there may be convincing argumentsfor the inevitability
of fettering and transformation.20 In particular,for present purposes, the critical issue is
the validity of the special theory of capitalisthistory.
Marx put a great deal of effort into developing the special theory of the fettering of
forces of productionwithin capitalism. His strongestargumentsare containedin the quasi-
deterministictheory of the long-run nonviability of capitalismbased on his famous "law
of the tendency of the falling rate of profit."21Marx arguedthat because of the inherent
competitive dynamics of capitalism, combined with the difficulties faced by capitalistsin
extractinglabor effort from workers, capitalistswill tend to substitutemachines for labor
(or, as he put it, the "organiccomposition of capital [will tend] to rise"). According to
18
One can soften this statementslightly withoutunderminingits essential structureby saying: "Theprobability
of a given set of relationsexisting is determinedby the extent to which those relationsare optimal for the further
development of the forces of production. Therefore there is a tendency for the relations to be what they are
because they facilitate the development of the forces." The probabilisticform retains the functional form of
Cohen's interpretationof historical materialismwithout implying a unique, deterministichistoricaltrajectory.
19 Even if Marx was wrong that capitalismwas the last form of class society, and even if a new form of class
society would replace capitalism, accordingto Thesis 5, still that society eventually would also fetter the forces
of production, according to Thesis 4, and thus eventually would be replaced. Thus, unless one believes that
there is an indefinitenumberof new class modes of production,eventually a society without classes will occur.
20 If each of these
special theories were shown to be valid, then collectively they could providethe justification
for the generalizationscontained within the general theory of history. Still, they would not provide a defense of
the general theory as such because there is no independenttheoreticalargumentof explanatorymechanismsfor
the general theory itself.
21 I refer to this
theory as "quasi-deterministic" because Marx is careful to describe a set of countertendencies
to the generaltendencyhe proposes. Althoughhe arguesthatin some unspecifiedlong runthese countertendencies
cannot permanentlyblock the primarytendency, most of his argumentsimply only the strong probabilitythat
the rate of profit will fall, not the inevitabilityof that fall.
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 51
Marx's analysis of the labor theory of value, however, the rate of profit is fundamentally
a function of the amount of surplus labor time performedin production. Therefore, by
substituting machines for labor power, capitalists reduce the amount of labor time in
productionavailable for exploitation, and this process ultimatelyerodes the rate of profit.
The decline in the average rate of profit, in turn, makes capitalism as a whole more and
more vulnerablebecause randomshocks, tendenciesto overproduce,and so on will more
easily push the rate of profit to zero or below.
The key point is that if the rate of profithas an inherent,forceful tendencyto fall, and
if the available "countertendencies"cannot ultimatelyblock this decline, then it is highly
probablethat eventually capitalismwill stagnateand the forces of productionwill become
fettered, because in capitalism, capitalisticprofitsare the only source of resourcesfor new
investment and innovation. Therefore, if the law of tendency were true, capitalism ulti-
mately would become unreproducibleas a social order.This does not mean that socialism
would occur only in the aftermathof the catastrophiccollapse of capitalism. People may
become committedto socialism out of the belief that capitalismwill collapse, and through
such commitmentsthey may bring about the demise of capitalismbefore it would have
destroyeditself. In any event, the theoryprovidesa strongbasis for predictingthe eventual
nonsustainabilityof capitalism as a social order.
The thesis of the likely long-term nonviabilityof capitalismdue to its self-destructive,
internalcontradictionsis crucial for the traditionalMarxisttheoryof socialism. The burden
on the theory to demonstratethe superiorityof socialism (not to mention communism)
over capitalism is reduced if it can be demonstratedthat ultimately capitalism itself is
nonviable. Socialism could be plagued with all sorts of inefficiencies, dilemmas, and
uncertainties,and yet could be preferableto moribundcapitalism. Furthermore,if capi-
talism becomes nonviable and thus ceases to be an alternativeto socialism, the political
will to cope with dilemmas internal to socialism and to devise novel solutions would
increase, thus rendering socialism itself more attractive.Because his theory of the laws
of motion of capitalism predicts the eventual nonreproducibilityof capitalism, Marx
perhapscould be excused for refusingto elaborateblueprintsor even systematicarguments
for the sustainabilityof socialism or communism as the alternativeto capitalism. It was
enough to say that workers would be in control and that throughtheir creative energies,
throughtrial and error and systematic experimentation,the precise institutionalforms of
socialism, and later of communism, would be produced.
Unfortunately,the debates over the labor theory of value in recent years have raised
very serious issues with the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The general
claims of the labor theory of value to explain the rate of profit in terms of labor values
have been challenged seriously. In addition, even within the terms of the labor theory of
value, the specific claim that the "organic composition of capital" has any tendency to
rise indefinitely (and thus that the rate of profit tends to fall) has been shown to be
problematicat best and simply wrong at worst.
Of course, capitalism may contain other kinds of dynamic tendencies besides the
hypothesizedtendency of the rate of profitto fall which potentiallycould provide a basis
for predicting the eventual socialist transformationof capitalism. Indeed, Marx himself
often advancedother argumentsbesides the strongtheory of capitalistnonviabilitydriven
by the falling rate of profit, most notably his frequent reference to the contradiction
betweenthe increasinglysocial characterof productionand the enduringlyprivatecharacter
of capitalist appropriation.The increasing social characterof production signaled the
increasingcapacity of workersthemselves to organizeproductionand to deploy the means
of productionfor the satisfaction of human needs and the expression of human creative
energies; the enduringlyprivate appropriationby capitalistsblocked the realizationof this
52 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
potentialby directing productiontowards the goal of privateprofits and the expansion of
capital.22The tendency for this "contradiction"to increase does not itself depend on the
falling rate of profit (although the falling rate of profit would render the contradiction
more destabilizing);it merely depends upon a claim about the trajectoryof organizational
forms of capitalistproduction.Socialism, then, becomes the solution to this contradiction
by creating a new social form of appropriationcompatible with the already developed
social characterof production.
Cohen (1978) also elaborates a view of capitalist development and its "distinctive
contradictions"that does not hinge on the falling rate of profit. He proposes that although
capitalism may not actually fetter the sheer growth of the forces of production in the
mannerpostulated in historical materialism, it fetters the rational use of those forces of
production (through waste, a systemic bias for consumption over leisure, ecological
damage, and so on). What Cohen calls "use fettering,"then, could provide the rationale
for socialism, at least if one were convinced that socialism would "unfetter"the rational
use of the means of production.
Marx may be correct in saying that as capitalismdevelops, an increasingcontradiction
exists between social productionand privateappropriation,and Cohen may well be correct
in saying that capitalismsuffers increasinglyfrom use fettering.Yet these processes would
lead one to predict the eventual triumphof socialism only if it also could be shown that
they strongly motivatedpeople (especially workers)to struggleto overthrowcapitalismin
favor of socialism. In the case of the theory of the tendency of the falling rate of profit,
much weaker motivational assumptions are needed because capitalism itself becomes
unreproduciblein the long run. Neither of the alternativeformulationsof capitalism's
distinctive contradictions-social production/privateappropriationand use fettering-im-
ply in themselves that capitalism as an economic system has any tendency to become
unsustainable.Thus they become effective argumentsfor socialism only if socialism can
be shown to be superior to capitalism. This, again, requires a positive theory of the
viability of the emancipatoryalternativeto capitalism.
This failure to develop a convincing theory of the fatal fettering of the forces of
productionin capitalismis importantbecause, as alreadysuggested, it is far from a simple
task to demonstrateconvincingly the practical superiorityof socialism over capitalism,
particularlyin the aftermathof the collapse of social experimentscarriedout in the name
of socialism. Capitalismmay be damaging to masses of people, oppressive, and exploi-
tative; it may embody contradictionsbetween the deeply social-cooperativecharacterof
its productiveforces and its system of privateappropriation;and it may block the rational
deployment of those forces of productionto meet human needs. Yet people still may
prefer "actually existing" capitalism to an alternativewith uncertaincharacteristicsand
dynamics, whose viability is open to serious challenge by sympathetic(not to mention
hostile) critics. In the absence of a credible theory of the inherenttendency for capitalism
to move towards catastrophiccollapse, a positive theory of the viability of socialism and
communismbecomes essential.
The importanceof this task is recognized widely by socialists. Even in the heyday of
relativelydeterministicversions of Marxism, therewas some discussion aboutthe problem
of design of socialist institutionsand aboutthe conditionsunderwhich socialism could be
sustainable.In recent years, serious theoreticaland empiricalwork exploring these issues
has proliferated.No comparablebody of theoryand researchon the viability of eliminating

22
In Marx's words from Volume 3 of Capital, "The contradictionbetween the general social power into
which capital develops, on the one hand, and the private power of the individual capitalist over these social
conditions of production,on the other, becomes ever more irreconcilable. . ."
EXPLANATIONAND EMANCIPATIONIN MARXISM AND FEMINISM 53

gender oppression has developed yet within feminism. This is not an indictmentof the
theoretical work of contemporaryfeminists. Rather, it is a reflection of the differences
between theoretical agendas imposed by the differences between the two emancipatory
projects.

CONCLUSION
At the core of the Marxist traditionis a set of quasi-deterministictheories in which the
"laws of motion"of social systems tend to propel social change along specific trajectories.
Sometimes these deterministicargumentsare relatively strong, as in classical historical
materialism.At other times they are considerablyweakened, takingthe form of arguments
about underlyingtendencies and countertendencies,which generate only probabilitiesof
particularcourses of development ratherthan unique paths. And sometimes-especially
in certain strandsof contemporaryMarxism-determinism is rejected altogetherin favor
of a theoretical framework emphasizing the open interplay of structure and agency.
Capitalism,as a result, is viewed as having no inherenttendencies of development. Even
in this case, however, antideterministargumentsconstantly are holding a dialogue with
the more deterministic (sometimes called "economistic")variants of Marxism because
determinismis such an integralpart of this intellectualtradition.
Feminism, in contrast, characteristicallyhas taken the form of a much more agent-
centeredtheory, in which social change has no particulartendency to move along a given
trajectory. With a few exceptions, feminists do not posit even probabilistic "laws of
motion" of patriarchytowards self-destruction. The prospects for women's liberation
depend crucially on consciousness raising and on culturallyorientedemancipatorystrug-
gles. The problem of determinismgenerally is not a centralpreoccupation.23
If the analysis in this paper is correct, perhapsone of the reasons why Marxism often
has taken a relatively deterministicform is precisely that such deterministicarguments
helped to preempta serious problem confrontingemancipatoryclass theories, namely the
credibility of the radical egalitarian alternativeembodied in the revolutionaryproject.
Marx certainly relied heavily on the "scientific"argumentthat socialism is the necessary
culminationof laws of motion of capitalism, as a way of discreditingand dismissing the
moral argumentsfor the socialism of the "utopiansocialists" and the various proposals
extant in his era for blueprintsof a socialist society. Workerswould join the revolution
because socialism is inevitable and because it was in their intereststo hasten its arrival,
not because of an abstractbelief in its morality or in the credibility of its institutional
design.24

23 Some feminists, of course, deploy more deterministic frameworks for analyzing variations in gender
relations, especially within those strands of feminist theory that are influenced most heavily by the Marxist
tradition. For example, although O'Brien (1981) clearly rejects class determinism, she translatesthe Marxist
notion of a "dialectic"between the forces and relations of productioninto an account of the dialectic of forces
and relations of reproductionto produce a relatively deterministicaccount of the transformationsof gender
relations. A similar argumentis found in Firestone (1971). Chafetz's (1990) more sociological work on gender
inequalityalso has a somewhat deterministiccast. These kinds of deterministicarguments,however, are outside
the central concern of most feminist theory, which emphasizes the relatively open, nondeterministiccharacter
of the futureof gender relations.
24 It
might seem a paradox that workers would join a movement for socialism when they believed that
capitalism would destroy itself by its own internaldynamics, thus making socialism inevitable. Cohen (1989)
explains this paradoxby arguingthat the predictionof the inevitable demise of capitalismis itself based on the
theory of workers' rational agency. That is, the supercessionof capitalismby socialism is inevitable precisely
because workers respond to the conditions of capitalism in a rational way. The analysis presented here goes
furtherthan Cohen's argumentby stating that the theory of the inevitability of the demise of capitalism was
essential for rendering socialism or communism credible; thus workers would have been less likely to join a
revolutionarymovement if they felt that the viability of socialism was an open question.
54 SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
Feminist theory does not face this problem so acutely; thus feminists have less reason
to be attractedto such deterministic theoretical currents. Given that the emancipatory
project has relatively high existential validity to feminists, and given the plausibility of
extrapolatingfrom individual micro-level experiences to society as a whole, the viability
of a society without gender dominationand oppressiongenerally is not viewed as deeply
problematic by people who share the normative commitments of feminists. Thus the
emancipatorygoals of feminism exert no pressureto producea deterministictheory of the
internal contradictionsof patriarchy,which would push it on a trajectorytowards self-
destruction.
Whether or not these differences in the natureof their emancipatoryprojects actually
help to explain the tendencies towardsdeterminismin Marxiansocialist theory and toward
nondeterminismin feminism, the fact remains that historical materialism provided a
convenientsolution to a very difficultproblemfor Marxisttheory.The theoreticaladvances
in recent years, however, have seriously underminedthe credibility of both the general
theory of historicalmaterialismand the special theory of capitalisthistory. In and of itself,
this certainly does not imply that the emancipatoryproject of Marxism is bankrupt,nor
thatthe explanatorycapacityof Marxismas a traditionof social theoryhas been exhausted.
It means, however, that the task of developing a more systematic, more positive theory
of a classless society is imperativeif this emancipatoryproject is to regain credibility.

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