Digest Rule4

Outline: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Lesson for August 9, 2014
Saturday
Venue
- The Manila Railroad Co. v. The Attorney General, G.R. No. L-6287, December 1, 1911
Venue versus jurisdiction
- Dacoycoy v. IAC, G.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991
- Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005
- Santos v. Northwest Orient, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
Venue of real actions
- Go v. UCPB, G.R. No. 156187
- Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
Venue of personal actions
- Claridades v. Mercader, G.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966
- Davao Abaca Plantation v. Dole Philippines, G.R. No. 134431, December 1, 2000
- Marcos-Araneta v. CA, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008
Venue of actions against non-residents
- Baritua v. CA, G.R. No. 100748, February 3, 1997

When the rules on venue do not apply
- Gonzales v. Lopez, G.R. No. 48068, April 15, 1988
- Polytrade v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969
Effects of stipulations on venue
- Sps. Lantin v. Hon. Lantion, G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006
- Uniwide Holdings Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007
Case Digest: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Venue
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
G.R. No. L-6287, December 1, 1911
Facts:
The plaintiff, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in the
CFI of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real
estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the
Province of Tarlac. It is for the construction of a railroad line "from
Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose
of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this
action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is 69,910
square meters in area. The complaint states that before beginning
the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in
the office of the registry of property and of the tax where the lands
sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged.
As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands
in question were located in the Province of Tarlac.
The defendants in one action are all of the different
owners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square
meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving the
complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final
determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the
lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the
same in operation.
On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made
to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned
was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province
of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.
Trial court- Granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed
the action on the ground that CFI Tarlac had no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take
cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another
province.
Held:
Yes. CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take
cognizance of the case.
Section 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine

Commission confer jurisdiction upon the CFI of these islands with
respect to the real estate. It was the intention of the Philippine
Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect
and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters
mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to
depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The
jurisdiction is universal.
It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court
of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province,
may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action
arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate
located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at
the time be assigned.
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority.
Other provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is
projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of the
Court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the
procedure by which such powers are put into action.
The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority;
it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly
exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised
in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the
court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter.
After jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been
conferred so generally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to be
presumed or construed that the legislature intended to modify or

restrict that jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code of Civil
Procedure the object of which is to make that jurisdiction effective.
Such modification or restriction should be held only by virtue of the
clearest and most express provisions.
It is to be observed that the section contains no express
inhibition against the court. It provides simply that certain actions
affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the
land, or some part thereof, is situated." The prohibition here is
clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the
venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to
do with either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does
the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is
concerned. The prohibition is nor a limitation on the power of the
court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take something
from the court but to grant something to the defendant. Its wording
clearly deprives the court of nothing which it had, but gives the
defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he did not
have. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject
,after, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to
jurisdiction but to trial. It touches convenience, not substance. It
simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to
have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all
of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial.
We, therefore, hold that the terms of section 377
providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in
the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part
thereof, is located, do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance over the land itself but relate simply to the personal rights
of parties as to the place of trial.

Furthermore, we hold that section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to
condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants
express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any
province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants
whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may,
by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or,
if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where
their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the
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defendants not objecting would continue in the province where
originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants
and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province
or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it cannot
affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the
defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a
change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that
jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to
remove it.
DACOYCOY vs IAC
G.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta,
Rizal, filed before the RTC, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint
against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland
situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Before summons could be served on private respondent as
defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order
requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge
on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is
a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated
deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject
parcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
IAC- dismissed Petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the order
of dismissal. Hence this appeal.
Petitioner’s arguments:
The right to question the venue of an action belongs solely
to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate does not
possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the
venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable.
Petitioner asserts that, without the defendant objecting

that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to
dismiss the case motu proprio.
Respondent’s arguments:
The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is proper because
the same can "readily be assessed as (a) real action."
He asserts that "every court of justice before whom a civil
case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the defendant to raise
that venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial notice
and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated as real action
and improperly filed before it. .
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Held:
No. The court held that the motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of
improper venue is erroneous, obviously attributable to its inability
to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are
basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said
that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It
relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than
the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation
between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court
and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction,
touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the

substance of the case.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a
case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place
where the suit may be had.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue
is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
courts of first instance, may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss
as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows
the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on
appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the
wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue
in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue,
though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for
whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
NOCUM vs TAN
G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005

Facts:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand
Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the RTC of
Makati ,seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that: (1) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action; (2) the defamatory statements
alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without factual
premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true
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report on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure
and therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part
was negated by the publication in the same article of plaintiff’s or
PAL’s side of the dispute with the pilot’s union.
ALPAP and UMALI alleged therein that: (1) the complaint
stated no cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)
plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest.
It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed
and first published.
RTC- dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper
venue
Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of

the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par.
2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was
printed and first published in the City of Makati" and in par. 2.04.1,
that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City of
Makati"
RTC- after having dismissed the case for improper venue,
admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the
previous order of dismissal. Petitioners appealed the RTC Decision to
the CA.
CA- dismissed the appeal of petitioners and affirmed RTC;
MR likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC Makati had acquired jurisdiction over
the case upon filing of the original complaint
Held:
Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based
on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the original
complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case
when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof,
respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the
jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former
colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction
and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard

or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the
court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is
fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be
conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the
Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed
and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the
question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations
would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s
failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower
court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege
these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a
party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not
properly laid.
It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do
with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue
were properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that
would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil
cases, venue may be waived.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the
place where the libelous articles were printed and first published
would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The
failure of the original complaint to contain such information would
be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the
case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.

SANTOS vs NORTHWEST ORIENT
G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
Facts:
This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1)
of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be
brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of
the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at
the place of destination.
The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines.
Petitioner is represented by his father. Private respondent
Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with
principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and
maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
Petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via
Tokyo and back.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the

NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled
departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his
flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
Then, petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of
Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Citing the above-quoted article, it contended that the
complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, before:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
2. the court of its principal place of business;
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3. the court where it has a place of business through which the
contract had been made;
4. the court of the place of destination.
Private respondent NOA contended that Philippines was
not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither
was the petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was his
destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
RTC- granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case
CA- affirmed the RTC; MR of petitioner was likewise
denied.
Petitioner’s arguments: He claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is a
rule merely of venue and was waived by defendant when it did not
move to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Issue:
Whether Article 28(1) refers to venue or jurisdiction.
Held:
Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international,
the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back to
the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four
places where an action for damages may be brought.
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters.
Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon the
court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute
may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that
the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by
the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either
case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction
can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties,
whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.
A number of reasons tends to support the characterization
of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision.
First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places
where the action for damages "must" be brought, underscores the
mandatory nature of Article 28(1).
Second, this characterization is consistent with one of the
objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air."

Third, the Convention does not contain any provision
prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which
means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32
must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article
32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1)
as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the
parties regardless of the time when the damage occurred.
In other words, where the matter is governed by the
Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept.
Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in
accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following
which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established
pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of
which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be
taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the
court to which the case is submitted.
In any event, we agree that even granting arguendo that
Article 28(1) is a venue and not a jurisdictional provision, dismissal of
the case was still in order. The respondent court was correct in
affirming the ruling of the trial court on this matter, thus:
Santos' claim that NOA waived venue as a ground of its
motion to dismiss is not correct. True it is that NOA averred in its
MOTION TO DISMISS that the ground thereof is "the Court has no
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint" which
SANTOS considers as equivalent to "lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter . . ." However, the gist of NOA's argument in its
motion is that the Philippines is not the proper place where SANTOS
could file the action — meaning that the venue of the action is
improperly laid. Even assuming then that the specified ground of the
motion is erroneous, the fact is the proper ground of the motion —
improper venue — has been discussed therein.
GO vs UCPB
G.R. No. 156187
Facts:
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-
owners of Noah’s Ark International, Noah’s Ark Sugar Carriers,
Noah’s Ark Sugar Truckers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Repacker, Noah’s Ark
Sugar Insurers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Terminal, Noah’s Ark Sugar
Building, and Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko applied for
an Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of Nine Hundred Million
(P900,000,000) Pesos, and was favorably acted upon by the latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages
over parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 64070, located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837
square meters, and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT
No. 3325, also located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271
square meters, registered in the name of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.
The approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to

petitioner was subsequently cancelled by respondent UCPB. As a
consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from UCPB the
return of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real
Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same
and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages
and caused the registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City.
Respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered by TCT No. 64070, for
nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result,
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the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11
April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against
respondent bank and its officers with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 266.
Respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss based, among
other things, on the following grounds: 1) that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the proper filing
and docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong venue.
TRIAL COURT: granting petitioner’s application for a writ
of preliminary injunction; denied respondent bank’s motion to

dismiss. COURT OF APPEALS: set aside trial court’s decision based
on improper venue
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of
real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of
determining venue.
Held:
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an
action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is the
same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property or any part thereof lies.
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of
personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages
for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The
venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and
municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate
mortgage filed by herein petitioner was primarily an action to
compel private respondent bank to return to him the properties

covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had
already initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation
by the said respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July
1997. The prime objective is to recover said real properties.
Respondent bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, and were it not for the timely issuance of a restraining
order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the same would
have already been sold at a public auction.
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage,
subject of the instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real
estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An action
for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action
affecting the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action
which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the
place where the subject property lies.
INFANTE vs ARAN BUILDERS
G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
Facts:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City was an
action for revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders,
Inc. (private respondent) against Adelaida Infante (petitioner).
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which became final and
executory, in an action for specific performance and damages. The
judgment rendered was in favor of Adelaida Infante.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival
of judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.
The Muntinlupa RTC issued an order dismissing the
Motion.
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific
performance and damages before the Makati RTC is a personal
action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is also
personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the action
for revival of judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City where
private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the
election of private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the
subject action for revival judgment is “quasi in rem because it
involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property”;
and that, consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the
property is situated.
The CA ruled in favor of herein private respondent
reasoning that the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in
an action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem
which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place
where the real property is located.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint for revival of
judgment is an action in rem which was correctly filed with
the RTC of the place where the disputed real property is
located.
Held:
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. -
Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be
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commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal
actions. - All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or
a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the
action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be
filed with the court of the place where the real property is located.
If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is
then a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place
where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final
and executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a
deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in
favor of herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in
connection with said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry
of Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title
issued in the name of private respondent. The same judgment
ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of
P321,918.25 upon petitioner's compliance with the aforementioned
order. It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply with
her judgment obligations despite private respondent's repeated
requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the
action for revival of judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property
conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent
has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect
such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the
previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to revive
is the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over a

piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real
action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real
property.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real
action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the realty is located.
NOTE:
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Sec. 18. Authority to define
territory appurtenant to each branch. - The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings
or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts over which the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted
shall be exercised with a view to making the
courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making the
attendance of litigants and witnesses as
inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a
particular territory defined by the Supreme Court. Originally,
Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati
Courts. However, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An
Act to Amend Section Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took
effect on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation of
a branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now
the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial
jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processes
concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
CLARIDADES vs MERCADER
G.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966
Facts:
Petitioner, Dr. Simeon S. Claridades brought this action
against Vicente C. Mercader and Perfecto Fernandez for the
dissolution of a partnership allegedly existing between them and an
accounting of the operation of the partnership, particularly a
fishpond located in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, which was the main asset
of the partnership, from September 1954, as well as to recover

moral and exemplary damages, in addition to attorney's fees and
costs.
In their answer the defendants admitted the existence of
the partnership and alleged that its operation had been so far
unproductive. By way of special defense, they alleged, also, that
there is an impending auction sale of said fishpond due to
delinquency in the payment of taxes owing to lack of funds and
plaintiff's failure to contribute what is due from him. Defendants,
likewise, set up a counter-claim for damages, by reason of the
institution of this action, and for attorney's fees and costs.
Guillermo Reyes was allowed to intervene for the purpose
of recovering a sum of money allegedly due him for services
..
rendered as foreman of said fishpond, plus damages. Later, one
Armando Asuncion succeeded in intervening as the alleged assignee
of the interest of defendant. Mercader in said partnership and
fishpond. Thereafter, on plaintiff's motion, the lower court
appointed a receiver of the fishpond. Upon the other hand, Alfredo
Zulueta and his wife Yap Leding sought permission to intervene, still
later, alleging that they are the owners of said fishpond, having
bought one-half (½)of it from Benito Regencia, who, in turn, had
acquired it from Asuncion, who had purchased the fishpond from
defendant Mercader, and the other half having been assigned to
him directly by Asuncion.
Despite plaintiff's opposition thereto, said permission was

granted in an order. Soon thereafter, the Zuluetas filed a motion to
dismiss upon the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action; that venue has been improperly laid; and that plaintiff
complaint is moot and academic.
Acting upon the motion, the lower court granted the same
upon the ground of improper venue.
Issue:
Whether or not this action should have been instituted,
not in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, but in that of
Marinduque, where the aforementioned fishpond is located.
Held:
Plaintiff's complaint merely seeks the liquidation of his
partnership with defendants Fernandez and Mercader. This is
obviously a personal action, which may be brought in the place of
residence of either the plaintiff or the defendants. Since plaintiff is
a resident of Bulacan, he had the right to bring the action in the
court of first instance of that province.
What is more, although
defendants Fernandez and Mercader reside in Marinduque, they did
not object to the venue. In other words, they waived whatever
rights they had, if any, to question it.
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the
partnership, including the fishpond in question, did not change the
nature or character of action, such sale being merely a necessary
incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede
and/or is part of its process of dissolution. Neither plaintiff's

complaint nor the answer filed by defendants Fernandez and
Mercader questioned the title to said property or the possession
thereof.
DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION vs DOLE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 134431, December 1, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Davao Abaca Plantation Company, Inc. [DAPCO
for brevity] brought a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against respondent DOLE Philippines, Inc.[DOLE], which reads:
Two (2) Lease Agreements (hereinafter ‘1985 Lease
Agreements’), one covering 839 hectares and the other 165 hectares
or a total of 1,004 hectares were executed. The lease period for
both contracts was ten (10) years from February 7, 1984 to February
7, 1994 renewable for another six (6) years at the sole option of
DOLE. It was also agreed that if no agreement is reached by the
parties on the rental or other terms and conditions of the lease at
the end of the original period, DOLE shall be automatically granted a
grace period of two (2) years viz., until February 7, 1996 within
which to wind up its operations on the land.
After the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took
effect in 1988, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) deferred
subjecting the land to CARL coverage but later reversed itself.

Nevertheless, CARL precludes early coverage of private land leased,
held or possessed by multinational corporations such as DOLE.
DOLE exercised its sole option and renewed the lease up
to December 31, 2000 pursuant to paragraph 1 of the 1985 Lease
Agreements.
Since DOLE had rights under the Lease Renewal
Agreement which had to be represented or protected in the DAR
proceeding, DAPCO formally requested DOLE to intervene in the said
proceeding in a letter of December 27, 1993.
DOLE replied to DAPCO by letter that it chose not to
intervene in the DAR proceeding. DOLE in the letter further
underscored the obligatory force of the contracts between the
parties until December 31, 2000 and assured that DOLE will honor
and ‘faithfully comply in good faith with our contracts and other
obligations.
DOLE wrote DAPCO asking the latter for its intentions
regarding the lease agreements in view of the pendency of
proceedings subjecting the leased area to CARL.
DAPCO replied to DOLE that it would honor and defend
the lease agreements and emphasized that by DOLE’s own
representation, DOLE chose not to be a party to the DAR
proceeding, in order that it could not be bound by any decision
rendered by DAR. DAPCO demanded that DOLE abide with the lease
contracts, pay base rental and make an accounting of the production
for 1994 so that the base rental can be computed. Under the
agreements, the rental for 1995 was to paid on or before January
15, 1995.
In an apparent attempt to cover up its own wrongdoings
as will be shown hereafter, DOLE, in a letter, answered DAPCO

claiming that: ‘the acts of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in implementing R.A. 6657 are already fait accompli’;
that ‘Government’s complete taking of the leased premises and
distribution of the same to ARB association made it legally
impossible for DAPCO, Inc. to perform its obligation to maintain the
lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the things leased; and
..
that the actions of the Government amount to caso fortuito’. DOLE
further stated that ‘STANFILCO’s obligation to pay DAPCO, Inc. the
rentals stipulated in the Lease Agreements ceased.
DOLE’s letter surprised DAPCO because it represented a
total reversal of DOLE’s former legal position, promises,
representations, written and other assurances of contractual fidelity
to DAPCO.
When the hearing ensued on the basis of the foregoing
complaint, DOLE filed with the Court of Appeals [CA] a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
questioning, among others, the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The CA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint filed
by DAPCO on the ground of wrong venue. Thus, it held that the
complaint filed by DAPCO “is actually a real action, DAPCO’s main
objective being to assert ownership and recover possession of the
land in dispute. Such being the case, venue lies not in Manila but in
South Cotabato where the property in dispute is located.

Issue:
Whether or not the nature of the complaint filed by
DAPCO is a real action.
Held:
DAPCO is enforcing the lease contract against DOLE. A
breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts. It cannot be said that the
main objective of DAPCO in filing the complaint is to recover the
land leased to DOLE because DAPCO neither denied the fact that the
lands were subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. What is being asserted was the rental payment for the
year 1995 and the succeeding annual rentals until the expiration of
the lease.
The question as to whether DOLE was bound by the terms
of the lease and is liable for damages should be discussed and
settled by the trial court in accordance with the evidence submitted
by both parties. The Court of Appeals holds that the venue lies in
South Cotabato where the property is situated. Granting that the
complaint is a real action, the venue is not in South Cotabato but is
in Davao del Norte where the property is situated as described in
the lease agreement. However, considering that the complaint
below is in the nature of a personal action, the rules on venue at the
time the complaint was filed governs. When the complaint was filed
on March 15, 1995, venue for personal actions is in the place where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of
the plaintiff. Since DAPCO has its principal office in Manila, it cannot
be said that DAPCO, in exercising its option by filing the suit in

Manila, committed a breach of the rules.
MARCOS-ARANETA vs CA
G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008
Facts:
Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his
business associates (Benedicto Group) organized Far East Managers
and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC),
respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta would later allege,
both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or
arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and
in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of
FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and their
fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of
such shares. Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-husband,
Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC
two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting
and receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The second sought the recovery to the extent of 65% of
FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other defendants named

therein.
Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto's
daughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 3341-17, followed
later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss. Benedicto, on the other
hand, moved to dismiss the case filed, adopting in toto the five (5)
grounds raised by Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss.
Among these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate dispute
over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the RTC,
has jurisdiction; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation therein
that plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted the
trust created in her favor. Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases
were consolidated.
During the preliminary proceedings on their motions to
dismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering their
contentions on improper venue, presented the Joint Affidavit of
Gilmia B. Valdez, Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco who all
attested being employed as household staff at the Marcos' Mansion
in Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain
residence in said place as she in fact only visited the mansion twice
in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections;
and that she was staying at her husband's house in Makati City.
Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene
presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued on
"11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimed
residency in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and
was substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca.
RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these partly

constituted "real action," and that Irene did not actually reside in
Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid.
Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration,
Irene filed a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching
..
therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint in which the names of
Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin appeared as
additional plaintiffs. As stated in the amended complaint, the added
plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new trustees.
Parenthetically, the amended complaint stated practically the same
cause of action but, as couched, sought the reconveyance of the
FEMII shares only.
RTC admitted such amended complaint.
Later developments saw the CA issuing a TRO and then a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC from conducting
further proceedings on the subject civil cases. It further rendered a
Decision, setting aside the assailed RTC order and the amended
complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case
on the ground of improper venue.
Held:
It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that the venue was

in this case improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a
real action involving real properties located outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac.
This contention is not well-taken. In a personal action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement
of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the
other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein.
In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the
venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has territorial
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the
court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
In this case, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust
arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The fact that
FEMII's assets include real properties does not materially change the
nature of the action, for the ownership interest of a stockholder
over corporate assets is only inchoate as the corporation, as a
juridical person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon the
liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders, depending on
the type and nature of their stockownership, may have a real
inchoate right over the corporate assets, but then only to the extent
of their stockownership.
The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being
a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by
Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability to

Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They
are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real
properties instead of against persons.
We point out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and
peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of
Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this case, the factual
determination of the trial court and the premises holding it
together. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action,
contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.
As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court adverts to as the place "where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended
complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451 issued sometime in
June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her
address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Let
alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic residence certificate
practically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer's
office and dictate whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene
procured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to her motion
for reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement against her
being a resident of Batac.
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-
interest plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed
trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the
present suit. It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio,
Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were
included as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new
designated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere

representatives of Irene.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is
more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of
the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper
venue. Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-
17, Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real
party-in-interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases
ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene
resides.
Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes
Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac,
Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence has it that one can have several
residences, if such were the established fact.
Venue of actions against non-residents
BARITUA vs CA
G.R. No. 100748, February 3, 1997
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the RTC Pangasinan a
complaint against petitioner as owner and operator of J.B Bus Lines
to recover damages after a bus owned by petitioner rammed private
respondent’s car.
Private respondent in his complaint, alleged that he is a
resident of Pangasinan before he went to United States where he

now lives and that he is being represented by his attorney in fact.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for
improper venue alleging that since respondent was not a resident of
the Philippines, the complaint should be filed in petitioner’s resident
which is in Sorsogon.
..
RTC – denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
private respondent was merely temporarily out of the country. CA –
Affirmed
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petitioners
claim for improper venue.
Held:
Section 2(b) speaks of the place where the defendant or
plaintiff resides (in which case, the complaint shall be filed).
“Residence” does not mean fixed permanent resident to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. For purposes of
venue, actual residence is the place of abode and not necessarily the
legal residence or domicile. The physical presence, nonetheless,
must be more than temporary and must be with continuity and
consistency.
Private respondent was not a mere occasional resident of
United States. He fixed his place of abode in California and stayed

there continuously and consistently for over a year at the time the
complaint was filed in Pangasinan. The choice of venue is given to
the plaintiff but not left to his caprice. It cannot unduly deprive a
resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the rules of
court.
When the complaint was filed in Pangasinan, not one of
the parties was a resident of the town – private respondent was a
resident of California which his atty in fact was a resident of QC and
petitioner’s business address in in Pasay City. Hence, venue was
improper.
GONZALES vs LOPEZ
G.R. No. 48068, April 15, 1988
Facts:
DECEDENT Antonio was the owner of a parcel of land in
Tueguegarao. He had six children.
A contract was executed under the terms of which 100
hectares of land of decedent would be converted into a residential
subdivision. The contractees were Eusebio, Soledad and Eusebio
Lopez Jr. On the part of the owners who signed as heirs of decedent
were Amparo, Rosario and those who represent the other deceased
children of the DECEDENT. (Note that not all of the heirs signed the
contract)
AMPARO and ROSARIO filed a suit against the
subdividers (contractees) praying for annulment of the subdivision
contract on the ground that it was not signed by all the heirs.
Defendant, in their answer raised the affirmative
defence of improper venue. RTC – granted motion to dismiss.CA –
affirmed
Issue:
Whether or not RTC erred in finding that venue was
improperly laid.
Held:
Records show that the Subdivision Contract was executed
before the defendant appellee became the administrator of the
estate and that the plaintiff appellants are signatories to the
contract. The subject subdivision contract is binding among the
parties until it is annulled by proper court action. In effect, the
contract is valid between the plaitff-appellants and defendants-
appellants who were signatories thereto until annulled by the court.
Section 3 Rule 4 provides that by written agreement of the
parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from
one province to another.

POLYTRADE vs BLANCO
G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969
Facts:
This is a complaint arising from four causes of action to
recover the purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to
defendant. Plaintiff corporation has its principal office in Makati
while defendant is a resident of Bulacan.
Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of
improper venue. He claims that by contract, suit may only be lodged
in the courts of Manila.
The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not answer the
complaint thus, a default judgment was rendered against him.
Issue:
Whether or not venue was properly laid in the province of
Bulacan where defendant is resident.
Held:
No such stipulation as to venue appears in the contract
covering the first two causes of action. Only the third and fourth
causes of action cover a stipulation.
An accurate reading of the stipulation “the parties agree
to sue and be sued in the court of manila” does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain
meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and
Manila alone is the venue are totally absent. That agreement did not
change or transfer venue, it simply is permissive. They did not waive
their right to pursue remedy in the court specifically mentioned in
Section 2(b) or Rule 4.
..
SPS. LANTIN vs HON. LANTION
G.R. No. 160053, August 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners took several peso and dollar loans from
respondent and executed several real estate mortgages and
promissory notes.
They defaulted on the payments so respondent bank
foreclosed the mortgaged lots.
Petitioner filed against Planters Bank and its officers a
complaint for declaration of nullity and/or Annulment of Sale with
the RTC of Batangas alleging that only their peso loans were covered
by the mortgages and that these had been fully paid.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of improper venue since loan agreement restricted the
venue of any suit in Metro Manila. RTC – dismissed the case for
improper venue
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in not finding that the

mere use of word “exclusively”does not by itself mean that such
stipulations automatically provide for an exclusive venue.
Held:
The general rules on venue shall not apply where the
parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing
on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an
action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a
case in other venues. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
Clearly, the words “exclusively” and ”waiving for this
purpose any other venue” are restrictive and used advisedly to meet
the requirements.
UNIWIDE HOLDINGS INC. vs CRUZ
G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner, whose office is located in Paranaque entered
into a Franchise agreement grating respondent a five year franchise.
Respondent Cruz has purchased goods from UHI’s
affiliated companies FPC and Uniwide Sales.

FPC and Uniwide Sales executed a deed of assignment in
favour UHI assigning all their rights and interests over Cruz’s
accounts payable to them
Cruz had outstanding obligation with UHI, FPC and
Uniwide Sales. UHI sent a letter for the settlement of the obligation
but it still remained unsettled.
UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
before the RTC of Paranaque on the ff. causes of action:
a. Being entitled to payment of monthly service fee
b. Being the assignee of FPC’s receivables which
defendant failed to pay, plaintiff suffered actual
damages
c. Being the assignee of Uniwide Sales’ receivables
which defendant failed to pay, plaintiff suffered
actual damages.
Cruz filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue invoking the provision of its franchise agreement with UHI
which states that the venue shall be exclusive in Quezon City. RTC –
granted Cruz’ motion to dismiss
Issue:
Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is
dismissible on the ground of improper venue where only one of the
causes of action arises from a contract with exclusive venue
stipulation?
Held:
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the
same parties, one of which does not arise out of the contract where
the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the
one at bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such
other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and
venue lies therein.
The second and third causes of action are based on the
deed of assignment executed by FPC and Uniwide Sales. The deed
bears no exclusive venue stipulation with respect to causes of action
thereunder. Hence, the rule on venue applies.
Full Text Cases: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE
..
G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular Government, et
al., defendants-appellants.
W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan, for appellant.
Antonio Constantino, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of
the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the controversy.
The question for our consideration and decision is the power and
authority of a Court of First Instance of one province to take

cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation
of real estate located in another province.
In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the
condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his
complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the
complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a
railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it
is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such
line that this action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is
69,910 square meters in area. The complaint states that before
beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough
search in the office of the registry of property and of the tax where
the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they
belonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that
the lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac. The
defendants in one action all of the different owners of or persons
otherwise interested in the 69,910 square meters of land to be
condemned. After filing and duly serving the complaint the plaintiff,
pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action, took
possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint,
building its line and putting the same in operation. During the
progress of the action a commission to appraise the value of the
lands was duly appointed, which, after taking oral testimony,
amounting to 140 typewritten pages when transcribed, and after
much labor and prolonged consideration, made a report consisting
of about 55 typewritten pages, resolving the question submitted to
it. On the coming in of this report the court, by order entered the
27th of September, 1909, set the 11th day of October following for
the hearing thereon.
On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made
to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned
was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province
of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and,
after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon
the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said
judgment of dismissal.
The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon the
proposition, already referred to, that in condemnation proceedings,
and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of First
Instance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power or authority
where the land is located in another province, and that no such
power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.
Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission
confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these Islands
with respect to real estate in the following words:1awphi1.net
SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. — The
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds:
1. Original; and
2. Appellate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance
shall have original jurisdiction: .
xxx xxx xxx
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of

any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible
entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of
justice of the peace.
It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was the
intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First
Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over
the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no
suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. Nor do the
provisions of sections 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 at all militate against the
universality of that jurisdiction. Those provisions simply arrange for
the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts
and do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action. While it is provided in these sections
that a particular court shall hold its sessions in any other province
(except under certain specified conditions), the assertions is
nevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a particular court is in no
wise and in no sense limited; and it is nowhere suggested, much less
provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly
sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take
cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action
relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the
province to which it may at the time be assigned.
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Other
provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is
projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of the
Court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the
procedure by which such powers are put into action. The one is the
thing itself; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred
from the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object of
procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
..
available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised
is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect
exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by
natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most
perfect opportunity for the powers of the courts to transmute
themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before
it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in
righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient
objection which can be urged against procedure to-day is that it so
restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that the
part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many
times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a
means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court
are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of

the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice
becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism.
The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and
convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between
them as a result. While a fair hearing is as essential as the
substantive power of the court to administer justice in the premises,
and while the one is the natural result o the other, it is different in
its nature and relates to a different thing. The power or authority of
the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or
change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in
which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain
cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean
that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that
he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment
may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential
to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between
person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the
subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over
diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but
the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of
the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on
the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or
any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be
conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an

objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has
attached.
In the light of these observations, we proceed to a consideration of
those provisions of the law which the plaintiff claims are decisive of
his contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has no
jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action by a railroad company
to condemn lands located in another province. The plaintiff relies for
the success of its cause upon section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and upon the special laws relating to the condemnation
of lands railroad corporations. We take up first the section of the
Code of Civil Procedure referred to.
The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If their
interests are best subserved by bringing in the Court Instance of the
city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos
Norte, there is no controlling reason why such a course should not
be followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely within the control
of either party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such
selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant may
make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is changed to meet
the requirements of the law. It is true that this court has more than
once held than an agreement to submit a controversy to a court
which, under the procedural law, has not been selected as the
appropriate court, generally speaking, to hear such controversy, can
not be enforced. This means simply that either party to such a
contract may ignore it at pleasure. The law will not compel the
fulfillment of an agreement which deprives one of the parties to it of

the right to present his cause to that court which the law designates
as the most appropriate. But the principle asserted in the cases
which hold thus is no authority for the proposition that two persons
having a controversy which they desire to have decided by a
competent tribunal may not, by appropriate procedure, submit it t
any court having jurisdiction in the premises. In the one case the
relation is contractual to be enforced over the objection of one of
the contracting parties. In the other relation is not contractual
because not between the parties; but, rather, between the parties
and the court. In the one case it is a contract to be enforced; in the
other, a condition to be met.
This being so, we say again, even though it be repetition, that after
jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been conferred so
generally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to be presumed or
construed that the legislature intended to modify or restrict that
jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code of Civil Procedure the
object of which is to make that jurisdiction effective. Such
modification or restriction should be held only by virtue of the
clearest and most express provisions.
The wording of that section should be carefully examined. It reads as
follows:
SEC. 377. Venue of actions. — Actions to confirm title to
real estate, or to secure a partition of real estate, or to
cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real
estate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover
damages for injuries to real estate, or to establish any
interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the
condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be
brought in the province were the lands, or some part

thereof, is situated; actions against executors,
administrators, and guardians touching the performance
of their official duties, and actions for account and
settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the
estates of deceased persons among the heirs and
distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall
be brought in the province in which the will was admitted
to probate, or letters of administration were granted, or
the guardian was appointed. And all actions not herein
otherwise provided for may be brought in any province
where the defendant or any necessary party defendant
may reside or be found, or in any province where the
plaintiff, except in cases were other special provision is
..
made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant resides within the Philippine Islands and the
action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the
defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is
brought to seize or obtain title to property of the
defendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be
brought in the province where the property which the
plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated or is
found: Provided, that in an action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the
defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in

accordance with law, the action must be brought in the
province where the land lies. And in all cases process may
issue from the court in which an action or special
proceeding is pending, to be enforced in any province to
bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees
of the court. The failure of a defendant to object t the
venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance
in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all
objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is
brought, except in the actions referred to in the first
sixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, and
actions against executors, administrators, and guardians,
and for the distribution of estates and payment of
legacies.
Leaving out of discussion for the moment actions and proceedings
affecting estates of deceased persons, they resting upon a different
footing being governed by special laws, it is to be observed that the
section contains no express inhibition against the court. It provides
simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in
the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The
prohibition here is clearly directed against the one who begins the
action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is
commenced, has nothing to do with either. The plaintiff does both.
Only when that is done does the section begin to operate effectively
so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor a limitation
on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not
to take something from the court but to grant something to the
defendant. Its wording clearly deprives the court of nothing which it
had, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights
which he did not have. It establishes a relation not between the
court and the subject ,after, but between the plaintiff and the
defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches
convenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant the
unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where
his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object
is to secure to him a convenient trial. If it had been the intention of
the law-makers by section 377 to put a limitation to the jurisdiction
of the court, how easy it would have been to say so squarely. "No
Court of First Instance shall have or take jurisdiction of an action
touching title to or interest in real property lying wholly in a
province other than that in which such court is authorized to hold
sessions," or a similar provision, would have been sufficient. This
would have been clearly a limitation on the court rather than the
party. There would have been no room for doubt. The legislature,
however, did not do so. It, rather, chose to use language which
imposes a limitation on the rights of the plaintiff.
In saying this we do not desire to force construction.1awphil.net
Courts should give to language its plain meaning, leaving the
legislature to take care of the consequences. The Philippine
Commission having, in fullest phrase, given the Courts of First
Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by
Act No. 136, we are of the opinion that the jurisdiction ought not to
be held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an Act equally express,
or so clearly inconsistent as to amount to the same thing. The fact
that section 377 is not such Act, that it is found in code of Procedure
rather than in the substantive law, that it deals with the relative
procedural rights of parties rather than the power of the court, that
it relates to the place rather than to the thing, that it composes the
whole of a chapter headed simply "Venue," lead us to hold that the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac had full jurisdiction of the subject
matter of this action at the time when it was dismissed.
That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is
indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual
course of practice — that is, by the process of the court — but also
by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself
to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. (Ayers vs. Watson, 113
U.S., 594; Fisher vs. Shropshire, 147 U.S., 133.) The defendants are
now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but
continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of
maintaining that very jurisdiction over them.
Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly
guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the
land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. It alleged in its
complaint:
4. That, according to the information secured after a
minute investigation in the offices of the land registry and
of the land-tax record of the municipalities within whose
jurisdiction lie all the parcels composing the tract of land in
question, the owners and occupants of the same, with
their names as they appear on the plan, are as follows.
At the time it commenced the action it was possessed of every fact
which a complete knowledge of the location of the lands sought to
be condemned required. It had the map of its entire line from
Paniqui to Tayug, showing the provinces and the various
municipalities through which it runs. Not only that: Before beginning
its action it had to know the name of every necessary defendant, the
land he owned, and the extent of that portion to be condemned.
The investigation required to ascertain these facts would of
necessity force into plaintiff's mind the knowledge required to bring
the action in the proper court. That the plaintiff at the time it
commenced this action did not know in what province its proposed
stations and terminals were is difficult to believe. That it did not
know in what province the land lay which it was about to make the
subject of so important a proceeding is still more difficult to believe.
In spite of all this, however, it deliberately laid the venue in a
province where no part of the land lay, took possession of the land
in controversy, constructed its line, switches, and stations, and after
nearly two years of litigation, accompanied with great trouble to the
court and trouble and expense to the parties, calmly asks the
dismissal of the case for the reason that it did not know where its
own railroad was located. Under such circumstances a dismissal of
the action over the objection of the defendants ought not to be
permitted expect upon absolute necessity and then only on
payment of the costs and expenses of the defendants and of the
actin. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)
There is no equitable ground, then, upon which the plaintiff may
claim that it has not yielded itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Nor, as we have seen, is there a legal ground. As we have already
..
said, the plaintiff, having brought the action, of necessity submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of the

situation it itself created to take possession of the lands described in
the complaint, construct its lines, switches, stations, yards and
terminals, and to carry the cause through two years of expensive
litigation. It now attempts to make all this go for naught alleging its
own negligence as a reason for such attempt. (Ayers vs. Watson and
Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)
While the latter part of section 377 provides that "the failure of a
defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of
entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on
his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is
brought," except, a month other things, in actions affecting real
estate, we apprehend that it was not intended that a defendant can
not waive such objection in such excepted cases. Nor we do believe
that such provision is controlling in this case. In the first place, the
application is restricted to "the time of entering his appearance in
the action." It might well have been in the mind of the lawmakers
that, at the time of entering his appearance in the action, the
defendant would not ordinarily be fully informed of all the facts of
the case, at least not sufficiently to warrant his being held to a
waiver of important rights; whereas, later in the cause, as when he
files his answer or goes to trial, being fully informed, he might justly
be held to have waived his right to make such objection. for this
reason it might well be that the Legislature purposely refrained from
extending the time for his protection beyond the "time of entering
his appearance in the action." Moreover, there is, in said clause, no
prohibition against an express waiver of his rights by the defendant.
The general rule of law is that a person may renounce any right
which the law gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited
or the right conferred is of such a nature that its renunciation would

be against public policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughly
established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in relation to the
venue of the action will not be held to have been abridged by
section 377 without very clear provision therein to that effect. There
is no part of that section clear enough to warrant such a holding.
Even though the terms of said section were much clearer than they
are in this respect, we should still hold, if they were much short of
express, that the right of renunciation is not abridged, founding
ourselves not only upon the principles already laid down but also
upon the proposition of general law embodied in section 294 of the
code of Civil Procedure which provides that:
When a statute or instrument is equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other
against it, the former is to be adopted.itc-alf
Moreover, it should be noted that this prohibition, if it be such,
against waiver refers exclusively to the defendant. The plaintiff is
given no rights respecting it. Yet it is the plaintiff who is here calling
for the application of the provision even against the declared will of
the person who is expressly named as the sole beneficiary. We will
not by interpretation extend this provision so as to contravene the
principles of natural rights. We will not construed it so as to included
in its terms nor named as its beneficiary. But even if the plaintiff
were entitled to invoke the aid of the provision he is estopped from
so doing. (Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7; Babcock vs. Farewell, 146
Ill. App., 307; White vs. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Dill (U.S.), 183;
Shuttle vs. Thompson, 15 Wall., 159; Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45 Mich.,
103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R. Co., 18 Barb., 585; Ferguson vs.
Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.), 230; State vs. Mitchell, 31 Ohio State, 592;
Counterman vs. Dublin, 38 Ohio State, 515; McCarthy vs. Lavasche,
89 Ill., 270; Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371; Strosser vs. City of Fort
Wayne, 100 Ind., 443). Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads:
Conclusive presumptions. — The following presumptions
or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made
from particular facts, are deemed conclusive:
1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he can not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration,
act, or omission, be permitted to falsity it.
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. Rep., 67; 69; Municipality of Oas vs.
Roa, 7 Phil. Rep., 20, 22; Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al., 7 Phil. Rep., 449,
453; Macke et al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. Rep., 553, 555.)
The fact is, there are very few rights which may not be renounced,
expressly or impliedly. (Christenson vs. Charleton, 34 Atl., 226, 227,
69 Vt., 91; Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56 Vt., 91;
Donahaue vs. Windsor Ins. co., 33 Atl., 902, 904, 66 Conn., 21, 40;
Fitzpatrick vs. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116, 134, 17
Atl., 411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288; Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44
Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl., 615, 617, 75 Conn., 104; First
Nat. Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn., 22, 44; Johnson vs.
Schar, 70 N.W., 838, 839, 9 S. D., 536; Corey vs. Bolton, 63 N.Y.,
Supp., 915, 917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply Co. vs. Jones, 68
N. Y. Supp., 806, 809, 58 App. Div., 231; Monroe Waterworks Co. vs.
City of Monroe, 85 N.W., 685, 688, 100 Wis., 11; Fraser vs. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 90 N.W., 476, 481, 114 Wis., 510; Cedar Rapids Water Co.
vs. Cedat Rapids, 90 N.W., 746, 749, 117 Iowa, 250; Kennedy vs.
Roberts, 75 N.W., 363, 366, 105 Iowa, 521; Shaw vs. Spencer, 100
Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec., 107, 1 Am. Rep., 115; West vs. Platt,
127 Mass., 367, 367, 372; Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App., 649, 653;
Michigan Savings & Loan Ass'n. vs. Missouri, K & T. Trust Co., 73 Mo.
App., 161, 165; Perin vs. Parker, 18 N. E., 747, 748, 126 Ill., 201, 2
L.R.A., 336, 9 Am. St. Rep., 571; Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N. E.,
1072, 1075, 152 Ull. 458; Star Brewery Co. vs. Primas, 45 N.E., 145,
148, 163 Ill., 652; United Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Thomas (U.S.), 82
Fed., 406, 408, 27 C.C. A., 42, 47 L.R.A., 450; Rice vs. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. (U.S.), 103 Fed., 427, 43 C.C.A., 270; Sidway vs. Missouri
Land & Live Stock Co. (U.S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395; able vs. United
States Life Ins. Co. (U.S.), 111 Fed., 19, 31, 49 C.C.A., 216L Peninsular
Land Transp., etc., Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666, 676, 14
S.E., 237; Dey vs. Martin, 78 Va., 1, 7; Liverpool & L.& G. Ins. Co. vs.
T.M. Richardson Lumber Co., 69 Pac., 938, 951, 11 Okl., 585; Livesey
vs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50, 69; Cutler vs. Roberts, 7 Nebr., 4, 14, 29
Am. Rep., 371; Warren vs. Crane, 50 Mich., 300, 301, 15 N.W., 465;
Portland & R.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587, 592, 32 Pac., 688,
689; First Nat. Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac., 980, 982, 123 Cal., 360, 69
Am. St. Rep., 64; Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 38 Atl., 320,
322, 90 Me., 385; Reed vs. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 Pac., 21, 21
Utah, 295; Dale vs. Continental Ins. Co., 31 S.W., 266, 269, 95 Tenn.,
38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 829, 95 Tenn., 38;
Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 827, 78 Miss., 525;
Bucklen vs. Johnson, 49 N.E., 612, 617, 19 Ind. App., 406.)
We have delayed until this moment the citation of authorities
relative to the proposition that venue is not jurisdictional as to
subject matter and that defendant's rights in respect thereto are
such that they may be waived, expressly or by implication, for the

..
reason that we desired that the principles which rule the case
should first be discussed and presented in the abstract form. In the
case of First National Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141), it
was held that the exemption of national banks from suits in State
courts in counties other than the county or city in which the
association was located was a personal privilege which could be
waived was located was a personal privilege which could be waived
by appearing in such brought in another county, but in a court of the
same dignity, and making a defense without claiming the immunity
granted by Congress. the court said:
This exemption of national banking associations from suits
in State courts, established elsewhere than in the county
or city in which such associations were located, was, we do
not doubt, prescribed for the convenience of those
institutions, and prevent interruption in their business that
might result from their books being sent to distant
counties in obedience to process from State courts. (First
Nat. Bank of Bethel vs. National Pahquioque Bank, 14
Wall., 383, 394; Croker vs. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass.,
240.) But, without indulging in conjecture as to the object
of the exemption in question, it is sufficient that it was
granted by Congress, and, if it had been claimed by the
defendant when appearing in the superior court of
Cleveland County, must have been recognized. The

defendant did not, however, choose to claim immunity
from suit in that court. It made defense upon the merits,
and, having been unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of error
to the supreme court of the State, and in the latter
tribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity granted
to it by Congress. This was too late. Considering the object
as well as the words of the statute authorizing suit against
a national banking association to be brought in the proper
State court of the county where it is located, we are of
opinion that its exemption from suits in other courts of the
same State was a personal privilege that it would waive,
and, which, in this case, the defendant did waive, and,
which, in this case, the defendant did waive, by appearing
and making defense without claiming the immunity
granted by Congress. No reason can be suggested why one
court of a State, rather than another, both being of the
same dignity, should take cognizance of a suit against a
national bank, except the convenience of the bank. And
this consideration supports the view that the exemption of
a national bank from suit in any State court except one of
the county or city in which it is located is a personal
privilege, which it could claim or not, as it deemed
necessary.
In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369), the court said:
The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person
may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of
the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal
exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he
may waive. If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient, a

defendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases,
and certainly jurisdiction will not be ousted because he has
consented. Here, the defendant companies have provided
that they can be found in a district other than that in
which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding is
adopted, and they have been so found. In our opinion,
therefore, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the causes,
and should proceed to hear and decide them.
In the case of St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBride
(141 U.S., 127), the court used the following language:
The first part of section 1 of the Act of 1887, as amended
in 1888, gives, generally, to the circuit courts of the United
States jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of
different States where the matter in dispute exceeds the
sum of two thousand dollars exclusive of interest and
costs. Such a controversy was presented in this complaint.
It was therefore a controversy of which the circuit courts
of the United States have jurisdiction. Assume that it is
true as defendant alleges, that this is not a case in which
jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the
controversy is between citizens of different States, but
that it comes within the scope of that other clause, which
provides that "no civil sit shall be brought before either of
said courts, against any person, by any original process or
proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is
inhabitant," still the right to insist upon suit only in the one
district is a personal privilege which he may waive, and he
does waive it by pleading to the merits. In Ex parte
Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369, 378), Chief Justice Waite

said: "The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a
person may be sued is not one affecting the general
jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a
personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one
which he may waive." The Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec. 11,
Stat., 79), besides giving general jurisdiction to circuit
courts over suits between citizens of different States,
further provided, generally, that no civil suit should be
brought before either of said courts, against an inhabitant
of the United States, by any original process, in any other
district than that of which he was an inhabitant, or in
which he should be found. In the case of Toland vs.
Sprague (12 Pet., 300, 330), it appeared that the
defendant was not an inhabitant of the State in which the
suit was brought, nor found therein. In that case the court
observed: "It appears that the party appeared and pleaded
to issue. Now, if the case were one of the want of
jurisdiction in the court, it would not, according to well-
established principles, be competent for the parties by any
acts of theirs to give it. But that is not the case. The court
had jurisdiction over the parties and the matter in dispute;
the objection was that the party defendant, not being an
inhabitant of Pennsylvania, nor found therein, personal
privilege or exemption, which it was competent for the
party to waive. The cases of Pollard vs. Dwight (4 Cranch.,
421) and Barry vs. Foyles (1 Pt., 311) are decisive to show
that, after appearance and plea, the case stands as if the
suit were brought that exemption from liability to process
and that in case of foreign attachment, too, is a personal

privilege, which may be waived, and that appearing and
pleading will produce that waiver." In (14 Wal., 282), the
jurisdiction of the circuit court over a controversy between
citizens of different States was sustained in a case
removed from the State court, although it was conceded
that the suit could not have been commenced in the first
instance in the circuit court. See also Claflin vs.
Commonwealth Ins. Co. (110 U.S., 81 [28:76].) Without
multiplying authorities on this question, it is obvious that
the party who in the first instance appears and pleads to
..
the merits waives any right to challenge thereafter the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the suit has
been brought in the wrong district. (Charlotte Nat. Bank
vs. Morgan, 132 U.S., 141; Fitzgerald E. M. Const. Co. vs.
Fitzergerald, 137 U.S., 98.)
In the case of the Interior Construction and Improvement Co. vs.
Gibney (160 U.S., 217), the court held as follows:
The circuit courts of the United States are thus vested with
general jurisdiction of civil actions, involving the requisite
pecuniary value, between citizens of different States.
Diversity of citizenship is a condition of jurisdiction, and,
when that does not appear upon the record, the court, of
its own motion, will order the action to be dismissed. But
The provision as to the particular district in which the

action shall be brought does not touch the general
jurisdiction of the court over such a cause between such
parties; but affects only the proceedings taken to bring the
defendant within such jurisdiction, and is matter of
personal privilege, which the defendant may insist upon,
or may waive, at his election; and the defendant's right to
object that an action within the general jurisdiction of the
court is brought in the wrong district, is waived by entering
a general appearance, without taking the objection.
(Gracie vs. Palmer, 8 Wheat, 699; Toland vs. Sprague, 12
Pet., 300, 330; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S., 369, 378;
St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. vs. McBride, 141 U.S., 127; Southern
Pacific Co. vs. Dento, 146 U.S., 202, 206; Texas & Pacific
Railway Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U.S., 105; Central Trust Co.
vs. McGeorge, 151 U.S., 129; Southern Express Co. vs.
Todd, 12 U.S. app., 351.)
In the case of Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge (151 U.S., 129), the
court disposed of the case as follows:
The court below, in holding that it did not have jurisdiction
of the cause, and in dismissing the bill of complaint for the
reason, acted in view of that clause of the Act of March 3,
1887, as amended in August, 1888, which provides that
"no suit shall be brought in the circuit courts of the United
States against any person, by any original process or
proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant;" and, undoubtedly, if the defendant company,
which was sued in another district than that in which it
had its domicile, had, by a proper plea or motion, sought
to avail itself of the statutory exemption, the action of the

court would have been right.
But the defendant company did not choose to plead that
provision of the statute, but entered a general
appearance, and joined with the complainant in its prayer
for the appointment of a receiver, and thus was brought
within the ruling of this court, so frequently made, that the
exemption from being such out of the district of its
domicile is a personal privilege which may be waive and
which is waived by pleading to the merits.
(Improvement Co. vs. Gibney, 16 Sup. Ct., 272, 160 U.S., 217; 40 L.
ed., 401; Walker vs. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A., 421, 56 Fed., 76, 5
U.S. App., 423; Von Auw. vs. Chicago Toy & Fancy Goods Co., 69
Fed., 448 McBride vs. Grand de Tour Plow Co., 40 Fed., 162; Black vs.
Thorne, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 495 (10 Blatchf., 66, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas., 550);
Norris vs. Atlas Steamship Co., 37 Fed., 279; Hoover & Allen Co. vs.
Columbia Straw Paper Co., 68 Fed., 945; Blackburn vs. Railroad Co.,
Fed., Fed., Cas. No. 1, 467 (2 Flip., 525); Vermont Farm Mach. Co. vs.
Gibson, 50 Fed., 423.)
In the case of Security Loan and Trust Co. vs. Kauffman (108 Cal.,
214), the court said:
The constitution, Article VI, section 5, declares that, "All
actions for the enforcement of liens" shall be commenced
in the county in which the real estate or some portion
thereof is situated; and at the time this action was
"commenced" the property was situate within the
boundaries of San Diego. The constitution does not,
however, require property is situated, and the statutory
provision in section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
that actions 'for the foreclosure of liens and mortgages on

real property' must be tried in the county in which the
subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated,
"subject to the power of the court to change the place of
trial," shows that "the place of trial" is not an element
going to the jurisdiction of the court, but is a matter of
legislative regulation. The provision for the transfer of
certain actions to the superior court of the county of
Riverside, which is contained in section 12 of the act
providing for the organization of that county, shows the
extent of this regulation which the legislature deemed
necessary, and implies that only the actions there
designated were to be transferred for trial.
In the case of Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290), the court held as
follows:
The statutory provision in respect to personal actions is
more emphatic, requiring that "suits instituted by
summons, shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought: First, when the defendant is a resident of the
State, either in the county within which the defendant
resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff resides,
and the defendant may be found," and yet it was held in
reference to this statute in the case of Hembree vs.
Campbell (8 Mo., 572), that though the suit was brought in
the county in which the plaintiff resided, and service had
upon the defendant in the county of his residence, unless
a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant, was interposed in the first
instance, the objection on the score of lack of jurisdiction
could not subsequently be successfully raised. And this,

upon the generally recognized ground that the court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and that
the defendant's plea to the merits acknowledged
jurisdiction over his person, and precluded objection on
account of absence of regularity in the instituting of the
action. So also, in Ulrici vs. Papin (11 Mo.., 42), where the
then existing statute required "suits in equity concerning
real estate, or whereby the same may be affected, shall be
brought in the county within which such real estate or
greater part thereof is situate," and by demurrer to the bill
it was objected that the suit was not brought in the proper
county in conformity with the statutory provision, Judge
Scott remarked: "That it does not clearly appear where the
greater part of the lands lie. This objection, if tenable,
should have been raised by a plea to the jurisdiction." And
..
the same learned judge remarks, in Hembree vs. Campbell,
supra, "No principle is better established than that a plea
in bar is a waiver of all dilatory matter of defense. That the
matter of abatement was apparent upon the writ can
make no difference. Such matters are and should be
pleaded." And pleas to the jurisdiction are as necessary in
local as in transitory actions. (1 Tidd. Prac., 630.)
It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere failure to
plead to the jurisdiction of the court would have the effect

to confer jurisdiction where none existed before; for it is
well settled that even consent of parties can not confer
jurisdiction. (Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 350.) But all circuit
courts have a general jurisdiction over the foreclosure of
mortgages.
In the case of Armendiaz vs. Stillman (54 Texas, 623), the court
disposed of the question involved in the following words:
In our opinion, however, these common law rules
respecting local and transitory actions have no more to do
in determining with us where a suit can be brought and
maintained, than the like rules in respect to the form and
names of actions; but this is solely regulated by and
dependent upon the proper construction of the
constitution and statutes of the State. In the first, it is
emphatically declared in the bill of rights as a fundamental
principle of government, "All courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law." Now a party may not have an action in rem for or
concerning land in foreign jurisdiction, because redress
can not be given or had by such proceeding in due course
of law; but personal damages may be given for such injury
and enforced by due process of law within the State. "And
it would seem if the State failed to give to one of its
citizens a remedy against others for injuries of this kind, it
would fail in the pledge made in the constitution as plainly
as if the injury had been in a foreign jurisdiction to one's
goods or person."
There is, as Judge Marshall himself says, no difference in

principle in giving redress for injuries to land in the
jurisdiction where the defendant is found, which may not
be equally applicable in other cases. He says, speaking of
the fiction upon which transitory actions are sustained,
where the cause of action occurred out of the jurisdiction
where they are brought: "They have" (i. e., the courts),
"without legislative aid, applied this fiction to all personal
torts, wherever the wrong may have been committed, and
to all contracts wherever executed. To this general rule
contracts respecting lands from no exception. It is
admitted that on a contract respecting lands, an action is
sustainable wherever the defendant may be found. Yet in
such case every difficulty may occur that present itself in
an action of trespass. An investigation of title may become
necessary, a question of boundary may arise, and a survey
may be essential to the full merits of the case. Yet these
difficulties have not prevailed against the jurisdiction of
the court. They are countervailed by the opposing
consideration, that if the action be disallowed, the injured
party may have a clear right without a remedy in a case
where a person who has done the wrong, and who ought
to make the compensation, is within the power of the
court. That this consideration loses its influence where the
action pursues anything not in the reach of the court is
inevitably necessary, but for the loss of its influence,
where the remedy is against the person, and is within the
power of the court, I have not yet discovered a reason,
other than a technical one, which can satisfy my
judgment.'
In the case of De La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas, 205), the court said:
Our statutes in force at the time the reconvention was
filed provided that suits for the recovery of land should be
brought in the county where the land or a part thereof is
situated. This is one of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring suits to be brought in the county of the
defendant's residence. This requirement is not a matter
that affects the jurisdiction of the district courts over the
subject matter of controversies about the title or
possession of lands. Every district court in the State has
cognizance of such suits; the requirement as to the county
in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal
privilege granted to the parties, which may be waived like
any other privilege of this character. (Ryan vs. Jackson, 11
Tex., 391; Morris vs. Runnells, 12 Tex., 176.) A judgment
rendered by the district court of Galveston County, when
the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction, would settle
the title to land in McLennan County as effectually as if
rendered in its own district curt. Jurisdiction of causes may
be obtained by defendants in counties other than those in
which the statute requires them to be brought, in other
ways than by express consent or by failure to claim the
personal privilege accorded by law. A suit upon a monied
demand, brought in the county of a defendant's residence
by a resident of another county, may be met with a
counter demand against the plaintiff, and a recovery may
be had upon the counter demand, though if suit had been
originally commenced upon it, the county of the plaintiff's
residence would have had exclusive jurisdiction. And so

with other cases that might be supposed. A plaintiff calling
a defendant into court for the purpose of obtaining relief
against him invites him to set up all defenses which may
defeat the cause of action sued on, or any other
appropriate and germane to the subject matter of the suit,
which should be settled between the parties before a
proper adjudication of the merits of the cause can be
obtained. He grants him the privilege of setting up all such
counterclaims and cross actions as he holds against the
plaintiff which may legally be pleaded in such a suit.
This is particularly the case in our State, where a
multiplicity of suit is abhorred, and a leading object is to
settle all disputes between the parties pertinent to the
cause of action in the same suit. The question of the
original right to bring the cross action in the county where
the suit is pending can not be raised; otherwise this design
would, in a large number of cases, be defeated, and the
various matters which could well be settled in the cause
might have to seek a number of different counties, and be
asserted in a number of different suits, before the
controversy between the parties could be settled. The
plaintiff must be considered as waiving any privilege to
plead to the jurisdiction in such cross actions, and as
..
consenting that the defendant may assert in the suit any

demands which he could plead were it commenced in the
county where such demands were properly usable. The
question then is, La Vega have set up the matters pleaded
in his answer in reconvention had the land sought to be
partitioned been situated in Galveston County? This
question must be determined by the solution of another,
viz, can a defendant to a partition suit who claims through
the title under which the partition is sought set up a
superior title to the whole land? "It is doubtless true that,
in a partition suit, a court of equity will not entertain any
controversy as to the legal title, whether it arises between
the part owners as to their respective interests, or by
reason of a claim set up by one or more of them to the
entire land by title superior to the one under which the
partition is asked to be decreed. In our State, where there
is no distinction between law and equity in the
determination of causes, an action to settle disputed titles,
whether legal or equitable, may be combined with one to
partition the land between the plaintiff and defendant.
Hence there can be no objection to determining any
questions as to title between the coowners in a partition
suit in our State, and the strict rules of chancery do not
prevail.
In the case of Kipp vs. Cook (46 Minn., 535), the court made use of
the following language:
1. The appellant contends that the district court for the
county of Sibley, and of the eighth judicial district, was
without jurisdiction, and could not properly determine the
rights or interests of either litigant to lands located in

Sherburne County, which is in the seventh judicial district;
but this question was passed upon many years since, in
the case of Gill vs. Bradley (21 Minn., 15), wherein it was
held that, although the proper place for the trial of an
action to recover real property, or for the determination,
in any form, of a right or interest therein, was, by virtue of
an existing statute — now found as Gen. St. 1878, c. 66,
par. 47 — in the county wherein the lands were situated,
the district court of the county designated in the
complaint had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
had power to before the time for answering expired, in
accordance with the express provisions of another section
— now section 51 — of the same chapter, and the place of
trial had actually been changed by order of the court or by
consent of parties.
In the case of the west Point Iron Co. vs. Reymert (45 N.Y., 703), the
court said:
The action was tried in the county of Dutches, and by the
court without a jury, without objection on the part of the
defendants. If the trial should have been in Putnam, and
by a jury, it was for the defendants to assert their rights at
the trial; and by not them claiming them, they waived
them, and must be regarded as having assented to the
place and mode of trial.
We transcribe the following from decisions of the supreme court of
Spain:
Considering, further, that Pedrosa, instead of immediately
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court and asking for a
change of venue, sued for recovery of title, thereby

submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court of first
instance, which reserved its decision thereon until plaintiff
had presented the petition in due form. (Judgment of May
30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)
Considering that although other proceedings were had in
the first court (Salvador de Granada) and in the courts of
first instance of Sagrario and Guerra of said city
subsequent to the death of the count, the truth of the
matter is that his daughter, the countess, the only party
now claiming relief, not only had the proceedings taken in
the first of said courts dismissed but asked the court of
first instance of Castilla de la Nueva to accept, and the
court accepted, her express submission to its jurisdiction:
Considering that far from objecting, as she might have
objected, to the jurisdiction of the court, the countess
acknowledged such jurisdiction as did the other coheirs
when thru asked the court to proceed with the
testamentary proceedings, thus creating a jurisdictional
situation perfectly in harmony with the respective claims
of the parties and so binding upon them that they are now
absolutely estopped from denying its importance or legal
force. (Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)
He who by his own acts submits himself to the jurisdiction
of a court shall not thereafter be permitted to question
such jurisdiction. (Judgment of December 30, 1893, 29 Civ.
Jur., 64.)
According to article 305 (of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil)
the plaintiff shall be presumed to have tacitly submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the mere act of

filing his complaint therein, and in the case of the
defendant where the latter after appearing in the action
takes any step therein other than to object to such
jurisdiction. (Judgment of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur.,
232.)
Plaintiff and defendant are presumed to have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, the former by
the mere act of filing his complaint therein and the latter
by his answering the same and taking any step other than
demurring to such jurisdiction as provided in articles 56 to
58 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment of July 27,
1883, 52 Civ. Jur., 511.)
In order that a tacit submission based upon the mere act
filing the complaint may be valid the court must be one of
ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article 4 of the Ley de
Ebjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ.
Jur., 14.)
The following language is taken from The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of
England (vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory' actions,
though of far less importance than it was before the
passing of the judicature acts, must still be borne in mind
..
in connection with actions relating to land situate outside
the local jurisdiction of our courts. 'Transitory' actions

were those in which the facts in issue between the parties
had no necessary connection with a particular locality,
e.g., contract, etc.; whilst "local" actions were those in
which there was such a connection, e.g., disputes as to the
title to, or trespasses to, land.
One importance of this distinction lay in the fact that in
the case of local actions the plaintiff was bound to lay the
venue truly, i.e., in the county (originally in the actual
hundred) in which the land in question lay. In the case,
however of a transitory action, he might lay it wherever he
pleased, subject to the power of the court to alter it in a
proper case. Local venues have now been abolished, and,
therefore, so far as actions relating to land in England are
concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.
It is, however, important from another point of view, viz,
that of jurisdiction as distinct from procedure. In the case
of real actions relating to land in the colonies or foreign
countries the English relating courts had, even before the
judicature acts, no jurisdiction; and, therefore, the
removal by those acts of a difficulty of procedure — viz,
the rule as to local venue — which might have stood in the
way, if they had and wished to exercise jurisdiction, did
not in any way confer jurisdiction in such cases. The lack of
jurisdiction still exists, and our courts refuse to adjudicate
upon claims of title to foreign land in proceedings founded
on an alleged invasion of the proprietary rights attached
thereto, and to award damages founded on that
adjudication; in other words, an action for trespass to, or
for recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained in

England, at any rate if the defendant chooses to put in
issue the ownership of such land.
There is no decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in
conflict with the principles laid down in this opinion. In the case of
Serrano vs. Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431), the matter before the court
was the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the actions
and proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons. The determination of that question required the
consideration of section 602 of the code of Civil Procedure rather
than section 377 of that code. The argument of the court touching
the last-named section, is inapplicable to the case at bar and would
not affect it if it were. The reference to the jurisdiction of the court
made in that argument based on section 377 was unnecessary to a
decision of the case.
The case of Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12), presented simply
the question whether or not an agreement between parties to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court to the
exclusion of the court provided by law as the appropriate court in
the premises could be enforced. As we have before intimated, it
touched no question involved in the litigation at bar.
In the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (7 Phil. Rep., 302), the action was
one to foreclose a mortgage upon a real and personal property. In
discussing the matter before it the court said:
The demurrer was also based upon the ground that this
was an action to foreclose a mortgage and by the
provisions of sections 254 and 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure it should have been brought in the Province of
Albay where the property was situated. The action is
clearly an action to foreclose a mortgage, lien, or

incumbrance upon property, but it will be noticed that
section 254 relates only to mortgages on real estate. This
contract covered both real and personal property, and
while, perhaps, an action could not be maintained in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for the foreclosure of the
alleged mortgage upon the real estate situated in Albay,
yet so far as the personal property was concerned, we
know of no law which would deprive that court of
jurisdiction.
As will readily be observed, the court in the remarks above quoted
was not discussing or deciding the question whether or not an
action could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real estate located in Albay;
but, rather, whether or not an action could be maintained in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgate
on personal property located in the Province of Albay. The remark of
the court that perhaps the former action could not be maintained
was not intended to be decisive and was not thought at the time to
be an indication of what the decision of the court might be if that
precise case were presented to it with full argument and citation of
authorities.
The case of Castano vs. Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep., 310), involved the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to issue a writ of
prohibition against a justice of the peace holding his court outside
the province in which the Court of First Instance was sitting at the
time of issuing the writ. The determination of the question
presented different considerations and different provisions of law
from those which rule the decision of the case at bar.
We, therefore, hold that the terms of section 377 providing that
actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province
where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located,
do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land
itself but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to the
place of trial.
We come, now, to a consideration of the special laws relating to the
condemnation of land by railroad companies upon which also
plaintiff relies. Of those laws only one is of importance in the
decision of this case. That is Act No. 1258. In it are found these
provisions:
SECTION 1. In addition to the method of procedure
authorized for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two
hundred and fifty-three, inclusive, of Act Numbered One
hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," the procedure in this Act provided may
be adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to
appropriate land for the construction, extension, or
operation of its railroad line.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized by
its charter, or by general law, to exercise the power of
..
eminent domain in the city of Manila or in any province,

and has not obtained by agreement with the owners
thereof the lands necessary for its purposes as authorized
by law, it may in its complaint, which in each case shall be
instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila if the land is situated in the city of Manila, or in the
Court of First Instance of the province where the lands is
situated, join as defendants all persons owing or claiming
to own, or occupying, any of the lands sought to be
condemned, or any interest therein, within the city or
province, respectively, showing, so far as practicable, the
interest of each defendant and stating with certainty the
right of condemnation, and describing the property sought
to be condemned. Process requiring the defendants to
appear in answer to the complaint shall be served upon all
occupants of the lands sought to be condemned, and upon
the owners and all persons claiming interest therein, so far
as known. If the title to ant lands sought to be condemned
appears to be in the Insular Government, although the
lands are occupied by private individuals, or if it is
uncertain whether the title is in the Insular Government or
in private individuals, or if the title is otherwise so obscure
or doubtful that the company can not with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners, averment may
be made by the company in its complaint to that effect.
Process shall be served upon resident and no residents in
the same manner as provided therefor in Act Numbered
One hundred and ninety, and the rights of minors and
persons of unsound mind shall be safeguarded in the
manner in such cases provided in said Act. The court may

order additional and special notice in any case where such
additional or special notice is, in its opinion, required.
SEC. 4. Commissioners appointed in pursuance of such
complaint, in accordance with section two hundred and
forty-three of Act Numbered One hundred ad ninety, shall
have jurisdiction over all the lands included in the
complaint, situated within the city of Manila or within the
province, as the case may be, and shall be governed in the
performance of their duties by the provisions of sections
two hundred and forty-four and two hundred and forty-
five, and the action of the court upon the report of the
commissioners shall be governed by section two hundred
and forty-six of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to in these
sections are, so far as material here, the following:
SEC. 241. How the right of eminent domain may be
exercised. — The Government of the Philippine Islands, or
of any province or department thereof, or of any
municipality, and any person, or public or private
corporation having by law the right to condemn private
property for public use, shall exercise that right in the
manner hereinafter prescribed.
SEC. 242. The complaint. — The complaint in
condemnation proceedings shall state with certainty the
right of condemnation, and describe the property sought
to be condemned, showing the interest of each defendant
separately.
SEC. 243. Appointment of Commissioners. — If the
defendant concede that the right of condemnation exists

on the part of the plaintiff, or if, upon trial, the court finds
that such right exists, the court shall appoint three
judicious and disinterested landowners of the province in
which the land to be condemned, or some portion of the
same, is situated, to be commissioners to hear the parties
and view the premises, and assess damages to be paid for
the condemnation, and to report their proceedings in full
to the court, and shall issue a commission under the seal
of the court to the commissioners authorizing the
performance of the duties herein prescribed.
We are of the opinion that what we have said in the discussion of
the effect of section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance over lands is applicable generally to the sections of law just
quoted. The provisions regarding the place and method of trial are
procedural. They touched not the authority of the court over the
land but, rather, the powers which it may exercise over the parties.
They relate not to the jurisdictional power of the court over the
subject matter but to the place where that jurisdiction is to be
exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is assured, whatever the
place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is the thing; the place of
exercise its incident.
These special laws contain nothing which in any way indicates an
intention of the legislature to alter the nature or extent of the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance granted by Act No. 136. As we
said in discussing the provisions of section 277 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we can not hold that jurisdiction to be limited unless by
express provision or clear intendment.
We have thus far drawn an analogy between section 377 of the code
of Civil Procedure and section 3 of Act No. 1258, asserting that

neither the one nor the other was intended to restrict, much less
deprive, the Courts of First Instance of the jurisdiction over lands in
the Philippine Islands conferred upon them by Act No. 136. We have
extended that analogy to include the proposition that the question
of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, it simply granting to
the defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff
relative to the place of trial, which rights and privileges he might
waive expressly or by implication. We do not, however, extend that
analogy further. On reading and comparing section 377 of the Code
of Civil Procedure with section 3 of Act No. 1258. both of which are
hearing set forth, a difference is at once apparent in the wording of
the provisions relating to the place of trial. Section 277 stipulates
that all actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province
where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." Section 3 of Act
No. 1258 provides that in an action brought by a railroad
corporation to condemn land for its uses the plaintiff "may in its
complaint, which in each case shall be instituted . . . in the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is situated, join as
defendants all persons owning, etc . . . land within the city or
province . . ." Section 1 of that Act, as we have already seen, says
that: "In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by sections two hundred
and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three" of the Code of Civil
Procedure, "the procedure in this Act may be adopted whenever a
railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land . . . ."
From these provisions we note, first, that the procedure expressly
made applicable to actions for the condemnation of land by railroad

..
corporations is not that contained in section 377 but that found in
sections 241 to 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 377 is
nowhere expressly mentioned in Act No. 1258 nor is it anywhere
touched or referred to by implication. The procedure embodied in
that Act to consummate the purposes of its creation is complete of
itself, rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself,
rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself or by
reference to specific sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which
by such reference are made a part thereof.
In the second place, we observe that, so far as venue is concerned,
Act No. 1258 and section 377 are quite different in their wording.
While the latter provides that the actions of which it treats shall be
commenced in the province where the land, or some part thereof,
lies, Act No. 1258, section 3, stipulates that the actions embraced in
its terms shall be brought only in the province where the land lies.
This does not mean, of course, that if a single parcel of land under
the same ownership, lying party in one province and partly in
another, is the subject of condemnation proceedings begun by a
railroad corporation, a separate action must be commenced in each
province. Nor does it mean that the aid of section 377 is required to
obviate such necessity. The situation would be met and solved by
the general principles of law and application of which to every
situation is an inherent or implied power of every court. Such, for
example, are the prohibition against multiplicity of actions, the rules
against division of actions into parts, and the general principle that
jurisdiction over a subject matter singly owned will not be divided
among different courts, the one in which the action is first brought
having exclusive jurisdiction of the whole. The provisions of these
two laws, section 377 and Act No. 1258, differ in the manner
indicated because they refer to subjects requiring inherently
different treatment, so different, in fact, as to be in some respects
quite opposite. While it is true that section 377 speaks of action for
the condemnation of real estate, nevertheless it was intended to
cover simply the ordinary action affecting title to or interest in real
estate, where the land involved is comparatively speaking, compact
together. Its provisions were not intended to meet a situation
presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously
from one end of the country to the other. Act No. 1258 is a special
law, enacted for a particular purpose, and to meet a particular
exigency. The conditions found in an action for the condemnation of
real estate by a railroad company might and generally would be so
different that the application of the provisions of section 377
permitting the venue to be laid in any province where any part of
the land lies would work a very great hardship to many defendants
in such an action. To hold that a railroad company desiring to build a
line from Ilocos Norte to Batangas, through substantially the whole
of the Island of Luzon, might lay the venue in Batangas, it being a
province in which a part of the land described in the complaint was
located, would be to require all the parties defendant in Ilocos Norte
and intervening provinces, with their witnesses, to go to Batangas,
with all the inconvenience and expense which the journey would
entail, and submit the valuation of their lands into only to the Court
of First Instance of Batangas but to a commission appointed in that
province. The hardship to such defendants under such a holding is so

manifest that we are of the opinion that it was not intended that
section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure should apply to actions for
condemnation. Under the provisions of that section, the defendant
has no right to ask for a change of venue if the land involved in the
litigation, or any part thereof, is located in the province where the
court sits before which the action has been commenced. When,
therefore, an action such as is detailed above is begun by a railroad
company in Batangas against persons whose lands lie in Ilocos
Norte, there being also involved lands lying in Batangas, such
defendants would have no right under section 377, if it were
applicable, to demand that the trial as to their lands take place in
the Province of Ilocos Norte. We do not believe that this was
intended. We believe, rather, that under the provisions of the
special laws relating to the condemnation of real estate by railroad
companies, the defendants in the various provinces through which
the line runs may compel, if they wish, a separate action to be
commenced in each province in order that they may have a fair and
convenient trial not only before the court but also before
commissioner of their province who are not only before
commissioners of their province who are not only conveniently at
hand, but who are best able to judge of the weight of testimony
relative to the value of land in that province.
We, therefore, hold that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn
lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or
implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province
selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie
in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one

defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or
his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not
objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It
would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered
continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces.
While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the
decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are
not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof.
They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be
maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to
criminal cases. They seem to rest on a different footing. There the
people of the state is a party. The interests of the public require
that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of
crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the
very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. As a
result it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in
constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action must be laid in the
place where the crime was committed. While the laws here do not
specifically and in terms require it, we believe it is the established
custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions must be
brought and conducted, except in cases especially provided by law,
in the province where the crime is committed.
For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the
cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed with the
action according to law. So ordered.

..
G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991
JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V.
BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground
of improper venue? This is the issue confronting the Court in the
case at bar.
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti,
Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de
Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving
a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private
respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon
petitioner's demand.
On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private
respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an
order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial

judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is
a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated
deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject
parcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court
of Appeals, which in its decision of April 11, 1986,
affirmed the
order of dismissal of his complaint.
In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in
affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of the trial court
that the venue was improperly laid when the defendant, now
private respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor
waived the venue.
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action
belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate
does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him
that the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other
words, petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the
venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the
case motu proprio.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal
of petitioner's complaint is proper because the same can "readily be
assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court of justice

before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the
defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can
take judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly
denominated as real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the
location of the subject parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec.
2, par. (a), Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court . . .
We grant the petition.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent
trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and
venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the
laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the
subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches
more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of
the case.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit
may be had.
5
In Luna vs. Carandang,
involving an action instituted before the
then Court of First Instance of Batangas for rescission of a lease
contract over a parcel of agricultural land located in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, which complaint said trial court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction over the leased land, we emphasized:
(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over
suits involving title to, or possession of, real
estate wherever situated in the Philippines,
subject to the rules on venue of actions (Manila
Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, etc., et
al., 20 Phil. 523; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs.
De Leon, et al., 56 Phil. 169; Navarro vs. Aguila,
et al., 66 Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs. Del Rosario,
etc., et al., 55 Phil. 692);
(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court
requiring that an action involving real property
shall be brought in the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land lies is a rule on
venue of actions, which may be waived expressly
or by implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of
petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with
the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . .
." in accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
With respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired

jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the
moment he filed his complaint for annulment and damages.
Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, now private respondent, either by his voluntary
..
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the
coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.
Although petitioner contends that on April 28, 1963, he requested
the City Sheriff of Olongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons
on defendant Rufino de Guzman at his residence at 117 Irving St.,
Tapinac, Olongapo City,
it does not appear that said service had
been properly effected or that private respondent had appeared
voluntarily in court
or filed his answer to the complaint.
10
At this
stage, respondent trial court should have required petitioner to
exhaust the various alternative modes of service of summons under
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, i.e., personal service under Section 7,
substituted service under Section 8, or service by publication under

Section 16 when the address of the defendant is unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or
impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge
belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
11
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a
motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been
improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue,
though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for
whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on
the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure
outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we
are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and
fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that
respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to
afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to
be heard on his cause.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated April 11,
1986, is hereby nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI is
revived and reinstated. Respondent court is enjoined to proceed
therein in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
vs.
LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision
of the Court of
Appeals dated 19 April 2000 that affirmed the order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No. 98-2288,
dated 19 April 1999, admitting respondent Lucio Tan’s Amended
Complaint for Damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations against him in two (2) articles of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, and its Resolution
dated 15 September 2000 denying
petitioners Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.’s
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter
Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288,
seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27,
1998, wherein they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the
complaint were general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the
questioned news report constituted fair and true report on the
matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore,
was privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by
the publication in the same article of plaintiff’s or PAL’s side of the
dispute with the pilot’s union.
ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October
31, 1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause
of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan
was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed
to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article
was printed and first published.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated
February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint without prejudice on
the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan
filed an Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended
complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that
"This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p.
53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1, that "This
caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p.
55, id.).
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper
venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the
previous order of dismissal, supra, stating, inter alia, that:
"The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to
have been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be
properly admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final.
Besides, there is no substantial amendment in the Amended
Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses and their
Answers. The Amendment is merely formal, contrary to the
contention of the defendants that it is substantial."
Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo
Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Two
petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55192, and the other by defendants
Umali and ALPAP which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54894. The
two petitions were consolidated.
On 19 April 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the
court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by
defendants Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied in a resolution
dated 15 September 2000.
Both petitioners and defendants Umali and ALPAP appealed to this
Court. Under consideration is the petition for review filed by
petitioners.
On 11 December 2000, the Court required respondent Tan to
comment on the petition filed by petitioners.
Respondent filed his comment on 22 January 2001
to which
petitioners filed a reply on 26 April 2001.
In a Manifestation filed on 19 February 2001, respondent stated that
the petition
filed by defendants Umali and ALPAP has already been
denied by the Court in a resolution dated 17 January 2001.
7
On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice.
Both petitioners
and respondent complied.
Petitioners assigned the following as errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE LOWER
COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE (ON THE BASIS OF THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER JURISDICTION UPON THJE COURT; AND
(2) THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR
ADMITTED BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT WAS "NEVER DIVESTED" OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
..
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS AMENDED PURPOSELY
TO CONFER UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.
10
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC
of the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first
published; or (2) where the complainant, if a private person, resides;
or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. They
argue that since the original complaint only contained the office
address of respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the
place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and
first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies
in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire
jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original
complaint for damages?
We rule in the affirmative.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint
since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action.
11
In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint,
we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the
case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s
cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that it is a Court of First Instance
12
that is specifically
designated to try a libel case.

13
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former
colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,
14
differentiated jurisdiction
and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard
or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the
court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is
fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be
conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended
Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first
published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of
venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would
neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s
failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower
court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege
these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a
party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not
properly laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar,
15
this Court construed the term "jurisdiction"
in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place
where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue."

In Escribano v. Avila,
16
pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363,
17
we laid
down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil
actions in written defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the
time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of
Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of
residence at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the
offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has always
the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed or first
published.
We further restated
18
the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person,
the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action
may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where
he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of
Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the
complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,
where originally it had none. The amendment was merely to
establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule
that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal
actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where
the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a
jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be
waived.
Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper
venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently,
the herein petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by filing their
answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of venue,
instead of a motion to dismiss.

..
...
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was
proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to
allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where
the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless,
before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended
as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the court
a quo’s jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the
court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion.
19
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising
from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of
jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the
person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not
to jurisdiction.
20
It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It
relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of
the court.
21
It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather

than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial.
22
In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
23
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the
libelous articles were printed and first published would have been
tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the
original complaint to contain such information would be fatal
because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case
before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
The cases
24
cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases
involve amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on
courts over which they originally had none. This is not true in the
case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter upon the filing of the original complaint. It did
not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the
ground of improper venue. The amendment merely laid down the
proper venue of the case.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and
legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos, petitioner,
vs.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be
brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the
carrier or of his principal place of business, or
where he has a place of business through which
the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination.
The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private
respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation
with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business
and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-

trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to
Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from
Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return
to San Francisco.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA
counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to
Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was
informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing the
above-quoted article, it contended that the complaint could be
instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
before:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
2. the court of its principal place of business;
3. the court where it has a place of business
through which the contract had been made;
4. the court of the place of destination.
The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its
domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the
petitioner's ticket issued in this country nor was his destination
Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
On February 1, 1988, the lower court granted the motion and
dismissed the case.
2
The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the lower court.
On June
26, 1991, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied.
The petitioner then came to this Court, raising
substantially the same issues it submitted in the Court of Appeals.
The assignment of errors may be grouped into two major issues, viz:
(1) the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention;
and
(2) the jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the case.
The petitioner also invokes Article 24 of the Civil Code on the
protection of minors.
THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention violates the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on
February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate,
through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine
instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on
October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on
November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the

Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our
formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every
article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith
by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of
law in this country.
The petitioner contends that Article 28(1) cannot be applied in the
present case because it is unconstitutional. He argues that there is
no substantial distinction between a person who purchases a ticket
in Manila and a person who purchases his ticket in San Francisco.
The classification of the places in which actions for damages may be
brought is arbitrary and irrational and thus violates the due process
and equal protection clauses.
It is well-settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
..
proper party; and the resolution of the question is unavoidably

necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question.
This attitude is based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming
respect for each other's acts.
The treaty which is the subject matter of this petition was a joint
legislative-executive act. The presumption is that it was first
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
adopted and given the force of law in this country.
The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to overcome
this presumption. Apparently, the Convention considered the four
places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the
litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its
passenger, as distinguished from all other places. At any rate, we
agree with the respondent court that this case can be decided on
other grounds without the necessity of resolving the constitutional
issue.
B. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention is inapplicable because of a
fundamental change in the circumstances that
served as its basis.
The petitioner goes at great lengths to show that the provisions in
the Convention were intended to protect airline companies under
"the conditions prevailing then and which have long ceased to exist."
He argues that in view of the significant developments in the airline
industry through the years, the treaty has become irrelevant. Hence,
to the extent that it has lost its basis for approval, it has become
unconstitutional.
The petitioner is invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.
According to Jessup, "this doctrine constitutes an attempt to
formulate a legal principle which would justify non-performance of a
treaty obligation if the conditions with relation to which the parties
contracted have changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to
create a situation in which the exaction of performance would be
unreasonable."
The key element of this doctrine is the vital change
in the condition of the contracting parties that they could not have
foreseen at the time the treaty was concluded.
The Court notes in this connection the following observation made
in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: 8
The Warsaw drafters wished to create a system
of liability rules that would cover all the hazards
of air travel . . . The Warsaw delegates knew
that, in the years to come, civil aviation would
change in ways that they could not foresee. They
wished to design a system of air law that would
be both durable and flexible enough to keep
pace with these changes . . . The ever-changing
needs of the system of civil aviation can be
served within the framework they created.
It is true that at the time the Warsaw Convention was drafted, the
airline industry was still in its infancy. However, that circumstance
alone is not sufficient justification for the rejection of the treaty at
this time. The changes recited by the petitioner were, realistically,

not entirely unforeseen although they were expected in a general
sense only. In fact, the Convention itself, anticipating such
developments, contains the following significant provision:
Article 41. Any High Contracting Party shall be
entitled not earlier than two years after the
coming into force of this convention to call for
the assembling of a new international
conference in order to consider any
improvements which may be made in this
convention. To this end, it will communicate
with the Government of the French Republic
which will take the necessary measures to make
preparations for such conference.
But the more important consideration is that the treaty has not
been rejected by the Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty
inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually
made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why
compliance with the treaty is no longer required.
In lieu thereof, the treaty may be denounced even without an
expressed justification for this action. Such denunciation is
authorized under its Article 39, viz:
Article 39. (1) Any one of the High Contracting
Parties may denounce this convention by a
notification addressed to the Government of the
Republic of Poland, which shall at once inform
the Government of each of the High Contracting
Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months

after the notification of denunciation, and shall
operate only as regards the party which shall
have proceeded to denunciation.
Obviously. rejection of the treaty, whether on the ground of rebus
sic stantibus or pursuant to Article 39, is not a function of the courts
but of the other branches of government. This is a political act. The
conclusion and renunciation of treaties is the prerogative of the
political departments and may not be usurped by the judiciary. The
courts are concerned only with the interpretation and application of
laws and treaties in force and not with their wisdom or efficacy.
C. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in ruling that the plaintiff must sue in the
United States, because this would deny him the
right to access to our courts.
The petitioner alleges that the expenses and difficulties he will incur
in filing a suit in the United States would constitute a constructive
denial of his right to access to our courts for the protection of his
rights. He would consequently be deprived of this vital guaranty as
embodied in the Bill of Rights.
Obviously, the constitutional guaranty of access to courts refers only
to courts with appropriate jurisdiction as defined by law. It does not
mean that a person can go to any court for redress of his grievances
..
regardless of the nature or value of his claim. If the petitioner is
barred from filing his complaint before our courts, it is because they
are not vested with the appropriate jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention, which is part of the law of our land.
II
THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.
A. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention is a rule merely of venue
and was waived by defendant when it did not
move to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue.
By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international
transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.
International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1
as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this convention, the
expression "international transportation" shall
mean any transportation in which, according to
the contract made by the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether
or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated [either] within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .
Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the
contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket.
When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the
passenger between certain designated terminals "within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the
Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights
and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same
being from the United States to the Philippines and back to the
United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four
places where an action for damages may be brought.
Whether Article 28(1) refers to jurisdiction or only to venue is a
question over which authorities are sharply divided. While the
petitioner cites several cases holding that Article 28(1) refers to
venue rather than jurisdiction,
there are later cases cited by the
private respondent supporting the conclusion that the provision is
jurisdictional.
10
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may
not be conferred by consent or waiver upon d court which otherwise
would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but
the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his
suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the
defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may
render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to
the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a
prohibition exists against their alteration.
11
A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article
28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording

of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for
damages "must" be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of
Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one of
the objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air." Third,
the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of
jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase
"rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only to Article
28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with
the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which,
as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the
time when the damage occurred.
This issue was analyzed in the leading case of Smith v. Canadian
Pacific Airways, Ltd.,
12
where it was held:
. . . Of more, but still incomplete, assistance is
the wording of Article 28(2), especially when
considered in the light of Article 32. Article 28(2)
provides that "questions of procedure shall be
governed by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted" (Emphasis supplied). Section
(2) thus may be read to leave for domestic
decision questions regarding the suitability and
location of a particular Warsaw Convention case.
In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw
Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the
international sense must be established in accordance with Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of

a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable
domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction
is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second
question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case
is submitted.
The petitioner submits that since Article 32 states that the parties
are precluded "before the damages occurred" from amending the
rules of Article 28(1) as to the place where the action may be
brought, it would follow that the Warsaw Convention was not
intended to preclude them from doing so "after the damages
occurred."
Article 32 provides:
Art. 32. Any clause contained in the contract and
all special agreements entered into before the
damage occurred by which the parties purport
to infringe the rules laid down by this
convention, whether by deciding the law to be
applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction,
shall be null and void. Nevertheless for the
transportation of goods, arbitration clauses shall
be allowed, subject to this convention, if the
arbitration is to take place within one of the
jurisdictions referred to in the first paragraph of
Article 28.
His point is that since the requirements of Article 28(1) can be
waived "after the damages (shall have) occurred," the article should

..
be regarded as possessing the character of a "venue" and not of a
"jurisdiction" provision. Hence, in moving to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, the private respondent has waived improper
venue as a ground to dismiss.
The foregoing examination of Article 28(1) in relation to Article 32
does not support this conclusion. In any event, we agree that even
granting arguendo that Article 28(1) is a venue and not a
jurisdictional provision, dismissal of the case was still in order. The
respondent court was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court
on this matter, thus:
Santos' claim that NOA waived venue as a
ground of its motion to dismiss is not correct.
True it is that NOA averred in its MOTION TO
DISMISS that the ground thereof is "the Court
has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
the Complaint" which SANTOS considers as
equivalent to "lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter . . ." However, the gist of NOA's
argument in its motion is that the Philippines is
not the proper place where SANTOS could file
the action — meaning that the venue of the
action is improperly laid. Even assuming then
that the specified ground of the motion is
erroneous, the fact is the proper ground of the
motion — improper venue — has been discussed
therein.
Waiver cannot be lightly inferred. In case of doubt, it must be

resolved in favor of non-waiver if there are special circumstances
justifying this conclusion, as in the petition at bar. As we observed in
Javier vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals:
13
Legally, of course, the lack of proper venue was
deemed waived by the petitioners when they
failed to invoke it in their original motion to
dismiss. Even so, the motivation of the private
respondent should have been taken into account
by both the trial judge and the respondent court
in arriving at their decisions.
The petitioner also invokes KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. RTC,
14
decision of our Court of Appeals, where it was held that Article 28(1)
is a venue provision. However, the private respondent avers that
this was in effect reversed by the case of Aranas v. United Airlines,
15
where the same court held that Article 28(1) is a jurisdictional
provision. Neither of these cases is binding on this Court, of course,
nor was either of them appealed to us. Nevertheless, we here
express our own preference for the later case of Aranas insofar as its
pronouncements on jurisdiction conform to the judgment we now
make in this petition.
B. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that under Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, this case was properly filed

in the Philippines, because Manila was the
destination of the plaintiff.
The Petitioner contends that the facts of this case are analogous to
those in Aanestad v. Air Canada.
16
In that case, Mrs. Silverberg
purchased a round-trip ticket from Montreal to Los Angeles and
back to Montreal. The date and time of departure were specified
but not of the return flight. The plane crashed while on route from
Montreal to Los Angeles, killing Mrs. Silverberg. Her administratrix
filed an action for damages against Air Canada in the U.S. District
Court of California. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction but the motion was denied thus:
. . . It is evident that the contract entered into
between Air Canada and Mrs. Silverberg as
evidenced by the ticket booklets and the Flight
Coupon No. 1, was a contract for Air Canada to
carry Mrs. Silverberg to Los Angeles on a certain
flight, a certain time and a certain class, but that
the time for her to return remained completely
in her power. Coupon No. 2 was only a
continuing offer by Air Canada to give her a
ticket to return to Montreal between certain
dates. . . .
The only conclusion that can be reached then, is
that "the place of destination" as used in the
Warsaw Convention is considered by both the
Canadian C.T.C. and the United States C.A.B. to
describe at least two "places of destination," viz.,

the "place of destination" of a particular flight
either an "outward destination" from the "point
of origin" or from the "outward point of
destination" to any place in Canada.
Thus the place of destination under Art. 28 and
Art. 1 of the Warsaw Convention of the flight on
which Mrs. Silverberg was killed, was Los
Angeles according to the ticket, which was the
contract between the parties and the suit is
properly filed in this Court which has jurisdiction.
The Petitioner avers that the present case falls squarely under the
above ruling because the date and time of his return flight to San
Francisco were, as in the Aanestad case, also left open.
Consequently, Manila and not San Francisco should be considered
the petitioner's destination.
The private respondent for its part invokes the ruling in Butz v.
British Airways,
17
where the United States District Court (Eastern
District of Pennsylvania) said:
. . . Although the authorities which addressed
this precise issue are not extensive, both the
cases and the commentators are almost
unanimous in concluding that the "place of
destination" referred to in the Warsaw
Convention "in a trip consisting of several parts .
. . is the ultimate destination that is accorded
treaty jurisdiction." . . .
But apart from that distinguishing feature, I

cannot agree with the Court's analysis in
Aanestad; whether the return portion of the
ticket is characterized as an option or a contract,
the carrier was legally bound to transport the
passenger back to the place of origin within the
prescribed time and. the passenger for her part
..
agreed to pay the fare and, in fact, did pay the
fare. Thus there was mutuality of obligation and
a binding contract of carriage, The fact that the
passenger could forego her rights under the
contract does not make it any less a binding
contract. Certainly, if the parties did not
contemplate the return leg of the journey, the
passenger would not have paid for it and the
carrier would not have issued a round trip ticket.
We agree with the latter case. The place of destination, within the
meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of
the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket
between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the
petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San
Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the
contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was
bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila.
Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping

place and not the destination.
The petitioner submits that the Butz case could not have overruled
the Aanestad case because these decisions are from different
jurisdictions. But that is neither here nor there. In fact, neither of
these cases is controlling on this Court. If we have preferred the Butz
case, it is because, exercising our own freedom of choice, we have
decided that it represents the better, and correct, interpretation of
Article 28(1).
Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an
"agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed
stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining
jurisdiction under the Convention.
The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the
place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The
use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of
the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one
place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate
place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place
of destination."
C. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that under Art. 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, this case was properly filed
in the Philippines because the defendant has its
domicile in the Philippines.
The petitioner argues that the Warsaw Convention was originally
written in French and that in interpreting its provisions, American
courts have taken the broad view that the French legal meaning
must govern.
18
In French, he says, the "domicile" of the carrier
means every place where it has a branch office.
The private respondent notes, however, that in Compagnie
Nationale Air France vs. Giliberto,
19
it was held:
The plaintiffs' first contention is that Air France is
domiciled in the United States. They say that the
domicile of a corporation includes any country
where the airline carries on its business on "a
regular and substantial basis," and that the
United States qualifies under such definition. The
meaning of domicile cannot, however, be so
extended. The domicile of a corporation is
customarily regarded as the place where it is
incorporated, and the courts have given the
meaning to the term as it is used in article 28(1)
of the Convention. (See Smith v. Canadian Pacific
Airways, Ltd. (2d Cir. 1971), 452 F2d 798, 802;
Nudo v. Societe Anonyme Belge d' Exploitation
de la Navigation Aerienne Sabena Belgian World
Airlines (E.D. pa. 1962). 207 F. Supp, 191;
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), 427 F. Suppl. 971, 974).
Moreover, the structure of article 28(1), viewed
as a whole, is also incompatible with the
plaintiffs' claim. The article, in stating that places
of business are among the bases of the
jurisdiction, sets out two places where an action

for damages may be brought; the country where
the carrier's principal place of business is
located, and the country in which it has a place
of business through which the particular
contract in question was made, that is, where
the ticket was bought, Adopting the plaintiffs'
theory would at a minimum blur these carefully
drawn distinctions by creating a third
intermediate category. It would obviously
introduce uncertainty into litigation under the
article because of the necessity of having to
determine, and without standards or criteria,
whether the amount of business done by a
carrier in a particular country was "regular" and
"substantial." The plaintiff's request to adopt this
basis of jurisdiction is in effect a request to
create a new jurisdictional standard for the
Convention.
Furthermore, it was argued in another case
20
that:
. . . In arriving at an interpretation of a treaty
whose sole official language is French, are we
bound to apply French law? . . . We think this
question and the underlying choice of law issue
warrant some discussion
. . . We do not think this statement can be
regarded as a conclusion that internal French law
is to be "applied" in the choice of law sense, to

determine the meaning and scope of the
Convention's terms. Of course, French legal
usage must be considered in arriving at an
accurate English translation of the French. But
when an accurate English translation is made
and agreed upon, as here, the inquiry into
meaning does not then revert to a quest for a
past or present French law to be "applied" for
revelation of the proper scope of the terms. It
does not follow from the fact that the treaty is
written in French that in interpreting it, we are
forever chained to French law, either as it
existed when the treaty was written or in its
present state of development. There is no
suggestion in the treaty that French law was
intended to govern the meaning of Warsaw's
terms, nor have we found any indication to this
..
effect in its legislative history or from our study
of its application and interpretation by other
courts. Indeed, analysis of the cases indicates
that the courts, in interpreting and applying the
Warsaw Convention, have, not considered
themselves bound to apply French law simply
because the Convention is written in French. . . .

We agree with these rulings.
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where
the complaint is allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying
the three other places, to wit, the principal place of business of the
carrier, its place of business where the contract was made, and the
place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other
places were not comprehended in the term "domicile."
D. The petitioner claims that the lower court
erred in not ruling that Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention does not apply to actions based on
tort.
The petitioner alleges that the gravamen of the complaint is that
private respondent acted arbitrarily and in bad faith, discriminated
against the petitioner, and committed a willful misconduct because
it canceled his confirmed reservation and gave his reserved seat to
someone who had no better right to it. In short. the private
respondent committed a tort.
Such allegation, he submits, removes the present case from the
coverage of the Warsaw Convention. He argues that in at least two
American cases,
21
it was held that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention does not apply if the action is based on tort.
This position is negated by Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company,
22
where the article in question was interpreted thus:
. . . Assuming for the present that plaintiff's claim
is "covered" by Article 17, Article 24 clearly
excludes any relief not provided for in the

Convention as modified by the Montreal
Agreement. It does not, however, limit the kind
of cause of action on which the relief may be
founded; rather it provides that any action based
on the injuries specified in Article 17 "however
founded," i.e., regardless of the type of action on
which relief is founded, can only be brought
subject to the conditions and limitations
established by the Warsaw System. Presumably,
the reason for the use of the phrase "however
founded," in two-fold: to accommodate all of the
multifarious bases on which a claim might be
founded in different countries, whether under
code law or common law, whether under
contract or tort, etc.; and to include all bases on
which a claim seeking relief for an injury might
be founded in any one country. In other words, if
the injury occurs as described in Article 17, any
relief available is subject to the conditions and
limitations established by the Warsaw System,
regardless of the particular cause of action which
forms the basis on which a plaintiff could seek
relief . . .
The private respondent correctly contends that the allegation of
willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the
case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention. The
petitioner has apparently misconstrued the import of Article 25(l) of
the Convention, which reads as follows:
Art. 25 (1). The carrier shall not be entitled to

avail himself of the provisions of this Convention
which exclude or limit his liability. if the damage
is caused by his willful misconduct or by such
default on his part as, in accordance with the law
of the court to which the case is submitted, is
considered to be equivalent to willful
misconduct.
It is understood under this article that the court called upon to
determine the applicability of the limitation provision must first be
vested with the appropriate jurisdiction. Article 28(1) is the
provision in the Convention which defines that jurisdiction. Article
22
23
merely fixes the monetary ceiling for the liability of the carrier
in cases covered by the Convention. If the carrier is indeed guilty of
willful misconduct, it can avail itself of the limitations set forth in this
article. But this can be done only if the action has first been
commenced properly under the rules on jurisdiction set forth in
Article 28(1).
III
THE ISSUE OF PROTECTION TO MINORS
The petitioner calls our attention to Article 24 of the Civil Code,
which states:
Art. 24. In all contractual property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Application of this article to the present case is misplaced. The
above provision assumes that the court is vested with jurisdiction to
rule in favor of the disadvantaged minor, As already explained, such
jurisdiction is absent in the case at bar.
CONCLUSION
A number of countries have signified their concern over the problem
of citizens being denied access to their own courts because of the
restrictive provision of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.
Among these is the United States, which has proposed an
amendment that would enable the passenger to sue in his own
domicile if the carrier does business in that jurisdiction. The reason
for this proposal is explained thus:
In the event a US citizen temporarily residing
abroad purchases a Rome to New York to Rome
ticket on a foreign air carrier which is generally
..
subject to the jurisdiction of the US, Article 28
would prevent that person from suing the carrier
in the US in a "Warsaw Case" even though such a
suit could be brought in the absence of the
Convention.
The proposal was incorporated in the Guatemala Protocol amending
the Warsaw Convention, which was adopted at Guatemala City on
March 8,
1971.
24
But it is still ineffective because it has not yet been ratified
by the required minimum number of contracting parties. Pending
such ratification, the petitioner will still have to file his complaint
only in any of the four places designated by Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
The proposed amendment bolsters the ruling of this Court that a
citizen does not necessarily have the right to sue in his own courts
simply because the defendant airline has a place of business in his
country.
The Court can only sympathize with the petitioner, who must
prosecute his claims in the United States rather than in his own
country at least inconvenience. But we are unable to grant him the
relief he seeks because we are limited by the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention which continues to bind us. It may not be amiss
to observe at this point that the mere fact that he will have to
litigate in the American courts does not necessarily mean he will
litigate in vain. The judicial system of that country in known for its
sense of fairness and, generally, its strict adherence to the rule of
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

..
G.R. No. 156187 November 11, 2004
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner,
vs.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN,
FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD
MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the
Decision
dated 31 July 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 62625, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
orders dated June 7, 2000, August 9, 2000 and November
8, 2000 are SET ASIDE.
Respondent judge is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 67878 on the
ground of improper venue.
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of
Noah’s Ark International, Noah’s Ark Sugar Carriers, Noah’s Ark

Sugar Truckers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Repacker, Noah’s Ark Sugar
Insurers, Noah’s Ark Sugar Terminal, Noah’s Ark Sugar Building, and
Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.
Sometime in August 1996, petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T.
Looyuko applied for an Omnibus Line accommodation with
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of
Nine Hundred Million (P900,000,000) Pesos,
and was favorably
acted upon by the latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels
of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 64070,
located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837 square meters,
and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also
located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271 square meters,
registered in the name of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.
On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation
granted to petitioner was subsequently cancelled
by respondent
UCPB. As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go demanded from
UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325)
covered by Real Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to
return the same and proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real
Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the
registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City on 02 September 1997.

On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage
covered by TCT No. 64070, for
nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result,
the public auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11
April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
against respondent bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V.
Manahan, Francisco C. Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward E.
Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff Lydia G. San Juan and Sheriff
IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 266, docketed as Civil Case No. 67878. The complaint was
subsequently amended
on 22 May 2000. The amended complaint
alleged, among other things, the following: that petitioner Jimmy T.
Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT No. 64070,
although the title is registered only in the name of Looyuko; that
respondent bank was aware that he is a co-owner as he was asked
to sign two deeds of real estate mortgage covering the subject
property; that the approved omnibus credit line applied for by him
and Looyuko did not materialize and was cancelled by respondent
bank on 21 July 1997, so that the pre-signed real estate mortgages
were likewise cancelled; that he demanded from respondent bank
that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be returned to him, but
respondent bank refused to do so; that despite the cancellation of
the omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had the
two deeds of real estate mortgage dated and notarized on 22 July
1997 and caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale scheduled on 11
April 2000 and 03 May 2000 be enjoined; that the two real estate
mortgages be cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 be
returned to him; and that respondent bank and its officers be
ordered to pay him moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, instead of filing an answer, filed
a motion to dismiss
based on the following grounds: 1) that the
court has no jurisdiction over the case due to nonpayment of the
proper filing and docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the
wrong venue; 3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was
not impleaded and, therefore, the complaint states no cause of
action; 4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and 5) that
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient
and false certification of non-forum shopping.
On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order
10
granting
petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Correspondingly, the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and
03 May 2000, was enjoined.
On 09 August 2000, the trial court denied
11
respondent bank’s
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 67878. A motion for
reconsideration
12
was filed, but the same was likewise denied in an
Order
13
dated 08 November 2000.
Respondent bank questioned said orders before the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari
14
dated 03 January 2001, alleging
that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order denying the motion to
dismiss and the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 31 July 2002, the Court of Appeals
15
set aside the Orders dated
07 June 2000, 09 August 2000 and 08 November 2000 issued by the
trial court and directed the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. 67878
on the ground of improper venue.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner,
16
which was
denied in an order dated 14 November 2002.
17

..
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
18
On 16 June 2003, the Court gave due course to the petition, and
required
19
the parties to file their respective memoranda.
Respondents filed their Joint Memorandum on 27 August 2003,
while petitioner filed his on 25 September 2003 upon prior leave of
court for extension. With leave of this Court, private respondents
filed their reply to petitioner’s memorandum.
In his memorandum, petitioner raised a lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER BY
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS FINDING THAT
THE CASE A QUO IS A "REAL ACTION."
Simply put, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether
petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a
personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or
as provided for in Section 1, Rule 4,
20
a real action is an action
affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.
These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of

mortgage on, real property. The venue for real actions is the same
for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the court which
has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or
any part thereof lies.
21
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property,
for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its
breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an
injury to the person or property.
22
The venue for personal actions is
likewise the same for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the
court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of
Rule 4.
23
It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue
for cases of the above nature is the primary objective for which said
cases are filed. Thus:
1. In Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,
24
this Court ruled that "an action to redeem by
the mortgage debtor affects his title to the foreclosed
property. If the action is seasonably made, it seeks to
erase from the title of the judgment or mortgage debtor

the lien created by registration of the mortgage and sale. If
not made seasonably, it may seek to recover ownership to
the land since the purchaser’s inchoate title to the
property becomes consolidated after [the] expiration of
the redemption period. Either way, redemption involves
the title to the foreclosed property. It is a real action."
2. In Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc., v. Court of Appeals,
25
this Court quoting the decision of the Court of Appeals
ruled that "since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property results in a conveyance of the title of the
property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to
annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting
the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action
which should be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or part thereof lies."
3. In Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana,
26
this court ruled
that "while it is true that petitioner does not directly seek
the recovery . . . of the property in question, his action for
annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building
which, under the law, is considered immovable property,
the recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The
prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of

the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real
action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in
dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue
which was timely raised."
4. In Ruiz v. J. M. Tuason Co., Inc., et al.,
27
the court ruled
that "although [a] complaint is entitled to be one for
specific performance, yet the fact that [complainant]
asked that a deed of sale of a parcel of land . . . be issued
in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering
said land be issued to him, shows that the primary
objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel
of land itself because to execute in favor of complainant
the conveyance requested there is need to make a finding
that he is the owner of the land which in the last analysis
resolves itself into an issue of ownership. Hence, the
action must be commenced in the province where the
property is situated . . . ."
5. In Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Inc. v. Hon. Hermogenes
Caluag,
28
this Court ruled that "an action praying that
defendant be ordered `to accept the payment being made’
by plaintiff for the lot which the latter contracted to buy
on installment basis from the former, to pay plaintiff
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees and to enjoin
defendant and his agents from repossessing the lot in
question, is one that affects title to the land under Section

3 of Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, and ‘shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property
or any part thereof lies,’ because, although the immediate
remedy is to compel the defendant to accept the tender of
payment allegedly made, it is obvious that this relief is
merely the first step to establish plaintiff’s title to [the]
real property."
6. In Land Tenure Administration, et al. v. The Honorable
Higinio B. Macadaeg and Alejandro T. Lim,
29
this Court
ruled that "where the lessee seeks to establish an interest
in an hacienda that runs with the land and one that must
be respected by the purchaser of the land even if the latter
is not a party to the original lease contract, the question of
whether or not the standing crop is immovable property
become[s] irrelevant, for venue is determined by the
nature of the principal claim. Since the lessee is primarily
interested in establishing his right to recover possession of
the land for the purpose of enabling him to gather his
share of the crops, his action is real and must be brought
in the locality where the land is situated."
..
7. In Espineli & Mojica v. Hon. Santiago and Vda. de
Ramirez,
30
the court ruled that "although the main relief
sought in the case at bar was the delivery of the certificate
of title, said relief, in turn, entirely depended upon who,
between the parties, has a better right to the lot in
question. As it is not possible for the court to decide the
main relief, without passing upon the claim of the parties
with respect to the title to and possession of the lot in
question, the claim shall be determined x x x in the
province where [the] said property or any part thereof
lies."
The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals,
31
is more particularly
instructive. There, we held that an action for nullification of the
mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a
real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the
real action is before the court having jurisdiction over the territory in
which the property lies, which is the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of
mortgage is a personal action and since he resides at Pasig City,
venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by alluding
to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.
32
Petitioner’s reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural
Bank of Lucena
33
is misplaced. Firstly, said case was primarily an
action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That action, which is
not expressly included in the enumeration found in Section 2(a) of
Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now under Section 1, Rule 4 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the
mortgaged lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The
mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. The plaintiffs’ title is
not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots.
Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs’ personal action is the place where
the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff. In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real
estate mortgage filed by herein petitioner was primarily an action to
compel private respondent bank to return to him the properties
covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had
already initiated foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation
by the said respondent bank of the omnibus credit line on 21 July
1997. The prime objective is to recover said real properties.
Secondly, Carandang distinctly articulated that the ruling in
Hernandez does not apply where the mortgaged property had
already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by the
appellate court, respondent bank had already initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for the timely issuance of a
restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the
same would have already been sold at a public auction.
In a relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals,
34
it was succinctly stated that the prayer for the
nullification of the mortgage is a prayer affecting real property,
hence, is a real action.
In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the
instant petition, is a real action, considering that a real estate
mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.
35
An action for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting
the title to the property. It is, therefore, a real action which should
be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the
subject property lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision dated 31 July 2002 and the Order dated 14
November 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby
AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. NO. 156596 August 24, 2007
ADELAIDA INFANTE, Petitioner,
vs.
ARAN BUILDERS, INC., Respondent.
*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision
of the Court
of Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 12, 2002, which upheld the
Order dated September 4, 2001, issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City (RTC).
The undisputed facts and issues raised in the lower courts are
accurately summarized by the CA as follows:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (or "Muntinlupa
RTC"; Branch 276), presided over by Hon. Norma C. Perello (or
"respondent judge"), was an action for revival of judgment filed on
June 6, 2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. (or "private respondent") against
Adelaida Infante (or "petitioner"), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-164.
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (or "Makati RTC"; Branch 60) in an action
for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
15563.
The Makati RTC judgment, which became final and executory on
November 16, 1994, decreed as follows:
26. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B. INFANTE is ordered to do
the following within thirty (30) days from finality hereof:
26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN
BUILDERS, INC. the following: (a) the complete
plans (lot plan, location map and vicinity map);

(b) Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (c ) Real
Estate Tax clearance; (d) tax receipts; (e) proof of
up to date payment of Subdivision Association
dues referred to in the "CONTRACT TO SELL"
dated November 10, 1986 (Exh. A or Exh. 1);
26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of Lot No. 11,
Block 9, Phase 3-A1, Ayala Alabang Subdivision
covered by TCT No. 114015 for P500,000.00 in
favor of the plaintiff;
26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax, documentary
stamp taxes and other taxes which the Bureau of
Internal Revenue may assess in connection with
the sale mentioned in the preceding paragraph
and to submit to the plaintiff proof of such
payment;
26.1.4. To secure the written conformity of
AYALA CORPORATION to the said sale and to
give such written conformity to the plaintiff;
26.1.5. To register the deed of sale with the
Registry of Deeds and deliver to AYALA
CORPORATION the certificate of title issued in
the name of plaintiff pursuant to such
registration;
26.2 Upon the compliance of the defendant with the
preceding directives, the plaintiff must immediately pay to
the defendant the sum of P321,918.25;
26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff P10,000.00
as attorney’s fees;
26.4 The Complaint for moral and exemplary damages is

DISMISSED;
26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and
26.6 Cost is taxed against the defendant.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of
judgment) on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.
On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC issued an order which
reads:
The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.
Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by the Makati Regional Trial
Court, but it must be emphasized that at that time there was still no
Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, then under the territorial
jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that cases from this City were
tried and heard at Makati City. With the creation of the Regional
Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters involving properties located
in this City, and cases involving Muntinlupa City residents were all
ordered to be litigated before these Courts.
The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared the plaintiff
as the owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City. It is this
judgment which is sought to be enforced thru this action which
necessarily involves the interest, possession, title, and ownership of
the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to
Plaintiff. It goes without saying that the complaint should be filed in
the latter City where the property is located, as there are now
Regional Trial Courts hereat.
Defendant may answer the complaint within the remaining period,
but no less than five (5) days, otherwise a default judgment might be
taken against her.

It is SO ORDERED.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied per order dated
September 28, 2001, petitioner came to this Court [CA] via the
..
instant special civil action for certiorari. She ascribes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent judge for "erroneously holding that Civil Case No. 01-164
is a revival of judgment which declared private respondent as the
owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the
judgment rendered by the (Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 15563
sought to be enforced necessarily involves the interest, possession,
title and ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City."
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and
damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action and, therefore,
the suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature;
and that, consequently, the venue of the action for revival of
judgment is either Makati City or Parañaque City where private
respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the election of
private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the subject
action for revival judgment is "quasi in rem because it involves and
affects vested or adjudged right on a real property"; and that,
consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is
situated.
2
On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling in favor
of herein private respondent. The CA held that since the judgment
sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival
of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but the
motion was denied per Resolution dated January 7, 2003.
Hence, herein petition. Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding
that the complaint for revival of judgment is an action in rem which
was correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the disputed real
property is located.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an action
in personam; therefore, the complaint should be filed with the RTC
of the place where either petitioner or private respondent resides.
Petitioner then concludes that the filing of the action for revival of
judgment with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, the place where the
disputed property is located, should be dismissed on the ground of
improper venue.
Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is seeking
to revive involves interest over real property. As such, the present
action for revival is a real action, and venue was properly laid with
the court of the place where the realty is located.
Thus, the question that must be answered is: where is the proper
venue of the present action for revival of judgment?
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it
is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and executory
judgment or order may be enforced by action. The Rule does not
specify in which court the action for revival of judgment should be
filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,
the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same
court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by
the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.
(Emphasis supplied)
but emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure
which fix the venue of actions in general must be considered.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
xxxx
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether
the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a
personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the
action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be
filed with the court of the place where the real property is located. If
such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then
a personal action that may be filed with the court of the place where
the plaintiff or defendant resides.
In support of her contention that the action for revival of judgment
is a personal action and should be filed in the court of the place
where either the plaintiff or defendant resides, petitioner cites the
statements made by the Court in Aldeguer v. Gemelo
and Donnelly
v. Court of First Instance of Manila
. Petitioner, however, seriously
misunderstood the Court's rulings in said cases.
In Aldeguer, what the Court stated was that "[t]he action for the
execution of a judgment for damages is a personal one, and under
section 377 [of the Code of Civil Procedure], it should be brought in
any province where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff"
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioner apparently took such statement to mean that any action
for revival of judgment should be considered as a personal one. This
thinking is incorrect. The Court specified that the judgment sought

to be revived in said case was a judgment for damages. The
judgment subject of the action for revival did not involve or affect
any title to or possession of real property or any interest therein.
The complaint filed in the revival case did not fall under the category
of real actions and, thus, the action necessarily fell under the
category of personal actions.
In Donnelly, the portion of the Decision being relied upon by
petitioner stated thus:
..
Petitioner raises before this Court two (2) issues, namely: (a)
whether an action for revival of judgment is one quasi in rem and,
therefore, service of summons may be effected thru publication;
and (b) whether the second action for revival of judgment (Civil Case
No. 76166) has already prescribed. To our mind, the first is not a
proper and justiciable issue in the present proceedings x x x.
Nevertheless, let it be said that an action to revive a judgment is a
personal one. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court clearly pointed out that in said case, the issue on whether
an action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper
and justiciable. Therefore, the foregoing statement cannot be used
as a precedent, as it was merely an obiter dictum. Moreover, as in
Aldeguer, the judgment sought to be revived in Donnelly involved
judgment for a certain sum of money. Again, no title or interest in

real property was involved. It is then understandable that the action
for revival in said case was categorized as a personal one.
Clearly, the Court's classification in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the
actions for revival of judgment as being personal in character does
not apply to the present case.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine
whether it is a real action or a personal action.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and
executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed
of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of
herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with
said sale; register the deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and
deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in the
name of private respondent. The same judgment ordered private
respondent to pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon
petitioner's compliance with the aforementioned order. It is further
alleged that petitioner refused to comply with her judgment
obligations despite private respondent's repeated requests and
demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the action for
revival of judgment. Private respondent then prayed that the
judgment be revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce
said judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property
conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private respondent
has an established interest over the lot in question; and to protect
such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive the
previous judgment. The sole reason for the present action to revive
is the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged rights over a

piece of realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real
action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real
property.1avvphi1
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the
complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
place where the realty is located.
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. -
The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch
of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory
thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the
branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all
suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may
exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be
exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the
people of the different parts of the region and making the
attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the Regional
Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a particular
territory defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City
was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section
Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on September 4,
1991. Said law provided for the creation of a branch of the Regional
Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in

Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to
validly issue orders and processes concerning real property within
Muntinlupa City.
Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 when it denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss; and the CA did not commit any error
in affirming the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12,
2002 and Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. L-20341 May 14, 1966
DR. SIMEON S. CLARIDADES, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
VICENTE C. MERCADER and PERFECTO FERNANDEZ, defendants and
appellees,
GUILLERMO REYES, intervenor and appellant,
ARMANDO H. ASUNCION, intervenor and appellee,
ALFREDO J. ZULUETA and YAP LEDING, intervenors and appellees.
Francisco S. Dizon for plaintiffs and appellants.
Gonzales, Sr. and Munsayac for defendants and appellees.
Jose F. Tiburcio for intervenors and appellees Zulueta and Leding.

Toribio T. Bella for intervenor and appellee Asuncion.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan based upon the ground that venue had been improperly
laid.
Petitioner, Dr. Simeon S. Claridades brought this action against
Vicente C. Mercader and Perfecto Fernandez for the dissolution of a
partnership allegedly existing between them and an accounting of
the operation of the partnership, particularly a fishpond located in
Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, which was the main asset of the partnership,
from September 1954, as well as to recover moral and exemplary
damages, in addition to attorney's fees and costs.
In their answer the defendants admitted the existence of the
partnership and alleged that its operation had been so far
unproductive. By way of special defense, they alleged, also, that
there is an impending auction sale of said fishpond due to
delinquency in the payment of taxes owing to lack of funds and
plaintiff's failure to contribute what is due from him. Defendants,
likewise, set up a counter-claim for damages, by reason of the
institution of this action, and for attorney's fees and costs.
Subsequently, Guillermo Reyes was allowed to intervene for the
purpose of recovering a sum of money allegedly due him for services
rendered as foreman of said fishpond, plus damages. Later, one
Armando Asuncion succeeded in intervening as the alleged assignee
of the interest of defendant. Mercader in said partnership and
fishpond. Thereafter, on plaintiff's motion, the lower court
appointed a receiver of the fishpond. Upon the other hand, Alfredo
Zulueta and his wife Yap Leding sought permission to intervene, still
later, alleging that they are the owners of said fishpond, having
bought one-half (½)of it from Benito Regencia, who, in turn, had
acquired it from Asuncion, who had purchased the fishpond from
defendant Mercader, and the other half having been assigned to
him directly by Asuncion.
Despite plaintiff's opposition thereto, said permission was granted in
an order dated February 8, 1962, which, likewise gave the Zuluetas
ten (10) days within which to file such pleading as they may deem
necessary for the protection of their rights. Soon thereafter, or on
February 12, 1962, the Zuluetas filed a motion to dismiss upon the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action; that venue has
been improperly laid; and that plaintiff complaint is moot and
academic. Acting upon the motion, on March 2, 1962, the lower
court granted the same upon the ground of improper venue. A
reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff and
intervenor Reyes have interposed the present appeal.
The only question for determination before us is whether or not this
action should have been instituted, not in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, but in that of Marinduque, where the aforementioned
fishpond is located. The lower court answered this question in the
affirmative, upon the ground that the subject matter of this case is
the possessor of said fishpond, because plaintiff prays in the
complaint that the assets of the partnership, including said fishpond
be sold, that the proceeds of the sale be applied to the payment of
the debts of the partnership, and that the residue be distributed
equally among the partners; that, as intervenor, Asuncion claims to
have an interest in said fishpond; that the same has been placed
under a receivership; and that the Zuluetas claim to be the exclusive
owners of the fishpond aforementioned.
The conclusion drawn from these premises is erroneous. Plaintiff's

complaint merely seeks the liquidation of his partnership with
defendants Fernandez and Mercader. This is obviously a personal
action, which may be brought in the place of residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendants. Since plaintiff is a resident of Bulacan, he
had the right to bring the action in the court of first instance of that
province.
What is more, although defendants Fernandez and
Mercader reside in Marinduque, they did not object to the venue. In
other words, they waived whatever rights they had, if any, to
question it.
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the
partnership, including the fishpond in question, did not change the
nature or character of action, such sale being merely a necessary
incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede
and/or is part of its process of dissolution. Neither plaintiff's
complaint nor the answer filed by defendants Fernandez and
Mercader questioned the title to said property or the possession
thereof.
Again, the situation was not changed materially by the Intervention
either of Asuncion or of the Zuluetas, for, as alleged successors to
the interest Mercader in the fishpond, they, at best, stepped into his
shoes. Again, the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint.
At any rate, since the venue was
properly laid when the complaint was filed, said venue cannot,
subsequently, become improper in consequence of issues later
raised by any of the intervenors. The court having legally acquired
authority to hear and decide the case, it can not be divested of that
authority by said intervenors. "An intervention cannot alter the
nature of the action and the issues joined by the original parties
thereto."
Wherefore, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby set
aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, with costs against intervenors appellees, Armando H.
Asuncion and Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo J. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
..
G.R. No. 134431, Promulgated December 1, 2000
DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC., Petitioner
vs.
DOLE PHILIPPINES INC., Respondent
BUENA, J.:
On March 15, 1995, petitioner Davao Abaca Plantation Company,
Inc. [DAPCO for brevity] brought a complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila against respondent DOLE Philippines, Inc. [DOLE],
which reads:
"PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, most respectfully avers

that:
"ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
"1. Plaintiff Davao Abaca Plantation Company,
Inc. (DAPCO) is a corporation organized and
existing under Philippine law with principal
offices at 5-N Legaspi Towers 300, 2600 Roxas
Boulevard, Manila;
"2. Defendant DOLE Philippines, Inc. (DOLE) is a
corporation organized and existing under
Philippine law with principal offices at 14
th
Floor,
B.A. Lepanto Building, Paseo de Roxas, City of
Makati, where it may be served with summons
and other processes;
"3. DAPCO is the owner of the land located in the
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Davao,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1920 with an area of 1,023.81 hectares, more or
less;
"4. DOLE or its predecessor in interest been the
lessee of the property since 1969 and has used
the land for growing export quality bananas;
"5. On November 28, 1985, two (2) Lease
Agreements (herein after '1985 Lease
Agreements'), one covering 839 hectares and the
other 165 hectares or a total of 1,004 hectares
were executed. The lease period for both
contracts was 10 (ten) years from February 7,

1994 renewable for another six (6) years at the
sole option of DOLE. It was also agreed that if no
agreement is reached by the parties on the
rental or other terms and conditions of the lease
at the end of the original period, DOLE shall be
automatically granted a grace period of two (2)
years viz., until February 7, 1996 within which to
wind up its operations on the land. Copies of the
1985 Lease Agreements are attached and made
part hereof as Annexes 'A' and 'B';
"6. After Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) took effect in 1988, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) deferred subjecting the
land to CARL coverage but later reversed itself.
Nevertheless, CARL precludes early coverage of
private land leased, held or possessed by
multinational corporations such as DOLE;
"7. On December 9, 1992, DOLE exercised its
sole option and renewed the lease up to
December 31, 2000 pursuant to paragraph 1 of
the 1985 Lease Agreements. A copy of DOLE's
letter to DAPCO, hereinafter to as 'Lease
Renewal Agreement' is attached and made part
hereof as Annex 'C';
"8. Since DOLE had rights under the Lease
Renewal Agreement which had to be
represented or protected in the DAR proceeding,
DAPCO formally requested DOLE to intervene in
the said proceeding in a letter of December 27,

1993;
"9. DOLE replied to DAPCO by letter dated
January 28, 1994 that it chose not to intervene in
the DAR proceeding because: (1) such
intervention or participation is necessary
because the CARL itself (section 8, 4
th
par.)
Grants DOLE (Stanfilco) a 10-year CARL
deferment by providing that DOLE's lease with
DAPCO (Inc.) shall be respected until its valid
termination; (2) DOLE's (Stanfilco) right to
deferment is already fully protected by Section
8, 4
th
par. Of the CARL, and, accordingly, it does
not need the deferment allowed under Section
11 of the same law. Indeed, Section 72 of the
CARL mandates that DOLE's (Stanfilco) rights
under the renewed/extended lease contracts
with DAPCO, Inc. should be respected whatever
happens'; and (3) the DAR proceeding between
DAPCO and another party cannot prejudice the
rights and privileges of DOLE under the lease
renewal agreement since DOLE is not a party
thereto;
"DOLE in the letter further underscored the
obligatory force of the contracts between the
parties until December 31, 2000 and assured

that DOLE will honor and 'faithfully comply in
good faith with our contracts and other
obligations.' x x x
"x x x x x x x x x
"13. On January 6, 1995, DOLE wrote DAPCO
asking the latter for its intentions regarding the
lease agreements in view of the pendency of
proceedings subjecting the leased area to CARL..
xxx
"14. On January 18, 1995, DAPCO replied to
DOLE that it would honor and defend the lease
agreements and emphasized that by DOLE's own
representation, DOLE chose to not to be a party
to the DAR proceeding in order that it could not
..
be bound by any decision rendered by DAR>
DAPCO demanded that DOLE abide with the
lease contracts, pay base rental and make an
accounting of the production for 1994 so that
the base rental can be computed. Under the
agreements, the rental for 1995 was to pay (sic)
on or before January 15, 1995. x x x
"15. In an apparent attempt to cover up its own
wrong doings as will be shown hereafter, DOLE,
in a letter dated January 25, 1995, answered

DAPCO claiming that: 'the acts of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
implementing R.A. 6657 are already fait
accompli'; that 'Government's complete taking
of the leased premises and distribution of the
same to ARB association made it legally
impossible for DAPCO, Inc. to perform its
obligation to maintain the lessee in peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the things leased; and
that the actions of the Government amount to
caso fortuito.' DOLE further stated that
'STANFILCO's obligation to pay DAPCO, Inc. the
rentals stipulated in the Lease Agreements
ceased xxx.'xxx
"16. DOLE's letter surprised DAPCO because it
represented a total reversal of DOLE's former
legal position, promises, representations, written
and other assurances of contractual fidelity to
DAPCO;
"x x x x x x x x x
"PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a temporary restraining
order be immediately issued ex-parte, restraining DOLE and/or of its
duly authorized representatives wherever situated from doing the
following acts: (a) dealing or continuing with any contractual
arrangements with SEARBAI or others over the properties leased
from DAPCO; (b) claiming ownership and/or exercising right of
possession over the improvements belonging to DAPCO under the
contracts; and (c) utilizing and enjoying DAPCO's land and the
improvements thereon, particularly but not limited to standing
crops and the fruits thereof, and for this purpose ordering DOLE to
direct its duly authorized representatives in the leased area to
comply with the restraining order; and after notice and hearing, a
preliminary injunction issue restraining DOLE from dealing or
continuing with any contractual arrangements with SEARBAI or
others over the properties leased from DAPCO; claiming ownership
and/or exercising right of possession over the improvements
belonging to DAPCO under the contract; and utilizing and enjoying
DAPCO's land and the improvements thereon, particularly but not
limited to standing crops and the fruits thereof. After hearing,
judgement be rendered:
"1. Under the First Cause of Action
a] Permanently restraining DOLE from dealing or continuing with any
contractual arrangements with SEARBAI or others over any of the
properties leased from or owned by DAPCO;
b] ordering DOLE to pay actual damages to DAPCO in the amount of
P32 million.
"AND
"Under the Second Cause of Action
contractual arrangements with SEARBAI or others over any of the
properties leased from or owned by DAPCO;
b] Ordering DOLE to comply and honor its lease agreements with
DAPCO over the premises and/or properties subject matter of this
action;
c] Ordering DOLE to comply with the lease agreements by

surrendering and delivering to DAPCO the land, together with all
permanent and fixed improvements thereon existing including
standing crops and the fruits thereof.
"3. Under the Third Cause of Action
contractual arrangements with any contractual arrangements with
SEARBAI or others over any of the properties leased from or owned
by DAPCO;
b] Ordering DOLE to comply and honor its lease renewal agreement
with DAPCO over the premises and/or properties subject matter of
this action;
c] Ordering DOLE to pay DAPCO the annual rental for 1995 pursuant
to paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of the Lease Renewal Agreement in the
amount of at least P14 million and the succeeding annual rental
thereon;
"4 Under All Causes of Action
a] Ordering DOLE under all of the causes of action to pay DAPCO the
sum of a t least P500, 000.00 as attorney's fees;
b] Ordering DOLE to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P10
million;
c] Ordering DOLE to pay interest on all DAPCO's claims from date of
renewal; and
d] pay cost of suit.
"Other relief's just and equitable are likewise prayed for."
When the hearing ensued on the basis of the foregoing complaint,
DOLE filed with the Court of Appeals [CA] a petition for certiorari

..
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning,
among others, the jurisdiction of the trial court.
On March 13, 1998, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint filed by DAPCO on the ground of wrong venue. Thus, it
held that the complaint filed by DAPCO "is actually a real action,
DAPCO's main objective being to assert ownership and recover
possession of the land in dispute. Such being the case, venue lies not
in Manila but in South Cotabato where the property in dispute is
located, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Court,
as amended by Circular No. 13-95."
The appellate court prohibited
the trial court from taking any further action except to hear DOLE's
compulsory counterclaim on the merit.
With the denial of DAPCO's
motion for reconsideration, DAPCO now comes before us assailing
the order of dismissal.
The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of the
nature of the complaint filed by DAPCO. The jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in
the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not
entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein a matter
resolved only after and as a result of the trial.
4
Judging from the
terms of the complaint, DAPCO is enforcing the lease contract
against DOLE. A breach of contract is a cause of action either for
specific performance or recession of contracts.
DOLE argues that
the complaint is an assertion and claim of ownership over the land,
subject of the lease. It bears stressing that DOLE leased the subject
property from DAPCO. As Lessee, DOLE is stopped to deny lessor's
title. The conclusive presumption embodied in Rule 131, Section 2
(b) applies to DOLE and the estoppel does not depend on the validity
of the landlord's title.
It cannot be said that the main objective of
DAPCO in filing the complaint is to recover the land leased to DOLE
because DAPCO neither denied the fact that the lands were
subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. What is
being asserted was the rental payment for the year 1995 and the
succeeding annual rentals until the expiration of the lease. As to
whether the lease contract remains valid until the alleged renewed
or extended period is best left to the trial court to determine. The
relief demanded by DAPCO from DOLE is dependent on the
evidentiary matters to be raised and threshed out in trial proper.
The complaint itself may not be property worded and additionally
sought compliance with the lease agreement by 'surrendering and
delivering to DAPCO the land, together with all permanent and fixed
improvements thereon existing including standing crops and the
fruits thereof" which necessarily muddled the issues, as to whether
the action is real or a personal one. Both DAPCO and DOLE admitted
that the subject property was subjected to CARP. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law itself provides for recognition,
subject to limitations, of existing contracts, like lease, even when the
lands covered by lease, were subjected to CARP and were
transferred to owner-beneficiaries.
Whether or not DOLE is no
longer liable for rental payments for the year 1995 because of the
expired lease agreement must be properly proved before the court.
No claim of ownership can be properly raised by DAPCO from DOLE
considering that DOLE is not the owner of the property, being
merely a lessee thereof.
The operation of the CARP limited the recovery of DAPCO to rental
payments and damages, if any. The question as to whether THE
DOLE was bound by the terms of the lease and is liable for damages
should be discussed and settled by trial court in accordance with the
evidence submitted by both parties. The Court of Appeals holds that
the venue lies in South Cotabato where the property is situated.
Granting that the complaint is a real action, the venue is not in
South Cotabato but is in Davao del Norte where the property is
situated as described in the lease agreement.
However, considering
that the complaint below is in the nature of a personal action, the
rules on venue at the time the complaint was filed governs. When
the complaint was filed on March 15, 1995, venue for personal
actions is in the place where the plaintiff or any of the defendants or
any of the defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since
DAPCO has its principal office in Manila, it cannot be said that

DAPCO, in exercising its option by filling the suit in Manila,
committed a breach of the rules.
As for DOLE's argument that petitioner no longer owns the subject
property so that it has no more obligation to pay petitioner for the
rent, suffice it to say that the issue of ownership is subject of
another litigation between petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries,
and DAR. Whether petitioner is still the owner is best threshed out
in the trial proper rather than resolved in this incidental issue since
we are not tried of facts.
Moreover, whatever effect that the
expropriation of the leased lands may have had on their lease
contracts cannot be prematurely resolved herein without
preempting the lower court.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court of Appeals' decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and petitioner's complaint is hereby ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G. RESLIN,
and JOSE G. RESLIN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA
BENEDICTO-PAULINO, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails and seeks
to nullify the Decision
dated October 17, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64246 and its Resolution
of June 20,
2002 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The assailed
CA decision annulled and set aside the Orders dated October 9,
2000, December 18, 2000, and March 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 17 in Batac, Ilocos Norte which admitted
petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-
17.
The Facts
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now
deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto Group) organized
Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity
Corporation (UEC), respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta
would later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a
contract or arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in
his name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the shares of
stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation to hold those shares and
their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65%
of such shares. Several years after, Irene, through her trustee-

husband, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance of
said 65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC two
similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting and
receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The first, docketed
as Civil Case No. 3341-17, covered the UEC shares and named
Benedicto, his daughter, and at least 20 other individuals as
defendants. The second, docketed as Civil Case No. 3342-17, sought
the recovery to the extent of 65% of FEMII shares held by Benedicto
and the other defendants named therein.
Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino,
Benedicto's daughter,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 3341-17, followed later by an
Amended Motion to Dismiss. Benedicto, on the other hand, moved
to dismiss
Civil Case No. 3342-17, adopting in toto the five (5)
grounds raised by Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss.
Among these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate dispute
over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the RTC,
has jurisdiction; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation therein
that plaintiff, as beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted the
trust created in her favor.
To the motions to dismiss, Irene filed a Consolidated Opposition,
which Benedicto and Francisca countered with a Joint Reply to
Opposition.
Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were consolidated.
During the preliminary proceedings on their motions to dismiss,
Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering their contentions on
improper venue, presented the Joint Affidavit
of Gilmia B. Valdez,
Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco who all attested being
employed as household staff at the Marcos' Mansion in Brgy. Lacub,
Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain residence in said
place as she in fact only visited the mansion twice in 1999; that she
did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections; and that she
was staying at her husband's house in Makati City.
Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene presented her
PhP 5 community tax certificate
(CTC) issued on "11/07/99" in
Curimao, Ilocos Norte to support her claimed residency in Batac,
Ilocos Norte.
In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto died and was
substituted by his wife, Julita C. Benedicto, and Francisca.
On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that
these partly constituted "real action," and that Irene did not actually
reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore, venue was improperly laid. In
its dismissal order,
the court also declared "all the other issues
raised in the different Motions to Dismiss x x x moot and academic."
From the above order, Irene interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration
8
which Julita and Francisca duly opposed.
Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Irene filed on
July 17, 2000 a Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint),
attaching
therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint
10
dated July 14, 2000 in
which the names of Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G.
Reslin appeared as additional plaintiffs. As stated in the amended
complaint, the added plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's
new trustees. Parenthetically, the amended complaint stated
practically the same cause of action but, as couched, sought the
reconveyance of the FEMII shares only.
During the August 25, 2000 hearing, the RTC dictated in open court
an order denying Irene's motion for reconsideration
aforementioned, but deferred action on her motion to admit
amended complaint and the opposition thereto.
11
On October 9, 2000, the RTC issued an Order
12
entertaining the
amended complaint, dispositively stating:
WHEREFORE, the admission of the Amended Complaint
being tenable and legal, the same is GRANTED.
Let copies of the Amended Complaint be served to the defendants
who are ordered to answer within the reglementary period provided

by the rules.
The RTC predicated its order on the following premises:
..
(1) Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
13
Irene may
opt to file, as a matter of right, an amended complaint.
(2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs, one of whom was a Batac,
an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended complaint setting out the
same cause of action cured the defect of improper venue.
(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the
filing of the amended complaint in question in the place of residence
of any of Irene's co-plaintiffs.
In time, Julita and Francisca moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, but the RTC, by Order
14
dated December 18, 2000,
denied the motion and reiterated its directive for the two to answer
the amended complaint.
In said order, the RTC stood pat on its holding on the rule on
amendments of pleadings. And scoffing at the argument about there
being no complaint to amend in the first place as of October 9, 2000
(when the RTC granted the motion to amend) as the original
complaints were dismissed with finality earlier, i.e., on August 25,
2000 when the court denied Irene's motion for reconsideration of

the June 29, 2000 order dismissing the original complaints, the court
stated thusly: there was actually no need to act on Irene's motion to
admit, it being her right as plaintiff to amend her complaints absent
any responsive pleading thereto. Pushing its point, the RTC added
the observation that the filing of the amended complaint on July 17,
2000 ipso facto superseded the original complaints, the dismissal of
which, per the June 29, 2000 Order, had not yet become final at the
time of the filing of the amended complaint.
Following the denial on March 15, 2001 of their motion for the RTC
to reconsider its December 18, 2000 order aforestated, Julita and
Francisca, in a bid to evade being declared in default, filed on April
10, 2001 their Answer to the amended complaint.
15
But on the same
day, they went to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 64246, seeking to nullify the following RTC orders: the
first, admitting the amended complaint; the second, denying their
motion to dismiss the amended complaint; and the third, denying
their motion for reconsideration of the second issuance.
Inasmuch as the verification portion of the joint petition and the
certification on non-forum shopping bore only Francisca's signature,
the CA required the joint petitioners "to submit x x x either the
written authority of Julita C. Benedicto to Francisca B. Paulino
authorizing the latter to represent her in these proceedings, or a
supplemental verification and certification duly signed by x x x Julita
C. Benedicto."
16
Records show the submission of the corresponding
authorizing Affidavit
17
executed by Julita in favor of Francisca.
Later developments saw the CA issuing a TRO
18
and then a writ of
preliminary injunction
19
enjoining the RTC from conducting further
proceedings on the subject civil cases.
On October 17, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision, setting aside the
assailed RTC orders and dismissing the amended complaints in Civil
Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders admitting
the amended complaints are SET ASIDE for being null and
void, and the amended complaints a quo are, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
20
Irene and her new trustees' motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision was denied through the equally assailed June 20,
2002 CA Resolution. Hence, this petition for review is before us.
The Issues
Petitioners urge the setting aside and annulment of the assailed CA
decision and resolution on the following submissions that the
appellate court erred in: (1) allowing the submission of an affidavit
by Julita as sufficient compliance with the requirement on
verification and certification of non-forum shopping; (2) ruling on
the merits of the trust issue which involves factual and evidentiary
determination, processes not proper in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (3) ruling that the amended
complaints in the lower court should be dismissed because, at the
time it was filed, there was no more original complaint to amend; (4)
ruling that the respondents did not waive improper venue; and (5)
ruling that petitioner Irene was not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte
and that none of the principal parties are residents of Ilocos Norte.
21
The Court's Ruling
We affirm, but not for all the reasons set out in, the CA's decision.
First Issue: Substantial Compliance with the Rule
on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
Petitioners tag private respondents' petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 64246
as defective for non-compliance with the requirements of Secs. 4
22
and 5
23
of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court at least with regard to Julita,
who failed to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. Petitioners thus fault the appellate court for directing
Julita's counsel to submit a written authority for Francisca to
represent Julita in the certiorari proceedings.
We are not persuaded.
Verification not Jurisdictional; May be Corrected
Verification is, under the Rules, not a jurisdictional but merely a
formal requirement which the court may motu proprio direct a party
to comply with or correct, as the case may be. As the Court

articulated in Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism and Nationalism (KILUSAN)-Organized Labor Associations in
Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) v. Court of Appeals:
V]erification is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not mere speculation. The Court may order the correction of the pleading, if
not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served.24
Given this consideration, the CA acted within its sound discretion in
ordering the submission of proof of Francisca's authority to sign on
Julita's behalf and represent her in the proceedings before the
appellate court.
..
Signature by Any of the Principal Petitioners is Substantial
Compliance
Regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping, the general rule is
that all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it.
25
However, the Court has time and again stressed that the rules on
forum shopping, which were designed to promote the orderly
administration of justice, do not interdict substantial compliance
with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

26
As has been
ruled by the Court, the signature of any of the principal petitioners
27
or principal parties,
28
as Francisca is in this case, would constitute a
substantial compliance with the rule on verification and certification
of non-forum shopping. It cannot be overemphasized that Francisca
herself was a principal party in Civil Case No. 3341-17 before the RTC
and in the certiorari proceedings before the CA. Besides being an
heir of Benedicto, Francisca, with her mother, Julita, was substituted
for Benedicto in the instant case after his demise.
And should there exist a commonality of interest among the parties,
or where the parties filed the case as a "collective," raising only one
common cause of action or presenting a common defense, then the
signature of one of the petitioners or complainants, acting as
representative, is sufficient compliance. We said so in Cavile v. Heirs
of Clarita Cavile.
29
Like Thomas Cavile, Sr. and the other petitioners
in Cavile, Francisca and Julita, as petitioners before the CA, had filed
their petition as a collective, sharing a common interest and having a
common single defense to protect their rights over the shares of
stocks in question.
Second Issue: Merits of the Case cannot be Resolved
on Certiorari under Rule 65
Petitioners' posture on the second issue is correct. As they aptly

pointed out, the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under
Rule 65, is limited to reviewing and correcting errors of jurisdiction
only. It cannot validly delve into the issue of trust which, under the
premises, cannot be judiciously resolved without first establishing
certain facts based on evidence.
Whether a determinative question is one of law or of fact depends
on the nature of the dispute. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain given set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact obtains when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites the
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility
of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.
30
Clearly then, the CA overstepped its boundaries when, in disposing
of private respondents' petition for certiorari, it did not confine itself
to determining whether or not lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion tainted the issuance of the assailed RTC orders, but
proceeded to pass on the factual issue of the existence and
enforceability of the asserted trust. In the process, the CA virtually
resolved petitioner Irene's case for reconveyance on its substantive
merits even before evidence on the matter could be adduced. Civil
Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17 in fact have not even reached the
pre-trial stage. To stress, the nature of the trust allegedly

constituted in Irene's favor and its enforceability, being evidentiary
in nature, are best determined by the trial court. The original
complaints and the amended complaint certainly do not even clearly
indicate whether the asserted trust is implied or express. To be sure,
an express trust differs from the implied variety in terms of the
manner of proving its existence.
31
Surely, the onus of factually
determining whether the trust allegedly established in favor of
Irene, if one was indeed established, was implied or express
properly pertains, at the first instance, to the trial court and not to
the appellate court in a special civil action for certiorari, as here. In
the absence of evidence to prove or disprove the constitution and
necessarily the existence of the trust agreement between Irene, on
one hand, and the Benedicto Group, on the other, the appellate
court cannot intelligently pass upon the issue of trust. A
pronouncement on said issue of trust rooted on speculation and
conjecture, if properly challenged, must be struck down. So it must
be here.
Third Issue: Admission of Amended Complaint Proper
As may be recalled, the CA veritably declared as reversibly
erroneous the admission of the amended complaint. The flaw in the
RTC's act of admitting the amended complaint lies, so the CA held, in
the fact that the filing of the amended complaint on July 17, 2000
came after the RTC had ordered with finality the dismissal of the
original complaints. According to petitioners, scoring the CA for its
declaration adverted to and debunking its posture on the finality of
the said RTC order, the CA failed to take stock of their motion for
reconsideration of the said dismissal order.

We agree with petitioners and turn to the governing Sec. 2 of Rule
10 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. -- A party may
amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
As the aforequoted provision makes it abundantly clear that the
plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e.,
without leave of court, before any responsive pleading is filed or
served. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief
and/or set up defenses,
32
like an answer. A motion to dismiss is not
a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10.
33
Assayed
against the foregoing perspective, the RTC did not err in admitting
petitioners' amended complaint, Julita and Francisca not having yet
answered the original complaints when the amended complaint was
filed. At that precise moment, Irene, by force of said Sec. 2 of Rule
10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending her underlying
reconveyance complaints. As aptly observed by the RTC, Irene's
motion to admit amended complaint was not even necessary. The
Court notes though that the RTC has not offered an explanation why
it saw fit to grant the motion to admit in the first place.
In Alpine Lending Investors v. Corpuz, the Court, expounding on the
propriety of admitting an amended complaint before a responsive
pleading is filed, wrote:
W]hat petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to dismiss, not an
answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for
purposes of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent
could amend her complaint in Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this
Court's ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co. considering that respondent has the
..
right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the
amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words, the trial
court's duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent
should not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint.34
It may be argued that the original complaints had been dismissed
through the June 29, 2000 RTC order. It should be pointed out,
however, that the finality of such dismissal order had not set in
when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, she
having meanwhile seasonably sought reconsideration thereof.
Irene's motion for reconsideration was only resolved on August 25,
2000. Thus, when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17,
2000, the order of dismissal was not yet final, implying that there
was strictly no legal impediment to her amending her original
complaints.
35
Fourth Issue: Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue
Petitioners maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively
precluded from raising the matter of improper venue by their

subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. To petitioners, these
pleadings, taken together, signify a waiver of private respondents'
initial objection to improper venue.
This contention is without basis and, at best, tenuous. Venue
essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions,
is fixed for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff and his
witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised
seasonably, else it is deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to
either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or
include the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have
waived his right to object to improper venue.
36
In the case at bench,
Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time possible,
meaning "within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint,"
37
the matter of improper venue. They would thereafter
reiterate and pursue their objection on venue, first, in their answer
to the amended complaints and then in their petition for certiorari
before the CA. Any suggestion, therefore, that Francisca and
Benedicto or his substitutes abandoned along the way improper
venue as ground to defeat Irene's claim before the RTC has to be
rejected.
Fifth Issue: The RTC Has No Jurisdiction
on the Ground of Improper Venue
Subject Civil Cases are Personal Actions
It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that the venue was in this
case improperly laid since the suit in question partakes of a real

action involving real properties located outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac.
This contention is not well-taken. In a personal action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a
contract, or the recovery of damages.
38
Real actions, on the other
hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4,
the venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has
territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal
actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
39
In the instant case, petitioners are basically asking Benedicto and his
Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust Irene's
purported 65% stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive of the
fruits of the trust, and to execute in Irene's favor the necessary
conveying deed over the said 65% shareholdings. In other words,
Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she has
with the Benedicto Group. The fact that FEMII's assets include real
properties does not materially change the nature of the action, for
the ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only
inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such
assets. It is only upon the liquidation of the corporation that the

stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the corporate
assets, but then only to the extent of their stockownership.
The amended complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit
against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now represented by Julita
and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal liability to Irene
upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not
actions in rem where the actions are against the real properties
instead of against persons.
40
We particularly note that possession or
title to the real properties of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed,
albeit part of the assets of the corporation happens to be real
properties.
Given the foregoing perspective, we now tackle the determinative
question of venue in the light of the inclusion of additional plaintiffs
in the amended complaint.
Interpretation of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of Rule 4
We point out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and
peremptorily found by the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of
Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she claimed. The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this case, the factual
determination of the trial court and the premises holding it
together. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action,
contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.
As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court adverts to as the place "where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides" at the time she filed her amended
complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451

41
issued sometime in
June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her
address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Let
alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic residence certificate
practically anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer's
office and dictate whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene
procured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to her motion
for reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement against her
being a resident of Batac.
Petitioners, in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos
Norte is the proper court venue, asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte
is where the principal parties reside.
Pivotal to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the
status of Irene's co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3
in relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 4, which pertinently provide as follows:
..
Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. -- A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. -- Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative
or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative
may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or
these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract
involves things belonging to the principal.
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. -- All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Venue is Improperly Laid
There can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest
plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she
stands to be benefited or entitled to the avails of the present suit. It
is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin,
and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included as co-
plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's new designated
trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of
Irene.
Upon the foregoing consideration, the resolution of the crucial issue

of whether or not venue had properly been laid should not be
difficult.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than
one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the
principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue.
According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, "the word 'principal' has
been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the
plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or
defendant as the venue."
42
Eliminate the qualifying term "principal"
and the purpose of the Rule would, to borrow from Justice
Regalado, "be defeated where a nominal or formal party is
impleaded in the action since the latter would not have the degree
of interest in the subject of the action which would warrant and
entail the desirably active participation expected of litigants in a
case."
43
Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17,
Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-
interest. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to
be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene resides.
Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action
As earlier stated, no less than the RTC in Batac declared Irene as not
a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Withal, that court was an improper
venue for her conveyance action.
The Court can concede that Irene's three co-plaintiffs are all
residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this

regard that not one of the three can be considered as principal
party-plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, included as
they were in the amended complaint as trustees of the principal
plaintiff. As trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of
Rule 3, the right to prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the
beneficiary who must be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party-in-interest. In the final analysis, the
residences of Irene's co-plaintiffs cannot be made the basis in
determining the venue of the subject suit. This conclusion becomes
all the more forceful considering that Irene herself initiated and was
actively prosecuting her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, assigns,
or associates, virtually rendering the impleading of the trustees
unnecessary.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene was a resident during the
period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident
of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte, although jurisprudence
44
has it
that one can have several residences, if such were the established
fact. The Court will not speculate on the reason why petitioner
Irene, for all the inconvenience and expenses she and her
adversaries would have to endure by a Batac trial, preferred that her
case be heard and decided by the RTC in Batac. On the heels of the
dismissal of the original complaints on the ground of improper
venue, three new personalities were added to the complaint
doubtless to insure, but in vain as it turned out, that the case stays
with the RTC in Batac.
Litigants ought to bank on the righteousness of their causes, the
superiority of their cases, and the persuasiveness of arguments to

secure a favorable verdict. It is high time that courts, judges, and
those who come to court for redress keep this ideal in mind.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision
and Resolution dated October 17, 2001 and June 20, 2002,
respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 64246, insofar as they
nullified the assailed orders of the RTC, Branch 17 in Batac, Ilocos
Norte in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17 on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction due to improper venue, are hereby AFFIRMED. The
Orders dated October 9, 2000, December 18, 2000, and March 15,
2001 of the RTC in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17 are
accordingly ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and said civil cases are
DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. 100748 February 3, 1997
JOSE BARITUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleventh Division); HON. MANUEL D.
VICTORIO, Judge, RTC, Br. 53, Rosales-Pangasinan; and ROY. R.
DOMINGO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Crispin A.
Domingo, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Jose Baritua raises the question of venue in the filing of a
complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict.
The facts show that on June 26, 1989 private respondent Roy R.
Domingo, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crispin A. Domingo,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Resales, Pangasinan a
complaint against petitioner Jose Baritua as owner and operator of
the J.B. Bus Lines. Private respondent sought to recover actual and
exemplary damages after a bus owned by petitioner rammed private
respondent's car along the Maharlika Highway, Sto. Tomas, Batangas
on January 19, 1988. In his complaint, private respondent alleged
that:
1. He is a Filipino, of legal age, married and a
resident of Poblacion Resales, Pangasinan before
he went to the United States where he now lives
at 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada LA 91011. He is
being represented by his attorney-in-fact Crispin
A. Domingo, a Filipino, of legal age, married and
resident of No. 47 Yale St., Cubao, Quezon City.
Defendant is also a Filipino, of legal age, married
and doing business under the business name
"J.B. Bus Lines" with business address at Tramo
Street, Pasay City where said defendant could be
served summons. . . .
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. He
alleged that since private respondent was not a resident of the
Philippines, the complaint should be filed in the place where
petitioner, the defendant, resides which is in Gubat, Sorsogon. The

trial court denied the motion to dismiss after finding that private
respondent was merely temporarily out of the country and did not
lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Hence this petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioner claims that:
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER'S OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE THAT
THE VENUE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ACTION (CIVIL CASE NO.
915-R) WAS IMPROPERLY LAID;
B. INSPITE ALSO OF THE ADMITTED FACT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ROY DOMINGO HAS REMAINED AN ACTUAL RESIDENT
OF 4525 LEATA LANE, LA CANTADA, LA 91011, U.S.A., AT LEAST
SINCE FEBRUARY 18, 1988, UP TO THE PRESENT.
A complaint for damages is a personal action. In cases filed before
the Regional Trial Court, the venue for personal actions is laid down
in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads
as follows :
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or

any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
xxx xxx xxx
The complaint in personal actions may be filed in the place
where the defendant resides or may be found, or where
the plaintiff resides, at the option of the plaintiff. The
Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file
his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he
himself or any of them resides; or (2) where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The
plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place
where the action has been instituted at the time the
action is commenced.
Section 2 (b) of Rule 4 speaks of the place where the defendant or
the plaintiff "resides." We have held that the residence of a person
must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual
residence or abode.
It does not mean fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. The word
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence" or "domicile."
Actual residence may in some

cases be the legal residence or domicile, but for purposes of venue,
actual residence is the place of abode and not necessarily legal
residence or domicile.
Actual residence signifies personal
residence, i.e., physical presence and actual stay thereat.
10
This
physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than temporary and
must be with continuity and consistency.
11
The question in this case is whether private respondent had his
actual residence in Rosales, Pangasinan or in Los, Angeles, California
at the time the complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Resales, Pangasinan.
It is undisputed that private respondent left for the United States on
April 25, 1988 before the complaint was filed on June 26, 1989.
12
This fact is expressly admitted in the complaint itself where private
respondent states that he "is [sic] . . . a resident of Poblacion
Rosales, Pangasinan before he went to the United States where he
now lives in 4525 Leata Lane, La Cantada, LA 91011." Furthermore,
the special power of attorney in favor of Crispin A. Domingo was
drawn and executed by private respondent on February 18, 1988
before the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California.
13
In said
special power of attorney, private respondent declared that he was
a resident of Los Angeles, California.
14
..
Private respondent was not a mere transient or occasional resident
of the United States. He fixed his place of abode in Los Angeles,
California and stayed there continuously and consistently for over a
year at the time the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan.
15
Contrary to the lower courts' finding, the temporary nature of
private respondent's "working non-immigrant" visa did not make
him a non-resident of the United States. There is no showing as to
the date his temporary employment in the United States ended.
16
There is likewise no showing, much less any allegation, that after the
filing of the complaint, private respondent actually returned to the
Philippines and resumed residence in Rosales, Pangasinan. In fact,
petitioner's claim that private respondent resided in the United
States continuously and consistently since 1988 until the present has
not been refuted.
17
We previously held that:
We are fully convinced that private respondent
Coloma's protestations of domicile in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested
intention to return there after the retirement of
his wife from government service to justify his
bringing of an action for damages against
petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely
of no moment since what is of paramount
importance is where he actually resided or
where he may be found at the time he brought
the action, to comply substantially with the
requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of
Court, on venue of personal actions. . . . .
18
It is fundamental that the situs for bringing real and personal civil
actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience
possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by affording them
maximum accessibility to the courts of justice.
19
The choice of
venue is given to the plaintiff but is not left to his caprice.
20
It
cannot unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred
upon him by the Rules of Court.
21
When the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan, not one of the
parties was a resident of the town. Private respondent was a
resident of Los Angeles, California while his attorney-in-fact was a
resident of Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner's "business address"
according to private respondent is in Pasay City,
22
although
petitioner claims he resides in Gubat, Sorsogon
23
The venue in
Rosales, Pangasinan was indeed improperly laid.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20737 is reversed and set aside.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 915-R is dismissed for improper
venue. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. L-48068 April 15, 1988
EMILIO J. GONZALES, AMPARO CARAG and ROSARIO CARAG VDA.
DE BUÑAG, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EUSEBIO M. LOPEZ, SOLEDAD L. DOLOR, LEON DOLOR, EUSEBIO
LOPEZ, JR., NICANOR CARAG, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 17 in relation to Section 31 of
the Judiciary Act as amended, and Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court, the Court of Appeals certified the present case to this
Court on the ground that the issues raised are pure questions of law.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
The complaint in this case was flied before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment
of a contract relative to the subdivision of a
parcel of 100 hectares of land located in
Cagayan. The principal relevant facts can be
stated as follows:
Antonio S. Carag DECEDENT) was the owner of a
parcel of more or less 6,991,921 square meters
of land in Tuguegarao, roughly 700 hectares,
covered by TCT No. 1278 of the Office of the of
Cagayan. After his death, the date of which is not
determined, Sp. Proc. No. 1273 of the Court of
First Instance of Cagayan was instituted of his
estate.
It would appear that the DECEDENT had six
children, namely: AMPARO, ROSARIO, Consuelo,
Nicanor, Domingo and Leonor. On May 3, 1963,
Leonor had already passed away. She had
married, and her husband's surname was
Canillas. They had then four living children:
Antonio, Angel, Edgar, and Dolores, and perhaps
two other deceased children, one named Edna C.

Santos and whose widow is Helena T. Canilla.
Domingo, one of DECEDENT's sons, and Dolores,
a daughter of Leonor, have also died since then.
On the mentioned date of May 3, 962, a contract
was executed under the terms of which 100
hectares of the land of decedent would be
converted into a residential subdivision. The
contractees who were to take charge of
establishing the said subdivision (hereinafter
coed the " SUBDIVIDERS" ), were Eusebio M.
Lopez, Soledad L. Dolor, and Eusebio Lopez, Jr.
The first of them, Eusebio M. Lopez, had also
since died.
On the part of the owners, who signed as heirs
of DECEDENT, the signatories were AMPARO,
ROSARIO, Consuelo, Nicanor, Domingo, and, in
representation of the deceased Leonor, the
contract was signed by Antonio Canillas, Dolores
Canillas, and Helena T. Vda. de Canillas. It will be
noted that other children, and possibly
grandchildren, of the deceased Leonor did not
sign the subdivision contract.
On September 19, 1971, AMPARO and ROSARIO
(hereinafter called " Plaintiff Heirs" ) filed suit
against the SUBDIVIDERS in Civil Case No.
151160 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the
CASE BELOW), praying for the annulment of the
subdivision contract on the grounds that said
contract was not entered into by the a

administrator of the DECEDENT's estate; that it
was not signed by all the heirs of the DECEDENT;
and that it was against public policy and public
morals. On September 28, 1972, the complaint
was amended to include, as parties defendant,
all the heirs of DECEDENT other than Plaintiff
Heirs. It can be presumed that all the heirs of
DECEDENT then became parties in the CASE
BELOW. The newly impleaded defendants can be
collectively called Defendant Heirs.
The Answer of some of the Defendant Heirs
pleaded, inter alia, the affirmative defenses that
(a) venue had been improperly laid; (b) that no
honest efforts towards a compromise had been
made although the suit was between members
of the same family; and (c) that the cause of
action is barred by prescription. Thereafter,
Defendant Heirs moved to dismiss the case
mainly on their mentioned affirmative defenses,
at the Flame time asking the lower court to set
those defenses for pre hearing in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 16. On June 6, 1975, the
lower court granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground that earnest efforts towards a
compromise had not been made although the
suit was between members of the same family,
and that venue had been improperly laid. No
evidence, either testimonial or documentary,
were submitted by the parties. From the Order

of dismissal, Plaintiff Heirs took an appeal, by
record on appeal, to this instance. (pp. 125-127,
Rollo).
In their appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE OBJECTION THAT NO
EARNEST EFFORTS FOR COMPROMISE HAVE BEEN MADE IS WELL-
TAKEN.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT VENUE WAS
IMPROPERLY LAID. (p. 128,. Rollo)
The first assigned error appears to have merit. The trial court ruled
that members of the same family are quarrel over the estate left by
..
their father and grandfather and, therefore, earnest efforts towards
a compromise agreement are mandatory before a complaint may be
flied in court.
Included as party defendants were Eusebio Lopez, Soledad Dolor
and Eusebio Lopez, Jr., designated as "Capitalists" in the contract of
May 3, 1962 and whose part therein was "to exercise full discretion
in the development, promotion, management and sale of lots in the
subdivision subject to all conditions and stipulations contained in the
subdivision contract as may be agreed upon by the CAPITALISTS and
the OWNERS." Apparently, the said defendants are strangers to the
Carag family, the principal parties in the case. Hence, section 1(j),
Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a suit
between members of the same family may be dismissed when no
earnest efforts under Article 222 of the Civil Code towards a
compromise have been made, does not apply.
In the case of Magbaleta v. Gonong, (76 SCRA 511), we ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
... While indeed, as pointed out by the Code
Commission " it is difficult to imagine a sadder
and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family" hence, "
it is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family"
and It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers" (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 18), these considerations do not,
however, weigh enough to make it imperative
that ,such efforts to compromise should be a
jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance
of an action whenever a stranger to the family is
a Party thereto, whether as a n or indispensable
one. It is not always that one who is alien to the
family would be willing to suffer the
inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and
the complications that wranglings between or
among relatives more often than not entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
determination of the rights of a stranger to the

family who just happened to have innocently
acquired some kind of interest in any right or
property disputed among its members should be
made to depend on the way the latter would
settle their differences among themselves. We
find no cause in the reason for being of the
provisions relied upon by petitioner to give it
broader scope than the literal import thereof
warrants. (at p. 513)
This appeal may, however, be decided on the second assignment of
error.
The issue as to whether or not venue was improperly laid with the
Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal where the annulment of the
contract case was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants against the
defendants-appellees depends on whether or not the plaintiffs-
appellants are bound by Section 20 of the Subdivision Contract
which provides that:
All suits in connection with this subdivision
contract shall be filed with the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cagayan.
The records show that the Subdivision Contract was executed before
Consuelo Carag, defendant-appellee herein, became administrator
of the estate. Moreover, the records show that the plaintiffs-
appellants are signatories to the contract. In their Amended
Complaint they alleged:
8. That sometime on May 3, 1962, and the
period preceding thereto, defendants and/or
their predecessors in interest-mutually helping
one another induced and convinced plaintiffs to

enter to a subdivision contract wherein 100
hectares of the 700 hectares more or less
property of the late Antonio S. Carag under
Intestacy was to be segregated and subdivided
into lots for sale to the public. A copy of said
subdivision contract is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part of this complaint.
Inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellants alleged in their complaint that
there was fraud in the execution of the Subdivision Contract, the
same is merely voidable not void (Article 1390 (2) New Civil Code;
Miraflor v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 18; Pangadil v. Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, 116 SCRA 347; and Tumalad v. Vicencio 41
SCRA 143).
Consequently, the subject Subdivision Contract is binding among the
parties, until it is annulled by a proper action in court (Article 1390,
par. (2) New Civil Code). In effect, the Subdivision Contract is valid
between the plaintiffs-appellants on one hand and the defendants-
appellants on the other hand, who were signatories thereto until
annulled by the court in the very case being filed.
Since, Section 20 of the Subdivision Contract provides for the Court
of First Instance of Cagayan to be the venue of all suits in connection
with the Id contract the annulment of the same filed by the
appellants before the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal was
properly dismissed by the latter upon motion by the defendants-
appellants based on improper venue (Section 1 [c] Rule 16, Revised
Rules of Court). Section 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that "by written agreement of the parties the venue of an
action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another." We have ruled that this agreement is valid, binding, and

enforceable (Villanueva v. Mosqueda, 115 SCRA 904; Hoechst
Philippines, Inc., v. Torres, 83 SCRA 297; and Bautista v. De Borja,
124 Phil. 1056).
In addition to the agreement on venue specified in the Subdivision
Contract, it should be emphasized that the entirety of the disputed
real estate is also in Cagayan. The Carags themselves are members
of a prominent family of Cagayan.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
questioned order of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal which
dismissed Civil Case No. 15160 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for plaintiff-appellee.
Isidro T. Almeda and Mario T. Banzuela for defendant-appellant.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of
action to recover the purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff
to defendant.
Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place

of business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper
venue. He claims that by contract suit may only be lodged in the
courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not
answer the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was
rendered against him on September 21, 1966, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the following amounts:
First Cause of Action — P60,845.67, with interest thereon at 1% a month from May 9, 1965 until the full
amount is paid.
Second Cause of Action — P51,952.55, with interest thereon at 1% a month from March 30, 1965
until the full amount is
paid.
Third Cause of Action — P53,973.07, with interest thereon at 1% a month from July 3, 1965 until the
full amount is paid.
Fourth Cause of Action — P41,075.22, with interest thereon at 1% a month
until the full amount is paid.
In addition, defendant shall pay plaintiff attorney's fees
amounting to 25% of the principal amount due in each
cause of action, and the costs of the suit. The amount of
P400.00 shall be deducted from the total amount due
plaintiff in accordance with this judgment.
Defendant appealed.
1. The forefront question is whether or not venue was properly laid
in the province of Bulacan where defendant is a resident.
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal
actions triable by courts of first instance — and this is one —
provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule
which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement —
"By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be
changed or transferred from one province to another."
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just quoted.
According to defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by written
contracts covering the four causes of action, stipulated that: "The
parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila." This
agreement is valid.
Defendant says that because of such covenant
he can only be sued in the courts of Manila. We are thus called upon
to shake meaning from the terms of the agreement just quoted.
But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in the contracts
covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in
Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action,
venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the province of defendant's
residence.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering
the third and fourth causes of action. An accurate reading, however,
of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the
Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the
parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or
restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone
is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that
clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits

with respect to the last two transactions in question only or
exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer
venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the
courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert Theatrical Co., 151
N.Y.S. 593, 594. And this, became there the stipulation as to venue is
along lines similar to the present. Said stipulation reads: "In case of
dispute, both contracting parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction
of the Vienna courts." And the ruling is: "By the clause in question
the parties do not agree to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction
of the Viennese court, and to those courts only. There is nothing
exclusive in the language used. They do agree to submit to the
Viennese jurisdiction, but they say not a word in restriction of the
jurisdiction of courts elsewhere; and whatever may be said on the
subject of the legality of contracts to submit controversies to courts
of certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such
agreements should be strictly construed, and should not be
extended by implication."
Venue here was properly laid.
2. Defendant next challenges the lower court's grant to plaintiff of
interest at the rate of one per centum per month. Defendant says
that no such stipulation as to right of interest appears in the sales
confirmation orders which provided: "TERMS — 60 days after
delivery with interest accruing on postdated cheques beyond 30
days." The flaw in this argument lies in that the interest and the rate
thereof are expressly covenanted in the covering trust receipts
executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff, as follows: "All

obligations of the undersigned under this agreement of trust shall
bear interest at the rate of one per centum (1%) per month from the
date due until paid."
On this score, we find no error.
3. Defendant protests the award of attorneys' fees which totals
P51,961.63, i.e., 25% of the total principal indebtedness of
P207,846.51 (exclusive of interest). Defendant's thesis is that the
foregoing sum is "exorbitant and unconscionable."
..
To be borne in mind is that the attorneys' fees here provided is not,
strictly speaking, the attorneys' fees recoverable as between
attorney and client spoken of and regulated by the Rules of Court.
Rather, the attorneys' fees here are in the nature of liquidated
damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause.
It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene
law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant.
The attorneys' fees so provided are awarded in favor of the litigant,
not his counsel. It is the litigant, not counsel, who is the judgment
creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by execution.
6
The governing law then is Article 2227 of the Civil Code, viz.:
"Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable." For this reason, we do not really have to strictly
view the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees in the light of such
factors as the amount and character of the services rendered, the
nature and importance of the litigation, and the professional
character and the social standing of the attorney. We do concede,
however, that these factors may be an aid in the determination of
the iniquity or unconscionableness of attorneys' fees as liquidated
damages.
May the attorneys' fees (P51,961.63) here granted be tagged as
iniquitous or unconscionable? Upon the circumstances, our answer
is in the negative. Plaintiff's lawyers concededly are of high standing.
More important is that this case should not have gone to court. It
could have been easily avoided had defendant been faithful in
complying with his obligations. It is not denied that the rawhide was
converted into leather and sold by defendant. He raises no defense.
In fact, he did not even answer the complaint in the lower court, and
was thus declared in default. Nor does he deny the principal liability.
Add to all these the fact that the writ of attachment issued below
upon defendant's properties yielded no more than P400 and the
picture is complete. The continued maintenance by defendant of the
suit is plainly intended for delay. The attorneys' fees awarded
cannot be called iniquitous or unconscionable.
In the very recent case of Universal Motors Corporation vs. Dy Hian
Tat (1969), 28 SCRA 161, 170, we allowed attorneys' fees in the form
of liquidated damages at the rate of 25% of the total amount of the
indebtedness. Here, the trial court has already reduced the

attorneys' fees from the stipulated 25% "of the total amount
involved, principal and interest, then unpaid" to only 25% of the
principal amount due. There is no reason why such judgment should
be disturbed.
FOR THE REASON GIVEN, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed,
except that interest granted, in reference to the fourth cause of
action, should start from March 24, 1965.
Costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.
..
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA
LANTIN,
Petitioners,
- versus -
G.R. No. 160053
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

HON. JANE AURORA C.
LANTION, PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF LIPA CITY,
FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 13, PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK,
ELIZABETH C. UMALI, ALICE
PERCE, JELEN MOSCA,
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
LIPA CITY, BATANGAS, THE
CLERK OF COURT and EX-
OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BATANGAS,
Respondents.
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 28, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the orders dated
May 15, 20031[1] and September 15, 20032[2] in Civil Case No.
2002-0555 issued by public respondent, Presiding Judge Jane Aurora
C. Lantion, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Batangas.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin took several peso
and dollar loans from respondent Planters Development Bank and
executed several real estate mortgages and promissory notes to
cover the loans. They defaulted on the payments so respondent
bank foreclosed the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed properties, in
partial satisfaction of petitioners’ debt, were sold at a public auction
where the respondent bank was the winning bidder. On November
8, 2003, petitioners filed against Planters Development Bank and its
officers Elizabeth Umali, Alice Perce and Jelen Mosca (private
respondents), a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or
Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of
Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the
RTC of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners alleged that only their peso
loans were covered by the mortgages and that these had already
been fully paid, hence, the mortgages should have been discharged.
They challenged the validity of the foreclosure on the alleged non-
payment of their dollar loans as the mortgages did not cover those
loans.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of improper venue since the loan agreements restricted
the venue of any suit in Metro Manila.
On May 15, 2003, the respondent judge dismissed the case
for improper venue.
Petitioners sought reconsideration. They argued that the
trial court in effect prejudged the validity of the loan documents
because the trial court based its dismissal on a venue stipulation
provided in the agreement. The motion for reconsideration was
denied and the lower court held that the previous order did not
touch upon the validity of the loan documents but merely ruled on
the procedural issue of venue.
Petitioners now come before us alleging that:
..
THE HONORABLE JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
VENUE STIPULATIONS IN THE “REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE” AND “PROMISSORY NOTES” FALL
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 4(B) OF RULE

4 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
THAT IT LIMITED THE VENUE OF ACTIONS TO A
DEFINITE PLACE.
II
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE MERE USE OF THE WORD “EXCLUSIVELY”
DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, MEAN THAT SUCH
STIPULATIONS AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDE FOR
AN “EXCLUSIVE VENUE”, AS CONTEMPLATED BY
SECTION 4(B) OF RULE 4 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, SPECIALLY WHEN THE TENOR
OR LANGUAGE OF THE ENTIRE VENUE
STIPULATION CLEARLY PROVIDES OTHERWISE.
III
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE
FACT THAT HEREIN PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT
INVOLVES SEVERAL CAUSES OF ACTION WHICH
DO NOT ARISE SOLELY FROM THE “REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE” AND “PROMISSORY NOTES” AND
WHICH OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION MAY BE FILED
IN OTHER VENUES UNDER SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF
RULE 4 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
IV

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE
PRINCIPLE THAT THE RULE ON VENUE OF
ACTIONS IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE
CONVENIENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS.3[3]
The main issue in the present petition is whether
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she
dismissed the case for improper venue.
Petitioners contend that, since the validity of the
loan documents were squarely put in issue, necessarily this
meant also that the validity of the venue stipulation also
was at issue. Moreover, according to the petitioners, the
venue stipulation in the loan documents is not an
exclusive venue stipulation under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.4[4] The venue in the loan agreement
was not specified with particularity. Besides, petitioners posit, the
rule on venue of action was established for the convenience of the
plaintiff, herein petitioners. Further, petitioners also contend that
since the complaint involves several causes of action which did not
arise solely from or connected with the loan documents, the cited
venue stipulation should not be made to apply.
Private respondents counter that, in their complaint,
petitioners did not assail the loan documents, and the issue of
validity was merely petitioners’ afterthought to avoid being bound
by the venue stipulation. They also aver that the venue stipulation
was not contrary to the doctrine in Unimasters,5[5] which requires
that a venue stipulation employ categorical and suitably limiting
language to the effect that the parties agree that the venue of
actions between them should be laid only and exclusively at a
definite place. According to private respondents, the language of
the stipulation is clearly exclusive.
At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b)
of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on
venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing
of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue.
The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues.
The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is
exclusive.6[6] In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.7[7]
..
The pertinent provisions of the several real estate
mortgages and promissory notes executed by the petitioner

respectively read as follows:
18. In the event of suit arising out of or in
connection with this mortgage and/or the
promissory note/s secured by this mortgage, the
parties hereto agree to bring their causes of
auction (sic) exclusively in the proper court of
Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue
chosen by the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor
waiving for this purpose any other venue.8[8]
(Emphasis supplied.)
I/We further submit that the venue of any legal
action arising out of this note shall exclusively be
at the proper court of Metropolitan Manila,
Philippines or any other venue chosen by the
BANK, waiving for this purpose any other venue
provided by the Rules of Court.9[9] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the words “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any
other venue” are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the
requirements.
Petitioners claim that effecting the exclusive venue
stipulation would be tantamount to a prejudgment on the validity of
the loan documents. We note however that in their complaint,
petitioners never assailed the validity of the mortgage contracts
securing their peso loans. They only assailed the terms and
coverage of the mortgage contracts. What petitioners claimed is
that their peso loans had already been paid thus the mortgages
should be discharged, and that the mortgage contracts did not

include their dollar loans. In our view, since the issues of whether
the mortgages should be properly discharged and whether these
also cover the dollar loans, arose out of the said loan documents,
the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto.
Considering all the circumstances in this controversy, we
find that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, as the questioned orders were evidently in accord with
law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
orders dated May 15, 2003 and September 15, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas, in Civil Case No. 2002-0555 are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
..
G.R. No. 171456 August 9, 2007

UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ALEXANDER M. CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI), whose principal office is
located in Parañaque City, entered into a Franchise Agreement
(the
agreement) granting respondent, Alexander M. Cruz (Cruz), a five-
year franchise to adopt and use the "Uniwide Family Store System"
for the establishment and operation of a "Uniwide Family Store"
along Marcos Highway, Sta. Cruz, Cogeo, Marikina City.
Article 10.2
of the agreement called for Cruz as franchisee to pay
UHI a monthly service fee of P50,000 or three percent of gross
monthly purchases, whichever is higher, payable within five days
after the end of each month without need of formal billing or
demand from UHI. In case of any delay in the payment of the
monthly service fee, Cruz would, under Article 10.3
of the
agreement, be liable to pay an interest charge of three percent per
month.
It appears that Cruz had purchased goods from UHI’s affiliated
companies First Paragon Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales
Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
In August 2002, FPC and USWCI executed Deeds of Assignment

4
in
favor of UHI assigning all their rights and interests over Cruz’s
accounts payable to them.
As of August 13, 2002, Cruz had outstanding obligations with UHI,
FPC, and USWCI in the total amount of P1,358,531.89, drawing UHI
to send him a letter of even date for the settlement thereof in five
days. His receipt of the letter notwithstanding, Cruz’s accounts
remained unsettled.
Thus UHI filed a complaint
for collection of sum of money before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque docketed as Civil Case
No. 04-0278 against Cruz on the following causes of action:
First Cause of Action
10. Being entitled to the payment of monthly service fee
pursuant to the FA, which defendant failed to pay despite
demand, plaintiff suffered actual damages in the amount
of Phil. Peso: One Million Three Hundred Twenty Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine & 83/100
(P1,327,669.83), computed as of 05 April 2004, for which
defendant should be held liable together with legal
interest thereon from the date of filing of this Complaint,
until fully paid.
Second Cause of Action
11. Being the assignee of the receivable of FPC, which
receivable defendant failed to pay despite demand,
plaintiff suffered actual damages in the amount of Phil.
Peso: Sixty Four Thousand One Hundred Sixty Five &

96/100 (P64,165.96) for which defendant should be held
liable together with the legal interest thereon computed
from date of receipt of plaintiff’s demand letter, or on
August 16, 2002 to be exact, until fully paid.
Third Cause of Action
12. Being the assignee of the receivable of USWCI, which
receivable defendant failed to pay despite demand,
plaintiff suffered actual damages in the total amount of
Phil. Peso: One Million Five Hundred Seventy Nine
Thousand Sixty One & 36/100 (P1,579,061.36), computed
as of 05 April 2004, inclusive of the two and a half percent
(2.5%) monthly interest, as and by way of penalty, and the
three (3%) annual interest on the unpaid amount, for
which defendant should be held liable, with legal interest
thereon from the date of filing of this Complaint, until fully
paid.
Fourth Cause of Action
13. By reason of defendant’s obstinate refusal or failure to
pay his indebtedness, plaintiff was constrained to file this
Complaint and in the process incur expenses by way of
attorney’s fees, which could be reasonably estimated to
reach at least Phil. Peso: Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P250,000.00) and for which defendant should be held
answerable for.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To the complaint Cruz filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of
improper venue, he invoking Article 27.5 of the agreement which
reads:
27.5 Venue Stipulation – The Franchisee consents to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of Quezon City, the Franchisee waiving any
other venue.
(Emphasis supplied)
Branch 258 of the Parañaque RTC, by Order
of December
12, 2005, granted Cruz’s motion to dismiss.
Hence, the present petition before this Court, raising the sole legal
issue of:
WHETHER A CASE BASED ON SEVERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
IS DISMISSIBLE ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE
WHERE ONLY ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION ARISES
FROM A CONTRACT WITH EXCLUSIVE VENUE
STIPULATION.
10
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the agreement is there a
mention of FPC and USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto,
hence, they cannot be bound to the stipulation on "exclusive
venue."
The petition is impressed with merit.
The general rule on venue of personal actions, as in petitioner’s
complaint for collection of sum of money, is embodied in Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides:

..
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The afore-quoted provision is, however, qualified by Section 4 of the
same rule which allows parties, before the filing of the action, to
validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue.
11
The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an
action does not, however, preclude parties from bringing a case to
other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same
parties one of which does not arise out of the contract where the
exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at
bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such other
cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the
venue lies therein.
12
Based on the allegations in petitioner’s complaint, the second and
third causes of action are based on the deeds of assignment

executed in its favor by FPC and USWCI. The deeds bear no exclusive
venue stipulation with respect to the causes of action thereunder.
Hence, the general rule on venue applies – that the complaint may
be filed in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
13
It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts
are not based on a breach of the agreement between UHI and Cruz.
They are based on separate, distinct and independent contracts-
deeds of assignment in which UHI is the assignee of Cruz’s
obligations to the assignors FPC and USWCI. Thus, any action arising
from the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive
venue stipulation embodied in the agreement. So San Miguel
Corporation v. Monasterio
14
enlightens:
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract
restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates
to breach of said contract. But where the exclusivity
clause does not make it necessarily encompassing, such
that even those not related to the enforcement of the
contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the
stipulation designating exclusive venues should be
strictly confined to the specific undertaking or
agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to
contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak
party-suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts
of justice.
15
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In fine, since the other causes of action in petitioner’s complaint do
not relate to a breach of the agreement it forged with Cruz
embodying the exclusive venue stipulation, they should not be
subjected thereto. As San Miguel further enlightens:
Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general
policy of making it more convenient for the parties to
institute actions arising from or in relation to their
agreements. Thus, the restriction should be strictly
construed as relating solely to the agreement for which
the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding
the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will
create unwarranted restrictions which the parties might
find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
16
(Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 12, 2005
Order of Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 in Civil
Case No. 04-0278 is SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to said court
which is directed to reinstate the case to its docket and conduct
further proceedings thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

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Outline: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE

Lesson for August 9, 2014

Venue versus jurisdiction

- Dacoycoy v. IAC, G.R. No. 74854, April 2, 1991

- Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005

- Santos v. Northwest Orient, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

Venue of real actions

- Go v. UCPB, G.R. No. 156187

- Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007

Venue of personal actions

- Claridades v. Mercader, G.R. No. L-20341, May 14, 1966

- Marcos-Araneta v. CA, G.R. No. 154096, August 22, 2008

Venue of actions against non-residents

- Baritua v. CA, G.R. No. 100748, February 3, 1997

- Gonzales v. Lopez, G.R. No. 48068, April 15, 1988

- Polytrade v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969

Effects of stipulations on venue

- Uniwide Holdings Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007

Case Digest: RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE

THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

G.R. No. L-6287, December 1, 1911

The plaintiff, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in the

CFI of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real

estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the

Province of Tarlac. It is for the construction of a railroad line "from

Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose

of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this

action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is 69,910

square meters in area. The complaint states that before beginning

the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in

As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands

in question were located in the Province of Tarlac.

The defendants in one action are all of the different

owners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square

meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving the

complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final

determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the

On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the

defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made

had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been

ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned

was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province

of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.

Trial court- Granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed

the action on the ground that CFI Tarlac had no jurisdiction.

Whether or not CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take

cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another

Yes. CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take

cognizance of the case.

Section 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine

respect to the real estate. It was the intention of the Philippine

Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect

and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters

mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to

depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The

It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court

of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province,

may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action

arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate

located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at

the time be assigned.

Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority.

Other provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is

procedure by which such powers are put into action.