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Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123


ASEAN at 52: Unity in
Diversity?
Carlyle A. Thayer
August 10, 2019

We are preparing a series of reports on ASEAN’s 52th anniversary. We request your


assessment of seven issues (see questions below). Your assessments will be used
where appropriate in each of our individual reports.
Q1: Pro-ASEAN persons always say that ASEAN is characterized by “unity in diversity”.
What is your assessment? What factors contribute to the persistence of ASEAN after
more than 50 years (at least it is not on the verge of any “Brexit” or “collapse”)?
ANSWER: The expression “unity in diversity” was borrowed from Indonesia. Quite
clearly the concept of unity is a very broad one. ASEAN diversity has facilitated
ASEAN’s recognition as a regional organisation representing Southeast Asia by other
regional organisations and more importantly by the United Nations. But ASEAN’s
diversity has slowed the process of institutionalisation and this has been particularly
acute when dealing with political and security issues. “Unity in diversity” remains a
slogan.
ASEAN has been able to exist for fifty-two years for a number of reasons.
First, it evolved from five anti-communist states during the Cold War into a regional
organisation of ten members that sought to remain independent from the dominating
influence of rival powers, first the United States and the Soviet Union, then from the
United States during a period of uni-polarity, and now a multipolar world in which the
United States and China and the two dominant players.
Second, ASEAN has been able to persist because of its norms of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of other states and the so-called ASEAN Way of dialogue, inclusion.
Peaceful settlement of disputes, and consensus decision-making.
Third, ASEAN promotes its centrality in the regional architecture and this has seen a
proliferation of ASEAN-centric institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN
Plus Three (ASEAN, China, Japan) ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, Expanded
ASEAN Maritime Form and the East Asia Summit. All the major powers participate in
the meetings of these institutions.
Fourth, ASEAN has found common ground among its members in dealing with
transnational issues and acting as a single market in economic relations with outside
powers. ASEAN members have reached consensus of building three communities:
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political-security, economic and social-cultural. Community-building has utility for all


its ten members.
Q2: What is the most important challenge to ASEAN during its existence and right now,
at this time, as China is increasing its influence in the region?
ANSWER: The most important challenge ASEAN has faced as been its membership
expansion to include Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. The inclusion of these three
developing countries has slowed the pace of ASEAN’s institutionalization and
community-building. This has resulted in constant tension between national
sovereignty and institutionalization. For example, the ASEAN Charter includes a clear
structure for decision-making and resolution of disputes between members, yet this
is off-set by clauses on respecting national sovereignty and non-interference.
China rise has led Beijing to play on differences within ASEAN to prevent a unified
stance against China’s interests. This was particularly evident in 2012 when Cambodia,
as ASEAN Chair, prevented the ASEAN foreign ministers from issuing a joint statement
that included paragraphs on the South China Sea reflecting the serious concerns of the
Philippines and Vietnam about China’s interference in their sovereign jurisdiction.
China has continued to play on differences in ASEAN to advance its interests.
Q3: How do you consider the results of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) in
Bangkok last week? How did ASEAN perform at the time U.S. – China tentions
escalated, threatened to challenge the region’s security?
ANSWER: The ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint statement that contained
stronger language on the South China Sea than similar statements since 2016. This
year’s statement read: “We discussed the situation in the South China Sea, during
which concerns were expressed by some Ministers on the land reclamations, activities
and serious incidents in the area, which have eroded peace, security and stability in
the region (emphasis added).” In other words, it was made clear the concerns were
expressed by the foreign ministers of more than one ASEAN member about serious
incidents.
However, when ASEAN ministers issued statements after multilateral meetings with
their dialogue partners, such as the statement issued after the meeting of East Asian
foreign ministers, they retained the same wording as in previous years: “We discussed
the matters relating to the South China Sea and took note of some concerns on the
land reclamation and activities in the area, which have eroded trust and confidence,
increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.”
Q4: To maintain unity or even the fate of the bloc, what is the core value that ASEAN
should focus on?
ANSWER: The core value at the heart of ASEAN is its collective Southeast Asian
identity. Some analysts use the term “we feelings”, the development of a collective
identity or “we Southeast Asians” that can pool sovereignty to protect national
sovereignty. Pooling sovereignty refers to sharing sovereignty with other states to
advance the common interest.
Q5: How should ASEAN view the role of “external powers” when it comes to the South
China Sea, the COC [Code of Conduct] process and China? We know that the best way
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to pursue sustainable development is the region’s own prosperity. Can ASEAN attain
this goal without assistance from “external powers”?
ANSWER: China views all maritime disputes over jurisdiction in the South China Sea
as a bilateral matter between China and the littoral states. China insists that these
disputes be settled directly between the countries concerned.
Negotiations between China and ASEAN are in fact negotiations between China and
ten ASEAN members. This is because ASEAN gave up its right to act collectively in
negotiations with China. In August 2005, for example, ASEAN tabled its draft
Guidelines to Implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC). Point two of this draft called for collective ASEAN consultations prior
to meeting with China. China refused to accept this. It took six years of discussions and
the exchange of twenty-one successive drafts before final agreement could be
reached. In a major concession ASEAN agreed to “promote dialogue and consultation
among the parties” and dropped all reference to prior consultations by its members.
There is no reference to “external powers” or third parties in the current South China
Sea Code of Conduct Single Draft Negotiating Text. China’s input into the Single Draft
Negotiating Text makes clear that outside power should be barred from cooperating
in the development of marine resources in the South China Sea. Further, China’s input
into military exercises with outside powers in the South China Sea should be the
subject of a veto.
ASEAN should insist that outside powers be allowed to accede to a protocol
supporting the final COC in a similar fashion that outside powers can accede to a
protocol supporting the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
The issue of sustainable development and regional prosperity is a separate issue from
the South China Sea. ASEAN and its members are economically interdependent with
the global economy, including the economies of China and the United States. ASEAN
contributes to the global supply chain and benefits from trade and investment from
all major powers including China, the United States, Japan, the European Union etc.
ASEAN has Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Australia-New Zealand, China, India,
Japan, and Republic of Korea. ASEAN is presently negotiating a Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership that would bring its FTAs under one
framework.
ASEAN has structured its relations with outside powers into three groups – dialogue
partners, sectoral partners and development partners. In short, ASEAN can only reach
the goal of prosperity by working with external powers.
Q6: As you have been studying ASEAN closely, how do you assess the role of Vietnam
in the region?
ANSWER: Since Vietnam joined ASEAN as its seventh member it has played an
increasingly positive and constructive role. This is because Vietnam has maintained
domestic stability at a time when several of the original members of ASEAN have been
pre-occupied with domestic instability, such as Thailand following a military coup in
2014. Vietnam’s policy of “diversifying and multilateralizing” its foreign relations and
non-alignment with any major power fits well with ASEAN’s orientation. In addition,
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since 2013 Vietnam has given priority to negotiating strategic partnerships with
Thailand, Singapore Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
Vietnam’s role as an independent and constructive member of the regional and
international community has raised its prestige to new heights. This year, for example,
Vietnam was picked to host the second summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-
un. More significantly, Vietnam was the unanimous choice of the Asia group at the
United Nations as its candidate for non-permanent membership on the UN Security
Council. Vietnam was elected by an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly for
the second time.
Q7: To keep up ASEAN’s momentum, what should Vietnam prioritize?
ANSWER: Vietnam will be ASEAN Chair in 2020. It should continue to work closely with
Thailand, the current Chair, to ensure that ASEAN projects and initiatives currently
underway continue to receive priority when Vietnam takes office. For example,
Vietnam will have responsibility for the mid-term review of the three community
blueprints (political-security, economic and socio-cultural).
Vietnam will also have responsibility for five on-going priority areas: advancing
negotiations with China on a South China Sea Code of Conduct; strengthening the
ASEAN Secretariat and reviewing other ASEAN agencies; completing the Work Plan for
the Initiative of ASEAN Integration, 2016-2020 and drawing up a Work Plan for 2021-
25; implementing the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025; and promoting the
UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda along with the ASEAN Community Vision
2025.
One particular issue that Vietnam could take up is to canvass the idea of a qualified
majority in ASEAN decision-making. ASEAN’s consensus norm of decision-making
often leads to inaction to the detriment of countries whose interests are directly
affected. ASEAN has already adopted the N – x model in the economic area where N
stands for the majority number of countries that agree on a proposal and x represents
the minority who have yet to decide. Under this model the countries that agree can
proceed and the minority countries can join later.
The qualified majority model could be applied at all levels of ASEAN decision-making
except at the Summit-level when consensus decision-making would apply.
Vietnam should work closely with Brunei, the ASEAN Chair for 2021, to ensure
continuity in policy implementation.
In addition, as ASEAN Chair, Vietnam should give particular priority to developing
relations with its dialogue partners so they reinforce ASEAN goals and objectives. It is
particularly important to identify what roles ASEAN members and their dialogue
partners should play in ensuring that Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea,
remains peaceful and stable.
As the incoming chair Vietnam has the prerogative to announce its theme for the year.
Thailand picked “Advance partnerships for Sustainability.” Vietnam might consider
“Promoting International Law for Peace, Cooperation and Development.”
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Media Identification: The University of New South Wales, Canberra or The University
of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN at 52: Unity in Diversity,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, August 10, 2019. All background briefs are posted on
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

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