Environmental Impact Assessment Review

23 (2003) 383 – 397

www.elsevier.com/locate/eiar

Is environmental impact assessment regulation

a ‘burden’ to private firms?
David Annandale a,*, Ross Taplinb
a
School of Environmental Science, Division of Science and Engineering, Murdoch University,
South Street, Murdoch 6150, Western Australia, Australia
b
School of Mathematics, Division of Science and Engineering, Murdoch University, South Street,
Murdoch 6150, Western Australia, Australia
Received 1 April 2002; received in revised form 1 November 2002; accepted 1 December 2002

Abstract

The impact of environmental regulation on macroeconomic performance has been

studied in some depth over the last 15 years. Similarly, impact on profit performance,
investment intention and location decisions of firms has also been studied, although in less
depth. There has been less academic interest, however, in the impact that environmental
regulation has on the strategic objectives of companies.
This article reports on a research project that focused on the impact that environmental
approvals regulation (predominantly environmental impact assessment, EIA) has on
proposed new development in the international mining sector.
Based on a large and externally valid survey of senior mining company executives in
Australia and Canada in the late 1990s, the research indicated that a significant majority of
firms consider the environmental approvals process to be an important determinant of
investment strategy. An initial reaction to these figures might suggest that the majority of
respondents believe the environmental approvals process to be a negative influence.
However, further questioning indicated that only a small proportion of companies in
both countries thought of the environmental approvals process as an impediment to
development. Instead, it is clear that most firms see EIA as a catalyst for integrating
environmental design into the early planning of a project, thereby alleviating the need to
spend money on overcoming environmental problems once a poorly designed project has
been commissioned.
The somewhat surprising conclusion that companies see environmental approvals
regulation as important, but as an encouragement to development rather than as an

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61-8-9360-6081; fax: +61-8-9360-6787.

E-mail address: annandal@essun1.murdoch.edu.au (D. Annandale).

0195-9255/03/$ – see front matter D 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0195-9255(03)00002-7
384 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

impediment, goes against much previous industry and academic comment and, at least in
relation to the mining sector, refutes the idea that EIA is ‘‘burdensome’’.
D 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Environmental regulation and firms; Environmental approvals; Environmental impact

assessment

1. Introduction

In recent years there has been much discussion and research about the impact
of government regulatory action on the economic performance of companies.
Speculative comment by industry representatives tends to support the view that
environmental regulation is a burden which can drive companies out of business
or, if they are ‘mobile’, drive them to invest offshore in countries where
environmental regulations are believed to be less onerous (Hancock, 1993;
Rayner, 1992; Barnett, 1992; Constantineau, 1996; Cattaneo, 1995; Charlier,
1993; Morgan, 1993; Armstrong, 1995; Smith, 1994; Dyson, 2000).
Such speculation has supported the growth of a substantial academic literature,
where dichotomous views tend to be the norm. There is, for example, a research
community view that coincides with the abovementioned industry perspective.
Some academics assert that environmental regulation has an observable negative
impact on companies, meaning that there is evidence that environmental regu-
lation directly impacts upon performance and investment intentions (Trewin et
al., 1992; Palmer et al., 1995; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1990).
There is, however, an alternative position stated by commentators such as
Porter and van der Linde (1995), Leonard (1988) and Bartik (1988) which argues
that there is little, or no, evidence to suggest that companies are negatively
affected by environmental regulation and that, in some cases, it is possible to
argue that environmental regulation has actually encouraged better financial
performance1.
This academic debate is still current, and there is no genuine consensus as to
its outcome.
While there has been substantial research into the issue of the impact of
environmental regulation on macroeconomic activity and, to a lesser extent,
microeconomic performance at the level of the firm, there has been less academic
interest in the impact that environmental regulation has on the strategic objectives
of companies.
This article reports on a research project that focused on one aspect of
environmental regulation, notably environmental approvals regulation, and its
impact on proposed new development in the multinational mining sector.

1
This argument is most forcefully presented by Porter and van der Linde (1995).
 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397 385

The article opens by briefly examining the kind of environmental regulations

that are directed at mining companies. This helps to categorise regulations
according to the degree of controversy surrounding their impact. The article
concludes with a presentation of primary research undertaken in the Australian
and Canadian mining sector, aimed specifically at the impact that environmental
approvals regulation has on project development.

2. What kind of environmental regulations are directed at mining

companies?

In an early cataloguing attempt, Kirschen (1964) listed 64 different types of

policy instrument that can be used to influence the activities of firms. A more
recent effort by Dovers (1995), and specific to environmental management,
presented 13 different categories, with associated subcategories. Table 1 lists
these categories.
While Table 1 is fundamentally a descriptive list of instruments used to
implement environmental policy, it also contains a rudimentary attempt to group
policy instruments according to categories.
A number of commentators have attempted to develop more sophisticated
taxonomies or categorisation schemes for policy instruments. The most signific-
ant are briefly summarised in Table 2.
These categorisation schemes are based on the following: governments’ use of
resources (Hood, 1986); desired ends (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987; Schneider
and Ingram, 1990); degree of coercion (Doern and Phidd, 1992); and level of
state presence in the provision of goods and services (Howlett and Rameesh,
1995; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).

Table 1
Policy instruments for environmental management
Research, development and monitoring
Improved communication and information flow
Education and training
Consultation, mediation and negotiation between parties
Agreements and conventions between governments
Direct regulation
Common law
Self-regulation by firms or sector
Community involvement in management
Market (economic) mechanisms
Institutional change (to enable other instruments)
Removal/adjustment of distorting policy settings (subsidies, conflicting policies)
Reasoned inaction
Sources: Adapted from Dovers (1995).
386 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

Table 2
Categorisation schemes for policy instruments
Commentator System of categorisation
Hood (1986) Use of information (‘nodality’), use of legal power
(‘authority’), use of money (‘treasure’), use of formal
organization (‘organization’)
McDonnell and Elmore (1987) ‘Mandates’, ‘inducements’, ‘capacity-building’,
‘system-changing’
Schneider and Ingram (1990) ‘Incentives’, ‘capacity-building’, ‘symbolic and
hortatory’, ‘learning’
Doern and Phidd (1992) Continuum from ‘self-regulation’ through to ‘public
ownership’
Howlett and Rameesh (1995) Continuum from ‘voluntary instruments’ through to
‘compulsory instruments’
Gunningham and Grabosky Continuum from ‘command-and-control’ through to
(1998) ‘free market environmentalism’

Clearly there are many ways in which governments may influence the
behaviour of corporations, and mining firms will need to respond to any
combination of the policy instruments listed above.
Arguably, given the wide range of available instruments, research into
corporate responses to policy pressure could be problematic unless it is focused
on a narrow range of policy instruments.
For this reason, the research reported on in this article focused on the impact of
direct regulation2. This is because, traditionally, this is the way governments have
tended to pursue corporate behaviour modification, especially in the mining
sector. As a consequence, mining company executives who are the ‘unit of
analysis’ for this research are likely to be more familiar with direct regulation
than with other forms of policy instrument.
Not surprisingly, direct environmental regulation can be further categorised.
Bates (1995) outlines four components of direct environmental regulation arising
out of government intervention: (i) development legislation (e.g., public devel-
opment or fast-track legislation); (ii) resource allocation legislation (e.g., mining,
forestry, rights to water and land); (iii) conservation legislation (e.g., national
parks and reserves, flora and fauna, cultural and natural heritage); and (iv)
planning and protection legislation (e.g., land use planning, environmental impact
assessment (EIA), pollution control, waste disposal, environmental contami-
nants).
New development proposals by mining companies, or existing mining opera-
tions, could be affected by any one of these types of direct regulation. For

2
It is worth noting at this point that the term ‘regulation’ was defined in this research to mean
laws (legislation), subsidiary legislation that provides details relating to how laws should be
implemented (sometimes called ‘regulations’ or ‘rules’), and any policies or guidelines that are
directly supported by law.
 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397 387

example, mining companies wishing to obtain environmental approval to proceed

with a new development in Western Australia need to meet the requirements of at
least 10 separate pieces of legislation, administered by the same number of
government departments (Department of Minerals and Energy Western Australia,
1998). This lack of integrated regulation for mining is a common feature, at least
in the main industrialized mining countries (Acquah, 1994, p.196).
Perhaps a simpler way of thinking about the direct regulation pressures faced
by mining companies is to categorise them according to whether they regulate
existing operations or proposed activities.
Existing mining operations produce emissions and wastes, and exhaustion of
the resource results in the need for rehabilitation (Australian Minerals and Energy
Environment Foundation, 1998). Regulation relating to these activities can fit
within the areas of pollution control, waste management, and rehabilitation and
mine closure. Government agencies will enforce the law in these areas by means
of permits and licenses to operate (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).
While mining companies take an interest in the development of environmental
regulation related to operations, the literature does not indicate that there is
significant concern or controversy in relation to the development and imple-
mentation of mining operation regulation.
The situation is quite different, however, in relation to the regulation of
proposed activities (both exploration and mining). The regulation of potential, or
future, acts is known generically as the environmental approvals process. In this
research, ‘‘environmental approvals regulation’’ was defined to mean all gov-
ernment environmental regulation that companies need to comply with before
they can gain environmental approval for a new, or expanded, development. This
includes laws, subsidiary legislation, and policy in the areas of EIA and pre-
development licensing and permitting. In practice, the regulatory instrument
most often confronted by proponents during the environmental approvals process
is EIA3. However, to ensure that survey respondents were encouraged to think
broadly about the regulation of proposed activities, and to provide an abbreviated
form for inclusion in this article, the term ‘‘environmental approvals regulation’’
was used throughout the primary research, and is used from now on in this
article.
The environmental approvals process for proposed activities is considered by
some industry commentators and academics to be burdensome because it is
perceived as causing delays and increased uncertainty (sometimes known as

3
Administrative processes for EIA have matured significantly over the last decade (Wood, 1995,
Annandale, 2001). Typically, an EIA administrative system will be backed by high-level policy or
legislation and will specify the following: a ‘triggering’ mechanism for ‘calling in’ of proposals; the
content of EIA documentation that proponents are required to present; the nature of public
consultation required of proponents; the decision-making process to be followed by Government once
the proponent’s EIA documentation has been assessed; and the nature of condition-setting and
performance follow-up.
388 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

‘sovereign risk’) (Benidickson et al., 1994; Trewin et al., 1992; Hancock, 1993;
OECD, 1993).
The environmental approvals process therefore appears to be a focus of some
concern for both industry representatives and researchers, and is likely to invoke
strong views. As a consequence, it may well be a particularly productive point in
the regulatory cycle at which to direct research.

3. Outline of the research design

The research reported on here was part of a large study undertaken in the late
1990s into the responses that Australian and Canadian mining companies make in
relation to environmental approvals regulation. Some of this work has been
reported on elsewhere (Annandale, 2000).
Primary research consisted of two aspects, undertaken during the period
1997 –early 2000.
The first was a semi-structured interview process conducted with 64 senior
executives of hard rock mining companies based in Toronto, Ontario and Perth,
Western Australia. Both cities are significant corporate homes for Canadian and
Australian international hard rock mining companies4.
In the Toronto sample of 38 interviews, the companies employing the
interviewees made up 70% of the total number of mining firms traded on the
Toronto Stock Exchange, with 80% of mining sector market capitalization
(Toronto Stock Exchange, 1997).
The Perth sample of 26 interviewees represented 35 different companies. The
sample made up 60% of production and/or exploration members of the Western
Australian Chamber of Minerals and Energy.
The first stage of primary research was used to determine independent
variables that were further tested in the second stage (Annandale, 2000).
The second piece of primary research tested these independent variables by
way of a structured post-out questionnaire responded to by 121 Australian
executives and 56 Canadian executives in 1999 and early 2000, and analyzed
using standard bivariate statistical techniques5.
For the Australian survey, this was a response rate of 36%. If the 153 publicly
listed Australian mining companies that are small gold explorers are withdrawn
from the sample, the response rate was nearly 80%. For the Canadian survey, the

4
Clements and Johnson (2000) and Ahammad and Clements (1999) demonstrate the importance
of the minerals sector to the Western Australian economy. Mining Association of Canada (2000)
achieves the same purpose for the Ontario economy.
5
Unlike the qualitative work described above to uncover possible determinants of response to
environmental regulation, the hypothesis-testing post-out survey was conducted across all Australian
States, and all Canadian Provinces.
 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397 389

response rate was 22%, which represents approximately 70% of Canadian mining
sector market capitalization.
When combined with the qualitative survey responses obtained in the first
phase of primary research, it is possible to be confident that the outcomes are
generalizable, and therefore externally valid.

4. Outcomes of the research: the influence of environmental approvals

regulation

The issue of whether or not environmental approvals regulation is, in fact,

perceived to be a burden by mining company executives was addressed by two
questions. One asked respondents to rate the importance of the environmental
approvals process as a determinant of investment strategy on a seven-point scale
where ‘‘1’’ is ‘‘not at all important’’, and ‘‘7’’ is considered to be ‘‘very
important’’.
The other question asked respondents to indicate whether they thought of the
environmental approvals process as an impediment, or as an encouragement to
good development (a score of ‘‘1’’ on a seven-point scale was considered to
represent a ‘‘strong impediment’’, and a score of ‘‘7’’ indicated ‘‘strong
encouragement’’).
Table 3 presents the outcomes of the first question for all of the Australian and
Canadian executives who responded to the stage two, post-out survey.
Table 3 indicates that the majority of responses clustered towards the
‘‘important’’ end of the scale, although 38% of Australian firms and 15% of
Canadian firms believed that the environmental approvals process has either
medium importance, minor importance, or none at all.
An initial reaction to these figures might suggest that the majority of
respondents believed the environmental approvals process to be a negative
influence (from their perspective).

Table 3
Importance of the environmental approvals process as a determinant of investment strategy
Position on scale Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
responses total responses (%) responses total responses (%)
Australian firms Canadian firms
‘‘1’’ (not important) 1 1 0 0
‘‘2’’ 8 7 1 2
‘‘3’’ 13 11 3 6
‘‘4’’ 22 19 4 7
‘‘5’’ 28 23 10 19
‘‘6’’ 31 26 23 42
‘‘7’’ (very important) 15 13 13 24

Total 118 100 54 100

390 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

This is not necessarily the case, however. It is possible, for example, for a
respondent to view the approvals process as being important, but in a positive
sense. It could be seen as a catalyst for integrating environmental design into the
early planning of a project, thereby alleviating the need to spend money on
overcoming environmental problems once a poorly designed project has been
commissioned.
It is clear from an analysis of Table 4 that it is indeed the case that there is not
a strong relationship between believing that the environmental approvals process
is an important determinant of investment intention, and perceiving that influence
to be negative.
Table 4 indicates that only 16 (13.5%) of the 120 Australian respondents
believed that the environmental approvals process is an impediment to good
development (i.e. scores equal to, or less than, ‘‘3’’). The remaining 104
Australian respondents (87.5%) claimed that the environmental approvals process
has a neutral or encouraging influence on good development. Table 4 also shows
that 17 (31%) of Canadian respondents believed that the environmental approvals
process is an impediment to good development, with the remaining 37 (69%)
claiming that the Canadian environmental approvals process has a neutral or
encouraging influence on good development.
Tables 5 and 6 shed further light on the relationship between the importance of
the environmental approvals process as a determinant of investment strategy, and
the issue of impediment or encouragement.
Table 5 indicates that of the 74 Australian executives who believed that
environmental approvals regulation was an important determinant of investment
strategy (i.e. respondents who gave ‘‘5’’, ‘‘6’’, or ‘‘7’’ as the answer to the
question as to whether the environmental approvals process was a determinant of
investment strategy), only 9 perceived it to be an impediment to development
(these respondents gave ‘‘1’’, ‘‘2’’, or ‘‘3’’ as their answer to the question as to
whether environmental approvals regulation was an impediment or encourage-
ment to development).

Table 4
The environmental approvals process as an impediment to, or encouragement for, good development
Position on scale Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
responses total responses (%) responses total responses (%)
Australian firms Canadian firms
‘‘1’’ (strong impediment) 2 2 4 7
‘‘2’’ 5 4 6 11
‘‘3’’ 9 7.5 7 13
‘‘4’’ 39 32.5 14 26
‘‘5’’ 33 28 10 19
‘‘6’’ 28 23 12 22
‘‘7’’ (strong encouragement) 4 3 1 2

Total 120 100 54 100

 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397 391

Table 5
The relationship between importance of the Australian environmental approvals process and influence
on project developmenta
Importance of the Influence of environmental approvals
environmental process on project development
approvals process (‘‘impediment’’ or ‘‘encouragement’’)
as a determinant <4 4 >4 Total
of investment strategy (impediment) (encouragement)
< 4 (not important) 2 (10%) 7 (33%) 12 (57%) 21
4 4 (18%) 11 (50%) 7 (32%) 22
>4 (important) 9 (12%) 21 (28%) 44 (59%) 74

Total 15 39 63 117
a
The numbers in parentheses are the row percentages. For example, for the respondents who
answered question 15 as less than ‘‘4’’, 10% answered question 16 as less than ‘‘4’’.

Table 6 indicates that of the 46 Canadian executives who believed that

environmental approvals regulation was an important determinant of investment
strategy (i.e. respondents who gave ‘‘5’’, ‘‘6’’, or ‘‘7’’ as the answer to the
question as to whether the environmental approvals process was a determinant of
investment strategy), 17 perceived it to be an impediment to good development
(these respondents gave ‘‘1’’, ‘‘2’’, or ‘‘3’’ as their answer to the questions as to
whether environmental approvals regulation was an impediment or encourage-
ment to development). Answers to the two questions are also negatively
correlated (r = 0.273, P = 0.050), indicating that when the answer to one
question is large (i.e. close to ‘‘7’’), the answer to the other question tends to
be small (i.e. closer to ‘‘1’’).
It is therefore clear that both Australian and Canadian executives can think of
the environmental approvals process as having an important influence on

Table 6
The relationship between importance of the Canadian environmental approvals process and influence
on project developmenta
Importance of the Influence of environmental approvals
environmental process on project development
approvals process (‘‘impediment’’ or ‘‘encouragement’’)
as a determinant <4 4 >4 Total
of investment strategy
(impediment) (encouragement)
< 4 (not important) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 4
4 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 4
>4 (important) 17 (38%) 11 (24%) 18 (38%) 46

Total 18 14 21 54
a
The numbers in parentheses are the row percentages. For example, for the respondents who
answered question 15 as greater than ‘‘4’’, 38% answered question 16 as less than ‘‘4’’.
392 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

investment decisions, but at the same time view this influence as encouraging for
project development, rather than as an impediment.
Before analysing the significance of this finding, a few important observations
should be made about the difference between Australian and Canadian responses.
In both countries a considerable majority of respondents believed that envir-
onmental approvals regulation was an important determinant of investment
strategy, but acted as an encouragement to development, rather than as an
impediment. There was, however, significant evidence of a difference between
the countries for both questions.
On average, Australian companies believed that the environmental approvals
process was less important as a determinant of investment strategy than did
Canadian companies ( P = 0.008 with a t-test). Australian companies provided an
average importance score of 4.89 (standard error 0.13) on the scale from ‘‘1’’ to
‘‘7’’, and Canadian companies had a mean score of 5.66 (standard error 0.16).
On the other hand, Australian companies considered the environmental
approvals process as being more of an encouragement to good development
than did Canadian firms ( P = 0.018, t-test with a mean of 4.63 for Australian
firms, and a mean of 4.10 for Canadian firms).

5. Analysis and conclusions

Presumably if companies are not inactive or reactive, then there must be at

least some consideration that environmental approvals regulation is not the
burden that media-reported industry commentators suggest.
A significant majority of firms indicated that the environmental approvals
process should be considered to be an important determinant of investment
strategy. An initial reaction to these figures might suggest that the majority of
respondents believed the environmental approvals process to be a negative
influence. However, this is not necessarily the case. The phrase ‘important
determinant of investment’ could be read by respondents to mean either an
impediment to investment, or an encouragement to good development.
Further questioning indicated that only a small proportion of companies in
both countries thought of the environmental approvals process as an impediment
to development. In addition, an equally small proportion of executives who
indicated that environmental approvals regulation was ‘important’, also believed
it to be an impediment.
This somewhat surprising conclusion certainly goes against the media-reported
industry comments referenced at the beginning of this article. A surface reading
suggests that it is also at odds with the small amount of academic work in this area.
For example, in their analysis of the impact of ‘environmental constraints’ on
mining performance in Australia, Trewin et al. (1992) claim that ‘‘most respond-
ents considered that the costs associated with environmental processes were
important factors constraining mineral production’’. Similar conclusions are
 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397 393

reached by another analysis of the impact of environmental assessment on major

projects in Australia (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1990).
Two main points can be made about the divergence between the research
reported on in this article and the two studies discussed above.
First, no indication is given of the sample size of either of the studies. Trewin
et al. (1992) qualify their work when they say that ‘‘it should be stressed that the
survey was of a few large companies that make up a large proportion of
Australia’s current mining activity’’. In addition, the Bureau of Industry Eco-
nomics study warns that ‘‘the rankings shown in the table must be interpreted
with caution because the sample on which they are based is small’’ (Bureau of
Industry Economics, 1990).
Second, the survey instruments that support both of these studies are clearly
designed with an underlying assumption that environmental approvals regulation
is a cost burden. Respondents are not given the chance to opt for ‘environmental
regulation as an encouragement’. For example, the first question in the Bureau of
Industry Economics survey that provided data for the 1990 report asks: ‘‘what
aspects of the environmental assessment process imposed the highest costs?’’
(Bureau of Industry Economics, 1990). Also, the first sentence of the cover letter
sent to potential respondents of Trewin et al.’s survey describes it as a study ‘‘on
the effects of environmental constraints on Australia’s future mining devel-
opment’’ (National Centre for Development Studies and Centre for International
Economics, 1991).
Even given the clear bias of these two studies, some of the results indicate that
environmental approvals regulation is not quite the burden that the researchers
appear to hope it to be. For example, when given a choice of ‘‘impediments’’ to
project development, respondents of the Bureau of Industry Economics survey
ranked ‘‘environmental assessment’’ as low as fourth out of eight possible
choices (behind operating costs, constructions costs, and cost of capital) (Bureau
of Industry Economics, 1990).
There are other indications that not all of those interviewed for the Bureau of
Industry Economics study think of environmental approvals regulation as an
impediment. Despite the fact that none of the survey’s questions ask about
perceived benefits, the Bureau’s report includes a section dealing with ‘‘benefits
of environmental assessment’’. The implication is that some respondents must
have added such comments, even though they were given no opportunity to do
so. The report states that benefits to firms, in addition to those that accrue to the
community, are associated with increased discipline in the planning stages of
projects, and savings in input costs as a result of increased discipline in the
production process induced by environmental standards (Bureau of Industry
Economics, 1990).
Comments collected during both stages of primary research support the
Bureau’s remarks about perceived benefits of environmental assessment. A
number of respondents claimed that the environmental approvals process should
be seen as a catalyst for integrating environmental design into the early planning
394 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

of a project, thereby alleviating the need to spend money on overcoming

environmental problems once a poorly designed project has been commissioned.
The idea that environmental approvals regulation can be thought of as a
business benefit also ties in with the literature reviewed earlier in this article,
which indicates that there is little research evidence pointing to the adverse effect
of environmental regulation on exports, trade flows, plant location decisions, or
employment.
Given the nature of this research’s results, (i.e. that environmental approvals
regulation is important, but not as an impediment), it is necessary to address the
possible criticism that these results are somehow biased because of the roles
played in firms by those responsible for environmental management6. This
argument would have it that environmental managers are likely to hold
‘greener’ individual values than do other employees, and so view envir-
onmental regulations as being more benign than those hardened by the harsh
economics of mining. Further, these environmental managers may actually be
beholden to environmental regulations because their jobs would not exist
without them.
There are two responses to this view. First, while the survey work was most
certainly directed to executives responsible for environmental management inside
firms, these people often held other portfolios, as would be expected in small-to-
medium-sized firms.
In fact, 13% of respondents to the second-stage, post-out survey were
CEOs. Another 40% held responsibilities that could be considered to be ‘more
traditional’, in addition to their environmental portfolios (for example, Vice
President for Finance, or Operations, or Exploration). In addition, most of the
interviewed executives had traditional mining sector backgrounds and training
which would not generally sit well with the idea of ‘‘green-focused’’
executives7.
The second response is that, even if mining company environmental managers
were to be somehow ‘‘softer’’ on environmental regulations than other execu-
tives, it is hard to see how this would affect their view of the burdensome nature
of the regulations. For example, it is these very same executives who are directly
responsible for dealing with the regulations. If there are difficulties or uncertain-
ties or frustration involved in meeting the requirements of these regulations, it
will be the environmental management executives who would be the first in line
to feel the brunt. Because of their ‘‘at the coalface’’ position, one would assume
that they are more likely to perceive burdens than those executives with more
distance from the responsibility. In addition, it is hard to see how not painting
environmental approvals regulations as a burden would threaten the position of

6
Remembering that the subjects of the both surveys were senior executives ultimately responsible
for environmental management.
7
Sixty two percent of the 177 post-out questionnaire respondents had qualifications in either
geology, mining engineering, or metallurgy.
 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397 395

environmental management executives. It could be argued, for example, that

describing regulations as a burden to their CEOs and Boards might actually assist
environmental management executives in obtaining more resources to do their
jobs. In other words, it may well be to their advantage to present environmental
regulations as being burdensome.
Looking at the same issue in a slightly different way, if environmental
management executives present environmental approvals regulations in a benign
light, their jobs could be threatened by criticism that there is no need for such
positions.
It is therefore suggested that, in fact, executives directly responsible for
addressing the requirements of environmental approvals regulation are more
likely to view them as burdensome than might other executives holding different
portfolios, and that, if anything, the results are biased in the opposite direction.
In relation to the difference between Australian and Canadian firms, Austral-
ian companies believed that the environmental approvals process was less
important as a determinant of investment strategy than did Canadian companies.
On the other hand, Australian companies considered the environmental approvals
process as being more of an encouragement to good development than did
Canadian firms. It seems clear, then, that Canadian mining firms consider the
environmental approvals process to be marginally more of an impediment than do
Australian firms.
Survey responses did not provide additional information as to why this might
be the case. Some possible explanations could include recent calls for reform of
Canadian mining environmental regulation, which could be the outcome of
frustration with the regulatory system (Natural Resources Canada, 1998a,b,c),
and a number of high-profile development controversies that may have neg-
atively affected organizational learning. Examples of the latter include the Lac de
Gras diamond mine in the North West Territories (BHP Diamonds, undated), and
the proposed Windy Craggy mine in British Columbia (Hood, 1995; Day and
Affum, 1995).
The above conclusions are preliminary. They suggest the need for further
research. In particular, given the somewhat counterintuitive nature of the research
outcomes, it would appear relevant for further research to focus in more detail on
why it was that companies viewed EIA as a ‘‘benefit’’. This article has speculated
on the reasons for this observation, but additional primary research on this
question would be valuable. It should also be noted that the research undertaken
for this article focused on environmental approvals regulation in two developed
country jurisdictions. Future work could seek to examine the utility of the
environmental approvals process in a wider geographic context, thereby provid-
ing a deeper understanding of the impact of this type of regulation on the strategic
decision-making of companies.
Finally, it is worth reiterating the most important conclusion of this research.
At least in relation to the mining sector, it appears that the idea of environmental
approvals regulation as burdensome has been finally refuted.
396 D. Annandale, R. Taplin / Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 23 (2003) 383–397

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