Navarro vs.

Domagtoy

FACTS:

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they
are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and
been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50
km away.

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of
gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and
the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where
it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court
finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a
period of six months.
Kho vs. Republic

FACTS:

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:

Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon,
now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and
prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and
respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public
from witnessing the marriage ceremony; 4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital
vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to
the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of
same early morning of June 1, 1972;5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar
to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection
with the procurement of a marriage license;6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of
May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual
marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been
validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the
most essential requisite;7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning
and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license;

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to
their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica
Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and
5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the
requisite marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As
such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision, disposing thus:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25
September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid
and subsisting for all intents and purposes.The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized
between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that
purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of
any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the
formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST

PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN
COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING
PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS
ASSAILED DECISION

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due
credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time
that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in
deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate
court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.

HELD:

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells
out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title
111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of
marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages;
and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage do not fall under any of these
exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact
that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of
a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.16Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.17

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of
any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata
[respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges
such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any
entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage
contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage
license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so.
The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the
statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a
marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued
in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and
petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such
allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show
that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple
defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is
null and void.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair
with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The
law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly
absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch
2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

Niñal vs. Bayadog

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died
on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months
later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit
stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for
lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence,
his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.

Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson

FACTS:

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and
Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya(Maria Luisa) and Gaston
Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis. Luis alleged in his complaint that
he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30,1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous
relationship. During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San
Juan, Metro Manila. According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and
Severina, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent,
Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002transferring the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates
of title over the said properties. When Severina died on September 21, 2002, Maria Luisa executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002,
adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties. Luis claimed that
because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.

ISSUE: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject lands as conjugal partnership

HELD:

Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis asserted
that their marriage was an exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage
license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition agreement is
valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also,
attesting that his marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted
to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court finds such suspicious and fraudulent
thereby tainting his credibility.

Republic vs. Dayot

FACTS:

On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the execution of a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the
sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

HELD:

Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which
the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living together
five months before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is
unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or
could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab
initio.

Garcia vs. Recio

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued
purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual
Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3,
1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his
legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former
presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as
evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will
be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or
trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free
him on the ground of bigamy.

Rep. vs. Cipriano Orbecido

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.

Republic vs. Iyoy

FACTS:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In
1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her
husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought
“danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus
submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusband’s last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

ISSUE: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
HELD:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

Fujiki vs. Marinay

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition. The RTC cited the following provisions of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.

ISSUE: Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

HELD:

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii
in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under
a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen
who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.