G.R. No. 174673
Daniel’s
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and
facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and
evaluate their admissibility and probative value in the context of the issues presented by the
parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having
been able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law and
determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear
demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years
of litigation actively participated in by both parties should not be encouraged.
There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the
Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its
evaluation of the evidence presented and offered and the interpretation of the relevant law.
After all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final
order ruling on the merits of a case.
This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
May 25, 20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic
of the Philippines (Republic) to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence 4 and
granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence. 5
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
instituted a Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages
against the Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. 7 "The Complaint seeks to recover
. . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or
nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"8
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The
Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.11
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V.
testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29,
2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence." 14
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April
28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence." 15 This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.16
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006
within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. 18 Following this, no additional Motion for
extension was filed by the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the
Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and
the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. 19 Thus, it
declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence. 20
The first assailed Resolution provides:
It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on
February 27, 2006, and it appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its
written formal offer of evidence for an unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days
(i.e., 30 days original period plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said
written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.
WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23,
2006, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled. 21
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30,
2006.22 He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to
support its cause of action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13,
2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined
Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.25
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the
Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of
documentary exhibits attached to the Motion are summarized as follows:
Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax
Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest
Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of
Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said
period. Exhibits H -J and series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real properties.
Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the
Bankers Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account
under Account Number 34-714-415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are
several BTC checks, proving that from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued
several checks against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some
individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The Waldorf Towers,
Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and Renato Balestra, involving
substantial amount of money in US Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several
The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa Gimenez
under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued several checks drawn against
her TCMB account, payable to individuals and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma
Bautista and The Waldorf Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated
December 9, 1982 in the amount of US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she
received said enormous amount from the PNB, New York Branch Office, with clearance
from the Central Bank, which amount was charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the
PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT 56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the
amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving her receipt of such amount as
remitted from California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and series (O1-O-
8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland
to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current account with said
bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984,
she placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank,
Luzemburg, Luxemburg, Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of
the Office of the President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1,
1986, worked with the Office of the President under different positions, the last of which as
Presidential Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.
Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United
States Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand
E. Marcos, et al." which discussed certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista,
among others, in relation to the funds of the Marcoses.
Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles
of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by
Ignacio Gimenez and the Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio
Gimenez and Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s
interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.
Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-
Geneve Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current
account with said bank under Account Number 101045.50 and that from March to June,
1984, he placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit
Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and Bank
of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25,
1986 and the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino,
Vice-President and Manager of the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds
of the PNB New York Branch were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the
instructions of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa
Gimenez and others as conduit.
Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez
while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she
received substantial amounts of money which were coursed through the PNB to be used by
the Marcos spouses for state visits and foreign trips.
Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan,
Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States
Attorney regarding the ongoing investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York
Branch proving that PNB cooperated with the United States government in connection with
the investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New York Branch.
Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office
of the President which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-
1986 holding different positions, the last of which was Presidential Staff Director.1âwphi1
Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn
against Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove
that she issued said checks payable to individuals and entities involving substantial amount
of money.
Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of
Funds Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving
that she maintained a current account under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal
Bank.
Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of
Lamberto R. Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities of spouses Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among
the records on file in said Office except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities as of December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities as
of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These documentary exhibits
prove the assets and liabilities of former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and
1969.
Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December
31,1969 submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period
amounted only to P39,500.00.
Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.",
including its Annexes which prove the assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.
Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in
the names of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.
Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are
the General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation,
and Amended Articles of Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the
corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has substantial interests.
Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the
PCGG which prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez,
Securities, Inc. and the real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
137638, 132807, 126693 and 126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were
sequestered by the PCGG.
Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and
Alexander M. Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG,
proving that the PCGG conducted an investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational
Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in relation
to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.
Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to
the concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had
been sequestered and are the subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.
Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration
issued by the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc.
pursuant to its mandate to go after ill-gotten wealth.
Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks
dated March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the
Letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed
to then Central Bank Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier
request of PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks not to allow any
withdrawal or transfer of funds from the market placements under the names of said
persons, to include spouses Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.
Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real
properties, business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part
of the testimony of Atty. Tereso Javier.
Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador
Pangilinan, Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached
Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account
Ledger wherein he mentioned that Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal
Bank, the balance of which is approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was
informed by Mr. Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez for
deposit to said accounts.
Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K.
Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include
Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various
foreign banks. In his Affidavit, Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts
maintained by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the deposits
were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his
family.
Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo
R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG
regarding the investigation conducted on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the
subject matter of Civil Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-
gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982, several
withdrawals, in the total amount of P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128
(A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank
accounts of substantial amounts and gained control of various corporations.1âwphi1 These
are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel. 27 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied
the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss.28 According to the Sandiganbayan:
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of
substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the
circumstances of this case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court
allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of
procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .
The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of
evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s
counsel appear to be the same missing documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago.
The plaintiff had more than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain
missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason why the search
for these documents should delay the filing of the formal offer of evidence.
[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the
time. We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to
observe the orders of this Court. The carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track
of the deadlines is an unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the
observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of evidence. 29 (Citation omitted)
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an
unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court’s rules. 30 The court also noted that
the documentary evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true
copies.31 However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were
not presented.32 Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.33 The dispositive portion of
the assailed Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the
Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the
plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence
is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio
B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is
then DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this
court.35
The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition. 36 This court noted the
separate Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the
Comments through a Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.
In theResolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their
memoranda.41
On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the
premises[.]"42
On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File
and Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the
Republic argued that the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void
for failing to state the facts and the law on which it was based. 44This Motion was granted,
and the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the Supplement to the
Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this
court in a Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File
and Admit Attached Rejoinder49 was denied.50
The Republic raised the following issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the
allegations in the Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented
vis-a-vis the material admissions of spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to
specifically deny that they were dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that
they acquired illegal wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a manner
prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit
Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right
to due process.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that
petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative value.51
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and
Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the
Philippines waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents
Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
We grant the Petition.
I
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode
of review of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and petitioner has to
show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction.54
Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan,
cannot be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the
Bill of Rights.55 "Due process [in criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway
judgment."57
To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision,
accounting, restitution, and damages.
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten
wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her]
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary
as such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired."59
This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:
. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even
though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty.60
In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature. 62 Civil forfeiture proceedings
were also differentiated from plunder cases:
. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different
from a plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On
the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under
RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the
Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379
does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. 63(Citation omitted)
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act
No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.64
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is
equivalent to an acquittal.65
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy.66
Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court:
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s
demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,
based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides
the mode of appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
II
Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural
technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal
Offer of Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate several missing documents resulted in
petitioner’s inability to file the pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan. 70
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its
incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed
period, PCGG’s evidence still had no probative value. 72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the
persons who certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to testify[.]"73 It
is also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary evidence presented are public
documents.74 "The documents are not public in the sense that these are official issuances of
the Philippine government."75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents that
have simply been certified true and faithful."76
According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the
Formal Offer of Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66
missing documents.77 However, the issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during
the hearing on November 16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005
to produce the documents; otherwise, these would be excluded. 79 The testimonies of the
witnesses related to the missing documents would also be expunged from the case
records.80
Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it
ruled that the great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no
probative value."81 Aside from the 66 missing documents it failed to present, almost all of
petitioner’s pieces of documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82The few that were
certified true copies were not testified on by the persons who certified these documents. 83
Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial
evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify." 84 Documentary and object
evidence, on the other hand, are offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence."85 Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless
permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. 86
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to
be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the
case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed
a waiver to submit it."88
Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against
them and take the necessary actions to secure their case. 89 Hence, any document or object
that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the
opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness
called upon to prove or identify it."90
This court explained further the reason for the rule:
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their
findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes
for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing
parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review
as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by
the trial court.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the
other party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must
be excluded by the court.92
Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary
evidence presented within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed
Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the
filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the
deadline based on the extended period granted by the court. Petitioner was granted several
extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totalling 75 days from the date petitioner
terminated its presentation of evidence. Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-
day period. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of Evidence.
In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable.
According to the Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the
court’s orders.
This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth:
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set
aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution.
This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But
substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have
passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth.
The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of
illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought
out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural
sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly.
Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as
shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. As petitioner argues:
Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the
case. The most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has
been accomplished. Petitioner completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten
nature and character of the funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It
presented vital testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record
proving the gross disparity of the subject funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared
income which must be reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of
the Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.95
This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in
cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to
prosecute corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the government and the
people of the Republic.
This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.
Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal
redemption, which were heard jointly before the trial court. 97 The defendant did not file a
Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered
in the legal redemption case.99 The trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file his
Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s evidence therein as
uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision and was affirmed by this
court.101 This court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically
sound, a liberal interpretation was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:
It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary
evidence is offered after presentation of testimonial evidence. However, a liberal
interpretation of these Rules would have convinced the trial court that a separate formal
offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an offer of
evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly heard by the trial court, counsel
for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was adopting these evidences for Civil Case
No. 6518. The trial court itself stated that it would freely utilize in one case evidence
adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in Civil
Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony since at the
time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time
the witness is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid,
technical case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.
....
The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court
was being overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of
evidence. This posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure decreeing a liberal construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and
inexpensive litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing the
rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice. Despite the intervening years, the language of
the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, still remains relevant:
"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute
the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the
means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses
the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism." 102 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the
rules of procedure."103
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays
petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on
recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be
relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
III
According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence
filed by respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on
the pleadings and documents on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous
wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets." 104
Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:
[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in
unlawful concert and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the
disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or
agent of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio
Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural
Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the
New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with the government buildings,
such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of the
National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to
the gross and manifest disadvantage of the Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in
furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged
in food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation,
Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc.,
A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation,
Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining
Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.105
Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents
merely gave general denials to the allegations in the Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial
[was] made on the material allegations [in] the [C]omplaint." 107
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal
Offer of Evidence considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner had all the resources and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary
evidence to build its case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to
complete, and yet it failed to submit the necessary documents and pleading. 109
Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to
comply with the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to
petitioner to present evidence, which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110
To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer
to Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to
evidence due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to
evidence was defined as:
. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment
on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he
would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief
sought."113 (Citations omitted)
This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and
conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the
defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise
sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his
favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to
make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to
support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s
evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a
motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether
the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence
contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case,
excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. . . . 115 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had
presented and offered during trial warranted consideration and analysis. 116 The
Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded these testimonies in determining whether to grant the
motion to dismiss or not, hence:
. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence,
petitioner still had testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It
behoved then upon the Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very
least, an analysis of petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117
With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of
Evidence, what should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s
evidence is sufficient to entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its
case. Petitioner is required to establish preponderance of evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss based on the lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it
observed that the pieces of documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly
certified true copies of the original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s
evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:
On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true
copies of the original. These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the
plaintiff were not testified on by the person who certified them to be photocopies of the
original. Hence, these evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative
value.118
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the
evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly
certified true copies which had not been testified on by the person who certified
[them]."119 Thus, its right to due process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected
petitioner’s documentary evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the case. 120
Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of
the documentary evidence presented by petitioner; 121 and b) the documents it presented
were public documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of
the original documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan Order123 dated
August 6, 2002. The Order reads:
Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that
the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents
to be presented and identified by the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the
PCGG, the parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence
is set on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s
functions prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), 125 and form part of the
official records of the PCGG:126 "Certifications as to the various positions held in
Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and compensation during her stint as a
public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing
the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of various
corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various corporations; and several
transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted as conduit in the
disbursement of government funds."127
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not
"official issuances of the Philippine government." 128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer
to evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan
did not err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative
value, considering that most of these documents are only photocopies. 131
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon.
Save for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the
subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. 132 This is the Best Evidence Rule
provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be
presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document
is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.
(5a)
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this court clarified the
applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject
of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively
explained thus —
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when
the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant
to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other
substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the
documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did
not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in
the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and
no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
"x x x x x x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for
certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible
and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature
is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to
inspect it."
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in
evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by
the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of
these documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was
respondent’s position that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534)
never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were
merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the
proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted
receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters
she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep
up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their
existence or execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the
documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and
which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence
presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in
mind that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the
revised Rules of Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are
classified as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of
proof for public documents:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record
is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
....
SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
....
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved
and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court
pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial
will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a
public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no
further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or
agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court.137 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated:
 ....
"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those
specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section
19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which
gave rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that
Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the
notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12,
1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized
documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved
(e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed
the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution
of the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have
been regularly performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which
are required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by
the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date
mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled
that affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between
mere copies of audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited
financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public
documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of
SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and
statement of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified
period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public
accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial
statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However,
once financial statements are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law,
they become public documents.
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as
evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in
evidence unless they are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
....
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere
copies of the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party
claimed that copies presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements
obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would
have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private documents.
Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as
evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious
nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely
presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly market
revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While there is no fixed criterion
as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private
document, the best proof available must be presented. The best proof available, in this
instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC’s external auditor
who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited
financial statements were never authenticated.141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents
by the PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court:
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its
investigations does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that
these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the
PCGG in the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno
was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the
writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses."
Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is,
those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she
obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents
themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still
classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the
affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 143(Citations omitted)
Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was
cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was
that there was no evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of
Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear
from the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other
evidence presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in
ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous
exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa
Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out
of proportion to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or
properties.
Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and
Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:
Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses
owned and/ or under the control of spouses Gimenezes.144
Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s
testimonial evidence:
1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties
of the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."146
2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the
purpose of proving the real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez
and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 148
3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and
"KK-40"149 were offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which
Ignacio B. Gimenez has interest, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150
4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG
conducted an investigation of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in relation to
Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday, and as part of the testimony of
Tereso Javier."152
5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of proving that the
PCGG formally filed notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay,
Rizal, Lucena City, Quezon and San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties
mentioned in said notices in connection with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the
Sandiganbayan, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 154
6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered "for the
purpose of proving that the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied
Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated in the said
writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier." 156
7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of
proving that the PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank
accounts of the spouses Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that
the Central Bank, acting on said request, issued a memorandum to all commercial
banks relative thereto. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of
Tereso Javier."158
8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving that
Dominador Pangilinan, former Acting President and President of Traders Royal
Bank, executed an affidavit on July 24, 1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang
trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal Bank the balance of which was
very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as indicated in the monthly
statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel."160
9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving that
Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed
an Affidavit on July 23, 1987 wherein he mentioned about certain numbered
(confidential) trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal Bank, the deposits
to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he) suspected that they had been
made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel."162
10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director
Danilo R.V. Daniel of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG
conducted an investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe
Roa Gimenez and found that from 1977 to 1982, the total sum of P75,090,306.42
was withdrawn from the account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B.
Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are also being offered as part of
the testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to
evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative
weight is canonical.165
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in
evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of
the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness
to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of
the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.166 (Citations omitted)
The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.167 where
this court held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its
probative value than to outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.168
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth.
In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based
on demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the
merits.170 This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."172
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objections"; or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or
formal or merely technical point."174 (Citations omitted)
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief
sought."175 The order of dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order
granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the
merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.176(Citation omitted)
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
IV
Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.
Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set
forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial." 177 There are
three modes of specific denial provided for under the Rules:
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the
matters which he will rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an
averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.178
In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
averred that:
14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position,
influence and connection and with grave abuse of power and authority, in order to prevent
disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained:
(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government
funds into several accounts in her name in foreign countries;
(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own
use[,] benefit and enrichment;
(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
in purchasing the New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald
Center, 40 Wall Street, 200 Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works
of arts;179
In their Answer, respondents claimed that;
9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took
advantage of her position or alleged connection and influence to allegedly prevent
disclosure and recovery of alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said
paragraphs.180
Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint:
16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence,
and connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually
enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally
obtained, among others:
(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking
Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National
Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources;
(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the
[sic] New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the
government for the construction of government buildings, such as the University of
Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of the National Manpower
Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross
and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several
establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro
Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development
Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal
Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation,
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc. 181
To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:
11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of
his alleged relationship, influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful
concert with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of enriching
themselves and preventing the discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1) allegedly
acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly
obtained multi-million peso projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several
establishments, the truth being: (1) that defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy,
nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that defendant Gimen[e]z never
once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant Gimenez is a legitimate
businessman and organized business establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in
accordance with his own plans and for his own purposes. 182
In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial
does not automatically convert that general denial to a specific one. 184 The denial in the
answer must be so definite as to what is admitted and what is denied:
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general
denial does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of
whether the defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
are plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack
of information" will not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules
also provides that material averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of
unliquidated damages shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the
answer should be so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary
should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by
denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation
to the rest of the statements in the pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply
with the modes provided for under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring
specific denials from the defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters alleged in
the complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the
matter which he [or she] relied upon to support the denial." 187 The denials proffered by
respondents sufficiently disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they would
rely upon in making their denials.
To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to
evidence. It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the
documentary evidence offered by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during
trial without full evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.
V
The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to
dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence." As this court held:
[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the
movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who
presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own
evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order,
the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in
addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims
to discourage prolonged litigations.188 (Citations omitted)
This procedure, however, does not apply.
In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the
Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied.
This is not the situation contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able
to even comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that we
remand the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option and through
proper motion, submit their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the
admissibility of the documentary and object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted
by petitioner. Respondents then may avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by
the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006
and September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.