CASE DIGE STS IN CRIMINAL PROCE DURE

(Courts and Its Jurisdiction)

GARCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835
June 22, 2005

FACTS:
On September 27, 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, filed a complaint against petitioner
for violation of provisions in the Republic Act No. 6713, Revised Penal Code, and the Civil Service Law.
Petitioner’s wife Clarita Garcia and their three sons were impleaded in the complaint for violation of RA
No. 1379 in so far as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving,
accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
On October 22, 2004, the Republic of the Philippines files before the Sandiganbayan a petition
with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against
petitioner, his wife and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties.
The corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was subsequently issued on November 2,
2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic.
On November 17, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings under RA
1379?

RULING:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379 by virtue of
an implied repeal P.D. 1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to Sandiganbayan and the Chief
Special Prosecutor, hence the RTC and OSG cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over
such case.

PEOPLE v. TAROY
G.R. No. 192466
September 7, 2011

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with two counts of Rape before the RTC of Benguet. Victims alleges that
the crimes were committed in the victim’s and the offender’s house in Benguet. RTC of Benguet found
Taroy guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Taroy challenged Benguet RTC’s jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having testified that
the offenses took place in Baguio, although the appellant had admitted already during pre-trial that RTC
Benguet had jurisdiction to hear. RTC held that Taroy’s testimony did not strip the court of its jurisdiction
since he waived the jurisdictional requirement. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC of Benguet has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
 Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to
stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the
criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city or province where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The uncorroborated
assertion of Taroy that the offense was committed in Baguio cannot overturn the testimonies of the
victim and her mother and the affidavit of arrest. Besides, Taroy has already admitted in the pre-trial
that the RTC of Benguet has jurisdiction.

OMBUDSMAN v. GALICIA
G.R. No. 167711
October 10, 2008

FACTS:
Then principal of M.B Asistio, Sr. High School Reynaldo Yamsuan discovered upon review of
the 201 files of his teaching staff that the TOR submitted by respondent was not an original copy but
only stamped with “verified correct from the original” signed by the administrative officer Rogelio Mallari.
The principal required respondent together with other teachers who did not submit similar records to
submit authenticated copies of the TOR which they submitted in pursuant of a Division Memorandum.
Respondent was not able to comply with said order. The principal requested confirmation from the
school where respondent represented himself to have earned eighteen units in education. In the college
registrar’s reply, she stated that there was no record of said TOR. Due to said findings, the principal
instituted a complaint for falsification, dishonesty and grave misconduct against respondent. The
ombudsman rendered its decision in favor of the principal. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
respondent on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was denied hence respondent elevated the matter
to the CA which rendered its decision in favor of respondent. Hence the present petition. Respondent
argued that it should be the Division Superintendent who has jurisdiction over public school teachers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent who was a public school
teacher and was accused of falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.

RULING:
No, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over respondent who was a public school teacher and
was accused of falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. In the case of Office of the Ombudsman
vs Estandarte, original jurisdiction belongs to the school superintendent by virtue of the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers. The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate standard and
procedural requirement for administrative cases involving public school teachers, must be given
consideration. Therefore, the Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School
Superintendent.

ENEMECIO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 146713
January 13, 2004

FACTS:
 Enemecio, the petitioner, is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and
Technology, College of Fisheries Technology while Bernarte, the private respondent, is an Assitant
Professor IV of the same school. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct,
falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against the private
respondent before the Office of the Executive Dean and the latter indorsed the complaint to the Office
of the Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Furthermore, petitioner also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against the private
respondent for falsification of public document. Both cases were jointly tried by the Ombudsman.
Enemecio alleges that Bernarte caused the spray painting of obscene and unprintable words
against her on the walls of the school and that he shouted defamatory words against her while she was
inside the school premises.
Petitioner also contend that Bernarte was not entitled to receive salary for a certain period
because of some falsified leave applications which was approved by the Superindendent.
Ombudsman dismissed the administrative complaint against the private respondent as well as
the criminal complaint finding no probable cause to indict the latter for falsification of public document.
Enemecio then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA, assailing the resolutions
which dismissed the criminal complaint and denied the motion for reconsideration. Applying the ruling
in Fabian v. Disierto, the CA dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. CA also stated that
the proper remedy available to Enemecio was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the Court of Appeals is the
proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the Ombudsman.

RULING:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the
Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. Since the petitioner a certiorari petition before the Court of
Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum.
Based on the evaluation of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman has carefully studied the merits
of the criminal complaint. Hence, this petition is dismissed.

EMILIO GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 196231
January 28, 2014

FACTS:
On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with PNP-IAS and with the Manila City
Prosecutor’s Office against MPD Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others for robbery, grave
threat, robbery extortion and physical injury. On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for
Military and other Law Enforcement Officers directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of
Mendoza’s case to his office duly complied on July 24, 2008. Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza for his
failure to substantiate his allegations. Similarly, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute on October 17,
2008.
On February 16, 2009, Gonzales found Mendoza guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on
them the penalty of dismissal from the service as stated in this draft decision forwarded to the Office of
the Ombudsman for review. Upon receiving a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision approving Gonzales’
recommendation, Mendoza filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending final action by the Ombudsman
on their case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four tour
assistants on board as hostage on August 23, 2010. The hostage taking ended tragically resulting in
the death of Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus.
The aftermath prompted the creation of an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
The IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their gross negligence and grave
misconduct in handling the case of Mendoza which resulted to the hostage situation. On March 31,
2011, the Office of the President found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from service.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the President had administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman.

RULING:
No. The Office of the President has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. On motion for reconsideration, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition and to declare
Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key
Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office. Section 5,

Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon,
Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.

Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman
violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.

In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government.

PILIPINAS SHELL vs. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL

G.R. No. 189669
February 16, 2015

PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
Petron and Shell through NBI filed with the RTC Naga two separate applications for search warrants
after having discovered that Romars International had been illegally selling or distributing liquefied
petroleum gas bearing their duly registered trademarks. The RTC Naga granted said applications to
which Romars International responded with a Motion to Quash. The Motion was then denied by said
Court, however, respondent’s new counsel filed an appearance with Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that RTC Naga had no territorial jurisdiction over the case since the crime was committed in
Bula where RTC Iriga had jurisdiction. RTC Naga then granted the motion quashing the search
warrants. The petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the order of the RTC.
Petitioner now elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari questioning whether
the CA erred in affirming the order of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not venue in an application for search warrant is jurisdictional since it is not considered as
a criminal case?

RULING:
No, proceedings for the applications for search warrant are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule
that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Moreover, the power to issue a special criminal
process, such as search warrants, is inherent in all courts.

PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 167304
August 25, 2009

PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu. On
January 14, 1994, she obtained a cash advance for the defrayal of seminar expenses of the Committee
on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed but as of December 19, 1995, no liquidation
was made. The investigation report of the Commission on Audit submitted to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas) recommended for further investigation to ascertain whether
appropriate charges could be filed against her. On May 21, 2004, an Information for Malversation of
Public Funds was filed against her. However, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a
position with Salary Grade 6 who is charged with violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines falls under
Section 4 (b) of RA 49 which states that other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section
in relation to their office. An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense
is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official funtions.
Public officials below Salary Grade 227 may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold positions particularly and exclusively enumerated under Section 4 (a) such as
provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city
department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations.
Applying the above provisions, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES vs. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ

G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173
March 21, 2012

SERENO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch 121 of
the RTC Caloocan City; while private respondent Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the DOJ.
Petitioner filed a criminal Complaint against respondent with the Ombudsman and sought his indictment
before the Sandiganbayan for the acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor: (1) Giving
an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case for smuggling by
failing to present a material witness; (2) Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of
child abuse cases against petitioner; (3) Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a
clarificatory hearing on the child abuse Complaint was conducted.
The Ombudsman dismissed the charges against respondent. It found that after evaluation of the facts
and evidence presented by complainant, there was no cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or
an administrative adjudication.
Hence, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court was filed by
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint.

RULING:
The court found no arbitrariness or abuse that was so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its
discretion. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly
absent in the instant Petition. The rule of non-interference by the courts is based not only upon respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the
office and the courts.
Certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable as a matter of right. It is meant
to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment committed in the exercise of the
discretion of a tribunal or an officer. This is especially true in the case of the exercise by the
Ombudsman of its constitutionally mandated powers.
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause is usually done after the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory as provided
in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Finally, the burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and he has failed to
discharge this burden. He merely states why he does not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman,
instead of demonstrating and proving. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment and must be in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty. The Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries
of its plenary powers and acted within the permissible limits.

ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 152889
JUNE 5, 2009

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot on June 9, 2000 in Barangay San Juan, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. On June 26, 2000, a complaint for the alleged murder of the said victims was filed by the
303rd Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Division (PNP CID) Team with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Likewise, on July 14, 2000, a complaint for murder against petitioner Enrique
Viudez II was filed by Estrella Galvez, widow of Mayor Honorato Galvez, for the killing of the latter and
his driver.

On March 31, 2001, a Resolution was issued by the Investigating State Prosecutor finding probable
cause to indict the petitioner and others for the crime of murder. On September 19, 2001, two (2)
Information for murder were filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued warrants of
arrest on the same day.

On September 21, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the
Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest, Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) arguing that all the accused in the said criminal cases had filed a timely petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70, the
implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending
resolution of the said petition for review.

The RTC denied petitioner’s Motion stating that, insofar as the implementation of the warrant of arrest
against petitioner was concerned, said warrant had already been issued for his apprehension. The
court also added that there was no way for it to recall the same in the absence of any compelling
reason, and that jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired by it; hence, petitioner had no
personality to file any pleading in court relative to the case until he was arrested or voluntarily
surrendered himself to the court. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction but
dismissed the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning
a finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the implementation
of a warrant of arrest.

HELD:
No, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The function
of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus,
the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a
petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is
executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on
the exclusive prerogative of the judge.

It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings and to
suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion
to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to the
validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to
defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of
the petition for review that he filed citing the following directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ
Department Circular:
xxxx
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance.

The said provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant and the trial
prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held
in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold the
proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the
proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial
prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier ruling of this Court that once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction
or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it. In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely
exercised his judicial discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the implementation of
the warrant of arrest.

PESTILOS V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182601
November 10, 2014

Brion, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless arrest took place. The RTC
denied the motion and the CA affirmed the denial.

Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The
latter called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve
dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with
augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers
to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately
survived the attack.

Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant when the police officers did not witness the crime
and arrived only less than an hour after the alleged altercation?

RULING:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The Court’s appreciation of the elements that “the offense has just been committed” and ”personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it” depended on the
particular circumstances of the case. The element of ”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances”,
however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
clarification. Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police
officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his
personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence
of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances” is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.

With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime, it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests.

Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise
appropriate.
Serana v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059
January 22, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student
regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.

Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.

Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada
gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and the
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office
of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother
Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent, claiming
that she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents
who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did
not receive any salary as a student regent.

The OMB opposed the motion. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations,
iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and
exerciseds the corporate powers of UP.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.

RULING:
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition
fee-paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D.
No. 1606.

Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision
of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most,
it is merely incidental to the public office.

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.

ANTONIO v. DISIERTO
G.R. No. 144492
December 18, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against the respondents for
violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019and for malversation of public funds
or property through falsification of public documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy involving
respondents to cheat and defraud the city government of General Santos through the illegal disposition
of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its charter. The Ombudsman issued a resolution
dismissing the charges against the respondents. Petitioner filed MR which was denied by the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informationswere already filed and the
cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos City,
the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case. Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in the exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges against the
respondents.

RULING:
NO.
1.Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Ac tof 1989) provides:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions

. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must
be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only
one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Petitioner failed to establish that her MR was
indeed filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the
aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution.
There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However,
in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the MR. We find no
justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

2.(relevant topic)
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise.

A contrary rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
courts, in much the same way that courts would be swamped bya deluge of cases if they have to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant

Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This Court laid down the following exceptions to the rule:
1.When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2.When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity
of actions;
3.When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4.When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5.Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6.When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7.Where the court has no jurisdiction over theoffense;
8.Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
9.Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10.When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. The
alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this
Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule.

3.Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under Section
3(e), R. A. No.3019, are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official
duties, or in relation to his or her public functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving nwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect. As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of
evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. Finally, petitioner
speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted. However, as found by the
Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample evidence.
Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design. This, the
petitioner sadly failed to establish.

PEOPLE v DUCA
G.R. No. 171175
October 9, 2009

FACTS:
It was in 1999 that Pedro Calanayan filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca
and several of her relatives. The case was decided in favor of Calanayan. Decision became final and
executory. Ultimately properties belonging to Cecilia hit the auction block to satisfy judgment and a
certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale. Cecilia
Duca went on fighting. She filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with
prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order. When the said case was heard, Cecilia
Duca testified to the effect that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by
her son Aldrin Duca.

This is the core of the controversy: Cecilia (Mother) and Arturo (Son) Duca feloniously prepared a
Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house by making it appear that the
signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of her other son Aldrin F. Duca. This was
false of course, as the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only long after
the dastardly deed. Accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon and by doing so
caused damage to private complainant Pedro Calanayan. Because of themisrepresentation, Cecilia
and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff
Hortaleza and the policemen ordering hem to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in
question. Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she
had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time. Arturo insisted there was no
falsification. The MTC found him guilty. RTC affirmed. Duca filed petition for review at the CA.

The CA ruled that Arturo was empowered by Aldrin to issue that tax declaration, hence no crime had
been committed. Aggrieved, the Sol Gen declared that the CA should have given the Republic a chance
to be heard before ruling such.

ISSUE:
w/n the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without discretion by resolving the appeal without
giving the SOLGEN a chance to be heard.

RULING:
CA abused its discretion. Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA
resolved the respondent’s appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment.
Petitioner also asserts that once the case is elevated to the CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor
General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be
considered void for being violative of due process. The authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General(OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides,
.:
SEC. 35.
Powers and Functions
. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. x xx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government orany officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)

The CA also failed to follow Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42of the 1997 Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing

A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same
time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought
to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion fo rnew trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extensionshall be granted except for the mostcompelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen
(15) days.

Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements

The failure of thepetitioner to comply with any of thefore going requirements regarding the payment of
the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

Respondent Duca appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party, in this case, the People of the
Philippines through the OSG.
Respondent Duca failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. The service of a copy of the petition on the People of
the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General
is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme
Court. Certiorari was thereby granted and the SC remanded the case to the CA.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LIWAG

G.R. No. 149311
February 11, 2005

FACTS:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-
affidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray
B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint-
affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and
Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient inform and substance
and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February
28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them
be dismissed. Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn
statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her
complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001
addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson,
Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes: kidnapping for
ransom and murder of several individuals. On May7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent
a subpoena to Lacson, et al named in the witnesses’ sworn statements directing them to submit their
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the
complaint filed by the NBI. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001 that
the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are
complaint spending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same
respondents, and claimed that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may takeover, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as private respondent. DOJ, which construed the letter as a
motion to dismiss, denied the motion. Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which
the RTC granted, saying that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to
desist from conducting preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a Petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the SC.

ISSUE:
W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances

RULING:
NO. The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the investigation of the
case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. Since the
Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
the matter, respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter
under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter
by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the
other investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the
Ombudsman’s investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly
allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the
investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. The public respondents cannot find
comfort in tha tprovision of the law that the Ombudsman may takeover, at any stage, from any
investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including
police and military officials such as the petitioners. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not thereto fore
being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, It cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the investigation
being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and
becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the respondents to desist from interfering
with the case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are
deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principa
lof the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority.
Thehierarchy of powers must be remembered. Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal
with the same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming there is
concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case
before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the
investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed.
Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation over
the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice. Although
a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more
investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to
the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where
the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and
plead their cause or defense. There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct
possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting
resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents