Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 (2015)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.]
JUAN PONCE ENRILE , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD

DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN , J : p
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity
for ight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari led by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 2 and August 8, 2014 3 issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been
charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion to Fix Bail and his Motion for Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the O ce of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). 4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively led his
Omnibus Motion 5 and Supplemental Opposition, 6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition. 7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile's motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law. 8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on con ned at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
Thereafter, Enrile led his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, 11
and his Motion to Fix Bail, 12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. 13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he
was not a ight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
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considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its rst assailed resolution denying
Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
. . . [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and
the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not
strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then
and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact,
accused Enrile has not led an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing
can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail.
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because
while he is charged with plunder, " the maximum penalty that may be possibly
imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this
claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he
is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly,
it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit. TIADCc
xxx xxx xxx

. . . [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is
not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in
the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already x his bail
because he is not a ight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously
considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused's age, physical condition and his being a ight
risk are among the factors that are considered in xing a reasonable amount of
bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to x the amount
of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused
Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile's Motion
to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED . 14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to
deny Enrile's motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution. 15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari,
namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter
of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only
upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense
is punishable by reclusion perpetua , and (ii) when evidence of
guilt is strong . cSEDTC

xxx xxx xxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if
ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua ;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right .
xxx xxx xxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enrile's guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxx xxx xxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk . 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances — his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a ight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment, 17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile's right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. 18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, 19 and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused. 20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes. 21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to ful ll this purpose. 22 Thus, bail
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society's interest in assuring the
accused's presence at trial. 23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution, viz.:
. . . All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by su cient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death. 25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or
restrained by the o cers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. 27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or
even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 29
or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided
none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal con nement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of ight if
released on bail; or SDAaTC

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma , 30 "such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution. 31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained
in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.: 32
. . . Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already
ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail
can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this
wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a
murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for it,
without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The
court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the
a davits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it
issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is su cient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still
has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.
xxx xxx xxx
Certain guidelines in the xing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of
the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a
fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under
bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in
a n ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor
heard. AaCTcI

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means: —
. . . such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence
as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in
the examination and cross examination. 33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial
judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied. acEHCD
3. n
Enrile's poor health justifies his admission to bail
We rst note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he
voluntarily surrendered. 35
Enrile's averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that —
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be
imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, su ce it to state that the presence or absence
of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an
offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility
of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused's
favor . 36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile's averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, 37 simply because
the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile's petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by
the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines' responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
. . . uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justi ed. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail .
38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a ight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. 39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of
his ight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition
from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his
utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect
for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because
he was not seen as a ight risk. 40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history's judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, 41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classi ed Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found
during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the
following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with uctuating blood pressure levels on
multiple drug therapy ; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following : SDHTEC

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications ; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calci cations . (Annex
1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented
by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome ; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,
s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound). 42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose signi cant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension,
because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2)
arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calci cations associated with coronary artery
disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could
cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD. 43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile's advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His con nement at the PNP General Hospital,
albeit at his own instance, 44 was not even recommended by the o cer-in-charge (OIC)
and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical
support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued con nement of
Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON: AScHCD
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the
best .
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile,
are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present
condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital ?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear .
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation ?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the
condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things,
Your Honor. 45
xxx xxx xxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court
has already held in Dela Rama v. The People's Court: 46
. . . This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
. . . [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in
the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration
which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of
the proceeding, in uence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; 47 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to
the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable
type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in
said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance
stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into
consideration that the petitioner's previous petition for bail was denied by the
People's Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent
and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People's Court in
sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether
the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in
deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People's Court
has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted
resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No.
3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued
con nement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger
their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People's Court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail. 48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to nish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail — whose existence is either
admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice — that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the
trial to nish. 49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest
of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same
time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such,
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail.
Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or
lack of jurisdiction. 50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 51
WHEREFORE , the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the
Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause. AcICHD
No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED .
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., * J., is on official leave.
Reyes, ** J., is on sick leave.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Jardeleza, *** J., took no part, prior OSG action.
Separate Opinions
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong , shall, before
conviction, be bailable by su cient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. — CONST., art. III, sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. —
The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France, French
novelist (1844-1924)
LEONEN , J., dissenting :
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the
Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right
in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when it failed
to release accused on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical
and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail 1
led before the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in
this Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for
petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the
pleadings led before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not
shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to nd
what it deems a better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and
the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that require very
special treatment is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth
contained in a certi cation coming from one doctor. This doctor has to be presented
as an expert witness who will be subjected to both direct and cross-examination so
that he can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his inferences as well
as the nature of the medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be
presented by the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be proper
before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by the Sandiganbayan
because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right on grounds
other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majority's opinion — other than the invocation of a general
human rights principle — does not provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently
provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justi able criticism of granting a privilege
ad hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to x bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance, whether bail
should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and
former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug tra cking,
multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention, and other crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and not to the aging or
sick detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this country. caITAC
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of personal
discretion causing petitions for certiorari to be led before this court. This will usher in
an era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal provisions, but one that is
unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human
compassion on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the legitimacy and
the stability of our entire judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with the crime
of plunder punishable under Republic Act No. 7080. 2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. De nition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties . — Any public o cer who,
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by a nity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death [.] (Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile led an Omnibus Motion before the Sandiganbayan,
praying that he be allowed to post bail if the Sandiganbayan should nd probable cause
against him. 3 On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus Motion on the
ground of prematurity since no warrant of arrest had been issued at that time. In the
same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile's arrest. 4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile proceeded
to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. 5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile led a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his alleged age and
voluntary surrender were mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would lower
the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal. 6 He also argued that his alleged age and
physical condition indicated that he was not a flight risk. 7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court allow Enrile
to post bail, and forthwith set the amount of bail pending determination that (a)
evidence of guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at
least 70 years old and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty
to reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic]. 8
The O ce of the Ombudsman led its Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail 9
dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a Reply 10 dated July 11, 2014.
Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile led a Motion for Detention
at the PNP General Hospital 11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that "his advanced age and
frail medical condition" 12 merit hospital arrest in the Philippine National Police General
Hospital under such conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan. 13 He
also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the
Philippine National Police General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside
medical facility. 14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court temporarily
place him under hospital con nement at the PNP General Hospital at Camp
Crame, Quezon City, with continuing authority given to the hospital head or
administrator to exercise his professional medical judgment or discretion to
allow Enrile's immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility
outside of Camp Crame, in case of emergency or necessity, secured with
appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate medical treatment or
procedure, he be returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital. 15
After the prosecution's submission of its Opposition to the Motion for Detention
at the PNP General Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to
resolve this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to remain at
the Philippine National Police General Hospital for medical examination until further
orders of the court. 16
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital is not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that
this Order be declared invalid or null and void .
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution 17 denying Enrile's
Motion to Fix Bail for being premature, 18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will
the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact,
accused Enrile has not led an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing
can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask
the Court to fix his bail. 19
Enrile led a Motion for Reconsideration, 20 reiterating that there were mitigating
and extenuating circumstances that would modify the imposable penalty and that his
frail health proved that he was not a ight risk. 21 The Sandiganbayan, however, denied
the Motion on August 8, 2014. 22 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed. ICHDca
II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
Motion to Fix Bail for prematurity. It was following entrenched and canonical
procedures for bail based upon the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial court — in this case, the Sandiganbayan — acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused through his or her arrest. 23 The consequent detention is to
ensure that the accused will appear when required by the Rules and by order of the
court trying the offense. 24 The provisions on bail provide a balance between the
accused's right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due process rights of the
state to be able to effect the accused's prosecution on the other hand. That balance is
not exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by su cient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our Rules of
Court. The grant of bail is ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as a
matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of discretion. Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114
provide: cDHAES
SEC. 4 . Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall

be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with su cient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.
SEC. 5 . Bail, when discretionary . — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may
be led and acted upon by the trial court despite the ling of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7 . Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution . (Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail when it is a
matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to
x the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. TCAScE
The mandatory character of a bail hearing was rst addressed in the 1945 case
o f Herras Teehankee v. Rovira 25 where this court ordered the People's Court to
conduct a bail hearing despite the accused being charged with a capital offense. 26
This court reasoned that "the hearing is for the purpose of enabling the People's Court
to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in
force[,] petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail." 27
A year later, this court clari ed its orders to the People's Court and gave the
following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose
the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it
should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's
attitude is not justi ed, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the
state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any
particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure
imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the
court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that
effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors,
is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at
the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to
introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights
of the defendant or detainee. 28
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe: 29
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons , that all
persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital
offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all
persons, whether charged or not yet charged, are, before their conviction, entitled
to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of
the application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the
exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in the
Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the
very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court,
the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal. Mere a davits or recital of their contents are not su cient
since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object
thereto. 30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al . 31 and
Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al. 32
We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this court's instructions on
the application of the constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo 33 outlines these administrative cases promulgated
from 1981 to 1996. 34 Unfortunately, there were still administrative complaints led
against judges for failing to hold a hearing for bail even after the promulgation of
Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral, 35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a ne of
P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with capital offenses. 36 This court
could only lament on the deluge of these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged
with a number of administrative cases led against erring judges involving bail.
After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving
bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars
conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the
trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
"1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied." cTDaEH
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court,
trial judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not
applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court
justi ably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For a judge is
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if
litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charged
with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases continued to be
filed against judges who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas , 38 the accused was charged with murder. 39
Judge Bugtas initially denied the accused's petition for bail but granted his motion for
reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing. 40 As a result, Judge Bugtas was
ordered to pay a ne of P20,000.00 41 for being "grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures in granting or denying bail[.]" 42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores , 43 the erring judge was ordered to pay a ne
of P10,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with rape without a hearing. 44
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabebe , 45 Judge Cabebe was ned
P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the requisite hearing, to the accused charged with
possession of illegal drugs. 46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not led an application for
bail or the prosecutor already recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante: 47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No.
1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct
from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which
the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is su cient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show
the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.
xxx xxx xxx
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the precedents
laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the bail hearing being mandatory and
indispensable. He ought to have remembered, then, that it was only through
such hearing that he could be put in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the
hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules. 48
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court justify that
bail be granted without any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. During the hearing on petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution
argued that any grant of bail should be based only on their failure to establish the
strength of the evidence against him. 49 The prosecution had no opportunity to present
rebuttal evidence based on the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied
petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail for being premature. The denial is neither "capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary [nor] despotic" 50 as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. It was
in accord with the clear provisions of the Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing
rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. ITAaHc
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
release petitioner on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask
that bail be granted because of his medical condition or for humanitarian reasons.
Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent developed their arguments on this
point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to establish the legal and factual basis for
this special kind of bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner's grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of
two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
• It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile falls within the exception and exclusion
from the right; and not the burden of Enrile to show entitlement to
his right.
• The prosecution failed to establish that Enrile's case falls within the
exception; hence, denial of his right to bail by the Sandiganbayan
was in grave abuse of discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he
would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
• The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty prescribed by the
Anti-Plunder Law itself for the crime of plunder is not only reclusion
perpetua but also the penalty next lower in degree (or reclusion
temporal) by "consider(ing) the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code."
• Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating circumstances is a
needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile's guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
• Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence failed to raise
in issue, in its Opposition to Enrile's motion for bail, that evidence of
guilt is strong, in the light of the prosecution's continuing muteness
to the defense's repeated challenge for the prosecution to produce
any "single piece of paper showing that Enrile received even a single
peso of kickback," the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted that
Enrile must rst initiate, and formally apply for, the formal
proceedings ("bail hearing") before the prosecution may be called
upon to discharge its duty of proving evidence of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
• The exception to, or exclusion from, the right ("shall be bailable") does not
become a prohibition ("shall not be bailable"). Indeed, the exception
to a mandatory right ("shall") is a permissive right ("may").
• A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to presumptive
innocence and non-deprivation of liberty without due process, and
the theory behind the exception to right-to-bail.
• Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile (i.e., Enrile is
demonstrated not being a ight risk), then bail may be granted to
him.
• Enrile is de nitely not a ight risk, being of old age, frail physical and
medical condition, and having voluntarily surrendered.
• Circumstances of o cial and social standing shows that Enrile is not a
flight risk.
• Other circumstances negating Enrile's disposition to become a fugitive
from justice are also present. CHTAIc
• The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court show that
at this stage of the proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of
right. 51

The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the Honorable
Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the
Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT BAIL in
favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may be just and
equitable. 52
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the justices of
this court in and out of formal deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the
discussion was triggered by the submission of the member in charge of a draft early
this year. The draft mainly adopted the legal arguments of the Petition which was
centered on this court taking judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic
mitigating circumstances that would lower the penalty to be imposed even before trial
or a hearing for the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong happened
before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member
submitted their re ections on this issue. Refutations and arguments were vigorously
exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the common
position that there was no grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition should
be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could be treated by the Sandiganbayan as
a petition or application for bail as in all cases where the statutorily imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, death, or life imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-
Bernabe and this member differed only in the treatment of mitigating circumstances
and the interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et al. 53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on
August 11, 2015, the member in charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of
dropping all discussion on the legal points pertaining to whether bail was a matter of
right and focusing the grant of bail on "humanitarian" grounds. The member in charge
committed to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This member
expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical
condition of petitioner was circulated on August 14, 2015. After considered re ection,
this member responded with a letter addressed to all the justices, which stated:
In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the revisions in
the proposed ponencia that need to be threshed out thoroughly so that the
Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an accused charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua should be released on bail "for humanitarian
reasons."
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it applied the text of the Constitution, the
rules of court, and the present canonical interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the
certi cation of a certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending our rules on
evidence, that is, doing away with cross examination and not appreciating
rebutting evidence that may be or have been presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
appreciating the facts relating to the medical condition of the accused? Or, are
we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the Sandiganbayan which
authorizes the accused to be brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits
symptoms which cannot be treated by the PNP hospital subject only to
reportorial requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the
Sandiganbayan's decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of
the accused were tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases on bail?
Or, if we are able to hurdle the factual issues and nd that there is actually a
medical necessity, should his detention rather be modi ed? Do we have clear
judicial precedents for hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so that his
medical condition can be attended to, should he be returned to detention when
he becomes well? If he reports for work, does this not nullify the very basis of
the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have established
rules on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. In relation to the
accused and his circumstances, what is our basis for setting this amount? What
evidence have we considered? Should this Court rather than the Sandiganbayan
exercise this discretion?
Eighth: What are our speci c bases for saying that the medical condition
of the accused entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now
under detention and undergoing trial for plunder? Is it simply his advanced age?
What quali es for advanced age? Is it the medical conditions that come with
advanced age? Would this apply to all those who have similar conditions and
are also undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique debilitating
disease which cannot be accommodated by the best care provided by our
detention facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are there su cient evidence and
rules to support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more speci c and binding international law provisions,
other than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which speci cally
compel the release of an accused in his condition? Or, are we now reading the
general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply speci cally to the
condition of this accused? What entitles the accused in this case to a liberal
application of very general statements on human rights? 54 EATCcI
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August 18, 2015.
The member in charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written
re ection on the points raised. Insisting on a vote, he thus declared that he was
abandoning the August 14, 2015 circulated draft centering on release on bail
on humanitarian grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea that bail
was a matter of right based on judicial notice and the judicial declaration of
the existence of two mitigating circumstances .
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18, 2015. The
only amendment to the majority opinion accepted by the member in charge was the
increase of the proposed amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was the
member in charge, emerging as the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno,
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe,
and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00 p.m., the
ponente passed around a nal copy of the majority opinion which was not the
version voted upon during the morning's deliberation . Rather, the copy offered
for signature was substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version granting bail on
humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioner's entire argument, stating
that: ISHCcT
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enrile's

averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him
to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context,
is ideally to be made by the trial court. 55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of
the court at the time that the case was voted upon. But because the nal version for
signing was not the version voted upon, this member had to substantially revise his
dissent. Since the issue of mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter of right was
no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided
to graciously offer her points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to
abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the submission of a
dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion. — A Member who disagrees
with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the disposition of the case may
submit to the Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting
forth the reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the
result of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may submit a
separate opinion; a concurrence "in the result" should state the reason for the
quali ed concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion, but opts to
express other reasons for concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The
dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion must be submitted within one week
from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the decision for the
signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the ideas and
suggestions of other dissenting justices within two days from the circulation of the
majority opinion. DHITCc
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote and started
to speculate on the contents of the majority opinion. This may have created
expectations on the part of petitioner's friends, family, and counsel. The Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting that the Decision had as yet not been
promulgated and served, made announcements as to their readiness to receive the
cash bond and process the release of the accused even if August 19, 2015 happened
to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements regarding the
vote and the date of promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioner's arguments, the majority, instead of
denying the Petition for Certiorari, grants it on some other ground that was not even
argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the
certi cation in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating
conditions. 56 This certification was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation 57 before
this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of ight of the accused not for
the purposes of asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial
notice of a doctor's certi cation. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on
evidence by doing away with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales'
ndings on petitioner's health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether
no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2 . Judicial notice, when discretionary . — A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro: 58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it
must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it
must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 59
Petitioner's medical ailments are not matters that are of public knowledge or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general
notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the
prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may
rebut the ndings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical documents presented by
petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that we remand this matter for a bail
hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales' ndings and to ensure that that is still the condition that
prevails at present.
That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one
who is obviously politically privileged without the bene t of the presentation of
evidence by both the prosecution and the accused, without the prosecution being
granted the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without consideration of
any rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a hearing be held, casts
serious doubt on our neutrality and objectivity. cEaSHC
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-
standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is
granted as a mandatory manner after a petition for bail is led by the accused. The
medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that require
immediate medical attention, this court has not established clear guidelines for such
releases. The closest that the majority opinion reaches for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during trial. 60
(Emphasis in the original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its premises:
Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to their health OR whose lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners are
humanely treated. Under A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC, 61 judges of lower courts are mandated
to conduct monthly jail visitations in order to "[e]nsure the promotion and protection of
the dignity and well being" 62 of detention prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be
released to a medical facility on humanitarian grounds "if their continuous con nement
during the pendency of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their
life." 63
In many instances, alternative detention — whether temporary or permanent — is
granted upon a clear showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that the
physical condition of the accused, as proven through evidence presented in open court,
is absolutely requiring medical attention that could not be accommodated within the
current custodial arrangements. Care should, however, be taken that such alternative
custodial arrangements do not take place more than the time necessary to address the
medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the Sandiganbayan should ensure that
alternative custodial arrangements are not borne by the state and, therefore, should be
sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives are not seen as a privilege given to
the wealthy or powerful detainees.
On July 9, 2014 64 and July 15, 2014, 65 the Sandiganbayan already issued
Resolutions allowing accused to remain at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital and continue medical examinations until further orders from the court, subject
to reportorial requirements and at accused's personal expense. In particular, the
Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states: IAETDc
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales's report], the Court will hold in
abeyance action on accused Enrile's motion for detention at the PNP General
Hospital. However, he is allowed to remain thereat until further orders from this
Court. The Director or Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED
AUTHORITY to allow accused Enrile to access another medical facility outside
Camp Crame only (1) in case of emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical
procedure required to be administered on accused Enrile is not available at, or
cannot be provided for by the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL AT
THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE . After completion of the
medical treatment or procedure outside Camp Crame, accused Enrile shall be
returned forthwith to the PNP General Hospital. The said director or
administrator is DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such
visit/s of accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day
following the said visit/s . 66 (Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, and/or any his
duly authorized representative/s from the Philippine General Hospital, is
DIRECTED to continue with the medical examination of accused Juan Ponce
Enrile and to submit a report and recommendation to the Court within thirty (30)
days from receipt hereof. The necessary medical examinations and/or
procedure/s as determined the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any
government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the
appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical apparatus and
competent personnel to undertake the procedure/s, ALL AT THE PERSONAL
EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE . Pending the completion of
the aforesaid medical examinations and/or procedure/s and submission of the
required report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to
remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject to conditions
earlier imposed by the Court in its Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED . 67
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize accused to be
brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated at
the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject only to reportorial requirements
to the court. In granting bail to petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that the
Sandiganbayan's decisions in relation to its supervision of the accused's detention
were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it, accused does
not seem to be suffering from a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be
provided for by our detention facilities and temporary hospital arrest in accordance
with their order. How the majority arrived at a conclusion different from the
Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue
become the subject of intense discussion by the parties through their
pleadings .
It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have similar
conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner's
incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his medical conditions are simply
conditions which come with advanced age.
The majority has not set speci c bases for nding that the medical condition of
petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no showing as to how grave his
conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made available to him. There is also no
showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the
best care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his
detention that is the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make detention in the
hospital necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the
accused's detention. There is now no clarity as to when special bail based on medical
conditions and modified arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on medical
condition is applicable only to those of advanced age and whether that advanced age is
beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to whether this is applicable only to
cases involving plunder. There is no guidance in the majority's opinion as to whether
this is only applicable to the medical conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the
special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald: 68
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical
care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It
may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are
seriously sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the "selective
decarceration of older prisoners" based on ndings that recidivism rates
decrease as age increases. 69
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for this special
kind of bail. Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then
enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. 70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent has
dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he would
report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that the majority's inference as to
the existence of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or
premature.
Signi cantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then
can be cancelled motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that
motion to cancel bail should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or before this court. DcHSEa
The crime charged in petitioner's case is one where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only be granted
after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is strong.
The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and
exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties would be to blatantly aunt
a violation of the provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the
basis of humanitarian considerations extends even after the medical emergency has
passed. Again, a case of a decision especially tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as the
amount for bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This
was increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015.
Then, upon the request of one member who voted with the majority, it was then
increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. 71
The majority opinion is sparse on the evidence it considers for setting this particular
amount. Again, the more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
IX
There are no speci c and binding international law provisions that compel this
court to release petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general declaration 72 to uphold
the value and dignity of every person. 73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused
based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person accused of
crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention must be carried out in a digni ed and
humane manner. SaCIDT
The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr . 74 as basis for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons. 75
However, Government of Hong Kong does not apply to this case because the issue was
on whether bail could apply to extradition cases. This court stated that because of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles are now embodied in the
Constitution, bail applies to all instances where an accused is detained pending trial,
including administrative proceedings such as extradition. This court, however, does not
state that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates that bail must be
granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age and frail health.
Petitioner's remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
safeguard his fundamental right to liberty are quali ed by the Constitution. Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution clearly states that bail is available to all persons before
conviction "except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong[.]" Even Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the same document used by the majority opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to grant bail
without evidence presented that the accused was not a ight risk. For this reason, it
remanded the case to the trial court 76 instead of applying the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating that based on these
principles alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the respect for
human dignity and the protection of human rights. These rights are applicable to those
who, during the dark days of Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured, and even
involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these rights and the
invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not
shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to be nonchalant about the existence of other
constitutional and statutory provisions and the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere
invocation of human rights does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a
shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want. Rather, human rights are best
entrenched with the Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions
upon the invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and
rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our humanity to ght
for it and ensure that it allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will consider
meaningful. This applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it also applies with equal force to
all the individuals in our communities and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and collective
meaningful existence, is put at risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be
granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned circumstances. Otherwise, we
accept that there are just some among us who are elite. Otherwise, we concede that
there are those among us who are powerful and networked enough to enjoy privileges
not shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is lled with discomfort with the
consequences of the majority's position. It cannot accept any form of impunity. cHECAS
X.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the following
crimes, among others, carry this as maximum penalty:
(1) Parricide; 77
(2) Murder; 78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention; 79
(4) Robbery with homicide; 80
(5) Robbery with rape; 81
(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries; 82
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide; 83
(8) Rape; 84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old; 85
(10) Sexual assault; 86 and
(11) Incestuous rape. 87
Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape; 88
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity; 89
(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more of
cocaine, 50 grams or more of shabu, 500 grams or more of marijuana, or
10 grams or more of ecstasy; 90
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams of shabu; 91
(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin, cocaine, shabu,
or ecstasy; 92
(6) Child prostitution; 93
(7) Child trafficking; 94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a means of
living; 95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in drug tra cking or
pushing; 96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any illegal activities; 97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries
of a child under 12 years old. 98
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there are those
accused of murder, tra cking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape of
minors, multiple counts of rape, or even serious illegal detention who languish in
overcrowded detention facilities all over our country. We know this because the
members of this court encounter them through cases appealed on a daily basis. Many
of them suffer from diseases that they may have contracted because of the conditions
of their jails. But they and their families cannot afford hospitals better than what
government can provide them. After all, they remain in jail because they may not have
the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the creativity of well-
networked defense counsel. After all, they may have committed acts driven by the twin
evils of greed or lust on one hand and poverty on the other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to them is
often brute, banal, and canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts. AHDacC
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer
accused, this court has had no di culty denying a motion to x bail or motion to set
bail where the crime charged carries the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua. With
less powerful accused, we have had no di culty reading the plain meaning of Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution. With those who are less fortunate in life, there are no
exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and legal result.
In my view, it is not right, just, and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without
clearly articulating why the Sandiganbayan's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and
whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with su cient
compassion. It did not gravely abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be
dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal issues
outlined in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result of
obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious consideration of the facts and
the law. This case may bene t one powerful public o cial at the cost of weakening our
legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective justice. If it is meant
to apply in a blanket manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the
administration of justice because the judicial standards are not clear.
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the Sandiganbayan
hearing these complex and politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted.
Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or favor, the sitting justices will become
more sensitive to the demands of those who have political in uence. After all, in their
minds, even if they do what is expected of them, this court may still declare that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the bounds of the
Constitution. Our duty is to ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in di cult
cases. This case does not really present any kind of legal complexity if we blind
ourselves as to who is involved. It is complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own opinions on or predilections
for how the balance of fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should be. It may
be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth of knowledge and
experience. cAaDHT
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual formulation
of the fundamental document written and rati ed by the sovereign. This fealty to the
text of the Constitution will provide us with a stable anchor despite the potential
political controversies that swirl over the legal questions that we need to decide. It is
also this fealty to the text of the Constitution that gives this court the legitimacy as the
final bastion and the ultimate sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the court from
whom all other courts — like the Sandiganbayan — should nd inspiration and courage,
we should apply the law squarely and without fear or favor. We should have collectively
carried the burden of doing justice properly and denied this Petition.
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and compassion
should never replace justice. There is injustice when we, as the court of last resort,
conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of enforcing the Rule of Law by neglecting to
do the kind of rigorous, deliberate, and conscious analysis of the issues raised by the
parties. There is injustice when we justify the result we want with ambiguous and
unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of this court. It
also fails us in our own humanity.
ACCORDINGLY , I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail should be
treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court. IDSEAH
Footnotes
*On official leave.
**On sick leave.
***No part.
1. See Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State
Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1 (2009), pp. 307-
309.
2. Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and concurred in
by Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz.
3. Id. at 89-102.
4. Id. at 107-108.
5. Id. at 103-157.
6. Id. at 163-192.
7. Id. at 193-221.
8. Id. at 222-241.
9. Id. at 241.
10. Id. at 242-243.
11. Id. at 244-247.
12. Id. at 249-256.
13. Id. at 13.

14. Id. at 84-88.
15. Id. at 89-102.
16. Id. at 16-19.

17. Id. at 526-542.
18. Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
19. Government of the United States of America v. Purganan , G.R. No. 148571, September 24,
2002, 389 SCRA 623 where the Court said that the constitutional right to bail ows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt; see also Shima Baradaran,
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72 (2011), p.
728.
20. Baradaran, supra note 19, at 736.
21. Id. at 731.

22. Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 572.
23. Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.
24. As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

25. Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
26. Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 19, at 693.
27. Id.
28. Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail
as a matter of right, with su cient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
29. Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

30. A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.
31. Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (Formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-RTJ), October
5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32. A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
33. Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Rollo, pp. 252-253.

36. Id. at 260.
37. Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v. Genosa (G.R. No.
135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal prosecution for parricide in
which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, appreciated the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance, and consequently
lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
38. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr. , G.R. No. 153675,
April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
39. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17 , G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006,
483 SCRA 290, 298.
40. Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.
41. Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

42. Id. at 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
43. Id. at 334-335, 374-375.
44. Id. at 244-247.

45. Id. at 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).
46. 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the petitioner
was for treason.
47. Id. at 462.

48. Id. at 465-466.
49. Bravo, Jr. v. Borja , No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the Court
observed:
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a
consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also
evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a
need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a
decision in the case. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such
procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending trial.
50. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) , G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA
119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc. , G.R. No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163
SCRA 489, 494.
51. Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation , G.R. No. 156822, October 18, 2004, 440
SCRA 467, 478; Duero v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373
SCRA 11, 17.
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
1.Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.
2. An Act De ning and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993).
3. Ponencia, p. 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.

7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.

10. Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.
11. Petition for Certiorari, Annex H.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

17. Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.
18. Id. at 6 and 10.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
21. Id. at 3-5.

22. Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.
23. See Fiscal Gimenez v. Judge Nazareno , 243 Phil. 274, 278 (1988) [Per J. Gancayco, En
Banc].
24. See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 3.
25. 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

26. Id. at 644.
27. Id.
28. Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
29. 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].
30. Id. at 58.
31. 112 Phil. 781, 782-783 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].

32. 149 Phil. 241, 247 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
33. 336 Phil. 214 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
34. Id. at 221-227, citing People v. Mayor Sola, et al. , 191 Phil. 21 (1981) [Per C.J. Fernando,
En Banc], People v. Hon. San Diego, etc., et al. , 135 Phil. 514 (1968) [Per J.
Capistrano, En Banc], People v. Judge Dacudao , 252 Phil. 507 (1989) [Per J.
Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], People v. Calo, Jr. , 264 Phil. 1007 (1990) [Per J. Bidin,
En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos , A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48 [Per
J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155
[Per J. Bidin, Third Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr. , A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6,
1992, 215 SCRA 421 [Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang , A.M. No. RTJ-89-
306, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v. Tamin , A.M.
No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc],
Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J.
Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v. Abraham-Singson , A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26,
1994, 237 SCRA 1 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052,
October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal v. Reyes, A.M.
No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc],
Guillermo v. Judge Reyes, Jr., etc. , 310 Phil. 176 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second
Division], Santos v. Judge O lada , 315 Phil. 11 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc],
Sule v. Biteng , 313 Phil. 398 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v.
Judge Velasco, 323 Phil. 724 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
35. 344 Phil. 415 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
36. Id. at 430-431.
37. Id., citing Basco v. Judge Rapatalo , 336 Phil. 214, 237 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second
Division].
38. 448 Phil. 45 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
39. Id. at 48.

40. Id. at 49-50.
41. Id. at 56-57.

42. Id. at 56.
43. 389 Phil. 372 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
44. Id. at 375 and 388.

45. 486 Phil. 605 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
46. Id. at 611 and 618.
47. 674 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

48. Id. at 340-341, citing Directo v. Judge Bautista , 400 Phil. 1, 5 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third
Division] and Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores , 389 Phil. 372, 381 (2000) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
49. Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.
50. People v. Sandiganbayan , 490 Phil. 105, 116 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second
Division], citing People v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431
SCRA 610, 616 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division], Matugas v. Commission on Elections , 465 Phil. 299, 313 (2004)
[Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals ,
467 Phil. 541, 553 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and Condo Suite Club
Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , 380 Phil. 660, 667 (2000) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].
51. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.
52. Id. at 64.
53. 219 Phil. 432 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].

54. J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.
55. Ponencia, p. 10.
56. The enumeration of diseases on page 12 of the ponencia is based on the certi cation of
Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of determining whether
hospital arrest can continue. The hearing was not for the purpose of determining
whether bail should be granted on the basis of his medical condition.
57. Rollo, p. 373.

58. A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
59. Id. at 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun, et al. , 109 U.S. 99,
27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.

61. Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines are stated in OCA
Circular No. 107-2013.
62. A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), sec. 1 (3).
63. De la Rama v. People's Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
64. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.
65. Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

67. Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.
68. 536 Phil. 413 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
69. Id. at 428, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro in Non-Bailable Offense, 419 Phil.
567, 581 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Judge Gako, Jr. , 401 Phil. 514, 541
(2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Ernesto Pineda, THE REVISED RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193 (2003) which in turn cited De la Rama v. People's
Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc], Archer's case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex
parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max Rothman, Burton Dunlop,
and Pamela Entzel, ELDERS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 233-234
(2000).
71. See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 9, which states:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall x a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not
limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], this
court stated: "Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State."
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 states that "[a]ll human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights."
74. 550 Phil. 63, 72 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

75. Ponencia, pp. 10-11.
76. See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr. , 550 Phil.
63, 77 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of 'clear and
convincing evidence.' If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch."
77. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 246.
78. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 6, and Rep. Act
No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
79. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 8, and Rep. Act
No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
80. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 294 (1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 9.
83. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 297.

84. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
85. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A (1) (d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
86. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A (2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
87. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-B (1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
88. Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 20 and
Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
89. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 5.

90. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 1st par. (3) (4) (5) (7) (8).
91. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).
92. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 5.

94. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 7.
95. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (1).
96. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (2).

97. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (3).
98. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 (2015)

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Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 (2015)

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.]

JUAN PONCE ENRILE , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD

xxx xxx xxx

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This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

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No pronouncement on costs of suit.

LEONEN , J., dissenting :

SEC. 4 . Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall

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Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not Enrile's

The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative

13. Id. at 13.

16. Id. at 16-19.

21. Id. at 731.

24. As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

29. Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

35. Rollo, pp. 252-253.

41. Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

44. Id. at 244-247.

47. Id. at 462.

6. Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.

9. Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.

16. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

21. Id. at 3-5.

25. 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

31. 112 Phil. 781, 782-783 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].

39. Id. at 48.

41. Id. at 56-57.

44. Id. at 375 and 388.

47. 674 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

53. 219 Phil. 432 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].

57. Rollo, p. 373.

60. Ponencia, p. 14.

66. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

74. 550 Phil. 63, 72 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

83. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 297.

89. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 5.

93. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 5.

96. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (2).

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