Judicial Ethics

A Review Material Prepared for

2019 Bar Candidates
June 2, 2019

A. Sources of Judicial Ethics:

1. The Constitution;
2. The Rules of Court;
3. Statues creating courts;
4. The New Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (took effect on June 1,
2004 per A.M. 03-05-01-SC) which was patterned after the Bangalore Draft of Code of
Judicial Conduct; and
5. Code of Judicial Conduct

Based on 2019 Syllabus:

1. The New Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (took effect on June 1,
2004 per A.M. 03-05-01-SC) which was patterned after the Bangalore Draft of Code of
Judicial Conduct; and
2. Code of Judicial Conduct

B. Membership in the Judiciary

Qualifying to the Bench
1. Members of the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts (Court of Appeals, Court of
Tax Appeals and Sandiganbayan):
Section 7(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution mandates that a Justice of the Supreme Court and
all collegiate appellate courts must be a natural born Filipino.
Qualifications of SC Justice: natural born Filipino, at least be 40 years old, must have been for
15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

2. Members of the lower courts (regional trial courts and first level courts): Section 7(2),
article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that Congress shall provide for qualifications but one
must be citizen of the Philippines and member of the Philippine Bar.
Note: The Congress may enact a law which prescribes that a naturalized Filipino citizen can
qualify to become a judge in the lower trial courts.

3. Common qualification for all members of the judiciary, Section 7(3), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution provides: “A member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence.”

4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that members of the
judiciary “shall hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 years old or they become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.”

4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that members of the
judiciary “shall hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 years old or they become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.”

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Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012: Congress is entitled only to one seat in
the JBC and not one for each house.
Recent rulings related to the JBC:
Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a 5-year period before he can be
promoted as RTC judge. The Court sustained the power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the
screening of qualified candidates to the judiciary to ensure that only men of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence will be appointed to the bench.
However, the Court held that JBC must publish all requirements to apprise applicants of such
requirements.

Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied due process, Jardeleza
should be included in the list of nominees to be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An
issue about his integrity was raised in the selection process but Jardeleza was never given the
opportunity to be heard to overturn the allegation against him.
Appointments made by the President in the judiciary do not need any confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Please note that:

Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
thereof. (Section 4(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
De Castro v. JBC, (GR No. 191002, Apr 20, 2010): The Court's exclusion of appointments to
the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on the plain and
unequivocal language of the Constitution. The Court affirmed the appointment of Chief Justice
Corona.

For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the
submission of the list. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Judge Aguinaldo v. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (G.R. No. 224302, Nov 29,
2016): The Court held that while it is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select
nominees recommended for appointment to the Judiciary, it cannot impair the prerogative of the
President to appoint members of the Sandiganbayan. The JBC cannot restrict the appointing
power of the President by resorting to clustering the nominees to the six vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan.

The Court dismissed the case filed against Atty. Cajayon Justice Lantion for failure of the
complainants for not only failing to comply with the formal requirements of the Rules of Court
but also to substantiate the allegations.

Requirements in the discharge of responsibilities of members of the judiciary:

1. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly, the facts and law on which it is based. (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution)
2. Dedicated service to the judiciary
3. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions. (Section12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

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 4. SALN Requirement
Members of the Supreme Court shall not only report all their assets, liabilities, and net
worth upon assumption to duty but they must disclose such to the PUBLIC in the
manner provided by law. (Section 17, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)
5. Allegiance to the Philippine Government. Any public officer owes allegiance to the
Philippine government and its Constitution and a public officer who seeks to change
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law.(Section 18, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
C. Qualities required of Members of the Judiciary
1. Independence
2. Integrity
3. Impartiality
4. Propriety
5. Equality
6. Competence and diligence

1. Duty to Uphold the Dignity and Independence of the Court

CANON 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the Judiciary.
(Sections 1-8)
Canon 1: Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence
in both its individual and institutional aspects.

SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
SECTION 2. In performing judicial duties, Judges shall be independent from judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation
or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
SECTION 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and
influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to
be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
SECTION 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to
the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial
duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the
judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.

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 Two aspects of independence: institutional independence and personal independence: What
is expected of judges: to discharge their functions based solely on a fair assessment of the
facts and invoking the appropriate provision of law in resolving issues presented before the
court; and shield themselves from any kind of influence from any party involved in the case.

Cases:
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664 SCRA 465 (2012): A complaint
against justices of the Court of Appeals must be dismissed if the same is baseless and the
recourse of the party is to seek judicial relief from an adverse decision.

In Re: S.C. Resolution dated 28April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 146817 and 145822, (Atty. Pena)
669 SCRA 530(2012): A motion to inhibit the ponente in a pending case before the S.C.
based on suspicion of bribery in the form of a brand new Mercedes Benz and collusion with
another senior associate justice of S.C. cannot be given due course. Counsel must show proof
that a connection and direct correlation exists between his failure to receive a copy of its
Motion for Clarification of the other party. He alleged that the incident did not allow him to
refute the allegations therein. The Court said that such imputation is “completely untenable
and irresponsible.”

Santos v. Judge Arcaya- Chua, A. M. No. MT J-07-20093, February 17, 2009. A judge was
suspended by the Court for having accepted money to intercede on behalf of her husband’s
relative in a pending case before the Supreme Court where she was previously employed.

Go v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 165. The Court
held that the complainant was not deprived of due process when the charge against him was
upgraded from grave serious injuries to homicide. It said that when the death occurred after
the filing of the first information the same can be amended as a matter of course.

2. Duty to Uphold the Integrity of the Judiciary: CANON 2 – Integrity is essential not
only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges. (Sections 1-3)

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
SECTION 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.

Re Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA and IPI No.
17-248-CA-J, June 6, 2017): The complaint charged a certain Atty. Dorothy Cajayon from
Zamboanga City and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion of the Court of Appeals in

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 Cagayan De Oro City (CA-CDO) of illicitly selling favorable decisions involving cases filed
in the CA-CDO to the highest bidding clients.
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints both against lawyers and judges of
regular and special courts as well as Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
must be verified and supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the
facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations. For lawyers,
these requirements are stated in Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38. The Court reminded the family court judge to avoid
using vulgar language in the course of the trial. Use of vulgar language insults a witness and
may also diminish the respect of the litigants towards the court because court proceedings
are held in public.

Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, A.M. 1. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996: A judge was dismissed
from service for gross misconduct for sexually harassing his Clerk of Court.

Samson v. Judge Caballero, A. M. No. RT J-08- 213, 595 SCRA 423. The newly appointed
judge was not allowed to assume his post as RTC judge of Cabanatuan City for his material
misrepresentation in his application form. Caballero did not disclose that a graft and
corruption charge was filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman when he served
as a prosecutor.

Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A. M. No. RT J-06-2014, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 491. A judge was
dismissed from service due to gross misconduct. The judge was found to have officiated
several marriage rites in a short span of time without having resolved the numerous cases
pending before his court.

Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A. M. No. RT J-09-2175, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 168.A judge was
fined by the Court for “oppressive” conduct for citing a driver in contempt of court for
having parked the car of his employer in the parking slot assigned to the judge. The judge
imposed upon the driver a monetary fine.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014. The Court held that Judge Larida,
Jr. committed several lapses, specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required
inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such
lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for
the governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as
well as a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The
omission to submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of
Court. Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and
submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding Judge himself remained
to be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly
allowing detailed employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida,
Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or

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 initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which he would have become aware.

Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court held the conduct of Judge Austria of and posting
a picture with indecent attire for the public’s consumption in her Frendster account is
inappropriate. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not
prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her
everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in
a manner viewable by the public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Court said Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-
shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

3. Duty to Maintain Impartiality

CANON 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and
diligence. (Sections 1-6)
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to
the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come
before, them make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any
comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
SECTION 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings
include, but are not limited to, instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel
during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

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 (e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in
a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceedings;
SECTION 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure,
the parties and lawyers independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the
reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the
proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the
record of the proceedings

Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban,

Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained
basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. In this case, the civil case
was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of
Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. In violation of this rule,
Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than two years later the judge failed to
proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making
her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. .
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Judge Vilalon-Pornillos, 592 SCRA 36: A judge was
dismissed from service for gross misconduct. Evidence was presented to establish the
propensity to exact money from litigants and lawyers. She also exhibited manifest bias in her
demeanor in court.

Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA 364. A judge together with the
Clerk of Court and the court stenographer assigned to his court were also sanctioned by the
S.C. The Court said that except for clarificatory questions, the judge may not be allowed to
ask questions that would elicit answers to favor one of the parties to the case. It is not also
proper for the judge to allow the Clerk of Court to conduct any proceeding in the absence of
the judge and for the stenographer to transcribe such proceedings.

Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated Sept. 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal
Recreational Corp., A.M. No. 12-6-10 SC, June 13, 2012. The complaint raised the issue on
the capacity of then Chief Justice to decide on a pending case without any bias. The S.C.
dismissed the complaint because the same has become moot and academic with the
impeachment and eventual removal of Chief Justice Corona from office.

Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594. This case was
filed by Justice Villaluz, the former spouse of Pasay City RTC Judge Mijares, against her.
The S.C. called the attention of Mijares that the Rules of Court prohibit judges from hearing
cases involving relatives up to the sixth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same

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 fashion a member of the bench may not hear cases where a counsel is a relative up to the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559 SCRA 344. The apparent bias
exhibited by the judge shown in the delay in the legal procedure cannot be condoned. S.C.
held reminded judges of their pivotal role in the administration of justice.

4. Duty to Improve the Law and the Administration of Justice

CANON 4: A judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve
the law, the legal system and the administration of justice. (Sections 1-15)

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any
member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.
SECTION 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal
profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
SECTION 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial
interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of
members of their family.
SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their
private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they
convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
SECTION 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall
not be used or disclosed by for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.
SECTION 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal
system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters
relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related
matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the
judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
SECTION 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.

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 SECTION 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other
organizations representing the interests of judges.
SECTION 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any
gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done
by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties
or functions.
SECTION 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges
may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made
provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.

Albos v. Alaba, A.M.No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994.A judge who failed to sign the order
granting bail to the accused and who left for an out of town was found to have been remised
of his responsibility as a judge.

5. Duty to Avoid Conflict with Judicial Responsibilities

CANON 5: A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict
of judicial duties. (Sections 1 - 5)

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences
arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status
and other like causes.
SEC.TION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such
duties.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her
influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before
the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
SECTION 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except
such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate
advocacy.

Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543 SCRA. The Court held that
a judge cannot be suspended in the discharge of her responsibilities until after conviction of
a criminal offense she allegedly committed has become final and executory.

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 Sy v. Judge Fineza, A. M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374. The Court will
not condone the acts of judges of accepting money from a litigant with a pending case before
his court nor should a judge be seen dining with a litigant facing a criminal case before his
court.

6. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence

CANON 6: Competence and Diligence (Sections 1-7)

SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which
include not only the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the
making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s
operations.
SECTION 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge,
skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking
advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made
available, under judicial control, to judges.
SECTION 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of
international law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing
human rights norms.
SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of
legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
SECTION 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge
of judicial duties.

Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74,
Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013. The S.C. held that the 90-day period
within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is
mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed
additional time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her time to
decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be
implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being
efficient. Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate
on the part of the Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations and exact a rigid and literal
compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large volume
of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to apply for the
extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss.

Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch
1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2,
2013: For his failure to sufficiently explain why he failed to act on the twenty-three (23)
cases submitted for decision/resolution, the S.C. imposed upon him administrative sanctions.

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 The Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice
denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the
faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683,
September 11, 2013.The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of
his judicial duties for his failure to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC
and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired. Such
unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to
decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency.
The Court that this warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting
judge. Judge Soriano’s inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross
negligence as evinced by the loss of the records of at least four (4) cases which could no
longer be located or reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano
was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court
services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was found guilty of
gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the
amount withheld from his retirement benefits.

Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for
Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La
Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.The S. C. said that Carbonell’s failure to
decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period without any justifiable and credible
reasons constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court reiterated that as a frontline official of the
Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not
only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can
do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution
he represents. The Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000
considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may
have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge.

Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24,
2014.The Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
Circular No. 1–90, and of gross ignorance of the law. He was suspended for six months for
having notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in
his court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving
the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for
at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines do not state that the
judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation
is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage.

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 Note: Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1–90 allows municipal
trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if
connected with their official functions and duties.
Any fee collected by the judge in his capacity as notary public must be turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer. Otherwise, he may be guilty of double compensation.

Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA
IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013. S.C. said that as a matter of public policy, a judge
cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long
as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment. The Court reminded parties that resort to judicial remedies
must be exercised to question the decision of the trial judge. Bad faith on the part of the trial
judge should never be imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.

Bayaca v. Judge Ramos (RIP), A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577 SCRA 93. S.C. held that gross
misconduct and serious lapses in the conduct of the affairs of the court merit dismissal from
the judiciary except for reasons of compassion, the Court awarded the retirement benefits of
the judge who died during the pendency of this administrative case.

Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas,
RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas,
RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5,
2014. The Court held Judge Bitas judge liable for gross ignorance of the law when he
deviated from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail and
aggravated his offense when he also granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a
hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas’ acts are not mere deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment on his part, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith. Miralles
was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is
punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not more than
P5,000,000. Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is submitted in a
hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is
weak or strong.

Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court reiterated the rule that in administrative cases
and disbarment proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his
complaint by substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority,
irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection
are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad faith,
malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere
conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the

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 accusations. Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these
are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are
readily available to the complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.

D. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

Prohibition on practice of profession: No member of the judiciary may practice their profession
during their incumbency.
1. Duty to resolve pending matters within prescriptive period
All matters pending with the Supreme Court must be resolved with 24 months;
Twelve (12) months for all collegiate appellate courts; and
Three (3) months for all other lower courts. (Section 15(1), 1987 Constitution)
2. Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges: may be voluntary or involuntary: There are
two rules governing the qualification and voluntary inhibition of judges: Section 1, Rule 137
of the Rules of Court; and Rule 3. 12 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:” Disqualification of judges. – No
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise , or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.” (ex. If judge served as
wedding sponsor to one of the litigants or litigant is his “kasambahay.”)

Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states:
“Rule 3.12. – A Judge should take no part in proceeding where the judge’s impartially
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings
where:
The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustees or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree
or to co-counsel within the fourth degree;
The judge knows that his spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding.”

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 Voluntary Inhibition: When voluntary inhibition be done: A judge is allowed under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary inhibit
from a case for just or valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification.

Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann
Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December
10, 2013. Complainant charged Justice Hernando with manifest bias because he voluntarily
inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March
28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. Complainant alleged that she should have been
informed of the voluntary inhibition. The Court, however, said that under the internal rules
of the C.A., the same was not necessary. In the spirit of transparency, the Court held that
henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be immediately notified of any
mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in any
action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or
inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party or
cause.

How voluntary inhibition is effected: A judge may motu proprio or on motion of a party
voluntarily recluse from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of
acting objectively on the case.

When a judge should not inhibit himself: Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge
should not inhibit and if a motion to that effect is filed, he should deny it if, despite the
circumstances cited by the movant, he honestly believes that he can act on the case
objectively.

Remittal of Disqualification: Nature of remittal: Remittal of disqualification is the process

by which a judge who is disqualified to sit on a case on any of the grounds enumerated in
Section 5, Canon 3, may purge himself of such a disqualification so that he may act upon the
case.

How remittal is effected: This process is allowed under Section 6 of the same Canon which
provides:
“A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
disclose on the record the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties
and lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason
for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding.
The Agreement, signed by all the parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of
the proceedings.”

E. Removal of Members of the Supreme Court and Administrative Jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court over Judges and Justices

1. Members of the Supreme Court: Impeachment. (Section 2, Article XI, 1987

Constitution); Grounds; and Proceedings

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 Republic v. Sereno, (G.R. No. 237428, May 18, 2018): The Court held that quo
warranto may be a remedy to oust an impeachable public official. An infirmity in the
qualification of the appointed public official may subject of a challenge instituted by the
republic. The pending consideration of an impeachment complaint shall not bar the removal
of the public officer through quo warranto proceedings.

In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (A.M. No. 09-2-19, S.C.): The Court fined a
retired justice of the Supreme Court with P500, 000.00 and indefinite suspension for
premature release of a decision involving the citizenship requirement of a member of the
House of Representatives. The Court applied the principle of res ipsa loquitor in this case.

In Re: Letter Complaint of Atty. Pena against Justices Carpio and Sereno (A.M. No. 12-6-
11- SC): The Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Pena to substantiate his
allegations and that the same are purely conjectures which cannot be a subject of judicial
review.

2. Discipline of Appellate Justices and Lower Court Judges: Read Section 11, Article VIII,
1987 Constitution
(1). Jurisdiction over disciplinary cases: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline appellate justices and lower court judges.

(2). Vote required dismissing a member of the judiciary: A majority vote of all justices who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial judges

Arabani Jr . v Arabani, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, A.M. No. SCC-10-15-
P, A.M. No. SCC-11-17 February 21, 2017): Presiding Judge Bensaudi A. Arabani, Jr.
charged respondents Rahim A. Arabani, Junior Process Server, and Abduraji G. Bakil, Utility
Worker I, with conduct unbecoming of a court employee, dishonesty, insubordination, and
misconduct arising out of Bakil's alleged punching of Rahim's bundy card on three (3)
occasions despite being repeatedly warned by Judge Arabani.
Judge Arabani charged Clerk of Court Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. with conduct unbecoming a court
employee for loafing during office hours and his unauthorized absences.
Upon the other hand, the court employees charged Judge Arabani with conduct unbecoming
of a Judge, and many abuses consisting, among others, of his absences without filing the
corresponding leaves of absence, and toleration of the absences and tardiness of members of
his family. Rahim further claimed that Judge Arabani was courting a court employee,
Sheldalyn A. Maharan, who he asked to accompany him on his motorcycle to go around
town, professing his love and buying her gifts.
The Court’s ruling:
1. Following judicial precedents, the Court adopted the penalty recommended by the OCA,
and accordingly suspended Abduraji and Rahim for a period of six (6) months without pay
for dishonesty.
The Court also reprimanded them for their failure to comply with Judge Arabani's
memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents in writing, which constitutes

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 a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, a light offense punishable with
reprimand for the first offense.
2. The Court imposed upon Ramos the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension
for his unauthorized absences.
3. Respondent Judge Arabani was found GUILTY of sexual harassment classified as a less
grave offense under Section 53 (B) (5), Rule X of Civil Service Commission Resolution
No. 01-0940, and is accordingly SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay. The
charge that Judge Arabani made a drawing of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showed
it to Sheldalyn was corroborated by Mirad, a disinterested witness,
who categorically declared that it was Judge Arabani who made the drawing, and affirmed
that it was he (Mirad) who crumpled it. The act was enough to create an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for Sheldalyn such that all subsequent interaction with
Judge Arabani became unwelcome on her part.

Miano v Aguilar, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408, March 2, 2016): The instant
administrative case arose from a Verified Complaint filed by complainant Atty. Florante A.
Miano before the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Ma. Ellen M.
Aguilar, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70, with
ignorance of the rules on inhibition and gross inefficiency relative to several pending cases in
her sala.
The Court found respondent Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar GUILTY of Undue Delay in Issuing
Orders in Several Cases and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case. She
was SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a period of three (3)
months, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Marquez et al. v. Ovejera, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014): The
complainants instituted an administrative complaint against Judge Ovejera and Collado for
violations of their administrative and judicial functions. The Court dismissed the case against
Judge Ovejera but found Lourdes E. Collado GUILTY of violating Section 8 in relation to
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713 for her failure to duly comply with the legal
requirements pertaining to the submission of her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth (SALN) and was FINED the amount of ₱5,000.00 which was deducted from her
retirement benefits in view of her compulsory retirement on June 11, 2011.

4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture of benefits and disbarment

Office of the Court Administrator v. Former MTC Judge Daniel R. Liangco (A.C. No.5355,
December 11, 2011). A trial court judge was dismissed from service for gross misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law. He allowed a local government unit to take possession and awarded
ownership of a private property without any expropriation proceedings having been filed by the
government. As a defense, the judge said that what he rendered was not a decision but only an
opinion. After his dismissal, the Court initiated disbarment proceedings against him before the
IBP. The IBP recommended his disbarment which the Court affirmed.

4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture of benefits and disbarment

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Office of the Court Administrator v. Former MTC Judge Daniel R. Liangco (A.C. No.5355,
December 11, 2011). A trial court judge was dismissed from service for gross misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law. He allowed a local government unit to take possession and awarded
ownership of a private property without any expropriation proceedings having been filed by the
government. As a defense, the judge said that what he rendered was not a decision but only an
opinion. After his dismissal, the Court initiated disbarment proceedings against him before the
IBP. The IBP recommended his disbarment which the Court affirmed.

OCA v Grageda, Perlas-Bernabe, J (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235, March 11, 2013): The Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge Jesus L. Grageda (ret.) be found GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law for rendering orders/resolution on his retirement day and Gross
Inefficiency for undue delay in rendering decisions or orders and be FINED in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) to be taken from the ₱200,000.00 withheld from
his retirement benefits. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the case against Judge Grageda
in view of his compulsory retirement from service.
The Court said that jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the Court to acquire
jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an
administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government
service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the
public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. In fine,
cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the
case filed against the said officer or employee at the time that he was still in the public service or
render it moot and academic.

Lagado v Leonido, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014): Judge Lagado
filed an administrative case against respondent Clerk II Bryan Antonio C. Leonido of the
Municipal Trial Court of Mahaplag, Leyte, for encashing checks due to other court employees.
The Court found GUILTY of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and would have been
DISMISSED from service, had he not been earlier dropped from the rolls effective January 3,
2011. The Court forfeited his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits and
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED him from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.

Re: Complaint of Velasco, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-25-SB-J January 15,
2013): An administrative complaint was filed by Leonardo A. Velasco against the respondents,
Honorable Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., Alex L. Quiroz, and Samuel R. Martires
of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan for grave misconduct and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Mayor Pacifico Velasco was convicted for violation of R.A. 3019 and his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. However, there was a considerable delay in the execution of
judgement of Mayor Velasco which complainant Leonardo Velasco questioned.
The Court admonished Honorable Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., Alex L. Quiroz,
and Samuel R. Martires of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan to be ·more circumspect and

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prudent in observing the proper rules and procedures for the execution of judgments of
conviction in the absence of restraining orders or injunctive writs from the Court.

OCA v Amor, Perlas-Bernabe, J. (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140, October 7, 2014): The Court
received a report on several acts committed by respondent judge. Among them were:
a. Respondent impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda at the Hall of Justice of
Daet, Camarines Norte, when the latter bumped the former’s vehicle and was unable to
pay the amount demanded for the incurred damages. Another judge discovered that Judge
Amor berated the guards of the Hall of Justice, including Security Guard Morico, for
issuing the certification (of the impounding), and that SG Morico and Head Guard
Quintin Fernandez tried to conceal the alleged acts of grave abuse of authority by
respondent
b. Judge Amor accused Judge Lalwani – an acting presiding judge, of being lazy and
abusive. Respondent instructed Judge Lalwani to go slow with the trial of a BP 22 case as
the accused therein was his friend
c. Under the pretext of a judicial visit, respondent visited Judge Contreras at the latter’s
chambers and personally intervened for one Atty. Freddie Venida, who was previously
arrested and charged with indirect contempt. Respondent then told Judge Contreras that
he does not mind Atty. Verida’s abusive practice as he gives him gold which was
abundant in Paracale, Camarines Norte. Respondent further sneered at Judge Contreras
for “not exploiting the situation” and intimated to the latter that Atty. Venida would give
him gold.
d. Respondent was habitually absent resulting in delays in the disposition of cases in
violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial.
e. Upon assumption as Executive Judge, respondent ordered Clerk of Court Atty. Perfecto
Loria to submit all petitions for extrajudicial foreclosures to him for scrutiny, especially
those requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the delay in the proceedings.
The Court held that the totality of respondent’s acts warrant the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal from service but since he filed his Certificate of Candidacy, he is deemed resigned
from the judiciary. Corollary thereto, such penalty carries with it the following administrative
disabilities:
a) cancellation of civil service eligibility;
b) forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any;
c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporations or
government financial institution; and
d) bar from taking the civil service examinations

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