G.R. No.

L-6791, March 29, 1954

Justice Montemayor

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to
the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The
Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not
require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in
order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day
after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil
Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true
that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to
settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement

of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992

REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents.

G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992

RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL D. UNGOS,

BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D. FLORES, JR., EVELYN G. VILLEGAS,

DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON, PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS

NORMAN C. CERRADA, petitioners,

vs

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent

FACTS: These consolidated cases are petitions for mandamus and prohibition. On 27 February
1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for mandamus for himself and in behalf all
individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with
respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers earned or received on or after 1 January 1991
or as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.

On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. 104069 likewise filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition on their behalf as well as for those other individual taxpayers who
might be similarly situated, to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement the
mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and additional exemptions allowable to
individuals for income tax purposes in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and to
enjoin the respondents from implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by the President on 19
December 1991, or on 30 January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication on
14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation

RULING: The Court ruled that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after
fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya. The Supreme
Court applied the case of Caltex (Phils.), Inc. vs. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 97282, 26 June 1991 –– which was applicable in the case, to wit:

Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as amended by Executive Order No. 200)
which provides:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . .

In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446,
452) we construed Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid down the rule:

. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date

of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may

in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. . . .

Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it
become effective upon its approval notwithstanding its express statement,
following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra,
R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September 20, 1990, or specifically, on
October 5, 1990.

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman F'LONG

MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG,et.al petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES
BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC
(PHILIPPINES), INC.4 respondents.

FACTS: The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a
exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment
by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still
pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR
to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that
the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether
or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or
lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts
was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as
the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that
grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of
the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,
must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations
are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.

G.R. No. 141959 September 29, 2000

JUANITA NARZOLES, PERLITA GUTIERREZ, MYLENE GERONAGA, LETICIA M. FORNAL,

ARNEL DIMALIBOT, MARITES SAGUID, IRENE MARCENE, ABRAM GERONAGA,
ROLANDO LU, MARIBETH HERNANDEZ, CORAZON AGARAP, PATRICIA ROSARIO,
BERNADETTE LU, ANGELES MANGUL and JOSEFINA MARTE, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EASTERN MINDORO INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCES (EMITS), AND MR. MARCIAL S. SEMILLA, respondents

FACTS: On 19 October 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December
1998. The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin
Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. CA denied the petition for late filing. Apparently, the CA applied
Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, in computing the period for the filing of
the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim exception to the retroactive application of Circular
No. 39-98.

RULING: It was held by the SC that the principles governing curative statutes are applicable in
this case.

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings
which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are
6

intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to
enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of
expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own
action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their
purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are
7

retroactive.
8

Accordingly, while the Resolution states that the same "shall take effect on September 1, 2000,
following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," its retroactive application
cannot be denied. In short, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court on 17 December
1998 is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided
under the curative Resolution. We reach this conclusion bearing in mind that the substantive
aspects of this case involves the rights and benefits, even the livelihood, of petitioner-
employees.

Cui v. Arellano University

G.R. No. L-15127, 30 May 1961

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its
College of Law from the first year until the first semester of his 4 th year. During these years, he
was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He
then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To
secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University.
The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant
which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all
heads of private schools, colleges, and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to
another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school”.

ISSUE:

Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

RULING:

Not valid. Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that “When
students are given a full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship is merited
and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should
not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer
to another institution.” Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in
a school.

Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses
the scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an
educational institution. Thus, conceived, it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also,
good morals. The practice of awarding the scholarship to attract students and keep them in
school is not a good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation
except in some private institution as in Arellano University. Any contract entered into between
parties which is against the law, morals, good custom, public policy, or public order is void.

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of

rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after
February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging
that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a
petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to
bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996,
942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President
issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996,
942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge
Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed
a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within
the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and
to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the
"inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main
condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an
escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of
his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false
identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also
a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared
owner whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward
of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute

since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right
to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty

of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the
accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for

habeascorpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain
undercustody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcionwill be released immediately, with a condition that they
will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC
was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person
in custodyof the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the
right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It
is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.