NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
GR No. 133250 | July 9, 2002 | J. Carpio
RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION
PEA to disclose all facts on PEA’s on-going
renegotiations with Amari to reclaim portions of
Manila Bay.
Petitioner: Francisco I. Chavez
Respondent: Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation
FACTS
The Commissioner of Public Highways signed a
contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. In
1977, then President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1084
creating PEA. The PD tasked PEA “to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged area,” and “to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands.”
In 1988, then President Aquino issued Special
Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA
“the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).” Subsequently, the
Municipality of Paranaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the “Freedom Islands.”
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with Amari, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the configuration in the
Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project – MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI
entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding. In June 1995, then President
Ramos through Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
In 1996, Senate President Ernesto Maceda
delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the “grandmother of all
scams.” An investigation then ensued. The Senate
Committees after investigation concluded: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering
the Freedom Islands are thus void; and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
In 1998, reports from the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today stated that there were on-
going renegotiation between the PEA and AMARI.
On April 27, 1998, Chavez contends the
government stands to lose billions in pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA invoking the
right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.
Chavez assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of the
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands
of the public domain to private corporations.
In 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA.
Consequently, the Office of the President under
Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the constitutional right to
information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
2. Whether or not AMARI, a private
corporation, can acquire and own under
the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas
in Manila Bay.
3. Whether or not PEA has the authority to
sell reclaimed lands.
HELD
1. YES. The State policy of full transparency
in all transactions involving public
interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern.
Armed with the right information, citizens
can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective
implementation. An informed citizenry is
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy.
We must first distinguish between
information the law on public bidding
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and
information the constitutional right to
information requires PEA to release to
the public. Before the consummation of
the contract, PEA must, on its own and
without demand from anyone, disclose to
the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These include
the size, location, technical description
and nature of the property being disposed
of, the terms and conditions of the
disposition, the parties qualied to bid, the
minimum price and similar information.
PEA must prepare all these data and
disclose them to the public at the start of
the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because
the Government Auditing Code requires
public bidding. If PEA fails to make this
disclosure, any citizen can demand from
PEA this information at any time during
the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going
evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information.
While the evaluation or review is still on-
going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee
makes its o cial recommendation, there
arises a "definite proposition" on the part
of the government. From this moment,
the public's right to information attaches,
and any citizen can access all the non-
proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition.
The commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood
that the right to information
“contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the
transaction.“ Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information.
The information that petitioner may
access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert
opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached
to such reports or minutes, all relating to
the JVA.
2. YES. The 1987 Constitution continues the
State policy banning private corporation
from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
allows private corporations to hold
alienable lands of the public domain only
through lease.
One purpose of the constitutional
prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations
is to equitably diffuse land ownership or
to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family-size farm' and to
prevent a recurrence of cases like the
instant case. Huge landholdings by
corporations or private persons had
spawned social unrest.
This constitutional intent is safeguarded
by the provision prohibiting corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, since the vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional intent is
removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face
of an ever-growing population. The most
effective way to insure faithful adherence
to this constitutional intent is to grant or
sell alienable lands of the public domain
only to individuals.
PEA conces that lands reclaimed from
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay are alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. As such, foreshore and
submerged areas shall not be alienated,
unless they are classified as agricultural
lands of the public domain.
The mere reclamation of these areas by
PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
presidential proclamation ocially
classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover,
these reclaimed lands cannot be classified
as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-
public use.
PD 1085, under Aquino, authorized the
issuance of special land patents for lands
reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President
Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an ocial proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President
Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public
service. THE FREEDOM ISLANDS ARE
THUS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, OPEN
TO DISPOSITION OR CONCESSION TO
QUALIFIED PARTIES.
3. NO. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141,
admits that reclaimed lands transferred
to a branch or subdivision of the
government "shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in
a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress. PEA contends
that PD 1085 and EO 525 constitute the
legislative authority required to allow
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. There is no
express authority under either PD No.
1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely
transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from
Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
"shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO
No. 525 expressly states that PEA should
dispose of its reclaimed lands "in
accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter
of PEA.
TANO v. SOCRATES
GR No. 110249 | August 21, 1997 | J. Davide, Jr.
GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster
outside Puerto Princesa City effective for five years.
Petitioners: Alfredo Tano, et al.
Respondent: Hon. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates
FACTS
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92 banning the shipment of all
live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City
effective for five years.
To implement the ordinance, the City Mayor of
Puerto Princesa City, then Acting Mayor Amado
Lucero issued Office Order No. 23 dated January
22, 1993, ordering inspections on cargoes
containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from air and sea. Likewise, on February 19, 1993,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Provincial
Government of Palawan, enacted Resolution No.
33 and Ordinance No. 2, series of 1993,
prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five
years.
The respondents implemented the said
ordinances thereby depriving all the fishermen of
the whole province of Palawan and the City of
Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood.
Petitioners contend that: First, the Ordinances
deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no
regulation nor condition under which the Mayor's
permit could be granted or denied; in other words,
the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine
whether or not to issue the permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of
Palawan "altogether prohibited the catching,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping
of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without
any distinction whether it was caught or gathered
through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance
took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to
earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers
Association are concerned, they were unduly
prevented from pursuing their vocation and
entering "into contracts which are proper,
necessary, and essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion."
ISSUE
Whether or not the ordinances and office order
are constitutional.
HELD
Petitioners specically point to Section 2, Article XII
and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution
as having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
YES. There is absolutely no showing that any of
the petitioners qualies as a subsistence or
marginal sherman. In their petition, petitioner
Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is self-
described as "a private association composed of
Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim and
Virginia Lim, as "merchants;" while the rest of the
petitioners claim to be "shermen," without any
qualication, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specically provide
a definition of the terms "subsistence" or
"marginal" fishermen, they should be construed in
their general and ordinary sense. A marginal
fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing
whose margin of return or reward in his harvest
of fish as measured by existing price levels is
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost
of gathering the fish, while a subsistence
fisherman is one whose catch yields but the
irreducible minimum for his livelihood.
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines
a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an
individual engaged in subsistence farming or
shing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or
exchange of agricultural or marine products
produced by himself and his immediate family." It
bears repeating that nothing in the record
supports a finding that any petitioner falls within
these definitions.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of
the use of communal marine and shing resources,
but of their protection, development and
conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances
in question are meant precisely to protect and
conserve our marine resources to the end that
their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for
the present generation, but also for the
generations to come.
The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or
marginal shermen to the use of marine resources
is not at all absolute. In accordance with the
Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the
State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
"exploration, development and utilization . . . shall
be under the full control and supervision of the
State."
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to
grant shery privileges in municipal waters and
impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami , and other deleterious
methods of shing; and to prosecute any violation
of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.
The Sanggunians (Bayan, Panglungsod, and
Panlalawigan) are directed to enact ordinances
for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants which include ordinances that
“protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.“
The centerpiece of LGC is the system of
decentralization and indispensable to this system
is devolution and the LGC provides that “[a]ny
provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in
case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of
the lower local government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned."
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
Devolution refers to the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform
specific function and responsibilities.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the
section of the LGC on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances
to effectively carry out such fishery laws within
the municipal waters.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have
two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to
establish a "closed season" for the species of sh or
aquatic animals covered therein for a period of ve
years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine
waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
Province of Palawan from further destruction due
to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the rst objective is well
within the devolved power to enforce shery laws
in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which
allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The
devolution of such power has been expressly
conrmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5
April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Interior and Local
Government. The realization of the second
objective clearly falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate
thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment.
KULANG NG 2 NA DIGEST MINERS AND
PICOP DIGEST
ALCANTARA v. COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS
GR No. 145838 | July 20, 2001 | J. Kapunan
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement
Petitioner: Nicasio I. Alcantara
Respondent: Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems, Secretary of DENR, Antonio Cerilles, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Rolando Paglangan, et al.
FACTS
Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara
was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease
Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) by the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Under said FLGLA, Alcantara
was allowed to lease hectares of public forest land
for grazing purposes for a period of 25 years to
expire in 2018.
As early as 1990, however, private respondent
Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel
and Lasid Acop led a letter-complaint with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No.
542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares
to the B'laan and Maguindanaoan tribes.
Petitioner led his Answer questioning the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since the
dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral
land. Petitioner claimed that the case should have
been led with the DENR since it is the latter which
has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of
public lands, including grazing lands.
Petitioner claimed that the case should have been
filed with the DENR. The COSLAP issued a
Decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No.
542. Petitioner appealed the same to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Supreme Court should reverse
the Court of Appeals ruling.
HELD
NO. The Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in the assailed decision. The Court
agreed with the appellate court that petitioner
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the COSLAP since he participated actively in the
proceedings before the said body by ling an
Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration of the
COSLAP's decision and a Supplement to
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. The
Court also noted the appellate court's observation
that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction
of the COSLAP only when he realized that his
period to appeal the COSLAP's decision had
already lapsed.
Said Commission may assume jurisdiction over
land disputes involving occupants of the land in
question and pasture lease agreement holders.
(Executive Order No. 561, creating the COSLAP)
The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the
records, the land area being claimed by private
respondents belongs to the B'laan indigenous
cultural community since they were in possession
of, and were occupying and cultivating the same
since time immemorial, which had not been
disputed by petitioner. It was likewise declared by
the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to
petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 410 which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of
the public domain are declared part of the
ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups
occupying the same, and these lands are further
declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the
indigenous cultural group concerned. The
Supreme Court denied the petition.
CHEESMAN v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
GR No. 74833 | January 21, 1991 | J. Narvasa
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The attempt by an American citizen to annul the
sale by his Filipino wife of a residential lot and
building to Estelita Padilla.
Petitioner: Thomas C. Cheesman
Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court and
Estelita M. Padilla
FACTS
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were
married in 1970 but have been separated since
1981.
In 1974, a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of
Possessory Rights” was executed by one Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land
and the house thereon in favor of Criselda P.
Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of
the deed, did not object to the transfer being made
only to his wife.
Thereafter, with the knowledge of Thomas
Cheesman and also without any protest by him,
tax declarations for the property purchased were
issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and
the latter assumed exclusive management and
administration of said property, leasing it to
tenants.
In 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to
Estelita Padilla without the knowledge and
consent of Thomas Cheesman. On July 31, 1981,
Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the CFI against
his wife and Estelita praying for the annulment of
the sale.
The action resulted to declaring the sale executed
by Criselda as void ab initio. The judgment was set
aside as regards Estelita on a petition for relief
grounded on “fraud, mistake and/or excusable
negligence” which impaired her right to present a
case. Estelita filed a supplemental pleading as her
answer to the complaint and a motion for
summary hearing.
The trial court rendered a Summary Judgment
declaring the sale executed to be valid dismissing
Thomas’ complaint. The latter appealed before the
IAC arguing that IAC committed a reversible error,
to wit: (1) in finding that the presumption of the
property was conjugal which was overcame by
Estelita; (2) in ruling that the latter was a
purchase in good faith, among others.
ISSUE
Whether or not Thomas Cheesman has the
authority to question the sale of his wife, Criselda.
HELD
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
NO. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to
aliens of residential land. The 1973 Constitution
ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands of
public domain.
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course,
charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in
question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatever over the property by
virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If
the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution
does not permit him to have.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
GR No. 122156 | February 3, 1997 | J. Bellosillo
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Filipino First Policy is invoked by the petitioners in
its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corp.
Petitioner: Manila Prince Hotel
Respondent: GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation,
Committee on Privatization and Office fo the
Government Corporate Counsel
FACTS
On December 8, 1986, GSIS decided to sell through
a public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation. The winner bidder or the eventual
strategic partner is to provide management
expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held in 1995, only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner (a) Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino Corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at Php 41.58 per share, and (b) Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at Php 44.
Pending declaration of Renong Berhad as the
winning bidder and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.
Then, petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by
Philtrust Bank as Bid Security which GSIS refused
to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid, petitioner came before
this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Section 10 (2), Article XII of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical moment
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the
nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of
the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it
has become a part of the national patrimony.
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares
of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of
the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by national economy.
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila
Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
economy petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian rm.
Respondents’ argue that what the petitioner
invoke is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s). Further,
Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain. Additionally, 51% of the equity of the
MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony. Also, the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner, as a Filipino
corporation has the right over the 51% equity of
the MHC.
HELD
YES. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation.
It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that — qualied Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specied circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on
the subject.
As regards to patrimony, the patrimony of the
Nation that should be conserved and developed
refers not only to our rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. The term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various signicant
events which have shaped Philippine history.
With this, the Court holds that 51% of the equity
of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires
or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edice stands.
Respondents further argue that the constitutional
provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a
separate and distinct personality. It is undisputed
that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
“state action.“
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a
"public function;" (2) when the government is so-
signicantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories.
Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command.
Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not
an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
nor are they under obligation to enter into one
with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to
all the bidders and other interested parties.
In the instant case, where a foreign rm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign rm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional at is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the
MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization.
We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking
about a historic relic that has hosted many of the
most important events in the short history of the
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a
hotel where heads of states would prefer to be
housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to
cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their ocial visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
signicant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture.
CORPUZ v. SPS. GROSPE
GR No. 135297 | June 8, 2000 | J. Panganiban
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Agrarian Reform; Operation Land Transfer where
the petitioner was a farmer-beneficiary
Petitioner: Gavino Corpuz
Respondents: Sps. Geronimo Grospe and Hilaria
Grospe
FACTS
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-
beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Pursuant to PD No. 27, he was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over
two parcels of agricultural land in Nueva Ecija.
To pay for his wife’s hospitalization, petitioner
mortgaged the subject land in favor of Virginia de
Leon. When the contract period expired, he again
mortgaged it to Hilaria Grospe for four years to
guarantee a loan. The parties executed as
“Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang
Sakahan” which allowed the respondents to use or
cultivate the land during the duration of the
mortgage.
Petitioner instituted against the respondents an
action for recover of possession claiming that they
had entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation. Respondents claimed that the
Kasunduan between them and petitioner allowed
the former to take over the possession and
cultivation of the property until the latter paid his
load. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner
allegedly execute a “Waiver of Right” over the
landholding.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest
over the landholding and alleged that his and his
children's signatures appearing on the Waiver
were forgeries. Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that
petitioner abandoned and surrendered the
landholding.
COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING
The appellate court ruled that petitioner had
abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right
as a beneficiary. It rejected his contention that all
deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding
by a beneficiary were unenforceable.
Petitioner failed to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the alleged forgery of his and
his sons' signatures.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Waiver of Rights is
valid.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
2. Whether or not the petitioner abandoned
his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27.
3. Whether or not by voluntary surrender,
forfeit his right as a beneficiary.
HELD
1. NO. The sale or transfer of rights over a
property covered by a Certicate of Land
Transfer is void except when the
alienation is made in favor of the
government or through hereditary
succession. This ruling is intended to
prevent a reversion to the old feudal
system in which the landowners
reacquired vast tracts of land, thus
negating the government's program of
freeing the tenant from the bondage of
the soil.
As such [the farmer-beneciary] gained the
rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over
that particular property were granted by
the government to him and to no other.
To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not,
under the law, make any valid form of
transfer except to the government or by
hereditary succession, to his successors.
2. NO. We are not swayed by Petitioner's
incantations that his signature on the
'Waiver of Rights' is a forgery. In the first
place, forgery is never presumed. The
Petitioner is mandated to prove forgery
with clear and convincing evidence. The
Petitioner failed to do so. Indeed, the
'Waiver of Rights' executed by the
Petitioner was even with the written
conformity of his four (4) sons.
Denying that he abandoned the land, he
contends that the transaction was a
simple loan to enable him to pay the
expenses incurred for his wife's
hospitalization. Abandonment requires
(a) the tenant's clear intention to sever
the agricultural tenancy relationship; and
(b) his failure to work on the landholding
for no valid reason.
The mortgage expired after four years.
Thus, the private respondents were
obligated to return possession of the
landholding to the petitioner. At bottom,
we see on the part of the petitioner no
clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to
abandon. His surrender of possession did
not amount to an abandonment because
there was an obligation on the part of
private respondents to return possession
upon full payment of the loan
3. YES. Petitioner's voluntary surrender to
the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a
surrender or transfer to the government
because such action forms part of the
mechanism for the disposition and the
reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-
farmers who refuse to become
beneciaries of PD 27.
petitioner's intention to surrender the
landholding was clear and unequivocal.
He signed his concurrence to the
Samahang Nayon Resolutions
surrendering his possession of the
landholding. The Samahan then
recommended to the team leader of the
DAR District that the private respondent
be designated farmer beneficiary of said
landholding. To repeat, the land was
surrendered to the government, not
transferred to another private person. It
was the government, through the DAR,
which awarded the landholding to the
private respondents who were declared
as qualied beneciaries under the agrarian
laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of
extinguishment of tenancy relations, does
not require court approval as long as it is
convincingly and suciently proved by
competent evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
MACEREN
GR No. L-32166 | October 18, 1977 | J. Aquino
Validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Hon. Maximo A. Maceren, Court of First
Instance of Sta. Cruz, Laguna
FACTS
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo
Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged that the accused resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Sta. Cruz by "using their
own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a
generator colored green with attached dynamo
colored gray or somewhat white; and
electrocuting device locally known as 'senso' with
a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or
other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment which was attached to the dynamo
direct and with the use of these devices or
equipment catches fish thru electric current,
which destroy any aquatic animals within its
currect reach, to the detriment and prejudice of
the populace"
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court
quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed.
The CFI affirmed the order of dismissal.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE
Whether or not electro fishing can be penalized
under the Fisheries Law.
HELD
NO. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are
not warranted under the Fisheries Commission,
Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro shing. As electro shing
is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro shing, are
devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro shing, a penal provision
to that effect could have been easily embodied in
the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or explosive in shing; (2)
unlawful shing in deepsea sheries; (3) unlawful
taking of marine mollusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed shermen to report
the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other
violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro shing specically
punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate
that such an offense falls within the category of
"other violations" because, as already shown, the
penalty for electro shing is the penalty next lower
to the penalty for shing with the use of obnoxious
or poisonous substances, xed in Section 76, and is
not the same as the penalty for "other violations"
of the law and regulations xed in Section 83 of the
Fisheries Law.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP., (CORN
DIVISION) v. LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
GR No. 1911427 | May 30, 2011 | J. Carpio-Morales
Cessation of Operation due to URC’s discharge of
pollutive effluents into the Pasig River; URC’s
pollution case
Petitioner: Universal Robina Corporation,
corporation engaged among other things the
manufacture of animal feeds.
Respondent: Laguna Lake Development Authority
FACTS
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA),
respondent, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a
laboratory analysis of petitioner's corn oil refinery
plant's wastewater, found that it failed to comply
with government standards provided under
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs)
Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
LLDA later issued an order requiring petitioner to
explain why no order should be issued for the
cessation of its operations due to its discharge of
pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and why it
was operating without a clearance/permit from
the LLDA. Despite subsequent compliance
monitoring and inspections conducted by the
LLDA, petitioner's wastewater failed to conform to
the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs.
In early 2003, petitioner notified LLDA of its plan
to upgrade the wastewater treatment facility
(WTF) of its corn oil refinery plant in an effort to
comply with environmental laws, an upgrade that
was completed only in 2007. In 2007, a re-
sampling of URC’s wastewater was conducted
which showed that URC finally complied with
government standards.
Petitioner requested for a reduction of penalties.
The LLDA, after hearings, issued its Order to Pay
which reads that URC is found to be discharging
pollutive wastewater computed in two periods:
(a) 932 days from the initial sampling to the date
it requested for re-sampling; and (b) the date
when the re-sampling was done.
Petitioner moved to reconsider for the reduction
of the penalties yet the same was denied by herein
respondent.
Petitioner challenged the twin orders before the
Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave abuse
of discretion in disregarding its documentary
evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the
enforcement of LLDA's order justified such
recourse as an exception to the rule requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
judicial action.
COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING
The appellate court armed both LLDA orders,
which it found to be amply supported by
substantial evidence, the computation of the
accumulated daily penalties being in accord with
prevailing DENR guidelines. The appellate court
held that while petitioner may have offered
documentary evidence to support its assertion
that the days when it did not operate must be
excluded from the computation, the LLDA has the
prerogative to disregard the same for being
unverified, hence, unreliable.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due
process.
HELD
NO. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side,
or an opportunity to sseek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Administrative
due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard.
Here, petitioner URC was given ample
opportunities to be heard — it was given show
cause orders and allowed to participate in hearing
to rebut the allegation against it of discharging
pollutive wastewater to the Pasig River, it was
given the chance to present evidences in support
of its claims, it was notied of the assailed "Order to
Pay," and it was allowed to le a motion for
reconsideration. Given these, we are of the view
that the minimum requirements of administrative
due process have been complied with in this case.
It is noted that during the hearing on June 19,
2007, the LLDA gave petitioner the opportunity
"to submit within fteen (15) days . . . any valid
documents to show proof of its non-operating
dates that would be necessary for the possible
reduction of the accumulated daily penalties," but
petitioner failed to comply therewith.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY
OF SAN MATEO v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
GR No. 129546 | December 13, 2005 | J. Chico-
Nazario
Proclamation No. 635 to use parts of Marikina
Watershed Reservation as a sanitary landfill.
Petitioners: Province of Rizal, Municipality of San
Mateo, el al.
Respondent: Executive Secretary
FACTS
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
At the height of the garbage crisis in Metro Manila,
the Office of the President issued Proclamation No.
635 to set aside parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation for use as a sanitary landfill and
similar waste disposal applications.
In 1988, the respondent Secretaries of DPWH and
DENR and the Governor of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) which provides that: (1)
DENR agrees to allow the utilization of MMC’s
land property in San Mateo, Rizal; (2) DPWH to
commence the construction and development of
such dumpsite; and (3) the MMC shall take change
in the relocation of the families, oversee the
development of the areas, coordinate the
construction, and ensure necessary civil works.
In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo
pointed out in its letter that it had recently passed
a Resolution banning the creation of dumpsites for
Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction,
asking that their side be heard, and that the
addressees "suspend and temporarily hold in
abeyance all and any part of your operations with
respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite." No
action was taken on these letters.
It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17
November 1988 and owned by the DENR was part
of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area.
On 06 September 1995, Director Wilfrido S.
Pollisco of the Protected Areas and Wildlife
Bureau wrote the DENR Secretary to express the
bureau's stand against the dumpsite at Pintong
Bocaue, and that "it is our view . . . that the mere
presence of a garbage dumpsite inside a
watershed reservation is definitely not compatible
with the very purpose and objectives for which
the reservation was established." On 24 November
1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo
and the residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented
by former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a letter to
President Ramos requesting him to reconsider
Proclamation No. 635. Receiving no reply, they
sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating
their previous request.
Accordingly, on 20 July 1999, the Presidential
Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and
the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial
Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San
Mateo, and the City of Antipolo, wherein the latter
agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite
until its permanent closure on 31 December 2000.
On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay
to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite "in view of the
emergency situation of uncollected garbage in
Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent
health and sanitation epidemic."
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No.
9003, otherwise known as "The Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act of 2000," was signed into
law by President Estrada.
ISSUE
Whether or not the permanent closure of the San
Mateo landfill is mandated by RA 9003.
HELD
YES. The law and the facts indicate that a mere
MOA does not guarantee the dumpsite's
permanent closure.
On 20 July 1999, with much fanfare and rhetoric,
the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs
and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA
with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the
Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of
Antipolo, whereby the latter agreed to an
extension for the use of the dumpsite until 31
December 2000, at which time it would be
permanently closed.
Despite this agreement, President Estrada
directed Department of the Interior and Local
Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA
Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo
dumpsite on 11 January 2001, "in view of the
emergency situation of uncollected garbage in
Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent
health and sanitation epidemic;" our issuance of a
TRO on 24 January 2001 prevented the dumpsite's
reopening.
We thus feel there is also the added need to
reassure the residents of the Province of Rizal that
this is indeed a nal resolution of this controversy,
for a brief review of the records of this case
indicates two self-evident facts. First, the San
Mateo site has adversely affected its environs, and
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
second, sources of water should always be
protected.
The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive
Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the
guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation and our other natural
treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency
of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve
and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is
not absolute, but is defined by the declared
policies of the state, and is subject to the law and
higher authority.
Rep. Act No. 9003 was approved on 26 January
2001, "The Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act of 2000" was enacted pursuant to the declared
policy of the state "to adopt a systematic,
comprehensive and ecological solid waste
management system which shall ensure the
protection of public health and environment, and
utilize environmentally sound methods that
maximize the utilization of valuable resources and
encourage resource conservation and recovery."
It requires the adherence to a Local Government
Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the
collection and transfer, processing, source
reduction, recycling, composting and nal disposal
of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of
special wastes, education and public information,
and the funding of solid waste management
projects.
The said law mandates the formulation of a
National Solid Waste Management Framework,
which should include, among other things, the
method and procedure for the phaseout and the
eventual closure within eighteen months from
effectivity of the Act in case of existing open
dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an
aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area.
Any landfills subsequently developed must
comply with the requirement that the site selected
must be consistent with the overall land use plan
of the local government unit, and that the site
must be located in an area where the landfill’s
operation will not detrimentally affect
environmentally sensitive resources such as
aquifers, groundwaters reservoirs or watershed
areas.
ON THE LEGALITY OF PROCLAMATION NO. 635
The circumstances under which Proclamation No.
635 was passed also violates Rep. Act No. 7160,
or the Local Government Code. Contrary to the
averment of the respondents, Proclamation No.
635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is
subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code, which was approved four years earlier, on
10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the
policy of the state "to require all national agencies
and oces to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-
governmental and people's organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before
any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions."
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two
requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented:
prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by
the appropriate sanggunian . Absent either of
these mandatory requirements, the project's
implementation is illegal.
SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION
v. CANDA
GR No. 160932 | January 14, 2013 | J. Bersamin
Petition to exempt from the requirement of the ECC
in the tapping and purifying of water from the
Loboc River
Petitioners: Special People, Inc. Foundation
represented by Roberto Cericos
Respondent: Nestor M. Canda, et al.
FACTS
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-
resource development and utilization project in
the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would
involve the tapping and purifying of water from
the Loboc River, and the distribution of the
purified water to the residents of Loboc and six
other municipalities.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-
Coverage with the Environmental Management
Bureau of the DENR seeking to be exempt from
the requirement of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate on the following justifications, among
others: (a) no waste is generated as the
electrocatalytic process dissolves all impurities in
the water, and (b) the project involves no
destruction nor harm to the environment.
Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of the EMB Bohol
found that the project is located within a critical
area; hence, initial Environmental Examination is
required.
Petitioner appealed Canda's findings to
respondent EMB Regional Director Bienvenido L.
Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also
be issued a CNC because the project was no
different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project
of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that
an Initial Environmental Examination document
was required for the project due to its significant
impact in the area to determine whether the
project was within an environmentally critical
area or not.
In 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for
mandamus and damages in the RTC, alleging that
it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right
after having complied with the certification
requirements.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S RULING
The RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus
upon the following considerations, namely: (1)
PHIVOLCS certified that the project site had been
subjected to an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990;
(2) the CNC issued by the EMB to a similar
waterworks project of the DPWH in the same area
was only for the construction of a unit spring box
intake and pump house, and the DENR issued a
cease and desist order relative to the DPWH's
additional project to put up a water filtration plant
therein; (3) the determination of whether an area
was environmentally critical was a task that
pertained to the EMB; (4) the assignment of a
control number by the EMB to the petitioner's
application did not mean that the application was
as good as approved; (5) the RTC would not
interfere with the primary prerogative of the EMB
to review the merits of the petitioner's application
for the CNC; and (6) there was already a pending
appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner should be issued
with the said document.
HELD
NO. RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his
discretion with regard to the CNC application
when he made his nding. It is clear that his nding
referred to the "procedural requirements for
review" only. He had still to decide on the
substantive aspect of the application, that is ,
whether the project and the project area were
considered critical to the environment. In fact, this
was the reason why RD Lipayon required the
petitioner to submit certications from the various
government agencies concerned. Surely, the
required certications were not mere formalities,
because they would serve as the bases for his
decision on whether to grant or deny the
application.
There is no sufficient showing that the petitioner
satisfactorily complied with the requirement to
submit the needed certications. For one, it
submitted no certication to the effect that the
project site was not within a critical slope. Also,
the PHIVOLCS's certication showed that the
project site had experienced an Intensity VII
earthquake in 1990, a fact that suced to place the
site in the category of "areas frequently visited
and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the
petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal
right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting
the denial of its application. SHTaID
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF
THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON
STRAIT v. REYES
GR No. 180771 | April 21, 2015 | J. Leonardo-De
Castro
Service Contract No. 46 allowing the exploration,
development and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Tanon Strait
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
Petitioners: Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, joined in and
represented by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza
Eisma Osorio
Respondent: Secretary Angelo Reyes, Secretary of
the Department of Energy
FACTS
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102
(GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved
geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally
converted GSEC-102 into SC46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum
resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
APEX committed to drill one exploration well
during the second sub-phase of the project. Since
the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon
Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988,
JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental
Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled
"Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures and for Other
Purposes."
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII
granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon
Strait. Months later, JAPEX began to drill an
exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters,
near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu
Province.
PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of
JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon
Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic
survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically by 50 to 70 percent.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill”
observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the
seismic survey. And they further allege that the
ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is
invalid because public consultations and
discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-
requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held
prior to the ECC's issuance.
Moreover, it alleges that during the seismic
surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering
and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the
point where the oilrig was located, an area greater
than the 1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone.”
ISSUE
Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is valid
and constitutional.
HELD
NO. Such service contracts may be entered into
only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in
accordance with a general law that will
set standard or uniform terms, conditions
and requirements, presumably to attain a
certain uniformity in provisions and avoid
the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for
the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the
President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different
levels to ensure that it conforms to law
and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed
agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over
the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano
PRESIDENT WAS NOT THE SIGNATORY TO SC-
46 AND THE SAME WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO
CONGRESS.
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No.
87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a
general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-
46, and that Congress be notied of such contract,
renders it null and void.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to
show that the President had any participation in
SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually
the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo,
absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the
requirement that the President herself enter into
these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in
any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself.
These service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present
and future generations. Hence, safeguards were
put in place to insure that the guidelines set by
law are meticulously observed and likewise to
eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate
departments and agencies by ensuring that the
President has authorized or approved of these
service contracts herself.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 110120 | March 16, 1994 | J. Romero
Responsibility of the Government of Caloocan to
dispose garbage and the sensitivity to a pollution-
free environment of the Tala Estate in Caloocan.
Petitioner: Laguna Lake Development Authority
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Hon. Manuel JN.
Serapio, Presiding Judge, RTC.
FACTS
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite of Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority
seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare
open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects
on the health of the residents and the possibility of
pollution of the water content of the surrounding
area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an
on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate that seeps from said
dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA found that the
Government of Caloocan failed to secure a
compliance certificate from the EMB and
clearance from LLDA.
December of that same year, LLDA issued a Cease
and Desist Order ordering the City Government of
Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, and
their contractors to completely halt, stop and
desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage
and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the
assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by
prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as
a dumpsite.
The City Government of Caloocan filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for
the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and
safety and enhance the right of the people in
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S RULING
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease
and desist order.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio,
after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's
motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA,
its agent and all persons acting for and on its
behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease
and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of
Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Gallant D. Soriano

dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or
until further orders of the court.
COURT OF APPEAL’S RULING
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal
to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of
LLDA's cease and desist order, including the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since
appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development
Authority has no power and authority to issue
a cease and desist order under its enabling
law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D.
No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.
and desist order issued by the LLDA been
complied with by the City Government of Caloocan
as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps
would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has
provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
institute "necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or
continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without
previous clearance from the LLDA."

Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development

Authority has the power to issue Cease and Desist
Order.
HELD

The LLDA claims that the appellate court

deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the
above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series
of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-
judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement
cases.

YES. Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D.

No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, authorizes the LLDA to “make, alter, or
modify orders requiring the discontinuance or
pollution.“

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist

order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is
a proper exercise of its power and authority under
its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease