Republic of the Philippines ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was

SUPREME COURT operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter
Manila communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she
sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after
FIRST DIVISION the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old. 4

The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The
provisional medical certificate 5 issued by ZHIENETH's attending doctor
G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999 described the extent of her injuries:

JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE Diagnoses:

and ELISA PANELO, petitioners, 1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due to blunt injury
vs. 2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to laceration, (L) lobe liver
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and 3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents. 4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum
5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal
DAVIDE, JR., J.: 6. Contusion, lungs, severe

CRITICAL
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners seek the reversal of the 17 June 1996 decision 1 of the Court of
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon
Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the resolution 2 denying their motion
petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and
for reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15 January 1992
funeral expenses 6 which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay.
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 60 in Civil
Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages, docketed as
Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorney's fees to
Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for
private respondents Conrado and Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar.
actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees and
an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department
Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries
are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor,
and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was
respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to
Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH
too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the
floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor
credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld
her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it observed
store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and
for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
control of its employees. The other petitioners likewise raised due care and
people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. 3
diligence in the performance of their duties and countered that the complaint
was malicious for which they suffered besmirched reputation and mental
anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in their favor.
In its decision 7 the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after
finding that the preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It ruled that
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of
clinging to it. It believed petitioners' witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH
clung to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell with the structure
falling on top of her, pinning her stomach. In contrast, none of private
respondents' witnesses testified on how the counter fell. The trial court also
held that CRISELDA's negligence contributed to ZHIENETH's accident.
In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the
counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary
measure hence, it could not be considered as an attractive nuisance. 8 The
counter was higher than ZHIENETH. It has been in existence for fifteen years.
Its structure was safe and well-balanced. ZHIENETH, therefore, had no
business climbing on and clinging to it.
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as errors of the trial
court its findings that: (1) the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was
ZHIENETH's misbehavior; (2) CRISELDA was negligent in her care of
ZHIENETH; (3) petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of the
counter; and (4) petitioners were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH.
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the
conclusive presumption that a child below nine (9) years is incapable of
contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at six (6) years old, was
already capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically impossible for
her to have propped herself on the counter. She had a small frame (four feet
high and seventy pounds) and the counter was much higher and heavier than
she was. Also, the testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo
Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the
emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners' theory that
ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was
asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "[N]othing, I did not come
near the counter and the counter just fell on me." 9 Accordingly, Gonzales'
testimony on ZHIENETH's spontaneous declaration should not only be
considered as part of res gestaebut also accorded credit.
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable
for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing
the credit card slip.
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the proximate cause of
ZHIENETH's death, was petitioners' negligence in failing to institute measures
to have the counter permanently nailed.
On the other hand, petitioners argued that private respondents raised purely
factual issues which could no longer be disturbed. They explained that
ZHIENETH's death while unfortunate and tragic, was an accident for which
neither CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could entirely be held faultless and
blameless. Further, petitioners adverted to the trial court's rejection of
Gonzales' testimony as unworthy of credence.
As to private respondent's claim that the counter should have been nailed to
the ground, petitioners justified that it was not necessary. The counter had
been in existence for several years without any prior accident and was
deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they acted
without fault or negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the matter.
In fact, the criminal case 10 for homicide through simple negligence filed by
private respondents against the individual petitioners was dismissed; a verdict
of acquittal was rendered in their favor.
The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and
reversed the appealed judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in
maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an
inverted "L" 11 with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight
of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow
base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward
pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the
counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously
brought to the attention of the management the danger the counter could cause.
But the latter ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals faulted the petitioners
for this omission, and concluded that the incident that befell ZHIENETH could
have been avoided had petitioners repaired the defective counter. It was
inconsequential that the counter had been in use for some time without a prior
incident.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7)
years old at the time of the incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or
other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years could not be held
liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could not
be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved
CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in
momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the
nearby counter.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the witnesses of
petitioners. It found them biased and prejudiced. It instead gave credit to the
testimony of disinterested witness Gonzales. The Court of Appeals then
awarded P99,420.86 as actual damages, the amount representing the
hospitalization expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the
hospital's statement of account. 12 It denied an award for funeral expenses for
lack of proof to substantiate the same. Instead, a compensatory damage of
P50,000 was awarded for the death of ZHIENETH.
We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, 13 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the lower court is SET
ASIDE and another one is entered against [petitioners], ordering them to pay
jointly and severally unto [private respondents] the following:
1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages for the death of Zhieneth
Aguilar, with legal interest (6% p.a.) from 27 April 1984;
2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for hospitalization expenses incurred; with
legal interest (6% p.a.) from 27 April 1984;
3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees; and
5. Costs.
Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the decision but the same was
denied in the Court of Appeals' resolution 14 of 16 July 1997.
Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision and the
reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court. Petitioners primarily argue that
the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the factual findings and conclusions
of the trial court. They stress that since the action was based on tort, any
finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents would necessarily
negate their claim for damages, where said negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained. The injury in the instant case was the death of
ZHIENETH. The proximate cause was ZHIENETH's act of clinging to the
counter. This act in turn caused the counter to fall on her. This and
CRISELDA's contributory negligence, through her failure to provide the proper
care and attention to her child while inside the store, nullified private
respondents' claim for damages. It is also for these reasons that parents are
made accountable for the damage or injury inflicted on others by their minor
children. Under these circumstances, petitioners could not be held responsible
for the accident that befell ZHIENETH.
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was already separated
from Syvel's at the time he testified; hence, his testimony might have been
tarnished by ill-feelings against them.
For their part, private respondents principally reiterated their arguments that
neither ZHIENETH nor CRISELDA was negligent at any time while inside the
store; the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are substantiated by
the evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales, who heard ZHIENETH
comment on the incident while she was in the hospital's emergency room
should receive credence; and finally, ZHIENETH's part of the res
gestaedeclaration "that she did nothing to cause the heavy structure to fall on
her" should be considered as the correct version of the gruesome events.
We deny the petition.
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was
accidental or attributable to negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of
negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for
maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches to the defendant. 15 It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." 16
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. 17 Negligence is "the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury." 18
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with
the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary
care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been
prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. 19
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the
landmark case of Plicart v. Smith, 20 thus: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. 21
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that
ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence.
We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the
incident and accompanied CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital:
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the
child was being treated?
A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the
doctor asked the child "what did you do," the child said "nothing, I did not come
near the counter and the counter just fell on me."
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN)
You want the words in Tagalog to be translated?
ATTY. BELTRAN
Yes, your Honor.
COURT
Granted. Intercalate "wala po, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta bumagsak." 22
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed (and
should be admitted as) part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, thus:
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions. 23 All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res
gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event
before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus
described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in
extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We
therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e.,
ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners
did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's
base.
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to keep and maintain the
structurally unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence, thus:
Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at the second floor, will you
please describe the gift wrapping counter, were you able to examine?
A Because every morning before I start working I used to clean that counter
and since not nailed and it was only standing on the floor, it was shaky.
Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon on
[sic] May 9 1983?
A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was standing beside the verification
counter. And since the top of it was heavy and considering that it was not nailed,
it can collapse at anytime, since the top is heavy.
Q And what did you do?
A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic] shaky and since Mr.
Maat is fond of putting display decorations on tables, he even told me that I
would put some decorations. But since I told him that it not [sic] nailed and it is
shaky he told me "better inform also the company about it." And since the
company did not do anything about the counter, so I also did not do anything
about the counter. 24 [Emphasis supplied]
Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated the testimony of
Gonzales, thus:
Q Will you please described [sic] to the honorable Court the counter where you
were assigned in January 1983?
A That counter assigned to me was when my supervisor ordered me to carry
that counter to another place. I told him that the counter needs nailing and it
has to be nailed because it might cause injury or accident to another since it
was shaky.
Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at the second floor on
February 12, 1983, will you please describe that to the honorable Court?
A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really in good [sic] condition; it was
shaky. I told her that we had to nail it.
Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir.
Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you told her that the counter
was shaky?
A She told me "Why do you have to teach me. You are only my subordinate
and you are to teach me?" And she even got angry at me when I told her that.
Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if any, did Ms. Panelo or
any employee of the management do to that (sic)
Witness:
None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only nailed the counter after the
accident happened. 25 [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally
informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any
concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra, petitioners failed to
establish that the former's testimonies were biased and tainted with partiality.
Therefore, the allegation that Gonzales and Guevarra's testimonies were
blemished by "ill feelings" against petitioners — since they (Gonzales and
Guevarra) were already separated from the company at the time their
testimonies were offered in court — was but mere speculation and deserved
scant consideration.
It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the
appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court,
which is in a better position to determine the same. The trial court has the
distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and observing the
deportment of the witnesses. 26 However, the rule admits of exceptions such as
when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or failed to
appreciate some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
affect the result of the case. 27 In the instant case, petitioners failed to bring
their claim within the exception.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, 28 former Judge Cezar S.
Sangco stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed
to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age,
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may
be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption
of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over
nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. [Emphasis
supplied]
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she
climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the
truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and
a scrutiny of the evidence 29 on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable
after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top
laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base
was not secured. 30
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially,
ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's
hand. 31 CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable
and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH
was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; 15 See Novo & Co. v. Ainsworth, 26 Phil. 380, 387 [1913].
and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from 16 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed. 1979, 14.
CRISELDA. 32 The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was 17 Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517, 539
near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. [1992] citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, 930.
She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not 18 U.S. v. Barias, 23 Phil. 434, 437 [1912] citing Judge Cooley's work on Torts,
do anything; the counter just fell on her. 3rd ed., 1324.
19 See Cavanaugh v. Jepson Iowa, 167 N.W. 2d 616, 623 [1969]. See
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and also Restatement, Second, Torts §8.
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. 20 37 Phil. 809 [1918].
No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED. 21 Ibid, 813.
22 TSN, 10 September 1987, 12, 13.
Costs against petitioners. 23 RICARDO J. FRANCISCO, III EVIDENCE, 1997, 591 citing Keefe v. State
of Arizona, 60 Ariz. 293; Stukas v. Warfield, Pratt, Howell Co., 175 N.W. 81, 85.
SO ORDERED. [1919].
24 TSN, 10 September 1987, 8, 9, 11.
25 TSN, 2 October 1987, 9, 11.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
26 See BPI Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 601, 608 [1991];
Footnotes
Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 494, 498 [1993].
1 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 36-47. Per Justice Godardo A. Jacinto, with
27 Borillo v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 130, 140-141 [1992]; McKee v.
Justices Salome A. Montoya and Maximiano C. Asuncion, concurring.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supranote 16, 537; Salvador v. Court of Appeals,
2 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 49.
243 SCRA 239, 253 [1995].
3 TSN, 13 February 1985, 5, 6, 7-8, 21-22, 31.
28 I PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS AND DAMAGES, 70-71 (1993).
4 Id., 32, 36, 42, 52.
29 Exhibit "D."
5 Original Record (OR), 8.
30 Exhibits "K," "M," and "N." The counter was made of heavy wood measuring
6 Exhibit "H."
about 4 to 5 meters in height; 1 meter in length; and 2 1/2 to 3 meters in width;
7 OR, 603-612. Per Judge Pedro N. Lagui.
with four (4) square legs. Its top was made of 5 1/2 inch thick wood covered by
8 One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
formica about 3/4 inch thick.
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
31 TSN, 13 February 15, 20.
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting
32 Ibid., 11, 22.
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the
child is technically a tresspasser in the premises.
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use Republic of the Philippines
it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. (Hidalgo SUPREME COURT
Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 488, 490 [1952]. Manila
9 TSN, 10 September 1987, 12.
10 Criminal Case No. 118986 filed with the Makati Metropolitan Trial Court, EN BANC
Branch 61.
11 Exhibit "D." G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
12 Exhibit "F."
13 Supra note 1. SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,
14 Supra note 2. LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by
their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a
certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to
Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about
eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the
passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver,
Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from
the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not
knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named
Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00
o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of
Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of
the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had
to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans
from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who
said they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show
whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver
and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the
four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were
made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one
end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all
but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the
bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his
death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor
children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was
lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value
involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to
its passengers and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing
the pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra
ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and
1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority
or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers,
if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court
that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the
bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by
the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the
defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where
the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters.
The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop
the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running,
its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the
canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is
liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion
that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his
co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was
still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical
injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate
cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited
by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause
of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the
present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for
the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30
in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and
what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus
can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning
capacity of the deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage
award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS
would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory,
moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs'
attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not
losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be
fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried
by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us.
According to the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries
suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by
the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard
him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the
tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that Republic of the Philippines
as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but SUPREME COURT
that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that Manila
the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to
insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those FIRST DIVISON
in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his
speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,
others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the vs.
criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,
provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on INC., respondents.
whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or
appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996
the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly
testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public
RICHARD LI, petitioner,
interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as
vs.
a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public
COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice
and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
DECISION
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the
trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX KAPUNAN, J.:
THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs. of Court stem from an action to recover damages by petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur. found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals
below:

This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical

injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in the morning of
June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi
lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her
home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd.
with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila.
Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires;
she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she
had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in
that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put
on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the
trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the
tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by
a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff
was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was
destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh,
with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was
brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an
artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the
cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car
insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million,
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and
related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of
expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home,
travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the
inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta
Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street,
San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right
to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which
he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or
early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his
defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then
"at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta
Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that
after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another
car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging
that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident
report and the sketch of the three cars involved in the accident, testified that the
plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether
the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not notice if there was an
early warning device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and
F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. "things can be
seen" (p. 16, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff alighted
from her car and opened the trunk compartment, defendant's car came
approaching very fast ten meters from the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The
rear left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the right and
hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of
defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that
defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could "smell it very well" (pp.
43, 79, tsn, June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found
defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay
the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the miscellaneous expenses
of the plaintiff as a result of her severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits because of the
stoppage of plaintiff's Bistro La Conga restaurant three (3) weeks after the
accident on June 24, 1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of
the plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date
of this judgment and (c) P30,000.00, a month for unrealized profits in plaintiff's
two (2) beauty salons from July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorney's fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for
New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No.
804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as
depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at
the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a
Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was
"ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the
plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was
bumped by defendant's car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that the
plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center of the road, the
respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car
was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of
the case.2 The respondent court furthermore observed that:
Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is
self serving; it was not corroborated. It was in fact contradicted by eyewitness
Rodriguez who stated that he was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora
Boulevard after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when his
attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the plaintiff) alighting from
her car and opening the trunk compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li
"approaching very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene"; defendant's car
was zigzagging", although there were no holes and hazards on the street, and
"bumped the leg of the plaintiff" who was thrown against the windshield of
defendant's care, causing its destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff,
who was pulled out from under defendant's car and was able to say "hurting
words" to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter was under the influence
of liquor, because he "could smell it very well" (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17,
1991). He knew that plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970's, but
did not know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however,
absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability
towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral
damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the
respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to
costs, attorney's fees and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise,
dismissed the defendants' counterclaims.3
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two
separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends
that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of
the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he
argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence
ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the
respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc.
from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it
reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial
court.4
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby consolidated.
It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no
substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court
review are factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer
provided by his company in the early morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we
will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding
and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of fact of the said court are palpably unsupported
by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.5
In the first place, Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by
an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an
establishment located just across the scene of the accident. On trial, he
testified that he observed a car being driven at a "very fast" speed, racing
towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue.6 Rodriguez further added that
he was standing in front of his establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from
the scene of the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her
against the windshield of the defendant's Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she
eventually fell under the defendant's car. Spontaneously reacting to the incident,
he crossed the street, noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had
alighted from the offending vehicle in order to survey the incident. 7 Equally
important, Rodriguez declared that he observed Valenzuela's car parked
parallel and very near the sidewalk,8 contrary to Li's allegation that
Valenzuela's car was close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as
between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness
who did not even know the accident victim personally and who immediately
gave a statement of the incident similar to his testimony to the investigator
immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater weight.
As the court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of the transcript,
We are not prepared to set aside the trial court's reliance on the testimony of
Rodriguez negating defendant's assertion that he was driving at a safe speed.
While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not
necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination and no attempt
was made to question .his competence or the accuracy of his statement that
defendant was driving "very fast". This was the same statement he gave to the
police investigator after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. "P").
We see no compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez' testimony are not borne out by an
examination of the testimony. Rodriguez testified that the scene of the accident
was across the street where his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet
away (pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the accident
transpired immediately in front of his establishment. The ownership of the
Lambingan se Kambingan is not material; the business is registered in the
name of his mother, but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn,
June 20, 1991). Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of
Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident transpired (p. 8) is not
necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos that there was a
streetlight at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn,
Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that there was only a
drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has stopped and he was outside his
establishment at the time the accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn, June 17,
1991). This was consistent with plaintiff's testimony that it was no longer raining
when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn, April 29, 1991). It was defendant
Li who stated that it was raining all the way in an attempt to explain why he was
travelling at only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn, Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of
Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to a
telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
We find no substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguez's testimony that would
impair the essential integrity of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are
compelled to affirm the trial court's acceptance of the testimony of said
eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's
testimony was peppered with so many inconsistencies leading us to conclude
that his version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability in
the incident. Against Valenzuela's corroborated claims, his allegations were
neither backed up by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed of 55 kph.
when "out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him, which
was (the) plaintiff's car". He alleged that upon seeing this sudden "apparition"
he put on his brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.9
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's
disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The average
motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a
car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the
street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like
Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing
conditions of the road if he were alert - as every driver should be - to those
conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
"fight or flight" 10 mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not
dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react in a
manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only
due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast"
speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of
alcohol.12 Either factor working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down
prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by
respondent court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan Police
immediately after the incident, he said that while driving along Aurora Blvd., out
of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer right in front of him which was
plaintiff's car, indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast,
oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he was not,
then he could not have missed noticing at a still far distance the parked car of
the plaintiff at the right side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights
on, thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at
the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police, he put on his
brakes when he saw the plaintiff's car in front of him, but that it failed as the
road was wet and slippery, this goes to show again, that, contrary to his claim,
he was, indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have easily
completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the bumping of the plaintiff,
notwithstanding that the road was wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he
was running slow, as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then,
inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the plaintiff
by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his testimony, which is
contrary to what he told the police immediately after the accident and is,
therefore, more believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes but
simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming car with glaring
headlights, from the opposite direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the car of the
plaintiff which was properly parked at the right beside the sidewalk. And, it was
not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid
a collision with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a double
lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white paint, and there is plenty
of space for both cars, since her car was running at the right lane going towards
Manila on the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.13
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his
company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to determine is
whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in
parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a
no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection. 14 Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li,
Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection was not to park at
all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct
normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes
stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective
care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.15
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.17
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident
swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the
street, we held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 that the driver
therein, Jose Koh, "adopted the best means possible in the given situation" to
avoid hitting the children. Using the "emergency rule" the Court concluded that
Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an
oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.19
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or
the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and
which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where
she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a
threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she
had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did
what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a
flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that
her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car." 20 In
fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of
the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's car was parked very close to the
sidewalk.21 The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed
Valenzuela's car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient
distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact
was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez. 22
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard
reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and
it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly
understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others."23 It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.24 We
stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,25 that negligence is the want
of care required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below
plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi
Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M.
after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery.
There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the
influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing
with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Presser
and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an automobile must be
prepared for the sudden appearance of obstacles and persons on the highway,
and of other vehicles at intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb
may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and his failure to
act properly when they appear may be found to amount to negligence.26
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the
night of the accident was clearly of his own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's
employer. In denying liability on the part of Alexander Commercial, the
respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Li's testimony, that the visit was in
connection with official matters. His functions as assistant manager sometimes
required him to perform work outside the office as he has to visit buyers and
company clients, but he admitted that on the night of the accident he came from
BF Homes Paranaque he did not have "business from the company" (pp. 25-26,
ten, Sept. 23, 1991). The use of the company car was partly required by the
nature of his work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a
"benefit", apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in
the discharge of their respective duties, the basis of which liability is
not respondeat superior, but the relationship of pater familias, which theory
bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18). Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in
the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High School vs.
Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an employer's liability for the acts
done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the Supreme Court
has held that this includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act
"indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer" (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that
since defendant Li was authorized by the company to use the company car
"either officially or socially or even bring it home", he can be considered as
using the company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion of his
functions. Driving the company car was not among his functions as assistant
manager; using it for non-official purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit,
one of the perks attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted, there must be a
showing that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of the
employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that
Richard Li was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of
the company's business or its interests, or at least for its benefit. The imposition
of solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must
therefore fail.27
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not
based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for
acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls
upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point,
however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing
the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc.
is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24,
1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals29 upon which
respondent court has placed undue reliance, dealt with the subject of a school
and its teacher's supervision of students during an extracurricular activity.
These cases now fall under the provision on special parental authority found in
Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally encompasses all authorized school
activities, whether inside or outside school premises.
Second, the employer's primary liability under the concept of pater
familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is
quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the
employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half
of the employer's burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision,
however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over either the employee's private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly
owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans
through which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period
of service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car
plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars,
which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able
to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to
the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the
car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing
vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved of responsibility
when an accident involving a company-issued car occurs during private use
after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the
first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to
turning over the car (subject of company maintenance) to their representatives.
In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle
only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given
full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a
threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives
full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees
that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the
privilege of using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those
cited in the example of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important
business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to
present to its clients and to the public in general, or - for practical and utilitarian
reasons - to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales
agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car
serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and decisions
may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the
provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the
business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes
of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or
company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use
and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to
whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use
the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc.
In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours
as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting
prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These
meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a
managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its
clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions.
The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore
enabled both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly
successful entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also
facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a
convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Paranaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate's place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction,
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not
the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the
respondent court, except as to the amount of moral damages. In the case of
moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff
at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be
commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the
opinion that the reduction in moral damages from an amount of P1,000,000.00
to P800,000,00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature
of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic
amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee.
Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic
technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li),
she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of
physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the
prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the
size of her lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for example, the
prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone resulting
from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones of all
post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her would not
only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo
through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these
adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the
resulting damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the
amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden
severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however
technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional
restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are
forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental
and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court's discretion, we are
of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury - physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li's grossly negligent
driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
Pursuant to Article 21801 of the Civil Code that acknowledges responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas, a person may be held accountable not
only for his own direct culpable act or negligence but also for those of
others albeit predicated on his own supposed failure to exercise due care in his
supervisory authority and functions. In the case of an employer, that vicarious
liability attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is
in the course of, his employment. The question to ask should be whether, at the
time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or 26 KEATON, supra, note 14, at 197, citing Stanek v. Sweizerk, 201 Neb., 357
concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own. While an (1981); Lutz v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 70 Wis 2d. 743 (1975); Potts v.
employer incurs no liability when an employee's conduct, act or omission is Krey 362 S.W. 2d 726 (1975); Ennis v. Dupree 128 S.E. 2d 231 (1962).
beyond the range of employment,2 a minor deviation from the assigned task of 27 Rollo, pp. 36-37.

an employee, however, does not affect the liability of an employer.3 28 The provision reads:

Footnotes Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable, not only for
1 Rollo, p. 31. one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
2 Id. responsible.
3 Rollo, p. 45-47.
4 Rollo, p. 5-22.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
5 De la Serna vs Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 325
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
6 Rollo, p. 37.
7 Rollo, p. 31-33.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons
8 Rollo, p. 31.
who are under their authority a live in their company.
9 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
10 The body releases catecholamines in response to "alerting" or threatening
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise in the service of
conditions (called "fight or flight" conditions by physiologists) rendering the the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
individual, through his reflexes, senses and other alerting mechanisms functions.
responsive to these conditions. Alcohol, drugs, illness, exhaustion and
drowsiness dull these normal bodily responses. BEST AND TAYLOR,
Employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees and house
PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, 81 (1993).
11 Id. helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
12 There is no allegation on record that the blood alcohol levels of petitioner Li are not engaged in business or industry.
were taken by the police. As this was a lapse on the part of the investigators,
not petitioner Valenzuela, Rodriguez's testimony as to the fact that Li was The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
smelling of alcohol should have been given greater weight by the courts below. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
13 Rollo, pp. 33-34. properly pertains, in which case what is provided by article 2176 shall be
applicable.
14 KEETON AND DOBBS, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS, 451
(1984) citing SECOND RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Sec. 463. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
15 Elmore v. Des Moines City Railway Co., 224 N.W. 28 (1929). damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, as long as they
16 165 SCRA 378 (1988) cf. Siegl vs. Watson, 195 NW 867. remain in their custody.
17 Id.
18 211 SCRA 517 (1992). The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein
19 Id., at 540. mentioned proved that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
20 Rollo, p. 37. family to prevent damage.
21 Rollo, p. 31.
22 Id. 29 194 SCRA 241 (1991).
23 KEATON, supra, note 14. 30 Rollo, p. 36.
24 Mc Kee, supra, note 17, at 539, citing 3 COOLEY ON TORTS, 265 (Fourth 31 Rollo, p. 35.
Ed.)
25 27 SCRA 674 (1969). VITUG, J., concurring:
1 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.

(2) Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.

(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

(4) Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and
household helps acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

(5) The State is responsible in like manner, when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task Republic of the Philippines
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2276 shall be SUPREME COURT
applicable. Manila

EN BANC
(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
G.R. No. L-13667 April 29, 1960
they remain in their custody.
PRIMITIVO ANSAY, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
vs.
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied.)
COMPANY, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
2See Marquez vs. Castillo, 68 Phil. 568.
3
Celso A. Fernandez for appellants.
See De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.; (4 SCRA
Juan C. Jimenez, for appellees.
517); see also J.C.S. Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Vol. II,
1994 Revised ed., pp. 572-573.
PARAS, C. J.:

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years
1954 and 1955. The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued the
following order:
Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning;
considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru
counsel and there was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court
waited for sometime for them; considering, however, that petitioners have
submitted an opposition which the court will consider together with the
arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked and presented,
namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering that
the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus
for petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that
the Court does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure
such bonus because:
(a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its
judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal;
(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such
bonus but that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is
a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it
has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142,
New Civil Code.).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this
appeal.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint
because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as
a natural obligation.
Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give
such claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the
natural obligation that they discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to
reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural.
"Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural
obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do
not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary
fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been
delivered or rendered by reason thereof".
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be
cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention
can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here
there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the
performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine
Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees
(NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz., 5278) — the legal point of view a bonus is
not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It is so when it is made a part of
the wage or salary compensation.
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National
Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:
Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or
compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on
equitable consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in
succeeding two years from low salaried employees due to salary increases.
still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and
hence the ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present
action.
Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138814 April 16, 2009
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., MA. VIVIAN YUCHENGCO, ADOLFO M.
DUARTE, MYRON C. PAPA, NORBERTO C. NAZARENO, GEORGE
UY-TIOCO, ANTONIO A. LOPA, RAMON B. ARNAIZ, LUIS J.L. VIRATA,
and ANTONIO GARCIA, JR. Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUEL V. CAMPOS, substituted by JULIA ORTIGAS VDA. DE
CAMPOS,1 Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of
the Decision2 dated 11 February 1997 and Resolution dated 18 May 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38455.
The facts of the case are as follows:
SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 was instituted on 10 February 1994 by respondent
Miguel V. Campos, who filed with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing
Department (SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a
Petition against herein petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. (MKSE) and
MKSE directors, Ma. Vivian Yuchengco, Adolfo M. Duarte, Myron C. Papa,
Norberto C. Nazareno, George Uy-Tioco, Antonio A, Lopa, Ramon B. Arnaiz,
Luis J.L. Virata, and Antonio Garcia, Jr. Respondent, in said Petition, sought: (1)
the nullification of the Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE Board of
Directors, which allegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally in the
allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of corporations registered with MKSE;
(2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly deprived of, for which he
would pay IPO prices; and (3) the payment of ₱2 million as moral damages, ₱1
million as exemplary damages, and ₱500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
On 14 February 1994, the SICD issued an Order granting respondent’s prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from
implementing or enforcing the 3 June 1993 Resolution of the MKSE Board of
Directors.
The SICD subsequently issued another Order on 10 March 1994 granting
respondent’s application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to continuously
enjoin, during the pendency of SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, the implementation
or enforcement of the MKSE Board Resolution in question. Petitioners assailed
this SICD Order dated 10 March 1994 in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the
SEC en banc, docketed as SEC-EB No. 393.
On 11 March 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss respondent’s Petition
in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, based on the following grounds: (1) the Petition
became moot due to the cancellation of the license of MKSE; (2) the SICD had
no jurisdiction over the Petition; and (3) the Petition failed to state a cause of
action.
The SICD denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated 4 May 1994.
Petitioners again challenged the 4 May 1994 Order of SICD before the SEC en
banc through another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as SEC-EB No. 403.
In an Order dated 31 May 1995 in SEC-EB No. 393, the SEC en banc nullified
the 10 March 1994 Order of SICD in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 granting a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondent. Likewise, in an Order dated 14
August 1995 in SEC-EB No. 403, the SEC en banc annulled the 4 May 1994
Order of SICD in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 denying petitioners’ Motion to
Dismiss, and accordingly ordered the dismissal of respondent’s Petition before
the SICD.
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the
Orders of the SEC en banc dated 31 May 1995 and 14 August 1995 in SEC-EB
No. 393 and SEC-EB No. 403, respectively. Respondent’s Petition before the
appellate court was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 38455.
On 11 February 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 38455, granting respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition in so far as it prays for annulment of the Orders
dated May 31, 1995 and August 14, 1995 in SEC-EB Case Nos. 393 and 403 is
GRANTED. The said orders are hereby rendered null and void and set aside.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision but it
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 18 May 1999.
Hence, the present Petition for Review raising the following arguments:
I.
THE SEC EN BANC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
 JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED
BY RESPONDENT BECAUSE ON ITS FACE, IT FAILED TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
II.
THE GRANT OF THE IPO ALLOCATIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT WAS A MERE ACCOMMODATION GIVEN
TO HIM BY THE BOARD OF [DIRECTORS] OF THE MAKATI
STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SEC EN BANC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT MADE AN EXTENDED INQUIRY
AND PROCEEDED TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO
THE TRUTH OF RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATIONS IN HIS
PETITION AND USED AS BASIS THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
DURING THE HEARING ON THE APPLICATION FOR THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO DETERMINE THE
EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF A STATED CAUSE OF
ACTION.
IV.
IPO ALLOCATIONS GRANTED TO BROKERS ARE NOT TO
BE BOUGHT BY THE BROKERS FOR THEMSELVES BUT
ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC.
HENCE, RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS
ILLUSORY AND HIS PETITION A NUISANCE SUIT.3
On 18 September 2001, counsel for respondent manifested to this Court that
his client died on 7 May 2001. In a Resolution dated 24 October 2001, the
Court directed the substitution of respondent by his surviving spouse, Julia
Ortigas vda. de Campos.
Petitioners want this Court to affirm the dismissal by the SEC en banc of
respondent’s Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 for failure to state a cause
of action. On the other hand, respondent insists on the sufficiency of his
Petition and seeks the continuation of the proceedings before the SICD.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.4 A complaint states a cause of action where it contains three essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.
If a defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action, he is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments
thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as constituting a
cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof.
The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well
pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be assessed by the defendant.5
Given the foregoing, the issue of whether respondent’s Petition in SEC Case
No. 02-94-4678 sufficiently states a cause of action may be alternatively stated
as whether, hypothetically admitting to be true the allegations in respondent’s
Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, the SICD may render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of said Petition.
A reading of the exact text of respondent’s Petition in SEC Case No.
02-94-4678 is, therefore, unavoidable. Pertinent portions of the said Petition
reads:
7. In recognition of petitioner’s invaluable services, the general membership of
respondent corporation [MKSE] passed a resolution sometime in 1989
amending its Articles of Incorporation, to include the following provision therein:
"ELEVENTH – WHEREAS, Mr. Miguel Campos is the only surviving
incorporator of the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. who has maintained his
membership;
"WHEREAS, he has unselfishly served the Exchange in various capacities, as
governor from 1977 to the present and as President from 1972 to 1976 and
again as President from 1988 to the present;
"WHEREAS, such dedicated service and leadership which has contributed to
the advancement and well being not only of the Exchange and its members but
also to the Securities industry, needs to be recognized and appreciated;
"WHEREAS, as such, the Board of Governors in its meeting held on February
09, 1989 has correspondingly adopted a resolution recognizing his valuable
service to the Exchange, reward the same, and preserve for posterity such
recognition by proposing a resolution to the membership body which would
make him as Chairman Emeritus for life and install in the Exchange premises a
commemorative bronze plaque in his honor;
"NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises, the
position of the "Chairman Emeritus" to be occupied by Mr. Miguel Campos
during his lifetime and irregardless of his continued membership in the
Exchange with the Privilege to attend all membership meetings as well as the
meetings of the Board of Governors of the Exchange, is hereby created."
8. Hence, to this day, petitioner is not only an active member of the respondent
corporation, but its Chairman Emeritus as well.
9. Correspondingly, at all times material to this petition, as an active member
and Chairman Emeritus of respondent corporation, petitioner has always
enjoyed the right given to all the other members to participate equally in the
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs for brevity) of corporations.
10. IPOs are shares of corporations offered for sale to the public, prior to the
listing in the trading floor of the country’s two stock exchanges. Normally,
Twenty Five Percent (25%) of these shares are divided equally between the
two stock exchanges which in turn divide these equally among their members,
who pay therefor at the offering price.
11. However, on June 3, 1993, during a meeting of the Board of Directors of
respondent-corporation, individual respondents passed a resolution to stop
giving petitioner the IPOs he is entitled to, based on the ground that these
shares were allegedly benefiting Gerardo O. Lanuza, Jr., who these individual
respondents wanted to get even with, for having filed cases before the
Securities and Exchange (SEC) for their disqualification as member of the
Board of Directors of respondent corporation.
12. Hence, from June 3, 1993 up to the present time, petitioner has been
deprived of his right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listing in the stock
market at their offering prices.
13. The collective act of the individual respondents in depriving petitioner of his
right to a share in the IPOs for the aforementioned reason, is unjust, dishonest
and done in bad faith, causing petitioner substantial financial damage. 6
There is no question that the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 asserts a
right in favor of respondent, particularly, respondent’s alleged right to subscribe
to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices;
and stipulates the correlative obligation of petitioners to respect respondent’s
right, specifically, by continuing to allow respondent to subscribe to the IPOs of
corporations listed in the stock market at their offering prices.
However, the terms right and obligation in respondent’s Petition are not magic
words that would automatically lead to the conclusion that such Petition
sufficiently states a cause of action. Right and obligation are legal terms with
specific legal meaning. A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything
whatsoever that is enforceable by law.7 An obligation is defined in the Civil
Code as a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do. 8 For every right enjoyed
by any person, there is a corresponding obligation on the part of another
person to respect such right. Thus, Justice J.B.L. Reyes offers 9 the definition
given by Arias Ramos as a more complete definition:
An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may
demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinative
conduct (the giving, doing or not doing), and in case of breach, may demand
satisfaction from the assets of the latter.
The Civil Code enumerates the sources of obligations:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
Therefore, an obligation imposed on a person, and the corresponding right
granted to another, must be rooted in at least one of these five sources. The
mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory pleading,
whether a Complaint or Petition, without identifying the basis or source thereof,
is merely a conclusion of fact and law. A pleading should state the ultimate
facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from
mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law.10 Thus, a Complaint or Petition
filed by a person claiming a right to the Office of the President of this Republic,
but without stating the source of his purported right, cannot be said to have
sufficiently stated a cause of action. Also, a person claiming to be the owner of
a parcel of land cannot merely state that he has a right to the ownership thereof,
but must likewise assert in the Complaint either a mode of acquisition of
ownership or at least a certificate of title in his name.
In the case at bar, although the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 does
allege respondent’s right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the
stock market at their offering prices, and petitioners’ obligation to continue
respecting and observing such right, the Petition utterly failed to lay down the
source or basis of respondent’s right and/or petitioners’ obligation.
Respondent merely quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed
sometime in 1989, granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for
life. However, there is nothing in the said Petition from which the Court can
deduce that respondent, by virtue of his position as Chairman Emeritus of
MKSE, was granted by law, contract, or any other legal source, the right to
subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the stock market at their offering
prices.
A meticulous review of the Petition reveals that the allocation of IPO shares
was merely alleged to have been done in accord with a practice normally
observed by the members of the stock exchange, to wit:
IPOs are shares of corporations offered for sale to the public, prior to their
listing in the trading floor of the country’s two stock exchanges. Normally,
Twenty-Five Percent (25%) of these shares are divided equally between the
two stock exchanges which in turn divide these equally among their members,
who pay therefor at the offering price.11(Emphasis supplied)
A practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally demandable
or enforceable right.12 Indeed, in labor cases, benefits which were voluntarily
given by the employer, and which have ripened into company practice, are
considered as rights that cannot be diminished by the employer. 13 Nevertheless,
even in such cases, the source of the employees’ right is not custom, but
ultimately, the law, since Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits
elimination or diminution of benefits.
There is no such law in this case that converts the practice of allocating IPO
shares to MKSE members, for subscription at their offering prices, into an
enforceable or demandable right. Thus, even if it is hypothetically admitted that
normally, twenty five percent (25%) of the IPOs are divided equally between
the two stock exchanges -- which, in turn, divide their respective allocation
equally among their members, including the Chairman Emeritus, who pay for
IPO shares at the offering price -- the Court cannot grant respondent’s prayer
for damages which allegedly resulted from the MKSE Board Resolution dated 3
June 1993 deviating from said practice by no longer allocating any shares to
respondent.1avvphi1
Accordingly, the instant Petition should be granted. The Petition in SEC Case
No. 02-94-4678 should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. It
does not matter that the SEC en banc, in its Order dated 14 August 1995 in
SEC-EB No. 403, overstepped its bounds by not limiting itself to the issue of
whether respondent’s Petition before the SICD sufficiently stated a cause of
action. The SEC en banc may have been mistaken in considering extraneous
evidence in granting petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, but its discussion thereof
are merely superfluous and obiter dictum. In the main, the SEC en banc did
correctly dismiss the Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678 for its failure to state
the basis for respondent’s alleged right, to wit:
Private respondent Campos has failed to establish the basis or authority for his
alleged right to participate equally in the IPO allocations of the Exchange. He
cited paragraph 11 of the amended articles of incorporation of the Exchange in
support of his position but a careful reading of the said provision shows nothing
therein that would bear out his claim. The provision merely created the position
of chairman emeritus of the Exchange but it mentioned nothing about
conferring upon the occupant thereof the right to receive IPO allocations. 14
With the dismissal of respondent’s Petition in SEC Case No. 02-94-4678, there
is no more need for this Court to resolve the propriety of the issuance by SCID
of a writ of preliminary injunction in said case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 11 February 1997 and its Resolution dated 18 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 38455 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 31 May 1995
and 14 August 1995 of the Securities and Exchange Commission en banc in
SEC-EB Case No. 393 and No. 403, respectively, are hereby reinstated. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 3 Rollo, p. 144.
Associate Justice 4 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 2, Section 2.
5 Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 465,

WE CONCUR: 490-491 (1996).

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
6 Rollo, pp. 50-52.
7 Bailey v. Miller, 91 N.E. 24, 25, Ind. App. 475, cited in 37A Words and
Phrases 363.
8 Civil Code, Article 1156.
9 Lawyer’s Journal, 31 January 1951, p. 47.
10 Abad v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, G.R. Nos. 58507-08, 26
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
February 1992, 206 SCRA 567, 579-580.
NACHURA 11 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
Associate Justice 12 A distinction, however, should be made between Municipal Law and Public

International Law. Custom is one of the primary sources of International Law,

and is thus a source of legal rights within such sphere.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 13 Arco Metal Products Co., Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco
Associate Justice
Metal-NAFLU, G.R. No. 170734, 14 May 2008, 554 SCRA 110, 118.
14 Rollo, p. 95.
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Republic of the Philippines
Division.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
EN BANC
Chairperson, Third Division
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909
CERTIFICATION
ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
vs.
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
Filemon Sotto, for appellee.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
TORRES, J.:
Footnotes
1 Per Resolution of 24 October 2001. On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu,
2 Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on
Jesus M. Elbinias and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-36. or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the
house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was
requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who
was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the
attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the
difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was
performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which
services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on
the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable
value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse
to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed
that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of
them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be
deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the
allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when
she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she
gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental
and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the defendants
be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the
demurrer, directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend
their answer. In compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the
same date, their amended answer, denying each and every one of the
allegations contained in the complaint, and requesting that the same be
dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by
the court below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were
absolved from the former complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient
evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants, with costs
against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved
for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law; the motion
was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that
the declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded
therefrom, for the reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had
been made, was also denied, and to the decision the defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff,
by virtue of having been sent for by the former, attended a physician and
rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants
during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the said
physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide
who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient,
or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in
the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations
arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the
mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support.
(Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088),
and spouses are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no
question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of
medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he
or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party
bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the
fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates
from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established
between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person
bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants
herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and
requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said
obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life
of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance
was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in
the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially
established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.
unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J., concurs in the result.
his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to Willard, J., dissents.
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.

From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have
brought an action against the defendants simply because they were the parties
who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her
difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and
mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were
not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to
pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.

In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the
supreme court of Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a
contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support another
who was not his relative, established the rule that the law does impose the
obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability arose out of a
contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11,
1897.)

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with
respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support,
among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of
her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a contract
existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it
is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are
under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind
SECOND DIVISION
themselves.

July 8, 2015
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned
to the judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of
action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use G.R. No. 195166
of forceps is a surgical operation.
SPOUSES SALVADOR ABELLA AND ALMA ABELLA, Petitioners,
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion vs.
that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the SPOUSES ROMEO ABELLA AND ANNIE ABELLA, Respondents.
appellant. So ordered.
DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court praying that judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the
September 30, 2010 Decision1 and the January 4, 2011 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals Nineteenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 01388. The Petition
also prays that respondents Spouses Romeo and Annie Abella be ordered to
pay petitioners Spouses Salvador and Alma Abella 2.5% monthly interest plus
the remaining balance of the amount loaned.
The assailed September 30, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the December 28, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6627. It directed petitioners to pay
respondents P148,500.00 (plus interest), which was the amount respondents
supposedly overpaid. The assailed January 4, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The Regional Trial Court’s December 28, 2005 Decision ordered respondents
to pay petitioners the supposedly unpaid loan balance of P300,000.00 plus the
allegedly stipulated interest rate of 30% per annum, as well as litigation
expenses and attorney’s fees.4
On July 31, 2002, petitioners Spouses Salvador and Alma Abella filed a
Complaint5 for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against respondents Spouses Romeo and Annie Abella before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 6627.6
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that respondents obtained a loan from
them in the amount of P500,000.00. The loan was evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt dated March 22, 1999 and was payable within one (1)
year. Petitioners added that respondents were able to pay a total of
P200,000.00— P100,000.00 paid on two separate occasions—leaving an
unpaid balance of P300,000.00.7
In their Answer8 (with counterclaim and motion to dismiss), respondents
alleged that the amount involved did not pertain to a loan they obtained from
petitioners but was part of the capital for a joint venture involving the lending of
money.9
Specifically, respondents claimed that they were approached by petitioners,
who proposed that if respondents were to "undertake the management of
whatever money [petitioners] would give them, [petitioners] would get 2.5% a
month with a 2.5% service fee to [respondents]."10 The 2.5% that each party
would be receiving represented their sharing of the 5% interest that the joint
venture was supposedly going to charge against its debtors. Respondents
further alleged that the one year averred by petitioners was not a deadline for
payment but the term within which they were to return the money placed by
petitioners should the joint venture prove to be not lucrative. Moreover, they
claimed that the entire amount of P500,000.00 was disposed of in accordance
with their agreed terms and conditions and that petitioners terminated the joint
venture, prompting them to collect from the joint venture’s borrowers. They
were, however, able to collect only to the extent of P200,000.00; hence, the
P300,000.00 balance remained unpaid.11
In the Decision12 dated December 28, 2005, the Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of petitioners. It noted that the terms of the acknowledgment receipt
executed by respondents clearly showed that: (a) respondents were indebted
to the extent of P500,000.00; (b) this indebtedness was to be paid within one (1)
year; and (c) the indebtedness was subject to interest. Thus, the trial court
concluded that respondents obtained a simple loan, although they later
invested its proceeds in a lending enterprise. 13 The Regional Trial Court
adjudged respondents solidarily liable to petitioners. The dispositive portion of
its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P300,000.00 with interest at the rate of 30% per annum from the time the
complaint was filed on July 31, 2002 until fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P2,227.50 as
reimbursement for litigation expenses, and another sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
For lack of legal basis, plaintiffs’ claim for moral and exemplary damages has to
be denied, and for lack of merit the counter-claim is ordered dismissed.14
In the Order dated March 13, 2006, 15 the Regional Trial Court denied
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.
On respondents’ appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that while respondents had
indeed entered into a simple loan with petitioners, respondents were no longer
liable to pay the outstanding amount of P300,000.00.16
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the loan could not have earned interest,
whether as contractually stipulated interest or as interest in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages. As to the loan’s not having earned stipulated
interest, the Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on Article 1956 of the Civil
Code, which requires interest to be stipulated in writing for it to be due. 17 The
Court of Appeals noted that while the acknowledgement receipt showed that
interest was to be charged, no particular interest rate was specified. 18 Thus, at
the time respondents were making interest payments of 2.5% per month, these
interest payments were invalid for not being properly stipulated by the parties.
As to the loan’s not having earned interest in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals, citing Eusebio-Calderon v.
People,19 noted that interest in the concept of actual or compensatory damages
accrues only from the time that demand (whether judicial or extrajudicial) is
made. It reasoned that since respondents received petitioners’ demand letter
only on July 12, 2002, any interest in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages due should be reckoned only from then. Thus, the payments for the
2.5% monthly interest made after the perfection of the loan in 1999 but before
the demand was made in 2002 were invalid.20
Since petitioners’ charging of interest was invalid, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that all payments respondents made by way of interest should be
deemed payments for the principal amount of P500,000.00.21
The Court of Appeals further noted that respondents made a total payment of
P648,500.00, which, as against the principal amount of P500,000.00, entailed
an overpayment of P148,500.00. Applying the principle of solutio indebiti, the
Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners were liable to reimburse
respondents for the overpaid amount of P148,500.00.22 The dispositive portion
of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one issued, finding that the
Spouses Salvador and Alma Abella are DIRECTED to jointly and severally pay
Spouses Romeo and Annie Abella the amount of P148,500.00, with interest of
6% interest (sic) per annum to be computed upon receipt of this decision, until
full satisfaction thereof. Upon finality of this judgment, an interest as the rate of
12% per annum, instead of 6%, shall be imposed on the amount due, until full
payment thereof.23
In the Resolution24 dated January 4, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present appeal25 where they claim that the
Court of Appeals erred in completely striking off interest despite the parties’
written agreement stipulating it, as well as in ordering them to reimburse and
pay interest to respondents.
In support of their contentions, petitioners cite Article 1371 of the Civil
Code,26 which calls for the consideration of the contracting parties’
contemporaneous and subsequent acts in determining their true intention.
Petitioners insist that respondents’ consistent payment of interest in the year
following the perfection of the loan showed that interest at 2.5% per month was
properly agreed upon despite its not having been expressly stated in the
acknowledgment receipt. They add that during the proceedings before the
Regional Trial Court, respondents admitted that interest was due on the loan. 27
In their Comment,28 respondents reiterate the Court of Appeals’ findings that no
interest rate was ever stipulated by the parties and that interest was not due
and demandable at the time they were making interest payments.29
In their Reply,30 petitioners argue that even though no interest rate was
stipulated in the acknowledgment receipt, the case fell under the exception to
the Parol Evidence Rule. They also argue that there exists convincing and
sufficiently credible evidence to supplement the imperfection of the
acknowledgment receipt.31
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether interest accrued on respondents’ loan from petitioners. If so, at
what rate?
Second, whether petitioners are liable to reimburse respondents for the latter’s
supposed excess payments and for interest.
I
As noted by the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court, respondents
entered into a simple loan or mutuum, rather than a joint venture, with
petitioners.
Respondents’ claims, as articulated in their testimonies before the trial court,
cannot prevail over the clear terms of the document attesting to the relation of
the parties. "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control."32
Articles 1933 and 1953 of the Civil Code provide the guideposts that determine
if a contractual relation is one of simple loan or mutuum:
Art. 1933. By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another, either
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain
time and return it, in which case the contract is called a commodatum;
or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount
of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply
called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
In commodatum the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while in
simple loan, ownership passes to the borrower.
....
Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing
acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal
amount of the same kind and quality. (Emphasis supplied)
On March 22, 1999, respondents executed an acknowledgment receipt to
petitioners, which states:
Batan, Aklan
March 22, 1999
This is to acknowledge receipt of the Amount of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos from Mrs. Alma R. Abella,
payable within one (1) year from date hereof with interest.
Annie C. Abella (sgd.) Romeo M. Abella (sgd.) 33 (Emphasis
supplied)
The text of the acknowledgment receipt is uncomplicated and straightforward. It
attests to: first, respondents’ receipt of the sum of P500,000.00 from petitioner
Alma Abella; second, respondents’ duty to pay back this amount within one (1)
year from March 22, 1999; and third, respondents’ duty to pay interest.
Consistent with what typifies a simple loan, petitioners delivered to respondents
with the corresponding condition that respondents shall pay the same amount
to petitioners within one (1) year.
II
Although we have settled the nature of the contractual relation between
petitioners and respondents, controversy persists over respondents’ duty to
pay conventional interest, i.e., interest as the cost of borrowing money. 34
Article 1956 of the Civil Code spells out the basic rule that "[n]o interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
On the matter of interest, the text of the acknowledgment receipt is simple,
plain, and unequivocal. It attests to the contracting parties’ intent to subject to
interest the loan extended by petitioners to respondents. The controversy,
however, stems from the acknowledgment receipt’s failure to state the exact
rate of interest.
Jurisprudence is clear about the applicable interest rate if a written instrument
fails to specify a rate. In Spouses Toring v. Spouses Olan,35 this court clarified
the effect of Article 1956 of the Civil Code and noted that the legal rate of
interest (then at 12%) is to apply: "In a loan or forbearance of money, according
to the Civil Code, the interest due should be that stipulated in writing, and in the
absence thereof, the rate shall be 12% per annum."36
Spouses Toring cites and restates (practically verbatim) what this court settled
in Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
61: "In a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
stipulated in writing, and in the absence thereof, the rate shall be 12% per
annum."37
Security Bank also refers to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
which, in turn, stated:38
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.39 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule is not only definite; it is cast in mandatory language. From Eastern
Shipping to Security Bank to Spouses Toring, jurisprudence has repeatedly
used the word "shall," a term that has long been settled to denote something
imperative or operating to impose a duty.40 Thus, the rule leaves no room for
alternatives or otherwise does not allow for discretion. It requires the
application of the legal rate of interest.
Our intervening Decision in Nacar v. Gallery Frames41 recognized that the legal
rate of interest has been reduced to 6% per annum:
Recently, however, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB),
in its Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, approved the amendment of
Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982 and, accordingly, issued Circular
No. 799, Series of 2013, effective July 1, 2013, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved
the following revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of
stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905,
Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods
or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express
contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the
Manual of Regulations for
Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate
of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments
shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum — as reflected in the case
of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations
for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1,= 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Non- Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by
BSP-MB Circular No. 799 — but will now be six percent (6%) per annum
effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could
only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve
percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013.
Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the
prevailing rate of interest when applicable.42 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Nevertheless, both Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, Series of
2013 and Nacar retain the definite and mandatory framing of the rule
articulated in Eastern Shipping, Security Bank, and Spouses
Toring. Nacar even restates Eastern Shipping:
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case
of Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB
Circular No. 799, as follows:
....
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.43 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Thus, it remains that where interest was stipulated in writing by the debtor and
creditor in a simple loan or mutuum, but no exact interest rate was mentioned,
the legal rate of interest shall apply. At present, this is 6% per annum, subject
to Nacar’s qualification on prospective application.
Applying this, the loan obtained by respondents from petitioners is deemed
subjected to conventional interest at the rate of 12% per annum, the legal rate
of interest at the time the parties executed their agreement. Moreover, should
conventional interest still be due as of July 1, 2013, the rate of 12% per annum
shall persist as the rate of conventional interest.
This is so because interest in this respect is used as a surrogate for the parties’
intent, as expressed as of the time of the execution of their contract. In this
sense, the legal rate of interest is an affirmation of the contracting parties’ intent;
that is, by their contract’s silence on a specific rate, the then prevailing legal
rate of interest shall be the cost of borrowing money. This rate, which by their
contract the parties have settled on, is deemed to persist regardless of shifts in
the legal rate of interest. Stated otherwise, the legal rate of interest, when
applied as conventional interest, shall always be the legal rate at the time the
agreement was executed and shall not be susceptible to shifts in rate.
Petitioners, however, insist on conventional interest at the rate of 2.5% per
month or 30% per annum. They argue that the acknowledgment receipt fails to
show the complete and accurate intention of the contracting parties. They rely
on Article 1371 of the Civil Code, which provides that the contemporaneous
and subsequent acts of the contracting parties shall be considered should there
be a need to ascertain their intent.44 In addition, they claim that this case falls
under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as spelled out in Rule 130,
Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.45
It is a basic precept in legal interpretation and construction that a rule or
provision that treats a subject with specificity prevails over a rule or provision
that treats a subject in general terms.46
The rule spelled out in Security Bank and Spouses Toring is anchored on
Article 1956 of the Civil Code and specifically governs simple loans or mutuum.
Mutuum is a type of nominate contract that is specifically recognized by the
Civil Code and for which the Civil Code provides a specific set of governing
rules: Articles 1953 to 1961. In contrast, Article 1371 is among the Civil Code
provisions generally dealing with contracts. As this case particularly involves a
simple loan, the specific rule spelled out in Security Bank and Spouses
Toring finds preferential application as against Article 1371.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, there is no room for entertaining extraneous
(or parol) evidence. In Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras v. Kimwa
Construction and Development Corporation,47 we spelled out the requisites for
the admission of parol evidence:
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted:
first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in
a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and
second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the
basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.48
The issue of admitting parol evidence is a matter that is proper to the trial, not
the appellate, stage of a case. Petitioners raised the issue of applying the
exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule only in the Reply they filed before this
court. This is the last pleading that either of the parties has filed in the entire
string of proceedings culminating in this Decision. It is, therefore, too late for
petitioners to harp on this rule. In any case, what is at issue is not admission of
evidence per se, but the appreciation given to the evidence adduced by the
parties. In the Petition they filed before this court, petitioners themselves
acknowledged that checks supposedly attesting to payment of monthly interest
at the rate of 2.5% were admitted by the trial court (and marked as Exhibits "2,"
"3," "4," "5," "6," "7," and "8").49 What petitioners have an issue with is not the
admission of these pieces of evidence but how these have not been
appreciated in a manner consistent with the conclusions they advance.
Even if it can be shown that the parties have agreed to monthly interest at the
rate of 2.5%, this is unconscionable. As emphasized in Castro v. Tan,50 the
willingness of the parties to enter into a relation involving an unconscionable
interest rate is inconsequential to the validity of the stipulated rate:
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if
knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a
repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the
common sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or in the
human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such
imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of
public or private morals.51
The imposition of an unconscionable interest rate is void ab initio for being
"contrary to morals, and the law."52
In determining whether the rate of interest is unconscionable, the mechanical
application of pre-established floors would be wanting. The lowest rates that
have previously been considered unconscionable need not be an impenetrable
minimum. What is more crucial is a consideration of the parties’ contexts.
Moreover, interest rates must be appreciated in light of the fundamental nature
of interest as compensation to the creditor for money lent to another, which he
or she could otherwise have used for his or her own purposes at the time it was
lent. It is not the default vehicle for predatory gain. As such, interest need only
be reasonable. It ought not be a supine mechanism for the creditor’s unjust
enrichment at the expense of another.
Petitioners here insist upon the imposition of 2.5% monthly or 30% annual
interest. Compounded at this rate, respondents’ obligation would have more
than doubled—increased to 219.7% of the principal—by the end of the third
year after which the loan was contracted if the entire principal remained unpaid.
By the end of the ninth year, it would have multiplied more than tenfold (or
increased to 1,060.45%). In 2015, this would have multiplied by more than 66
times (or increased to 6,654.17%). Thus, from an initial loan of only
P500,000.00, respondents would be obliged to pay more than P33 million. This
is grossly unfair, especially since up to the fourth year from when the loan was
obtained, respondents had been assiduously delivering payment. This reduces
their best efforts to satisfy their obligation into a protracted servicing of a
rapacious loan.
The legal rate of interest is the presumptive reasonable compensation for
borrowed money. While parties are free to deviate from this, any deviation must
be reasonable and fair. Any deviation that is far-removed is suspect. Thus, in
cases where stipulated interest is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of
interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is required by prevailing
market conditions. Here, petitioners have articulated no such justification.
In sum, Article 1956 of the Civil Code, read in light of established jurisprudence,
prevents the application of any interest rate other than that specifically provided
for by the parties in their loan document or, in lieu of it, the legal rate. Here, as
the contracting parties failed to make a specific stipulation, the legal rate must
apply. Moreover, the rate that petitioners adverted to is unconscionable. The
conventional interest due on the principal amount loaned by respondents from
petitioners is held to be 12% per annum.
III
Apart from respondents’ liability for conventional interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, outstanding conventional interest—if any is due from
respondents—shall itself earn legal interest from the time judicial demand was
made by petitioners, i.e., on July 31, 2002, when they filed their Complaint. This
is consistent with Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.
So, too, Nacar states that "the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from
the time it is judicially demanded."53
Consistent with Nacar, as well as with our ruling in Rivera v. Spouses
Chua,54 the interest due on conventional interest shall be at the rate of 12% per
annum from July 31, 2002 to June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or starting July 1, 2013,
this shall be at the rate of 6% per annum.
IV
Proceeding from these premises, we find that respondents made an
overpayment in the amount of P3,379.17.
As acknowledged by petitioner Salvador Abella, respondents paid a total of
P200,000.00, which was charged against the principal amount of P500,000.00.
The first payment of P100,000.00 was made on June 30, 2001, 55 while the
second payment of P100,000.00 was made on December 30, 2001.56
The Court of Appeals’ September 30, 2010 Decision stated that respondents
paid P6,000.00 in March 1999.57
The Pre-Trial Order dated December 2, 2002,58 stated that the parties
admitted that "from the time the principal sum of P500,000.00 was borrowed
from [petitioners], [respondents] ha[d] been religiously paying" 59 what was
supposedly interest "at the rate of 2.5% per month."60
From March 22, 1999 (after the loan was perfected) to June 22, 2001 (before
respondents’ payment of P100,000.00 on June 30, 2001, which was deducted
from the principal amount of P500,000.00), the 2.5% monthly "interest" was
pegged to the principal amount of P500,000.00. These monthly interests, thus,
amounted to P12,500.00 per month. Considering that the period from March
1999 to June 2001 spanned twenty seven (27) months, respondents paid a
total of P337,500.00.61
From June 22, 2001 up to December 22, 2001 (before respondents’ payment of
another P100,000.00 on December 30, 2001, which was deducted from the
remaining principal amount of P400,000.00), the 2.5% monthly "interest" was
pegged to the remaining principal amount of P400,000.00. These monthly
interests, thus, amounted to P10,000.00 per month. Considering that this
period spanned six (6) months, respondents paid a total of P60,000.00. 62
From after December 22, 2001 up to June 2002 (when petitioners filed their
Complaint), the 2.5% monthly "interest" was pegged to the remaining principal
amount of P300,000.00. These monthly interests, thus, amounted to P7,500.00
per month. Considering that this period spanned six (6) months, respondents
paid a total of P45,000.00.63
Applying these facts and the properly applicable interest rate (for conventional
interest, 12% per annum; for interest on conventional interest, 12% per annum
from July 31, 2002 up to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum henceforth), the
following conclusions may be drawn:
By the end of the first year following the perfection of the loan, or as of March
21, 2000, P560,000.00 was due from respondents. This consisted of the
principal of P500,000.00 and conventional interest of P60,000.00.
Within this first year, respondents made twelve (12) monthly payments totalling
P150,000.00 (P12,500.00 each from April 1999 to March 2000). This was in
addition to their initial payment of P6,000.00 in March 1999.
Application of payments must be in accordance with Article 1253 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 1253. If the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be
deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered.
Thus, the payments respondents made must first be reckoned as interest
payments. Thereafter, any excess payments shall be charged against the
principal. As respondents paid a total of P156,000.00 within the first year, the
conventional interest of P60,000.00 must be deemed fully paid and the
remaining amount that respondents paid (i.e., P96,000.00) is to be charged
against the principal. This yields a balance of P404,000.00. By the end of the
second year following the perfection of the loan, or as of March 21, 2001,
P452,480.00 was due from respondents. This consisted of the outstanding
principal of P404,000.00 and conventional interest of P48,480.00.
Within this second year, respondents completed another round of twelve (12)
monthly payments totaling P150,000.00.
Consistent with Article 1253 of the Civil Code, as respondents paid a total of
P156,000.00 within the second year, the conventional interest of P48,480.00
must be deemed fully paid and the remaining amount that respondents paid
(i.e., P101,520.00) is to be charged against the principal. This yields a balance
of P302,480.00.
By the end of the third year following the perfection of the loan, or as of March
21, 2002, P338,777.60 was due from respondents. This consists of the
outstanding principal of P302,480.00 and conventional interest of P36,297.60.
Within this third year, respondents paid a total of P320,000.00, as follows:
(a) Between March 22, 2001 and June 30, 2001, respondents completed three
(3) monthly payments of P12,500.00 each, totaling P37,500.00.
(b) On June 30, 2001, respondents paid P100,000.00, which was charged as
principal payment.
(c) Between June 30, 2001 and December 30, 2001, respondents delivered
monthly payments of P10,000.00 each. At this point, the monthly payments no
longer amounted to P12,500.00 each because the supposed monthly interest
payments were pegged to the supposedly remaining principal of P400,000.00.
Thus, during this period, they paid a total of six (6) monthly payments totaling
P60,000.00.
(d) On December 30, 2001, respondents paid P100,000.00, which, like the
June 30, 2001 payment, was charged against the principal.
(e) From the end of December 2002 to the end of February 2002, respondents
delivered monthly payments of P7,500.00 each. At this point, the supposed
monthly interest payments were now pegged to the supposedly remaining
principal of P300,000.00. Thus, during this period, they delivered three (3)
monthly payments totaling P22,500.00.
Consistent with Article 1253 of the Civil Code, as respondents paid a total of
P320,000.00 within the third year, the conventional interest of P36,927.50 must
be deemed fully paid and the remaining amount that respondents paid (i.e.,
P283,702.40) is to be charged against the principal. This yields a balance of
P18,777.60.
By the end of the fourth year following the perfection of the loan, or as of March
21, 2003, P21,203.51 would have been due from respondents. This consists of:
(a) the outstanding principal of P18,777.60, (b) conventional interest of
P2,253.31, and (c) interest due on conventional interest starting from July 31,
2002, the date of judicial demand, in the amount of P172.60. The last (i.e.,
interest on interest) must be pro-rated. There were only 233 days from July 31,
2002 (the date of judicial demand) to March 21, 2003 (the end of the fourth
year); this left 63.83% of the fourth year, within which interest on interest might
have accrued. Thus, the full annual interest on interest of 12% per annum could
not have been completed, and only the proportional amount of 7.66% per
annum may be properly imposed for the remainder of the fourth year.
From the end of March 2002 to June 2002, respondents delivered three (3)
more monthly payments of P7,500.00 each. Thus, during this period, they
delivered three (3) monthly payments totalling P22,500.00.
At this rate, however, payment would have been completed by respondents
even before the end of the fourth year. Thus, for precision, it is more
appropriate to reckon the amounts due as against payments made on a
monthly, rather than an annual, basis.
By April 21, 2002, _18,965.38 (i.e., remaining principal of P18,777.60 plus
pro-rated monthly conventional interest at 1%, amounting to P187.78) would
have been due from respondents. Deducting the monthly payment of
P7,500.00 for the preceding month in a manner consistent with Article 1253 of
the Civil Code would yield a balance of P11,465.38.
By May 21, 2002, _11,580.03 (i.e., remaining principal of P11,465.38 plus
pro-rated monthly conventional interest at 1%, amounting to P114.65) would
have been due from respondents. Deducting the monthly payment of
P7,500.00 for the preceding month in a manner consistent with Article 1253 of
the Civil Code would yield a balance of P4,080.03.
By June 21, 2002, P4,120.83 (i.e., remaining principal of P4,080.03 plus
pro-rated monthly conventional interest at 1%, amounting to P40.80) would
have been due from respondents. Deducting the monthly payment of
P7,500.00 for the preceding month in a manner consistent with Article 1253 of
the Civil Code would yield a negative balance of P3,379.17.
Thus, by June 21, 2002, respondents had not only fully paid the principal and
all the conventional interest that had accrued on their loan. By this date, they
also overpaid P3,379.17. Moreover, while hypothetically, interest on
conventional interest would not have run from July 31, 2002, no such interest
accrued since there was no longer any conventional interest due from
respondents by then.
V better interest of equity to no longer hold petitioners liable for interest arising
As respondents made an overpayment, the principle of solutio indebiti as
provided by Article 2154 of the Civil Code64 applies. Article 2154 reads:
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
In Moreno-Lentfer v. Wolff,65 this court explained the application of solutio
indebiti:
The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no
one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. It applies where (1)
a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor,
who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment, and (2) the
payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other
cause.66
As respondents had already fully paid the principal and all conventional interest
that had accrued, they were no longer obliged to make further
payments.1awp++i1 Any further payment they made was only because of a
mistaken impression that they were still due. Accordingly, petitioners are now
bound by a quasi-contractual obligation to return any and all excess payments
delivered by respondents.
Nacar provides that "[w]hen an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum."67This applies to obligations arising from quasi-contracts such
as solutio indebiti.
Further, Article 2159 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall pay legal
interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable for fruits received or
which should have been received if the thing produces fruits.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from
any cause, and for damages to the person who delivered the thing, until it is
recovered.
Consistent however, with our finding that the excess payment made by
respondents were borne out of a mere mistake that it was due, we find it in the
from their quasi-contractual obligation.
Nevertheless, Nacar also provides:
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its Court's Division.
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.68 MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Thus, interest at the rate of 6% per annum may be properly imposed on the Acting Chairperson
total judgment award. This shall be reckoned from the finality of this Decision
until its full satisfaction. CERTIFICATION

WHEREFORE, the assailed September 30, 2010 Decision and the January 4,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals Nineteenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No.
01388 are SET ASIDE. Petitioners Spouses Salvador and Alma Abella
are DIRECTED to jointly and severally reimburse respondents Spouses
Romeo and Annie Abella the amount of P3,379.17, which respondents have
overpaid.
A legal interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total
judgment award from the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

SO ORDERED. Footnotes

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN * Designated Acting Member per S.O. No. 2088 dated July 1, 2015.
Associate Justice ** Designated Acting Member per S.O. No. 2079 dated June 29, 2015.
*** Designated Acting Chairperson per S.O. No. 2087 (Revised) dated July 1,

WE CONCUR: 2015.
1 Rollo, pp. 28-42. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon A.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA* Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Myra V.
Associate Justice Garcia-Fernandez of the Court of Appeals Cebu.
2 Jd.at50-51.
3 Id. at 102–112. The Decision was penned by Judge Eustaquio G. Terencio.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO***
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN** 4 Id. at 112.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 5 Id. at 53–55.
Acting Chairperson
6 Id. at 29.
7 Id. at 53–55.
8 Id. at 58–63.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
9 Id. at 59.
Associate Justice
10 Id.
11 Id. at 59–60.
ATTESTATION
12 Id. at 102–112.
13 Id. at 111–112.
14 Id. at 112.
15 Id. at 123. 45 Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an
16 Id. at 39–41. agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
17 Art. 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
writing. in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
18 Rollo, p. 39. agreement.
19 484 Phil. 87 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
20 Rollo, p. 39.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
21 Id. at 39–40.
of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
22 Id.
23 Id. at 41.
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
24 Id. at 50–51.
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
25 Id. at 10–25.
agreement of the parties thereto;
26 Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
27 Rollo, pp. 19–20.
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
28 Id. at 128–137.
29 Id. at 133–136.
30 Id. at 178–181.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
31 Id. at 178–179.
46 See National Power Corporation v. Presiding Judge, RTC, 10th Judicial
32 CIVIL CODE, art. 1370.
33 Id. at 57. Region, Br. XXV, Cagayan De Oro City, 268 Phil. 507 (1990) [Per C.J. Fernan,
Third Division].
47 G.R. No. 171601, April 8, 2015,
34 Cf. interest on interest (i.e., interest due on conventional interest) and <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/april2
compensatory interest / penalty interest / indemnity interest (i.e., damages paid 015/171601.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
arising from delay in paying a fixed sum of money or delay in assessing and 48 Id.
paying damages). 49 Rollo, p. 19.
35 589 Phil. 362 (2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
50 620 Phil. 239, (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
36 Id. at 368, citing CIVIL CODE, art. 1956 and Security Bank and Trust
51 Id. at 242-243, citing Ibarra v. Aveyro, 37 Phil. 273, 282 (1917) [Per J. Torres,
Company v. RTC of Makati, Br. 61, 331 Phil. 787 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, First Division].
Jr., First Division], emphasis supplied. 52 Id. at 248, citing CIVIL CODE, art. 1306.
37 331 Phil. 787, 794 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division], citing
53 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 457 [Per J. Peralta, En
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, Banc].
234 SCRA 78 [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], emphasis supplied. 54 G.R. No. 184458, January 14, 2015,
38 G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78 [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. 39 Id. at

95, citing CIVIL CODE, art. 2195, 1956, and 1169.

40 See Philippine Registered Electrical Practitioners, Inc. v. Francia, Jr., 379 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/184458.pdf> [Per J.
Perez, First Division].
Phil. 634 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; University of Mindanao,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 659 Phil. 1 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division];
55 Rollo, p. 31.
and Bersabal v. Salvador, 173 Phil. 379 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division].
56 Id.
41 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
57 Id. at 40.
42 Id. at 454–456.
58 Id. at 125–126.
43 Id. at 457–458.
59 Id. at 125.
44 CIVIL CODE, art. 1371.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 40.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
65 484 Phil. 552 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].
66 Id. at 559–560, citing Power Commercial and Industrial Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 340 ]Phil. 705 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division];
and National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia v. Court of Appeals, 480 Phil.
391 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].
67 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439,
458 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
68 Id.
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries,
instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street
railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is
situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of
Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by
boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of
the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature
than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training
in mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols,
about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry
that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have
taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's
premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear
that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had
Republic of the Philippines asked for Mr. Murphy.
SUPREME COURT
Manila After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
EN BANC the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910 scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They
vs. are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the
COMPANY, defendant-appellant. ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they
could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less
W. L. Wright, for appellee. than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the
CARSON, J.: wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to
break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could
not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap
while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed,
causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the
necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his
wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to
be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the
boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident,
during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same
size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the
power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that
at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in
the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William
McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to
have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were
found would seem to have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only
to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to
prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant
counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes
crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will
on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place
where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to
forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises, although
it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware of the fact
that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin
boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's
office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a
month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman
and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day;
and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and
more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and
conclusively established by the evidence of record, and are substantially
admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed
are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on
defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they
had come from its possession and control, and that the company or some of its
employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were
found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant
company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof
of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists
that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or
less extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track;
that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's
premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where
the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies
and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of
electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were
found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes
and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of
blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average
citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to
the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the
place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the
caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think
also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were
willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot
where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of
the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood,
they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are
satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or
some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed
at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play,
where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought
to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of
the facts on which these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather
assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley
extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that
while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J.
G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and
immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's
foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the
McKinley extension was done by independent contractors. Only one witness
testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of
this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge, and
knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the
relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact having
been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on
work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think
that the company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its
contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the
owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for
tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that
this work had been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the
maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the company did not in
fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated
by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the
absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently
establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable
inference that the caps found on its premises were its property, and were left
where they were found by the company or some of its employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in
plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read
together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts,
and illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his
contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the
defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree
with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various
questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would,
perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the
generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such
as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion,
the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular
facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating
caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally
clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure
and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not
picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and
applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which
should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving
the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this
latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries
sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down
in many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as
the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company
is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle
curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad
company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good
reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where
such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable,
left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would
be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact
suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority
holds the owner of the premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the
principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable
to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are
that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in
regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to
passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and
that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same
rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult
that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or
negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not
the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in several state courts, and the supreme
court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally
repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that
laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held,
in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to
trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or
willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are
injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the
premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can
not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere
with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children and adults
as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a
license to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were
indulged in by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs.
Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been
questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other
States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United
States, citing and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading
case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these
cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra),
and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered
by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and
reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an
exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases,
both English and American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles
announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were
as follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own
pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without
defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident
injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no
knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises without any
fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although
defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these
facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser,
for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the
unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to make
provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the
principles involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is
strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of
defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the
defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for
injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on
defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra).
Applied to the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant
was guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the
vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to
its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so.
On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and
witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a
narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people
of the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were
in the habit of frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house in the
immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these
children would have suggested that they were in danger from being so near a
pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or
rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall
and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company
ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to
see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed
no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous
traps, baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the
premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his
neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps,
and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and
thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap
by means of his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by
manual force?" What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is
there between an express license to the children of this village to visit the
defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license,
resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or
warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the
case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of
Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule
of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited
with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct,
might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the
consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous
machine, so that his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle
with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in
the case of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts
and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution
toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they
leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting
to them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose
they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be
taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of
implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied
license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus
leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be
likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to
make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises,
near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should
arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its
conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific
Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this
jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are
actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and
impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be
found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of
machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and
inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the
magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence.
The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are
exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter
or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam
about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say
that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express
permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the
child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know
that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts
and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury
from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is
clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger
without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be
expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary
danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might
naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is
contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that
children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to
injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs.
Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very
tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized
as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of
negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and
girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the
child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so
as to deprive it a right to recover in such cases — a point which we neither
discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property
without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without
other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was
not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore
was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the
detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that
the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in
any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this
proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo
cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at
length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra),
"While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must
himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of
tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning
on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which
would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from its
negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age,
because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express
permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth
can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut
open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he
undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On this point,
which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the
doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid,
although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous
cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that the
plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender
years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or
character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of
15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age;
he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record
discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of
himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his
denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was
present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the
use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer,
and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate
that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9
years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the
contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of
the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the
cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred;
but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and
capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature
of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the
minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and
the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily
depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a
minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with
the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But
some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these
Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our
laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising
certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said
that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as
that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to
become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of
each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of
age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally
responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of
age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal
Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain
circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id.,
sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males
of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code,
art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when
he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense
that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided
the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of
his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from
another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts
the grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit.
7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own
acts the grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2,
tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which
expressly lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction,
nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme
court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the
right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries
sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902
(93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the
injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced
should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no
obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were imprudent
or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the
injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the
alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other
cause, gave rise to the damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the
decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an
obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause
and effect; but if the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions
of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even
though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when
it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness
of the injured party himself.
And again —
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is
upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to
establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July,
and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first
setting forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or
omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and
the production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect
between the act or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct
result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is
necessary that the damages result immediately and directly from an act
performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal ground
for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was
definitely settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are
many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the
negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions
of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated
in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme
court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes,
though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in
the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this
jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of proportional damages,"
but expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the
injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party
shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own
proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the Footnotes
event giving occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the 1 Phil. Rep., 85.

sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the
side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage
which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the
Republic of the Philippines
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
SUPREME COURT
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
Manila
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount
that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a EN BANC
sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate
cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having vs.
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
can not recover."
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in G. E. Campbell for appellee.
picking up upon defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of
defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between the negligent STREET, J.:
act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises
and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant,
Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused
very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of
but whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that First Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability
"boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity the plaintiff has appealed.
of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question
under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide. The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony
the judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw
costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered. a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur. successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
Johnson, J., concurs in the result. was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning
signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the
right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he
did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the
other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width
of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony
had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently
to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg
by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we
believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood
between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than
one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in
maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence
such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of
the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he
had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the
proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment
have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of
the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred
while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was
not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to
a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely
to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop
or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side
and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the
horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had
not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with
automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here
confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this
danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract
speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before
them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient
of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against
that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion
born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence
of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or
guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep.,
359) should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held
that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not
constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the
damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other
party. The defendant company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to
assist in transporting iron rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's
yards located not far away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were
hauled along a narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track
gave way by reason of the combined effect of the weight of the car and the
insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid off;
and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the
accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had dislodged one of the
supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company was
negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that the plaintiff
was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in walking
at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that while
the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having
failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the
damages should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the
plaintiff. As will be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an
omission only. The liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the
dangerous condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where
the defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which caused
the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of
the respective parties in order to apportion the damage according to the degree
of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant
was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that
the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense
pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the
action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In
this connection it appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the
plaintiff caused criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the
peace charging the defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones
graves). At the preliminary investigation the defendant was discharged by the
magistrate and the proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal
of the defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the
offense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil liability
arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to express an
opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing the criminal
proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect. (See U. S. vs.
Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the
defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances.
The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical
expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his
apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other
damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as
not to be recoverable. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in
this case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of
the law of negligence as particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule
cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of
the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a
situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will
prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of
the interval of time, and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to
avoid the accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In
other words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in
reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of
the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. Metcalf
[1917], 102 Atl., 330.)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City
finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan
located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He
found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated
portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the
opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano
then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the
right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who
was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo,
causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further
injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened.
Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not
finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead.
Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police
station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio,
Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead
suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available
medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla
issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which
reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of
age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound
was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already
treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle
their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of
Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared
before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman
Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis
and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to
each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno
Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and
not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3,
1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth
General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital,
Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was
caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The
medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the
crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third
Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found
Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was
ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of
the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on
appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to
P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for
new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven
(Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in
the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that
swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a
town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam
which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so
much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the
canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said
canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with
my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late
Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said
Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for
acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used
a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident,
Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the
following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the
natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was
declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from
the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a
period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the
deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was
in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his
death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim
suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there
is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the
wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate
cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And
the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA
43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to
his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly
healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had
not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless
enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found
no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two
weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The
evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the
time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected
with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the
record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following
definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief.
It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp.
185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of
muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only
local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast
majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs
and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a
short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which
increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of
muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As
the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense
and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be
impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central
nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an
onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is
absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus
has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains
adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005;
Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's
body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected
by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound
was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding
Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few
but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death
with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J.
pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal
liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight
physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was
wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier
used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement
where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of
Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also
People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote
cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not
necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No.
74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that
the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities
are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising
from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall
not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining
party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform
under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the
innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by
the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based
solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the
civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the
case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants

of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of
the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of
the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following
order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January
14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the
Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL
OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE
CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN
OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.
(page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored
Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do
not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed
the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own,
that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code
but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist.
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of
the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a
civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was
the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73
Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines
that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence -
even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous.
Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases
of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana
or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high
time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding
or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for
the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject
of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is
precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice
Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the
ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was
enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable
by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes
acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in
the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII
of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable
by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",
(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of
law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow
the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180
is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by
marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa,
Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch
as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of
Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).
Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919.
2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.
3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.
4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary view thus:
"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en cuenta que los lineage.
del precepts contenido en el presente articulo son bastante mas reducidos,
pues no se hallan comprendidos en el todos los datios que pues tener por
causa la culpa o la negligencia.
"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general de la culpa y de la
negligencia. se observe que, tanto en una como en otra de dichas causas, hay
tres generoso o tres especies distintas, a saber:
1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la que results
incumplida una obligacion anteriormente constituida.
2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un dano o perjuicio
que, teniendo su origen en un hecho ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o
falta; y
3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o falta produce
una responsabilidad civil como accesoria de la responsabilidad criminal.
"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es siempre
accesoria de una obligacion principal, cuyo incumplimiento da origen a la
terminos especial de la culpa en materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta
debe harms al examinar cada contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi,
analizando entoces los peculiares efectos de dicha culpa en cada uno de ellos.
"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien, pues no puede
concebirse su existencia sin la de un delicto o falts que la produzca. Es decir,
que solo al lado de la responsabilidad criminal puede supuesto esa
responsabilidad civil y la obligacion proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una
consecuencia de la responsabilidad criminal, y, por consiguente, su examen y
regulacion perusal. al Derecho penal.
"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie de culpa y omisiones
o negligencia que puede ser y es meanwhile.' del presente capitulo, es la
separability, o sea la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin
ningun antecedents contractual, produce un dano o perjuico que tiene su
origen en una accion u omision culpable solo civilmente; as decir, que siendo
ilicita, no reviste sin embargo, los caracteres de un delito o falta por no estar
penada por la ley. Y aun dentro de estos lineage hay que restringir aun mas los
terminos o la materia propria de este articulo, el cual se refiere unicamente a la
culpa o negligencia personates del obligado, pero no a las que prudencia de
actos o de omisiones de persons., distintas de este." (pp. 642-643, Vol. XII,
Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que mas bien se ha
instantaneous, en el criterio de la doctrina full-grown puesto que impone la
obligacion de reparar, el dano causado en virtud de una presuncion juris tecum
de culpa por parte del que tiene bajo su autoridad o dependecia al causante
del daho, derivada del hicimos de no haber puesto el cuidado y la vinculos
debida en los actos de sus subordinados para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es
que, segun el parrafo ultimo del art. 1,903, cesa dicha responsabilidad cuando
se prueba que los obligados por los actos ajenos emplearon toda la diligencia
de un buen padre de familia. Luego no es la causa de la obligacion impuesta la
representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad de que haya quienes responda del
dano causado por el que no tiene personalidad in garantias de specialist. para
responsabilidad por siendo sino el incumplimiento implicito o supuesto de los
deberes de precaucion y de prudencia que impuesta los vinculos civiles que
unicamente al obligado con las persons., por quienes debe representacion, el
mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion entre las que prudencia
de la culpa of negligentj (pp. 670671, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. XII.)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 76965 March 11, 1994
LUIS TAN, WILLIAM S. TAN, JOAQUIN S. TAN and VICENTE S.
TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Br. 52, Manila, and ROSITA B. LIM, in her behalf and as Guardian Ad
Litem of her minor children, JENNIFER, LYSANDER and BEVERLIE, all
surnamed LIMKETKAI, respondents.
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. for petitioners.
Dilag, Blanes, Alvaro, Sillano, Jurado, Cudiamat, Piollo and Basar for Luis S.
Tan.
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for private respondents.
Amadeo D. Seno, collaborating counsel for private respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bitter rivalry in the movie theater industry led tot he slaying of one of the more
prominent citizens of Cagayan de Oro almost twenty (20) year ago. Those
charged for the sensational manslaughter were either convinced or acquitted
by a military court. But the verdict did not put to rest the wounded feelings
spawned by the killing; it merely terminated the criminal prosecution of those
already haled to court.
The problem now before us concerns the civil aspect of the case. Petitioners
claim that the complaint1 filed against them in the trial court has already
prescribed, hence, should be, as it should have been, dismissed by respondent
Judge. On the other hand, private respondents insist that the issue on
prescription may no longer be relitigated on the ground that we have already
resolved the same in G.R. No. 69418, and that assuming that the same may
still be activated, respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss grounded on prescription because
private respondents' cause of action for damage is coterminous with the crime
of murder on which it is based.2
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
denying the motion to dismiss.
Florentino Lim, a scion of the wealthy Limketkai family of Cagayan de Oro City,
was shot dead in his office on 25 August 1973. The Constabulary, the NBI and
the police conducted a joint investigation of the case. As a result, on 17 April
1975, the brothers Luis, William, Joaquin, Vicente, Alfonso and Eusebio, all
surnamed Tan, and Go E Kuan, together with eight (8) others, were charged
with murder, and unlawful possession, control and custody of a
pistol before Military Commission No. 1.3 Incidentally, Alfonso, Eusebio and Go
E Kuan died even before the instant petition could be filed. Thereafter, William
also died.
On 11 June 1976, after trial, Military Commission No. 1. convicted Luis and
Five (5) of his co-accused4 for murder, while the gunman was also found guilty
of illegal possession of firearm.5 The other brothers of Luis were simply
declared "not guilty" in both cases.6
On 11 February 1983, private respondent Rosita B. Lim, together with her
minor children, Jennifer, Lysander and Beverlie, all surnamed Limketkai,
commenced in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a civil action for damages
against all those charged with the slaying of Florentino Lim. 7 The case was
raffled to the sala of respondent Judge David G. Nitafan.
On 10 May 1983, instead of filing an answer, the Tan brothers filled a motion to
dismiss8 contending that venue was improperly laid, and that private
respondents' cause of action was already barred or extinguished by the
acquittal of William, Joaquin, Vicente, Alfonso, Eusebio and Go E Kuan by
Military Commission No. 1. But respondent Judge disagreed and denied
petitioners motion, prompting the latter to elevate the issue to the then
Intermediate Appellant Court (now Court of Appeals) by way
of certiorari,9 which likewise rejected their arguments and denied their plea.
Then they came to this court raising the propriety of the denial of their motion to
dismiss. 10
On 23 May 1984, we dismissed the petition. We ruled that the action for
damages against the convicted defendants was sanctioned by Art. 33 of the
Civil Code which allowed an independent civil action in case of physical injuries,
which include death. We further held that the complaint stated a cause of action
against those acquitted because the Military Commission did not explain the
grounds for their acquittal. After all, it was not under any obligation to do so.
Hence, we concluded, it would be premature to dismiss the civil action against
them. 11
Thereafter, petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. Prescription was not
one of their affirmative defenses.
On 26 July 1984, Mariano Valez, Jr., a co-defendant of petitioners in Civil Case
No. 83-15633, filed a separate motion to dismiss based on prescription and
waiver or abandonment of claim by private respondents. 12 Invoking Escueta v.
Fandialan, 13 Velez argued that the prescriptive period for an independent civil
action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code was four (4) years, and since it took
private respondents almost ten (10) years to file the instant civil action,
prescription had already set in.
On 10 September 1984, with leave of court, petitioners filed an amended
answer adopting the grounds of Velez in his motion to dismiss as additional
affirmative defenses.
On 18 September 1984, respondent Judge denied Velez' motion to dismiss
while noting that petitioners expressly adopted the grounds therein stated. The
motion to reconsider the order of denial, which was again joined in by
petitioners, was likewise denied.
On 21 December 1984, Velez instituted a petition for certiorari 14 questioning
the denial of his motion to dismiss, the second incident to reach this Court
stemming from the civil action for damages. Petitioners did not join Velez in the
petition. On 25 March 1985, in a minute resolution, the court dismissed Velez'
petition. 15
On 16 January 1986, at the pre-trial, petitioners asked for time to file a motion
to dismiss, which the trial court granted purportedly to consider the "intents and
purposes of Section 3 of Rule 20, under which if the Court finds that jurisdiction
is lacking . . . or if the admitted facts and proof show that plaintiff has no cause
of action . . . the Court may render judgment dismissing the case." 16
On 28 January 1986, petitioners filed their motion to dismiss, which merely
reiterated prescription and lack of cause of action as grounds therefor. On 20
March 1986, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss ruling that the
grounds upon which the motion was anchored were "already passed upon
adversely by this Court (trial court) and such adverse rulings were even
affirmed by superior courts . . . ." 17 On 29 July 1986, reconsideration of the
Order of 20 March 1986 was denied.
On 16 January 1987, or almost six (6) months after such denial, petitioners
commenced the present petition for certiorari, the third to emanate from Civil
Case No. 83-15633, moored solely on the ground of prescription. After private
respondents filed their comment, petitioner Luis Tan through counsel filed his
own reply, while William, Joaquin and Vicente, also through counsel, filed
jointly a separate reply particularly introducing another issue, i.e., whether a
civil action for damages filed under Art. 29 of the civil Code 18 can still prosper
against them considering that their acquittal by Military Commission No. 1
simply declared them "not guilty", hence, without any qualification and not
merely based on reasonable doubt. But, this is an issue which was already
resolved in G.R. No. 67029.
Meanwhile, on 22 May 1987, pending resolution of the instant petition, a
decision in the twin cases of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 19 was
promulgated. Therein, through Mr. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, we ruled that
courts martial could not try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
committed by them for as long as the civil courts were open and functioning,
which was the prevailing condition during the period of martial law. Thus,
in Cruz v. Enrile, 20 penned by then Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, now
Chief Justice, we nullified the proceedings against non-political detainees who
were still serving sentence, although they were not immediately released as the
Department of Justice was simply directed to file the corresponding
informations against them in the civil courts.
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice designated a State Prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation of Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 and, if warranted, to
prosecute the case. 21 The State Prosecutor then, without conducting a
reinvestigation, filed two (2) informations, one for illegal possession of
firearm, 22 and another for murder, 23 against the fifteen (15) original accused in
Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro.
On 7 November 1988, the brothers William, Joaquin and Vicente instituted a
petition for certiorari as well as for prohibition before this Court 24 asserting that
the refiling of two (2) informations against them constituted double jeopardy as
they were already acquitted by Military Commission No. 1.
On 18 October 1990, through Mme. Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino,
this Court sustained the position of William, Joaquin and Vicente in
G.R. Nos. 85481-82 and ordered their discharge from the information in Crim.
Case No. 88-825, ruling that the refiling of the informations against the three (3)
brothers who had been acquitted by the military court long before the
promulgation of the Olaguer decision would place them in double jeopardy. 25
With the quashal of the information for murder, private respondents were left
with no recourse but to pursue Civil Case No. 83-15633 pending in the RTC of
Manila. Unfortunately, this case has been hibernating therein for ten (10) years,
the delay being attributable mainly to the tactical maneuvers of petitioners
herein, who are defendants therein.
This petition for certiorari must fail. For, prescription may be effectively place in
a motion to dismiss only if the complaint shows on its face that the action had
already prescribed at the time it was filed. 26 But this is not the situation here.
On the contrary, the applicable prescriptive period in this case is, at most,
dubitable. While petitioners contend that it is four (4) years hence the cause of
action of private respondent already prescribed, the trial court rules that it was
coterminous with the crime so that, in this case where the accused were
charged with murder, the prescriptive period for the offense being twenty (20)
years, the action had not yet prescribed it having been instituted less than ten
(10) years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Be that as it may, in G.R. No. 69418 we already affirmed the ruling of the trial
court that prescription had not yet set in, albeit in a minute resolution. But, it is
axiomatic that when a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for lack
of merit, the challenged decision or order, together with its findings of fact and
legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. 27 Correspondingly, the impression
that no legal rule was enunciated in G.R. No. 69418, 28 as espoused by
petitioners, is wrong and must be corrected. The resolution in G.R.
No. 69418 having already attained finality, it becomes the "law of the case" as
to the issue of prescription, which simply means that if an appellate court has
passed upon a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for
further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court
will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal given the same case
and substantially the same facts. 29 The law of the case, as applied to a former
decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in
refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is necessary to enable
an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would
be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be
litigated anew in the same case upon by any and every subsequent
appeal. 30 Thus, the matter on prescription in the case before us is already a
settled issue, now long dead to be revived. Corollary thereto, the issue of
whether a cause of action exists against petitioners who were acquitted was
already adjudicated in G.R. No. 67029, hence, is now the law of the case, at
least insofar as that issue is concerned.
Petitioners may not have been nominal parties in G.R. No. 69418, for which
reason they claim that res judicata does not lie against them by reason thereof,
they nevertheless took active part in the proceedings before the trial court that
led to the denial of Velez' motion to dismiss by joining him in pleading
prescription as a valid ground for dismissal of the complaint for damages,
having adopted not only the grounds 31 in his motion but those in his motion for
reconsideration as well. 32
In retrospect, petitioners joined movant Velez in his twin motions, one to
dismiss, and the other, for reconsideration, which were both denied by
respondent Judge. We subsequently sustained the denial of both motions.
However, petitioners herein did not join Velez in elevating both orders of denial
to the appellate court. Consequently, as regards petitioners, that early the issue
of prescription was already resolved against them. They can no longer revive
that same issue in this petition as our Resolution in G.R. No. 69418 is already
the law of the case. Indeed, it was only because of the inordinate reverence of
respondent Judge of what he perceived to be the "intents and purposes" of
Sec. 3, Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, hovering nevertheless on grave abuse of
discretion, that the issue of prescription was resuscitated.
Perforce, the finality of our denial of Velez' motion to dismiss, which relied
heavily on prescription, must also apply to petitioners who have joined cause
with Velez on the same issue. Consequently, they are now precluded from
contesting the validity of that denial even on the pretext that what is being
questioned in the instant petition is the denial of their motion to dismiss of
28 January 1986, 33 and not the previous motion of Velez. After all, petitioners
are raising under the same factual backdrop the very issue of prescription as
Velez did in G.R. No. 69418. The less familiar concept or less terminological
usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the
situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as
to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included
therein. 34 And prescription was one of the grounds raised in G.R. No. 69418.
Courts frown upon litigants reiterating identical motions in the hope that they
would entertain a possible change of opinion in the future. 35
Petitioners motion to dismiss made at the pre-trial stage did not contain any
new allegation on lack of jurisdiction or lack of cause of action, which are the
only grounds allowed for such a motion. On the other hand, all the grounds
raised by petitioners were mere reiterations of issues already settled by the trail
court and affirmed in G.R. Nos. 67029 and 69418. Consequently, the only
recourse open to the Court is to dismiss the petition. A contrary ruling of
respondent Judge would have, instead, easily subjected him to certiorari on
grave abuse of discretion for gross disobedience to settled pronouncements of
this Court.
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge, this Petition for Certiorariis DISMISSED. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 52, or whichever branch of the same court this case
may now be assigned, is directed to proceed with the least disposition of Civil
Case No. 83-15633 with the least possible delay. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romeo, Nocon, Melo,
Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur. I also maintain that the civil action, subject matter of the petition, has,
in any event, been timely instituted.
The Civil Code provisions on prescriptive periods are encompassing except
only when there are special laws, or provisions thereof, that exact their own
periods of limitations. Here, of course, I speak of civil obligations regardless of
this source — by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. So
evidently jealous and uncomprising, is the Civil Code on this matter that it has
emphasized, in its Article 1149, that "(a)ll other action whose periods are not
fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the
time the right of action accrues."
It would seem to me that between the prescriptive periods under the Civil Code
for bringing a civil action, on the one hand, and the prescription of felonies
under the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, there is, as regards civil
liability aspects, hardly any choice, I submit, but to accept the preponderance of
the Civil Code on the issue. I would see to it to be a disturbing development to
attempt an equation of one with the other, let alone to apply one by legal
implication absent the other. Whereas, the statute of limitations on felonies is,
by and large, made to depend on the gravity of the offense and the penalty
imposed, the prescriptive periods under the Civil Code, upon the other hand,
have been structured to weigh in so many other varied factors as, to cite a few,
the nature of the action, the status of the parties, the subject matter involved,
the aspect of the issue, the right that is violated, the manner of breach, the
degree of liability and the extent of injury or damage, all calculated to ensure
with reason the timely invocation of rights and of defenses in civil litigations.
Looking at the petition, is the Civil Code devoid of any specific period of
prescription to cover the case? I propose to answer it in the negative.
Firstly, we have Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which provides for a
10-year statutory limitation on actions upon obligations created by law. A
perfect example is the civil liability that the law attaches to the commission of
felonies under the Revised Penal Code when it categorically expresses that a
person liable for a felony is likewise civilly liable (Art. 100). This Code thus
gives correlatively a civil right of action in favor of an aggrieved party or, in
proper cases, of his successors in interest but, take note, only when the
offending party is made liable for the felony.
Secondly, we have Article 1146 of the same Civil Code, expressing a four-year
prescriptive limitation in two instances: (1) "(u)pon an injury to the right of the
plaintiff," referring more accurately than not to a violation of rights personal or
proprietary to the plaintiff, which incidentally is not the situation at hand, and (2)
"(u)pon a quasi-delict." Let me elaborate a little on the latter.
The Civil Code on quasi-delicts, among other things, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a
quasi-delict.
Based on the above statutory provisions, a quasi-delict would then be an
extra-contractual relation that the law ordains whenever one, by act or omission,
cause damage to another, there being fault or negligence. The concept covers,
said the Supreme Court in Elcano vs. Hill (77 SCRA 98), not only acts not
punishable by law but also those punishable whether intentional and voluntary
or
negligent. Somehow, this broad and sweeping statement has unfortunately
given rise to a number of misconceptions. Subsequent unqualified
pronouncements, particularly to the effect that where negligence is punishable
under the Penal Code the responsibility for quasi-delict is separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from the felony (Art. 2177, Civil Code; Joseph vs.
Bautista, G.R. L-41423, 23 February 1989; Bermudez vs. Hon. Hererra,
L-32055,
26 February 1988; Andamo vs. IAC, G.R. 74761, 6 Nov. 1990; Gula vs. Dianala,
L-40308, 28 September 1984), have it seems, compounded the matter even
further.
The broad concept of quasi-delict has evidently been purposely structured in
order to render actionable any wrongful act or omission, causing damage to
another, that would not otherwise be actionable under any of the other stated
sources of obligation — law, contracts, quasi-contracts and delicts — and thus
ensure that appropriate relief can be sought. It has not been intended, however,
that quasi-delict should predominate over such other sources of obligations
where, in fact, the applicability of such other sources is clearly
on hand; otherwise, the specific distinctions in law — substantive and
procedural — in the governance of these various kinds of obligations could very
well be reduced to great insignificance.
The Report of the Code Commission is enlightening.
A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a careful
deliberation, it was agreed to use the terms "quasi-delict" for those obligations
which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses.
They are known in Spanish legal treatises as "culpa aquiliana",
"culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delitos". The phrase
"culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-contractual fault" was
eliminated because it did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations.
"Aquiliana fault" might have been selected, but it was thought inadvisable to
refer to so ancient a law as the "lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delicts" was chosen,
which more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations
and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.
The Commission also, thought of the possibility of adopting the word "tort" from
Anglo-American Law. But "tort" under that system is much broader than the
Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual
negligence. "Tort" in Anglo-American jurisdiction includes not only negligence,
but also intentional criminal acts such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system,
intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although
certain exceptions are made in the Project . . . .
Prescinding from the rule that "(o)bligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties . . ." (Article 1159, Civil Code), the
existence of a contract will ordinarily bar an intrusion of specific provisions of
law but, of course, only to the extent that the latter would be opposed to the
specific areas validly and adequately covered by contractual stipulations. The
provisions of breach of contract. In matters, however, not provided for by the
parties themselves, the deficiency undisputably can be governed by the
general provisions of the Civil Code. That there is a contractual relation
between parties will not thereby necessarily militate against the application of
the rules on quasi-delict which, at times, can indeed be the very act or omission
that breaches the agreement. In such exceptional instances, the principles laid
down for quasi-delicts can also govern (see Singson vs. Bank of P.I., 23 SCRA
1117;
Air France vs. Carrasco, 18 SCRA 115; Philippine Air Lines vs. Court of
Appeals, 106 SCRA 143).
The same principle applies to acts or omissions punishable by law. When such
law likewise prescribes specifically a civil liability on the offender, such as that
found in the Revised Penal Code (Article 100 — Article 113, inclusive), the
obligation is thereby deemed to have arisen from "delict" within the meaning of
Article 1157 of the Civil Code in defining the sources of obligation, and in
relation to Article 1144 thereof, the prescriptive period would be ten years. In
the absence, however, of any declaration of civil liability in the law penalizing an
act or omission, like in certain special laws, or, in the case of felonies under the
Revised Penal Code, when an accused is acquitted of the felony for which he is
charged because of a failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
liability may still be warranted not or no longer, however, on the basis of delict
(since none can still be said to exist) but, as a rule and only if the
facts warrant, on quasi-delict as being itself a source of obligation under
paragraph (5) of Article 1157 of the Civil Code, but, in this latter case, the
prescriptive period would be four years conformably with Art. 1146 of the said
Code.
Does it mean then, that the aggrieved party should await a conviction for the
felonious act if he desires to base his action on delict? Not necessarily. The
complaint may, as a matter of alternative choice, either allow the civil case to
be taken up together with the criminal case or institute a separate civil action on
the basis of quasi-delict under what correctly is its broad concept. There being
no conviction, however, the applicable prescriptive period would be four years.
There are specific instances, however, when the conviction of the offender for a
felony would not be required in order to enable an aggrieved party to sue on the
basis of delict. Examples of such cases are those so declared by the Civil Code
as defamation, fraud and physical injuries (Article 33, Civil Code), including for
obvious reasons the more serious offenses of murder and homicide, where a
mere preponderance of evidence would also suffice to warrant the imposition of
civil liability. In these instances, where the civil liability is declared even without
the need for conviction of the offender, Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing
for a 10-year statutory limitation can then govern.
In resume, I submit, as follows:
General Proposition — The Civil Code on civil actions is a complete law on
prescriptive periods, and these periods apply except when provided otherwise
by special laws.
Specific Propositions —
(a) Absent any period specifically set out by the Civil Code on particular causes
of action, the 5-year statutory limitation prescribed in Article 1149 of the Civil
Code applies.
Article 1149. All other actions whose period are not fixed in this Code or in other
laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
(b) In the case of felonies (acts or omissions punishable by the Revised Penal
Code) —
(1) The Civil liability prescribes in ten years if the offender is found to
be liable for the offense. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code renders the
offender civilly liable only when he, in effect, is found guilty. Such civil liability,
being an obligation explicitly created by law, Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
prescribing a 10-year prescriptive period, would apply.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Exceptionally, civil liability may arise even without the accused being found
guilty of the felony. A good example, apropos the instant case, is Article 33 of
the Civil Code.
Article 33. In cases of defamation fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Obviously the term "physical injuries" includes cases when, as a result of those
injuries, the victim dies. In the above instances, the civil liability, being an
obligation created by law (that does not require the offender to be convicted),
the prescriptive period would be ten years (Art. 1144, Civil Code, supra.)
(2) When, in general (e.g., those not falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code),
an accused is acquitted of a felony, it may still be possible, subject to the
provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, for the complainant to file a civil action
for damages, based, not on "delict", but on quasi-delict, which is another
source of obligation under Article 1157 (5) of the Civil Code. Here, however, the
prescriptive period would be four years.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon a injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict.
Accordingly, the civil action in the case at bench against the petitioners, who
were all indicted for murder, being one of the exceptional; cases covered by
Article 33 of the Civil Code, must be held to have been filed seasonably, i.e.,
within the prescriptive period of ten years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition also on the above grounds.
QUIASON, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Josue N. Bellosillo that respondent Judge
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
of petitioners in Civil Case No. 83-15633 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
The motion to dismiss was based on the grounds that the civil action for
damages arising from the murder of Florentino Lim filed on February 11, 1983,
more than nine years after the incident, had prescribed.
Previously, Mariano Velez, Jr., a co-defendant of petitioners, filed a motion to
dismiss also on the grounds of prescription. Petitioners, after amending their
answers to include prescription as a defense, adopted Velez' motion. When
respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss, Velez filed with us a petition
for certiorari (G.R. No. 69418). We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution
dated March 25, 1985. Respondent Judge, therefore, cannot be faulted for
denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners, considering our minute
resolution in G.R. No. 69418.
Be it noted, however, that our resolution in G.R. No. 69418 never made any
finding that the civil action filed against petitioners had prescribed. The
resolution merely conformed to the procedural rules: (a) that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and unappealable; and (b) that certiorari does
not lie against such order of denial in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.
Petitioners can still appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss but
only when they appeal from the decision on the merits of the case.
I would have ended my discourse with the foregoing observations were it not
for the thesis of Justice Jose C. Vitug in his concurring opinion that the action in
Civil Case No. 83-015633 has not yet prescribed. I do not agree with his
stance.
The petition raises a novel question: When does the civil action for damages
arising from murder, which is filed independently of the criminal action,
prescribe?
It is a pity that the Court did not delve into the merits of the petition but preferred
to resolve it on procedural points.
I have made a study of the legal problem and I have come to the conclusion
that the action in Civil case No. 83-15633 has prescribed.
The Civil Code of the Philippines specifies the sources of obligation, thus:
(1) Law;
(2) Contract;
(3) Quasi-Contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punishable by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts (Art. 1157).
The Civil Code also specifically provides that:
(A) The prescription of action based on obligations created by law [1] and
contracts [2] is ten years (Art. 1144);
(B) The prescription of actions based on quasi-contract [3] prescribes in six
years (Art. 1145); and
(C) The prescription of civil actions based on quasi-delict [5] prescribes in four
years (Art. 1146).
Except for civil actions based defamation (Art. 1147), the Civil Code of the
Philippines does not specifically provide for a prescriptive period for obligations
arising from delict [4]. However there is the catch-all provision of Article 1149,
which provides that:
All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must
be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
The conclusion is irresistible that the civil action in Civil Case No. 83-15633
prescribed in five years.
Certainly, the prescriptive period cannot be ten-years. To justify a ten-year
prescriptive period, one has to show that the obligation falls within the purview
of Article 1144, the only provision in the entire Civil Code which specifies a
ten-year prescriptive period.
The civil action cannot be considered as "an obligation created by law" under
Article 1159 because the Civil Code itself has specified category for obligations
arising from delict and that is in item 4 of Article 1157 or "Acts or omissions
punishable by law".
Escueta v. Fadialan, 61 SCRA 275 [1974] provided the lodestar to guide us in
arriving at a safe harbor for our views. In said case, we ruled that the
prescriptive period for a civil action for damages arising from physical injuries is
four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, being an
injury to the rights of plaintiff. The victim of the criminal act was the plaintiff
himself; hence he instituted the action to recover damages for an injury to his
own rights. It is markworthy that we did not classify the action for damages
arising from physical injuries as one based on an "obligation created by law."
The provisions of Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines are irrelevant to
the issue and should not be brought into play. Said article merely provides a
rule of procedure and cannot be the source of an obligation, much less
prescribed a law on prescriptions.
Article 33 was adopted as an exception to the general rules in criminal
procedure that the criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately but after the criminal action has been commenced, the
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action (1940 Rules of Court, Rule 107, Sec. 1 [b]), and that after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whether stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has been
rendered (1940 Rule of Court, Rule 107, Sec. 1 [c]).
The substantive law provision that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable therefor" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 100) assumes that both
the criminal and civil liabilities are filed within the prescriptive period for each
action.
The action liability arises from the commission or omission of the acts punished
by law and not from the prior conviction of the accused.
The civil liability of the accused and consequently the indemnity, which he may
be sentenced to pay to the offended party, cannot be regarded as part of the
penalty provided for the offense charged (U.S. v. Heary, 25 Phil. 600). The
indemnity for damages in a criminal action, being purely civil in nature, is
independent of the penalties imposed for the criminal act (Quiming v. De la
Rosa, 67 Phil. 40 O.G. 1st. Supp. (No. 3) p. 85, 67 Phil. 406).
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur. I also maintain that the civil action, subject matter of the petition, has,
in any event, been timely instituted.
The Civil Code provisions on prescriptive periods are encompassing except
only when there are special laws, or provisions thereof, that exact their own
periods of limitations. Here, of course, I speak of civil obligations regardless of
this source — by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. So
evidently jealous and uncomprising, is the Civil Code on this matter that it has
emphasized, in its Article 1149, that "(a)ll other action whose periods are not
fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the
time the right of action accrues."
It would seem to me that between the prescriptive periods under the Civil Code
for bringing a civil action, on the one hand, and the prescription of felonies
under the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, there is, as regards civil
liability aspects, hardly any choice, I submit, but to accept the preponderance of
the Civil Code on the issue. I would see to it to be a disturbing development to
attempt an equation of one with the other, let alone to apply one by legal
implication absent the other. Whereas, the statute of limitations on felonies is,
by and large, made to depend on the gravity of the offense and the penalty
imposed, the prescriptive periods under the Civil Code, upon the other hand,
have been structured to weigh in so many other varied factors as, to cite a few,
the nature of the action, the status of the parties, the subject matter involved,
the aspect of the issue, the right that is violated, the manner of breach, the
degree of liability and the extent of injury or damage, all calculated to ensure
with reason the timely invocation of rights and of defenses in civil litigations.
Looking at the petition, is the Civil Code devoid of any specific period of
prescription to cover the case? I propose to answer it in the negative.
Firstly, we have Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which provides for a
10-year statutory limitation on actions upon obligations created by law. A
perfect example is the civil liability that the law attaches to the commission of
felonies under the Revised Penal Code when it categorically expresses that a
person liable for a felony is likewise civilly liable (Art. 100). This Code thus
gives correlatively a civil right of action in favor of an aggrieved party or, in
proper cases, of his successors in interest but, take note, only when the
offending party is made liable for the felony.
Secondly, we have Article 1146 of the same Civil Code, expressing a four-year
prescriptive limitation in two instances: (1) "(u)pon an injury to the right of the
plaintiff," referring more accurately than not to a violation of rights personal or
proprietary to the plaintiff, which incidentally is not the situation at hand, and (2)
"(u)pon a quasi-delict." Let me elaborate a little on the latter.
The Civil Code on quasi-delicts, among other things, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a
quasi-delict.
Based on the above statutory provisions, a quasi-delict would then be an
extra-contractual relation that the law ordains whenever one, by act or omission,
cause damage to another, there being fault or negligence. The concept covers,
said the Supreme Court in Elcano vs. Hill (77 SCRA 98), not only acts not
punishable by law but also those punishable whether intentional and voluntary
or
negligent. Somehow, this broad and sweeping statement has unfortunately
given rise to a number of misconceptions. Subsequent unqualified
pronouncements, particularly to the effect that where negligence is punishable
under the Penal Code the responsibility for quasi-delict is separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from the felony (Art. 2177, Civil Code; Joseph vs.
Bautista, G.R. L-41423, 23 February 1989; Bermudez vs. Hon. Hererra,
L-32055,
26 February 1988; Andamo vs. IAC, G.R. 74761, 6 Nov. 1990; Gula vs. Dianala,
L-40308, 28 September 1984), have it seems, compounded the matter even
further.
The broad concept of quasi-delict has evidently been purposely structured in
order to render actionable any wrongful act or omission, causing damage to
another, that would not otherwise be actionable under any of the other stated
sources of obligation — law, contracts, quasi-contracts and delicts — and thus
ensure that appropriate relief can be sought. It has not been intended, however,
that quasi-delict should predominate over such other sources of obligations
where, in fact, the applicability of such other sources is clearly
on hand; otherwise, the specific distinctions in law — substantive and
procedural — in the governance of these various kinds of obligations could very
well be reduced to great insignificance.
The Report of the Code Commission is enlightening.
A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a careful
deliberation, it was agreed to use the terms "quasi-delict" for those obligations
which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses.
They are known in Spanish legal treatises as "culpa aquiliana",
"culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delitos". The phrase
"culpa-extra-contractual" or its translation "extra-contractual fault" was
eliminated because it did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations.
"Aquiliana fault" might have been selected, but it was thought inadvisable to
refer to so ancient a law as the "lex Aquilia". So "quasi-delicts" was chosen,
which more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations
and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.
The Commission also, thought of the possibility of adopting the word "tort" from
Anglo-American Law. But "tort" under that system is much broader than the
Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual
negligence. "Tort" in Anglo-American jurisdiction includes not only negligence,
but also intentional criminal acts such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system,
intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although
certain exceptions are made in the Project . . . .
Prescinding from the rule that "(o)bligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties . . ." (Article 1159, Civil Code), the
existence of a contract will ordinarily bar an intrusion of specific provisions of
law but, of course, only to the extent that the latter would be opposed to the
specific areas validly and adequately covered by contractual stipulations. The
provisions of breach of contract. In matters, however, not provided for by the
parties themselves, the deficiency undisputably can be governed by the
general provisions of the Civil Code. That there is a contractual relation
between parties will not thereby necessarily militate against the application of
the rules on quasi-delict which, at times, can indeed be the very act or omission
that breaches the agreement. In such exceptional instances, the principles laid
down for quasi-delicts can also govern (see Singson vs. Bank of P.I., 23 SCRA
1117;
Air France vs. Carrasco, 18 SCRA 115; Philippine Air Lines vs. Court of
Appeals, 106 SCRA 143).
The same principle applies to acts or omissions punishable by law. When such
law likewise prescribes specifically a civil liability on the offender, such as that
found in the Revised Penal Code (Article 100 — Article 113, inclusive), the
obligation is thereby deemed to have arisen from "delict" within the meaning of
Article 1157 of the Civil Code in defining the sources of obligation, and in
relation to Article 1144 thereof, the prescriptive period would be ten years. In
the absence, however, of any declaration of civil liability in the law penalizing an
act or omission, like in certain special laws, or, in the case of felonies under the
Revised Penal Code, when an accused is acquitted of the felony for which he is
charged because of a failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
liability may still be warranted not or no longer, however, on the basis of delict
(since none can still be said to exist) but, as a rule and only if the
facts warrant, on quasi-delict as being itself a source of obligation under
paragraph (5) of Article 1157 of the Civil Code, but, in this latter case, the
prescriptive period would be four years conformably with Art. 1146 of the said
Code.
Does it mean then, that the aggrieved party should await a conviction for the
felonious act if he desires to base his action on delict? Not necessarily. The
complaint may, as a matter of alternative choice, either allow the civil case to
be taken up together with the criminal case or institute a separate civil action on
the basis of quasi-delict under what correctly is its broad concept. There being
no conviction, however, the applicable prescriptive period would be four years.
There are specific instances, however, when the conviction of the offender for a
felony would not be required in order to enable an aggrieved party to sue on the
basis of delict. Examples of such cases are those so declared by the Civil Code
as defamation, fraud and physical injuries (Article 33, Civil Code), including for
obvious reasons the more serious offenses of murder and homicide, where a
mere preponderance of evidence would also suffice to warrant the imposition of
civil liability. In these instances, where the civil liability is declared even without
the need for conviction of the offender, Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing
for a 10-year statutory limitation can then govern.
In resume, I submit, as follows:
General Proposition — The Civil Code on civil actions is a complete law on
prescriptive periods, and these periods apply except when provided otherwise
by special laws.
Specific Propositions —
(a) Absent any period specifically set out by the Civil Code on particular causes
of action, the 5-year statutory limitation prescribed in Article 1149 of the Civil
Code applies.
Article 1149. All other actions whose period are not fixed in this Code or in other
laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
(b) In the case of felonies (acts or omissions punishable by the Revised Penal
Code) —
(1) The Civil liability prescribes in ten years if the offender is found to
be liable for the offense. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code renders the
offender civilly liable only when he, in effect, is found guilty. Such civil liability,
being an obligation explicitly created by law, Article 1144 of the Civil Code,
prescribing a 10-year prescriptive period, would apply.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Exceptionally, civil liability may arise even without the accused being found
guilty of the felony. A good example, apropos the instant case, is Article 33 of
the Civil Code.
Article 33. In cases of defamation fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Obviously the term "physical injuries" includes cases when, as a result of those
injuries, the victim dies. In the above instances, the civil liability, being an
obligation created by law (that does not require the offender to be convicted),
the prescriptive period would be ten years (Art. 1144, Civil Code, supra.)
(2) When, in general (e.g., those not falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code),
an accused is acquitted of a felony, it may still be possible, subject to the
provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, for the complainant to file a civil action
for damages, based, not on "delict", but on quasi-delict, which is another
source of obligation under Article 1157 (5) of the Civil Code. Here, however, the
prescriptive period would be four years.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon a injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict.
Accordingly, the civil action in the case at bench against the petitioners, who
were all indicted for murder, being one of the exceptional; cases covered by
Article 33 of the Civil Code, must be held to have been filed seasonably, i.e.,
within the prescriptive period of ten years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition also on the above grounds.
QUIASON, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Josue N. Bellosillo that respondent Judge
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
of petitioners in Civil Case No. 83-15633 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
The motion to dismiss was based on the grounds that the civil action for
damages arising from the murder of Florentino Lim filed on February 11, 1983,
more than nine years after the incident, had prescribed.
Previously, Mariano Velez, Jr., a co-defendant of petitioners, filed a motion to
dismiss also on the grounds of prescription. Petitioners, after amending their
answers to include prescription as a defense, adopted Velez' motion. When
respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss, Velez filed with us a petition
for certiorari (G.R. No. 69418). We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution
dated March 25, 1985. Respondent Judge, therefore, cannot be faulted for
denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners, considering our minute
resolution in G.R. No. 69418.
Be it noted, however, that our resolution in G.R. No. 69418 never made any
finding that the civil action filed against petitioners had prescribed. The
resolution merely conformed to the procedural rules: (a) that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and unappealable; and (b) that certiorari does
not lie against such order of denial in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.
Petitioners can still appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss but
only when they appeal from the decision on the merits of the case.
I would have ended my discourse with the foregoing observations were it not
for the thesis of Justice Jose C. Vitug in his concurring opinion that the action in
Civil Case No. 83-015633 has not yet prescribed. I do not agree with his
stance.
The petition raises a novel question: When does the civil action for damages
arising from murder, which is filed independently of the criminal action,
prescribe?
It is a pity that the Court did not delve into the merits of the petition but preferred
to resolve it on procedural points.
I have made a study of the legal problem and I have come to the conclusion
that the action in Civil case No. 83-15633 has prescribed.
The Civil Code of the Philippines specifies the sources of obligation, thus:
(1) Law;
(2) Contract;
(3) Quasi-Contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punishable by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts (Art. 1157).
The Civil Code also specifically provides that:
(A) The prescription of action based on obligations created by law [1] and
contracts [2] is ten years (Art. 1144);
(B) The prescription of actions based on quasi-contract [3] prescribes in six
years (Art. 1145); and
(C) The prescription of civil actions based on quasi-delict [5] prescribes in four
years (Art. 1146).
Except for civil actions based defamation (Art. 1147), the Civil Code of the
Philippines does not specifically provide for a prescriptive period for obligations
arising from delict [4]. However there is the catch-all provision of Article 1149,
which provides that:
All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must
be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
The conclusion is irresistible that the civil action in Civil Case No. 83-15633
prescribed in five years.
Certainly, the prescriptive period cannot be ten-years. To justify a ten-year
prescriptive period, one has to show that the obligation falls within the purview
of Article 1144, the only provision in the entire Civil Code which specifies a
ten-year prescriptive period.
The civil action cannot be considered as "an obligation created by law" under
Article 1159 because the Civil Code itself has specified category for obligations
arising from delict and that is in item 4 of Article 1157 or "Acts or omissions
punishable by law".
Escueta v. Fadialan, 61 SCRA 275 [1974] provided the lodestar to guide us in
arriving at a safe harbor for our views. In said case, we ruled that the
prescriptive period for a civil action for damages arising from physical injuries is
four years under Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, being an
injury to the rights of plaintiff. The victim of the criminal act was the plaintiff
himself; hence he instituted the action to recover damages for an injury to his
own rights. It is markworthy that we did not classify the action for damages
arising from physical injuries as one based on an "obligation created by law."
The provisions of Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines are irrelevant to
the issue and should not be brought into play. Said article merely provides a
rule of procedure and cannot be the source of an obligation, much less
prescribed a law on prescriptions.
Article 33 was adopted as an exception to the general rules in criminal
procedure that the criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately but after the criminal action has been commenced, the
civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action (1940 Rules of Court, Rule 107, Sec. 1 [b]), and that after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whether stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has been
rendered (1940 Rule of Court, Rule 107, Sec. 1 [c]).
The substantive law provision that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable therefor" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 100) assumes that both
the criminal and civil liabilities are filed within the prescriptive period for each
action.
The action liability arises from the commission or omission of the acts punished
by law and not from the prior conviction of the accused.
The civil liability of the accused and consequently the indemnity, which he may
be sentenced to pay to the offended party, cannot be regarded as part of the
penalty provided for the offense charged (U.S. v. Heary, 25 Phil. 600). The
indemnity for damages in a criminal action, being purely civil in nature, is
independent of the penalties imposed for the criminal act (Quiming v. De la
Rosa, 67 Phil. 40 O.G. 1st. Supp. (No. 3) p. 85, 67 Phil. 406).
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.
# Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 83-15633 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
2 This is a Petition for Certiorari of the 20 March 1986 Order (Annex "C",
petition) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 52, denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss as well as the 29 July 1986 Order (Annex "E", Petition)
denying reconsideration. This case was transferred to ponente from the Third
Division on 13 May 1992. v. McNair, 413 NE 2d 606, cited in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., pp.,
3 Docketed as Crim. Case No. MC-1-67. 886-887.
4 Marciano Benemerito, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio 30 Ramos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72686, 8 March 1989, 171
Ocasiones and Leopoldo Nicolas. SCRA 93.
5 Marciano Benemerito. 31 Annex "3", Comment, p. 3.
6 A military tribunal, unlike a regular court of justice, is not required to make a 32 Annex "4", Comment, p. 1.
detailed finding of fact and conclusion of law; nor does it possess jurisdiction to 33 Annex "B", Petition.
award civil damages. 34 Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, 22 April
7 The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge David G. Nitafan, RTC, 1992, 208 SCRA 215.
Br. 52, Manila. 35 Medran v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil 165 (1949).
8 Annex "C", Petition, p. 2.
9 Docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 01583.
10 Docketed as G.R. No. 67029.
11 Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 67029, 24 May 1984, Second
Division, Minute Resolution.
12 Annex "2", Comment.
13 No. L-39675, 29 November 1974, 61 SCRA 279.
14 Docketed as G.R. No. 69418.
15 Annex "5", Comment; Rollo, p. 82.
16 See Note 6, p. 1.
17 Referring to then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. SP No. 01583
and the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 67029 and 69418; See Note 7, p. 7.
18 Art, 29 provides: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious . . . If in a
criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground."
19 G.R. Nos. 54558 and 69882, 22 May 1987, 150 SCRA 144.
20 G.R. No. 75983, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 700.
21 Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, 18 October, 190 SCRA 686.
22 Docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824.
23 Docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825.
24 Docketed as G.R. Nos. 85481-82.
25 See Note 19.
26 Francisco v. Robles, 94 Phil, 1035 (1954).
27 Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990, 186 SCRA 1.
28 Rollo, pp. 93-94.
29 Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 61 Mich App 62, 232 NW 2d 302, and Hinds