Persons and Family Relations Law

Lorenzo Tanada vs. Juan Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985

Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided
on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force
and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request
for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2
of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issue: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

Held: Yes, publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Supreme Court
has ruled that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” solely refers to the fifteen day period and not to the
requirement of publication. Publication is an indispensable requisite the absence of which will not render the
law effective. Thus, a person cannot be convicted for violating a law that was not published since the law
requires that a law must be published to become effective.

In the matter of the adoption of Elizabeth Mira, Gilbert Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm vs. Republic,
G.R. No., L-18566, 30 September 1963

Facts: Brehm is temporary assigned in Subic Bay as a U.S Navy. He married Ester Mira on October 9, 1958.
On January 28, 1959 they filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) for the
adoption of the child named Elizabeth Mira which is a daughter of Ester Mira with the other man. The court
notice that Brehm testified his residence in the Philippines was merely temporary same being effective only for
the purpose of his tour of duty with the U.S Navy, thus disqualifying him from making an adoption under Art.
335 (4) New Civil Code that the court has no jurisdiction over him. But they said that Art. 335 is not
applicable because the adoption under par. 3, Art. 338 of the Civil Code which expressly authorized the
adoption of a step-child by a step-father that he will be intend to reside in the Philippines after his tour of duty
with the U.S Naval Force.

Issue: Whether Brehm, not being permanent resident of the Philippines is qualified to adopt Elizabeth Mira?

Held: No, because the adoption under par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code of the Philippines, which states —The
following may be adopted:

(1) The natural child by the natural father

(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother

(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.

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Hence, the above article was connected with Art.335 (4) of the New Civil Code of the Philippines; Sec.2, Rule
100;Rules of Court: “Non-resident alien”, that the court has no jurisdiction over him since he previously
testified his residence in the Philippines was merely temporary same being effective only for the purpose of his
tour of duty with the U.S and it is therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and
is couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated.
Therefore, Art.5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is applicable on this case because it states that “Acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.”

D. M. Consunji Inc. vs. CA and Maria Juego, G.R. No. 137873, 20 April 2001

Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely
inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Jose Juego’s
widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the
choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy
chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant
who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil
Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

Issue: Whether the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil Code because she
already availed damages under the Labor Code.

Held: No, the widow, Maria Juego is not barred from availing death benefits. In Floresca case, ruled that a
claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of
action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she
already had. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Here, There is no showing that private
respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary,
private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights Thus, a claimant may still recover both from
Workmen Compensation Act and remedies from Civil Code since it is not deemed waived he is not aware of
the existence of such right.

People vs. Procoro J. Donato and Rodolfo Salas, G.R. No. 79269, 5 June 1991

Facts: On October 2, 1986, Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog” was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was
charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the
Writ of Habeas Corpus (WoHC). A conference was held thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was later agreed
upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for
the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the
parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail
and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the
prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to
bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.

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Issue: Whether the private respondent has the right to bail

Held: No, the respondent has no right to bail. The Supreme Court ruled that before conviction, bail is either a
matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, Rebellion is punishable by
Reclusion Perpetua. The Court further held that rights guaranteed by a statute or the Constitution maybe
waived, except when such waiver is in derogation of a statutory right and it infringes the rights of others. Thus,
a person who has waived his right to bail cannot avail anymore the benefit of right to bail.

National Marketing Corporation (Namarco) vs. Miguel Tecson, G.R. No. L-29131, 27 August 1969

Facts: December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint on the same court, as successor
of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955,
Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Tecson). Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint
upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action. More than ten
years have passed. Plaintiff forgot that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was
filed it was filed two days too late. The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regard to article 13
of the civil code. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment “must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues,” the issue thus confined to the date on which ten
years from December 21, 1955 had expired. However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same
“is erroneous because a year means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year,
December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. The case reached its conclusion with the
appellant’s theory that contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.

Issue: Whether the action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute limitations.

Held: Yes, the action for revival of judgment is already barred by statute limitation. The Civil Code computes
years in terms of 365 days each. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of
the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final.” Here, the
decision was received on December 21, 1955 and revival was filed on December 21, 1965. Thus, the action has
prescribed on December 19, 1965, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the
computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.

Tibajia vs. CA and Go, G.R. No. 82193, 6 February 1991

Facts: In an auction sale held on April 12, 1985, herein private respondent Aileen Go acquired the parcels of
land as the highest bidder for the amount of P330, 500.00. A certificate of sale was issued and registered with
the Register of Deeds of Pasay on April 15, 1985. On April 2, 1986, herein petitioner Aurora Vito, sister of
petitioner Norberto Tibajia, Jr., claiming to be a co-owner of the properties sold offered to redeem the same in
her own capacity as well as in her capacity as representative of her co-petitioner. The Clerk of Court and Ex-
officio Sheriff of Rizal, allowed the redemption and she paid the sum of P369,994.20 and a percentage fee in
the sum of P3,751.90 both dated April 2, 1986 and in the name of Norberto Tibajia. On April 14, 1986, upon
learning of the offer to redeem by petitioner Aurora Vito, private respondent Aileen Go filed a "Manifestation
and Motion" opposing the offer to redeem on the ground that she was not the judgment debtor or among
those authorized to effect redemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and further, the tender was not
addressed to the proper party specified under the Rules, which is the purchaser. In an ex-parte motion,
received by the Court on April 18, 1986, Aileen Go prayed for the issuance of a final deed of sale as the 12
months redemption period had already expired and no valid redemption had been made by the judgment
debtors. Aurora Vito filed an opposition thereto, maintaining that she is a co-owner of the properties subject

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matter of the action; that she offered to redeem the same in her own capacity as well as in her capacity as
representative of her co-petitioners; and that she is qualified to exercise the right of redemption as provided
for in Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and under Article 1620 of the Civil Code. At the hearing of the
incidents on April 24, 1986, Aurora Vito informed the court that she was authorized by her co-petitioners to
redeem, as per special power of attorney allegedly executed in New York on April 16, 1986, xerox copy of
which was submitted to the court on May 2, 1986. On the other hand, it is the position of private respondent
Aileen Go that the 360 days from the registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds on April
15, 1985 had expired on April 10, 1986.

Issue: Whether the redemption should be given a due course

Held: Yes, the redemption should be given due course. The Supreme Court ruled that redemption is allowed
under Article 1620 and Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The rule says 12 months, not one year. Here,
the certificate was issued and registered on April 15, 1985 and the redemption amount was paid on April 2,
1986. Thus, the redemption has not prescribed since the rule says 12 months which is 360 days.

Garcia vs. Recio, G.R. No.138322, 2 October 2001

Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal
on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued
purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January
12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,
Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only
in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

Issue: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

Held: Yes, the nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce
decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it
was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

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Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial
evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the
ground of bigamy.

Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were
married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the
U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his wife
had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with
the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to
remarry. The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue
of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue: Whether Cipriano can be allowed to remarry

Held: No, Cipriano cannot be allowed to remarry. The Supreme Court ruled that the reckoning point is not
the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. However, we note that the
records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence. Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Here, the respondent failed to show documents to prove his allegations. Thus, Cirprian
cannot be allowedto remarry since he was not able to show documents to prove his allegations.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA and Tobias, g G.R. NO. 81262, 25 August 1989

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T.
Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report,
Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias
returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie
detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation.
Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector
tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief
Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed. Tobias received a notice of termination
of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with
the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias
was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering

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petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the petitioners are liable for damages

Held: Yes, the petitioners are liable for damages. The Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told
Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail;
his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias
(“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe
Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All
these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused
with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant
case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. CA and Eugenio Baltao, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993

Facts: In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson)
delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the
mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific Banking
Corporation Check in the amount of P2, 575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. However,
upon presentment, the check was dishonoured for reason of account closed. Records of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) revealed that the owner of the check was Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an
extrajudicial demand against Baltao to make good of the check. The latter denied of issuing any check and
transacting any business with Albenson. Albenson then charged Baltao for violating BP 22. It appears however
that Eugenio Baltao has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L.
Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very
same business address of Guaranteed. The respondent averred that he was not given the opportunity to be
heard in the preliminary investigation. Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for
allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of
P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.

Issue: Whether the petitioner, Albenson, abused its right when it filed a case against Baltao.

Held: No, Albenson did not abuse its right when it filed a case against Baltao. The elements of abuse of right
under Article 19 of the Civil Code are 1.) There is a legal right or duty; 2.) Which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that
the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment
thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to
petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in the same building — he and his son
Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing
check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the

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complaint before the provincial fiscal. Thus, Albenson should not be found guilty of abuse of right when it
filed a case against Baltao since the former was in good faith in filing the complaint.

Sps. Custodio vs. CA and Pacifico Mabasa, G.R. No. 116100, 9 February 1996

Facts: Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One of the
tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first
passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence
and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the
trial court and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the
punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue: Whether Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way.

Held: Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is
usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his
own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable
loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use
thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the
same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said
use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.

Vicente Rellosa vs. Gonzalo Pellosis, G.R. No. 138964, 9 August 2001

Facts: Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St., Malate,
Manila. After the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor informed the respondents
that they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the knowledge of respondents,
the land was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her
name.
On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The office of
building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents on November 27,
1989. Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on December 12, the day respondents
filed an appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded with the demolition of the house. Respondents filed
case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the decision and ordered petitioners to
pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners filed the instant petition
contending that the appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the premature demolition of respondents'
houses entitled them to the award of damages..

Issue: Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that the premature demolition of respondent’s houses entitled
them to award damages.

Held: No, the CA did not err in ruling to the case at bar. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so
much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of whether or not
petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil

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Code. Thus, CA did not in its decision since the petitioner Cynthia Ortega abused her right when she
demolished the house of the respondents on her land.

Antonio Vasco vs. CA and Vasco, G. R. No. L-46763, 28 February 1978

Facts: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in a decision dated October 5, 1976 found
that Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco (born on April 8, 1952 and April 27, 1954, respectively) are the
illegitimate children of Antonio Vasco and Angelina Reyes. It ordered Antonio to pay them the sum of P200
as monthly allowance for support, beginning October, 1976 plus P500 as attorney's fees. Antonio Vasco
appealed to the Court of Appeals from that decision. He perfected his appeal on January 6, 1977. In its order
dated April 21, 1977 the lower court approved Vasco's record on appeal and ordered the elevation of the
record to the Court of Appeals. On June 22, 1977, or two months after the approval of the record on appeal,
Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco filed a motion for the execution of the said judgment pending appeal.
Antonio Vasco opposed that motion on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to grant execution.
The lower court granted the motion in its order of July 13, 1972. Antonio Vasco assailed that order of
execution in his petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in its decision of August
10, 1977 upheld that order of execution pending appeal in the "interest of substantial justice" and on the
theory that the judiciary is an agency of the State acting as parens patriae and that if the said order is erroneous,
the error is only an error of judgment and is not a grave abuse of discretion or an act in excess of jurisdiction.
On August 26, 1977 Antonio Vasco filed in this Court the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in upholding the execution order on the basis of substantial justice and the
role of the state as parens patriae protecting the interest of the minor.

Held: No, the CA is not correct. The Supreme Court ruled that As to the doctrine of parens patriae (father of
his country), its relevancy to this case is doubtful because the recipients of the support granted by the lower
court are no longer honors. The doctrine refers to the inherent power and authority of the state to provide
protection of the person and property of a person non sui juries. Under that doctrine, the state has the
sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability. Thus, the state is considered the parens
patriae of minors.

Carlota Valenzuela vs. CA and Carlos and Rufina Telosa, G.R. No. L-56168, 22 December 1988

Facts: The heirs of Carlos Telosa, a fisherman and farmer with a very limited education, initiated a complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon seeking the nullification of the real estate mortgage executed by
Carlos Telosa in favor of the Rural Bank of Lucena and/or its reformation to state the real intention of the
parties. On November 29, 1960 Carlos Telosa obtained a loan of P300.00 from the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc.
and as a security thereof, he mortgaged a parcel of land located at Bo. Amugeria, Malunay, Quezon with an
area of 50,000 square meters. This parcel of land was registered in the name of the spouses Carlos Telosa &
Rufina Telosa. Several months thereafter, it was rumoured that there was anomalies in the bank. The Monetary
Board in its resolution No. 426 dated April 2, 1963 designated the Superintendent of Banks Carlota P.
Valenzuela or her duly authorized representative to take charge of the assets of the Lucena bank. A demand
letter was thus sent to Carlos Telosa on August 27, 1965 by the Central Bank examiner Agapito S. Fajardo.
Because Carlos Telosa knew that his obligation to the rural bank was only P300.00 not P5, 000.00, he
protested to it. On January 4, 1966 Carlos Telosa paid the amount of P400.00. Carlos Telosa claimed this
amount represented the principal and interest with a remaining balance of P 11.25 which was paid by Dolores
Telosa on April 18, 1972. Carlos Telosa died on January 13, 1968. Claiming that the debt was not fully
satisfied, the Central Bank ordered the Sheriff of Quezon Province to extra-judicially foreclose and put the
mortgage on auction. A complaint was filed against the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc. They prayed for a judgment
declaring the contract of mortgage executed by Carlos Telosa in favor of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. null

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and void and of no further force and effect and/or that the said contract be reformed to state the true
intention and agreement of the parties with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to stop
the sheriff of Quezon from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure. It was the contention of the
plaintiffs (now private respondents) that the amount of the loan obtained by Carlos Telosa was only P300.00
and that the same had already been fully paid. Meanwhile, as there was no restraining order issued, the
foreclosure sale took place as scheduled on April 20, 1972, with the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., as the lone
and highest bidder in the auction sale for which an award was made in its favor The certificate of sale was
thereafter issued to it and the same was registered with the Registry of Deeds on September 11, 1972. On May
4, 1972, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, this time against Carlota P. Valenzuela in her capacity as
Superintendent of Banks and authorized representative of the Central Bank in the liquidation of the Rural
Bank of Lucena, Inc., as sole defendant. In addition to the prayers in their original complaint, plaintiffs prayed
in their amended complaint that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale be annulled. Defendant (now petitioner)
moved to dismiss the amended complaint on two (2) grounds: (1) that the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action as the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., is in the process of liquidation in the Court
of First Instance of Manila and (2) that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendant. The
motion to dismiss was denied. Thereafter, defendant filed her answer. In addition to the two grounds relied
upon in the motion to dismiss, she set up the defenses of the validity of the loan documents, reflecting in all
respects the correct amount (P5,000.00) which Carlos Telosa obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.
and that the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed. RTC decided in favour of Telosa. The bank
appealed and averred that there is no legal and factual basis for the application of Court Vigilance or Article 24
of the New Civil Code.

Issue: Whether there is factual and legal basis for the Court to apply Article 24 of the Civil Code.

Held: Yes, Article 24 has application in this case. The Supreme Court ruled that With the foregoing ruling, the
more proper procedure would be to set aside the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Quezon
and consequently dismiss the case without prejudice to the right of the private respondents to take up with the
liquidation court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, the settlement of their mortgage obligation. However,
taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice We are constrained to
deviate from this procedure. To order the private respondents to refile and relitigate their case before the
liquidation court would be an exercise in futility. It would mean another several years of trial and additional
expenses to private respondents who are admittedly living in poverty. Incidentally, the property in question is
the only property of private respondents. We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and We are
convinced as were the trial court and the appellate court that the amount of loan actually obtained by the
deceased Telosa was only P300.00 and not the P5, 000.00 as claimed by petitioner.

Jose Nessia vs. Jesus Fermin, G.R. No. 102918, 30 March 1993

Facts: Jose Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He filed a complaint
for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent Jesus Fermin, Mayor of Victorias,
Negros Occidental and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that respondent deliberately ignored
and caused non-payment of the vouchers because he defied the latter’s request to register and vote in the 1980
local elections. On the other hand, Fermin countered that Nessia’s claims could not be approved because they
exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality, for its part, added that Nessia was also at fault since he
did not give justification for drawing funds in excess of the budget. RTC decided in favour of Nessia. Both of
them elevated the case to the Court of Appeals: Nessia praying for an increase in award of
damages; Fermin seeking exoneration from liability; Municipality did not appeal. It is further contended that
Nessia may not claim relief under Art. 27 because his theory of unjust inaction is incompatible with his
allegations in the complaint that Fermin denied/refused the vouchers

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Issue: Whether the respondent Jesus M. Fermin, Mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental, liable for damages
for maliciously refusing to act on the vouchers of petitioner, Jose V. Nessia covering the latter's claim for
reimbursement of travel expense allowances.

Held: Yes, Jesus Fermin is liable under article 27. Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person
suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that maybe taken. The Supreme Court further held that while it is true
that Fermin may not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary
appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because
he did not act on the vouchers. This provision against official inaction finds its ally in Sec. 3, par. (f), of R.A.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," which criminalizes
"neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of discriminating against any interested party." Here,
Fermin did not act on the vouchers because Nessia defied Fermin’s request to register and vote in the 1980
election. Thus, Fermin as Mayor of Negros Occidental is liable for damages for maliciously refusing to act on
the vouchers of petitioner.

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