R.A. No. 3844 LEGASPI V. EXECUTIVE SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORMS. NO.
L-
NIEVES V. DULDULAO. G.R. 190276. APRIL 2, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner, owner of a piece of agricultural land, sought to
eject respondents, tenants and cultivators of the subject
land. Petitioner claimed that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay
their leasehold rentals since 1985 which had accumulated
to 446.5 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively. The PARAD
declared that the tenancy relations between the parties had
been severed by the respondents’ failure to pay their back
leasehold rentals thereby ordering them to vacate. The
DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAD. The CA granted
respondents’ petition for review, thereby reversing the
ruling of DARAB.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the right to eject respondents from
the land under RA No. 3844.
Ruling: YES
Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure may
be ejected from their landholding only on the grounds
provided by law. These ground – the existence of which is to
be proven by the agricultural lessor in a particular case – are
enumerated in Section 36 of RA No. 3844 xxx :
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rentals shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy
five per cent as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although
the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is
not thereby extinguished;
To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the
leasehold rentals under item 6 of the above-cited provision,
jurisprudence instructs that the same must be wilful and
deliberate in order to warrants the agricultural lessee’s
dispossession of the land that he tills.
Respondents’ failure to pay leasehold rentals to the
landowner also appears to have been wilful and deliberate.
They, in fact, do not deny – and therefore admit – the
landowner’s assertion that their rental arrearages have
accumulated over a considerable length of time, i.e., from
1985 to 2005 but rely on the fortuitous event defense,
which as abovementioned, cannot herein be sustained.
36153. NOVEMBER 28, 1975
Facts:
Petitioner Alfonso V. Legaspi, an employee of DAR, sent a
letter to respondent Secretary of DAR expressing his desire
to be laid off under the provision of RA No. 3844, as
amended by RA No. 6389, on condition that he would also
be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled
under RA No. 1616. The respondent Secretary approved
petitioner’s request. The General Manager of the GSIS
approved petitioner’s retirement under Sec. 12 (c) of CA No.
186, as amended by RA No. 1616 but denied the petitioner’s
claim for gratuity under Sec. 169 of RA No. 3844.
In the instant petition, respondents maintain that gratuity
provided for under Sec. 169 of RA No. 3844 is a retirement
gratuity intended for those who desire to be laid-off but
would not be eligible to receive retirement benefits under
the general laws.
Issue:
WON petitioner has the right to collect the gratuity under
RA No. 3844, in addition to what he has received under CA
No. 186.
Ruling: NO
There is nothing in Section 169, RA No. 3844, as amended,
that would as much suggest that an employee who is laid-
off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits,
one under its provisions and another pursuant to CA No.
186. From the phrase “in addition to all benefits to which
they are entitled under existing laws and regulations,” there
is no hint that it meant to allow double gratuities. On the
contrary, Section 169 of RA No. 3844, refer to those “other
than retirement benefits” to which the laid-off employee
may be entitled, such as, the money equivalent of his
accumulated sick and vacation leaves This interpretation is
more in line with the policy of the law embodied in Section
28 (b) of CA No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying
double retirement benefits to an employee.
AISPORNA VS. CA. NO. L-47533. OCTOBER 27, 1981
Facts:
Private respondent Avelino de la Cruz, the landowner,
entered into a verbal contract of leasehold tenancy with
tenant Fortunato Aisporna. Shortly thereafter, de la Cruz
obtained a favourable decision from the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) for ejectment of petitioner tenant on the
ground that de la Cruz will personally cultivate the farm.
After being ejected, petitioner filed a CAR case for
reinstatement with damages on the ground that the owner
had failed to personally cultivate the landholding. The
agrarian court ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA however
reversed the decision of the court a quo. The CA relied on
the amendment to the first paragraph of Section 36
introduced by RA No. 6389 during the pendency of the
action for reinstatement. The amendment allegedly
abolished personal cultivation as ground for ejecting an
agricultural lessee and with it, was eliminated the corollary
proviso on reinstatement of the ejected tenant.
Issue:
WON petitioner tenant who was ousted from his
landholding on the ground of personal cultivation by the
landowner is authorized to continue an action for
reinstatement on the ground that the landowner did not
actually personally cultivate the land.
Ruling: YES
What Republic Act 6389 abolished, eliminated or repealed is
the right of the landowner to eject his tenant on the grounds
that said landowner would personally cultivate the land. This
amendatory Act did not abolish the right of the tenant to
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding. In fact, such right of the tenant to remain in the
enjoyment and possession of the landholding was not
created by paragraph (1) of Sec. 36, Rep. Act 3844 because
the main proviso of Sec. 36 actually recognizes the tenant's
right to continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding in these terms: "Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land,
an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding ..." Such right to enjoy and
possess is not only a contractual right but also arises from a
status of tenancy or relationship duly recognized and
protected by agrarian reform legislation.
Hence, Rep. Act 6389 in its Section 7 specifically amending
Sec. 36 (1) of Rep. Act 3844 cannot be considered to have
repealed the tenant's right to enjoy and possess the
landholding because such right is preserved and maintained
in the main proviso of Sec. 36 which is not altered, amended
or otherwise repealed.
The different laws cited and enumerated above clearly show
that the right of the tenant to the enjoyment and possession
of the farmholding had been created and conferred,
protected and guaranteed therein previous to the
enactment of R.A. 3844 and that par. (1) of Sec. 36 of said
R.A. 3844 did not create such right. The security of tenure of
the tenant had been enjoyed by him long before the passage
of R.A. 3844. Hence, it is not correct for the Court of Appeals
to assume that the right of the tenant to the security of his
tenure was abolished by R.A. 6389 when the latter repealed
by substitution paragraph (1) of Sec. 36, R.A.3844.
MON V. CA. GR. NO. 118292. APRIL 14, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner sought to eject respondents from the land that
they were cultivating upon the former’s claim that he was
the owner-administrator of the subject land. The Regional
Office found for Mon, and ruled that under RA No. 3844,
subleasing was prohibited and is a valid ground for
ejectment. Since the Spouses Velasco were found to have
leased the subject land to another person, they may be
validly ejected by Mon. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the
finding and held that a share tenancy existed between the
parties on account of the 50-50 share in the harvest, had
long been declared illegal by agrarian laws. Hence, the
DARAB ordered for reinstatement of the Spouses. In the
instant petition, the petitioner argues that the issue of share
tenancy does not preclude his right to eject the tenants on
valid grounds.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has the right to eject the Spouses from
the land under RA No. 3844.
Ruling: NO
On August 8, 1963, RA No. 3844 abolished and outlawed the
share tenancy and put in its stead the Agricultural Leasehold
System.
The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: (1) the
parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; and (5) there is consideration.
The records establish that the Spouses are agricultural
tenants of the petitioner under the legal definitions. There
is no dispute that petitioner is the owner-administrator of
agricultural land planted to rice and tobacco by the Spouses
who petitioner himself referred to as his “tenants”. There is
also no dispute that the 50-50 share cropping system
between them was agreed upon by their predecessors and
was subsequently carried by consensual agreement of the
parties up to the present.
Sec. 7 of RA No. 3844, as amended, provides that once there
is a leasehold relationship, the landowner cannot eject the
agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the
court for causes provided by law. It expressly recognized and
protects an agricultural leasehold tenant’s right to security
of tenure.
CODERIAS VS. ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO. GR NO. 180476.
JUNE 26, 2013
Facts:
The deceased Juan Chioco is the landowner of a 4-hectare
farm in Nueva Ecija, whereas, petitioner Coderias, who was
issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), was a tiller of the
farm. In 1980, individuals connected with Chico threatened
to kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing
crops and house were bulldozed. For fear of his life,
petitioner left the farm. In 1993, upon learning of Chioco’s
death, petitioner and his family reestablished themselves on
the farm. Petitioner subsequently filed with the DARAB a
petition against the estate of Chioco praying, among others,
that the agricultural leasehold contact between them be
executed.
The PARAD dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. The DARAB reversed the ruling of PARAD. The
CA reversed the ruling of DARAB and reinstated the ruling of
PARAD.
Issue:
WON petitioner has the right to have the leasehold contract
between him and respondent executed.
Ruling: YES
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been
placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is also undisputed
that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and
petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favor of the
petitioner; thus, petitioner already had an expectant right to
the farm. A CLT serves as "a provisional title of ownership
over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full
payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-
farmer is an amortizing owner. This certificate proves
inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted
to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the
tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling." Since the
farm is considered expropriated and placed under the
coverage of the land reform law, Chioco had no right to evict
petitioner and enter the property. More significantly, Chioco
had no right to claim that petitioner’s cause of action had
prescribed.
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of
security of tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that
the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be
terminated for causes provided by law. x x x Security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which
they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings
is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold
relationship can take place only for causes provided by law.
xxx
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold
relation shall be extinguished only under any of the
following three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment of
the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served
three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons
under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x." None of these
is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot be
said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled
that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through
threats and intimidation.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "an
action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall
be barred if not commenced within three years after such
cause of action accrued." In this case, we deem it proper to
reckon petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only
upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not
at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in
1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to
petitioner’s life and limb existed, petitioner had a cause of
action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this
juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended with
Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert
his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws
within the prescriptive period commenced.
ALARCON V. CA. GR NO. 152085. JULY 8, 2003
Facts:
Respondent corporation is the owner of several saltbeds in
Paranaque with petitioners as tenants under a 50-50 share
tenancy agreement. The tenurial relationship was
interrupted in 1994, when the city government authorized
the dumping of garbage on the adjoining lot. The garbage
polluted the main source of salt water, which adversely
affected salt production on the subject landholding.
Petitioners filed with the RARAD-IV a complaint against
respondent and Mayor Olivares for damages and
disturbance compensation.
The RARAD made a decision holding that under Metro
Manila Zoning Ordinance, the subject saltbeds have been
reclassified to residential lands thereby severing the
relationship between respondent and petitioner, for no
tenurial relationship can exist on a land that is no longer
agricultural. But nevertheless, it held that petitioners are
entitled for disturbance compensation pursuant to Sec. 36
(1) of RA No 3844.
The DARAB affirmed in toto the decision of RARAD. The CA
reversed the decision of DARAB and ordered the dismissal
of the complaint.
Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to a disturbance
compensation.
Ruling: NO
At the core of the controversy is the issue of whether or not
a mere reclassification of the land from agricultural to
residential, without any court action by the landowner to
eject or dispossess the tenant, entitles the latter to
disturbance compensation.
A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant
to a security of tenure. He can only be ejected from the
agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.
Section 36 provides the different grounds and manner by
which a tenant can be lawfully ejected or dispossessed of his
landholding. One of them is the reclassification of the
landholding from agricultural to non-agricultural.
It is clear that a tenant can be lawfully ejected only if there
is a court authorization in a judgment that is final and
executory and after a hearing where the reclassification of
the landholding was duly determined. If the court authorizes
the ejectment, the tenant who is dispossessed of his
tenancy is entitled to disturbance compensation.
Petitioners argue that the RARAD decision, which was
affirmed by the DARAB, was the court judgment required by
law.
The argument is not well-taken. The RARAD decision is not
yet final and executory. It was made the subject of a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals and is pending with this
Court.
Since in this case, there is neither a final order of conversion
by the DAR nor a court judgment authorizing the tenants’
ejectment on the ground of reclassification, as a result of the
landowner’s court action, there is no legal basis to make
respondent liable to pay disturbance compensation.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals committed no error in
ordering the dismissal of the complaint before the DARAB.
PD 27
HOLY TRINITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT VS DELA CRUZ.
GR. NO. 2005454
Held:
Even if we supplemented the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 27, the outcome is still the same, because the
Dakila property was still not within the scope of the law. For
land to be covered under Presidential Decree No. 27, it must
be devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system
of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either
requisite is absent, the land must be excluded. Hence,
exemption from coverage followed when the land was not
devoted to rice or corn even if it was tenanted; or the land
was untenanted even though it was devoted to rice or
corn. Based on these conditions, the DAR Regional Office
erred in subjecting the Dakila property under the OLT.
For land to come within the coverage of the OLT, indeed,
there must be a showing that it is devoted to the cultivation
of rice or corn, and there must be a system of share-crop or
lease tenancy obtaining on October 21, 1972, the time when
Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect.66 Unfortunately, no
such evidence was presented, nor was there any field
investigation conducted to verify whether or not the
landholding was primarily devoted to the cultivation of rice
or corn. Accordingly, the Dakila property should be
excluded from the OLT.
TORALBA VS. MERCADO. GR. NO. 146480
Issue: WON the transfer of petitioner’s rights to the land to
respondent Mercado is in violation of PD No. 27
Ruling: NO (Not a violation)
Pursuant to P.D. No. 27, a farmer-beneficiary cannot make
any valid form of transfer of the land adjudicated to them,
except to the government or by hereditary succession to
their respective successors. The farmer-beneficiary alone
has title over the agricultural land covered by the Certificate the trial court, because even if at the time of valuation R.A.
of Land Transfer granted to him. 6657 was already effective, the respondents failed to
present any evidence on the valuation factors under Section
Nonetheless, a second look at the present transaction 17 of R.A. 6657.
reveals that petitioner voluntarily surrendered her
landholding to the Samahang Nayon, a legally permissible LBP VS. SPS. ESTEBAN. GR. NO. 192345
conveyance, for being in favor of the government. In Corpuz
v. Grospe, voluntary surrender to the Samahang Mao gyapon. Computation sa just compensation. Bahala na
Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the diha. 
government because such action forms part of the
mechanism for the disposition and the re-allocation of
farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27.

DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980 and DAR

Memorandum Circular 4, Series of 1983 set out the
procedure by which any tenant-farmer who abandons,
waives or refuses to become a beneficiary under P.D. No. 27
may validly forfeit his CLT. It requires (1) a recommendation
from a duly authorized Samahang Nayon (or agrarian
reform team leader) of other qualified tenant-farmers who
shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the
abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer; (2) an
investigation or hearing conducted on the lands covered
prior to its disposal and/or re-allocation; and (3) an order or
decision declaring the disqualification and removal of the
tenant concerned.

LBP VS. RIVERA GR. NO. 182431

Di na ko masabtan ni. Ug wala na ko nag effort musabot kay

computation ni. Payment of just compensation daw. Ingon sa
Court:

In many cases decided by this Court, it has been repeated

time and again that the award of 12% interest is imposed in
the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect
makes the obligation on the part of the government one of
forbearance. This is to ensure prompt payment of the value
of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner that
can drag from days to decades.

Contrary to the position of LBP, this Court did not commit a

mistake in not applying the extension thru A.O. 06-08 of the
6% interest until 31 December 2009. It must be understood
that at the time of the promulgation of the Imperial Decision
on 12 February 2007, A.O. 06-08 was not yet effective, as it
was signed only on 30 July 2008.

Likewise, it is erroneous for LBP to anchor its motion on the

contention that the 6% interest compounded annually does
not apply to agricultural lands valued under R.A. 6657 such
as the subject properties. The fact is that the valuation in the
instant case was under P.D. 27 and E.O. 228, as adjudged by