PEOPLE vs.

VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 186412

September 7, 2011

FACTS:

While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared
and stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo
stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the
stabbing incident, Villacorta fled.

RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by

treachery. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the
RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death

HELD:

The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection and not the
stab wound.

In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held

liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms
would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. Ultimately, we can only
deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent
infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The
infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
 SPS. GUANIO v. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL
GR No. 190601, February 7, 2011

FACTS:

For their wedding reception on July 28, 2011, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and
Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati. Prior
to the event, Makati Shangri-la Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an
initial and final food tasting. The parties eventually agreed on a final price –
P1,150.00 per person. On July 27, 2011, the parties finalized and signed their
contract.

Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondent’s representatives,

Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up
despite their assurance that they would; their guests complained of the delay in
the service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were
unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted
about the delay; and despite Alvarez’s promise that there would be no charge for
the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid
P8,000.00 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the
next day. They further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with
their open bar arrangement, but these were not served to the guests who were
forced to pay for their drinks.

Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel and

Resort, Inc. and received an apologetic reply from Krister Svensson, the hotel’s
Executive Assistant Manager in charge of Food and Beverage. They nevertheless
filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC of Makati City.
Respondents averred that it was the increase in number of the unexpected guests
that led to the shortage claimed by the petitioners.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and was reversed by
the CA, upon appeal, the latter holding that the proximate cause of petitioners’
injury was an unexpected increase in their guests.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly held that the proximate cause of petitioners’
injury was unexpected increase in their guests.

HELD:

The Court finds that since petitioners’ complaint arose from a contract, the
doctrine of proximate cause finds no application to it, the latter applicable only to
action for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply

with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse,
to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract. The
appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in
their obligation to inform respondent of the change in the expected number of
guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners’ failure
to discharge such obligation thus excused respondent from liability for “any
damage or inconvenience” occasioned thereby.
Facts:
Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving
the Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a
Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by Respondent COL Realty.
Due to the impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was
injured.

A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his
driver. Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily liable
since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident. He
further argued that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA
order, i.e. prohibiting the crossing is the place where the accident happened.

Issue:
Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the
accident is his employee's negligence.
RAMOS vs. COL Realty Corporation
GR No. 184905 August 28, 2009
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue
from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific
untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a
prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the
accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident
would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since
such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the
principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s
own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it

unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s
recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s
contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to
recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as
a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor.

Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate
cause of the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively,
the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
Universal International Investment (BVI) Limited vs. Ray Burton Development Corp.
G.R. No. 182201
November 14, 2016

Topic:
Breach of Contract

Facts:
Ray Burton Development Corp (RBDC) owned and developed
Elizabeth Place, a condominium located at Salcedo Village, Makati City. Universal International Investment
(Universal) and RBDC entered into separate Contracts to Sell covering the purchase of ten
condominium units and ten parking slots. Universal paid RBDC the full purchase price of the
properties amounting to ₱52,836,781.50. Universal demanded RBDC the cancellation of the sale
after RBDC failed to deliver possession of the properties and reneged on its obligation to transfer
the Condominium Certificates of Title (CCT) to Universal’s name. Universal subsequently
discovered that the mother title to the lot of Elizabeth Place is mortgaged to China Banking
Corporation (China Bank). The securities were foreclosed by China Bank.
Universal filed a Complaint for Specific Performance or Rescission of Contract and Damages
with the Expanded National Capital Region Field Office (ENCRFO) of the HLURB. The
ENCRFO rendered a decision in favor of Universal. When the case reached the Court of Appeals
(CA), Universal manifested that China Bank had released the subject properties and Universal
had already obtained their CCTs. When RBDC moved for dismissal of the case, Universal
claimed that it is RBDC is still liable for damages and compensation for property losses
supposedly to cover the depreciation costs and expenses it had incurred for the release of the
properties from China Bank under Section 6 of the Contract to Sell. Section 6 reads:
SECTION 6. BREACH AND/OR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONTRACT.
This agreement shall be deemed cancelled, at the option of the BUYER, in the event that SELLER, for the
reasons of force majeure, decide not to continue with the Project or the Project has been substantially delayed. In
such a case, the BUYER shall be entitled to refund all the payments made with interest at one-and-a-half (1½)
percent per month on the amount paid computed from the date of cancellation until the payments have
been fully refunded. Substantial delay is defined as six (6) months from date of estimated date of completion.
The parties agree that the estimated date of completion shall be December 31, 1998.

CA denied Universal’s claim for damages.

Issue: Whether or not RBDC committed a breach of contract?

Held: RBDC committed breach of contract. Both parties entered into a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. In a contract to sell, ownership is reserved by the vendor. The obligation of the
seller becomes demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive condition which is the
full payment of the purchase price. Such full payment gives rise to the right to demand the
execution of the contract of sale. It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that the seller
becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. Under the contract to sell, RBDC only has
two obligations: (1) to deliver the deeds of absolute sale; and (2) to deliver the corresponding CCTs. RBDC did not
have any contractual obligation to surrender possession of the properties. Neither did RBDC have to cause the
transfer of the CCT to Universal’s name.

However, RBDC did fail to deliver the deeds of absolute sale and to give the corresponding CCTs. RBDC invokes as
an excuse Section 5(a) of the contract where Universal is obliged to pay the transfer charges. RBDC’s excuse fails.
In order that the debtor may be held to be in default, the following conditions must be present: (1) obligation is
demandable and already liquidated; (2) the debtor delays performance of the obligation; and (3) the creditor requires
the performance judicially or extrajudicially. RBDC did not make any demand to Universal to tender any payment for
the expenses connected with the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or transfer of title. Universal cannot be
considered to have defaulted on the payment of transfer charges. Under the aforementioned provision of the
contract, Universal cannot be obliged to pay the transfer charges when RBDC did not aver to undertake the
responsibility of transferring the title of the properties. RBDC is left with no just reason not to perform its obligations
to Universal.
People v. Acuram
G.R. No. 117954 April 27, 2000

The appellant shot the victim who later died. After charges were filed and his
commanding officer was told of the incident, he was ordered not to leave camp,
where he surrendered.

HELD:
Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the

accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, it was
appellant’s commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court.
Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to
the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender
as contemplated by law.
Ardiente vs. Javier, et al
[Civil Law: human relations; principle of abuse of rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code]

Every person must, in the exercise of his right, and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Art. 19. New Ciivil Code of the Philippines)

Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro Water
District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013

Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then decision of the RTC regarding
its judgment sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The decision
being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water
District as requested by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was
subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as other
utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which was never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide
became delinquent in paying the water bill.

Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off
the water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed ownership of
property to Pastorfide.

Ruling: No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of
law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with
her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle of abuse of
Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE
PUBLISHING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184315
November 25, 2009
Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994, Chronicle
Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing"for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a
series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10 and 12,
1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony,"
which term according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an
individual who was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and
extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and
dishonorable business activities.

The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of Benguet
Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate as the
former. According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it
was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of gold and unprofitable
investments it ventured into. Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring
employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is the Chairman, staged a strike,
when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his group takes over Oriental, it will
experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.

In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not
defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained their
contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and
balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the finding
of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel.

Ruling:
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the subject
articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as
a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain unwarranted
benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the
portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of
Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions of the General Banking
Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a "corporate raider" seeking to profit
from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for
they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.
There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation,
where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation. In the
instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the
writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact is proven, assertions and
proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching
to a defamatory imputation.
Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts a quo,
Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a
desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of the
publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual
malice was not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the Court of
Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair commentaries on matters
of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged communications.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate the
Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This
Court, however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos bythe trial
court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.
GO vs. CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After
contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet
Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able to
close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memoran dum
of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per
agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to
the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and
Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to
answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to
find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the
second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson,
Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further
sale
between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus
depriving him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act
committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial
court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss
based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26,
1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the
termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the
contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with
the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status
reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged
the
services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the
vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission
for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997
considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354
and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the
Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go
(G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
ISSUE:
a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his
unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.
RULING:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only
parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented
by
Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in
the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of
AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be
held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract
can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable
for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the
amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation
of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June
24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages
may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
George (Culhi) Hambon, Petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Valentino U. Carantes, Respondents
G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein a complaint for damages against
respondent for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent
bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.

However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed
previously against the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioner’s lack of interest and
that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling
that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is
entitled to damages.

Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages on the
grounds that Hambon failed to file the civil case. Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal
case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the dismissal of the civil case.

According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to
institute a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case,
and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages,
notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and
had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action falling under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the new civil code be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation
to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising from the same act or omission of the
accused pursuant to Rule 111, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the failure to make reservation
being due to the fact that the criminal case was dismissed before the prosecution started to
present evidence for failure of the private complainant to appear despite notice.

HELD:
 Civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.

The Court expounded that it clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have
been instituted with the criminal case. In other words, the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed
instituted with the criminal action.

Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights,
but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it
may be brought separately.

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the
civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R
for damages subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933 Case Digest
G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933, October 11, 2011
Emilio Gancayco
vs City Government of Quezon City and MMDA
Ponente: Sereno

Facts:

In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land

located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City Council issued
Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for
commercial buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears
emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national
legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings
was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this
particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is
to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the
sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building
owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the
property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first
floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for
use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own
purposes.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently,

sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-
storey building being constructed on his property from the application
of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade
on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice
Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, “subject to
the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall,
within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his
own expense when public interest so demands.”

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear

obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a notice of
demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building
violated the National Building Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO
with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA from demolishing his
property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor
of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was
unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said that
because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters
of property were being taken without compensation for the public’s
benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise
held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to equal protection
of laws.

MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its
powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that
Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues,
alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus
excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated
that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent
or abate nuisances.

Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM

ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT
ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL
OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4) WHETHER OR
NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
Ruling:

(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made
the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at
that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false
misrepresentation or misleading act.
(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of
equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears
emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption
from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually
granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the
time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city
engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to
its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly
situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an
exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing
walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do
not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and
property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal
does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when
Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the
city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or
its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and
property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against
summarily demolishing the structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per

se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find,
as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is
not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its
nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined
and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.

MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ONG
G.R. NO. 190755 November 24, 2010

FACTS:

Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi City in the
amount of PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by three (3) residential lots, five (5) cargo trucks,
and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would be short-term and
would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10 million would be payable in
seven (7) years. The Notice of Loan Approval dated February 22, 1996 contained an acceleration
clause wherein any default in payment of amortizations or other charges would accelerate the
maturity of the loan. Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no longer pay
their loan. They sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to Angelina
Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.

Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform it about
the sale and assumption of mortgage. Atty. Edna Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank Branch
Head, told Alfredo and his counsel Atty. Ireneo de Lumen that there was nothing wrong with the
agreement with the Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for the assumption of
mortgage. They were also told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed
at PhP 750,000 and to update due or accrued interests on the promissory notes so that Atty.
Hingco could easily approve the assumption of mortgage. Two weeks later, Alfredo issued a
check for PhP 750,000 and personally gave it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his
payment. He also submitted the other documents required by Land Bank, such as financial
statements for 1994 and 1995. Atty. Hingco then informed Alfredo that the certificate of title of
the Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never materialized. No notice of
transfer was sent to him. On December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum
of money with damages against Land Bank in Civil Case No. T-1941, as Alfredo’s payment was not
returned by Land Bank. The RTC held that under the principle of equity and justice, the bank
should return the amount Alfredo had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the
filing of the complaint. The RTC further held that Alfredo was entitled to attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses for being compelled to litigate. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

Land Bank contends that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that Alfredo should
have sought recourse against the Spouses Sy instead of Land Bank. Art. 1236.

ISSUE:
 WON the Art. 1236 of the Civil Code should apply in the instant case.

RULING:

We agree with Land Bank on this point as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art. 1236.
Land Bank was not bound to accept Alfredo’s payment, since as far as the former was concerned,
he did not have an interest in the payment of the loan of the Spouses Sy. However, in the context
of the second part of said paragraph, Alfredo was not making payment to fulfill the obligation of
the Spouses Sy. Alfredo made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage would be titled in his name. It is clear from the records that
Land Bank required Alfredo to make payment before his assumption of mortgage would be
approved. He was informed that the certificate of title would be transferred accordingly. He,
thus, made payment not as a debtor but as a prospective mortgagor.

Alfredo, as a third person, did not, therefore, have an interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation of the Spouses Sy, since his interest hinged on Land Bank’s approval of his application,
which was denied. The circumstances of the instant case show that the second paragraph of Art.
1236 does not apply. As Alfredo made the payment for his own interest and not on behalf of the
Spouses Sy, recourse is not against the latter. And as Alfredo was not paying for another, he
cannot demand from the debtors, the Spouses Sy, what he has paid.
Kabisig Real Wealth Dev. Inc & Fernando Tito vs. Young Corporation Builders
G.R. No. 212375
January 25, 2017

Topic:
Requisites of a Valid Contract

Facts: In April 2001, Kabisig Real, through Ferdinand Tito, contracted the
services of Young Builders Corporation (Young Builders) to supply labor, tools,
equipment, and materials for the renovation of its building in Cebu City. Young
Builders then finished the work in September 2001 and billed Kabisig for
P4,123,320.95. However, despite numerous demands, Kabisig failed to pay. The parties
did not enter into a written contract, and there was no estimate as to the cost of the
renovation.

Young Builders filed a collection of sum of money suit against Kabisig. RTC-
Cebu rendered a decision ordering Kabisig to pay Young Builders. Kabisig
elevated the case to the CA, who affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Young Builders and Kabisig moved for reconsideration but were

denied. Kabisig filed the current petition.

Issue: Whether or not Kabisig is liable to Young Builders for the damages claimed?

Held: Yes, Kabisig is liable to Young Builders.

Under the Civil Code, a contract is a meeting of minds, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service. Article 1318 reads:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Accordingly, for a contract to be valid, it must have the following essential elements: (1)
consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain, which is the subject matter of the
contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.

Consent must exist, otherwise, the contract is non-existent. Consent is manifested by

the meeting of the offer and the acceptance of the thing and the cause, which are to
constitute the contract. By law, a contract of sale, is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing that is the object of the contract and upon the price.
Indeed, it is a consensual contract which is perfected by mere consent.

Kabisig's claim as to the absence of a written contract between it and Young

Builders simply does not hold water. It is settled that once perfected, a contract is
generally binding in whatever form, whether written or oral, it may have been
entered into, provided the aforementioned essential requisites for its validity are
present. Article 1356 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.

There is nothing in the law that requires a written contract for the agreement in
question to be valid and enforceable. Also, the Court notes that neither Kabisig
nor Tio had objected to the renovation work, until it was already time to settle the bill.

To determine the compensation due and to avoid unjust enrichment from

resulting out of a fulfilled contract, the principle of quantum meruit may be used.
Under this principle, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the
services rendered despite the lack of a written contract. The measure of recovery under
the principle should relate to the reasonable value of the services performed. The
principle prevents undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is
unjust for a person to retain any benefit without paying for it. Being predicated
on equity, said principle should only be applied if no express contract was
entered into, and no specific statutory provision was applicable.11

The principle of quantum meruit justifies the payment of the reasonable value of the
services rendered and should apply in the absence of an express agreement on the
fees. Considering the absence of an agreement, and in view of the completion of the
renovation, the Court has to apply the principle of quantum meruit in determining how
much is due to Young Builders.

Under the established circumstances, the total amount of P2,400,000.00 which the CA
awarded is deemed to be a reasonable compensation under the principle of
quantum meruit since the renovation of Kabisig's building had already been completed
in 2001.
Pryce Properties Corporation vs. Spouses Octobre and China Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 186976
December 7, 2016

Topic: Breach of Contract

Facts: Spouses Octobre and Pryce Properties (Pryce) executed a Contract to Sell
for purchase of two lots with a total of 742 square meters located in Puerto
Heights Village, Puerto Heights, Cagayan de Oro City for the price of ₱2,897,510.00.

Pryce certified that Spouses Octobre fully settled all the payments in relation to
the property, amounting to a total of ₱4,292,297.92. Spouses Octobre formally
demanded Pryce the delivery of the certificates of title but Pryce failed to comply.
This prompted Spouses Octobre to file a complaint for specific performance,
revocation of certification, refund of payments, damages and attorney’s fees before the
HLURB. The reason behind Pryce’s non-compliance is a Deed of Assignment Pryce
executed with China Bank. Under the Deed of Assignment, Pryce assigned
and transferred its accounts receivable in form of contracts to sell as security
and deliver the corresponding owner’s duplicate copies of the TCTs relating to the
Puerto Heights development project. In exchange, China Bank extended a ₱200
Million credit facility to Pryce. Pryce defaulted in its loan obligation to China Bank
which led to China Bank refusing to return the titles to Pryce.

The HLURB Arbiter rendered a decision rescinding the contract between Pryce and the
Spouses Octobre and ordered Pryce to refund the payments made by the spouses and
also to pay compensatory damages. On appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioner
modified the decision and ordered Pryce to pay the redemption value to China Bank so
that the bank may release the titles covering the lots purchased by the Spouses
Octobre. In default thereof, Pryce shall refund the payments with legal interest. The
HLURB Board upheld the grant of compensatory damages. The Office of President
(OP) affirmed in full the HLURB Board’s decision. Likewise, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the OP. The CA found that Pryce acted in bad faith for not
disclosing the titles were in custody of China Bank. The CA held Pryce’s contractual
breach justified the award of compensatory damages in the amount of ₱30,000.

Issue: Whether or not a breach of contract automatically triggers the award of

actual or compensatory damages?

Held: No. To be entitled to compensatory damages, the amount of loss must be

capable of proof and must be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. Its award must be
based on evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and
certainly, not on flimsy, remote, speculative and non-substantial proof. The amount
paid by Spouses Octobre as purchase price for the lots has been adequately proved.
Therefore, Spouses Octobre are entitled to such amount.
However, the compensatory damages in the amount of ₱30,000 is bereft of any
evidentiary basis. In absence of adequate proof, compensatory damages should not
have been awarded. Nonetheless, nominal damages, in lieu of compensatory
damages, are proper in this case.

Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must
be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind.
It could also be awarded where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial
injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown. So long as there is a
violation of the right of the plaintiff – whether based on law, contract or other sources of
obligation – an award of nominal damages is proper. Proof of bad faith is not required.
The HLURB Arbiter and the CA appear to have confused nominal damages with
compensatory damages.

Contractual breach is sufficient to justify an award for nominal damages but not
compensatory damages.
Mariano C. Mendoza and Elvira Lim v. Spouses Leonora J. Gomez and
Gabriel V. Gomez, G.R. no. 160110 June 18, 2014

Facts:

On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number
UAW 582, owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora) and driven by
Antenojenes Perez (Perez), was hit by a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus)
with temporary plate number 1376-1280, registered under the name of petitioner
Elvira Lim (Lim) and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza (Mendoza). Owing to
the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and multiple physical injuries was filed against Mendoza. Mendoza, however, eluded
arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate complaint for damages against Mendoza
and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board the

Isuzu truck, namely Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca (Banca), and Jimmy
Repisada (Repisada), sustained injuries necessitating medical treatment amounting to
P11,267.35,which amount was shouldered by respondents. Moreover, the Isuzu
truck
sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and steering wheel,
amounting to P142,757.40.
 Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a
daily income of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and
delivering them to recycling plants, respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital
in the furtherance of their business.

For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus
in question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the
actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus
attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-
called "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.

Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment

is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners]:
Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA. After evaluating the damages awarded by
the RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the award of unrealized
income which the CA ordered deleted. Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, petitioners filed
an appeal by certiorari before the Court.

Issue:

In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it Enriquez,

the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?

Ruling:

In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the latter’s

vicarious
liability as espoused in Article 2180 of the same Code: The obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business of
industry.

Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of

vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person who has not
committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to another may
nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under
certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is
embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action
under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
or supervision, or both, of his employee.

Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or

employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee
(culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando),
or both. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it
may be rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved of liability. However, with the enactment of the motor
vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code -
that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage –are no longer available
to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration
law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.

As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously

liable with Mendoza.

Vicarious Liability

QUESTION: A bus owned and registered under the name of Bea Locsin and
driven by Phil Manzano hit the car of Angelica Ramsay due to the negligent driving
and for violation of traffic regulations of Phil.
An information was filed against the driver, Phil Manzano, for reckless impr
udence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries, however, he
eluded arrest, thus, Angelica filed a separate complaint for damages against Bea.
Bea, on the other hand contended that she is exempted from any liabilities for the
acts done by his employee.

Can a separate claim for damages be instituted against Bea?

ANSWER: Yes, a separate claim for damages may be instituted against Bea under
the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person
who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to
another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or
subsidiarily under certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or
imputed negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for
damages in the action under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the
employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee
Case citation: Mariano C. Mendoza and Elvira Lim v. Spouses Leonora J.
Gomez and Gabriel V. Gomez, G.R. no. 160110 June 18, 2014

G.R. No. 190957 June 5, 2013

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

APAC MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by CESAR M. ONG, JR.,
Respondents.

FACTS:
The present case involves a simple purchase transaction between defendant-appellant
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), represented by defendants-
appellants Rogelio Espiritu and Rolando Macasaet, and plaintiff-appellee APAC,
represented by Cesar M. Ong, Jr., involving crushed basalt rock delivered by plaintiff-
appellee to defendant-appellant PNCC.

On August 17, 1999, APAC Marketing Corp. filed with the trial court a complaint against
Philippine National Construction Corp. for collection of sum of money with damages,
alleging that (i) Philippine National Construction Corp. engaged the services of APAC
Marketing Corp. by buying aggregates materials from APAC Marketing Corp., for which
the latter had delivered and supplied good quality crushed basalt rock; (ii) the parties
had initially agreed on the terms of payment, whereby Philippine National Construction
Corp. would issue the check corresponding to the value of the materials to be delivered,
or "Check Before Delivery," but prior to the implementation of the said payment
agreement, Philippine National Construction Corp. requested from APAC a 30-day term
from the delivery date within which to pay, which APAC accepted; and (iii) after making
deliveries pursuant to the purchase orders and despite demands by APAC, Philippine
National Construction Corp. failed and refused to pay and settle their overdue accounts.
The complaint prayed for payment of the amount of ₱782,296.80 "plus legal interest at
the rate of not less than 6% monthly, to start in April, 1999 until the full obligation is
completely settled and paid," among others.

On November 16, 1999, Philippine National Construction Corp. filed a motion to

dismiss, alleging that the complaint was premature considering that Philippine National
Construction Corp. PNCC had been faithfully paying its obligations to plaintiff-appellee,
as can be seen from the substantial reduction of its overdue account as of August
1999.

PNCC filed their answer, alleging that their obligation was only with respect to the
balance of the principal obligation that had not been fully paid which, based on the latest
liquidation report, amounted to only ₱474,095.92.

The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of APAC, ordering PNCC jointly and
solidarily to pay:
1. ₱782,296.80 as actual damages;
2. ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus ₱3,000.00 per court appearance;
3. Cost of suit.
Defendants-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that during the
pendency of the case, the principal obligation was fully paid and hence, the award by
the trial court of actual damages in the amount of ₱782,269.80 was without factual and
legal bases.

The trial court considered PNCC claim of full payment of the principal obligation, hence
modified the earlier decision, to wit:
1. ₱220,234.083
2. ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus ₱3,000.00 per court appearance;
3. Cost of Suit.

The CA promulgated a Decision affirming with modification the assailed Decision of the
RTC. PNCC is ordered to pay legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum on the
principal obligation.

ISSUE: Whether the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent is proper.

RULING:
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines states the policy that should guide
the courts when awarding attorney’s fees to a litigant. As a general rule, the parties may
stipulate the recovery of attorney’s fees. In the absence on such stipulation, this article
restrictively enumerates the instances when these fees may be recovered.

(T)he law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered as
actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article
2208 of the Civil Code.
The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are
not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no
sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other
than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

We have consistently held that an award of attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification to avoid speculation and conjecture surrounding
the grant thereof. Due to the special nature of the award of attorney’s fees, a rigid
standard is imposed on the courts before these fees could be granted. Hence, it is
imperative that they clearly and distinctly set forth in their decisions the basis for the
award thereof. It is not enough that they merely state the amount of the grant in the
dispositive portion of their decisions. It bears reiteration that the award of attorney’s
fees
is an exception rather than the general rule; thus, there must be compelling legal reason
to bring the case within the exceptions provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to
justify the award.

We have perused the assailed CA’s Decision, but cannot find any factual, legal, or
equitable justification for the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. The
appellate court simply quoted the portion of the RTC Decision that granted the award as
basis for the affirmation thereof. There was no elaboration on the basis. There is
therefore an absence of an independent CA finding of the factual circumstances and
legal or equitable basis to justify the grant of attorney’s fees. The CA merely adopted
the RTC’s rational for the award, which in this case we find to be sorely inadequate.

The RTC found as follows:

x x x since it is clear that plaintiff was compelled to hire the services of a counsel,
to litigate and to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party,
plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00 which it paid
as acceptance fee and ₱3,000.00 as appearance fee.

The only discernible reason proffered by the trial court in granting the award was that
respondent, as complainant in the civil case, was forced to litigate to protect the latter’s
interest. Thus, we find that there is an obvious lack of a compelling legal reason to
consider the present case as one that falls within the exception provided under Article
2208 of the Civil Code. Absent such finding, we hold that the award of attorney’s fees by
the court a quo, as sustained by the appellate court, was improper and must be deleted.
G.R. No. 165679 October 5, 2009
ENGR. APOLINARIO DUEAS, Petitioner vs. ALICE GUCE-AFRICA, Respondent

FACTS:

Respondent entered into a Construction Contract with petitioner for the

demolition of the ancestral house and the construction of a new four-bedroom
residential house. The parties agreed that respondent would pay P500,000.00 to the
petitioner, who obliged himself to furnish all the necessary materials and labor for the
completion of the project. Petitioner likewise undertook to finish all interior portions of
the house on or before March 31, 1998, or more than two weeks before
respondent’s sister, Sally’s wedding.

On April 18, 1998, however, the house remained unfinished. The wedding
ceremony was thus held at the Club Victorina and respondent’s relatives were forced to
stay in a hotel. Her mother lived with her children, transferring from one place to
another.

Respondent filed a Complaint for breach of contract and damages against

petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. Respondent prayed for the return of the P50,000.00 overpayment.
She also prayed for an award of P100,000.00 for the purpose of repairing what
had been poorly constructed and at least P200,000.00 to complete the project.
 Petitioner alleged that the delay in the construction of the house was due to
circumstances beyond his control, namely: heavy rains, observance of Holy Week, and
celebration of barangay fiesta. Ultimately, he was not able to complete the project
because on May 27, 1998, respondent went to his house and told him to stop the work.
He maintained that he cannot be
held liable for the amounts claimed by the respondent in her complaint considering that
he had faithfully complied with the terms and conditions of the Construction Contract.

The RTC rendered a Decision

in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner Apolinario Dueas who is hereby
directed to pay plaintiff:

- P100,000.00 for the necessary repair of the structure;

- 200,000.00 for the completion of the construction;
- 50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
- and costs of suit.

Plaintiffs claim for moral, nominal and exemplary damages are hereby denied for
lack of sufficient basis. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but
deleted the award of attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether the award of actual damages is proper.

RULING:

Respondent not entitled to actual damages for want of evidentiary proof

Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an

adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. In Ong v. Court of Appeals, we held that (a)ctual damages are such
compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in
which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses
that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To be recoverable, actual
damages must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. We cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the amount of damages. Thus, it was held that before actual
damages can be awarded, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss,
and credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.

Here, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, respondent did not present

documentary proof to support the claimed necessary expenses for the repair and
completion of the house. In awarding the amounts of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00,
the RTC and the Court of Appeals merely relied on the testimonies of the respondent
and her witness.
Respondent entitled to temperate damages in lieu of actual damages

Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual

damages suffered, a party is entitled to temperate damages. Articles 2216, 2224 and
2225 of the Civil Code provide

Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss

has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same
should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than
nominal but less than compensatory.

There is no doubt that respondent sustained damages due to the breach

committed by the petitioner. The transfer of the venue of the wedding, the repair of the
substandard work, and the completion of the house necessarily entailed expenses.
However, as earlier discussed, respondent failed to present competent proof of the
exact amount of such pecuniary loss. To our mind, and in view of the circumstances
obtaining in this case, an award of temperate damages equivalent to 20% of the original
contract price of P500,000.00, or P100,000.00 (which, incidentally, is equivalent to 1/3
of the total amount claimed as actual damages), is just and reasonable.

G.R. No. 193421 June 4, 2014

MCMER CORPORATION, INC., MACARIO D. ROQUE, JR. and CECILIA R.

ALVESTIR, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELICIANO C. LIBUNAO, JR.,
Respondent.

FACTS

According to private respondent, for quite some time, he and petitioners, specifically
Macario D. Roque, Jr. (Roque) and Cecilia R. Alvestir (Alvestir), McMer’s General
Manager and President, respectively, have been on a cold war brought often by the
disagreement in the design and implementation of company policies and procedures.
However, the subsisting rift between him and petitioners heightened when petitioner
McMer started verbally and maliciously imputing against his colleagues for certain
unfounded score of inefficient performance of duty.

Roque gave an immediate summon upon private respondent to proceed to his office to
discuss administrative matters. Private respondent, sensing some unusual development
in the attitude of petitioner Roque, instead of responding to the summon, went to Alvestir’s
office, and informed her of Roque’s disposition and his fear of a perceived danger to his
person.

He then requested for petitioner Alvestir to go to petitioner Roque’s office instead, of which
petitioner Alvestir conceded. Moments later, petitioner Roque, at the height of anger,
confronted private respondent and commanded him to proceed to his office. At this
juncture, private respondent was too scared to confront Roque as the latter may inflict
physical harm on him.

As a consequence of the foregoing, private respondent elected to discontinue work that

afternoon and immediately proceeded to the Valenzuela Police Headquarters to report
on the incident in the police blotter. Private respondent did not report for work. Because
of this, petitioner McMer, through Alvestir, issued a Memorandum directing private
respondent to explain within five days why no disciplinary action should be imposed upon
him for being in absence without official leave.

Feliciano C. Libunao, Jr. filed a complaint for unfair labor practices, constructive illegal
dismissal, nonpayment of 13th month pay and separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees, against petitioners McMer Corporation, Inc., Roque,
and Alvestir.

A conciliary meeting was held inside petitioners’ premises to discuss the possibility of an
amicable settlement. In the end, however, private respondent was informed verbally by
petitioner Alvestir that on account of strained relationship brought about by the institution
of a labor case against petitioners, the latter is inclined to dismiss him from office. Private
respondent was, likewise, offered a separation pay in the sum of P55,000.00.

Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno ruled that there was no constructive dismissal in the
instant case.

Private respondent filed his Appeal while petitioners filed their Memorandum of Appeal
dated April 10, 2008. After the parties submitted their respective replies to the
aforementioned appeals, public respondent NLRC, in its assailed Decision, reversed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and modified the relief granted to private respondent, to wit:

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in maintaining the NLRC’s decision on the ground that
McMer did not constructively dismissed Libunao.

HELD
No. The court held that the CA did not erred in maintaining the NLRC’s decision.

We uphold the factual and legal findings of the CA that there was constructive dismissal
because of the acts committed by petitioners against private respondent.

The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s

position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is
an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. Constructive
dismissal is, therefore, a dismissal in disguise. As such, the law recognizes and
resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and interests
from the coercive acts of the employer. In fact, the employee who is constructively
dismissed may be allowed to keep on coming to work.

As correctly observed by the CA, the sworn statement of Guiao is not only relevant and
material evidence, the same is likewise reliable and competent given that Guiao was
physically present at petitioner Alvestir’s office when the incident happened, and has
therefore personal knowledge of what transpired therein. Further, we find her
description of petitioner Roque’s disposition adequate to support a conclusion that
private respondent was caught in the state of humiliation and embarrassment in the
presence of his co-employees as a result thereof.

Case Digest: General Milling vs. Viajar

G.R. No. 181738 : January 30, 2013

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VIOLETA L. VIAJAR, Respondent.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Violeta Viajar received a Letter-Memorandum from General Milling Corporation (GMC) informing her that
her services are no longer needed because her position as Purchasing Staff was deemed redundant.
When Viajar reported for work on October 31, 2003, a month prior the effectivity from her severance from
GMC, the guard on duty prevented her from entering the companys premises. She was also asked to
sign an Application for Retirement and Benefits. Viajar refused to sign. Thus, she filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of GMC and held that the latter acted in good faith in terminating Viajar.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed LAs decision.

Viajar filed a petition before the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the petition. Thus, GMC filed this
instant petition for review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Viajar was validly terminated from GMC?

HELD: The petition is denied.

LABOR LAW: redundancy; retirement; termination

Art. 283 of the Labor Code provides that redundancy is one of the authorized causes for dismissal. It is
imperative that the employer must comply with the requirements for a valid implementation of the
companys redundancy program, to wit: (a) the employer must serve a written notice to the affected
employees and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of retrenchment; (b) the
employer must pay the employees a separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (c) the employer must abolish the redundant
positions in good faith; and (d) the employer must set fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining which
positions are redundant and may be abolished.

In the case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, the Court ruled that redundancy in an employers personnel
force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. Redundancy, for purposes of the Labor
Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the
actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and
superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity
previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.

While it is true that the characterization of an employees services as superfluous or no longer necessary
and, therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer, the
exercise of such judgment, however, must not be in violation of the law, and must not be arbitrary or
malicious.

To exhibit its good faith and that there was a fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining redundant
positions, a company claiming to be over manned must produce adequate proof of the same. Here, GMC
failed to present substantial proof to support its general allegations of redundancy. It must, however, be
pointed out that in termination cases, like the one before us, the burden of proving that the dismissal of
the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer.

In Quevedo v. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc., the Court explained the difference between retirement
and termination due to redundancy. Retirement from service is contractual (i.e. based on the bilateral
agreement of the employer and employee), while termination of employment is statutory (i.e. governed by
the Labor Code and other related laws as to its grounds, benefits and procedure).

Voluntary retirement cuts employment ties leaving no residual employer liability; involuntary retirement
amounts to a discharge, rendering the employer liable for termination without cause.

DENIED.
 G.R. No. 185829. April 25, 2012.

ARMANDO ALILING, petitioner, vs. JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL F. SAN MATEO

III, JOSEPH R. LARIOSA, and WIDE WIDE WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION,
respondents.

Nature of the Case: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails
and seeks to set aside the July 3, 2008 Decision and December 15, 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA - G.R. SP No. 101309, entitled Armando Aliling v.
National Labor Relations Commission, Wide Wide World Express Corporation, Jose B.
Feliciano, Manuel F. San Mateo III and Joseph R. Lariosa. The assailed
issuances modified the Resolutions dated May 31, 2007 and August 31, 2007 rendered
by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-
11166-2004, affirming the Decision dated April 25, 2006 of the Labor Arbiter.

FACTS:
 Respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to employ
petitioner Armando Aliling (Aliling) on June 2, 2004 as “Account Executive (Seafreight
Sales),” with a compensation package of a monthly salary of PhP 13,000, transportation
allowance of PhP 3,000, clothing allowance of PhP 800, cost of living allowance of PhP
500, each payable on a per month basis and a 14th month pay depending on the
profitability and availability of financial resources of the company. The offer came with a
six (6)-month probation period condition with this express caveat: “Performance during
probationary period shall be made as basis for confirmation to Regular or Permanent
Status.”

On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract under
the terms of conversion to regular status shall be determined on the basis of
work performance; and employment services may, at any time, be terminated for just
cause or in accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement.

However, instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to

handle Ground Express (GX), a new company product launched on June 18, 2004
involving domestic cargo forwarding service for Luzon. Marketing this product and
finding daily contracts for it formed the core of Aliling’s new assignment.

A month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and
Marketing Director, emailed Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the latter’s
performance.

On September 25, 2004, Joseph R. Lariosa (Lariosa), Human Resources

Manager of WWWEC, asked Aliling to report to the Human Resources Department to
explain his absence taken without leave from September 20, 2004.
Aliling responded two days later. He denied being absent on the days in
question, attaching to his reply-letter a copy of his timesheet which showed that
he worked from September 20 to 24, 2004. Aliling’s explanation came with a
query regarding the withholding of his salary corresponding to September 11 to
25, 2004.

On October 15, 2004, Aliling tendered his resignation to San Mateo. While
WWWEC took no action on his tender, Aliling nonetheless demanded reinstatement and
a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter dated October 1, 2004 to
management that San Mateo had forced him to resign.

Lariosa’s response-letter of October 1, 2004, informed Aliling that his case was
still in the process of being evaluated. On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again wrote,
this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his services effective as of that date
owing to his “non-satisfactory performance” during his probationary period. Records
show that Aliling, for the period indicated, was paid his outstanding salary.
 However, or on October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due
to forced resignation, nonpayment of salaries as well as damages with the
NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the complaint was Aliling’s Affidavit dated
November 12, 2004, in which he stated: “5. At the time of my engagement,
respondents did not make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a
regular employee.”

Refuting Aliling’s basic posture, WWWEC stated that in the letter offer
and employment contract adverted to, WWWEC and Aliling have signed a
letter of appointment on June 11, 2004 containing the terms of engagement.

WWWEC also attached to its Position Paper a memo dated September

20, 2004 in which San Mateo asked Aliling to explain why he should not be terminated
for failure to meet the expected job performance, considering that the load factor for the
GX Shuttles for the period July to September was only 0.18% as opposed to the
allegedly agreed upon load of 80% targeted for August 5, 2004. According to
WWWEC, Aliling, instead of explaining himself, simply submitted a resignation letter.

On April 25, 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision declaring that the grounds
upon which complainant’s dismissal was based did not conform not only the standard
but also the compliance required under Article 281 of the Labor Code,
Necessarily, complainant’s termination is not justified for failure to comply with the
mandate the law requires. Respondents should be ordered to pay salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract of employment
and all other benefits amounting to a total of P35,811.00 covering the period from
October 6 to December 7, 2004.

The Labor Arbiter explained that Aliling cannot be validly terminated for non-
compliance with the quota threshold absent a prior advisory of the reasonable
standards upon which his performance would be evaluated.

Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC, which affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The separate motions for reconsideration were also
denied by the NLRC.

The CA anchored its assailed action on the strength of the following

premises: (a) respondents failed to prove that Aliling’s dismal performance constituted
gross and habitual neglect necessary to justify his dismissal; (b) not having been
informed at the time of his engagement of the reasonable standards under which
he will qualify as a regular employee, Aliling was deemed to have been hired
from day one as a regular employee; and (c) the strained relationship existing
between the parties argues against the propriety of reinstatement.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: What is the effect once a decision was assailed for appeal?

HELD:

It is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case
open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters not
specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just resolution of the case.

Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless
patently erroneous. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction
of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by
evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts. The more recent Peñafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc., v. Sarmiento,
634 SCRA 279 (2010), has reaffirmed the above ruling, to wit: Finally, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-
established is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded
respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and
upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon this Court and will not
normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court
finds that none are applicable to the present case.

Case Digest: San Miguel Properties v. Gucaban

G.R. No. 153982: July 18, 2011

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. GWENDELLYN

ROSE S. GUCABAN, Respondent.

PERALTA,J.:

FACTS:

Gwendellyn Rose Gucaban (Gucaban), a licensed civil engineer, was hired by San
Miguel Properties Inc. (SMPI) in 1991 as a construction management specialist in 1991.
From 1991 until her termination from service in 1998, she was promoted twice, to
technical services manager, then to project development manager. In January of 1998
Gucaban was suddenly hounded by management to sign a blank resignation letter as
the company was undergoing cost-cutting. When Gucaban refused, she was alienated
in work and kept from meetings, given ugly performance reports, before she succumbed
to pressure and submitted her resignation to SMPI.

Gucaban filed a case for illegal dismissal against SMPI in the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter found for SMPI and dismissed the case. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed and ordered Gucabanimmediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and full backwages. On appeal under Rule 24 of the Rules of Court to the CA, the Court
affirmed the decision of the NLRC but reduced the awarded moral and exemplary
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gucaban was illegally dismissed.

HELD:

LABOR LAW: resignation

Gucaban separation from the company was the confluence of the fraudulent
representation to her that her office would be declared redundant, coupled with the
subsequent alienation which she suffered from the company by reason of her refusal to
tender resignation.The element of voluntariness in her resignation is, therefore, missing.

In Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Ronald P. Valderama, the Court held
that in illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is the rule that when an employer interposes
the defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the
employee indeed voluntarily resigned.

Petition is DENIED. Gucaban was illegally dismissed.

ERLINDA FRANCISCO AND JULIANA PAMAONG (petitioners)

vs.
RICARDO FERRER, JR., ANNETTE FERRER, ERNESTO LO AND REBECCA LO
(respondents)
G.R. No. 142029
February 28, 2001

FACTS: The petitioners failed to deliver the wedding cake on the wedding day as
ordered and paid for. Petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably
delayed because of the traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the
order slip got lost. The respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City, for breach of contract with damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiffs and against Erlinda Francisco who is ordered to pay an amount of P30,000.00
for moral damages. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the
appealed decision increasing the award of moral damages from thirty thousand
(P30,000.00) to two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) an awarded an
additional exemplary damages of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are liable for moral and exemplary damages?

RULING: The Court granted the petition and reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
To recover moral and exemplary damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach
must be palpable wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. The
person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence, for the law always presumes good faith. The Court found no such
fraud or bad faith.

Nevertheless, the Court found the petitioners liable for nominal damages (an amount of
P10,000.00) for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customer’s anxiety and
need of the hour. “Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present
loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.” Nominal damages may be
awarded “to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the
purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered.”

SANTOS (petitioner) vs. INTEGRATED PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. (respondent)

G.R. No. 204620 July 11, 2016 Commented [d1]: Please check first

FACTS: PETITIONER Rowena A. Santos was hired by respondent Integrated

Pharmaceutical Inc. as “clinician” tasked with the duty of promoting and selling their
products.

On April 6, 2010, she received a memorandum from her immediate supervisor relative to
her failure to remit her collections and to return the CareSens POP demonstration unit to
the office, at a specified time. On April 19, 2010, respondent’s national sales manager called
her to a meeting wherein she was informed that the management discovered that instead
of P2.00, she reported P10.00 as the actual amount of her traveling expense.

In the morning of April 21, 2010, respondents attempted to serve upon petitioner a
memorandum denominated as memo on padding of expense report. It charged petitioner
with attempting to coerce her immediate supervisor to pad her transportation expenses
and insubordination for not following instructions. She was required to submit a written
explanation within 24 hours in “aid of investigation”.

Petitioner refused to accept said memorandum. Subsequently, she received through

registered mail another memorandum likewise dated April 21, 2010 but already
denominated as termination of employment. It enumerated five infractions which allegedly
constrained respondents to terminate her employment.

ISSUE: Was petitioner sufficiently afforded due process before dismissal?

HELD: No.

In the present case, respondents presented two first written notices (memoranda dated
April 6, 2010 and April 21, 2010) charging petitioner with various offenses. Both notices,
however, fell short of the requirements of the law. The April 6, 2010 memorandum did not
apprise petitioner of an impending termination from employment. It did not require her to
submit within a specified period of time her written explanation controverting the charges
against her. Said memorandum also did not specify the company rules allegedly violated by
the petitioner or the cause of her possible dismissal as provided under Article 282 of the
Labor Code. After elaborating on the two acts of insubordination, said memorandum
merely reprimanded petitioner and warned her that a commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be visited with stiffer penalty. x x x

With regard to the April 21, 2010 memorandum, respondents claim that they attempted to
furnish petitioner with a copy thereof, but that petitioner refused to receive the same.
However, respondents’ bare allegation that they attempted to furnish the petitioner with a
copy of the April 21, 2010 memorandum is not sufficient. Proof of actual service is
required.

Also, the April 21, 2010 memorandum did not afford petitioner ample opportunity to
intelligently respond to the accusations hurled against her as she was not given a
reasonable period of at least five days to prepare for her defense. Notably, respondents
terminated her employment through another memorandum bearing the same date.
Moreover, the April 21, 2010 memorandum did not state the specific company rule
petitioner violated or the just cause for terminating an employment. Nothing was likewise
mentioned about the effect on petitioner’s employment should the charges against her are
found to be true.
Lastly, it does not escape our attention that respondents never scheduled a hearing or
conference where petitioner could have responded to the charge and presented her
evidence. Both the April 6, 2010 and the April 21, 2010 memoranda do not contain a notice
setting a particular date for hearing or conference. (Del Castillo, J.; SC 2nd Div., Rowena A.
Santos vs. Integrated Pharmaceutical, Inc. and Katheryn Tantiansu, G.R. No. 204620, July
11, 2016).

Libcap Marketing Corp. vs. Lanny Jean B. Baquial, GR. No. 192011, June 30, 2014

FACTS:

LIBCAP, engaged in the freight forwarding business, employed Baquial as accounting

clerk in Cagayan de Oro. Her functions included depositing Libcap’s daily sales and
collections with Global Bank (now PSBank). An audit was conducted and showed that
respondent made a double reporting of a single deposit made on April 2,2001.

Libcap then sent a letter requiring respondent to explain in writing within 24 hours why
there was a discrepancy.

In her reply, respondent claimed that on April 2, 2001, she deposited with the bank two
separate amounts of P1,437.00 each, but that it appears that both separate deposits
were covered by a single bank validation, which defect should not be blamed on her but
on the bank. Libcap discovered that only one P1,437.00 deposit was made on April 2,
2001. On verification with PS Bank, its branch head confirmed in a letter that only a
single deposit of P1,437.00 was posted on April 2, 2001, and that there was no
misposting or deposits to other accounts of the same amount made on such date.
Meanwhile, the amount of P1,437.00 was deducted from respondent’s salary each
payday on a staggered basis.

Libcap required respondent to attend an investigation to be conducted in Ilo-ilo City but

the latter failed to attend such due to financial reasons. Hence, she was placed on
preventive suspension and later on received a Notice of Termination for dishonesty,
embezzlement, inefficiency, and for commission of acts inconsistent with Libcap’s work
standards.

ISSUES:

1. WON there was a compliance with Procedural Due Process and WON the CA
was justified in awarding P100,000 as Nominal Damages deviating from the
standard P30,000?
2. WON respondent has a cause of action to ask for the award of salary
differentials, 13th month pay and holiday pay? (in relation to wage protection
provision)

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition.

1. Respondent was denied due process because respondent’s case has been pre-
judged even prior to the start of the investigation. The amount which petitioners
claim was embezzled – was peremptorily deducted each payday from
respondent’s salary on a staggered basis. The law and jurisprudence, contrary to
petitioner’s claim, allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in
a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe
due process in dismissing the employee. Financial assistance is granted as a
measure of equity or social justice, and is in the nature or takes the place of
severance compensation. The amount of P100,000.00 as nominal damages
should be reduced to P30,000.00. Nominal damages are awarded for the
purpose of vindicating or recognizing a right and not for indemnifying
 a loss. Nominal damages is awarded in favor of an employee in a case where a
valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in
dismissing the employee.

2. Pertinent Ruling:
Although petitioner company had cause to terminate Madriaga, this has no
bearing on the issue of award of salary differentials, holiday pay and 13th month
pay because prior to his valid dismissal, he performed work as a regular
employee of petitioner company, and he is entitled to the benefits provided under
the law. Thus, in the case of Agabon, even while the Court found that the
dismissal was for a just cause, the employee was still awarded his monetary
claims. An employee should be compensated for the work he has rendered in
accordance with the minimum wage, and must be appropriately remunerated
when he was suffered to work on a regular holiday during the time he was
employed by the petitioner company. As regards the 13th month pay, an
employee who was terminated at any time before the time for payment of the 13th
month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the length of time
he worked during the year, reckoned from the time he started working during the
calendar year up to the time of his termination from the service.

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even
where the employee must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden
rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to prove
nonpayment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls,
records, remittances and other similar documents — which will show that
overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have
been paid — are not in the possession of the employee but in the custody and
absolute control of the employer. Since in the case at bar petitioner company has
not shown any proof of payment of the correct amount of salary, holiday pay and
13th month pay, we affirm the award of Madriaga’s monetary claims.

Deoferio vs. Intel Technology Phils.,

GR No. 202996, June 18, 2014

FACTS:
On February 1, 1996, respondent Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. (Intel) employed
Deoferio as a product quality and reliability engineer with a monthly salary of P9,000.00.
In July2001, Intel assigned him to the United States as a validation engineer for an
agreed period of two years and with a monthly salary of US$3,000.00. On January 27,
2002, Deoferio was repatriated to the Philippines after being confined at Providence St.
Vincent Medical Center for major depression with psychosis. In the Philippines, he
worked as a product engineer with a monthly salary of P23,000.00.

Deoferio underwent a series of medical and psychiatric treatment at Intel’s expense

after his confinement in the United States. After several consultations, Dr. Lee issued a
psychiatric report dated January 17,2006 concluding and stating that Deoferio’s
psychotic symptoms are not curable within a period of six months and "will negatively
affect his work and social relation with his co-worker[s]." Pursuant to these findings, Intel
issued Deoferio a notice of termination on March 10, 2006.

Deoferio responded to his termination of employment by filing a complaint for illegal

dismissal with prayer for money claims against respondents Intel and Mike Wentling
(respondents). He argued that Intel violated his statutory right to procedural due process
when it summarily issued a notice of termination. Deoferio also prayed for backwages,
separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
1. WON Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia and whether his continued
employment was prejudicial to his health, as well as to the health of his co-
employees;
2. WON the twin-notice requirement in dismissals applies to terminations due to
disease.

RULING:

We find the petition partly meritorious.

Intel had an authorized cause to dismiss Deoferio from employment. Concomintant to

the employer’s right to freely select and engage an employee is the employer’s right to
discharge the employee for just and/or authorized causes. To validly effect terminations
of employment, the discharge must be for a valid cause in the manner required by law.
The purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working class from the
employer’s arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to dismiss. In concrete terms,
these qualifications embody the due process requirement in labor cases - substantive
and procedural due process. Substantive due process means that the termination must
be based on just and/or authorized causes of dismissal. On the other hand, procedural
due process requires the employer to effect the dismissal in a manner specified in the
Labor Code and its IRR.
The present case involves termination due to disease – an authorized cause for
dismissal under Article 284 of the Labor Code. As substantive requirements, the Labor
Code and its IRR require the presence of the following elements:

(1) An employer has been found to be suffering from any disease.

(2) His continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health, as well
as to the health of his co-employees.

(3) A competent public health authority certifies that the disease is of such nature or
at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with
proper medical treatment. With respect to the first and second elements, the
Court liberally construed the phrase "prejudicial to his health as well as to the
health of his co-employees" to mean "prejudicial to his health or to the health of
his co-employees." We did not limit the scope of this phrase to contagious
diseases for the reason that this phrase is preceded bythe phrase "any disease"
under Article 284 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 284. Disease as ground for termination. – An employer may terminate the
services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any
disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees:
Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month
salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is
greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year.

In the current case, we agree with the CA that Dr. Lee’s psychiatric report substantially
proves that Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia, that his disease was not curable
within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment, and that his continued
employment would be prejudicial to his mental health. This conclusion is further
substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts that Deoferio committed while at Intel’s
employ.

The twin-notice requirement applies to terminations under Article 284 of the Labor
Code.

The Labor Code and its IRR are silent on the procedural due process required in
terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in the law, Section 2, Rule 1,
Book VI of the IRR expressly states that the employee should be afforded procedural
due process in all cases of dismissals.

We award Deoferio the sum of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for violation of his
statutory right to procedural due process. In so ruling, we take into account Intel’s
faithful compliance with Article 284 of the Labor Code and Section 8, Rule 1, Book 6 of
the IRR.
Deoferio is not entitled to salary differential, backwages, separation pay, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

Deoferio's claim for salary differential is already barred by prescription. Under Article
291 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall
be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. In the current
case, more than four years have elapsed from the pre-termination of his assignment to
the United States until the filing of his complaint against the respondents. Deoferio is
not entitled to salary differential, backwages, separation pay, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

Deoferio's claim for salary differential is already barred by prescription. Under Article
291 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall
be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. In the current
case, more than four years have elapsed from the pre-termination of his assignment to
the United States until the filing of his complaint against the respondents. Intel
Technology Philippines, Inc. is ordered to pay petitioner Marlo A. Deoferio nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Universal International Investment (BVI) Limited vs. Ray Burton Development Corp.
G.R. No. 182201
November 14, 2016

Topic:
Breach of Contract

Facts:
Ray Burton Development Corp (RBDC) owned and developed
Elizabeth Place, a condominium located at Salcedo Village, Makati City. Universal International Investment
(Universal) and RBDC entered into separate Contracts to Sell covering the purchase of ten
condominium units and ten parking slots. Universal paid RBDC the full purchase price of the
properties amounting to ₱52,836,781.50. Universal demanded RBDC the cancellation of the sale
after RBDC failed to deliver possession of the properties and reneged on its obligation to transfer
the Condominium Certificates of Title (CCT) to Universal’s name. Universal subsequently
discovered that the mother title to the lot of Elizabeth Place is mortgaged to China Banking
Corporation (China Bank). The securities were foreclosed by China Bank.
Universal filed a Complaint for Specific Performance or Rescission of Contract and Damages
with the Expanded National Capital Region Field Office (ENCRFO) of the HLURB. The
ENCRFO rendered a decision in favor of Universal. When the case reached the Court of Appeals
(CA), Universal manifested that China Bank had released the subject properties and Universal
had already obtained their CCTs. When RBDC moved for dismissal of the case, Universal
claimed that it is RBDC is still liable for damages and compensation for property losses
supposedly to cover the depreciation costs and expenses it had incurred for the release of the
properties from China Bank under Section 6 of the Contract to Sell. Section 6 reads:
SECTION 6. BREACH AND/OR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONTRACT.
This agreement shall be deemed cancelled, at the option of the BUYER, in the event that SELLER, for the
reasons of force majeure, decide not to continue with the Project or the Project has been substantially delayed. In
such a case, the BUYER shall be entitled to refund all the payments made with interest at one-and-a-half (1½)
percent per month on the amount paid computed from the date of cancellation until the payments have
been fully refunded. Substantial delay is defined as six (6) months from date of estimated date of completion.
The parties agree that the estimated date of completion shall be December 31, 1998.

CA denied Universal’s claim for damages.

Issue: Whether or not RBDC committed a breach of contract?

Held: RBDC committed breach of contract. Both parties entered into a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. In a contract to sell, ownership is reserved by the vendor. The obligation of the
seller becomes demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive condition which is the
full payment of the purchase price. Such full payment gives rise to the right to demand the
execution of the contract of sale. It is only upon the existence of the contract of sale that the seller
becomes obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. Under the contract to sell, RBDC only has
two obligations: (1) to deliver the deeds of absolute sale; and (2) to deliver the corresponding CCTs. RBDC did not
have any contractual obligation to surrender possession of the properties. Neither did RBDC have to cause the
transfer of the CCT to Universal’s name.

However, RBDC did fail to deliver the deeds of absolute sale and to give the corresponding CCTs. RBDC invokes as
an excuse Section 5(a) of the contract where Universal is obliged to pay the transfer charges. RBDC’s excuse fails.
In order that the debtor may be held to be in default, the following conditions must be present: (1) obligation is
demandable and already liquidated; (2) the debtor delays performance of the obligation; and (3) the creditor requires
the performance judicially or extrajudicially. RBDC did not make any demand to Universal to tender any payment for
the expenses connected with the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or transfer of title. Universal cannot be
considered to have defaulted on the payment of transfer charges. Under the aforementioned provision of the
contract, Universal cannot be obliged to pay the transfer charges when RBDC did not aver to undertake the
responsibility of transferring the title of the properties. RBDC is left with no just reason not to perform its obligations
to Universal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO
G.R. No. 211062 January 13, 2016

FACTS:
Angeles, the mother of Auria, narrated that Auria and the accused-appellant got
married in March 2000 and that out of their union, they begot two (2) children. Angeles
claimed that, at the time of the incident, they were all living together in a house located in
V & G Subdivision, Tacloban City. The said house was entrusted to Angeles by her
brother, Quirino Ragub, who was then residing in Canada.

Angeles testified that around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her
children Catherine, Jessica, Auria and Arvin were walking home after playing bingo at a
local peryahan. Some friends tagged along with them so that they could all feast on the
leftover food prepared for the fiesta that was celebrated the previous day. Along the way,
Angeles and her group met Auria’s husband, the accused-appellant. The latter joined
them in walking back to their house.

When they arrived at the house, the group proceeded to the living room except for
Auria and the accused-appellant who went straight to their bedroom, about four (4) meters
away from the living room. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter Auria shouting,
“mother help me I am going to be killed.” Upon hearing Auria’s plea for help, Angeles
and the rest of her companions raced towards the bedroom but they found the door of
the room locked. Arvin kicked open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a
bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to Auria was the accused-appellant who
was then trying to stab himself with the use of an improvised bladed weapon (belt buckle).
Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, on board a vehicle owned by a neighbor, but
was pronounced dead on arrival. Angeles declared that the accused-appellant jumped
over the fence and managed to escape before the policemen could reach the crime
scene.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime Parricide?

RULING:
All the Essential Elements of Parricide Duly Established and Proven by the
Prosecution

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused. Among the three requisites, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of
parricide from homicide. In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship
between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be
considered in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not
contested.
In this case, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond
dispute. As previously stated, the defense already admitted that Auria was the legitimate
wife of the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference. Such admission was even
reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of trial of the case. Nevertheless, the
prosecution produced a copy of the couple’s marriage certificate which the defense
admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the original. Hence, the key element
that qualifies the killing to parricide was satisfactorily demonstrated in this case.
Secretary of DPWH vs Sps. Heracleo and Ramona Tecson Case Digest GR
179334 Apr 21 2015

Facts:
Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties
traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken
sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation
proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the
fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm.,
as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed
a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were
rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest
per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC Division
reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the
property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting
opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of the issue, the
case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.

Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should

No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to
actual taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power,
given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and
public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to
the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process
would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate
objective of which is to serve the greater good.

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of
the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.

Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time
of taking

Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated
valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property should be
computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the
purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to
compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what
he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time it
is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case

No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for
only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for
computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence,
would open varying interpretation of economic policies – a matter which this Court
has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come
into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

Velasco Dissent:
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. As
such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead to
failure of taking an individual’s property. In this case, since the property was already
taken, the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss thereof. For
purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the
time the property owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To
hold otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of
procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part.
To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue
dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.