A
Actual Self
Cristina Măroiu and Laurent‚iu P. Maricut‚oiu
Department of Psychology, West University of
Timis‚ oara, Timis‚ oara, Romania
Definition of the Actual Self
The term actual self was introduced by Tory
Higgins in 1987, as part of his self-discrepancy
theory. From this perspective, the actual self is a
cognitive structure (cognitive schemata, or repre-
sentation) that contains all attributes that a person
believes that are self-descriptive. These self-
descriptive attributes are not necessarily issued
by the owner of the actual self; they also can be
issued by other people. For example, if I believe
that I am a punctual person, then punctuality is
part of my actual self. Similarly, if my colleagues
describe me as being punctual and I am aware of
this description, then punctuality is an attribute
contained in my actual self. In conclusion, the
actual self is a cognitive structure (or schemata,
or representation) that includes all self-describing
attributes that a person is aware of, regardless
whether these characteristics resulted from self-
evaluations or evaluations provided by others.
Similar Terms: the True Self
The true self is a term suggested by Carl Rogers
(1951), and his definition is similar with Higgins’
view of the actual self. The difference lies in the
# Springer International Publishing AG 2017
V. Zeigler-Hill, T.K. Shackelford (eds.), Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_1435-1
fact that Rogers’ true self is not fully expressed in
the social life, and the individual might not even
be aware of its content, while awareness is a key
feature in the definition of the actual self.
According to Rogers, the therapeutic process
should assist the patient in discovering his/her
true self and to manifest it in social interactions.
Introduction
Functions of the Actual Self
Along with the actual self, Higgins’ self-
discrepancy theory defines two more basic
domains of the self: the ideal self (i.e., how I or
others describe the ideal me) and the ought self
(i.e., how I or others believe I should be). The
actual self is a representation that is compared to
the possible selves (ideal or ought). A discrepancy
between the actual self and the ideal self is related
to dejected affect (Higgins et al. 1985; Higgins
1987). A discrepancy between the actual and the
ought self is related to higher levels of anxiety and
agitation. In conclusion, the outcome of the com-
parison can be motivational (e.g., when people
increase their efforts to reach a realistic standard
they hold), but it can also lead to negative conse-
quences like anxiety or depression (e.g., when
people appraise their performance based on unre-
alistic high standards).
More recent perspectives suggest that not all
self-describing adjectives are equally relevant for
comparisons. According to the Contingencies of
2 Actual Self
Self-Worth Model (Crocker and Wolfe 2001),
individuals categorize self-describing information
and use only some of the categories for compari-
sons. Crocker and Wolfe (2001) defined seven
main domains of self-describing information,
grouped into two categories: internal and external
contingencies of self-worth. The internal contin-
gencies of self-worth are God’s love (i.e., self-
descriptive information that confirms he/she is
acting in a religious manner) and virtue (i.e.,
self-descriptive information that confirms he/she
is adhering to a moral code). The external contin-
gencies of self-worth are competencies (i.e., self-
relevant information that confirms his/her compe-
tence), competition (i.e., self-relevant information
that confirms own superiority to others), approval
from generalized others (i.e., information that
confirms peers approve the individual), family
support (i.e., information that confirms support
from the family), and appearance. Individuals
are primarily motivated to achieve success and
avoid failure in domains that are relevant for
their self-worth.
Assessment of the Actual Self
Assessment of the actual self is usually conducted
within the framework of the self-discrepancy the-
ory, and researchers developed both idiographic
and nomothetic measures. A traditional idio-
graphic measure is the Selves Questionnaire
(Higgins et al. 1985). This measure requires
respondents to provide several traits or attributes:
one set that describes their actual self, one set that
describes their ideal self (both from own and
other’s standpoint) and one that describes their
ought self (both from own and other’s standpoint).
After generating the sets of traits, the respondents
rate them using a Likert scale, and discrepancy
scores are calculated using these ratings. Nomo-
thetic measures of self-discrepancy (e.g., Hoge
and McCarthy 1983) use fixed lists of adjectives
and also compute discrepancy scores using
respondent ratings. More recently, Hardin and
Lakin (2009) developed a measure that integrates
idiographic and nomothetic methods: Integrated
Self-Discrepancy Index (ISDI – see Hardin and
Lakin 2009 for a broader discussion).
Accuracy of the Actual Self Information
The actual self is a cognitive structure, and the
information contained in it is not necessarily
valenced. However, researchers showed that indi-
viduals tend to consider positive information as
being more self-relevant, as compared with neu-
tral or negative information. In general, people
have a positive self-evaluation, but cultural differ-
ences do exist, in the sense that collectivist cul-
tures tend to have a more neutral evaluation of the
self, as compared with individualistic cultures.
Because the actual self contains self-
descriptive attributes, it is important to discuss
the accuracy of these self-evaluations. Paulhus
and John (1998) distinguish between impression
management (i.e., a conscious dissimulation) and
self-deception (i.e., automated and positively
biased response that the respondent actually
believes to be true). There are two types of self-
favoring biases (Paulhus and John 1998): an ego-
tistic bias (i.e., individuals exaggerate the positive
information about the self) and a moralistic bias
(i.e., individuals minimize negative information
about the self, claiming “saint-like” attributes).
Thus, it is important to consider the self-deception
processes when we are investigating the content
of the actual self.
Cultural Differences
Because the actual self has two possible sources
(the individual or another person), researchers
investigated whether the two sources have equal
importance in determining the content of the
actual self. Cross-cultural research studies identi-
fied cultural differences regarding the dominant
source. Markus and Kitayama (1991) found that
in Western societies like the USA, people construe
themselves by referring to their own internal rep-
ertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action, rather
than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and
actions of others. On the contrary, in non-Western
cultures like Japan, people construe themselves by
referring to what they perceive to be the thoughts,
feelings, and actions of significant others. In con-
clusion, it seems that people from individualistic
cultures rely more frequently on own evaluations,
while individuals from collectivistic societies give
Actual Self
more importance to self-relevant information pro-
vided by significant others.
Applications of the Concept of the Actual Self
Self-Regulation
Self-regulation entails two different strategies,
depending on which possible self (ideal or
ought) is the actual self compared to. When the
actual self is compared to the ideal self, a congru-
ence means positive outcomes, and a discrepancy
indicates the absence of positive outcomes. When
the actual self is compared with the ought self, a
congruence results in the lack of negative out-
comes, while a discrepancy leads to negative out-
comes. This is why, when the ideal self is taken as
reference, self-regulations is guided by an
approach motive (i.e., to try and obtain the posi-
tive outcomes of fulfilling one’s hopes, wishes,
and aspirations), while if ought self is taken as
reference, self-regulation is guided by an avoid-
ance motive (i.e., to try and avoid adverse out-
comes of unfulfilling duties and obligations).
Marketing Applications
In marketing research, the term self-congruence
indicates a fit between the consumer’s self and the
brand’s image. Sirgy et al. (2000) argue that shop-
pers who experience a match between the image
of a product and their actual self-image will be
motivated to buy that product. Doing so will sat-
isfy their need for self-consistency. That is, a
person tends to have a positive attitude towards
brands that share the same attributes they, or other
people, believe they actually possess. However,
self-construal is culturally dependent. Therefore,
it is possible to find cultural differences regarding
the relations between consumer behavior and the
actual-self congruity.
Human Relations Applications
Robins and Boldero (2003) extended the self-
discrepancy framework presented by Higgins
(1987) and applied it to dyadic relations. In this
context, discrepancies may arise between a fol-
lower’s actual self, and his or her perception of the
leader’s actual self. Gardner et al. (2005) proposed
that an authentic leader-follower relationship is
3
facilitated by high levels of congruence between
the follower’s and leader’s actual, ought, and
ideal self.
Online Interaction
Today, the Internet is part of our daily lives, and
this has opened new possibilities for expressing
ourselves and connecting with each other. While
the actual self is more accessible during face-to-
face interactions, the true self is more accessible
during online interactions (Bargh et al. 2002). As
Bargh et al. (2002) show, on the Internet one is
better able to express his/her true self and also
create meaningful relationships with other people.
In a similar vein, Bessiére et al. (2007) investi-
gated the possibilities offered by online multi-
player games. They found that players created
their avatar more similar to their ideal self than
to their actual self. Having the opportunity to
enact aspects of one’s ideal self by means of an
avatar may help to reduce the discrepancy
between the actual and ideal self. As this can be
an excellent opportunity to increase well-being,
many other factors need to be taken into consid-
eration, like the players’ willingness to emulate
their characters’ better traits in their day-to-day
lives also.
Conclusion
The actual self is one facet of the complex struc-
ture that is the self. The actual self becomes mean-
ingful when we compare its content with what we
would like to be, what others would like us to be,
what are our duties, or the duties others think we
have. The results of these comparisons will impact
our behavior and subsequently our well-being.
References
Bargh, J. A., McKenna, K. Y., & Fitzsimons, G. M. (2002).
Can you see the real me? Activation and expression of
the “true self” on the Internet. Journal of Social Issues,
58(1), 33–48. doi:10.1111/1540-4560.00247.
Bessière, K., Seay, A. F., & Kiesler, S. (2007). The ideal
elf: Identity exploration in world of Warcraft.
4 Actual Self
Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 10(4), 530–535.
doi:10.1089/cpb.2007.9994.
Crocker, J., & Wolfe, C. T. (2001). Contingencies of self-
worth. Psychological Review, 108(3), 593–623.
doi:10.1037//0033-295X.108.3.593.
Gardner, W. L., Avolio, B. J., Luthans, F., May, D. R., &
Walumbwa, F. (2005). “can you see the real me?”
A self-based model of authentic leader and follower
development. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(3),
343–372. doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2005.03.003.
Hardin, E. E., & Lakin, J. L. (2009). The integrated self-
discrepancy index: A reliable and valid measure of self-
discrepancies. Journal of Personality Assessment,
91(3), 245–253. doi:10.1080/00223890902794291.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating
self and affect. Psychological Review, 94(3), 319–340.
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.319.
Higgins, E. T., Klein, R., & Strauman, T. (1985). Self-
concept discrepancy theory: A psychological model
for distinguishing among different aspects of depres-
sion and anxiety. Social Cognition, 3(1), 51–76.
doi:10.1521/soco.1985.3.1.51.
Hoge, D. R., & McCarthy, J. D. (1983). Issues of validity
and reliability in the use of real–ideal discrepancy
scores to measure self-regard. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 44(5), 1048–1055.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.5.1048.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self:
Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Psychological Review, 98(2), 224–253. doi:10.1037/
0033-295X.98.2.224.
Paulhus, D. L., & John, O. P. (1998). Egoistic and moral-
istic biases in self-perception: The interplay of self-
deceptive styles with basic traits and motives. Journal
of Personality, 66(6), 1025–1060. doi:10.1111/1467-
6494.00041.
Robins, G., & Boldero, J. (2003). Relational discrepancy
theory: The implications of self-discrepancy theory for
dyadic relationships and for the emergence of social
structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
7(1), 56–74. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0701_4.
Rogers, C. (1951). Client-centered therapy. Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin.
Schmitt, D. P., & Allik, J. (2005). Simultaneous adminis-
tration of the Rosenberg self-esteem scale in 53 nations:
Exploring the universal and culture-specific features of
global self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89(4), 623–642. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.
89.4.623.
Sirgy, M. J., Grewal, D., & Mangleburg, T. (2000). Retail
environment, self-congruity, and retail patronage: An
integrative model and a research agenda. Journal of
Business Research, 49(2), 127–138. doi:10.1016/
S0148-2963(99)00009-0.