Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12963 October 25, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
URBANO DOMEN, defendant-appellant.

Leopoldo Rovira for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The defendant and appellant frankly admits that a wound inflicted by him with a tuba knife on the
right arm of Victoriano Gadlit caused the death of the latter. The appellant, however, advances the
claim, that he should be exempted from criminal liability because of having acted in defense of his
person. Let us, therefore, examine the evidence to ascertain if the decision of the trial court finding
the defendant and appellant guilty of homicide should be sustained or whether as contended by
counsel and as recommended by the Attorney-General the defendant should be acquitted.

The widow took the stand for the prosecution and testified that the accused made an unprovoked
attack upon her husband at the foot of the stairway leading up into their house, and that this attack
was also witnessed by a neighbor, Angel Pocong. But Angel Pocong testified that he was absent
from home at the time in question, and that all that he knew of the fight was what was told him by the
widow. The court found that the widow was mistaken in her testimony. Not considering, therefore,
her testimony, the prosecution has in addition only the testimony of Filomeno Antipuesto, who told of
the accused having admitted that he had wounded the deceased, and the testimony of Angel
Pocong as to the death of the deceased while being carried in a hammock. We must then perforce
rely on the evidence for the defense. From the testimony of two witnesses who claimed to have seen
what occurred and the testimony of the defendant, it appears that the defendant and the deceased
quarrelled about a carabao of the defendant, which the deceased said had gotten into his corn
patch; that the deceased attacked the defendant and struck him with a piece of wood called
"Japanese," about a vara in length and about the size of one's wrist; that the deceased struck at the
accused four or five times; and that the accused did not retreat but struck back wounding the
deceased on the forearm.

The facts stated present a close question for the decision. Admitting that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased, the doubt centers around the point as to whether there was
reasonable necessity for the means employed by the defendant to repel the attack. Resolving, as it
is our duty to do, any doubt in favor of the accused, and passing by well known principles of the
criminal law, we come to the case of United States vs. Molina ([1911] 19 Phil., 227), and the
doctrines therein enunciated. In the opinion handed down in this case by Mr. Justice Mapa, it is held
that: (1) During an unlawful attack by another and while a struggle is going on and the danger to his
person or to his life continues, the party assaulted has a right to repel the danger by wounding his
adversary, and if, necessary, to disable him; (2) the fact that a person when assaulted does not flee
from his assailant is not sufficient reason for declining in a proper case to uphold the rational
necessity of the means employed in repelling the illegal attack. 1awphil.net

The first proposition of the Molina opinion is in accord with the settled jurisprudence of this court.
(See U. S. vs. Laurel [1912], 22 Phil., 252; U. S. vs. Patoto [1914], 28 Phil., 535.) The second
proposition dealing with the necessity of retreat by the accused can be further examined in the light
of controlling authorities. The ancient common law rule in homicide was denominated "retreat to the
wall." This doctrine makes it the duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before he is
justified in meeting force with force. This principle has now given way in the United States to the
"stand ground when in the right" rule. The Supreme Court of the United States carefully examined
the application of the two doctrines in Beard vs. United States ([1894] 158 U. S., 550). In the opinion
handed down by Mr. Justice Harlan reference is made approvingly to the decision of the Supreme
Court of Ohio in Erwin vs. State ([1876] 29 Ohio St., 186) in which it is said:
 It is true that all authorities agree that the taking of life in defense of one's person cannot be
either justified or excused, except on the ground of necessity; and that such necessity must
be imminent at the time; and they also agree that no man can avail himself of such necessity
if he brings it upon himself. The question, then, is simply this: Does the law hold a man who
is violently and feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought such necessity upon
himself, on the sole ground that he failed to fly from his assailant when he might safely have
done so? The law, out of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human nature, will not
permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or even to save life where the assault is
provoked; but a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by
violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm.

Justice Harlan then concludes his opinion with these words:

The defendant was where he had the right to be, when the deceased advanced upon him in
a threatening manner, and with a deadly weapon; and if the accused did not provoked the
assault and had at the time reasonable grounds to believe and in good faith believed, that
the deceased intended to take his life or do him great bodily harm, he was not obliged to
retreat, nor consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground
and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly weapon, in such way and with such force
as, under all circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly believed, and had reasonable
grounds to believe, was necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from great bodily
injury.

The same Court reexamined and reaffirmed the doctrine in Rowe vs. United States ([1896] 164 U.
S., 546).

We can do no better than to paraphrase the language of these well considered opinions for our
present purpose. The accused did not provoke the assault. The accused was where he had a right to
be. The law did not require him to retreat when his assailant was rapidly advancing upon him in a
threatening manner with a deadly weapon. The accused was entitled to do whatever he had
reasonable grounds to believe at the time was necessary to save his life or to protect himself from
great bodily harm. The element of practicability made it impossible for him to determine during the
heat of a sudden attack whether he would increase or diminish the risk to which exposed by
standing his ground or stepping aside. His resistance was not disproportionate to the assault. The
wound was inflicted, not on what is usually a vital part of the body but on the arm as one would
naturally strike to defend himself. Viewed from all angles, we believe this is a "proper case" for the
exemption of the accused from criminal liability because of having acted in legitimate defense of his
person.

Agreeable to the recommendation of the Attorney-General and in conformity with the proof, judged in
connection with the principles just stated, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court and acquit
the defendant and appellant of the crime charged, with the costs of both instances de officio. So
ordered.