PART 1: TORTS:
A. Primary Consideration:
1. Tort, Defined;
An unlawful violation of private right, not
created by contract, and which gives rise to
an action for damages.
It is an act or omission producing an injury
to another, without any previous existing
lawful relation of which the said act or
omission may be said to be a natural
outgrowth or incident.
Torts are basically called quasi-delicts in
the Philippines, although torts has been
used by jurisprudence, its definition stems
from Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which
states that:
“Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict x x x “
In a nutshell, the elements of a valid tort
are as follows:
1. There must be an act or omission
2. Damage or injury is caused to another
3. Fault or negligence is present
4. There is no pre-existing contractual
relations between the parties
5. Causal connection between damage
done and act/omission.
Quasi-Delict Defined;
A quasi-delict is a negligent act or omission
which causes harm or damage to the
person or property of another, and thus
exposes a person to civil liability in civil law
jurisdictions, as if the act or omission was
intentional (a delict).
Article 1157, Civil Code;
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
2. Quasi-Delict, Defined;
CHAPTER 2
QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
CASES:
BARREDO vs. GARCIA, 73 PHIL 607
(1942);
FACTS:
1. At about 1:30 am on May 3, 1936, taxi
driver Fontanilla guided by Dimapilis
collided head on with a “kalesa” thereby
injuring and killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia.
2. Faustino’s parents, Garcia and Alamario,
filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and
reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit.
3. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
4. After the criminal suit, on March 7, 1939,
the parents of the deceased instituted a
civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the
Malate taxicab (employer of Fontanilla)
making him primarily and directly
responsible under culpa acquiliana of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
5. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the
civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees).
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6. Barredo’s defense was that Fontanilla’s
negligence is punished by the Revised
Penal Code, but since Fontanilla was not
sued for civil liability, therefore, Barredo
claims that he cannot be held liable arguing
that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil suit should have been
filed against Fontanilla primarily and not
him.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Barredo, as employer, is civilly
liable for the acts of his employee,
Fontanilla?
2. W/N the parents of the deceased file civil
action against Fausto Barredo thus making
him primarily and directly responsible
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla?
HELD:
Yes, Barredo is primarily liable under Article
1903. The parents were well within their
rights in suing him.
1. Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil
Code of the Philippines and is entirely
distinct and independent from a delict or
crime under the Revised Penal Code.
In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act
causing damage may produce civil liability
(subsidiary) arising from a crime under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines; or create an action for quasi-
delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the
parties are free to choose which course to
take.
And in the instant case, the negligent act of
Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of
Barredo:
First, a subsidiary one because of the civil
liability of Fontanilla arising from the
latter’s criminal negligence under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Second, Barredo’s primary and direct
responsibility arising from his presumed
negligence as an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
2. Barredo was held liable for damages.
It was also proven that Barredo is negligent
in hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired
him. He is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his driver’s
negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee
(Article 1903).
“Some of the differences between crimes
under the Penal Code are:
• “1. That crimes affect the public interest,
while quasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
• “2. That consequently, the Penal Code
punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
• “3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-
delicts, because for the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-
delitos, include all acts in which any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes.
However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of
the game laws, infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt.
GARCIA vs. FLORIDA, 52 SCRA 420
(1973);
FACTS:
A head-on collision between a taxicab
owned by Barredo and a carretela
occurred. The carretela was overturned
and one of its passengers, a 16-year old
boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died as
a result of the injuries which he received.
The driver of the taxicab, an employee of
Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and
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was convicted. When the criminal case was
instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved
their right to institute a separate civil action
for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and
Almario instituted a civil action for
damages against Barredo, the employer of
the taxicab driver.
ISSUE:
W/N they can file a separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo making him
primarily and directly responsible?
HELD:
(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided
by the Supreme Court prior to the present
Civil Code. However, the principle
enunciated in said case, that responsibility
for fault or negligence as quasi-delict is
distinct and separate from negligence
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, is
now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of
the Civil Code.)
The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s
negligence being punishable by the Penal
Code, his (defendant’s) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to
said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not
been sued in a civil action and his property
has not been exhausted. To decide the
main issue, we must cut thru the tangle
that has, in the minds of many, confused
and jumbled together delitos and cuasi
delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and
fault or negligence under Articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code. According to the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain:
“Authorities support the proposition that a
quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a
separate legal institution under the Civil
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime. Upon
this principle, and on the wording and spirit
of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
“It will thus be seen that while the terms of
Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be
broad enough to cover the driver’s
negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless Article 1903 limits cuasi-
delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT
PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’
But inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes not only reckless but
even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under Article 1902 of
the Civil Code has apparently been crowded
out. It is this overlapping that makes the
“confusion worse confounded.’
However, a closer study shows that such a
concurrence of scope in regard to negligent
acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or
culpa extra-contractual under Articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the
differences between crimes under the Penal
Code are:
“1. That crimes affect the public interest,
while quasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
“2. That consequently, the Penal Code
punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-
delicts, because for the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-
delitos, include all acts in which ‘ any kind
of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However,
it should be noted that not all violations of
the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt.
“The foregoing authorities clearly
demonstrate the separate individuality of
cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there
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is a distinction between civil liability arising
from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely the
authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer
– in this case the defendant-petitioner – is
primarily and directly liable under Article
1903 of the Civil Code.”
ELCANO vs. HILL, 77 SCRA 98 (1977);
FACTS:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of
the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against
him but he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of
lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint
for recovery of damages against defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time
of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was
living and getting subsistence, for the same
killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the
defendants. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the civil case was finally
dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the present civil action for damages
is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case.
2. W/N Article 2180 (2nd and last
paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already
legally married.
HELD:
1. No, the present civil action for damages
is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a
distinction as regards the proof required in
a criminal case and a civil case. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a
civil case for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict does is independently
instituted from a criminal act. As such the
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may
still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child,
emancipation by marriage is not absolute,
i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. As in the present case, killing
someone else contemplated judicial
litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply
to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
CINCO vs. CANONOY, 90 SCRA 369
(1979);
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court
for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a
jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed
against the driver. At the pre-trial of the
civil case counsel for the respondents
moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case
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invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.
The City Court granted the motion and
ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari
to the Court of First Instance, alleging that
the City Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the
petition; hence, this petition to review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N there can be an independent civil
action for damages to property during the
pendency of the criminal action?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for
damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-
delictual in character which can be
prosecuted independently of the criminal
action.
Where the plaintiff made essential
averments in the complaint that it was the
driver's fault or negligence in the operation
of the jeepney which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney;
that plaintiff sustained damages because of
the collision; that a direct causal
connection exists between the damage he
suffered and the fault or negligence of the
defendant-driver and where the defendant-
operator in their answer, contended,
among others, that they observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees, a defense peculiar to
actions based on quasi-delict , such action
is principally predicated on Articles 32176
and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is
quasi-delictual in nature and character.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict ,
the civil case may proceed as a separate
and independent court action as specifically
provided for in Article 2177.
Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court refers to "other civil actions arising
from cases not included in Section 2 of the
same rule" in which, "once the criminal
action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a)
and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not
the civil action based on quasi delict.
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property. It
makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other.
The word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with
respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An
example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in
Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property".
Respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the decision of the
city court suspending the civil action based
on quasi-delict until after the criminal
action is finally terminated.
MENDOZA vs. ARRIETA; 91 SCRA 113
(1979);
FACTS:
On October 22, 1969, a three-way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-
Arthur Highway, Marilao Bulacan involving
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Mercedes Benz Owner/ petitioner, Edgardo
Mendoza, and respondents jeepney driver
Salazar and truck driver Montoya. This
resulted in the filing of two separate
Informations of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Damage to Property.
The first one being a Php 1604.00 Criminal
case against truck driver Montoya for
hitting Salazar’s jeepney at the right rear
portion causing the jeep to hit Mendoza’s
Mercedes, and the second Criminal Case
was against jeepney driver Salazar for
hitting the Benz in the amount of Php
8,890.00.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Bulacan rendered
judgment. Truck driver Montoya was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of
damage to property through reckless
imprudence and was sentence to pay
jeepney driver Salazar a fine for actual
damages and indemnity. Accused Rodolfo
Salazar, on the other hand, was acquitted.
Mercedes Benz owner was not awarded
damages.
On August 22, 1970 , after termination of
criminal cases, Petitioner filed Civil Case
against truck owner Timbol and jeepney
driver Salazar. Timbol filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that such action is barred
by the prior judgment in criminal cases.
The CFI judge granted Timbol’s Motion to
Dismiss.
ISSUES:
Can Timbol be sued for damages by
Mendoza after termination of criminal
cases? – YES.
Should the Civil Case against jeepney
driver Salazar be dismissed? YES.
HELD:
Timbol can be sued for damages.
No reservation need be made in the
criminal case, it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate. Even if it
were not substantive but adjective, it
cannot stand because of its inconsistency
with Article 2177, an enactment of the
legislature superseding the Rule of 1940.
There is no oneness in Identity in the civil
and criminal cases. In the former, the truck
owner, Timbol, was made a party in the
case while in the latter only the jeepney
driver, Salazar, was a party in the case for
the damage to Petitioner’s Mercedes Benz.
Moreover, in the criminal cases, the cause
of action was the enforcement of a civil
liability arising from criminal negligence,
while the August 22 Civil Case is based on
quasi delict under Art 2180 in relation to
Art 2176 of the New Civil Code.
The civil case against Salazar should be
dismissed.
The extinction of the penal action does not
entail the extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in
the final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Given the
facts of the case, the trial court pronounced
that jeepney driver Salazar cannot be held
liable for the damages sustained by
petitioner’s car.
Accordingly the civil action against Salazar
must be held to have been extinguished in
consonance with Section 3 (c) Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.
3. CULPA AQUILIANA DISTINGUISHED
FROM CRIME;
CRIMES:
1. Crimes affected the public interest.
2. Penal law punishes/ corrects the criminal
act.
3. Only acts covered by Penal Law are
punished (Barredo vs Garcia, 73 Phil 607;
J. Bocobo, 1940 : Taxi c lied with Carretela)
4. Guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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5. Reservation to file separate civil action. 5. Reservation to 5. No reservation
No reservation, civil action is impliedly file separate civil – it’s independent
instituted in the criminal action. action. No from crime.
reservation, civil (Andamo vs IAC,
6. Employer’s liability is subsidiary. action is impliedly 191 SCRA 203)
instituted in the
criminal action.
CULPA AQUILIANA:

1. Only private concern.

6. Employer’s 6. Employer’s
2. Repairs the damage by indemnification. liability is liability is solidary
subsidiary. (Fabre Jr. vs CA,
3. Covers all acts that are faulty or 259 SCRA 426, ‘
negligent. 96)

4. Preponderance of evidence.

5. No reservation – it’s independent from ARTICLES 101 TO 101, RPC;

crime. (Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 203)
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of
6. Employer’s liability is solidary (Fabre Jr. felony. — Every person criminally liable for
vs CA, 259 SCRA 426, ‘ 96) a felony is also civilly liable.

CULPA Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in

CRIMES
AQUILIANA certain cases. — The exemption from
1. Crimes affected 1. Only private criminal liability established in subdivisions
the public interest. concern. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability,
2. Penal law 2. Repairs the which shall be enforced subject to the
punishes/ corrects damage by following rules:
the criminal act. indemnification.
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of
Article 12, the civil liability for acts
3. Only acts covered 3. Covers all acts committed by an imbecile or insane person,
by Penal Law are that are faulty or and by a person under nine years of age,
punished (Barredo negligent. or by one over nine but under fifteen years
vs Garcia, 73 Phil of age, who has acted without discernment,
607; J. Bocobo, shall devolve upon those having such
1940 : Taxi c lied person under their legal authority or
with Carretela) control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such

4. Guilt proven 4. Preponderance insane, imbecile or minor under his
beyond reasonable of evidence. authority, legal guardianship or control, or
doubt. if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their
own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil
law.

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Second. In cases falling within subdivision
4 of Article 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall
be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound
discretion, the proportionate amount for
which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be
equitably determined, even approximately,
or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the
inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in
the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5
and 6 of Article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there
be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter
that part of their property exempt from
execution.
RULES 111, ROC;
Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than
actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees
shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal
and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall
be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing
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consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (cir. 57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said
civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the
merits is rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the
evidence already adduced in the civil action
shall be deemed automatically reproduced
in the criminal action without prejudice to
the right of the prosecution to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of
the parties to present additional evidence.
The consolidated criminal and civil actions
shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action,
the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.
(2a)
Section 3. When civil action may
proceeded independently. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil
actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict. However,
the independent civil action instituted
under section 3 of this Rule or which
thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or
legal representative of the accused after
proper substitution or against said estate,
as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the
offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of
the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the
case shall be dismissed without prejudice
to any civil action the offended party may
file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a
bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil
action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is not a bar to a criminal action
against the defendant for the same act or
omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of
prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
9
preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed
in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial
question. — The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (5a)
BARREDO vs. GARCIA; 73 PHIL 607
(1942);
FACTS:
1. At about 1:30 am on May 3, 1936, taxi
driver Fontanilla guided by Dimapilis
collided head on with a “kalesa” thereby
injuring and killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia.
2. Faustino’s parents, Garcia and Alamario,
filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and
reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit.
3. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
4. After the criminal suit, on March 7, 1939,
the parents of the deceased instituted a
civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the
Malate taxicab (employer of Fontanilla)
making him primarily and directly
responsible under culpa acquiliana of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
5. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the
civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees).
6. Barredo’s defense was that Fontanilla’s
negligence is punished by the Revised
Penal Code, but since Fontanilla was not
sued for civil liability, therefore, Barredo
claims that he cannot be held liable arguing
that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil suit should have been
filed against Fontanilla primarily and not
him.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Barredo, as employer, is civilly
liable for the acts of his employee,
Fontanilla?
2. W/N the parents of the deceased file civil
action against Fausto Barredo thus making
him primarily and directly responsible
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla?
HELD:
Yes, Barredo is primarily liable under Article
1903. The parents were well within their
rights in suing him.
1. Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil
Code of the Philippines and is entirely
distinct and independent from a delict or
crime under the Revised Penal Code.
In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act
causing damage may produce civil liability
(subsidiary) arising from a crime under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines; or create an action for quasi-
delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the
parties are free to choose which course to
take.
And in the instant case, the negligent act of
Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of
Barredo:
First, a subsidiary one because of the civil
liability of Fontanilla arising from the
latter’s criminal negligence under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Second, Barredo’s primary and direct
responsibility arising from his presumed
negligence as an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
2. Barredo was held liable for damages.
It was also proven that Barredo is negligent
in hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired
10
him. He is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his driver’s
negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee
(Article 1903).
“Some of the differences between crimes
under the Penal Code are:
• “1. That crimes affect the public interest,
while quasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
• “2. That consequently, the Penal Code
punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
• “3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-
delicts, because for the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-
delitos, include all acts in which any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes.
However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of
the game laws, infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt.
ELCANO vs. HILL, 77 SCRA 98, (1977);
FACTS:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of
the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against
him but he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of
lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint
for recovery of damages against defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time
of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was
living and getting subsistence, for the same
killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the
defendants. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the civil case was finally
dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the present civil action for damages
is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case.
2. W/N Article 2180 (2nd and last
paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already
legally married.
HELD:
1. No, the present civil action for damages
is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a
distinction as regards the proof required in
a criminal case and a civil case. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a
civil case for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict does is independently
instituted from a criminal act. As such the
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may
still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child,
emancipation by marriage is not absolute,
i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. As in the present case, killing
someone else contemplated judicial
litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply
to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
11
DULAY vs. CA, 243 SCRA 220, (1995);
FACTS:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation
between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang
Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of
the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children,
filed an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and private respondents
Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action.
Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. Superguard further alleged
that a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil
liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In addition, the
respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of
the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal
case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer’s subsidiary liability. Respondent
Safeguard also filed a motion praying that
it be excluded as defendant on the ground
that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
employees. Petitioners opposed both
motions, stating that their cause of action
against the private respondents is based on
their liability under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that
the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code as distinguished from those arising
from, quasi-delict.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of
shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code;
2. Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil
Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed; and
3. Whether or not the liability or
respondents is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides that “whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private
respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional.
2. No. The term “physical injuries” in Article
33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide.
Although in the Marcia case, it was held
that no independent civil action may be
filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be
noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused
in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia was
charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based
on Article 33 lies.
12
3. No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both. The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
PADILLA vs. CA, 129 SCRA 558,
(1984);
FACTS:
1. The information states that on February
8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused
prevented Antonio Vergara and his family
to close their stall located at the Public
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently
forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and
destroying said stall and the furnitures
therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods,
wares and merchandise
Contentions:
Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public
positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent
municipal mayor, and the rest of the
accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it
was committed with evident premeditation.
Roy Padilla, et al
1. finding of grave coercion was not
supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order
the clearance of market premises and the
removal of the complainants' stall because
the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market
stall was a nuisance per se
3. violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall
owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate
the market premise
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and
Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and hereby imposes upon them
to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5)
months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of
P500.00 each; to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount
of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, jointly and severally,
and all the accessory penalties provided for
by law; and to pay the proportionate costs
of this proceedings.
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered
them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000.
The petitioners were acquitted because
these acts were denominated coercion
when they properly constituted some
petitioners were acquitted because these
acts were denominated coercion when they
properly constituted some other offense
such as threat or malicious mischief
Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on
certiorari - grounds
1. where the civil liability which is included
in the criminal action is that arising from
and as a consequence of the criminal act,
and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from
the criminal case), no civil liability arising
from the criminal charge could be imposed
upon him.
2. liability of the defendant for the return of
the amount received by him may not be
enforced in the criminal case but must be
raised in a separate civil action for the
recovery of the said amount
13
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent
court committed a reversible error in
requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To
require a separate civil action simply
because the accused was acquitted would
mean needless clogging of court dockets
and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it. The exceptions are when
the offended party expressly waives the
civil action or reserves his right to institute
it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished
upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the
defendant. That the same punishable act or
omission can create two kinds of civil
liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the
civil liability arising from the act as a crime
and the liability arising from the same act
as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced
against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited,
that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a
civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case
may be filed but there is no statement that
such separate filing is the only and
exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages. Considering moreover the delays
suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be filed.
PEOPLE vs. LIGON, 152 SCRA 419
(1987);
FACTS:
An appeal from te judgment of the RTC
convicting accused of the crime of robbery
with homicide sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a
17-year-old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He
was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box,
and the latter uon clinging to the window of
the accused, lost his grip and fell down the
pavement as the car sped up. On appeal.
The Cort held that it was not convinced with
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was
acquitted.
ISSUE: W/N a person feed from criminal
liability is also freed from civil liability?
Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly
liable for his acts and omissions, there
being fault and negligence.
14
J: It does not follow that a person who is
not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt must be established
beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal
prosecution, only preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation
of the testimonies of both prosecution and
defense witness at the trial and applying
the quantum of proof required in civil
cases, We find that a preponderance of
evidence establishes that Gabat by his act
and omission with fault and negligence
caused damage to Rosales and should
answer civilly for the damage done.
MANIAGO vs. CA, 253 SCRA 674
(1996);
FACTS:
One of the shuttle buses owned by
petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by
Herminio Andaya, figured in a vehicular
accident with a passenger jeepney owned
by respondent Boado along Loakan Road,
Baguio City. A criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple physical injuries was
filed against petitioner’s driver. A month
later, respondent Boado filed a civil case for
damages against petitioner Maniago
himself. Petitioner moved that the civil case
be suspended citing that a criminal case
was already pending. The trial court denied
the motion on the ground that the civil
action could proceed independently of the
criminal action. On appeal to CA, petitioner
reiterated his contention adding that the
civil action could not proceed because no
reservation to bring it separately was made
in the criminal case. CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal action when
no reservation of right to bring it separately
was made?
HELD:
No.
*We have reached the conclusion that the
right to bring an action for damages under
the Civil Code must be reserved as required
by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be
dismissed.
To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that
a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery
of civil liability, otherwise they will be
deemed to have been instituted with the
criminal case. Such civil actions are not
limited to those which arise “from the
offense charged,” as originally provided in
Rule III before the amendment of the Rules
of Court in 1988. In other words the right
of the injured party to sue separately for
the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will
be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
MANLICLIC vs. CALAUNAN, 512 SCRA
642 (2007);
FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are:
(1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by
petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2)
owner-type jeep owned by respondent
Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the
North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of
the jeep causing the latter to move
to the shoulder on the right and
then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive
damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries
while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal
case was filed charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
15
 Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel
for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) of the testimonies in the
criminal case be received in evidence in
the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in
the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are
summarized by the trial court as
follows:
Respondent’s version:
- According to the respondent and his
driver, the jeep was cruising at the
speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the
expressway when the Philippine
Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in
the process of overtaking the jeep,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear of the jeep on the left side.
- At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus
hit the jeep, it was about to
overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at
the back of the jeep when the jeep
was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the
testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza.
He said that he was on another jeep
following the Philippine Rabbit Bus
and the jeep of plaintiff when the
incident took place. He testified that
the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the
right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Petitioner’s version:
- The petitioner explained that when
the Philippine Rabbit bus was about
to go to the left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the
left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it
observed and exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of
its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.
CA found no reversible error and
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal
case may be admitted in evidence for
the civil case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may
be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the CA in the criminal
case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part.
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI,
exercised due diligence and supervision
of its employee.
HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly
liable for the damages for his negligence or
reckless imprudence based on quasi-delict.
The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the
damages caused by the petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.
1. Admissibility of the TSNs
Petitioner’s contention:
- The TSNs should not be admitted to
evidence for failure to comply with
the requisites of Sec. 47, Rule 130
of the ROC
- The petitioner, PRBLI, had no
opportunity to cross examine the
witnesses because the criminal case
was filed exclusively against
Manliclic.
- Admission of the TSNs will deprive
the petitioner of due process.
Court:
- The testimonies are still admissible
on the ground that the petitioner
failed to object on their
admissibility.
- Failure to object to the inclusion of
the evidence is a waiver on the
provision of the law.
- In addition, the petitioner even
offered in evidence the TSN
16
 containing the testimony of
Ganiban.
- The court disagrees that it would
deprive the petitioner of due
process. For the failure of the
petitioner to object at the proper
time, it waived its right to object for
the non compliance with the ROC.
2. Civil liability arising from crime v.
Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana
Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner
deserves more credit as the
petitioner was already acquitted by
the CA of the charge of Reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be
gathered that the civil case for
damages was one arising from or
based on quasi-delict: Petitioner
Manliclic was sued for his negligence
or reckless imprudence in causing
the collision, while petitioner PRBLI
was sued for its failure to exercise
the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its
employees
- it appears that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is
not the author of the act complained
of which is based on Section 2(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
- In spite of said ruling, petitioner
Manliclic can still be held liable for
the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action
arising from crime or ex delicto and
not to a civil action arising from
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability
referred to in the quoted provision,
refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the
accused.
In sum, the court distinguished civil
liability arising from a crime and that
arising from quasi-delict:
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A
CRIME
(a) if an accused is acquitted based on
reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime
may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of
the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist),
said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex
delicto.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
QUASI-DELICT
- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime.
- The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. The acquittal
of the accused, even if based on
a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the
17
 extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
- civil liability arising from quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana, same will
not be extinguished by an acquittal,
whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not
exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case based on quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana.
- The petitioners urge the court to
give more credence to their version
of the story however, as they
constitute a question of fact, it may
not be raised as a subject for a
petition for review. Findings of the
trial court and appellate court are
binding on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner
about the jeep of the respondent
overtaking another vehicle in the
criminal case was not consistent
with what he gave to the
investigator which is evidently a
product of an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony
of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic,
and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already somewhat parallel to the
jeep when the collision took place,
the point of collision on the jeep
should have been somewhat on the
left side thereof rather than on its
rear. Furthermore, the jeep should
have fallen on the road itself rather
than having been forced off the
road.
3. PRBLI’s liability
- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both.
- The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
Petitioner’s contention:
- PRBLI maintains that it had shown
that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees
- In the matter of selection, it showed
the screening process that
petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver.
- As to the exercise of due diligence
in the supervision of its employees,
it argues that presence of ready
investigators is sufficient proof that
it exercised the required due
diligence in the supervision of its
employees
Court:
- In the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required
to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and
service records. In the supervision
of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof.
- As the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the
employer, the latter has the burden
of proving that it has been diligent
not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work.
- The trial court found that
petitioner PRBLI exercised the
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 diligence of a good father of a reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award
family in the selection but not in of exemplary damages shall be lowered
the supervision of its employees to P50,000.00.
- it seems that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as
well as in the maintenance of its
vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the
supervision of its personnel.
o no evidence introduced that
there are rules promulgated by
the bus company regarding the
safe operation of its vehicle and
in the way its driver should
manage and operate the
vehicles
o no showing that somebody in
the bus company has been
employed to oversee how its
driver should behave while
operating their vehicles
o The presence of ready
investigators after the
occurrence of the accident is not
enough. Same does not comply
with the guidelines set forth with
regard to the supervision.
o Regular supervision of
employees, that is, prior to any
accident, should have been
shown and established.
o the lack of supervision can
further be seen by the fact that
there is only one set of manual
containing the rules and
regulations for all the drivers
- For failure to adduce proof that
it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is
held solidarily responsible for
the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1)
the award of moral damages shall be
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