A.M. No.

RTJ-96-1335 March 5, 1997

INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LEO M. RAPATALO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or
willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal
Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against
a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The
hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the
respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent
Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize.
Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on
said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another
attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.

In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He
later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at
all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated
June 29, 19951 was issued on the basis of a marginal note2 dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of
the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00,"
signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that
there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the
Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and
instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.

In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition
based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation
setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to
oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared
that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was
doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended
bail.

Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a
warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration.3 To date, accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.

A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature and
purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the
accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges
brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused
in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. 4 In other words,
if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of
probability of evasion of the prosecution.5 In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release
of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to
release."6

It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases
where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person" charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the
very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, 7 it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." 8

To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-
known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual
views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the
part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful; but legal and regular." 9

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination." 10 If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process.

That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in the
following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981. 11 In this case seven separate informations for
murder were filed against the accused Sola and 18 other persons. After preliminary
investigation. the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest. However
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release. Citing People v San Diego, 12 we held: "We are of the considered
opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground.

(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989. 13 In this case, an information was filed
against the accused for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge, without
conducting any hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough
evidence to warrant a case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses who were allegedly not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held:
"Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the
persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for
each individual accused still has to established unless the prosecution submits the
issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness
of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or held. It is equally
entitled to due process.

(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990. 14 In this case, the prosecution was scheduled to
present nine witnesses at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence
against the private respondents was strong. After hearing the fifth witness, the
respondent judge insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The prosecution
in the instant case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt and to present within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to
present.

(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991 15 which involved an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion. In this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior hearing,
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with
murder, fixing at the same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the ground that the
evidence against them was merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is
accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding to allow the prosecution to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence
it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused.
Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a
violation of due process." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the performance of his duties.

(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992. 16 In this case, the judge issued an order
admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any hearing.
We held: "The prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present evidence
because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of
the accused is strong."

(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992. 17 In this administrative case, the
respondent judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing, and even before the accused had
been arrested or detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail from
a person charged with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the defense and the prosecution
must be given reasonable opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the
evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such
evidence of guilt was not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and warned to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of
his duties.

(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993, 18 the respondent judge issued a warrant
of arrest and also fixed the bail of an accused charged with the non bailable offense
of statutory rape, without allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge alleged that the
only evidence on record = the sworn statements of the complaining witness and her
guardian = were not sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an
established principle that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense,
the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may
desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,
before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to
conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of due process." It was
noted that the warrant of arrest was returned unserved and that after the case was
re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the warrant was set aside and cancelled.
There was no evidence on record showing whether the approved bail was revoked
by the complainant judge, whether the accused was apprehended or whether the
accused filed an application for bail. Hence, the respondent judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual P20,000.00 that the court imposes on
judges who grant the application of bail without notice and hearing.

(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993. 19 In this case, a complaint for murder was
filed against five persons. While the preliminary investigation was pending in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused before
the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge ordered the
prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the guilt of the accused
is strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to appear prompting
the respondent to grant the application for bail. We held: "Whether the motion for bail
of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present within a reasonable time all evidence it may desire to
introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge
was fined P20,000.00 and was warned that the commission of a similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994. 20 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued two separate warrants of arrest against two persons charged with
murder and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each accused without notifying
the prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the same.
Citing People v. Dacudao, 21 we held: "A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a
judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong.
Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of
procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled as the defense. A
hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those
factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec 6." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a
fine of P20,000 with a warning that the commission of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994. 22 In this case, an administrative

complaint was filed against the respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she
granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged with murder. The grant
was made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence of
guilt was strong and without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in this
regard. We held: "In immediately granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for
each of the accused without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence, the
respondent denied the prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many
cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail in
capital offenses and in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong." The
respondent judge was dismissed from service because the erroneous granting of bail
was just one of the offenses found to have been committed by her in the aforesaid
complaint.

(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994. 23 In this administrative case, the

respondent judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own
motion, authorized the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal
cases for murder. The accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail
was issued. We held: "A hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an
accused who is charged with a capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay a fine
of P25,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely. He was meted a fine in a higher amount than the
usual P20,000.00 because it involved two criminal cases wherein the respondent
judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but likewise the applicant therefor."

(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994. 24 In this administrative case, the

respondent judge issued an order directing the arrest of the accused charged with
rape and, motu proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00
without any application on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the
accused filed a motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge, again, without any
prior notice and hearing, reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is
explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that
purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge
to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of similar or the same offense will be dealt with more severely.

(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995 25 involving an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for granting bail to the two accused charged with
serious illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint application for bail,
the petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused and the
prosecution in opposition thereto were properly taken into account. However, the
respondent judge denied the application for bail on the around that it was premature
since the accused were not yet in custody of the law. In a subsequent order, the
respondent judge, without conducting any hearing on aforestated application and
thereby denying the prosecution an opportunity to oppose the same, granted said
petition upon the voluntary appearance in court of the two accused. Respondent
judge insisted that there was a hearing but the proceeding he adverted to was that
which was conducted when the motion for bail was first considered and then denied
for being premature. We held: "The error of the respondent judge lies in the fact that
in his subsequent consideration of the application for bail, he acted affirmatively
thereon without conducting another hearing and what is worse, his order concededly
lacked the requisite summary or resume of the evidence presented by the parties
and necessary to support the grant of bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded
because despite the irregularity in the procedure adopted in the proceeding, the
prosecution was undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and hearing. No erroneous
appreciation of the evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to
introduce additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated grant of
bail by the respondent.

(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995. 26 In this case, an administrative complaint

was filed against the respondent judge, who, without notice and hearing to the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder and illegal possession
of firearm. We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is
mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. At the hearing, both the
prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in case
of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, and in the
case of the defense, that evidence of such guilt is not strong." The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar
acts will warrant a more severe sanction.

(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995. 27 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted with
indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused charged with murder because
the accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he was
informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) . . . ." We held: "With his open
admission that he granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any
opportunity to be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this
court holding that such act amounts to a denial of due process, and made himself
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for which appropriate sanctions
may be imposed." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00
and warned that commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996. 28 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without hearing nor comment from the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail was
recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of discretion,
the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such hearing to the
fiscal or require him to submit his recommendation. . . . Truly, a judge would not be in
a position to determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong unless
a hearing is first conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was imposed on the respondent
 judge with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of
strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the
court.

Hence:

(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., 29 an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with homicide case without
affording the prosecution a chance to be heard. The respondent judge explained that he issued an
order for the motion to fix bail but the public prosecutor filed a comment instead which respondent
judge thought was adequate compliance with law. Respondent added that the evidence of guilt of
the accused, as disclosed by the records, was not so strong as to deny the application for bail. In
fact, the accused who filed for bail, together with three others, were later dropped by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor from the information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify them. We
held: "The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter
is left to the sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not
a hearing should be held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt
against the accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in
a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong." Although the
respondent judge's explanation was not enough to completely exculpate him, the circumstances,
coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety of his order warranted a mitigation of the usual
sanction the court imposes in cases of this nature. The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to a person charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and
estafa in five separate informations. The accused filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge
instead of setting the application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its comment or
opposition. The prosecution submitted its comment leaving the application for bail to the discretion of
the court. The respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering the
prosecution to comment on the accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the
requirement of a formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce
evidence but the latter refused and left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court
held, "It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. However, such discretion may only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted
liberty. . . . In the case at bar, however, no formal hearing was conducted by the respondent judge.
He could not have assessed the weight of evidence against the accused Gatus before granting the
latter's application for bail." The respondent judge was dismissed from service because he was
previously fined for a similar offense and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense would be dealt with more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison, 31 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent
judge for granting bail to several accused in a double murder case. The respondent judge claimed
that he granted the application for bail because the assistant prosecutor who was present at the
hearing did not interpose an objection thereto and that the prosecution never requested that it be
allowed to show that the evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted the incident for resolution.
The respondent judge further claimed that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail
was denied only after due consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We held: "The discretion of the
court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing
called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies,
not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the
weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine
of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future
would be dealt with more severely.

A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or
ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused." 32

In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas, 33 an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to an accused charged with murder. The application for bail
contained the annotation "No objection" of the provincial prosecutor and the respondent judge,
without holding a hearing to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted
bail and ordered the release of the accused from detention with instructions to the bondsman to
register the bond with the Register of Deeds within ten days. It was later found out that the assessed
value of the property given was short of the amount fixed for the release of the accused. We held:
"Although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused,
respondent judge should have nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application . . .
. Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for
justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into account the factors enumerated in Rule
114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should respondent judge have ordered the petition for bail and ordered the
release of the accused." Respondent judge herein was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and was
given a stern warning that the commission of a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.

Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. 34 This Court, in a number of cases 35 held that
even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an
accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the
strength of the state' s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.

After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution. 36 On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may
be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang 37 invalidated the order of respondent judge granting
bail to the accused because "Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the
court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and
concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to
Escano."

With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly remind trial court
judges to perform their mandatory duty of conducting the required hearing in bail applications where
the accused stands charged with a capital offense.

An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his
knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.

Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not
to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his
having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to
the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused
is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional
liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.

In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria, 38 this Court held that the respondent judge is duty bound to
exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to determine whether in the case at bar, the
proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant and to grant or deny the
petition for provisional liberty. It also held that a writ of mandamus will lie in order to compel the
respondent judge to perform a duty imposed upon him by law.

The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is
the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the
basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation
made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be
a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accused's
provisional release will be determined at the hearing.

The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails
to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the
case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons 39 where this Court gave the following "instructions"
to the People's Court, 40thus:

1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition
for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its
discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the
purpose;

2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not
justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or
to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
 3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question
on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the
prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do
so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as
head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of
the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present
evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such
refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee. 41

The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:

If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for
any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled and
the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence and, in so
doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a
certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it
to exist, and the opposite course if that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not
voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court's clear duty would be to adopt that
course which has been provided for in case of absence of such evidence. Applying
the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within the power — nor discretion —
of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the
prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a
perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the
application for bail.

As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:

The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy
his burden of proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's
attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over him in
the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance, the court is authorized
by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor
to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail.

As for the third instruction, this Court declared:

It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of the
Solicitor General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence may
endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This is
so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without having the
evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is sought to be
avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution before the trial.

It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under a completely
different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason
cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under the
1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.

In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail" provides, as follows:
 Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule,
is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of
a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7. Capital offense — burden of proof. — On the hearing of an application for

admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a
capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution.

The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have been intercalated, as
shown by the underscored phrases and statements below:

Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in these
rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death.

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for

admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise
unable to testify.

It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in the
counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a
situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the
application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case, the
judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a judge
since all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is to refrain
from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the
1940 Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person
charged with a capital offense is strong cannot be determined if the prosecution chooses not to
present evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial
judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or
refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should be
scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the application for bail necessarily means presentation of
evidence, and the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the bail application by the
prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to
prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of
bail to the accused. "This also prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used
as a means to force the prosecution into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to
do so, the accused would claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not
strong." 42

It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail
must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution
were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose
of the proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare
for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution
witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits. 43

In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court
reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections
7 and 8, supra);

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.

The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection
with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of
the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof. 44 A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There
will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 45

Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail to the accused
since the Assistant Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no objection to the grant of bail and
recommended, instead, the bailbond in the sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although
the court may have the discretion to grant the application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached after due
hearing which, in this particular instance has not been substantially complied with by the respondent
Judge.

While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing three times,
thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not
completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted
in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for
purposes of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where the judge
grants the application for bail without notice and hearing. In view however of the circumstances of
this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo,
La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the
City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander
Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987
granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987
which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.

The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and
whether such right may be waived.

The following are the antecedents of this petition:

In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which was filed on 24 October
1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal
Code allegedly committed as follows:

That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until
the present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party
of the Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the
National Democratic Front with its other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under
the direction and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the aforenamed
accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers whose
whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the
country against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government, the seat of which is in the City of Manila, or of
removing from the allegiance to that government and its laws, the country's territory or part of
it;

That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of
the aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the
 organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and other acts in the pursuit
of their unlawful purpose, such as . . .

(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).

At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military
custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave.,
Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was
offered for his
capture.4

A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas
corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court5 which, as shall hereafter
be discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the
agreement of the parties under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will
face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person.

On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the
Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 6 to which petitioner filed an
Opposition7 citing, among other grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:

xxx xxx xxx

Par. 2 (B) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody over his person.

In his Order of March 6, 1987,8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.

Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a
petition for bail,9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the
ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is
no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.

On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.

Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83,
No. 24) which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.

In his Order of 7 July 198711 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon
private respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2)
months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent
Judge stated:

. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the offense
of rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable
pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses
before final judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114,
aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the present
circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a matter of right
inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a capital offense.

As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private
respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is
to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release
would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before
whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:

True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-
capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows the right, the paramount interest
of the state." Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to bail, is a
"declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed
by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action.
Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of
certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, which the government is prohibited
from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77).
To this Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the same should
be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of
his rights under the Bill of Rights as against the State. Anyway, the government is that
powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and the wherewithals to fight those
"who oppose, threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and
political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the accused
may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and
anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a reason to
deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an accused
is entitled as a matter of light to bail. Dura est lex sed lex.

In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to
increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice
Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an
amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable
for the offense and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent
"had in the past escaped from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the
perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the well-
organized plan to overthrow the government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his
bail –– to appear in court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts
which are widely known by the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have
judicial notice of:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested;

2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;

4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;

5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest,

which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court
for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers,
are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens the
existence of this very Court from which he now seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original
penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State
conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of the State of self-
preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United States of America holding "that
there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings,14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he
presents a risk of flight;15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious
felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to
the community which no condition of release can dispel.16

On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order 17 adverted to in the introductory portion
of this decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
"supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds
the first motion for reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of bail is
concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase the amount of
bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the
additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every two (2)
months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-
31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the
"sudden turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to
increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the
petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the
cases involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a
proviso on the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against
excessive bail; and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of
Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108,
October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.

Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following
issues:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE
GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED
BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.

in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to
bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant
of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-
capital offenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious
threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present
evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the
time that the petition for bail was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to
adduce such evidence. And that even if release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing
the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy
record of private respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the
likelihood of flight.18

In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of
P50,000.00.

In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE

ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER
 WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.

II

RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE

PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.

III

RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION

PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.

IV

THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS
NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.

THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES

NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987.22

In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to file simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.

In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November 24 and 23 November

198725 petitioner and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that
the petition and reply be considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November
198726 and 1 December 1987,27 respectively.

In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on
the issues raised in this petitions,28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May
199029 wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private
respondent had waived the light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail
to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the
primary consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against him
which would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of whatever
amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor
General likewise maintains that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the application of private
respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.

I.

Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the
application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which
the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the
application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the
penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored.
The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for
bail.

We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is
charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore,
a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:

Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when
the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.31 To that extent the
right is absolute.32

And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact
that the accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment,
We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such
conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the
security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates
that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:

. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican
state, like ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of
public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political
system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of
section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4),
(5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the
protection of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the
Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof
will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons, supra., We held:

The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:

The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many states provide
that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses,
where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such
provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all
cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right
even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great!34

Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail
in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail
is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail.35

We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at
P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the
fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are
not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et
al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature
and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight
of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused
is under bond in other case. . . .

In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant
of an opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for
the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to
deny bail.
 II.

It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968
approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in at least two
newspapers of general circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:

Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. ––– Any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion

or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

xxx xxx xxx

This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed
prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.36

III.

We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in
G.R. No. 76009.

On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent,
and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia
Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel
Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying,
among others, that the petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued
requiring respondents to produce the bodies of herein private respondent and his co-
accused before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested and detained them.
The following proceedings took place thereafter in said case:

1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required

respondents to make a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October
and set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Return To The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina
Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were
apprehended by the military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine General
Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders or members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic Front, organizations
dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent means, and having actually
committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After
their arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for
their arrest were issued and respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of
arrest and the pendency of the criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that,
contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was not a member of the
NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe conduct pass issued by competent
authorities.

3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements
reached between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:

When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong,
Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon
Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for
the petitioners. Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the
respondents, with Solicitor General Ordoñez arguing for the respondents.

Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in

conformity with the agreement reached with the government, the petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released
immediately.

Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing
statement made by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition
for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed to the immediate
release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will
be required of them, but they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo
Salas; further, that they will not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by
the trial court provided that they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when their presence
is required.

In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel today

relative to the compromise agreement that they have previously undertaken to
submit.

Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath
as member of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have
agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered
their immediate release.

Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and
required both parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00
o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.

4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint
Manifestation and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
 COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel,
and to this Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:

1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and

Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were
conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and human
considerations may be called into play.

2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of agreement:

a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and

Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but
shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo
Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them under their
personal recognizance.

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his person.

c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation before
the Supreme Court that they will submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.

3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the
Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic)
and their counsel of record.

4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on
October 14 and the present manifestation in compliance with the resolution
announced in court this morning.

WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.

5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:

G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas,
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño and Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14,
1986 filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and
Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney
Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states that they have entered
into an agreement whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by
petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately
released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs.
Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed against them, on their personal
recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for the
 person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in
view of the formal manifestation before this Court that they will submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition
for habeas corpus but subject to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty.
Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to
ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.

It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even
during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to
bail."37 Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and
legal basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest
and the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was
not resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent
after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the
petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional
rights to be granted not only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent
maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means
that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.

Interestingly, private respondent admits that:

"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as
the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and possession of a thing
or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59
Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)

He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled
jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for
admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38

When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:

b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having
custody over his person.

they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of
the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his
co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them;
they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons."
Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having
jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had
the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they
should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the
parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their
agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had
already been issued by the trial court against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation
that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and
that only they shall be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall remain
in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.

In defining bail as:

. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .

Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for
the term "in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.39 It
presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of liberty.40

Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.

But, is such waiver valid?

Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have
enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to
exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it."41

As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:

. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the
word "waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive
any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the
owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest
in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and
further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive,
and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection
of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . .

Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
 While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute
and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional
provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional
rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver. 42

In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in
which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the
accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be
waived; those of the second may be.

It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will." 44

This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;45 the right to counsel and to remain silent;46 and the right to be
heard.47

Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights.1âwphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:

. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly
suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver
will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.

We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry,
Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part
G.R. No. 90643 June 25, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN FORTES Y GARRA, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 91155 June 25, 1993.

AGUSTIN G. FORTES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE EUGENIO C. GUAN,. JR. of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, Irosin, Sorsogon, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Gavino L. Barlin for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape of a young girl described by the trial court as "a
guileless lass of only 13, [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in a barangay of rural atmosphere," and the
denial by the trial court of his application for bail pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction
are questioned in these consolidated cases.

In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Irosin, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 219. The court a quo, in its Decision dated 18
November 1988 but promulgated on 25 January 1989, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the
sum of P20,000.00 to answer for damages and costs.1

In G.R. No. 91155, the accused seeks to annul and set aside two (2) related orders of the said trial
court denying his application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his provisional liberty
pending the resolution of his appeal.

The records disclose these antecedents:

On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of

Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said
municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused at around 11:00 o'clock in
the morning of that day. Following this, the accused was forthwith apprehended.

Thereupon, on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a complaint 2 for rape
against the accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in
Matnog, Sorsogon.3 The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:

That on or about 11:00 in the morning of November 26, 1983, at Barangay

Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate intent
and without the consent of the victim MERELYN GINE, and by means of force and
 intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) armed with a
bolo threatened (sic) and dragged (sic) the victim MERELYN GINE, and there the
said accused committed the acts of rape inside the nipa hut owned by Leovegildo
(sic) Garra, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned offended party.

Act contrary to law.4

Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary examination was conducted, the MCTC issued on
9 December 1983 an order for the arrest of the accused.5 The bond for the latter's temporary liberty
was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.006 upon motion of the accused.
The latter then put up the required bond; upon its approval, the court ordered his release on 15
December 1983.7

When the case was finally called for preliminary investigation on 5 December 1984, the accused,
through his counsel de oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto. The court then
ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. 8

On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Manuel C. Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a complaint for rape against
the accused, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about, the 26th day of November, 1983, in the Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design
(sic), and armed with a bolo and (sic) threatened her with harm and dragged to a hut
the victim and there have (sic) carnal knowledge with one Merelyn Gine against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 219.

Accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 28 February 1985. 10 The protracted trial began
on 26 June 1985 and ended nearly three (3) years later when the case was finally submitted for
decision on 22 February 1988. 11 The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Merelyn Gine,
her father Agripino and Dr. Eddie Dorotan. The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, were
the accused himself, Leovegildo Garra and Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan,
Matnog, Sorsogon.

On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the accused of the crime
charged. 12 The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered committed to the Sorsogon Provincial Jail through the
Provincial Warden or through any of his provincial guards and eventually committed
to the National Penitentiary in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED. 13
On the same day, the accused filed his notice of appeal 14 wherein he requested that the amount of
the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave
due course to the appeal 15 but did not resolve the request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April
1989, the accused filed an "Application for Bail on Appeal" 16 reiterating his earlier request that the
bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was subsequently denied by the trial
court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that ". . . the accused has already been found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his
appeal from the decision already approved by the Court . . . ." 17Thereupon, on 19 August 1989, the
trial court issued a Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the person of the accused to the
Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. 18

On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying
his application for bail pending appeal, 19 but the same was denied in the Order of 6 September
1989. 20

In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to this Court the records of
criminal Case No. 219. We received the same on 16 November 1989 and docketed the appeal as
G.R. No. 90643.

On 9 December 1989, the accused filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside
the aforementioned orders of the trial court denying his application for bail and his motion to
reconsider the said denial. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 91155. In the Resolution of 20
December 1989, 21 this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition.
Then, on 18 June 1990, the said case was ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 90643. 22 The
records of G.R. No. 91155 do not disclose if the respondents had actually filed the required
comment.

G.R. No. 91155

We shall first resolve G.R. No. 91155. Accused assails the trial court's refusal to grant his application
for bail pending appeal on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his
constitutional right to bail. He contends that before his conviction by final judgment, he enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence, and is therefore entitled to bail as a matter of right.

There is no merit in the said petition.

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution 23 and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, 24 that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of

right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. . . . 25
The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is
neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is
strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs.
Ricardo Cortez, 26 ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital

offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to
bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion
perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and
subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied
his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.

G.R. No. 90643

We now turn to the accused's appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The inculpatory facts, proven by the prosecution and upon which the trial court based its judgment of
conviction, are summarized by the trial court in its decision. Finding the same to be fully supported
by the evidence adduced, We hereby adopt the said summary as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of 26 November
1983, Merelyn Gine accompanied her father Agripino Gine to Barangay Naburacan,
Matnog, Sorsogon, where he was going to work in the farm of Patrolman Nonito
Galeria. Her father left her in the nipa hut of one Leovegildo Garra so she can cook
his meal for lunch. She was alone in the hut.

(4) While she was preparing to cook the meal, accused appeared from nowhere and
inserted his T-shirt inside her mouth. Accused also held her hands and tore her pedal
pant (sic). She tried to kick him but to no avail. After he was able to remove her
pedal, she was threatened with a bolo and was warned that he will kill her if she
shouted. The bolo which was presented in evidence as Exhibit C (sic) was 23½
inches long including the handle. The sharp end of the bolo was pointed by the
accused to her throat. Accused laid her down and it was in this position when (sic)
the accused had sexually abused her by inserting his penis through her (sic) panty
she was wearing which was torn and stained with her (Exhibits B, B1 and B2). She
suffered extreme pain and her vagina started bleeding. She cried and wished that
her father were around so that she could ask him to kill the accused.

(5) Just as the accused consummated the rape, her father returned from the farm to
inquire whether his meal was cooked already. He called for his daughter but she did
not answer during the first call and on the second call he heard her answer "po"
 (meaning yes). Suddenly, the accused jumped out of the window with his short pants
on but leaving behind in his hurry to escape, the T-shirt which he inserted inside the
mouth of the victim and the bolo he used to threaten her. Her father gave chase but
was not able to catch up with the accused.

(6) When her father went gave inside the hut, he found her in a state of shock and
(sic) was trying to get up but was swaying for she could hardly stand. It was at this
instance when his daughter narrated to him the dastardly act perpetrated upon her
by the accused.

(7) On the same day, she and her father reported the incident to the police
authorities in Matnog, Sorsogon, and an investigation was made. On that same day,
the accused was apprehended.

(8) From the police, went to the Irosin District Hospital for medical examination.
Thereat, she was subjected to a medical examination by a certain Dr. Tito Garrido
but he did not issue her a medical certificate. So she had another medical
examination by Dr. Eddie Dorotan of the same hospital who issued her a medical
certificate which was introduced in evidence as E and E1.

(9) At the time she was sexually abused, Merelyn Gine was only 13 years old (Exhibit
D). She demonstrated to the Court the position in which she was raped by the
accused. She felt so ashamed after the rape and underwent so much suffering and
pain like her father, which could not be compensated with money alone and wants
justice done. 27

On the other hand, the accused capsulated his version of the incident in this manner:

On November 26, 1983 at about 8:30 in the morning, accused Fortes on his way to
the Nipa Hut which he used as a rest house met Agripino Gine, father of
Complainant Merelyn Gine in the ricefield at Bgy. Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon
where they both work and cultivate their respective ricelands. In that meeting
Agripino asked permission from accused if her (sic) daughter, Merelyn, could cook
their lunch at the Nipa Hut, ("Payag" in local dialect), owned by the grandfather of
accused Leovegeldo (sic) Garra. Accused who is a neighbor and family friend of
Agripino (sic) in Bgy. Camachilis where they both reside gave his permission.
Accused proceeded to the Nipa Hut owned by his grandfather for the purpose of
preparing his own lunch. When accused arrived in the Nipa Hut, he saw Merelyn
preparing their lunch.

Accused waited for his turn while Merelyn was preparing their lunch. Accused spent
his waiting time in repairing the plow (araro) which he used in the cultivation of the
riceland. At this point in time his grandfather Leovegeldo (sic) Garra arrived. Merelyn
Gine and accused who are known to each other being neighbors and family friends
exchanged pleasanties (sic) and jokes. In the process, accused accidentally dropped
the fish which he was about to cook for lunch outside the window. Accused passed
through the window which is about half (½) meter from the ground to pick-up the fish.

At this juncture, Agripino (sic) arrived from the ricefield at about 11:00 in the morning
and called his daughter, Merelyn, to inquire if lunch was ready. Merelyn answered in
the negative. Agripino got angry and scolded his daughter, Merelyn for failing to cook
the lunch on time.
 In the meantime, accused-appellant returned to the ricefield to pick-up his bottle of
drinking water. He returned back to the Nipa Hut at about 12:00 noon and he saw
inside the nipa hut, the following people: Agripino Gine, Joel, Mondoy, sons of
Agripino and Dick Galeria son the owner of the riceland being cultivated, by Agripino
Gine eating their lunch. 28

To bolster his defense, the accused presented two (2) other witnesses, namely Leovegildo Garra,
his grandfather, and Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan, Matnog.

The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the prosecution's version; it was convinced beyond
reasonable doubt that Merelyn fell victim to a sexual assault on the morning of 26 November 1983
which was perpetrated through force and intimidation. On that same day, both she and her father
immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. She then submitted to a medical
examination.

There seems to be no logical reason for her or her father to concoct the charge of rape against the
accused. During her testimony, Merelyn "showed an unmistakable determination to exact justice,
from the man who had forcibly violated her and caused her early loss of virginity." She "has no
motive other than to bring to justice the culprit who had grievously wronged her." 29

In his Brief, the accused, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, urges this Court to reverse his
conviction and acquit him on the ground that the trial court erred in:

I . . . GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

II . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE SHOWING

THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT SEXUALLY ABUSED ON NOVEMBER
26, 1983.

III . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE BGY. CAPTAIN
WHERE THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED.

IV . . . NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HIS GUILT HAS

NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 30

For his first assigned error, the appellant contends that the rape for which he was charged and
subsequently convicted was not established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. He claims
that the complainant's statement that she had her panty on while she was being raped is incredible,
as "[E]xperience will show that it is physically [I]mpossible to perform and execute the act of sexual
intercourse to woman with her panty on." 31

In support of the second assigned error, he asserts that the medical examination conducted by
Eddie Dorotan, a government physician assigned to the Irosin District Hospital, which revealed that
"there was no bleeding" and "no spermatozoa" 32 present, conclusively proved that the accused did
not commit the crime of rape. The latter further contends that the trial court erred in believing the
complainant's declaration that her panty was stained with her blood because, as he points out, there
was no "corroborated (sic) evidence to prove that indeed the alleged blood stain is indeed the blood
coming from the vagina of complainant." 33
As to his third ascribed error, the appellant faults the trial court for not giving due weight to the
testimony of the Barangay Captain of the locality wherein the rape was committed. He further
contends that since Barangay Captain Celso Gardon testified that he (Gordon) passed by the nipa
hut and saw the complainant and her father Agripino together with other persons at around lunch
time — the time of the commission of the alleged rape — Agripino should have immediately reported
the sexual assault to him as he is the barangay captain.

The appellant additionally assails the credibility of Agripino Gine, claiming that the latter failed to
corroborate his daughter's story that there was blood on the spot where she was purportedly raped
and that her panty and pants were torn by the appellant. Moreover, it is averred that Agripino did not
even describe to the court his daughter's attire when he found her in the nipa hut. Appellant then
faults the trial court for concluding that he had presented the defense of alibi when the records
reveals that no such defense was offered by him.

Appellant's last assigned error is but a summation of the previous three (3) errors; he concludes that
the totality of the prosecution's evidence creates sufficient doubt as to his guilt. Hence, he concludes
that he is entitled to an acquittal.

Our careful review of the records and painstaking evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties
yield nothing to support the assigned errors, and lead Us to the inevitable conclusion that the
culpability of the appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. This appeal must therefore
be dismissed for palpable lack of merit.

The victim narrated her ordeal in a simple, yet candid and straightforward manner as evidenced by
the transcripts of her testimony, the pertinent portions of which read:

FISCAL GENOVA —

What happened while you were getting the kettle preparatory to

cooking your meal?

A Suddenly, this Agustin Fortes appeared from nowhere and tried to

embrace me.

Q In what part of your body?

A He tried to insert his T-shirt in my mouth.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What happened after you were held and a piece of T-shirt put (sic)
inside your mouth?

A He had sexual intercourse with me.

Q Before he had sexual intercourse with you, what did he do?

A He torn (sic) my panty and my pedal.

Q Do you mean to tell this Court that you were dressed during that
time?
A Yes, sir.

Q And how did Agustin Fortes tried (sic) to torn (sic) your pedal and
panty?

A When he was trying to hold my hands, he was pulling my panty at

the same time tearing my pedal and I was kicking him.

Q I am showing to you clothes from the Police Station labeled

"Criminal Case No. 3226" which I presumed is the criminal case
number . . . a panty with dark stain and a pedal. I am showing to you
these in connection to what you just stated. This is from the Police
Station of Matnog.

A This is the pedal I was wearing at the time.

Q When you were wearing this, was it already torn?

A Not yet.

Q How about this panty of yours, is this already in this kind (sic)?

A No, sir.

Q What is this dark stain here . . . which you could see?

A That is a blood.

Q Whose blood?

A Mine.

Q How was this torn? The pedal . . . no the panty?

A He was the one who torn (sic) my panty.

Q And in the process this was removed from your body?

A Yes sir.

Q What happened now after this pedal also was removed?

A I was able to shout but he warned me that he is going to kill me.

Q When he stated that he was going to kill you, what was in his
possession?

A A bolo.
Q I am showing to you a bolo wrapped in a coupon bond, 23½ inches
labelled "People of the Philippines versus Agustin Fortes November
26, 1983." What is the relation of this bolo to the bolo that was used?

A This is the bolo that was used.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, how was this bolo being used in your body?

A He was trying to thrust it below my neck.

Q With what hand was the accused using this?

A Left.

Q When you say it was being poked in your body, which part of the
bolo?

A The sharp end.

Q On what part of your body was it being poked?

A On my neck.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you said you were sexually abused by Agustin fortes, how
was this sexual abuse made in (sic) your body?

A By holding my hands and laying me down on the floor and he lied

(sic) down on top of me . . . and then he performed the sexual
intercourse.

Q When you said "ikiti" (sexual intercourse), my question is, did the
penis of the accused penetrate your vagina?

A Yes sir.

Q And while he was on that act of sexual intercourse with his penis
inside your vagina, what happened then?

A I felt pain. And my vagina started bleeding.

Q And what happened next?

A And then I cried and I remembered that if only my father is there I

will ask him to kill the accused.

Q Did your father arrive?

 A Yes sir and Agustin Fortes jumped out of the window. 34

The jumping of the appellant out of the window was witnessed by Merelyn's father whose testimony
thereon was further bolstered during cross-examination:

ATTY. ZULUETA:

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you returned to the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what

happened?

A When I was about in a distance of (sic) three meters from the

house of Leovegildo (sic) Garra, I called for my daughter. My first call,
there was no answer, and on my second call, there was an answer
"po", then, suddenly, somebody jumped out of the window in the
person of Agustin Fortes.

Q When you saw the alleged accused in this case jumped (sic) out of
the window of the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what did you do?

A Instead of trying to run after Agustin Fortes, I felt apprehensive, and

so, I went to the succor of my daughter which (sic) was speechless.

xxx xxx xxx

Q After you went to the house of Leovegildo Garra, what happened

there?

A That (sic) my daughter was raped.

Q How come that you knew that your daughter was raped?

A Because my daughter herself told me. 35

Agripino's daughter was in a sitting position and could hardly stand when he saw her. 36 He thus
decided to report the incident to the police authorities immediately. Thus, both he and Merelyn
proceeded to the police station
where they were consequently interrogated. Thereafter, the appellant was apprehended. 37

From Merelyn's testimony, it is evident that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her through force
and intimidation. He gagged her first with a
t-shirt and then forced her into the sexual act by threatening to kill her with his bolo. Her testimony
on this point was even further strengthened and enhanced when, during cross-examination, counsel
for the appellant gambled on the fate of the latter by asking Merelyn to show how the rape was
committed. Merelyn then demonstrated how the appellant gripped her hands and pointed the bolo to
her neck. 38

As to the alleged impossibility of the commission of the sexual act because of the fact that Merelyn's
panty was not actually removed, the appellant seems to have forgotten that it was he, through the
cross-examination of his lawyer, who elicited from Merelyn the declaration that his penis was
inserted through a hold in the said panty. Thus:

ATTY ZULUETA:

xxx xxx xxx

Q You have said that the accused had forcefully made sexual
intercourse with you. How come that (sic) the penis penetrated your
vagina?

A When his right hand was holding my hands he unzipped his pants
and put out his penis and inserted his penis to (sic) my vagina.

Q When the accused conducted sexual intercourse with you, do (sic)

you have your panty?

A Yes sir. There is a hole in my panty where he inserted his penis to

(sic) my vagina.

Q While the accused was having sexual intercourse with you, what
happened next?

39
A My vagina was bleeding because it was very painful.

Neither may the medical certificate (Exhibit "E") issued by Dr. Eddie Dorotan be of any help to the
appellant. The said certificate does not, contrary to the latter's claim, prove that Merelyn did not have
sexual intercourse because of the findings therein reported that there was no bleeding, the vagina
admitted two (2) fingers and the vaginal fluid contained no spermatozoa. Again, the appellant
conveniently forgot that Dr. Dorotan examined Merelyn only on 28 November 1983 at 9:45 o'clock in
the morning, 40 or two (2) days after the incident. By that time, the bleeding, which had taken place
earlier, may no longer have been noticeable and the spermatozoa may no longer have been
present. It is settled that the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape.
The important consideration is not the emission of semen, but the penetration by the male
organ. 41 It must likewise be emphasized that Dr. Tito Garrido of the District Hospital of Irosin, the
physician who examined Merelyn in the afternoon of 26 November 1983, did not issue a medical
certificate, although he promised to deliver one in Matnog. It has been shown that Dr. Garrido
reneged on this pledge. Furthermore, during trial, complainant's father claimed that he had later
learned that Dr. Garrido is related to the appellant. 42 This assertion was not even rebutted by the
defense.

Moving on, this Court is not persuaded by the appellant's contention that if Merelyn had in fact been
raped, then either she or her father should have first informed the barangay captain about the
incident. Suffice it to say, reporting the commission of a crime to a barangay captain is not a
prerequisite for the formal institution of criminal charges. Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing
law then, rapes was not among the crimes which required referral to the Barangay Lupon for the
purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among those excepted from
such a referral considering that the penalty imposable is more than thirty (30) days imprisonment. 43 If
the complainant and her father seemed to have "by-passed" the barangay captain and instead
reported the incident directly to the police, it is quite obvious that they wanted immediate action to
ensure the appellant's arrest and forestall any possible escape on his part.
Finally, the appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously characterized his defense as one of
alibi, is without any basis. The trial court actually characterized the appellant's defense as one of
"alibi and absolute denial." 44 Besides, the "alibi" aspect thereof is not entirely inaccurate for in fact,
as shown by his own story, the appellant went back to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking
water before returning to the nipa hut at around 12:00 o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he
was not at the scene of the crime at the time the sexual assault was committed.

All told, We have in this case a 13-year old barrio lass who: immediately revealed the commission of
the heinous crime to her father just as the appellant consummated the act and jumped out of the
window to escape, forthwith reported it to the police authorities who, after having heard her
story, apprehended the appellant; thereafter, in the afternoon of the same day, voluntarily submitted
to a medical examination of her private parts; submitted again to a second medical examination on
her private parts on 28 November 1983; underwent the ordeal of a public trial; and, upon demand
by the appellant's counsel, even demonstrated — as part of the cross-examination — how she was
raped. We need no further evidence to convince Us that indeed, the complainant was raped by the
appellant. We have repeatedly held that when a woman admits that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been committed. A complainant would make public
the offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to
all the gory details if she had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly admit that
she has been raped unless it is the truth. 45

Moreover, the appellant has not shown that the complainant and her father were actuated by any
ulterior motives which could have induced them to falsely implicate him in the commission of the
crime. It is settled that when there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive existed, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 46 Indeed, if an
accused had really nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of
human nature and against the presumption of good faith that the prosecution witness would falsely
testify against the former. 47

We thus affirm the decision appealed from except as to the matter of the indemnity, which is hereby
increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 pursuant to the current policy of the Court.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) In G.R. No. 90643, AFFIRMING the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 219 of Branch 55 of
the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, at Irosin, Sorsogon, with the modification of the
indemnity which is increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00; and

2) In G.R. No. 91155, DENYING, for lack of merit, the petition.

Costs against appellant Agustin Fortes y Garra in both cases.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON,
LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA,
MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO
LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ.
FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C.,
LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC.
RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL.
ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO
JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT
MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero,
Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and
Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning
the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against
them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority
either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
 I

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been
constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there
to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was
done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5
days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the
PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March
14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by
Article of War 71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries
as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of
the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by
a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no
prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not
been able to submit their counter-affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however,
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to
declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He
later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-
martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not
apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-
Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14,
this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot
as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges.
The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to
respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be
referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation
was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had
been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned
counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit
controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be
dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard.1âwphi1 If it is

not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is
now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial
of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695,
93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed
as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial
jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-
martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is
clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required
investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same
contention, reversing a court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article
70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-
trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress
has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication
that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the
Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial
proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in
later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that
the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way
 effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended
Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable
pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article
of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless
have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in
the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved
more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77,
as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their
co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio
Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of
Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets
were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided
under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the
manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the
dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the
witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to
subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in
accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of
the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding
officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the
Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may
appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior
competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has
not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition
Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and
appointed its president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or
revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had
been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the
Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12,
1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by

the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than
one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented
and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for
cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing
army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory
challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in
any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no
mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a
court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-
Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of
the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education
in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the
formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been
indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War
18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with
the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel
and such other cases as may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,

Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:
 No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to
insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by
a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify
the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to
meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the
state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of
the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio
legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No.
39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge
remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn
when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of
the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the
present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom
of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own
misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional
Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals4 where this Court held that
"appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court
of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not
to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" —
as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action
suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies
and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that the
decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned
only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can
exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally
not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right
to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from
the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues
collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of
and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release
on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order
were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
 Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly
situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after
more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge
memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial
investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required
to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation
only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers,
have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass
review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against
him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is
wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to
release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is
arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the
person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be
punished as a court martial may direct.6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26,
1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the
latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under
Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received
by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was
filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the
Court in Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
(AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it
in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the
reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No.
96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948,
the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise
the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of
the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0 April 6, 1995

RE: FIRST INDORSEMENT DATED JULY 21, 1992 OF HON. FERNANDO DE LEON, CHIEF
STATE PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

ALICIA A. BAYLON, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE DEODORO J. SISON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Dagupan City, Respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The present administrative matter was initiated by a sworn letter-request1 of Alicia A. Baylon, City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City, dated June 18, 1992, charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding
judge of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Dagupan City, with utter disregard of judicial decorum by
excessive display of interest in handling a case assigned to and then pending in his branch. The said
letter was sent to Chief State Prosecutor Fernando P. de Leon of the Department of Justice who, in
turn, indorsed the same to this Court for appropriate action as requested therein.

The records of this case show that on October 24, 1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Dagupan City filed an information for double murder against several accused which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. D-10678, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et al.," and
thereafter raffled to respondent judge.

Subsequently, the accused filed on November 8, 1991 a petition for reinvestigation which was
granted by the trial court in an order dated November 20, 1991, and the Office of the City Prosecutor
was given until December 23, 1991 to resolve the same. The reinvestigation was finally concluded
by the said prosecutor on March 31, 1992. A petition for review interposed therefrom by the accused
was later dismissed by the Department of Justice in a resolution dated May 8, 1992.

During the pendency of the reinvestigation, however, the accused filed a petition for bail on
December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and requested that it be set for hearing on December 23, 1991, the
immediately following Monday. On this latter date, according to an order handed down by
respondent judge on June 8, 19922 the prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail signed
by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita Estrella D.N. Bonifacio and noted by First Assistant City
Prosecutor Silverio Q. Castillo, alleging inter alia, that the information was filed on the bases of the
sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitutes clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of all the accused; that to grant the petition for bail would preempt the outcome
of the reinvestigation which was then being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor at the
instance of the accused, and also necessarily defeat the purpose of said reinvestigation; and that the
accused should at least wait for the outcome of the reinvestigation, which they themselves sought,
before any motion of the same import could be filed.

Nevertheless, on the very day and time specified by the accused, December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M.,
a hearing on the petition was purportedly held by the trial court. Then, reportedly on the basis of a
joint counter-affidavit of the accused, an affidavit of one Oscar Villaga, a certification of entry in the
police blotter, and the position paper submitted by the accused, and allegedly because there was no
objection on the part of the prosecution which was supposedly represented by Third Assistant
Prosecutor Rosita Castro, the court forthwith granted bail for the provisional liberty of each accused
in the amount of P40,000.00.
A motion for reconsideration of said order of December 23, 1991 was duly filed by the prosecution
but the same was denied by respondent judge on January 10, 1992. In his aforecited order of June
8, 1992 reiterating his denial of a motion for his inhibition, he maintained that he had granted bail
ostensibly "after due hearing and after a careful and deliberate consideration of the pertinent and
affidavits and counter-affidavit, position papers arguments advanced by the parties." Respondent
judge further stated therein that the prosecution did not ask for an opportunity show that the
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

Significantly, the aforestated orders of respondent judge of December 23, 1991 granting bail, and
that dated January 10, 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, became the subject of a petition
for certiorari filed by the prosecution and were subsequently annulled and set aside by the Court of
Appeals in its judgment handed down in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384 on January 19, 1993.

In the meantime, immediately after the court had issued its order granting bail, Roberto Untalan, the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. D-10678, filed with the assistance of counsel on March 11,
1992 a motion for respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case,3 contending that such act of
respondent judge "had invited our serious doubt and less expectation of (an) impartial disposition of
this case," and "that the instant case had plunged (sic) into (a) network of intrigue and distrust
creating thereby an animosity between us (litigants-complainants) and the judicial system
represented by the Honorable Court and in the last analysis, our grievance of justice is in grave peril.

In an order dated March 25, 1991 (sic, should be 1992), respondent judge denied the motion to
inhibit on the ground that during the hearing on the petition for bail, the prosecution was represented
by Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who supposedly "interposed no objection to the granting
of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she considered reasonable." He also argued therein that
time was of the essence considering that all of the accused, except for one Joel Doe, had been
under detention since October 21, 1991 and that the City Prosecutor had not yet terminated the
reinvestigation as of December 23, 1991, hence "without determining whether the proper charge
could be double homicide," he granted said bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. 4

Private complainant moved for the reconsideration of said order contending that, aside from the
court's non-observance of the three-day notice rule before the hearing, Assistant City Prosecutor
Rosita Castro who happened to be present during said hearing in Branch 40 was not duly authorized
to appear for and in behalf of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. D-10678 or to comment on the
proceedings for bail, since she actually was sent by her office to Branch 42 to move for the
postponement of another case therein.5 Attached thereto was an affidavit to that effect by said
assistant prosecutor.6

On June 8, 1992, in an order of respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration and which
has been earlier adverted to, he insisted that in its opposition to the petition for bail and its motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail, the prosecution never asked for an opportunity to show
that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong; that during the hearing on the petition for
bail, the assistant prosecutor did not raise any objection and instead left the matter to the sound
discretion of the court; that the alleged lack of due process had been cured by the filing of the motion
for reconsideration and the motion to inhibit; that the motion to inhibit constituted forum shopping;
and that from the narration of facts and events, the prosecution failed to convince the court that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.

Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands charged with the now familiar malfeasance of granting
bail in a non-bailable offense without benefit of notice and hearing. Specifically, it is averred that the
prosecution was not given notice of at least three days before the scheduled hearing on the petition
for bail, in violation of the mandate under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and, worse, with
two non-working days between the filing and the hearing of the petition. It is likewise contended that
during the controverted hearing on December 23, 1991, the prosecution, which was not even duly
represented, was not given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was
strong.

Required to comment thereon, respondent judge tried to justify his assailed orders by claiming that
he honestly believes that he did not commit a serious and grave abuse of discretion; that he granted
the petition for bail because the assistant prosecutor present at the hearing did not interpose any
objection thereto; that the prosecution never requested, either in its opposition to the petition for bail
or in its motion for reconsideration of his adverse order, that it be allowed to show that the evidence
of guilt against the accused was strong but, instead, submitted the incident for resolution; that the
motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only after due hearing and after a
careful and judicious consideration of the pertinent affidavits, counter-affidavit, position papers and
arguments submitted by the parties; that the lack of previous notice was cured by the filing of the
motion for reconsideration since, in the application of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded
is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard; that the claim of
Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro that there was no hearing held on December 23, 1991 is
negated by the testimonies given in A.M. No. RTJ-92-822 by defense counsel Atty. Constante
Rueca, Officer-in-Charge Gloria Beltran, Court Stenographer Tripina Tigno, and herein respondent;
that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith;
and that the filing of the complaint is pure and simple harassment. 7

In a resolution 8 dated May 4, 1993, this Court referred the administrative matter at bar to the Office
of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the records of this case. However, it was only two (2) years thereafter, or on February 10,
1995 when, after repeated inquiries, the said office submitted its report and recommendation with
the explanation that it had to verify whether the issue raised in the instant case is pertinent to
another pending administrative case involving the same parties. It made no manifestation or
submission in the interim.

The Court views with displeasure and chagrin the chronology of events which, even if true, caused
the supervenience of a grossly unreasonable delay in the resolution of this simple administrative
matter, to the inevitable prejudice and frustration of the offended parties and the prosecution in the
criminal case involved. This is a situation which this Court has assiduously tried to avoid and
obviate, since it tarnishes the judicial image, fuels suspicions and speculations, and creates an
unfair climate of misperception and distrust. We shall not clutter this decision with the pointless mea
culpae of the parties responsible, but this Court is not beyond expressing its profound regrets for this
distressing episode and shall redouble its efforts to prevent any repetition thereof.

Nonetheless, prescinding from the regrettably lackadaisical manner with which this case was
handled by the Office of the Court Administrator, we are constrained to agree with its finding that
respondent judge is indeed guilty as charged, as well as its recommendation for a much belated
administrative sanction to be imposed on him.

Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of the petition for bail at least three
(3) days prior to the scheduled hearing thereof . It bears emphasis that the petition for bail was filed
in court and a copy thereof served on the prosecution on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was
craftily set for hearing on December 23, 1991, thereby giving the prosecution only one day, a
Sunday at that, to prepare its opposition thereto. The stratagem employed by the defense which
virtually deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately counter the representations in its
petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge condoned the same and aggravated the
situation by the unusual and precipitate haste with which the petition was granted by respondent
judge.

On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of procedure by justifying his non-
observance of the three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the theory
that the petition for bail is an urgent motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such
ratiocination, which espouses and reveals a distorted notion as to the true nature and conditions of
the right to bail, does violence to the well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and
requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.9 Given this contingency, respondent judge should
have carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather
than cavalierly considering it outright as an urgent motion.

There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent judge to support and justify his
grant of bail to the accused, namely, that time was of the essence, considering that the accused had
been detained since October 21, 1991; and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to
the granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against
the accused.

We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the ambient
circumstances obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but have cautioned respondent judge to
be more circumspect in entertaining and resolving the petition therefor. First, the accused were
charged with double murder, each of which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail
is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended in the information which was filed on the
bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting clear and
strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused. 10 Third, at the time of the application for bail, there
was still pending a reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor.
It must be noted that the reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any
resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof is naturally and logically attributable to them.
And, finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for bail on December 23, 1991, when the
same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday, readily casts doubt on the good
faith in and the regularity of the procedure adopted by the defense.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations alone, and even without the further elaboration correctly
advanced by complainant in representation of her office, we find no cogent reason whatsoever to
justify respondent's alacrity in ordering the immediate release of the accused despite their somewhat
extended confinement and, much less, could respondent's pretensions validly support a grant of bail.

Respondent judge asseverates that he honestly believes that he did not commit a serious and grave
abuse of discretion. He hastens to add the handy and oft-invoked defense that he cannot be held
administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.

Respondent should not hide behind that axiom so often resorted to, it may be now be said, to the
point of abuse. While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a
faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill the position of
administrators of justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to act with
competence, integrity and independence and should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 11 It is true that, generally, a judge cannot
be held liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment
or decision rendered by him in good faith. However, good faith may be negated by the
circumstances on record, 12 as we have hereinbefore demonstrated.
We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed to the sound
discretion of respondent judge. But this does not mean, however, a lubricious and untrammeled
exercise of such discretion. We have held that admission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles, to wit:

. . . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is
not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Accordingly, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is
in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail. If the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. 13

Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not
there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against
the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence there of is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. 14

This brings us to the second and main contention of respondent judge. He would want to impress
upon this Court that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to seek permission from the trial court to
prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and that when it failed to do so in any
of its pleadings filed with the court, respondent judge was left with no other recourse but to grant the
application for bail. He likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection during
the hearing on the petition for bail. Such arguments are deplorably specious and lamentably absurd.

The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death, such as murder, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has
been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not
the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial,
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court resolves the
motion for bail. 15

It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own
conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the
accused. 16 In fact, such a summary with his evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an
aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled
that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused.

Thus , in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., 17 it was there held that even where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court
may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the People's evidence or
judge the adequacy vel non of the amount of bail. This was reiterated in the recent case of Aguirre,
et al. vs. Belmonte, etc. 18 where we said that the error committed by the therein respondent judge in
granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure of the prosecution to file a motion for
cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order.

In Libarios vs. Dabalos, 19 we emphasized that irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demands that a
hearing be conducted before bail can be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at
all justified.

Where the prosecutor does not oppose the application for bail and refuses to satisfy his burden of
proof, but the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as when he is
evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, it has been ruled in the early case
of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, et a1. 20 that, in the paramount interest of justice, the
court must inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it
is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, in
recommending bail.

Finally, in the most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas 21 it was categorically stressed that although
the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the
respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application.
Additionally, it must be borne in mind that a hearing is also necessary for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the
amount of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied himself that these requirements have been
met can he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.

The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that he did conduct a hearing on
December 23, 1991 is belied by the fact that the order granting bail, the contents of which could
merely be deduced after a careful perusal of the records of the case and the other orders issued by
him in view of the parties' failure to present the same, leaves much to be desired. For one, it does
not contain the requisite summary of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to
support the grant of bail. What appears from the records is that the petition for bail was granted on
the basis merely of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and possibly of a witness, and the
position paper of the accused. The prosecution was not even given the chance to cross-examine the
accused on their counter-affidavit. Mere affidavits or recitals of their contents are not sufficient since
they are mere hearsay evidence, hence they cannot legally form the basis of an order granting
bail. 22

As a final note, we take judicial cognizance of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28384, promulgated on January 19, 1993, which annulled and set aside the orders dated
December 23, 1991 and January 10, 1992 issued by herein respondent judge. The disquisitions
therein of said appellate court serve to further strengthen the merits of our findings and the necessity
for the present administrative disciplinary proceeding.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and grave abuse of discretion. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P20,000.00 with a
STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future will definitely be
dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of
respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison.

Considering that the offense involved in this administrative matter was committed way back on
December 23, 1991, this judgment is immediately final and executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986

RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as
Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as
Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a
criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former corporation.

Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-
stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a
management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No.
001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a
management committee was organized and appointed.

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested
the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the
Immigration Regulation Division.

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza,
Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to
respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove.
In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9,
1982, reads:
 Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all
embracing ground that his trip is ... relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.

The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is
discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.

In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now
or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated .2

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:

6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would
allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety companies that filed the bail
bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held liable in their
undertakings because it was the Court which allowed the accused to go outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to
return.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED. 3

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall
or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied
in a letter dated May 27, 1982.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of
Appeals 4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.

On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14,
1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite.7 In his
motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the
obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc."8 He attached the letter dated August 9,
1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W.
Miller9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would
be involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal
Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had
been dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the ground that after verification of the
records of the Securities and Exchange Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected with the
Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to
him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however,
remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the other cases against
petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so
as to delete the allegation that petitioner was president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984, the Court in
a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 12

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him. 13

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People
vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit
said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts
from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and
the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the
public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment.
The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and
have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. 14

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the
court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the
court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to
leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the
first place, if it were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People
vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:

... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as
demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines
and not demandable if the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most
important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty
operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle
perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country.

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The
rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was
able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her
sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions
of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:

A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it
is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will,
allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or
compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto.
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel
abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business transactions
could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint
that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from
taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that
petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage
or prejudice. 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed
to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety
because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not
take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their
remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged
by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result
has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition
of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order of
March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal
as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said
order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,
the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in
much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been
committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health.

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.

Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court
finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent

Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants
for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel
questions is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set
aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance
of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the
same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against
respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be
issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.

Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the
taking of Jimenez into legal custody.

The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to
the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which
was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was
the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26
US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code
Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court
below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12

Hence, this Petition. 13

Issues

Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing
a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in
allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:

‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.

‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.

‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading

to extradition.

‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings

leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.

‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify
release on bail.

‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.

‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.

‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting
bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.’" 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail
and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take
up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion
for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the
Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity,
absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the
passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition;
and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1)
even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of
the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to
follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail
but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might
likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to
comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to
it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when
public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine
qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued
and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the
present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.

Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:

[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
 subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De
Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these

writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put
an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23

‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’

In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:

This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Five Postulates of Extradition

The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and
the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give
effect to its intent. 25Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will
aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.

With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent
criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
 prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.

Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as
the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It
is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a
court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals

should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the
number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that
efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the
deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective
extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement
and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32

In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do
it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be
part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes."

Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly
authorized representative’s signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity
and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
 An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite."

Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or
the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will
serve the national interest.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On
the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before
the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the
conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to
the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition
to the requesting state.

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee. Indeed,

extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before
the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing

Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his
arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.

On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily
deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as
yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.

Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:

SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)

Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for
the hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
(Emphasis ours)

Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
 1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing
the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and present
such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate."
The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.

By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as
speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to
ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the accused.

Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of
the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental
Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes. 49

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined
whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually
concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:

In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request
for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of
probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.
Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure
of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate
arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding
of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence
of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and
something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with
previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is
ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have

intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of
the accused from the requested state.

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents
upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55

In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:

Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally
the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a
de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review
the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest,

what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires --
in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main
case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify
the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were
called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s
demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought
is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may

require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of
all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,
insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.

On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting
the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.

Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not
at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

No Violation of Due Process

Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall
be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does
not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those
present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation
of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently
ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it
takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without
the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling
its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of
crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy
to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In
the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general
rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or
evade their prosecutors.1âwphi1.nêt

The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to
Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to
the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution
of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the
summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right
to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into
the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and
bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough
for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.

1. Alleged Disenfranchisement

While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked
the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.’ This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the
people’ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with
the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
 governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious

discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." 73

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila,
it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.
Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

2. Anticipated Delay

Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would
be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine
guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional
rights available to the accused in a criminal action.

We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings.
This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would
be merely anticipatory and academic.

However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the
grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for
the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This
we cannot allow.

3. Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned
of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually
fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps
of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after
the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously
denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application
for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact,
it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than
sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application
for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required
by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of
which were separately filed by the parties.

This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral
Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal.
Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee --
have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for
bail.

A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial
court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.

In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and
carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful
purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition
Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous
cop-out.

Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a
case is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it
to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due
process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.

Summation

As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:

1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request

expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced
during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether
the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to
its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.

2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in
the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.

3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt
or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given
the opportunity.

4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person
sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a
prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.

5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no
flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or
compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.
Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings
on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its
authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-
independent organs of government.

8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising

out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.

9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions,
delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition
 proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to
our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the
quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.

10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with
the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the
said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.

YAP, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985,
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985,
and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an entitled "People of
the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."

The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes,
former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the
Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.

Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had submitted his
resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on December 12, 1979,
Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the
petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary
of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous report filed by
complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC).

On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS
Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the
following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD have violated Sec. 3
(e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also
liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue
of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for reconsideration was also
denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the
Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated
April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the following
informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith;
 2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973;

3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978.

Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the Sandiganbayan against
the petitioner:

Re: Criminal Case No. 10499

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with

Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then
the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and
there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for
printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of January,
1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to intervene under the law in
the release of the funds for said project.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10500

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD

with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the
Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as
required of every public officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was flied with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10501

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD

with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now
Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give
Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his
brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and
ownership of South East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private
corporation registered with the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4,
1973, but whose organization and operating expenses came from the confidential
funds of the Department of Public Information as it was organized to undertake
research, projects for the government, without requiring an accounting of the funds
advanced by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D'
GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10502

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD

with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the
Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of
December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1976), as required of every public officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Re: Criminal Case No. 10503

 The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD
with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the
Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as
required of every public officer.

That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of the
Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the
informations on the follow grounds:

1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to
a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction
to file the informations;

2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;

3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of
Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;

4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos.
10500, 10502 and 10503;

5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;

6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.

On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash,
stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation,
namely:

1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500 and 10501, have
already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and

2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 — For failure to file
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122
SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts the
period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of
the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31,
1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on July 9,
1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10) year
prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless
the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.

Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities
in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft
Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets
of P50,000.00 or more..." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities "... regardless of the
networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and officials to submit a
statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and
distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said
informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs preliminary
investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) days from its termination to
resolve the preliminary investigation.

On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's
motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's

"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured
by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said information to
change the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein charged
from January 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.

On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the
Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the
commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.

On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16, 1985
assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due
course the petition, resolved to require the respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary
restraining order effective immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, enjoining the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial and other proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In compliance with said resolution,
the respondents, through ,Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6,
1986.

On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the
supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and the provisions of
Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the Public respondents were concerned, which
requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action or position taken by his
predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges
are not political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to
pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any
event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as the
filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed
a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the position taken by the new
Tanodbayan.

Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-
evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in question
be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has
been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid
motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this
Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.

Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:

1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional light to due process and
the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.

2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.

3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.

4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by

the petitioner.

5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non- existence of prima

facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the
questioned informations.

Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process"
and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the
alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to
file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that
the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be
premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the
proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof
without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or
allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable
proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due
process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out
at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:

That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the
proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on
April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do not appear on record
 and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could
even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a painstaking an gruelling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official. In this respect, We are the considered opinion that the provision of Pres.
Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint by
the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary investigation
is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in
said office.

The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in
concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to
arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of its official
functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such
facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such
as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply with due process or any other
constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented during the trial wherein evidence for
and against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and considered.
Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a radical relief
during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a pre-cocious or summary
evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.

This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to
due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the
Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of
the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial?

In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare
the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has
been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes
without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard
must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed.
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal
Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The
"report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely
known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned
from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner
Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS,
Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices
against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was
only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of
the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a
vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint
came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require
the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt
to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the
suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that
prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being
used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive
of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear
or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only
by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor
be enhanced.

Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on
the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the
prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we
agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other
hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be
assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless
and to be treated as a dead letter.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption
that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether
the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by
Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years
in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be
deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by
giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back
time.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant
case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it
unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.

Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued
on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY CONCEPCION

BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA,
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN,
FELIX PEREZ, JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR.,
RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP,
ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE
JAYME, **, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and
Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO
FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS,
BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS,
JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd
LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE
GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO
MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC
ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO
ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, *** , respondents.

Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.

Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.

Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.

Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.

Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.

Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.

Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.

Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C.J.:

Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third
anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno
"Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in
September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing
squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been committed long before the
declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial
process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly
not courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him under
the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in
a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence against
Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21,
1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971
elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by
Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was
instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President
never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.

Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to undergo
successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a
passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on
justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was
smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a
military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity
was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although
he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on
August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and
continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President
instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that
he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the
military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to
do it."

The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free world. The
large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning and came out in
millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his
martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the treacherous
and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has
to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early
distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest
men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by
prestigious and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on
October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3
hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194
witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority
reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the
world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the
chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the report
as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to
respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the
Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other
members was submitted on the following day to the then President who coldly received them and
could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you
can live with your conscience with what you have done."

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as
propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-
hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen.
Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen.
Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen.
Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured
story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn,
of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not
a communist plot The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the
twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then AFP Chief
General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the
premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August
21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters
"the six persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General
Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented
without his intervention."

The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to our work
lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the President may thereafter
direct to be taken. "The four-member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after
warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously
using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes
and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing."
They wrote:

The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late former
Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold
righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality,
humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable
result of which will restore our country's honored place among the sovereign nations
of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.

More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the late
former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine
society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been haunting this country for
decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic
instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive
elements in what are otherwise noble institutions in our country-the military and law
enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large, the great
majority of the officers and men of these institutions have remained decent and
honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our country and people.

The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what
unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba
 Eban observes. "Nobody who has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its
proper limits." Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have spawned in
secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-
loving people.

To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public officials
should regard public service as a reflection of human Ideals in which the highest
sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.

A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that followed,
would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a
country where public office is viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the
moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all other considerations.

It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and statements from
the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and insisted on the military
version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of
anyone in his government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief
in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my
government were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I would have
known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview
in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:

CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to
contradict earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to
indicate that some of the guards may have been responsible (for
shooting Ninoy).

MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been
reading are the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been
biased. The evidence still proves that Galman was the killer. The
evidence also shows that there were intelligence reports connecting
the communist party to the killing. 8

In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of absence
upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more
aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its
findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are deeply
disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by some members of
the Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of
your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if
he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo
Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably
be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10

It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo
Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other
petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university
presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens
of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of
the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the
interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with
the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination."
Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases
which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial
and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a

At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the
Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also
granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to
the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.

But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio in
reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days
earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged
was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a
consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with
Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14

On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did
not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the
merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital
evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded:
The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased
prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain
material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from
promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.

On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled,
respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual
first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was
not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the
prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal,
the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad
Santos maintaining our dissent.

On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and
theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6,
1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered
the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel
headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and
produce a verdict of acquittal.

On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and
ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15

Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that
he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new
Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he added
"relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein
respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the
premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case
after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder
cases below against herein private party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his
memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there
were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15-a He submitted that
"even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any
alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find
sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such
development so that any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least
the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as
he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986
"interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the
said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."

Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9,
1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the
basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former
Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into
suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents
would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its
course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment,
asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his handwriting;
he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of
the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the
note passing issue once and for all.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the allegations in the
second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and
Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
He amplified his revelations, as follows:

1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!

Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate of
the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman
on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an ignominous end. Malacanang wanted
dismissal-to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel
(composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution charging all
the respondents as principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10,
1985.

2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL

At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former
President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the
Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and
an the members of the Panel

Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former President
had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as principals),
evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.

The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at
the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent
was the more discreet posture when the former President became emotional (he was
quite sick then).

During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino and
the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to
the military he rumbled on such statements as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos,
though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to do".
. . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is
becoming ambitious "the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be charged
in court, and wig be detained at city jail."

From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach.
The former President more or less conceded that for political and legal reasons all
the respondents should be charged in court, Politically, as it will become evident that
the government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and
thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that
after (not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent.

In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered to
get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly
Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their respective institutions. The
existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of members of
AFP charged in court) was never mentioned.

It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle the
trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in four to six months,
pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the trial could be expedited.

Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly
mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."
 The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your cooperation. I
know how to reciprocate."

While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his
desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well
as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient
evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the
trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in
accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to say on.

Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of a "make-
believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of
January 23, 1985, while there were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly
beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct
and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S.
Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the
bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not decide
these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the
Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the
crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability,"
adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of
the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of
acquittal. " He "associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."

New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a declaration of
mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of
evidence and collusion. He submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-
appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No.
71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco
Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder
case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a
valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.

Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial.
Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was to file a direct action to
annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.

As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the
issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment
of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver
and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for
any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon
the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.

After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of June 5,
1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado
Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and
Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the
charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to
submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on 19
days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day, respondents
announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected deposition of
former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of
respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its
extensive 64-page Report 16wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a
recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:

1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special
Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special
Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be charged as
principals of the crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman.

2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft
Resolution recommending such course of action, President Marcos summoned
Justice Fernandez, the tree members of the Special Investigating Panel, and justice
Pamaran to a conference in Malacanang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.

3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the
recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the
Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.

4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the

advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted as
planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double
jeopardy.

5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail
during the trial, considering that they would be charged with capital offenses,
President Marcos directed that the several accused be "categorized" so that some of
them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.

6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled
personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.

7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to the letter;
and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in the course
of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution of the special
investigating panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment
to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses,
recantation of witneses who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board,
coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in
the very decision rendered in the case.

8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-
Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those
involved in said task to comply with the same in the subsequent course of the
proceedings.
 9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion
against complying with the Malacañang directive, justice Herrera played his role with
manifestly ambivalent feelings.

10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and pre-determined
manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-
managed from Malacañang and performed by willing dramatis personnae as well as
by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an
authoritarian ruler.

The Commission submitted the following recommendation.

Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the

prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the
same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but
also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the
considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this
Honorable Court that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of
due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a
declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be granted.

The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the Report and
required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at
the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.

The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the
evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts of public
record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code named
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined
manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in
the Aquino Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could
have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution
of the twenty-six respondents accused of all criminal and civil liability.

The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and findings and
conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of
distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the
practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86 years in the trial and
appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised
the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:

The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a

manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be
expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide international
attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate Senator
Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that
President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.

The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this purpose. . . .

President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the
start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the
investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator
Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence
that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point.
Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the
charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further
street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure would be a
better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby
avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President
Marcos is no longer in office.

xxx xxx xxx

After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but
with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and
the question of preventive custody of the accused having thereby received
satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case
and how long it would take to be finished.

According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to
personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial
was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day
testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not have been given
inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case
and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular
Justice thereof.

It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such

presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that
the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the division headed by
him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that
he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang conference
wherein the said directive was given. . . .

The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his
admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to
how long it would take him to finish the case.

The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an agreement
was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the accused, President
Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their way out
 of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered "I know
how to reciprocate," did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part of
justice Fernandez or justice Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference
was presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the
respondents of their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo,
such move was abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.)

The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind of
the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that pressure
from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on both the court and the
prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity
of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it,
his moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his instructions were directed,
the motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing
at that time which enabled, the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers.
That the conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the
Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should be kept
away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those
directly involved were caned to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the
Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were
with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever
made of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15)
months later when the former president was no longer around.

President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted to

take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and
not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or determination on the part of
Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite
their realization of its unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated
murder case may be easily inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No
effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on
the lame excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or "out of respect to the
Office of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from
the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential
pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned
to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject
deference to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact
that, not having been given seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez
said it was not that long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the
talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said
that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became
illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January
10, 1985. 18

The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on whether
the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may
be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It duly concluded
that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference held on January 10,
1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in
several specific incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of
"Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."

Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—

1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six accused as
principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and
6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for the latter two
categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice
Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as
principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended
that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may
hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard practice of the
prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or in the highest category so
as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his
guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action should have been, as
originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned
out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance
with the Malacañang instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual
categorization came only after the then President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's
counsel, Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November,
1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang conference
on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to
charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder." 19 As the
Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the
draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to
have been the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through
due to the summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20

2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that a party's
case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in
behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the
accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and
some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled,
perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the
defense."

The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact
Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial.
Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and
could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi
Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and
described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not
even allowed to return to Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of
Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The
Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in
accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English
transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing
of the discrepancy from the original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA
on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired
and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by
surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by Saturday
(August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he could testify the following
Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission
reported that

... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed testimony

and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to
suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the case of Wakamiya.
... She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by
armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed
by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the local Rural Bank, and
ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk with her about
her proposed testimony; that a certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a
trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the
United States to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Fariñas offered
her two million pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the
persons responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from testifying.

It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or

perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice Fernandez of the displeasure
expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano
to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the
First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985.
The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did not end with her
taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which
suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was
suspected of having coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another
occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which
lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and making
most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing
of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It was verified that the
brownout was limited to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having
affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera
declared that the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was
located beside the room occupied by Malacañang people who were keeping track of
the proceedings.

Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that the two
Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks
after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who
jotted down the number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984,
during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was
kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then,
despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five
persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the Minister of National
Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new
leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.

3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the U.S. airmen's
proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa
Airfield or some other place, such showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of the
prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport.
Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane
merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans
designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even
assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended
that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence.
Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the
prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice
Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally uncalled for."

4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.

5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme
Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the
military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost
immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of said
denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the
same. ... His posture ... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing
the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else."

6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified that President
Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice
Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having been complied
with to the letter. ...

"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President Marcos to handle
the case personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to
a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The evidence before the Comission on how the case
happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such assignment was
not done fairly or regularly.

"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal
would be presented by the respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid
Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not
like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who,
according to Justice Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the
claim of Justice

xxx xxx xxx

"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were filed by Justice
Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were
summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in
the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary,
considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount
of paper work to be undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the
limited time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media
people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually conducted which
resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission
did not receive any evidence on how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who
wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his division. . . .

7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When
the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an
order directing the confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried
out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the
twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to
be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At
that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of
the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed
that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who
had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was
given such copy only after sometime. ..."

8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang

personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by
Malacañang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take remedial measures as may
be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the
label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose.
There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military and
Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings." the close monitoring by
Malacañang showed its results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacañang was
immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office on
August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise
Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief,
suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca
Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of
her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel
pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the
prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear
that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case should be handled He saw to
it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with."

9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of the
twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an
integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal objectives,
seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to
wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged
in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same
offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.

"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to
simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on the standard ground that their guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of justifying the
acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of
the accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two
informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to
see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. ...

Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who concurred with
the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified
that in October, 1985, when the decision was being prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that
he was of the view that some of the accused should be convicted he having found difficulty in
acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to
him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six
accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm
this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for
Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera
remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)

The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more
precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to
corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur22) since
the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal
Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would
summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera
prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered
at the Malacanang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the
public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their
acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24

Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution
panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the
trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious
final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a
phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the
evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall
address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' "
acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:—

1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he himself
appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent and
dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators."

2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four majority
members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it
were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four majority members when they
presented to him the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by
Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).

3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally
disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's
"fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers'
incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in
gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.

4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as

Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very
information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and

5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to
convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them
"innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal
nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had
unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given
deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."

The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian
President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution
panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as
admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's
"Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was
illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission
noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto
under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ...
Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10,
1985."

No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who
by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on
a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the
time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military
men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which
is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should
be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders
moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals
Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness
suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not
make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein
ordered before a neutral and impartial court.

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception
and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from
the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world
are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an
accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to
due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the
relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and
a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare
the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution
which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court
stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-
30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).

Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).

xxx xxx xxx

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.

In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.

More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we
have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to
assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the
respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near
the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was
already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming
powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its
evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them
from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their
natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6
months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of
"the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of
warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense.
Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making
assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera
pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases
before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo"
and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign
people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the
constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in
the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor
bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible
and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the
authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he
invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.

Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case
which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully
disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows:
"That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however,
respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment
at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.

|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx

"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It
is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged
must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A
verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the
society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render
justice where justice is due.30

2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private prosecutors had filed a
motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of
manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M.
Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to defense counsel.
Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the
prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the
merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange
between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacanang.
 PJ PAMARAN

Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then
deal later on with that. After all, the most important thing here is, shall
we say, the decision of the case.

J. HERRERA

I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is
the capacity of the justices to sit in judgment. That is more important
than anything else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by
Herrera). 31

But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in the decision,
for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as
follows:

... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the contempt
proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution neither joined that
petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to the
submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but is
also a confession of official insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32

The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of respondents Justices
pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs.
Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a verdict of acquittal,
leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to
mention the overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due
process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete
evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34

In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting
of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been
taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the
court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge)
refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his
decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge
acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts
of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."

3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents' counsels must be

rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-
determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment, instead of the
present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the
void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its nullity,
following the presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and the Court's findings
therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but
also by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a
pre-determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.

(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of the
proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or
verdict.

(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are not entitled
to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited
hereinabove.

(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied by the
authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against them
must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained
wholesale exoneration.

(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg.
Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one
Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his
lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end
and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept
pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion
for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February
4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of
April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had
received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The second
motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was not known at the
time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret
Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March,
1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the
petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of
acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to
admit the second motion for reconsideration.37

4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since
the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now
admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-
man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.

As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new
members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an
extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the
judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was
overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."

Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and
confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse.
Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This
has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and fairness and
unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the
leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this
Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a
new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as
vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become
simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face
trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with
all due process. What the past regime had denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham
trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will
assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.

The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary
allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the
Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may
acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing
authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the
Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase
the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must
ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor.

5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the invaluable
services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa
as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and without remuneration
thorough competent and dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the
evidence, evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the
scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of

November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the
proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a
re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard
for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to an

This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 131728 March 9, 1998

BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y.
PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte,
docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R.
No. 131728, that assail the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated.

On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an
incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed
by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information contained the following averments; thus:

That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named accused, who is the incumbent mayor
of Biñan, Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water which made her dizzy and
weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said
JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

That accused Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion without having participated as principal or

accessory assisted in the commission of the offense by bringing said complainant child to the
rest house of accused Bayani "Arthur" Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna and after
receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped
her.

Contrary to Law.1

The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC
of Biñan, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.

On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin,
and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-
RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance, quoted
herein in full, as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE

I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street,

Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my
parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:

1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani "Arthur"
Alonte of Biñan, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Biñan, Laguna;

2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically,
(a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the
Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the
President, on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the
State Prosecutor's Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure
order filed with the Biñan Court.

3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost
two (2) semesters of my college residence. And when the actual trial is held after all
the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of
my schooling to attend the hearings;

4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most
abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my younger brother,
who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;

5 That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and
live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, and live normally once
again;

6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other
charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the Office of the
State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information has not been
filed, and that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases,
whether, criminal, civil, and/or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines;

7 That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my
credibility as a witness-complainant;

8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a

corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in whatever form, against
members of the police force or any other official of officer, my relatives and friends
who extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.

WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.

(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

 Complainant

Assisted by:

(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN

Private Prosecutor

In the presence of:

(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN

Father

(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Mother

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.

(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer2

On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for
change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit
of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the motion to dismiss.
Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the
desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who
had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the
motion to dismiss.

On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC),
granting the petition for change of venue. The Court said:

These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by coercion or
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors
Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her
witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from
pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some illicit
influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to
grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to
the City of Manila.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Biñan, Laguna to the City of
Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No.
9619-B to any of its branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled
shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of
Biñan, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light
of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to personally
deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B
upon receipt of this Resolution.3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of
Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo
A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.

On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court
a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."

In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent
of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the
[private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."

On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended
bail of P150,000.00.

On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The
parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge
Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to
Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the
question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance.5

It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private
complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan
affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no
intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in
further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist
because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor
influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her
parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.

Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's
parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their
daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto
Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents
in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to
pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the
accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.

Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6

On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State
Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed "no
objection to the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his
prayer for the granting of bail."

Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.

On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even
date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair
play to join the aforestated motion."

Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.

The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December
1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for
Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions were
acted upon by Judge Savellano.

On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte
received a notice from the RTC Manila. Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on
18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having
received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.

On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano
manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering
from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner
Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The
promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani
Alonte and Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous
crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or
imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura "Wella'" Concepcion for
his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered without any further force and effect.

SO ORDERED.7

On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration.
Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari,
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action
against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.

Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified
and the case remanded for new trial; thus:

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the
petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, §1, Constitution).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and order of trial
(Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
 The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal
jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2)
affidavits (Punongbayan's and Balbin's) which were neither marked nor offered into evidence
by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the
affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioner's right to due process (Article III, §1,
Constitution).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the
facts which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III,
§1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result
in conviction without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up with the
same result).8

On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:

1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the
prosecution's motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total violation of the petitioner's right to due
process of law.

2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is

concerned.

3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial
by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations and outlook of the case had been
motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of media hype that surrounded this case
and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.

4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the
petitioner as a principal even though he has been charged only as an accomplice in the
information.9

The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity
of petitioners' invocation, i.e., even before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for
reconsideration.

The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded
below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case
did proceed on the merits but that —

The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did
not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private
complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court,
but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for decision
merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called "desistance" which, to them, was
sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called "desistance" of the
private complainant.10

According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November
1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the
resolution of this Court in Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and
voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.

It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings.
Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the
Court's perception, taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial
court certainly is not alone to blame.

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Jurisprudence11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a)
that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing.12

The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in
our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial." 13

The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court; viz:

Sec. 3. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the
civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising
from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless
the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda.
 (e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.

In Tabao vs. Espina,14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It
reminds that —

. . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be
given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its
evidence.

Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration
the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise
of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and
just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted
sense of justice and fairness.15

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that —

Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-
examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to
respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits —
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the
opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may be waived." (emphasis
supplied) —

it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated.
The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."16 Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a
few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1)
Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates
therefor been scheduled for the purpose;18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in
the order of trial.20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for
not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost
place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even
to the most undeserving.

This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be
sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference
that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition
of the case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including
the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.

Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain
any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be
allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this
subject, the case of People vs. Junio,21 should be instructive. The Court has there explained:

The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant

who was assisted by her mother supported the "inherent incredibility of prosecution's
evidence" is specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally
unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying
him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish,
Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that "[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.

Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be
given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the
court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for
one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the
Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable [Flores vs. People,
211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People
vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]22

The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,23 a
murder case, the Court has ruled:

The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie
Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it
formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd,
906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said during the
trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo
Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against accused-appellant.
Thus, her affidavit stated:

3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no
longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance
before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of
record to confirm (sic) with my father's desire;

It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and
the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented
by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the
recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify
on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was
presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear on the substance of Tessie's
affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not involved in the perpetration of the crime.
 In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial
a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA
683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this circumstance alone
does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this
reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor,
198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his
testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of
the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a
comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of
evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial court
correctly ruled.24

It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any
person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that
authority.25

Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been
instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold —

While "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint flied by the offended party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be," [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the
pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution
of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194
SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion
to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the institution of the
criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be serious in "signifying (her) intention to refrain
from testifying" since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of
desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated "April 1992," it
was only submitted sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed
before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual
filing of the case.26

In People vs. Miranda,27 applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which, in full, states —

Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and
acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
 The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the
coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.

the Court said:

Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction,
abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit
the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause
has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according
to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is
the marriage between the offended and the offended party. 28

In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:

In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of
the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he
pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper for
two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in
question reads: "The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders." This provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must
come before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the
offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old
Penal Code provided: "The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his
wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be
remitted." These provisions of the old Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of
Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same. The Revised Penal
Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the
effect of reviving any of its provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of
the second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the offended party again
constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it must be
emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and
must be for both offenders to be effective — circumstances which do not concur in this
case.30

The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has
heretofore already held.

Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the
Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, the best excused from the
case. Possible animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The
pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan31 could again be said: All suitors
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. 32 It is not
enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.

The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before
the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so
with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place
in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition
that must at no time be lost to it.

Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to
discharge their duties with the highest degree or excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act
each time with utmost devotion and dedication to duty.33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has
been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions, will
not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.

WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that —

(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan

on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935,
DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said criminal case;

(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997,
convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the
case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings; and

(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the
case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other branches of that court for
proper disposition.

No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21325 October 29, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA,
MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERO SAVANDAL, defendants;
PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Arturo G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellee.

Arturo E. Balbastro for defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novel in the plea made by counsel de oficio in this
appeal of the accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced to life
imprisonment for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed that because the
information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only the two appellants being
convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the other three having been acquitted on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the judgment of conviction against the
appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. To bolster such a
contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the proof offered by the prosecution were noted. A careful
study of the evidence of record would leave no other rational conclusion but that the deceased met
his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as found by the lower court. Hence the appeal
cannot prosper. We affirm.

The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the morning of January 9, 1964. The
two accused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the
deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte,
saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the
deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was decidedly in the
negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals
who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-
accused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused
Francisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla. Crescencio and Severo Savandal, for a drinking session at a
place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of
killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo
and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station
themselves nearby.1

Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a
cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right
ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate
from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their
mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the
next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the, latter's widow Corazon that
he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly
notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The
answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. 2 The death was due to the
wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar region, and another in the left
breast.

It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court reached its
decision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno
Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the circumstance of evident premeditation aggravated
by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin,
the penalty of [reclusion perpetual]."3 Reference was likewise made in such decision as to why the
other co-accused were not convicted, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal
being utilized as state witnesses, and the others three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto
Roquilla acquitted.

Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From the
beginning the accused Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with the group but that he was
fishing in the sea during the night in question. These facts that is, that none of the prosecution
witnesses has testified that any of these three accused actually helped in the killing of the deceased,
Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were included in the case only much later after the filing
of this case against Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent contention of the accused
Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the night in question; and the
testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona,
Esperanza Oposa Billona, Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward
manner, without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that the testimonies of these
witnesses have not been refuted by the PC soldiers (whom they accused of maltreatment] when
they were available to the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very serious doubt as to the
guilt of the said accused."4

The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants
Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led to
the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence
sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while
conspiracy was alleged, only two of the seven accused were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous
appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged, thus
calling for the affirmance of the decision.

1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be,
according to the Constitution.5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on
their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be
in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this Court has
always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of
the state, both oral and documentary, independently whatever defense is offered by the accused.
Only if judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into count. The
proof against him must survive the reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
away judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes.6 United States v.
Lasada,7 decided in 1910, yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility
may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense." 8 To the same
effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v. Esquivel.9Thus: "In this
connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute
necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to
the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the
guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the
accused, and to the state." 10

It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any
further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of record
resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability
of appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three
accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite quantum of
proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other
two who testified for the state being likewise no long subject to any criminal liability. The reference
then to opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental
postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is
unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinion of Justice
Laurel in People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Upon the other hand there are certain facts which if taken
together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-
appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90,
96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of
Erajio Ello that he gave the hat ... to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our minds as to
the guilt of the appellant but also seems to sustain the theory of the defense and strengthen the
suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the
killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to
acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to
confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. ..." 12 The
facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of appellants
on the above decision is therefore futile.

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than
amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more
than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been a
blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two
appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the
reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly
untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been
cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of
conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense
guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. 13

2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilt not having been sufficiently
demonstrated with the contention that the lower court overlooked or did not properly consider
material and significant facts of record that ought to have substantially affected or altered the
judgment. Even the most careful reading of such brief, however, with due recognition of the vigor in
which this particular point is pressed, would not destroy the credibility of the facts as testified to
concerning the manner in which the deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants to
put an end to his life. That such a version could not have been concocted is shown by the
undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the
offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away with the principal
witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have committed this
crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the perpetration
of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in
defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the
well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who
was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in
this case, circumstances weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him. 14

WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 affirmed with the modification that the
indemnification to the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum P12,000.00. With costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas
Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who
has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the
Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel,
Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of

the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1
hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been
6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that
the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall
commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
 .... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate
in any partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held on
January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution.
The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on
January 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides
that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and
discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso,
et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for
being violative of the Constitution.

I . The procedural Aspect

At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions.
Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does
not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao
in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has
joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as
the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner
Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits,
in the interest of orderly procedure.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial
review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide
the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have
raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.

A. Actual case and controversy.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the
Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet,
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking
Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that
constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a
question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion
from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's
case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando
in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section
2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:

1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns

and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial
and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:

Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt
of a copy thereof.

B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition,
that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has
been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being
candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs
is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of
any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that
the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary
of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:

... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement
of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of
the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing
to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections
4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly,
the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]),
or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary
of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this
Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this
Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act
of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an
"appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are
actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.

II. The substantive viewpoint.

We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not
being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was
relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and
in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases
having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the
paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few
days hence.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is
belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions
based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15,
respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither
well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65
years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining
that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not
be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or
might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good
policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective
echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged
65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that
the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where
the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the
same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966];
Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc.,
et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred
by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977
ed., p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are
practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the
conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55
[1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56).
Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires
to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two
parts. The first provides:

a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive

evidence of such fact ...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside
a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are
constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law,
is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both
of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the
ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of
findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby
be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to
be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid. Said paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article

XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are
hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in
Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52

providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil
court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence
of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties
on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the provisions of
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the
Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the
reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition
for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for
being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge
against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still
pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on
private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's
certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition.

Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992
resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent. The Court, in its
resolution of 02 June 1992, held:

Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy.

Since the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected
Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petition below for disqualification has
ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held that a
pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should be
 dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in
a separate proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to

the filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten
(10) days from notice. 1

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner
instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.
In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The
COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected, focuses on
whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date),
is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest
comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on
to, an elective local office.

Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further
interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits,
and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition
truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B.
Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102,
103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p.
792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight
Committee which, conformably with Section 5332 of R.A. 7160, was convened by the President to
"formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective
implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of
Local Autonomy.

Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:

CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.

So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next,
Page 39.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.

REP. CUENCO: What does he want?

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na

kung kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme
Court later on.

REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.

Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical

cases here or abroad.

Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the
warrant of arrest pending, unserved. . .

HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano —

what is a fugitive? It is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong

fugitive.

Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.

THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She
is not a fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I
have held that for a long time ago. So can. . .

MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording,
this is very important. Manny, can you come up?

MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.

THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by

final judgment. Okay,. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by
final judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that
approved? No objection, approved (TSN, Oversight Committee, 07
May 1991).

xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page

2? Sino ba ang gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44,
"fugitive from justice". What "fugitive"? Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?

MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree
to clarify the word "fugitive".

THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?

MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...

 THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?

HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.

THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice
shall mean or means one who has been convicted by final judgment.
It means one who has been convicted by final judgment.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.

THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?

THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been

convicted by final judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and
because he put up, post bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that
is not yet conviction by final judgment. 3

The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional
infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so
taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was
expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation:

. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered
ako doon, a. 4

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:

Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from running
for any elective local position:

(a) . . .

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its
enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no
obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent
to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of
the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the
term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private
respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the
Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the
petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand
the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to
proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the foregoing opinion. No special
pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur
G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27,1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there being
no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07
which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit. Further, the accused
is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to
the amount embezzled.

SO ORDERED.

As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the
petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received
collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government
accounts.

On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22,
1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The
Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08. 1

A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but
he was able to pay only P10,159,50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated October 12,
1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of
temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from the
service.2

On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to
the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said amount
was filed against him with the respondent court on October 11, 1983.

The above facts are not denied by the petitioner.3

He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the unliquidated
withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and
encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of absence. He avers he was later made to post
the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had
no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said amount.

The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding vouchers dated are
described as follows:

1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of
P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December 22,1980.

2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount
of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. NS958525 dated December 23,1980.

3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of
P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Cheek No. 956639J dated December 22,1980.

4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the amount
of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29,1980.

Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts
thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid
vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits ).4

He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged but was in fact
the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to the sick wife in the
hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came
back from the hospital.5

Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner
was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had
already been encashed on December 23 1980, the encashment was not immediately recorded in the
petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage."
It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted with it, the
petitioner had no explanation to offer.6

Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cash
book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980, he
discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00 appeared to have been already encashed, the
encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he required the
petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was already
part of the latter's accountability.7

After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q.
Alconcel, made the following findings:

The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the amount of
P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the said
amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim that
same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:

First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the same
purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial
officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the period, January to
December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December 23, 1980, and in fact,
another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day. The two (2)
other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were issued and encashed on December 22 and
29, 1980, respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was only entered in accused's
Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and encashment, all
the other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above,
was issued and encashed on the same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his
Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging the
embezzlement of its money equivalent.

Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks Nos. 956639 and 958525, could
not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary
differentials of government officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since
these have been issued and encashed on the same day.

Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he duly
liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:

Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?

A I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the vouchers
paid by me or disbursed by me.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated?

A Yes, Your honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you give these documents?

A give them to the cashier only, no other person.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO

Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these
payrolls to the cashier?
 A On December 29, sir.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q Duly accomplished?

A Duly accomplished, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?

A At the office, Your Honor.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:

Q At what time?

A In the afternoon, sir.

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?

A He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was supposedly
having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp.
1618)

The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.

And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on December 22,
23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave
Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the month of
December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the
same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to
October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the
day when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the other check which was
issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.

The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to
disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal.
On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point unmistakably to the
petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:

Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the
following factors:
 First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not make
any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually received.

Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any
certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.

Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he did
not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.

The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission.1âwphi1 That is not a
preliminary requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt
of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is the presence
of the following requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.

The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he
has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to
account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive
protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere
emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the
petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an
warrant presumptuousness.

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is
evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution
and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he
malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached.
His conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its agent, FEEDER INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.)
INC.,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fourteenth Division, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8,
1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals which found the vessel
M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
(Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000
metric tons of fuel oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the
forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo.1

The facts as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20470 are as
follows:

The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100
metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy
Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.

On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without
notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the
knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on
said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19,
1986 to verify the report.

The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and
shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing
the vessel for "Zamboanga."

In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention
over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to
Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector
denied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.

In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel,
agreed on a stipulation of facts, to wit:

l. That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI" subject of Sl-2-86, herein
identified as Exh. "A", is admitted.
 2. That the existence and identity of l,100 metric tons of gas oil, subject of Sl-2-86-A,
herein identified as Exh. "B", is admitted;

3. That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil, subject of Sl-2-86
herein identified as Exh. "B-1", is admitted;

4. That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 and was cleared by Singapore
customs authorities for Zamboanga, Philippines;

5. That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island, Municipality of Nueva Valencia,

sub-province of Guimaras, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about 1120HRS, May
14,1986;

6. That subject vessel was boarded by Customs and Immigration authorities for the
first time in the afternoon of May 19, 1986, at about 1600HRS;

7. That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986, submitted by the Team leader
of the Customs and Immigration Team, Roberto Intrepido, marked and identified as
Exh. "C", is admitted;

8. That at the time of boarding, the Master of subject vessel could not produce any
ship and/or shipping documents regarding her cargo except the Port Clearance
Certificate No. 179999 issued by the Port of Singapore authority dated May 4, 1986,
marked as Exh. "D", which is hereby admitted;

9. That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULU WAI", Capt. Romeo E. Deposa
filed a Marine Protest dated same date, which Marine Protest, marked and identified
as Exh. "E", is hereby admitted;

10. That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E. Deposa, marked and identified
as Exh. "F", given on May 26, 1986 before Atty. Hernando Hinojales, Customs Legal
Officer, is admitted;

11. That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres, Owner's representative of M/T
"ULU WAI" marked and identified as Exh. "G" given before Atty. Hernando Hinojales
on May 28,1986, is admitted;

12. That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas, Master of M/T "CATHEAD"
given before Lt. Dennis Azarraga on June 4, 1986, marked and identified as Exh.
"H", is admitted;

13. That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41 entered into by and
between the National Stevedoring & Lighterage Corporation and the Far East
Synergy Corporation, marked and identified as Exh. "I", is admitted; and;

14. That the Preliminary Report of Survey Sounding Report dated June 17, 1986,
signed by J.P. Piad, Surveyor of Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and duly attested
by Ernesto Cutay, Chief Officer of the M/T "ULU WAI" marked and identified as Exh.
"J", is also admitted.2

On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, with the following disposition:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T "ULU WAI" hereby found guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD
1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are
hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530* (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code
and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated May
13, 1987, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 19, 1987 of the
District Collector of Customs of Iloilo, ordering the forfeiture of M/T "ULU WAI" and its
cargo of 2,100 metric tons of gas and fuel oil is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.4

On June 25, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and
the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from
implementing his decision. On December 14, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its
decision, with this dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs dated May 13,

1987, ordering the forfeiture of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" for violation of Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Custom Codes (sic), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100
metric tons of Gas Oil and 1,000 metric tons of Fuel Oil for violation of Section
2530 * (a) and (f), and (I-1) of the same Code, is hereby affirmed. With costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals'
decision with this Court. On March 21, 1990, we issued a resolution6 referring the disposition
of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of our decision in Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.7 holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court
of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been
denied on July 4, 1990, it interposed this instant petition contending that:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence that an illegal
importation had been committed;

2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be
presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt; and

3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel in
violation of their constitutional right thereto.8
We find no merit in the Petition.

1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal
in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by herein petitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of
first Instance of Rizal etc., et al.,9 this Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture
proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, as follows:

. . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws
are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the
imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from
Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, are
purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the
administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate
possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability
that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties
may be imposed.

In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings,
concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or
illegally imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as
such, have been prevented from being assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding
duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the form of fine or of
forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The
importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty be falls
on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable
guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The
Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his
findings that untaxed goods were transported in respondents' car and seized from their
possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the
provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined
in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if
any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal
in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of
a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the
goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 10

In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an
illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T
"ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of
the Tariff and Customs Code.

Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention
that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed
innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

2. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at
least an attempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.
Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133
of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated, forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said
provision of Rule 133 which involves. such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt does not apply.

Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying
vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear
from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation.
And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred
from the facts,11 and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and
circumstances generally.12

In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload,
is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive
discussion in respondent court's decision:

It is undisputed that the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" entered the jurisdiction of the Philippines. The
issue that calls for Our resolution is whether or not there was an intention to unload. The
facts and circumstances borne by the evidence convince Us that there was intent to unload.
The following circumstances unmistakably point to this conclusion.

1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga was shorter
and Iloilo lies further north.1âwphi1 It is not logical for the sailing vessel to travel a longer
distance to get the necessary repairs.

2. When the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not
notify the Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. The master of the vessel did not file
a marine protest until 12 days after it had anchored, despite the supposed urgency of the
repairs needed and notwithstanding the provision (Sec. 1016) of the Code requiring the
master to file protest within 24 hours.

3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and shipping
documents were not on board except the clearance from Singaporean port officials clearing
the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner claims that these were turned over to the shipping
agent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986. However, this claim is belied by the sworn
marine protest (Exhibit "E") of the master of M/T "ULU WAI" Mr. Romeo Deposa.

It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the crew to: get
down of (sic) the vessel and find means and ways to contact the vessel's
representative.

Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit "G"), ship agent, Antonio Torres, stated that he
did not know the buyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the Local Purchase Order of
the alleged buyer, Pogun Construction SDN. Torres also swore that his knowledge came
from the vessel's owner, without mentioning the shipping documents which indicate such
data. He also said that he did not know the consignee of the oil which would have been
patent from the documents. Lastly, as also pointed out by the court a quo, the captain of the
vessel M/T "ULU WAI" Romeo Deposa, in his sworn statement to custom authorities on May
26, 1986, enumerated the documents he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio Torres, but did not
mention as among them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and the Bill
of Lading.
 4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T "CATHEAD", and the large M/T
"SEMIRANO NO. 819" were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge and the
tugboat were contracted by Consignee Far East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel into
the awaiting barge and to discharge the same to Manila (Exhibits "I" and "I-1").

It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T "ULU WAI"
Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was the vessel's cargo which
was to be unloaded and brought to Manila by them.13

The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings
of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals.
We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are
entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance of counsel
may not be considered an outright violation of their constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. As
explained in the case of Nera vs. The Auditor General:14

The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by
the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial
investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to counsel
except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the trial of the accused, who has
the right "to be heard by himself and counsel," either retained by him or provided for him by
the government at its expense. These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along
with the other rights of the person facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must
contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life) against the awesome authority of
the State.

In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is
it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a
non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such
representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process
clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only
with a lawyer at his side.

Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and
Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute
or deny the statements they made. This was not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that
official duty was regularly performed stands. In addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is
himself a lawyer. Finally, petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without
the assistance of counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken under
anomalous circumstances which would render them inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. We
thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the said sworn statements.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.

Mauricio Carlos for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MORAN, C.J.:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." On may 8, 1948,
the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:

Court:

Is this the case ready for trial?

Fiscal:

I am ready, your honor.

Court: — to the accused.

Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. I have no lawyer and I will
plead guilty.

Court:

Arraign the accused.

Note:

Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was
asked this question.

Q. What do you plead? — A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.

Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? — A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.

The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.

Fiscal:

I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the
case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.

Court:
 Sentenced reserved.

Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following judgment:

[Criminal Case No. V-118]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-
appellant.

SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION

SENTENCE

The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention in the following

INFORMATION

That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of

Romblon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused being a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in
the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreag of her personal liberty.

Contrary to law.

This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to
the information above described.

The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined
by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 18
and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. Applying indeterminate
sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion
temporal in the medium degree as minimum, or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision
mayor to twenty (20) years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. The
accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment.

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the
offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is
said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In
the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of
slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense
is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial
judge in his judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have
been presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts
pleaded in the information.

Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by
counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment
finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten
years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and
clarify the true facts of the case.

The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our
rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:

If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right
to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the
Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney.

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties
to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must
grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said
court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the
aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to
grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the
court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did
such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before
arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by
the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a
denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little
avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that
it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to
ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of
his own.

It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty
but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to
inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed
instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making
of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the
accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense
or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the
fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do
with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of
the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court
should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified
plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new
arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by
counsel. So ordered.