Showing posts sorted by relevance for query jabinal.

Sort by date Show all posts

Sunday, August 12, 2012

Gatchalian v. Delim

Facts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus
owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping
sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned
turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills
were paid by respondent’s spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents.
Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner
filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities,
mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead.
Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The
trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate
court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to
damages.

Issues:

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver

(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of
her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective,
must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not
explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of
the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she
too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages
by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be
to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from
common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had]
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised
extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence
imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the
driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton
disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the
part of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost
any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages
on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead,
is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have
suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.