Natres Cases Set 2

Supreme Court of the Philippines
387 Phil. 67
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000
(1) FELIPE CALUB AND RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, AND CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191,
denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to
annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order
had denied petitioners’ (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as
well as (b) petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24,
1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin..[2]
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor
vehicles, described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board
feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a
certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and
ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by
one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. …".[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents
and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of
lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued but the
drivers refused to accept the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against
Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as
amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[6]
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the
custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave
coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public
Prosecutor..[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended
by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd
Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with
an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal
complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal
Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive
Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..[8]
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished
the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it
was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it..[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio
Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded
vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The
trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated
April 24, 1992..[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary
Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting
further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or
attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners.
The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest
products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in
custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on
September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate
disposition..[13]
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere
seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to
the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized
representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the
conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order
No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines
in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses
penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report
of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to
render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure
to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was
confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to
the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such
procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia
legis.[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners’ claim that private respondents’
complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves
under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to
respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue
against the government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond
the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer
might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another.. [16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the
subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own
findings..[17] Their petition was found without merit.[18]
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE
PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277
DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING
RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE
BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO.
277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of
an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. – Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying
legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as
prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles
were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products,
in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation
were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an
offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of
the same Code. They read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. -- In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department]
or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined
in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used
in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All conveyances used in the transport of any
forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated
in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary or his duly authorized representative
such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are
authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized
military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products
and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products
and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by
DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office
as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents
that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the
seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day
following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the
impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was
apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the
seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles
and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It
would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be
effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law,
in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise..[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the
case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were
already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in
favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia
legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure.
The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of
partial Sheriff’s Return, and wait for the judge’s instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.
In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:
". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel
earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily
be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".[21]
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles,
with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent..[22] And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold
the State ultimately liable..[23] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
willfulness, malice or corruption.[24] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in
question are clearly official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions
as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad
faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the
State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General’s line for
the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall
that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss..[26] If not invoked at the proper time,
this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case
and try it.[27]
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992,
are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take
possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of
and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable
Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the
abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. – Any
[6]
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
[26]
Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.
SECTION 1. Grounds. -- Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
342 Phil. 485
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997
(2) EPIFANIO LALICAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING

JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 52, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber"
is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an
information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio
Lalican,[1] Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto
Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody
and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger
jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber
and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only
after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to
'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or
the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that
the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the law.[2]
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine
the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the
word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The
position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the
law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal
prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a
question of law.[3]
On September 24, 1991, the lower court,[4] guided by the principles that penal laws should be
construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused,
issued an Order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber"
is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D.
No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished
wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized
under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the
government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:
"Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by
being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be
made to apply to lumber."
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a
holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.[5]
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the
Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not
just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been
sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had
made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented
Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the
certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the
two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to
this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a
certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for
transportation from one point to another.[6]
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of
"timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-
inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of
"lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.[7]
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited
himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to
Branch 52.
On June 10, 1992, the lower court[8] issued the herein questioned Order setting aside the quashal
Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be
penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of
"other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and
possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood"
in the definition of forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant
petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec.
68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest
products."
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by
then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License.- Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such
officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on
the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."
(Underscoring supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other
forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber
or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, thru Justice Hilario
Davide, held:
"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph
(aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code
uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being
prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus."
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned
from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the
following:
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain
inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry
laws more responsive to present situations and realities; x x x"
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the
law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by
law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an
inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.[10] After all, the phrase "forest products" is
broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention
lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:
"Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still
it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is
equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3 (q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products, viz., x x x
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we
are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be
very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it
sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the
law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. x x x.
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their
possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents
contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or
whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of
cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority."
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only
where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility.[11] Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of power.[12]
On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.[13] Where the court has
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[14] As this Court said:
"x x x. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive
it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently,
an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible
through the original civil action of certiorari." [15]
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.[16]
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the
fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion
to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the
proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if
after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law.[17]
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the
appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well
as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari.[18] The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.[19] An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is
shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. [20]
However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders.
To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari
would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. [21]
Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan[22] for his contention that a denial of a
motion to quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different
factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the
offense charged has prescribed,[23] this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the
proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.
With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court
consider,[24] this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the
requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case,[25] this Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on
some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.[26]
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country,
considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties,
more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an
accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when
the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court
must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving
at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however,
has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due
process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower
court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This
Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., on leave.
385 Phil. 195
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131270, March 17, 2000
(3) PERFECTO PALLADA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction
of illegal possession of lumber in violation of §68[2] of the Revised Forestry Code[3] (P.D. No. 705, as
amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The facts are as follows:

Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of
the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice
milling and trading.
DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's
warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain
saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two
receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The
DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero
Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were
cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet,
worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber,
consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE
stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order[4] was served on petitioner Perfecto
Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.
On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company president
Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for
a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed
with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.[5]
Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the
warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure
orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations
manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias
Valdehueza, were charged with violation of §68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information
alleged:[6]
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1992, and prior thereto at the Valencia Golden Harvest
Corporation Compound, municipality of Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally possess 2,115 pieces [of] lumber of different dimensions in the total volume of 29,299 .25
board feet or equivalent to 69.10 cubic meters with an estimated value of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY
EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR PESOS AND 45/100 (P488,334.45)
Philippine Currency, without any authority, license or legal documents from the government, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P488,334.45.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277.
As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994, judgment was rendered as
follows:[7]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Perfecto Pallada and Francisco Tankiko
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having in their possession timber products worth of P488,334.45
without the legal documents as charged in the information in violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree 705, as amended and are, therefore, each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The lumber subject of the crime are confiscated in favor of the government.
Accused Isaias Valdehueza and Noel Sy are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence against them.
Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997,
affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his participation in the
purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber.[8]
Hence this petition which raises the following issues:[9]
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
PALLADA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF
TIMBER ORIGIN WAS NOT THE PROPER DOCUMENT TO JUSTIFY PETITIONER'S
POSSESSION OF THE SQUARED TIMBER OR FLITCHES.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

UPHOLDING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PRESENCE OF ERASURES
IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TIMBER ORIGIN RENDER THEM VALUELESS AS EVIDENCE.
First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as summarized by the trial
court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was
legal:[10]
1. Exh. 6 - Certificate of Timber Origin (CTO for short), dated December 15, 1991, for 56 pieces of
flitches equivalent to 12.23 cubic meters, transported from Bombaran, Lanao del Sur of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Taken from the forest area of Wahab and H.D.
Pangcoga
Exh. 6-A - Auxiliary Invoice

Exh. 6-B - Certificate of Transport Agreement (CTA, for short)
Exh. 6-C - Tally Sheet, dated December 14, 1992, for 463 pieces of lumber equivalent to 5,056.94
board feet
Exh. 6-D - Delivery Receipt, dated December 16, 1991, from WHP Enterprises of Maguing,
Lanao del Sur, to the Corporation for the lumber mentioned in Exh. "6-C"
Exh. 6-F - Cash Voucher for P58,832.45 in payment to WHP Enterprises, dated December 16,
1991, for the 5,056.94 board feet of lumber
Exh. 6-D-1 - [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above
2. Exh. 7 - CTO, (undated), for 961 pieces of log equivalent to 25.4 cubic meter[s] taken from the
forest area of a certain Somira M. Ampuan in Lama Lico, Bombaran of the ARMM
Exh. 7-B - CTA
Exh. 7-C - Tally Sheet, dated February 6, 1992, for 961 pieces of lumber equal to 10,758.2 board
feet
Exh. 7-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by SMA Trading Company,
dated February 6, 1992
Exh. 7-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee issued to Somira M. Ampuan, dated August 9,
1991
Exh. 7-F - Cash Voucher for P126,562.05 issued by the Corporation in payment to SMA
Trading Company for 10,758.02 board feet of lumber, dated February 6, 1992
3. Exh. 8 - CTO for 678 pieces of chain-sawn lumber with an equivalent volume of 18.93 cubic
meter from the forest area of Wahab Pangcoga and H.D. Pangcoga, dated February 25, 1992
Exh. 8-B - CTA
Exh. 8-C - Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber
Exh. 8-D - Delivery Receipt to Golden Harvest Corporation issued by WHP Enterprises,
Exh. 8-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee

Exh. 8-F - Cash Voucher for P93,614.50 in payment for 8,024.99 board feet of lumber issued by
the Corporation payable to WHP Enterprises
4. Exh. 9 - CTO for 426 pieces of logs (?) with an equivalent volume of 12.24 cubic meters from
licensee Somira M. Ampuan of Lama Lico, Bombaran, Lanao del Sur, consigned to the
Corporation, (undated). Stamped "Release 3/2/92"
Exh. 9-B - CTA, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-C - Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992
Exh. 9-D - Delivery Receipt issued by SMA Trading Company to the Corporation, dated March
20, 1992
Exh. 9-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee
Exh. 9-F - Cash Voucher, for P64,299.50 to pay [for] 5,189 board feet of lumber
Exh. 9-D-1 - Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"
The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by
petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber
Origin.[11] For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83[12] states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment
of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms
for official use by authorized BFD officers. . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as

herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to
confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber
Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the
company's possession of the lumber.[13] In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[14]
The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed
timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's
ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705
means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by
law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the
question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.
Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest
products.[15] As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that
the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting
the origin thereof."
Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of
Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner,
considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.
According to the trial court:[16]
Although the CTO marked Exh. "6" mentions 56 pieces of flitches, the supporting documents, like the
Tally Sheet, the Delivery Receipt from the lumber dealer and the Cash Voucher describe 463 pieces of
lumber. . . .
In like manner, Exh. "7" and Exh. "9" mention 961 and 420 pieces of log, respectively. But the
supporting documents describe the forest product[s] as lumber.
The CTO marked Exh. "[8]" reveals a half-truth: it mentions 678 pieces of hand-sawn lumber. Its
Auxiliary Invoice also states the same load of lumber. Someone may have noticed the "mistake" of
mentioning lumber in the Auxiliary Invoice and so the words "flitches 87 pieces" were written down
and enclosed in parenthesis.
The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]
The CTO marked Exh. "6" is consigned to "any buyer (sic) Cagayan de Oro", but its Auxiliary Invoice
(Exh. "6-A") mentions Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation as the consignee. Moreover, the CTO
states (at the back page) that the same is covered by Auxiliary Invoice No. 00491; in fact, the Auxiliary
Invoice (Exh. 6-A) has invoice number 000488.
In the CTO marked Exhibit "7", the original typewritten name of the consignee was clearly erased and
changed to "Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon". In the Auxiliary Invoice
(Exh. "7-A") the blank space for the name and address of the consignee was smudged with a
typewriter correction fluid (the better to erase what was originally typewritten in it?) and changed to
"Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, Valencia, Bukidnon".
The CTO marked Exh. "9" and its Auxiliary Invoice marked Exh. "9-A" [were] "doctored" in the same
manner as Exh. "[7]" and Exh. "[7-A]".[17]
Additionally, all the Auxiliary Invoice were not properly accomplished: the data required to be filled
are left in blank.
Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal
side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to
that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and
volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus
belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still
in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.[18]
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only
questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. [19]
It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner
because the documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and
Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in
their execution.[20]
This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the patent
irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such
irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber,
petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have
them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the
documents are regular and complete.[21]
The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly
executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when
the public documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.[22]
Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made
applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides:
ART. 309. Penalties.- Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than P12,000 pesos but does not exceed P22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. . . .
As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,[23] the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person
[3]
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (As
amended by PD No.1559, and by EO No. 277, prom, July 25, 1987, emphasis added).
398 Phil. 109
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 136142, October 24, 2000
(4) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFONSO DATOR AND

BENITO GENOL, ACCUSED (ACQUITTED) PASTOR TELEN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.D E C I
SION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch
25, in Criminal Case No. 1733 convicting the appellant of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree
No. 705.
Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol, were charged with the crime of
violation of Section 68[2] of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code,[3] in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 29th day of October, 1993 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, in barangay
Laboon, municipality of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
each other, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
1,560.16 board feet of assorted lumber flitches valued at TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (23,500.00), Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under
existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on May 27, 1994, Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito
Genol, assisted by counsel, separately entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the charge in the
Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
It appears that on October 29, 1993, Police Station Commander Alejandro Rojas of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, and SPO1 Necitas Bacala, were on board a police patrol vehicle heading towards Barangay San
Rafael, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Upon reaching Barangay Laboon of the same municipality, they
noticed a Isuzu cargo truck loaded with pieces of lumber bound toward the town proper of Maasin.
Suspicious that the cargo was illegally cut pieces of lumber, Police Station Commander Rojas
maneuvered their police vehicle and gave chase.[4]
Upon catching up with the Isuzu cargo truck in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte, they
ordered the driver, accused Benito Genol, to pull over. Benito Genol was left alone in the truck after
his companions hurriedly left. When asked if he had the required documents for the proper transport
of the pieces of lumber, Genol answered in the negative. Genol informed the police authorities that
the pieces of lumber were owned by herein appellant, Pastor Telen, while the Isuzu cargo truck
bearing Plate No. HAF 628 was registered in the name of Southern Leyte Farmers Agro-Industrial
Cooperative, Inc. (SLEFAICO) which is a local cooperative. Consequently, Police Officers Rojas and
Bacala directed Benito Genol to proceed to the Maasin Police Station, Maasin, Southern Leyte for
further investigation.[5]
On November 5, 1993, Forest Ranger Romeo Galola was fetched from his office at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Maasin, Southern Leyte by SPO1 Necitas
Bacala to inspect the pieces of lumber that were confiscated on October 29, 1993 in Soro-soro, Maasin,
Southern Leyte from Pastor Telen. Galola and his immediate supervisor, Sulpicio Saguing, found that
the cargo consisted of forty-one (41) pieces of Dita lumber and ten (10) pieces of Antipolo lumber of
different dimensions with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.[6]
Subsequently, SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt[7] covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated
Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The
confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP
Property Custodian, Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same
to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[8]
The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility
worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office, Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified
that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao,
Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by law to cut
trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the
CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy Leonor,
who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the
plan of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mother's track of land in Tabunan, San Jose,
Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only.
According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he
could cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother,
provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant
trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.[9]
On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire for him a cargo truck in
order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern
Leyte. His cousin obliged after Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from
Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the said
lumber.[10]
After having been informed by Vicente Sabalo on October 29, 1993 at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon that a cargo truck was available for hire, Telen instructed his cousin to personally supervise
the hauling of the sawn lumber for him inasmuch as he was busy with his work in the office. At
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumber were
confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[11]
Upon arrival in Barangay Soro-Soro, Telen was accosted by Police Station Commander Alejandro
Rojas who demanded from him DENR permit for the sawn lumber. After confirming ownership of
the sawn lumber, Telen explained to Rojas that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy
Leonor to cut Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, to be used in the renovation of his house
and that he had already replaced the sawn Dita trees with Gemelina seedlings, but to no avail. Rojas
ordered that the pieces of lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck be impounded at the municipal building
of Maasin, Southern Leyte for failure of Telen to produce the required permit from the DENR.[12]
Pastor Telen appeared before Bert Pesidas, CENRO hearing officer, in Maasin, Southern Leyte for
investigation in connection with the confiscated pieces of lumber. Telen had tried to contact Officer-
in-Charge Boy Leonor of the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte after the confiscation of the sawn
lumber on October 29, 1993 and even during the investigation conducted by the CENRO hearing
officer for three (3) times but to no avail, for the reason that Boy Leonor was assigned at a
reforestation site in Danao, Cebu province.[13]
Alfonso Dator, was the accounting manager of SLEFAICO, Inc., a local cooperative engaged in
buying and selling abaca fibers. Dator testified that on October 29, 1993 at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, a certain Vicente Sabalo, accompanied by their company driver, Benito Genol, proposed to
hire the Isuzu cargo truck owned by SLEFAICO, Inc. to haul pieces of coconut lumber from Barangay
San Jose to Barangay Soro-soro in Maasin, Southern Leyte. He readily acceded to the proposal
inasmuch as the owner of the alleged coconut lumber, according to Sabalo, was Pastor Telen, who is a
long time friend and former officemate at the provincial office of the Department of Health. Besides,
the fee to be earned from the hauling services meant additional income for the cooperative. [14]
At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Dator met the Isuzu cargo truck of SLEFAICO,
Inc. at the Canturing bridge in Maasin, Southern Leyte, being escorted by a police patrol vehicle,
heading towards the municipal town proper. At the municipal hall building of Maasin, he learned
that the Isuzu truck was apprehended by the police for the reason that it contained a cargo of Dita
and Antipolo lumber without the required permit from the DENR. He explained to the police
authorities that the Isuzu cargo truck was hired merely to transport coconut lumber, however, it was
impounded at the municipal building just the same.[15] Due to the incident Dator lost his job as
accounting manager in SLEFAICO, Inc.[16]
For his defense, Benito Genol testified that he was employed by the SLEFAICO, Inc. as driver of its
Isuzu cargo truck. Aside from transporting abaca fibers, the Isuzu cargo truck was also available for
hire.[17]
While Genol was having the two tires of the Isuzu cargo truck vulcanized on October 29, 1993 in
Barangay Mantahan, Maasin, Southern Leyte, Vicente Sabalo approached him and offered to hire the
services of the cargo truck. Genol accompanied Sabalo to the residence of the accounting manager of
SLEFAICO, Inc., Alfonso Dator, which was nearby, and the latter agreed to the proposal of Sabalo to
hire the Isuzu cargo truck to haul pieces of coconut lumber from San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte,
for a fee.[18]
At 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Genol, Sabalo and a son of Alfonso Dator, proceeded
to San Jose after fetching about six (6) haulers along the way in Barangay Soro-soro. Upon arrival in
San Jose, Genol remained behind the steering wheel to take a rest. He was unmindful of the actual
nature of the lumber that were being loaded. After the loading, Genol was instructed to proceed to
Barangay Soro-soro in front of the lumberyard of a certain Jimmy Go. Before the lumber could be
unloaded at 8:00 o'clock in the evening Genol was approached by Police Station Commander
Alejandro Rojas who demanded DENR permit for the lumber. The pieces of lumber were confiscated
by Rojas after Genol failed to produce the required permit from the DENR office.[19]
Vicente Sabalo corroborated the testimonies of the three (3) accused in this case. He testified in
substance that he was requested by his cousin, Pastor Telen, to engage the services of a cargo truck to
transport sawn pieces of lumber from San Jose to be used in the renovation of his house in Abgao,
Maasin, Southern Leyte; that he approached Benito Genol and offered to hire the services of the Isuzu
cargo truck that he was driving; that both of them asked the permission of Alfonso Dator who readily
acceded to the proposal for a fee of P500.00;[20] that he saw Genol remained behind the steering wheel
as the loading of the lumber was going on in San Jose; and that the lumber and the Isuzu cargo truck
were confiscated in Barangay Soro-soro for failure of his cousin, Pastor Telen, to show to Police
Station Commander Alejandro Rojas any written permit from the DENR for the subject lumber. [21]
After analyzing the evidence, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. CONVICTING the accused PASTOR TELEN beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and there being no modifying circumstances, and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being
inapplicable, the herein accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2)
degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified
Theft, and to pay the costs. His bail for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and he shall
be committed to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila thru the Abuyog
Regional Prisons, Abuyog, Leyte via the Provincial Warden, Maasin, Southern Leyte;
2. ACQUITTING co-accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol on reasonable doubt for
insufficiency of evidence; and cancelling their bail;
3. CONFISCATING and SEIZING the 1,560.16 board feet of illegal lumber worth P23,500.00 and
ORDERING the CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte to sell the lumber at public auction under
proper permission from the Court, with the proceeds thereof turned over to the National
Government thru the National Treasury under proper receipt, and to REPORT the fact of sale
to this Court duly covered by documents of sale and other receipts by evidencing the sale
within five (5) days from the consummation of sale; and
4. DIRECTING the CENRO authorities to coordinate with its Regional Office for immediate
administrative proceedings and determination of any administrative liability of the truck
owner, SLEFAICO Inc. if any, otherwise, to release the truck to its owner.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED, BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FOR BEING NOT IN
CONFORMITY WITH DENR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 79, SERIES OF 1990.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF

RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 68, P. D. 705, AS AMENDED,
IT BEING A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS PENALTY NOT WARRANTED BY ANY PROVISION OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR JURISPRUDENCE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE OF THE CONFISCATED LUMBER
IS P23,500.00 FOR NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH VALUE WAS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
It is not disputed that appellant Pastor Telen is the owner of the fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted
Antipolo and Dita lumber with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet. He alleged that the pieces of
lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte
which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality.
After having been confiscated by the police, while in transit, in Barangay Soro-soro, appellant Telen
failed to produce before the authorities the required legal documents from the DENR pertaining to
the said pieces of lumber.
The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and
Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[22] Section 68 of the code provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any
Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
Appellant Telen contends that he secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer-in-Charge of
the DENR-CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte before cutting the lumber, and that the latter
purportedly assured him that written permit was not anymore necessary before cutting soft lumber,
such as the Antipolo and Dita trees in this case, from a private track of land, to be used in renovating
appellant's house, provided that he would plant trees as replacements thereof, which he already did.
It must be underscored that the appellant stands charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is considered mala prohibita. In
the prosecution for crimes that are considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the
law has been violated.[23] The motive or intention underlying the act of the appellant is immaterial for
the reason that his mere possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations gave rise to his criminal liability.
In any case, the mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy
Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the
established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces
of lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the
trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative
evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant
on this point which is, at best, self-serving.[24]
The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of DENR Administrative
Order No. 79, Series of 1990[25] which prescribes rules on the deregulation of the harvesting,
transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits
that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of
planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR
Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle,
apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and
manggis.
Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession
do not belong to the premium species enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series
of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO
concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and
disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do,
thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior
acquisition of permit and "legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations."
The pertinent portion of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 1990, is quoted hereunder, to
wit:
In line with the National Reforestation Program and in order to promote the planting of trees by
owners of private lands and give incentives to the tree farmers, Ministry Administrative Order No. 4
dated January 19, 1987 which lifted the restriction in the harvesting, transporting and sale of
firewood, pulpwood or timber produced from Ipil-Ipil (leucaenia spp) and Falcate (Albizzia falcataria)
is hereby amended to include all other tree species planted in private lands except BENGUET PINE
and premium hardwood species. Henceforth, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees
within the titled lands or tax declared A and D lands with corresponding application for patent or
acquired through court proceedings, except BENGUET PINE and premium species listed under
DENR Administrative Order No 78, Series of 1987, provided, that a certification of the CENRO concerned
to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land is
issued accompanying the shipment.
Appellant Telen next contends that proof of value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is
indispensable, it being the basis for the computation of the penalty prescribed in Article 309 in
relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code; and that in the absence of any evidence on record to
prove the allegation in the Information that the confiscated pieces of lumber have an equivalent value
of P23,500.00 there can be no basis for the penalty to be imposed and hence, he should be acquitted.
The appellant's contention is untenable. It is a basic rule in criminal law that penalty is not an element
of the offense. Consequently, the failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of its
allegation in the Information with respect to the value of the confiscated pieces of lumber is not
necessarily fatal to its case. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of
lumber, as appearing in the official transmittal letter[26] of the DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte
addressed to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the same province, is P23,500.00 which is
alleged in the Information. However, the said transmittal letter cannot serve as evidence or as a valid
basis for the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber for purposes of computing the
proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant considering that it is hearsay and it was not formally
offered in evidence contrary to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the case of People vs. Elizaga,[27] the accused-appellant therein was convicted of the crimes of
homicide and theft, and the value of the bag and its contents that were taken by the accused-
appellant from the victim was estimated by the prosecution witness to be P500.00. In the absence of a
conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its
contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of
People vs. Reyes,[28] this Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the
stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on
the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of
P5.00.
In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were
classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may also be
noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital,
from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation
of his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any
other pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code
(P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of
justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount
under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is
punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree,
the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.[29]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[30] the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, in
Criminal Case No. 1733 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Pastor Telen is
sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
483 Phil. 774
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 161798, October 20, 2004
(5) PICOP RESOURCES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, 10TH JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 5, BUTUAN CITY, HON. VICTOR A. TOMANENG, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, 10TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 5,
BUTUAN CITY, EDUARDO CASIA, ROGELIO CASTILLO, ULDARICO CASINGINAN,
ELADIO GALANO, CATALINO VIRTUDAZO, RICARDO BALAD-ON, JOEL VILLAREAL,
TIBURCIO IMPUERTO, HILARIO FERNANDEZ, ANDREA VASQUEZ, SPOUSES REMELITO
CODERA AND MARILYN RANOSO-CODERA, AND FLORIO JOSAFAT, JR., FOR HIMSELF
AND IN REPRESENTATION BY WAY OF A CLASS SUIT THE MEMBERS OF THE UNIFIED
FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J,:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp and paper
manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and
Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA)
No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost
130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three
Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997,[1] February 16, 2001,[2] and April 6, 2001,[3] by virtue of which
petitioner was designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and
conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing “Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct
of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.”[4] The MOA provided, among others, that field
validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be
conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to
these Memoranda, petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to apprehend
and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the
forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security
personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area,
violators who loaded the illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as carabaos,
for transport out of the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept
in PICOP’s impounding area.
On June 18, 2001, private respondents Eduardo Casia, Rogelio Castillo, Uldarico Casinginan, Eladio
Galano, Catalino Virtudazo, Ricardo Balad-on, Joel Villareal, Tiburcio Impuerto, Hilario Fernandez,
Andrea Vasquez, Spouses Remelito Codera and Marilyn Ranoso-Codera, and Florio Josafat, Jr., for
himself and in representation, by way of a class suit, of the members of the UNITED FARMERS
ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG (UFAB), filed a complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
5, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City against the DENR Regional Office XIII (CARAGA) and/or its
Regional Executive Director Elias C. Seraspi, Jr., Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Norte and Butuan City and/or their respective PENR
Officers, Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) of San Francisco,
Bunawan, Lianga and Bislig and/or their respective CENR Officers, and herein petitioner
PICOP/Wilfredo D. Fuentes.[5]
Private respondents-complainants were some of those apprehended by PICOP’S security officers

transporting without any permit several hundred cubic meters of falcata logs allegedly grown in
petitioner’s plantation. The logs, trucks and other forms of conveyance on which they were carried
were confiscated and kept in petitioner’s impounding area. Private respondents alleged in their
complaint that the Memoranda dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 and the
MOA dated May 25, 2001 were illegal for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They
sought to have the Memoranda declared null and void for this reason and also sought to restrain the
DENR and all those acting for and in its behalf, including herein petitioner, from enforcing or
implementing said Memoranda.
On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision.[6] With regard to private respondent’s
allegation that the aforesaid Memoranda were illegally issued, the trial court disregarded the claim
and sustained the validity of the Memoranda. The Memoranda were issuances of a duly-authorized
government agency in the normal and regular course of its duty to enforce forestry laws and
procedures. The RTC added that the application for the writ of preliminary injunction was the wrong
remedy to assail the legality of the Memoranda, such an action being merely a collateral attack.
Private respondents should instead have filed a petition to declare the Memoranda null and void.
However, the trial court granted private respondent’s prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. It
noted that administrative or criminal cases had been filed against private respondents involving the
apprehended conveyances. The RTC ordered RED Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and
abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and commanded all
those acting pursuant to said Memorandum to refrain and desist from implementing the
Memorandum. Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the
owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur,
where the administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.[7]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit on October 17, 2001.[8]
On January 21, 2002, DENR-Region XIII RED Benjamin T. Tumaliuan issued a Memorandum
revoking the February 16, 2001 Memorandum issued by former OIC-RED Constancio A. Paye, Jr.[9]
On April 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of injunction before the Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed
for lack of merit on July 23, 2003.[10] The appellate court held there was no grave abuse of discretion
when the RTC issued the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner had no right or interest to
protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only as a
depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum dated February
16, 2001. Neither did petitioner claim ownership of the confiscated conveyances. While it claimed that
some of the confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted
that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases pending either
at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence,
petitioner’s interest in the confiscated forest products was merely contingent and cannot be material
as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Necessarily
therefore, petitioner had no basis to bring the action against respondents and it was not entitled to the
ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 15, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied in the
Resolution of January 16, 2004.[11]
Petitioner then filed this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that it is a proper party-in-interest, vested with a material interest in the outcome of
the case. It allegedly has more than just a contingent interest in the outcome of the dispute.
Petitioner contend that private respondents’ intrusion was in violation of petitioner’s PTLA No. 47
and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and
develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the
concession area.[12] In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary
interest pursuant to these license agreements.
Public respondents never refuted petitioner PICOP’s allegation that private respondents were
apprehended by the DENR-deputized PICOP guards at its checkpoint within PICOP’s concession
area. Private respondents also never denied that PICOP’s guards had been deputized as DENR
officers to enforce the Memoranda. Petitioner was therefore within its rights in exercising control
over its concession area pursuant to its duty as DENR depository.
Petitioner also argues that the RTC intruded upon the primary jurisdiction of the DENR when it took
cognizance of private respondents’ complaint for damages and issued the writ of injunction.
Petitioner invokes DENR Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 97-32[13] in asserting that it
has the obligation to keep custody of the apprehended forest products, tools and conveyances, the
disposal of which rests solely on the DENR.
The RTC also allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondents’ prayer
for issuance of injunction in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Petitioner argues that private respondents should have awaited the results of the administrative
procedure for summary administrative apprehensions and seizures of the DENR under Sections 5
and 6 of DAO No. 97-32, instead of filing the complaint before the trial court. This would have
allegedly allowed the proper administrative officer to ascertain whether a prima facie case lies against
the offenders and whether the apprehended articles should answer for the offense. By issuing the
assailed writ of injunction, the trial court arrogated unto itself the power to rule on the rightful
possession of the subject conveyances.
Petitioner also contends that the injunctive writ was issued without due process of law since the
transfer of custody of the forest products and conveyances was not even sought by private
respondents in their complaint. Consequently, the matter of the return of the seized conveyances was
never ventilated during the hearing and the issuance of the writ not sought for violates the rules of
due process.
Petitioner’s arguments do not convince us. The petition should be denied.
It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and
conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which
need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. As observed by the
Court of Appeals, any interest petitioner has in the confiscated properties is dependent on the
outcome of the proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and the Office of the Government Prosecution-
Surigao del Sur. The issue of ownership and possession of the confiscated products still has to be
determined in those proceedings. Petitioner had not refuted this.
Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and conveyances by
virtue of its being designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As
such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the
DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
The trial court noted that the confiscated vehicles were already subject of administrative proceedings
before the CENRO-Bislig and criminal complaints before the Office of the Government Prosecution-
Surigao del Sur. There were also letters or notices to petitioner from officers of the CENRO and the
Office of the Government Prosecution requesting the release of some of the conveyances to their
owners.[14] There is no reason for petitioner to refuse to hand over possession of the vehicles and
forest products since, being confiscated items, they will have to be handed over to the proper
government agencies for appropriate disposition proceedings.
Furthermore, the transfer of custody of the confiscated products and conveyances will not in any way
place petitioner at a disadvantage. Petitioner is merely a depository and the release of the
conveyances and products to the government agencies concerned has to be done but only in
compliance with lawful court orders.
It should also be remembered that the Memorandum dated February 16, 2001, which designated
petitioner as a DENR depository, had been revoked by the Memorandum of January 21, 2002. As of
the filing of the petition for review before this Court on March 11, 2004, petitioner no longer had any
right, as a depository, to retain possession of the conveyances.
All the foregoing considered, petitioner’s contention that the trial court violated the doctrines of
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies should also fail. The transfer of
custody of the confiscated products to the CENRO and the Office of the Government Prosecution was
for the purpose of resolving the cases with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
268 Phil. 739
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990
(6) FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT AND TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to
the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the
Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement
which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No.
356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding
and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing
petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63.]
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87
with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose
Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares
located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya* from October 12, 1965 until June
30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to
as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and
nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of
the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) That on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which
were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL
LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE
ORDERLY PULLOUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE
WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO
THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL
BE APPRECIATED - [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to
then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in
support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations [Annex "6" of the Petition;
Rollo, pp. 50-53], but no favorable action was taken on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly
covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under
TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged
by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos.
Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated
July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract
within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn
whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in
view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.
Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
* * *
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in view of the
total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and
Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to
forests. It considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of
forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well documented.
Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is
well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established
institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life of its people.
* * *
[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others, its request
that TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied
this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986, stating in part:
* * *
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin
Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to
say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of
privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered
into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the
Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national
interest so requires.
* * *
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over all
forest lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging
operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant’s former concession area is
located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or
uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an
unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the Ministry:
* * *
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the
logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a
resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President
ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in
the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed
a supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their
respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May
22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which
militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative
orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview
of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of
res iudicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72;
San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989.]
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)] dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively,
sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development
which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356
subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of
Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after
1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the
MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as
far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan
v. Aspillera, G.R. No. L-17305. November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda, G.R. No. L-
48190, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374.]
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which
petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53],
seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be
pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous resume made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In
the letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and
reforestation practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to
have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became
apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities
in that year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present
case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public
respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what
the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and
granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier
administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its
cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a
"reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of
up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761,
November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571.] And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a
reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of
laches [Municipality of Career v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27,
1982, 119 SCRA 392.]
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it of declined to assert it. [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113.] The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending
upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant,
not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See
Buenaventura v. David. 37 Phil. 435 (1918).]
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering
that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek
relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable
and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the
reversal of these orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this factor which prevents the Court
from departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR,
which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy considerations which
effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent
administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization
of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and
rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing
global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in
sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed,
most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's
forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the
region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate
balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and
the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's
immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of
their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the
government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is
expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v.
Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No.
L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352,
November 29, 1966. 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA
745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80.] More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing
public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion
possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and
manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these
resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
751.] Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302.]
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the
Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the
previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the
issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of
the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department
officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use
and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party
to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the
part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public
policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of
judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII.]
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the
affirmative reliefs sought.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.
* As a result of the creation of the province of Quirino, the municipality of Maddela is now deemed
part of the Quirino province.
464 Phil. 125
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152160, January 13, 2004
(7) VIRGILIO BON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not
to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the
circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August
22, 2001 Decision[2] and the February 15, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR
CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to
fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED.”[4]
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
“[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended[,] together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads
as follows:
‘That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of
Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4)
narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd.
ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita
Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit
or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and
the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
‘Contrary to law.’
“Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio
Bon entered a plea of ‘Not Guilty’ to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded.
The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza,
[Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The
defense, on the other hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon.
“The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows:
‘Prosecution’s evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones,
Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being
stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother
Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help
of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s],
Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza’s] complaint of Illegal Cutting
of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid,
Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During
their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao
tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon
admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that
sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre,
Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] for
Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling
the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board
feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x x.’
“In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their
testimonies were summarized by the trial court, as follows:
‘All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.]
[He said] that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21,
1990. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.
‘Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was]
instituted [as such] by Teresita’s father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit
trees. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant
[have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowner’s share
of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-
Mendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and pointed to Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar
Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his
complaint.
‘Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the
lumber. Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In
a drinking spree, he happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him
with] revenge.’
“On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by
the said decision, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the
CA].”[5]
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses’ credibility
and the sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian
Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the
cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza’s land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the
sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133[6] of the Rules of Court were
amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and
Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12,
1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the
trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside
from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other
evidence was presented to show the latter’s participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the
appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130[7] of the Rules of Court
would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioner’s admission, which did not constitute any of the
exceptions[8] to this provision. It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Forestry
Code as amended, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
“I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is
admissible in evidence against him.
“II
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police
operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man
says against himself[,] if voluntary, is believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it]
correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not (U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
“III
Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x that x x x petitioner Bon
admitted his guilt to them should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that x x
x many people who are being quoted in media today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In
other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness?
“IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution
witnesses, [whether or not] x x x the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?” [10]
Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported
extrajudicial admission of the allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had
ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those
witnesses.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 1 thereof, “only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth” may be
raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner actually raised questions of fact --the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless,
this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant
circumstances, opts to take cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the
interest of the proper administration of justice.[11]
In the main, petitioner contends that Lascano’s and Dangalan’s separate testimonies[12] regarding his
alleged extrajudicial admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also
argues that his supposed admission should not have been admitted, because it had been taken
without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a suspect.
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows:
“Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.”
Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value
is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not
on the witness stand.[13] Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches
the court is considered hearsay.[14]
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard
petitioner admit to having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as
hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he
allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from
their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made
by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement
attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay
rule.[15] Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto[16] ruled that evidence regarding the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the
admission of Dangalan’s testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has
been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have waived their
right to do so; thus, it may be admitted.[17] The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the
transcript of the stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.
Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?
A We were not able to see.

Q And how many trees were cut?
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.
Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?
A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty of cutting
those trees.
Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said that he took
[the] liberty of cutting those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees.
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.
Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi.”[18]
Moreover, a party’s verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who
heard it[19] fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, “[t]he
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.” This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself,
unless it is true.[20] The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a
custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been
defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. [21] We have ruled
previously that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement that is not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary
manner.[22]
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which --with the assistance of the barangay tanods[23]
-- was conducted by the owner’s brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial
investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of Article III[24] of the 1987 Constitution,
or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner.[25]
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. [26]
In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced solely from his admission, but from
the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their
demeanor as they testified.[27] Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of
the trial court,[28] as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CA’s findings, if no glaring
errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them.[29] We have no reason
to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts’ assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,[30] provides:
“SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any
“The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.”
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority;
and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents.[31]
Petitioner was charged with the first offense.[32] It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the
alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the
only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[33] Conviction
may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.[34]
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements
concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[35]
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its
assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and
circumstances:
“x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit
trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before
the [b]arangay [t]anod[,] Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting
of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his son-in-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His
admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the
lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not
under custodial investigation.”[36]
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved
petitioner’s culpability:
“x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and
Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990,
[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding
[that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13,
1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees.”[37]
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of
lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary
evidence: photographs of tree stumps,[38] the investigation report of an officer of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the
trees,[39] and the CENRO’s computation of the value[40] of the timber generated from the felled
trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion
than that petitioner was guilty as charged.
Correct Penalty
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing
penalties imposed by the appellate and the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence
of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years,
six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased
the penalty to imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,[41] provides that any
violation thereof “shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 [42] and 310[43] of
Revised Penal Code.” This amendment -- which eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified
theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code” -- has already
been interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts
of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute
distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under these
articles.[44]
Both the trial court[45] and the CA[46] found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles
309 and 310 of the RPC, the statutory penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods;[47] or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law,[48] however, reduces the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences
imposed by the trial court and the CA are within the allowable range. In view, however, of the
finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
offense, the penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the
accused. Hence, we adopt the trial court’s indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[24]
Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
“Sec. 12 (1) any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.”
[42]
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
“Art. 309. Penalties - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
“1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
“2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
“3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
xxx xxx x x x”
[43] Article 310 of the RPC provides as follows:
“Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond
or fishery of if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.”
[48] Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended, provides:
“SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.”
457 Phil. 65
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-854-RTJ), August 28, 2003
(8) ALFREDO Y. CHU, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 23, NINTH JUDICIAL REGION, MOLAVE,
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion
filed by Alfredo Y. Chu ("complainant") against Judge Camilo E. Tamin ("respondent judge") of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur ("Branch 23").
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer Michael F. dela Cruz ("CENRO dela Cruz") of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz
claimed that complainant was in possession of "forest products of dubious origin" in violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705[1] ("PD 705"), as amended. On the same day, respondent
judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from
complainant's fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of the warrant,
CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of
pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value of P183,790.
On 22 September 1999, complainant obtained from Branch 23 a copy of the complete records of the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 364, as certified by Branch Clerk of Court Ma. Asuncion Pabatao-
Lumapas ("Clerk of Court Lumapas"). On 24 September 1999, complainant again obtained, for the
second time, a copy of the complete records of the case, also certified by Clerk of Court Lumapas.
These certified copies did not contain any transcript of respondent judge's examination of CENRO
dela Cruz or his witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this administrative complaint.
Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under
questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled
that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search
Warrant Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more
than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any
transcript of the required examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four
warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact
conducted such examination but the record of the "deposition" was "misfiled in another case folder
through inadvertence."[2]
In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") of this Court to
comment on the complaint, respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement ("Indorsement") dated 16
December 1999, denied complainant's allegations. Respondent judge asserted that at around 1:15 p.m.
of 9 September 1999, he personally examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma ("Cuaresma"), allegedly a
witness of CENRO dela Cruz, before issuing the warrant in question. He claimed that a transcript of
the examination was included in the records of Search Warrant No. 364. However, he forwarded the
records to the OCA on 30 September 1999 in connection with his request for the transfer of the case to
the RTC, Branch 24, in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur ("Branch 24"). In lieu of the original copy, respondent
judge attached to his Indorsement an alleged computer printout of the transcript, claiming that the
time and date of its encoding was verifiable in the computer files in his office.
Due to the conflicting factual allegations of the parties, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1) verify from Branch 23 whether respondent judge
examined any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364; and (2) secure from Clerk of Court
Lumapas her explanation on the apparent discrepancy between the copy of the records of Search
Warrant No. 364, as forwarded by respondent judge to the OCA and as obtained by complainant.
In his Report, dated 30 July 2001, RTC Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas
("Executive Judge Villegas") stated that he verified the records of Search Warrant No. 364 in Branch
23. He found on page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination conducted by
respondent judge on one Reynaldo Cuaresma. He attached in his report the explanations of
respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas.[3]
In his explanation, dated 11 July 2001, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his
Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing
Search Warrant No. 364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript
of the examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal researcher in
his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant on 22 September 1999 failed,
through "pure inadvertence," to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed such omission to
the fact that at that time, the pages of the records were not yet "physically paged." He claimed that the
pages were numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following
week. He further asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch
24, however, refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the records
to the OCA with a request for their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to
respondent judge as their proper custodian.[4]
Clerk of Court Lumapas affirmed respondent judge's claims and defenses in her explanation dated 11
July 2001.[5]
In the Resolution of 10 September 2001, the Court referred this case to the OCA for evaluation, report,
and recommendation.
OCA's Findings and Conclusions
In its Report dated 10 December 2002, the OCA found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law and recommended the imposition of a P5,000 fine. The Report reads in part:
Respondent judge stands firm on his claim that he conducted searching questions on Reynaldo
Charesma [sic]. We find this claim highly suspect. First, the respondent judge [initially] failed to
produce a copy of the transcript of the searching questions allegedly made on September 9, 1999 and
append the same to the record of the case. x x x x The transcript of the searching questions was, in
fact, produced [only] after the filing of the instant complaint. Further, it was noted that during the
hearing of [complainant's motion to quash Search Warrant] Nos. 281, 282, 283 and 28[4] taken on 21
January 1999 at 9:30 a.m.[,] respondent judge apparently believes that searching questions need not
be in writing. This is borne by the following exchange during the said hearing:
Atty. R. Rambuyong [Counsel for complainant Alfredo Chu]:

In other words Your Honor, they would not admit that the accused received copies?
Court:
Is there a rule that the searching question must be in writing?
Atty. R. Rambuyong:
From the Case of HATA versus BAYONA, Your Honor, the Supreme Court has required.
As a matter of fact, I cited that in my supplemental motion and the Court said that, "mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses is not enough. There must be the deposition
in writing, and under oath of the complainants and his witnesses; and searching questions
should be propounded by the examining Judge." As a matter of fact, there have been
several decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect that mere ceremonial searching
questions and answers reiterating the contents of the affidavits will not be sufficient
compliance [there] with.
x x x x.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that respondent judge either did not conduct the required
searching questions, or if he did, he did not put it in writing. Thus, respondent judge erred because
Section 5, Rule 126, [of the ] Rules of Court specifically [requires such] x x x.
This is a basic legal precept which all judges are expected to be conversant with. Th[e] Court has
often impressed upon judges that as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe it to the
public and legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given case. In this
case, respondent judge failed to observe an elementary rule which amount[s] to ignorance of the law,
thereby subjecting him to disciplinary action. (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Court
The report of the OCA is well-taken.
Section 5, Rule 126[6] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures found in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals,[7] reiterated the requirements of Section 2 on the issuance
of search warrants, which judges must strictly observe,[8] as follows:
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of
probable cause. x x x In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x
x x must examine the x x x witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. (Emphasis
supplied)[9]
Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant No. 364, he complied with the rule that
he must "personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses." Respondent judge stated, however, that the certified copies
of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his examination because the
clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so. This
explanation fails to persuade us.
Respondent judge's own Clerk of Court certified twice, first on 22 September 1999 and later on 24
September 1999, that the 29-page copy of the records obtained by complainant constitutes the entire
record of the matter.[10] This renders improbable respondent judge's claim that the transcript already
formed part of the records but the legal researcher in his office inadvertently missed it in preparing
the copy obtained by complainant on 22 September 1999. The alleged legal researcher, who
presumably also prepared the second certified copy, could not have committed the same mistake,
twice in a row, within two days of each other. Curiously, in his Indorsement of 16 December 1999,
respondent judge did not point to his legal researcher's negligence as the cause for the discrepancy.
Neither did respondent judge state that the pages of the contents of the folder of Search Warrant No.
364 were unnumbered when complainant requested for copies. What he stated in his Indorsement
was that the records contained a copy of the transcript but the same was already forwarded to the
OCA.
If, as respondent judge claims, he personally examined a certain Cuaresma as the witness of CENRO
dela Cruz, he should have secured the affidavit of Cuaresma. Respondent judge should also have
secured the affidavit of the unnamed "legal researcher" who allegedly prepared the copies of the
records obtained by complainant. Respondent judge failed to secure their affidavits to corroborate his
claims. Lastly, respondent judge should have shown Executive Judge Villegas, during the latter's
investigation, the magnetic (hard disk) copy of the transcript allegedly stored in his office computer.
These omissions bolster complainant's claim and correspondingly weaken respondent judge's
defense. As it is, other than respondent judge's bare claim that he examined a certain Cuaresma, the
only proof on record in his favor is an unsigned computer printout of the alleged record of the
examination. Considering that any one can easily create and print out such document, it does not
suffice to exculpate respondent judge from administrative liability.
We uphold the OCA's findings that respondent judge, who had earlier professed ignorance of the
rule in question, failed either to examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to
reduce the examination in writing. His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law.
When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court on
search warrant issuance, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[11] Specifically, respondent judge failed to conform to the high standards of
competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that:
Rule 1.01. -- A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01 -- A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.

What was said in a case,[12] similarly involving gross ignorance of basic rules, bears repeating here:
[A judge] is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. It is imperative that he be studious of and conversant with basic legal principles. He
owes [it] to the dignity of the court he sits in, to the legal profession he belongs, and to the public who
depends on him, to know the law which he is called upon to x x x apply. Not only that, there would
be on the part of the litigants less expense and greater faith in the administration of justice if there be
a belief on their part that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency
in their grasp [of] legal principles.
On the Penalty to be Imposed
As recommended by the OCA, respondent judge should be fined P5,000. On 26 June 2003, in
Gregorio Limpot Lumapas v. Judge Camilo Tamin,[13] this Court dismissed respondent judge from
the service for "disobedience to an order issued by a superior court, as well as for gross ignorance of
the law x x x with forfeiture of all benefits due him except for accrued leave credits." Thus, the fine of
P5,000 should be deducted from respondent judge's accrued leave benefits.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a
fine of P5,000 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-46772
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46772, February 13, 1992
(9) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Quezon in Criminal Case No. 1591, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo
Arrozal, Luis Flores and twenty other John Does,” dismissing the information filed therein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and punished
under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines, in an information which read:
“That on or about the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim,
Municipality of General Nakar, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Godofredo Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with
twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the
administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father,
Macario Prudente, under Original Certificate of Title No. 6026, and once inside, illegally cut, gather,
take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any
authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species,
consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of FIFTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIVE PESOS and FIFTY TWO CENTAVOS (P50,205.52) including government charges, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount.
“Contrary to law.
Lucena City, 7 January 1977.” (p.17, Rollo).
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to
wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form.
On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked (pp. 32-42, Rollo).
The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977 (p. 42, Rollo).
On October 15, 1977, this petition was filed directly with this Court, raising the following questions of
law: (1) whether or not the information charged an offense; and (2) whether or not the trial court had
jurisdiction over the case.
On the first issue, the People alleged that, contrary to the allegation of the private respondents and
the opinion of the trial court, the information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of
qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the
information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was “without the consent
of the state,” nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused “illegally cut, gather,
take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority
under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species x x x.” Since
only the state can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest
resources, including timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was
“without any authority” under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging
that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.
We agree with the petitioner.
“SEC. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority
under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x”
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question
of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense
defined in the law (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958])” (People v. Abad, L-55132, August 30,
1988, 165 SCRA 57).
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or
removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products cut, gathered,
collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or
permit granted by the state.
The Order dismissing the complaint concluded that the information was defective because:
“x x x, it is noted that the Information alleges that the cutting, gathering and carrying away of the
logs were done without the consent of the owner of the land. While the prosecution admits that
timber is a forest product that belongs to the state, the information, however, fails to allege that the
taking was without the consent of the latter, for which reason the Information is patently defective.”
(p. 39, Rollo)
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It
should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a
private woodland registered in the name of complainant’s deceased father, Macario Prudente. The
fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the
owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in
private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9
SCRA 349, clarified the matter on ownership of timber in private lands. This Court held therein:
“The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff because the
timber which it cut and gathered on the land in question belongs to the government and not to the
plaintiff, the latter having failed to comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.
“The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, which reads;
‘SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. ? Every private owner of land containing
timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director
of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be
furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented
from time to time as occasion may require.
‘Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies
shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the
Bureau of Forestry.’
“In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that noncompliance with the
requirement would divest the owner of the land of his rights thereof and that said rights of
ownership would be transferred to the government. Of course, the land which had been registered
and titled in the name of the plaintiff under that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object
of a forester license issued by the Director of Forestry because ownership of said land includes also
ownership of everything found on its surface (Art. 437, New Civil Code).
“Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to
exempt the title owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under
Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:
‘Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered private lands. -
The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removed
from any private land the title to which is not registered Director of Forestry as required by the Forest
Law; Provided, however, That in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut,
gather and remove timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the
Director of Forestry Law and Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing of timber and the
other forest products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting,
gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the charges
prescribed in such cases in this chapter.’
“x x x.
“On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land
as a private woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative
Code, he still retained his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land
and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429, New Civil Code) - the
very rights violated by the defendant Basilan Lumber Company.”
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest
products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private
ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that
ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus,
the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was
sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.
Anent the second issue raised, Section 80 of Presidential Decree 705, provides:
“SEC. 80. Arrest: Institution of Criminal Actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of
the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government,
the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense. The arresting forest officer or
employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender
and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the
appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in
court.
“If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the authorities designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigations, the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall
be done within a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from the place of arrest to the place of
delivery. The seized products, materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in
accordance with forestry administrative orders promulgated by the Department Head.
“The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the Philippine Constabulary, police
agency, barangay or barrio official, or any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the
power or authority provided for in the preceding paragraph.
“Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not
committed in the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense
was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or
complaint.
“If there is a prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer
shall file the necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
The above cited provision covers two (2) specific instances when a forest officer may commence a
prosecution for the violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a
forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who has
committed or is committing; in his presence, any of the offenses described in the decree. The second
covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the
forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a complaint.
In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a
complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and
file the necessary informations in court.
The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of
P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was
the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land
and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.
The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the complaint of any forest officer as
prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that:
“x x x, the authority given to the forest officer to investigate reports and complaints regarding the
commission of offenses defined in P.D. No. 705 by the said last and penultimate paragraphs of
Section 80 may be considered as covering only such reports and complaints as might be brought to
the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development, or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed
in their presence. Such interpretation becomes cogent when we consider that the whole of Section 80
deals precisely with the authority of forest officers or employees to make arrests and institute
criminal actions involving offenses defined in the Decree.” (p. 26, Rollo).
Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the
Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any
crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against
persons charged with the commission of the crime.
“Sec. 1687. Authority of fiscal to conduct investigation in criminal matter. – A provincial fiscal shall
have authority, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor. To this end, he may summon reputed witnesses and require them to appear and testify
upon oath before him. x x x.”
With the exception of the so-called “private crimes”[1] and in election offenses,[2] prosecutions in
Courts of First Instance may be commenced by an information signed by a fiscal after conducting a
preliminary investigation. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority.
Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both cases
under said Sec. 80, namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest (for offenses committed in his
presence) or; 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of violations of the decree
(for violations not committed in his presence) - he is still required to file the proper complaint with
the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations in court. Said section
should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon forest officers to conduct investigations
regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it should be construed as granting forest officers
and employees special authority to arrest and investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce
the exercise of such authority by those upon whom it is vested by general law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Concubinage, adultery, seduction, abduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness and defamation

[1]
immputing any of the aforesaid offenses where the rule provides that these crimes shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party.
In People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788, We held that the Comelec has the
[2]
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses and to
prosecute such offenses. However, if the Comelec fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months
from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the Fiscal or with the
Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

333 Phil. 582
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120365, December 17, 1996
(10) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLE, VS. WILSON B. QUE, ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 705[1] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.[2]
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the
Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing
plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on
said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the
vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.[3]
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on
patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General
Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate
number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.[4]
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que,
and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the
cargo.[5]
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed,
accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut
slabs.[6]
SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the Cargo’s supporting documents, specifically: (1)
certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt
from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut
slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a
certification[7] from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate
transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. [8]
SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial
capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there
were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.[9]
At 10:00 o’clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three
CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of
coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck,
concealing the tanguile lumber.[10] When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized
forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total
volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.[11]
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu
Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of
Forest Products Chainsawn lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or
equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary
permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited
provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of
tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits
(PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa[13]
and Elpidio Sabal.[14] The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest
area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by
th PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for
his hauling services.[15]
Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against
him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled
extrajudicial admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also
ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-
appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision[16] states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277
and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck
bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of errors:[18]
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD705 as amended by EO 277 for
possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time
mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which
required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused
against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused
under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section
68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or
other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents
necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at
the time of its enactment.
Appellant’s argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. - Any
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found. (emphasis supplied)
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but
give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the
time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of
1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3
of the Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber
forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with
appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding
sections.
xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a
CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized
representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the
lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be
supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of
the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx
xxx When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single
document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. xxx
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed
documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by
Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a
xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were
cut. (Exhibit "F")
It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr. Wilson
Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD 548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered
inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614 (8) located at
Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating
the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination,
whichever comes first."
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to transport one (1)
truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended on
March 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD-548 which was loaded not only with
coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the
outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were
placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he
needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore,
concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police
authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to
the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be
transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo,
Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the
subject lumber. (Exhibit "8", "8-A")
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the court has
doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter
in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by
an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the
lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and "x x came from PLTP." (Ibid) The
letter-request was returned to him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency
are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the
agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such
document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the
CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on
cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who
returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person "x x but they were
already reshuffled." (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did
not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:
"x x x
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am hauling
and transporting my own lumber for my own needs."
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he
transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.[19]
xxx
Accused-appellant’s possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes
an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products
and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or
removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished
under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are
inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of
lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures
as well as his right to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in
People vs. Bagista,[20] thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of
a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned
right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The Constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility
of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected
to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations
omitted; emphasis supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant’s truck. A
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-
wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos
Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General
Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they
apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo,
admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked
for the lumber’s supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing
circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive
search of appellant’s truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were
lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant’s right to counsel
under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of
guilt of appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs Against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 152989.September 4, 2002]
(11) ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 04 SEPT 2002.
G.R. No. 152989(Manuel Jorge Roldan, Jr. vs. Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona Pairing Judge, RTC Branch 12,
Ormoc City and Hon. Alberto L. Conopio, City Prosecutor, Ormoc City, ATTY. FIEL MARMITA, OIC, DENR-
CENRO, Albuera, Leyte.)
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Herein petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of about 60,000 square meters covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. TP-331 which he bought from a certain Ildefonso O. Maglasang.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm
in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the various government agencies.
While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by some employees from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting
of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval.
Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway.He used
the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages.
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the
Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner's place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not
confiscated but were entrusted to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at
that time.
About two days later, the CENRO representatives came back with members of the media and ISAFP
charging illegal logging but they failed to get the logs, again for alleged lack of search warrant.
Several days thereafter, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a search warrant
and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled
timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
Consequently, on September 21, 2001, a complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended
was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of Ormoc City. Thereafter,
the City Prosecutor issued a resolution dated November 16, 2001 finding probable cause to convict
petitioner for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended.
A motion for reconsideration proved futile for, as it turned out, the information had already been filed
in court. Jurisdiction over the case was transferred to the regional trial court, also a public respondent
in this case.
A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view thereof, herein
petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and the recall
of his warrant of arrest.
After hearing the said motion, public respondent Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, in an order dated
February 15, 2000 denied the motion but reduced the recommended bail of petitioner.
Hence, the instant petition.
Before us, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner
in this case, is criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property;
(2) whether the owner of the private property is administratively liable under Sec. 14 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property
and just used them for his own agricultural purposes therein and (3) whether the logs confiscated by
the DENR should be returned to the petitioner considering that the same were not transported out and
merely used for his own agricultural purposes.
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that he should not be held liable under Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended since the timberthat was cut and gathered came from his titled property.
He further asserts that the part of Section 68, PD 705 incorporating the provisions of Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code regarding qualified theft should not be made to apply to his case since
the aforestated articles of the penal code apply only to those who commit theft, which under the law is
a crime committed when there is unlawful taking of a property belonging to another. He insists that both
penal provisions should not be made to apply since he is the owner of the property and as owner he
cannot be accused of stealing his own property. Petitioner concludes that Article 309 therefore applies
only to other persons or strangers gathering timber from the titled property of another while Article
310 is inapplicable in his case since such pertains to theft of coconuts in a plantation.
At the outset, the Court notes that while petitioner continues to harp on the alleged questions of law
present in this case, the petition at bar was filed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Nothing is
more settled than the rule that a writ of certiorari lies only where a court has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court believesthat none of the aforementioned
circumstances is present in this case.
Be that as it may, although this Court at the outset had pointed out that herein petitioner adopted the
wrong remedy and committed certain technical violations of the Rules on Civil Procedure which
necessitate its outright dismissal, nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice and in view of the
novelty of the question of law involved, the Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion shall treat
this petition as having been filed under Rule 45.
The fundamental question of law we seek to resolve in this case is: may a person who cuts trees for his
own use within his property without the necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting
the same outside said property, be criminally charged for violating PD 705?
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License.- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Herein petitioner argues that even if the phrase pertaining to Articles 309 and 310 of the penal code
was only meant to prescribe the imposable penalty, since the cut trees were from his private land, his
penalty should not be equated with that imposable on those who commit theft inasmuch as theft and
qualified theft involve the unlawful taking of a property belonging to another.
The argument of petitioner is specious. Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear
that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose of determining the imposable penalties
and not to define acts which constitute qualified theft.
Moreover, petitioner's argument that the provisions of the law regarding qualified theft should not be
applied to him since he is the owner of the property is devoid of merit. It must be stressed that petitioner
is not being charged for qualified theft but for violation of Section 68, PD 705 hence his ownership of
the land is of no moment. The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who
commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is
material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or
charged with its violation possesses the required permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he
or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.
As to his assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that for
qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of the law.
Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705 a penalty equal to that
imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond the power of this Court to resolve. It
is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law is harsh - dura lex sed lex. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the
executive oran amendment of the law by the legislature.
We come now to the second issue posed by herein petitioner on whether the owner of a private
property is administratively liable under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite
the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural
purposes.
Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private
Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit," provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by

these regulations which are transported without the prescribed documents shall be
considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the government
and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the
matter.
DENR Officials found issuing defective certificate of origin and other transport
documents required in this Order shall be subject to suspension without prejudice to the
imposition of other penalties as may be warranted by extant Civil Service Laws, rules and
regulations.
The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any
wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties
provided for by law. As to the defense of petitioner that he never transported the logs out of his
property, suffice it to say that such is a factual issue which this Court under Rule 45 cannot determine.
We are limited to resolving questions of law.
On the issue of whether the logs confiscated by the DENR should be returned to petitioner, any
pronouncement thereon at this point would be premature as the guilt of the petitioner has not been
legally established. The records of the case indicate that trial on the merits is still in progress. Hence,
this Court is not in a position to speculate on or prescribe the courses of action or remedies the
petitioner may avail of under the aforementioned law. Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not
duty bound to render advisory opinions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000

(1) FELIPE CALUB AND RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]

Costs against private respondents.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

342 Phil. 485

G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997

(2) EPIFANIO LALICAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING

The petition is devoid of merit.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

385 Phil. 195

G.R. No. 131270, March 17, 2000

(3) PERFECTO PALLADA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

The facts are as follows:

Hence this petition which raises the following issues:[9]

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN

Exh. 6-A - Auxiliary Invoice

Exh. 6-D-1 - [C]arbon copy of Exh. "6-D" above

Exh. 7-A - Auxiliary Invoice

Exh. 7-B - CTA

Exh. 8-A - Auxiliary Invoice

Exh. 8-B - CTA

Exh. 8-C - Tally Sheet for the 678 pieces of lumber

Exh. 8-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee

Exh. 9-A - Auxiliary Invoice

Exh. 9-B - CTA, dated March 20, 1992

Exh. 9-C - Tally Sheet, dated March 20, 1992

Exh. 9-E - Official Receipt for environmental fee

Exh. 9-D-1 - Xerox copy of Exh. "9-D"

5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as

The said exhibits also appear to be questionable, [t]hus[:]

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

398 Phil. 109

G.R. No. 136142, October 24, 2000

(4) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFONSO DATOR AND

DE LEON, JR., J.:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

In his appeal Pastor Telen interpose the following assignments of error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF

The appeal is not impressed with merit.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

483 Phil. 774

G.R. No. 161798, October 20, 2004

Private respondents-complainants were some of those apprehended by PICOP’S security officers

Petitioner then filed this petition for review.

Petitioner’s arguments do not convince us. The petition should be denied.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is DENIED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

268 Phil. 739

G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990

Petitioner made the following allegations:

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court of the Philippines

464 Phil. 125