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War and strong states, peace and weak states?
Michael C. Desch
International Organization / Volume 50 / Issue 02 / March 1996, pp 237 - 268

DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300028551, Published online: 22 May 2009
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818300028551
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Michael C. Desch (1996). War and strong states, peace and weak states?.
International Organization, 50, pp 237-268 doi:10.1017/S0020818300028551
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War and strong states,
peace and weak states?
Michael C. Desch
For most of the twentieth century, international politics were dominated by

the World Wars I and II and the cold war. This period of intense international
security competition clearly strengthened states, increasing their scope and
cohesion. However, the end of the cold war may represent a "threat trough"—a
period of significantly reduced international security competition. If so, this
decline in the external threat environment may reduce the scope and cohesion
of many states. My aim in this article is to investigate the relationship between
the changing international security environment and the future of different
types of states. My principal argument is not that we are about to witness the
end of the state or of the states system. Rather, as a result of the end of the cold
war the state as we know it will change. Some will disintegrate, many will cease
growing in scope and may even shrink a little, and few will remain unaffected.
While many have speculated about how the cold war's end will affect
international politics, few have discussed its domestic impact for three
reasons.1 First, relatively little theoretical research has been done in security
studies about interactions across the levels of analysis.2 While the use of a
single level of analysis may have been methodologically justifiable for some
research questions, the correlation between very dramatic international changes
I thank Craig Arcenaux, Robert Art, Marc Busch, Randall Collins, Dale Copeland, Mary Jo
Desch, Aaron Friedberg, Ted Hopf, Charles Lipson, Sean Lynn-Jones, Lisa Martin, Jon Mercer,
Max Neiman, John Odell, Robert Pape, Daniel Philipott, Bruce Porter, Dani Reiter, David Spiro,
Paul Stockton, Randall Schweller, James Wirtz, the participants in the Olin Institute's National
Security seminar, the reviewers for International Organization, and especially John Mearsheimer,
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also wish to acknowledge the generous
financial support of the Committee on Intramural Research of the Faculty Senate of the University
of California at Riverside and the John M. Olin Foundation's National Faculty Fellowship in the
Social Sciences.
1. For the debate about the external consequences of the end of the cold war see Snyder 1990;
Mearsheimer 1990; Hoffmann, Keohane, and Mearsheimer 1990; Van Evera 1990/91; Russett,
Risse-Kappen, and Mearsheimer 1990/91; Jervis 1991/92; Van Evera 1992; and Waltz 1993.
2. Notable exceptions are Posen 1984; Deudney and Ikenberry 1991/92; Barnett 1990; and
Schweller 1992.
International Organization 50, 2, Spring 1996, pp. 237-68

© 1996 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
238 International Organization
on the one hand and very significant domestic developments on the other
provides compelling reason for exploring cross-level linkages in the realm of
security affairs.3
A second reason why scholars have paid less attention to the domestic
consequences of the changing post-cold war international security environ-
ment is that some believe there has been little variation on the threat variable.
For example, John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz each argue that the shift
from bi- to multipolarity and the continuing anarchical nature of the interna-
tional system will make it less peaceful and therefore more threatening.4
However, most analysts believe that while we are not entering the millennium,
the contemporary international security environment indeed has become
significantly less threatening.5 During the cold war, the United States was
locked in an intense ideological struggle with an adversary possessing signifi-
cant nuclear and conventional forces. Today, that ideological struggle has
largely been won, and while the United States still faces conventional and
unconventional threats to its security, the stakes are widely acknowledged to be
far less than during the cold war.6 A report issued by former Congressman (and
later Secretary of Defense) Les Aspin's House Armed Services Committee in
1992 concluded that there had been a "decline in the magnitude of the military
threats America faces."7 Only 16 percent of U.S. leaders regard Russian
military power as a critical threat today, whereas in 1986 59 percent regarded it
as such.8 Similarly, the new Russian military doctrine asserts that it now
"regards no state as its enemy."9 While pessimists such as Mearsheimer and
Waltz may be vindicated over the longer run, for the foreseeable future, the
end of the cold war represents a significant reduction in the international
security competition among the developed states of the world.
Finally, most theories of international relations do not expect the end of the
cold war to have much effect upon the state. For example, the dominant
paradigm—neorealism—treats the state as a black box and pays little attention
to changes inside it. This means that we do not yet have a realist theory of the
state and domestic politics, merely simplifying assumptions about them.10
Neorealism's main competitor—neoliberalism—also assumes that states will
persist due to institutional inertia, though it argues that they might be
3. For an argument that a theory of international politics should focus on the structural
determinants of international systemic outcomes, see Waltz 1979,18-78.
4. See Mearsheimer 1990; and Waltz 1964.
5. Jervis 1993, 57. For a critique of the bipolar stability argument, see Hopf 1991.
6. This argument in many respects parallels that of Fukuyama 1989.
7. U.S. House 1992,1.
8. See Reilly 1995, 24; and 1987,12.
9. See the section entitled "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation: Russia's Military Doctrine," in the article entitled, "Detailed Account of Military
Doctrine," Rossiskiye Vestii, 18 November 1993, reprinted in the November 1993 supplement to
Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Central Eurasia 19:1.
10. Wendt 1987,342-44.
State strength 239
increasingly constrained by other international institutions.11 This article

departs from much of the international relations literature on the state in that
it treats the state not as a constant but as a variable.12
There are essentially two groups of theories about the state that make
diametrically opposed predictions about the effect of the changing interna-
tional security environment on various aspects of state structure. "State
persistence" theories maintain that despite the end of the cold war and the
dramatic changes in the international security environment, states will remain
basically unchanged in scope and cohesion. "The nation-state," according to
Michael Mann, is "not in any general decline, anywhere. "13 Some versions of this
argument hold that states facilitate internal economic or other nonmilitary
tasks such as dealing with market failures or mobilizing for collective action
that continue to justify their existence despite international changes. Others
hold that states are shaped by both internal and external factors such as ideas
or transaction costs that could also continue to justify the state. Still others
argue that the state is primarily a response to continuing external economic
vulnerability.
"State deformation" theories, on the other hand, maintain that the changed
international security environment makes the continued broad scope, and in a
few cases even the viability, of certain states extremely doubtful.14 According to
this argument, threats are critical for bringing groups of individuals together
and keeping them together. That is, insecure environments make for secure
states. This argument is based on two assumptions: (1) expansion in state scope
is justified primarily by war; and (2) some states are so deeply divided that
without external threats to hold them together they would collapse. In short,
the state deformation theorists would predict that the changed external
military threat environment at the end of the cold war should have very
dramatic effects on the scope and cohesion of a variety of different types of
states.
If the state persistence theorists are correct, the future looks much like the
past; however, if the state deformation predictions are right, then the post-cold
war period may present a host of new international and domestic challenges to
governments that need to be addressed to avoid future conflict and instability. I
shall argue that the state deformation and the state persistence arguments both
contain elements of truth. The state persistence arguments are right inasmuch
as most states will not fall apart as a result of the end of the cold war because
they retain other functions besides external defense. However, the state
11. See Keohane and Nye 1977, 24-26; and Vernon 1971.
12. Important exceptions to the norm of holding states constant include Hoffmann 1968; Herz
1957; Nettl 1968; and Hammond 1967.
13. Mann 1993,118, emphasis original.
14. General arguments about the uncertain future of the state can be found in Poggi 1990, 190;
and Tilly 1992, 329. For interesting arguments about why the American state is likely to weaken in
the near future, see Kurth 1992; Porter 1993; and Deudney and Ikenberry 1994.
deformation arguments contain a large element of truth, too. Specifically, war

and external defense were the single most powerful engines in the growth of
the scope of the state. Without these threats, the maintenance of the broad
scope of the state is unlikely. Also, there are a few states that are so deeply
divided internally that they are held together largely by common external
threats. The less intense international security competition of the post-cold
war period should witness their demise.
This article proceeds by first defining key terms and then laying out the state
deformation theory. Next it uses illustrative historical evidence from Europe,
the Third World, and the United States to demonstrate that theory's plausibil-
ity. It then discusses alternative theories of the state that might be used to
qualify this bleak prognosis for the state and support the view that states are
not likely to be affected much by the end of the cold war. I do not offer this
article as a strict test of these theories for two reasons: First, systematic
empirical research already has established the role of war in state formation.15
Second, post-cold war data are insufficient to make anything other than
provisional projections about the effects of prolonged peace on the scope and
cohesion of the state. My objective is fairly modest: to discuss the extant
theories, illustrate the plausibility of my alternative, and suggest that current
trends seem to support it. I speculate about what might occur in the future if
this qualified state deformation theory is indeed correct. Finally, I conclude
with some concrete policy recommendations and avenues for further research.
International security competition and the state

According to Gianfranco Poggi, the state
is perhaps best seen as a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule
operating through the continuous and regulated activities of individuals
acting as occupants of offices. The state, as the sum total of such offices,
reserves to itself the business of rule over territorially bounded society; it
monopolizes in law and as far as possible in fact, all faculties and facilities
pertaining to that business.16
Max Weber was even more succinct in his famous characterization of the state's
function as the "monopolization of legitimate violence."17 Most scholars agree
that the state is (1) a set of institutions, (2) placed in a geographically bounded
territory, that (3) has a monopoly upon rule within that area.18 In this sense,
"state" is largely synonymous with "government." States can be "strong" or
"weak."19 This distinction is quite vague, however. Therefore, I shall suggest
15. See Rasler and Thompson 1989; and Stein 1981.

16. Poggi 1978,1.
17. Weber 1978,904-5.
18. See Hall and Ikenberry 1989,1-2; and Jaggers 1992,29.
19. This distinction is drawn in Katzenstein 1976; and critiqued in Gourevitch 1978, 901-2.
State strength 241
that state strength or weakness should be disaggregated into scope and

cohesion. In terms of scope, I shall distinguish between "minimal" and
"maximal" states. A minimal state does only three things. Since Adam Smith,
the neoclassical economic view has been that the state should serve only to
provide such public goods as internal order, external defense, and basic public
infrastructure.20 It is important to keep in mind that even neoclassical
economists are not averse to the existence of the state as long as it remains
limited in scope. I would go further and argue that they would prefer a strong
(effective) state in those areas in which they think the state should act. In
contrast, a maximal state performs additional functions such as adjudication,
redistribution, and extensive infrastructural development.21 The cohesion of
states in turn varies between divided and unified. Strong states are highly
cohesive and tend to be maximal states; weak states are divided and tend to be
minimal states. The question is, what explains the variation in scope and
cohesion among different types of states?
The many theories of the state can be separated into roughly three
categories: those that give preeminence to internal factors, those that focus
upon external factors, and those that involve both.22 We can also distinguish
between theories that emphasize economic factors (the English school) and
those that point to military factors (the German school).23 As it stands now, the
literature gives disproportionate emphasis to the internal and economically
based theories of the state at the expense of external and militarily oriented
theories.24 In contrast, I shall argue that the state is a function of both internal
and external factors but that economic and military roles lead to very different
types of states in terms of scope and cohesion.
The generally accepted argument is that "[w]ar was a great stimulus to state
building, and it continues to be, if not a great stimulus, then at least a major
factor," as Karen Rasler and William Thompson have stated it.25 Historical
evidence suggests that the functions of the state were overwhelmingly military
rather than economic and predominantly international rather than domestic.26
The consensus among historians and sociologists is that while war was not the
only justification for the state, it was the most important one.27 War and
external threats played a key role in increasing the scope and cohesiveness of
states.28 External military threats make states more cohesive because they
reduce what Albert Hirshman labeled the "exit" option and tend to suppress
20. Poggi 1990,15.

21. This definition draws upon Tilly 1990, 96-97; and Mann 1988,13-14.
22. See Barkey and Parikh 1991, 527-31; Skocpol 1992; Skocpol and Amenta 1986; and Tainter
1988,32.
23. Mann 1988, 75.
24. See Zolberg 1980, 687-716; and 1987, 43 and 58.
25. Rasler and Thompson 1989, 2.
26. Mann 1988, 110.
27. Tilly 1990,12 and 14-15.
28. See Fried 1961; and Titmuss 1959, 75-88.
the "voice" option, thus leaving only the "loyalty" option.29 This argument is
undergirded by the conflict-cohesion thesis, which holds that threats increase
group cohesiveness—or unity—under specific conditions.30 Further, the volumi-
nous literature on war and state formation argues that various aspects of state
structure are in important ways reducible to external factors.31 Max Weber and
Otto Hintze made some of the earliest arguments along these lines, and this
perspective on the impact of war on the modern state continues to find
widespread acceptance.32
While war might have been centrally important in forming the strong states
of Western Europe and North America, Third World states historically have
not experienced the same challenging external threat environment (although
they have often faced significant internal threats), and their state structures
have turned out to be quite different.33 They are far less cohesive and smaller in
scope. Generally, Third World states have weak governments, little effective
control of the economy (despite frequent efforts to control large parts of it), a
low level of political institutionalization, and chronic political instability. The
absence of war and serious external threats at the time of their emergence as
new states may explain much of this. Indeed, it was only widely held ideas about
sovereignty by the great powers that account for the persistence of weak states
in Africa and other areas of the Third World.34 In contrast, those few Third
World states that faced harsh external environments developed much more
extensive and more cohesive states (for example, China, Cuba, Israel, and
South Korea).35
One might concede that war plays a critical role in state formation but still
argue that once established, states no longer depend upon external threats to
maintain cohesion and continue to grow or remain large in scope.36 But war, or
preparation for war, also plays a significant role in maintaining the scope and
cohesion of states.37 During wartime the scope of the state is greater because
the government controls more of the state's gross domestic product and people
consume more public goods than private goods.38 A continuing external
29. See Hirshman 1978,90-107; and 1970.

30. The classic articulation and development of this argument are in Simmel 1955, 13-123; and
Coser 1956.
31. Howard 1979.
32. For an early argument, see Hintze 1975. For lucid summaries of Weber's and Hintze's
arguments see Collins 1986, 145; and Gilbert 1980. For examples of modern acceptance of this
idea, see Stein 1981, 4; Park 1941, 551; Tilly 1975a, 51; Carneiro 1970, 734; Poggi 1978, 61; and
Kennedy 1993, 124.
33. On war's place in state formation in Western Europe and North America, see Bayley 1975,
359. For an excellent comparative treatment of the role of war, or its absence, in European and
African state formation, see Herbst 1990. For similar comparisons between Europe and different
parts of the Third World, see Tilly 1975b, 620; Rouquie 1987, 98-99; and Wendt and Barnett 1993.
34. Jackson and Rosberg 1982.
35. On this, see Migdal 1988, 274; and Barkey and Parikh 1991, 534.
36. Precisely this objection is raised in Tainter 1988, 31-32.
37. Coser 1956, 8; also see 31.
38. Stein 1981, 61, 72-73, and 76.
State strength 243
stimulus is critical to maintaining the cohesion of the state. Such indicators of

social cohesion as crime, race riots, and strikes decline significantly during
wartime.39 Emile Durkheim explained this increased cohesion by virtue of the
fact that
great social disturbances and great popular wars rouse collective senti-
ments, stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and national faith,
alike, and concerting activity toward a single end, at least temporarily cause
a stronger integration of society.... As they force men to close ranks and
confront a common danger, the individual thinks less of himself and more
of the common cause.40
In short, war and other external threats play an ongoing role in expanding the
scope and maintaining the cohesion of many states.
Given this, will the long-term reduction in the intensity of the international
security competition have the opposite effect? The reason it might is that "war
and peace are," as William Graham Sumner observed, "so intimately related
that peace creates the problem that war is required to solve."41 Specifically,
Georg Simmel noted:
A group's complete victory over its enemies is thus not always fortunate in a
sociological sense. Victory lowers the energy which guarantees the unity of
the group; and the dissolving forces, which are always at work, gain hold.42
Logically, the state deformation theory predicts that the end of the cold war
will produce a general crisis for the state.43
I argue that though the state deformation theory is generally correct in that
military threats produce maximal states while lower threat environments and
other state functions lead to minimal states, it does have a flaw. Namely, most
states do not shrink all the way back to their prewar scope or fall apart when
they no longer face external threats. The reason is that there seems to be a
"ratchet effect" in state growth: two steps forward in wartime but only one step
back in peacetime. This is because wartime growth often increases state power
so as to make it hard for society to prune it all the way back. Wars also produce
or reveal new problems that the state needs to deal with in the postwar
period.44 Thus, modern states have other functions besides national defense.
Peace and lower threats will halt state expansion, even reverse it somewhat, but
most states will not revert fully to their prewar scope. Therefore, we will also
have to incorporate other theories to explain minimal state persistence.
In contrast, those states with significant internal tensions and cleavages are
likely not only to shrink in scope but even to fall apart in a low-threat
39. See Durkheim 1951,150; Stein 1976,149; and Stein 1981,53.

40. Durkheim 1951, 208.
41. Sumner is quoted in Park 1941,569.
42. Simmel 1955,98.
43. See Poggi 1990; Tilly 1992; Kurth 1992; Porter 1993; and Deudney and Ikenberry 1994.
44. Tilly 1990,89.
environment. Some of these tensions include ethnic, linguistic, and cultural

differences; scarcity; wide regional variations; and diversity in interests and
vulnerabilities among economic sectors. If a state has significant internal
tensions, then once the external threat evaporates the state will fall apart. If it
does not, then an external threat may not be necessary to maintain state
cohesion.45 Hence, the level of internal tensions within a state must play an
important role as an initial condition in determining whether and how much
loss of cohesion will occur in a state facing a reduced external threat.
A final caveat to this argument about the effect of war and external threats
on the growth and maintenance of state scope and cohesion is that the
particular strategy a state adopts to meet an external threat is an important
intervening variable. States can rely on external sources of military power such
as allies or they can mobilize their own internal resources.46 And if they choose
internal mobilization, they can pursue one of two routes: coercive extraction or
contractual mobilization. These choices can have very different consequences.
External mobilization through alliances or internal mobilization via indirect
means are not likely to adversely effect cohesion; in contrast internal mobiliza-
tion through coercion is apt to decrease cohesion significantly by generating
internal resistance. The following section provides historical and contemporary
evidence to illustrate how changes in the external security environment have
strengthened and weakened states by affecting their scope and cohesion.
Illustrative evidence
The developed states of Europe and North America might be considered "least
likely" cases for the state deformation theory and "most likely" cases for state
persistence theories. Because they are the most expansive and cohesive states,
a state persistence view would expect them to remain relatively unchanged
despite the decrease in the external threat environment. Substantial variation
in the scope and cohesion of those states would weaken state persistence
theories.47
Scope
External threats have played a central role in determining the scope of the
state.48 "The largest and most persistent stimulus to increases or changes in
national fiscal burdens over the great period of European state-making,"
45. See Coser 1956,146; and Simmel 1955,101.

46. For discussion of the trade-offs among various options see Barnett 1990, 539-62; and
Morrow 1993, 207-33.
47. On the "least likely" case strategy see Eckstein 1975,118-19.
48. Bean 1973,203^.
State strength 245
Charles Tilly notes "was the effort to build armed forces and wage war."49
Britain's reliance upon the navy as its first line of defense produced little
demand for a large and intrusive government to raise revenue because the navy
was supported through customs payments exacted on foreign trade through a
small number of ports. In contrast, Prussia relied on its army for defense.
Therefore, it had to develop a large and intrusive government apparatus to
raise the revenue necessary to support that army by taxing peasants, urban
artisans, and merchants. Thus, the relative need to raise taxes for defense
determined the scope of government intervention into the economy.50
The purpose of the modern welfare state—the quintessential maximal
state—was not to provide social well-being as an end in and of itself. Rather, it
was a means to increase the state's military power. According to Poggi, a
"bigger, busier, more productive, better educated, happier population would
yield greater revenues, and thus indirectly increase the state's military might."51
Poggi further observes that the Germanpolizeystaat was thefirstwelfare state.52
External threats stimulated the growth of a more powerful state but one that
also becomes more dependent upon its citizens.53 As Mann observes, "Bis-
marck and the Kaiser, and not liberals and reformers, were the founders of the
welfare state."54 The maximal states of the developed world were clearly the
result of war and external threats.
The effects of war and peace (one surrogate for level of threat) on the
increasing and decreasing scope of the state (measured here by the percentage
of gross national product (GNP) subsumed by central government expendi-
tures) are generally illustrated, with a few anomalies during the cold war, by the
case of Britain in the twentieth century (see Figure 1). Rasler and Thompson
report similar increases in state scope during wars in Britain, France, and
Japan in the nineteenth century.55
Periods of war and external threat also affected the scope of the U.S. state.
For example, the Civil War witnessed such increases in the scope of the federal
government as the Homestead Act, the establishment of the Department of
Agriculture, the National Bank Act, and the first U.S. social welfare program.56
U.S. participation in the World Wars I and II had similar state-building effects.
"During the World Wars," observes Arthur Stein, "the federal government
responded to the requisites of mobilization by expanding its role and instituting
policies and programs unlike any it had previously or has since established."57
49. Tilly 1975a, 54.

50. Ibid., 23-24.
51. Poggi 1990, 66.
52. Poggi 1990,50-51.
53. Tilly 1990, 83.
54. Mann 1988,197. Also see Downing, 1992, 253.
55. Rasler and Thompson 1989, 209.
56. See Perret 1989, 255; and Skocpol 1983.
57. Stein 1981, 61. Also see Schaffer 1991.
War years
o
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
FIGURE l. Major war and the scope of the British state (measured as government
expenditures as a percentage of gross national product), 1900-1992
Sources. Mitchell 1992; and Dennis 1994.
War years
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
FIGURE 2. Major war and the scope of the U.S. state (measured as governmental
expenditures as a percentage of gross national product), 1900-1992
Sources. Mitchell 1993, tables G5 and Jl; U.S. Department of Commerce 1993; and World Bank
1994.
Figure 2 makes clear that major wars increased the extent of the American
state's involvement in the economy during the twentieth century. Further, it
shows that while state scope slowed in growth and even contracted somewhat
after wars, it did not shrink entirely back to its prewar levels.
State strength 247
Cohesion
Variation in the intensity of the international security competition also
affected the cohesion of many states. From the end of the Napoleonic wars and
the Treaty of Versailles in 1815 until the Crimean War of 1853-56, the external
threat environment facing European states became relatively benign.58 The
period between 1815 and 1853 witnessed an unprecedented breakdown in state
cohesion manifested in a series of internal upheavals in various European
states. In 1815 revolutions broke out in Spain, Portugal, and the Kingdom of
the Two Sicilies. In 1825 Russia experienced the Decembrist revolt. In the late
1820s, Greece and Serbia achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire.
In 1830 a second major wave of revolutionary unrest swept through Belgium,
France, Poland, and some of the German and Italian states. In 1848 a final
round of upheavals rocked France and the German and Italian states again.
Eric Hobsbwam observed that "[r]arely has the incapacity of governments to
hold up the course of history been more conclusively demonstrated than in the
generation after 1815."59
One might also point to the experience of the early United States as evidence
that the changing external threat environment affected its pattern of political
development. It is widely accepted that an important impetus to the building of
the American state was the need to ensure the common defense in a hostile
international environment.60 As John Jay argued in Federalist No. 4:
whatever may be our situation, whetherfirmlyunited under one national
government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is that for-
eign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us
accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well
administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized
and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit
re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much
more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.61
As that threat environment became more benign, the cohesion of the United
States markedly decreased.
This decrease in the external threat to the United States occurred gradually
over the course of almostfiftyyears. In 1803 the United States foreclosed the
French threat with the Louisiana Purchase. The 1814 Treaty of Ghent
eliminated the British threat to the United States from Canada. Andrew
Jackson's drive through Spanish Florida in 1815 demonstrated the impotence
of Spanish power in the Western Hemisphere. The 1821 Florida Treaty
removed the Indian question from the international agenda and made it a
purely domestic problem for the United States. Finally, the independence and
58. See Brinton, Christopher, and Wolff 1976, 544.

59. Hobsbawm 1962,137.
60. See the discussion of Alexander Hamilton's "Report on the State of Manufactures," in Earle
1986,226-46.
61. Jay 1962, 49.
annexation of Texas in the 1830s and the total defeat of Mexico in the war of
1846-47 removed the last potential external threat to U.S. security.62 By the
1850s, the external threat environment facing the United States had become
quite benign.
At the same time, long-standing internal tensions reemerged in the United
States. Despite a common language, religious heritage, and political institu-
tions, powerful centrifugal forces were at work within the United States. The
industrial North was committed to union and the abolition of slavery. The
agricultural South advocated secession and the maintenance of slavery. While
these tensions had been present from the beginning, the perception of a
common external threat that had previously served to minimize these fundamen-
tal differences changed. By the election of 1860, the country was so divided that
Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected with little more than a third of the
vote and three other parties did quite well. Lincoln's Republicans received 39
percent, Stephen Douglass's Democrats garnered 29 percent, Breckinridge's
Secessionist Democrats won 18 percent, and Bell's National Constitutional
Union won 13 percent.63 It is reasonable to conclude that the American Civil
War was in part the result of the breakdown of national cohesion due to the
changing external threat environment. As Samuel E. Morison notes, "with no
Mexican War there would have been no civil war, at least not in 1861."64
Finally, one can also point to a number of contemporary examples of
decreasing threats producing less cohesive states. The most dramatic manifes-
tation of this was the breakup of post-cold war Yugoslavia. During the cold
war, the external threat from the Soviet Union played an important role in
holding together the otherwise fractious Croats, Muslims, Serbs, and Slovenes. 65
That the breakup of Yugoslavia coincided with the end of the cold war is no
coincidence. The post-cold war "velvet divorce" between the Czech Republic
and Slovakia would have been similarly unlikely during the cold war.66 In short,
an external military threat also has played an important role in maintaining the
cohesion of states with significant internal cleavages.
Mobilization strategy
Further, the different post-cold war fates of the Soviet Union and the United
States illustrate the importance of the particular mobilization strategy adopted
to meet an external threat. Before and during the cold war, many predicted that
prolonged exposure to an intense international security competition would
encourage the spread of highly militarized and authoritarian states among the
62. On the reduction in the Mexican threat, see Smith 1919,58-155.

63. See Morison 1965,605.
64. Morison 1965.
65. Gow 1991,292.
66. For details of the Yugoslavian breakup, see Stephen Engelberg, "Careful Breakup in
Czechoslovakia," New York Times, 21 June 1992, 7; and Engelberg, "Czechoslovakia Breaks in
Two, to Wide Regret," New York Times, 1 January 1993,1.
State strength 249
advanced industrial powers—what Harold Lasswell called the "garrison

state."67 Why did this happen in the Soviet Union but not in the United States?
The United States was able, due to the development and deployment of
nuclear weapons and its geographically isolated position in the Western
Hemisphere, to devote significantly fewer resources to more expensive conven-
tional forces.68 In addition, Aaron Friedberg shows that the United States
chose contractual mobilization during the cold war and minimized internal
resistance to mobilization. The key characteristics of the U.S. "contract state"
were its limited capacity for extraction and heavy reliance on the market and
private industry for provision of military resources.69 Moreover, the United
States was able to wage the cold war by means that did not engender internal
resistance, such as indirect taxation and deficit spending. The point is not that
the American state did not expand but rather that because of its choice of
noncoercive mobilization, partial reliance on nuclear deterrence, and secure
geographic location, it did not grow as large as it might have and so resistance
to mobilization and internal disintegration did not set in as quickly as they did
in the Soviet Union.70
In contrast, the cold war Soviet Union was forced to adopt coercive
mobilization and ultimately fell apart due in some measure to the internal
resistance generated by its policies of coercive mobilization.71 Soviet govern-
ment expenditures as a percentage of GNP were well over 50 percent
throughout the cold war.72 One might also argue that the breakup of the Soviet
Union itself was in part another example of decreasing threats producing a less
cohesive state. Once President Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the West was
not really a threat, or that only Soviet policies were making it so, and persuaded
many of his colleagues and compatriots of this, elite resolve to maintain the
empire weakened, and the Soviet Union disintegrated.73
In fact, the cold war was the "perfect" type of threat: it never escalated to a
major war—despite the U.S. police action in Korea, the Vietnam War, and
numerous crises—although it was serious enough to be a unifying factor. Both
Simmel and Lewis Coser suggested that long-term or frequent threats and
conflicts that never actually lead to war are the ideal unifying stimuli.74 These
types of threats justify an expansive and fairly cohesive state but do not require
the kind of coercive mobilization that would engender internal resistance and,
therefore, a breakdown of national cohesion.
67. Lasswell 1941.

68. Friedberg 1992,116-20; and Krasner 1978, 67.
69. Friedberg 1992,114.
70. Ibid., 141-42.
71. Ibid., 113.
72. Mitchell 1992, tables Jl and G5.
73. On the change in Soviet threat assessments under Gorbachev, see Andrey Vladimirovich
Kozyrev, 1988, "Confidence and the Balance of Interests," Mezhdunardnaya Zhizn, no. 10 (October
1988) in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Soviet Report, 25 October 1988, 1-7. Also see
Snyder 1987/88; and 1988.
74. See Simmel 1955,104; and Coser 1956, 76-77.
In sum, the long peace of the nineteenth century, the early history of the
American republic, the growing scope of the British and American states in the
twentieth century, and the end of the cold war all provide suggestive evidence
that war and external threats led to both the growth of state scope and
increased cohesion. These cases also suggest that peace and a more benign
international environment slowed growth in scope (although it rarely shrank to
prewar levels) and in some cases led to significantly reduced cohesion. The
different fates of the post-cold war Soviet Union and United States underscore
the importance of the type of mobilization strategy a state adopts in the face of
an external threat. While the state deformation theory accounts for the
slowdown in the growth of most states and the dramatic loss of cohesion of a
few, it has trouble explaining the fact that most states do not fully revert to their
prewar scope or fall apart completely. The question is, which theory explains
this "ratchet effect?"
Alternative theories of the state
The state deformation theory must be supplemented by a state persistence

theory that explains why most states facing a diminished international threat
environment will neither fall apart nor revert all the way back to their prewar
scope. Therefore, we need to consider a number of nonmilitary theories based
on internal, external, or some combination of both types of factors that can
explain the peacetime residual state.
At least four internal explanations account for the state.75 Some have argued
that social, political, and economic modernization brought about greater social
mobilization, which increased popular demands for a larger state role in
various activities that had previously been managed through the private
sphere.76 Others have argued that the state is necessary to transfer wealth in
order to "arrive at a Paretian optimum."77 Still others hold that as the revenue
capacity of a state grew, so did its expansion into the economy. A final
argument is that democratic politics produce a more expansive state.78
On the basis of these internal economic theories one might argue that
economic or other nonmilitary internal functions could continue to justify a
maximal state despite a changed international environment.79 "Only minds like
those of Marx and Engels," Samuel Finer argues, "obsessively concerned with
75. One of the more important domestically oriented theories of the state as facilitator of
domestic collective action is Service 1975.
76. Deutschl961.
77. The term is from Feldman 1971, 511. See also Baumol 1952, 23; and Samuelson 1954,
387-89.
78. Skowronek 1982.
79. The classic statement of this argument that the raison d'etre of the modern nation-state has
changed is found in Constant [1813/14] 1988. For more recent articulations see Viner 1948 and
Rosecrance 1986.
State strength 251
conflict, could continuously harp upon the role of armed force as the sole force
creating and maintaining the state."80 While I agree with Finer that most states
will survive because they have other functions aside from national defense, I do
not believe maximal states will continue to be the norm, particularly if
economic efficiency becomes the main justification for states. The reason for
this is that two functions of the state would become primary: amelioration of
market failures and the provision of public goods.81 Neither is likely to be
conducive to the maximal state.
Market failures are a widely recognized problem that states are often
expected to solve. Because it claims the allegiance of all members of society and
wields extensive coercive powers such as regulation and taxation,82 some form
of state remains justified for dealing with market failures. Dealing with market
failures does not justify a maximal state, however. As Joseph Stiglitz reminds
us, there is in addition to market failure also the problem of "public failure." In
fact, the state is particularly ill-suited to play a large role in the economy for a
variety of reasons. Most state leaders are not chosen for their economic
acumen. The public in democratic states also has little incentive to pay close
attention to state economic policy because the individual voter can have little
effect on national policy. The government is further constrained in the quality
of economic managers it can hire by limits on salary. Finally, large government
bureaucracies find it difficult to implement performance-based incentives.83
Stiglitz notes that "while we might expect inefficiencies in both large public and
private enterprises, those in the public sector might be expected to be larger."84
In short, the state may have a continuing role to play in dealing with various
types of market failures, but the greater frequency of public failures will make a
maximal state difficult to justify exclusively on that basis.
Similarly, states will continue to provide goods other than defense. But this
role will not justify a maximal state because of the fundamental difference
between national defense and other internal activities, such as wealth produc-
tion or allocation.85 National defense is a classic example of a pure public good:
it is nonexcludable and the marginal cost for providing it to each individual
beyond the original group is extremely low. If one defended the state of
California from the Japanese during World War II, one also defended
Wisconsin at the same time—and at not much additional cost. The defense of
Wisconsin did not come at any expense to California's security; in fact it
probably increased it because two are stronger than one. The main problem
with providing public goods is "free riding"—the propensity of rational
individuals to undercontribute to their provision. The usual solutions are
80. Finer 1975, 89.

81. Gilpin 1987, 29.
82. Stiglitz 1989, 21 and 42-44.
83. Ibid., 29-33.
84. Ibid., 33.
85. For an important discussion of this difference, see Lipson 1984.
selective incentives and the presence of a hegemon to take responsibility for

applying them.86 In the realm of national defense, where the long-term interest
of saving money is outweighed by the immediate interest of surviving, taxpayers
are more willing to allow the state to use selective incentives to ensure that the
public good of national defense is provided.
In contrast, the production and allocation of wealth are closer to being
publicly provided private goods.87 Wealth is certainly excludable; and given a
slowly growing or stagnant economy, the marginal cost for providing wealth
outside the original group is very high.88 In such a redistributional economy,
one can only make a dollar by taking it from someone else.89 In such a zero-sum
situation, it is neither in the short- nor the long-term interest of individuals to
allow the state to coerce them through selective incentives to contribute to the
commonweal. In a redistributional economy, individuals can often make more
money by not cooperating with others in society. Because states supply
relatively few public goods beyond national defense—and most of the nonsecu-
rity functions states serve are better characterized as publicly provided private
goods—the likelihood of citizens supporting an expansive state for purely
economic reasons is very small. Therefore, as with dealing with market failures,
the provision of public goods probably will not continue to justify a maximal state.
The Great Depression of the 1930s might be raised as a possible historical
counterexample. While by many indicators of government scope—especially
federal outlays as a percentage of GNP—government did grow during the
Great Depression, it grew much larger during both World War II and the cold
war (see Figure 2). Further, this increased government expenditure was not
due solely to defense; social spending increased dramatically, as well. With the
exception of the Social Security Act of 1935, the most durable increases in U.S.
social welfare spending occurred not as a result of the continuation of New
Deal social programs but as an extension of wartime social welfare programs
initiated during World War II.90 Therefore, one cannot hold up the Great
Depression and the New Deal as reasons for optimism about continued
government growth in the absence of an external military threat.
One might object that the experience of the previous thirteen years of U.S.
politics also cuts against my argument. At the height of the second phase of the
cold war, the U.S. public elected Ronald Reagan on a platform of minimal
government and at the end of the cold war elected Bill Clinton on a more
86. For discussion of free riding, selective incentives, and the critical role played by small groups,
see Olson 1982,18-31.
87. This distinction is drawn in Stiglitz 1989,14.
88. For a compelling argument why narrow interest groups come to dominate stable developed
countries and inevitably choose redistribution over wealth generation thereby slowing economic
growth, see Olson 1982,42.
89. Ibid., 47.
90. Amenta and Skocpol 1988,94.
State strength 253
activist platform. Upon further reflection, however, the issue becomes less
clear-cut. While under Reagan the growth of nondefense spending slowed, it
did not stop and was not reversed.91 But by another measure of the extent of
government intervention into the economy—the federal budget deficit—
government intervention grew significantly during the Reagan era. Max
Neiman shows that the ratio of receipts to outlays (or the deficit) went from
0.88 in 1980 (1.00 is a balanced budget) to 0.78 in 1985.92
Nor was the post-cold war election of Clinton an endorsement of traditional
big government. At least a portion of the vote represented a protest against the
Bush administration's stewardship of U.S. domestic politics and the economy.
One might also note that a third-party candidate captured 19 percent of the
popular vote in that election. In addition, Clinton ran and was elected as a
"new Democrat" committed to low taxes, minimal regulation, less intrusive
government, and the reduction of the federal deficit.93 Finally, Clinton's recent
"health security" proposals, which seemed to be as ambitious an expansion of
the scope of the state as President Roosevelt's New Deal, effectively were killed
by the U.S. Congress.94 In sum, recent domestic developments have not
seriously undermined the general thrust of the argument that nonmilitary
internal functions will justify only a minimal state.
An alternative theory of the state focuses exclusively upon external economic
threats. David Cameron asserts that the best explanation for state expansion
into the so-called public economy is international openness. The more
vulnerable individuals are to international economic competition, the greater is
the demand for the state involvement in the economic arena.95 A more extreme
manifestation of this view of the economic role of the state is mercantilism. For
mercantilists, the state plays both an internal economic role through industrial
policy and an external role through strategic trade policy.96 This argument
predicts that the state will remain large in scope in order to deal with
91. New York Times, 14 February 1993,15. For a general discussion of the inability of the Reagan
administration to implement fully its efforts to cut federal spending, see Stockman 1986.
92. Neiman n.d.
93. On Clinton's efforts to decrease government size and spending, see the following newspaper
articles: Stephen Barr, "The Shrinking Federal Work Force," Washington Post, 19-25 September
1994, national edition; Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Sees Ways to Reduce Costs," New York Times, 27
October 1993; David Rosenbaum, "Remaking Government," New York Times, 8 September 1993;
and Ifill, "Billions in Savings Are Seen with Cut in U.S. Government," New York Times, 8
September 1993. On how these efforts are likely to be constrained, see "All the Government You
Can Eat," The Economist, 9 October 1993, 21-22; R. W. Apple, Jr., "Reagan's Curse on Clinton,"
New York Times, 1 August 1993; and Week in Review, New York Times, 1 August 1993,1.
94. See Adam Clymer, "National Health Program, President's Greatest Goal, Declared Dead in
Congress," New York Times, 27 September 1994; and "Requiscat," The Economist, 24 September
1994,23.
95. Cameron 1978,1249.
96. Wolf 1994, 97. For a clear statement of this new mercantilism, see Luttwak 1992; and 1993.
For an excellent review of this literature, see Richardson 1990.
international competition despite the end of the cold war.97 Evidence suggests
that some U.S. policymakers are thinking along those lines.98
There are three problems with this argument. First, uneven sectoral
vulnerability can undercut support for extensive state intervention in the
economy.99 A case in point is the continuing support for free trade among U.S.
executives despite the widespread perception that Japanese protectionism
constitutes an economic threat. Although 63 percent of U.S. leaders viewed the
economic power of Japan as a "threat to U.S. vital interests" in 1991, only 33
percent favored tariffs and trade restrictions.100 In 1995, 80 percent of U.S.
leaders polled believed Japan engaged in unfair trade practices, yet they
remained committed to free trade.101 One reason for this might be that some
industrial sectors benefit from free trade because U.S. workers are more
productive than Japanese workers in many areas of manufacturing.102 In
principal, economic threats could have a unifying effect, but only if they affect
all or most economic sectors of the state.103 However, it is rarely the case that
the majority of the sectors of an economy are threatened equally in large and
diverse advanced industrial economies.
The weak U.S. response to the oil crises of the 1970s suggests just how hard it
is for states to deal coherently with even very serious international economic
threats. Despite widespread acknowledgment by the public, elites, and govern-
ment that the growing U.S. dependence upon imported oil comprised a serious
problem, no coherent energy policy ever emerged.104 President Richard Nixon
appointed an "energy czar" to try to formulate a national energy policy, but
after two years and five different czars, no policy ever emerged.105 President
Gerald Ford proposed the Energy Policy Act of 1975, which after eleven
months of partisan debate accomplished little. And President Jimmy Carter
declared that the energy crisis was the "moral equivalent of war," but this did
not produce enough national unity to build consensus on energy policy.
Carter's National Energy Act of 1978 was dramatically weakened due to
divisions in the Congress between representatives of oil-producing and
oil-consuming states.106 It was not possible to build a national consensus on
energy policy because the rise in oil prices affected the various sectors of the
97. The argument is made explicitly in Luttwak 1990,19.

98. Kate Shatzken, "Economic Battles Loom, Top Officer Says," Baltimore Sun, 8 April 1995.
99. For discussion of varying sectoral vulnerability and support for free trade versus protection-
ism, see Frieden 1988, 61; Gourevitch 1984, 97; and Rogowski 1987a. For a slightly different
argument that increasing sectoral interdependence fosters support for free trade, see Milner 1987;
and 1988. The fullest study of this issue is found in Destler and Odell 1987.
100. Reilly 1991,20 and 27.
101. Reilly 1995, 23 and 29. Also see Steve Lohr, "In Poll, Executives Back Free Trade," New
York Times, 7 April 1993.
102. See Sylvia Nasar, "U.S. Rate of Output Called Best," New York Times 13 October 1992.
103. See Frey 1984, 208-9.
104. Davis 1993,121.
105. Ibid., 105.
106. Ibid., 115.
State strength 255
U.S. economy differently, which in turn caused a vigorous debate on what

should have been the appropriate response.107 Carter was thus frustrated in his
efforts to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. In fact, U.S. reliance upon
imported oil grew from 27 percent in 1972 to 47 percent in 1977.108 Since
domestic efforts by the U.S. government failed to remedy this problem, the
United States was forced to rely on international and market-based solutions
such as deregulation to deal with the energy crisis.109 Thus, far from demonstrat-
ing the ability of a state to respond effectively to international economic
threats, the U.S. nonresponse to the oil crises highlighted, in Franklin
Tugwell's words, the "growing incompetence of the U.S. government in
economic affairs."110
The second problem with the mercantilist approach is that state intervention
to promote or protect a particular industry may cause more difficulties than it
resolves. It is not clear that states are very good at managing trade or other
aspects of the national economy.111 Further, an extensive state role in the
domestic or international economy may lead to the promotion of the most
politically astute industries rather than the economically most productive.112
Finally, increasing integration into the international economy may even lead
to the further erosion of state power. Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore
concluded that economic integration is likely to decrease political cohesion and
encourage secessions.113 Kenechi Ohmae also expects smaller, rather than
larger, economic units to prosper in the global economy.114 In short, integration
into the international economy may continue to justify a minimal state, but it is
unlikely to justify the maximal state.
Two theories of the state focus upon both internal and external factors. One
holds that the state is a social construction; the other posits that the state arose
and persists because it reduces internal and external transaction costs.
Social constructivists such as Alexander Wendt hold that "states are not
structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent
interactions."115 According to the external version of this theory, states and the
international system arise from a "mutually implicating" dialectic process in
which neither one nor the other is "ontologically prior."116 Rather, the state
comes about as a result of how individuals conceive of the international system
107. On the debate about the appropriate response, see Yankelovich 1983,29 and 32.
108. Davis 1993, 94.
109. On efforts to find an international solution, see Ikenberry 1988. On increased reliance upon
the market see Davis 1993,115.
110. Tugwell 1988,234.
111. See Cable 1995; and Charles Wolf, Jr., "Demystifying the Japanese Mystique," New York
Times, 26 May 1991.
112. See Wolf 1994,105; and Tullock 1967, 231-32.
113. See Alesina and Spolaore 1995; and the summary article, "A Wealth of Nations," The
Economist, 29 April 1995,90.
114. See Ohmae 1993; and 1990.
115. Wendt 1994, 384-96. Also see Cox 1992, 133.
116. Wendt 1987,338.
and the state's role therein—it is a social construction.117 John Ruggie argues
that social constructs such as regimes can survive changes in the underlying
power structure if their "social purpose" remains unchanged. One could make
a similar social constructivist argument about states.118 The development of
international law, evolving notions of sovereignty, changing attitudes toward
the utility of military force, and new thinking about the proper function of the
state might all be cited as explanations for the changing nature of the state.119
An internal variant of the social construction theory holds that individuals
create states and nations through shared norms and ideas of legitimacy.120
Some suggest that since groups can be mobilized by persuasion as well as
coercion, it should be possible to bring and keep members together voluntarily,
using unifying rituals and a sense of community to maintain popular consent
and bolster the legitimacy of the state despite the evaporation of a serious
external threat.121 Both versions of social construction theory hold that as long
as domestic or international actors continue to conceive of the state as viable, it
will be; when they no longer do so, it will not be.122
Both the external and internal versions of the social constructivist theory of
the state give reason for skepticism. As Mearsheimer observes, most social
constructivists cannot explain why particular ideas become dominant, and
those few who can come close to conceding that their source may be material
reality.123 This is, of course, in tension with the structurationist tenet that
neither material nor ideational factors are ontologically prior. In addition,
empirical tests of social constructivist theories are admittedly scant,124 and
those that do exist are open to markedly different interpretations.125 Further,
citizens are unlikely to give their consent to continued rule unless they perceive
a compelling reason for doing so—such as a serious external threat—and they
believe that only the state is capable of successfully meeting it. Legitimacy is,
therefore, a dependent variable that in significant measure is determined by
the actual performance of the state leadership.126 Likewise, those who suggest
that ritual can somehow substitute for conflict as a means for keeping the state
together concede the critical role of the external threat but fail to demonstrate
117. Ruggie 1993,152. One of the pioneering works of social constructivism is that of Berger and
Luckmann 1967.
118. Ruggie 1992.
119. On sovereignty, see Thomson 1994, 10-14. For a recent chronicle of changing ideas about
war that is compatible with the constructivist approach, see Mueller 1988.
120. For a classic example of an internal variant of the social constructionist theory of the state,
see Anderson 1992.
121. For a very good discussion of voluntaristic versus coercive theories of state formation, see
Carneiro 1970, 733.
122. Cox 1992,143.
123. Mearsheimer 1994/95,43.
124. Wendt concedes as much in 1987,337; and 1994, 391.
125. Two key examples are Fischer 1992; and Mearsheimer, 1994/95,45-47.
126. See Collins 1986,145; and Tainter 1988, 28.
State strength 257
that rituals can in fact serve as an effective threat substitute over the long
term.127 Finally, since the social constructivist view of the state is similar to the
strong version of the institutionalist-transaction cost theory of the state it also
shares a number of that theory's defects, which I will discuss at length next.128
Like the social constructivist theory, the institutional-transaction cost
argument also incorporates both internal and external factors. This theory
begins with the assumption that the state is an institution.129 The term is
ambiguous, but most would accept Douglass North's definition: a "set of rules,
compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth
or utility of principals."130 Institutions determine the so-called rules of the
game that in turn shape the outcomes we want to explain.131
States are a clear example of an institution.132 The principals are the citizens
who establish the state to ensure the provision of collective goods such as
internal law and order and external defense.133 An important function of the
state, according to this line of reasoning, is to make it possible for individuals in
large groups to interact with each other without fear of being cheated.134 The
root of the problem is that particular forms of economic interaction are costly.
These costs arise from the necessity for accurate standards of measurement,
the large size of the market, the need for enforcement of contracts and the
protection of private property, and variation in ideology among parties to a
transaction.135 These "transaction costs" affect most economic interactions and
in domestic economies lead individuals to form firms.136 This shifts economic
relations from the market (a quasi-anarchical situation) to the firm (a
hierarchical setting). In the latter, problems of bounded rationality are
ameliorated through sequential decision making; it is both harder to cheat and
easier to detect cheating; and solutions to problems can be imposed rather than
negotiated.137 Transaction costs determine the nature and size of the firm.138
And so, taking this logic further, individuals might form a different type of
127. On the role of ritual in keeping groups together, see Durkheim 1965, 257-58; and Poggi
1971.
128. On the similarities between these two theories, see Wendt 1992, 393-94; and Scott 1987,
495.
129. See Frey 1990,444; and North 1989,1320-21.
130. On the term's ambiguity, see North and Thomas 1970, 5. The definition is from North 1981,
201-2.
131. Pommerehne 1990,458-59.
132. On this, see March and Olsen 1984, 734; and Krasner 1988, 67.
133. For discussion of this contract view of the state, see Baumol 1952, 17; Buchanan 1979, 33;
and Bates 1988,486.
134. North 1989, 1322.
135. North 1987,422-24.
136. Demsetz 1968,50.
137. Williamson 1975, 29 and 40.
138. Ibid., 2.
institution—the state—to deal with various sorts of internal and external

transaction costs.139
The strong version of the transaction cost-institutions theory holds that once
established an institution can take on a life of its own—it becomes an
independent variable.140 Institutional theorists maintain that institutions are a
force for stability and continuity rather than change.141 As Stephen Krasner
notes, "Institutional structures persist even if circumstances change."142 This is
because once established, institutions can alter their environment to make it
more favorable to their continued existence; recruit members who develop a
vested interest in keeping the institution going despite changes in the external
environment; provide useful services which ensure them a constituency; are
often not faced with serious competition from rival institutions; and become
interdependent with other institutions.143 An underlying assumption is that the
factors that account for the origins of institutions do not necessarily explain
their persistence.144 Therefore, institutions should be able to weather even
dramatic changes in the external environment.
However, this strong form of the transaction cost theory of the state is
unpersuasive because it tends to slight the importance of power and interests in
both the formation and persistence of institutions and so has trouble account-
ing for institutional variation and change.145 Institutions are regularly treated as
exogenous, and few theories explain how they come about in thefirstplace.146
In contrast, other institutional theorists regard institutions as dependent
variables that arise as a result of changes in the external environment. North
and Thomas suggest that "to induce institutional innovation, some disequilib-
rium must occur in the system that adds weight to the profit side in the
judgement of decision-making individuals or groups, i.e., the perceived benefits
must have arisen, the costs fallen, or both."147 These costs and benefits are
determined by exogenous factors such as technology or geography. This sort of
weak institutional-transaction cost theory of the state—that if significant
power or interest conflicts within the state are absent, it will probably persist to
ameliorate transaction costs—seems reasonable and fully compatible with the
neorealist view of institutions as largely dependent variables.148 The key
question is, what sorts of transaction costs can institutions like the state
ameliorate?
139. See Coase 1960, 16-17; and 1952, 335 n. 14. For a more recent but highly nuanced
institutional-transaction cost argument, see Spruyt 1994.
140. DiMaggio and Powell 1983,148.
141. Katzenstein 1976, 42-43.
142. Krasner 1984,66.
143. DiMaggio and Powell 1991,10. For empirical studies of the impact of so-called institutional
lock-in, see Arthur 1989; and David 1986.
144. Krasner 1984, 240-44.
145. See Martin 1993; DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 20 and 30; and Krasner 1991, 337.
146. DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 6.
147. North and Thomas 1970, 9.
148. Mearsheimer 1994/95, 7.
State strength 259
My argument is that military threats and war significantly raise the transac-
tion costs of international politics and justify a maximal state; international and
domestic economic relations pose lower transaction costs and, therefore, make
minimal states more efficient. Ronald Coase's argument about whyfirmsdo not
continually expand in size and scope applies to the state as well. Firms or states,
justified purely on economic transaction cost grounds, will not be large in scope
because size can add other transaction costs and, after a certain point, reduce
efficiency. Efficient firms or states have lower transaction costs than those of
the market.149 Thus, even the originator of the transaction cost approach was
quite skeptical about the ability of the state to eliminate all transaction cost
problems. "It is my belief," Coase argued, "that economists, and policy-makers
in general, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from
governmental regulation."150 Therefore, a more benign threat environment, in
which reducing transaction costs is the primary justification for the state,
should make minimal states more efficient than maximal states.
In sum, the alternative state persistence theories cannot be used to argue
that the scope and cohesion of maximal states will remain unaffected by the
diminishing international security competition of the post-cold war era.
However, some of them do justify the continued existence of minimal states in a
less competitive international security environment. Therefore, they nicely
supplement the state deformation argument in that they can explain the ratchet
effect of the maintenance of some greater-than-prewar scope in states without
deep internal divisions.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Since war and preparation for war have played such important roles in
expanding the scope and maintaining the cohesion of the modern state, the
changed international security environment ought to make the continued
growth or maintenance of broad scope, and in certain cases even the viability,
of some states doubtful. While the end of the cold war certainly will not see all
nation-states dissolve, it will nevertheless see significant changes in many
aspects of state activity due to slowed growth, or even some loss, in scope and to
decreased cohesion.
If this argument is correct, we should expect to see the following develop-
ments in the near future. First, the viability of multiethnic states facing a less
challenging external security environment will certainly decrease. Not all of
them will disintegrate either violently (Yugoslavia) or peacefully (Czechoslova-
kia and the Soviet Union), but many of them will do so. In addition, those that
survive will have to cope with a much higher level of ethnic separatism and
149. Coase 1952, 340-41.

150. Coase 1960,18.
demands for autonomy. The key cases to watch will be the developed world
such as Belgium (Walloons), Bulgaria (the Turks in Southern Dobrudja),
Canada (Quebecois), Czech Republic (ethnic Germans), Romania (Magyars),
Russia (numerous groups), Slovakia (Magyars), Spain (Basque and Catalon
Provinces), and the United Kingdom (Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland).
Ironically, the implications of the modified state deformation argument for
the less developed regions of the world are mixed. On the one hand, many
Third World states are more deeply rent with internal tensions and cleavages
than most developed states.151 On the other hand, the threat environment in
much of the Third World has not decreased dramatically with the end of the
cold war.152 Therefore, we ought to expect two sets of outcomes. States with
deep ethnic, social, or linguistic cleavages facing a more benign threat
environment should find it harder to maintain cohesion. Key cases to watch
here are Israel (secular versus religious Jews and the Jewish majority versus the
Arab minority), multiethnic Arab states such as Syria (Alawites) and Jordan
(Palestinians), Afghanistan (various political factions), much of black Africa
(tribal), and especially South Africa (Zulus and whites). On the other hand,
deeply divided Third World states that are still facing a challenging external
threat environment will probably find it easier to maintain cohesion. This is
particularly likely in India and Pakistan.
Even within relatively homogeneous states, we ought to see manifestations of
increasing resistance to an extensive state role and decreasing government
effectiveness. During the cold war, the United States grew in many areas
besides national defense. This was due in part to the lack of strong resistance to
state growth in the cold war climate. Mobilization for defense in the face of an
imminent external threat produces less immediate resistance than mobilization
for other reasons. The same will not be true in the post-cold war era. Rather,
the longer the period of reduced international security competition, the more
likely are developed states to be plagued by the rise of narrow sectoral, rather
than broad encompassing, interest groups.153 Recently the United States has
experienced increased manifestations of dissatisfaction with the broad scope of
the federal government. These are evident not only on the radical fringes but
even in mainstream political parties.154 We are now witnessing significant
challenges to federal authority, a growing consensus on the need to cut
spending to balance the federal budget, serious efforts to eliminate cabinet
departments and other federal agencies, skepticism about a state-dominated
industrial policy, and a Republican-controlled Congress committed to, and so
151. For a particularly alarmist view, see Kaplan 1994.

152. David 1992/93.
153. See Olson 1982,41-47.
154. See Peter Applebone, "Radical Right's Fury Boiling Over," New York Times, 23 April 1995;
and Robert Tomsho, "Though Called a Hoax, 'Iron Mountain' Report Guides Some Militias," Wall
Street Journal, 9 May 1995.
State strength 261
far successful in, its efforts to reduce the scope of the American state.155 The
recent defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and the subsequent rise
of antistate politicians in Canada may be other examples of this trend.155
Finally, this argument suggests why the current period of less intense
international security competition might not last. The decreasing external
threat environment will reduce the internal cohesiveness of some deeply
divided states. This could lead a few to disintegrate violently or to engage in
diversionary wars in order to maintain their fragile unity, either of which could
be an important source of future international instability. As Michael Howard
observed, "wars have arisen at least as often from the disintegration of
decadent states as from the aggression of strong ones."157 Hedley Bull makes a
compelling case that the Westphalian state system has been more beneficial as
a force for order and stability than a cause of war.158 Even in relatively cohesive
states, these domestic developments could exacerbate domestic social prob-
lems by producing a crisis of rising expectations.159 In short, while the changed
international security environment will not affect all types of states in the same
way, it nonetheless seems likely that it will have widespread negative conse-
quences in terms of reduced cohesiveness for some states and slowed growth
(or even some reduction) in scope for many states.
Unfortunately, the few available policy options are not very attractive. States
with large electoral districts, strong parties, and parliamentary systems may be
better able to resist rising sectoral pressures.160 However, it is not generally
feasible to impose radically new political systems on states. Certainly, policymak-
ers could (and some are likely to) try tofind,or manufacture, external threats in
order to "busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels."161 However, it is unlikely
155. On disaffection with the federal government, see Linda Greenhouse, "Justices Step In as
Federalism's Referee," New York Times, 28 April 1995. On federal spending, see Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., "Why I Switched," 25 February 1995; John H. Cushman, Jr., "House Endorses Deep Cutbacks
in Regulations," 4 March 1995; and Katherine Q. Seelye, "The Liberal Who Loathes Govern-
ment's Debt," 26 February 1995. On eliminating federal agencies, see Catherine S. Manegold,
"Republicans Skeptical of Education Department's Work Would Like to Eliminate It," 21
February 1995; and Robert Pear, "For Health Agency, a Fiscal Wake-up Call," 20 February 1995,
8, all New York Times articles. On industrial policy, see Bob Davis, "Clinton's Key Technology
Policy Effort is Dealt a Blow by Congressional Study," Wall Street Journal, 3 May 1995; and "Tech
Policy Falls Flat," Journal of Commerce, 5 May 1995. And, on reducing state scope, see Robin
Toner, "G.O.P. Blitz of First One Hundred Days Now Brings the Heavy Combat," New York Times,
9 April 1995; Katherine Q. Seelye, "Speaker Celebrating One Hundred Days, Pledges to 'Remake
Government,' " New York Times, 8 April 1995; and "Balancing Acts," The Economist, 13 May 1995,
25-26.
156. See the following New York Times articles, David Sanger, "How Scandal Undercut Japan's
Smug Leaders," 27 June 1993; James Sterngold, "Coalition in Japan Names New Leader to
Become Premier," 30 July 1993; and Timothy Egon, "New Canada Party Surges in Election," 28
October 1993.
157. Howard 1979,110.
158. Bull 1979.
159. Davies 1962, 5-7.
160. Rogowski 1987b, 208.
161. Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 2, 4.5.13.
that democratic decision makers would find much support for these types of
policies. Perhaps the best that can be done is for national leaders to work to
peacefully separate multiethnic states, recognize and try to dampen the
resulting manifestations of hypernationalism and diversionary war, check
expectations for a continued high level of government activism, and accept the
fact that growth of state scope will slow or even shrink somewhat in many
states. One final option is to try to hold out the inevitability of future
international conflicts as a surrogate for an external threat. Admittedly, these
are unsatisfactory and mostly negative policy recommendations, but if the logic
of the qualified state deformation argument is correct, the realistic options
available to policymakers will also shrink in the post-cold war period.
This article also suggests a number of avenues for further research. First, it is
important to understand why some multiethnic states can be deconstructed
peacefully while others cannot. Second, further research needs to be done on
the residual economic transaction cost and other functions that can still provide
a raison d'etre for a minimal state. Third, we need to explore further the sources
and consequences of the preexisting internal divisions within states from
uneven economic vulnerability to ethnic conflict. Finally, we need to ascertain
what will be the alternative forms of political organization that might become
more important in the future. One interesting possibility is that supranational
issues such as culture might become more salient.162 Another is that subna-
tional and supranational issues will merge and displace traditional national
issues.163 Still another is that subnational issues such as religion, ethnicity, or
kinship will come to the fore.164
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International Organization

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War and strong states, peace and weak states?

International Organization / Volume 50 / Issue 02 / March 1996, pp 237 - 268

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818300028551

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For most of the twentieth century, international politics were dominated by

International Organization 50, 2, Spring 1996, pp. 237-68

increasingly constrained by other international institutions.11 This article

deformation arguments contain a large element of truth, too. Specifically, war

International security competition and the state

15. See Rasler and Thompson 1989; and Stein 1981.

that state strength or weakness should be disaggregated into scope and

20. Poggi 1990,15.

29. See Hirshman 1978,90-107; and 1970.

stimulus is critical to maintaining the cohesion of the state. Such indicators of

39. See Durkheim 1951,150; Stein 1976,149; and Stein 1981,53.

environment. Some of these tensions include ethnic, linguistic, and cultural

45. See Coser 1956,146; and Simmel 1955,101.

49. Tilly 1975a, 54.

58. See Brinton, Christopher, and Wolff 1976, 544.

62. On the reduction in the Mexican threat, see Smith 1919,58-155.

advanced industrial powers—what Harold Lasswell called the "garrison

67. Lasswell 1941.

Alternative theories of the state

The state deformation theory must be supplemented by a state persistence

80. Finer 1975, 89.

selective incentives and the presence of a hegemon to take responsibility for

97. The argument is made explicitly in Luttwak 1990,19.

U.S. economy differently, which in turn caused a vigorous debate on what

institution—the state—to deal with various sorts of internal and external

Conclusions and policy recommendations

149. Coase 1952, 340-41.

151. For a particularly alarmist view, see Kaplan 1994.

162. Huntington 1993.

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