Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
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applicant must be able to show that lie has not been made independently liable to Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 147 and 236; Langdell's Summary of Eq.
any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a Pleading, No. 162' De Zouche v. Garrizon, 140 Pa. 430, 21
final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing. A/450. 17
It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when
position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to application therefore is delayed until after judgment has been
show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and that this
independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the
Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8. conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which
It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late such judgment was rendered. (See notes and cases cited 36 Am.
when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of Dec. 703, Am. St. Rep. 598, also 5 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. Sec. 41.)
the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the
holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the The evidence in the opinion of the majority shows beyond dispute
rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the that the appellant permitted the Parker county suit to proceed to
adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was judgment in favor of Britton with full notice of the adverse claims of
rendered. United Procedures Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. the defendants in the present suit other than the assignees of the
App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d judgment (the bank and Mrs. Pabb) and no excuse is shown why
1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 he did not implead them in the suit. 18
A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. 16
To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful
Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate
allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have 201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose
Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having
no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge
this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat.
was filed much too late.
The act providing for the proceeding has nothing to say touching
If a stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to the right of one, after contesting a claim of one of the claimants to
proceed so far as a judgment against him without filing a bill of final judgment unsuccessfully, to involve the successful litigant in
interpleader, it then becomes too late for him to do so. Union Bank litigation anew by bringing an interpleader action. The question
v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Gaulk, 86 Md. 385, seems to be one of first impression here, but, in other jurisdictions,
390, 38 A. 901; Gonia v. O'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. It from which the substance of the act was apparently taken, the rule
is one o the main offices of a bill of interpleader to restrain a prevails that the action cannot be resorted to after an unsuccessful
separate proceeding at law by claimant so as to avoid the trial against one of the claimants.
resulting partial judgment; and if the stakeholder acquiesces in
one claimant's trying out his claim and establishing it at law, he It is well settled, both by reasons and authority, that one who asks
cannot then have that part of the litigation repeated in an the interposition of a court of equity to compel others, claiming
interpleader suit. 4 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. No. 162; Mitfor's Eq. property in his hands, to interplead, must do so before putting
Page 3 of 507
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them to the test of trials at law. Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 176 La. 867, 147 So. 18; Dugas v. N.Y. Casualty Co., 181 La.
Smedes & M. 291 (41 Am. Dec. 626); Gornish v. Tanner, 1 You. & 322, 159 So. 572; 15 Ruling Case Law, 228; 33 Corpus Juris, 477;
Jer. 333; Haseltine v. Brickery, 16 Grat. (Va.) 116. The remedy by 4 Pomeroy's Jurisprudence, 1023; Royal Neighbors of America v.
interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance Lowary (D.C.) 46 F2d 565; Brackett v. Graves, 30 App. Div. 162,
and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or 51 N.Y.S. 895; De Zouche v. Garrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A. 450,
demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to 451; Manufacturer's Finance Co. v. W.I. Jones Co. 141 Ga., 519,
avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success 81 S.E. 1033; Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lawder, 22 R.I. 416,
in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of 84 A. 383.
defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the
successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to There can be no doubt that relator's claim has been finally and
diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others definitely established, because that matter was passed upon by
the burden which he asks may be taken from his own. ....' three courts in definitive judgments. The only remaining item is the
value of the use of the land during the time that relator occupied it.
It is urged, however, that the American Surety Company of New The case was remanded solely and only for the purpose of
York was not in position to file an interpleader until it had tested determining the amount of that credit. In all other aspects the
the claim of relatrix to final judgment, and that, failing to meet with judgment is final. 20
success, it promptly filed the interpleader. The reason why, it
urges, it was not in such position until then is that had it It is generally held by the cases it is the office of interpleader to
succeeded before this court in sustaining its construction of the protect a party, not against double liability, but against double
bond and the law governing the bond, it would not have been vexation on account of one liability. Gonia v. O'Brien, 223 Mass.
called upon to file an interpleader, since there would have been 177, 111 N.E. 787. And so it is said that it is too late for the
sufficient funds in its hands to have satisfied all lawful claimants. It remedy of interpleader if the party seeking this relef has contested
may be observed, however, that the surety company was the claim of one of the parties and suffered judgment to be taken.
acquainted with all of the facts, and hence that it simply took its
chances of meeting with success by its own construction of the In United P.P.I. Co. v. Britton (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S.W. 576. 578,
bond and the law. Having failed to sustain it, it cannot now force
it was said: 'It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes
relatrix into litigation anew with others, involving most likely a
too late when application therefor is delayed until after judgment
repetition of what has been decided, or force her to accept a pro
has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund,
rata part of a fund, which is far from benefits of the judgment. 19
and this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice
of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and
Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in
in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other which such judgment was rendered. See notes and cases cited 35
adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. Am. Dec. 703; 91 An. St. Rep. 598; also 5 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence No. 41.'
The jurisprudence of this state and the common law states is well-
settled that a claimant who has been put to test of a trial by a The principle thus stated has been recognized in many cases in
surety, and has establish his claim, may not be impleaded later by other jurisdictions, among which may be cited American Surety
the surety in an interpleader suit, and compelled to prove his claim Co. v. O'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787; Phillips v. Taylor,
again with other adverse claimants. American Surety Company of 148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18; Moore v. Hill, 59 Ga. 760,
New York v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727; American Surety 761; Yearborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. (11 Miss.) 291,
Company of New York v. Brim (In Re Lyong Lumber Company),
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41 Am. Dec. 626. See, also, 33 C.J. p. 447, No. 30; Nash v. Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists versus Hon. Antonia Corpus-
McCullum, (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S.W. 2d 1042, 1047. Macandog, Presiding Judge, Branch CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation, (a) dated September 5, 1985 (Rollo,
It would seem that this rule should logically follow since, after the pp. 21-25) reconsidering its Decision 1 of February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48) and
recovery of judgment, the interpleading of the judgment creditor is ordering petitioner to deposit whatever amounts due from it under the Land
in effect a collateral attack upon the judgment. 21 Development Agreement, and (b) dated February 13, 1986 (Rollo, p. 27) denying
for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had
already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent
present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists
final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his (MISSION for short) are corporations duly organized and existing under and by
rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby
increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an They executed a Land Development Agreement (Rollo, pp. 179-182) on October 6,
interpleader suit, with the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the 1976 whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense
said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the and responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot
interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or lots, at a stipulated area and price per lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale,
unreasonable delay. private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the
project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a
ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28, 1964, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, designated depositary trustee bank. On the same date private respondent
at appellant's cost. executed in petitioner's favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage (Rollo, pp.
183-186) on the lots with titles involved in the land development project. The deed
was supplemented by a Sale of Real Property with Mortgage and Special
Conditions dated October 28, 1978 (Rollo, pp. 189-194 The amounts totalling
about P984,110.82 paid by petitioner were to be considered as part of the 40%
due private respondent under the Land Development Agreement. All went well
G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988 until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in
question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION, petitioner, complaint for interpleader (Rollo, pp. 169-179) against private respondent
vs. MISSION and Maysilo Estate, docketed as Special Court Case No. C-9556 of the
FIRST SPECIAL CASES DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and then CFI of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan, alleging among others, that in view of the
NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants (herein private respondent and
ADVENTISTS, respondents. Maysilo Estate) over the properties subject matter of the contracts, over which
plaintiff corporation (herein petitioner) has no claim of ownership except as a
PARAS, J.: purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of plaintiff corporation which has no
interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to pay whoever is entitled
or declared to be the owners of said properties, the defendants should be required
This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to set
to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves (Rollo, p. 177).
aside the two resolutions of public respondent First Special Cases Division of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 04869 entitled "North Philippine
Page 5 of 507
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An order was issued by the presiding judge 2 requiring defendants to interplead on If not, the declared winner among the intervenors will be the party
October 22, 1981. MISSION filed a motion to dismiss dated November 10, 1981 to enter into a contract of sale with the plaintiff as aforementioned.
for lack of cause of action but also presented an answer dated November 12, (Rollo, p. 66).
1981. The motion to dismiss was denied in an Order dated January 12, 1982. The
heirs of Maysilo Estate filed their own answer dated November 11, 1981 and an Another order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13,
amended answer dated October 20, 1983 thru the estate's special receiver. The 1984 order and setting aside the order for private respondent's deposit of the
heirs of Pedro Banon filed an "Answer in Intervention with Special and Affirmative amounts it had previously received from petitioner, thus:
Defenses" dated October 24, 1983, while Lilia B. Sevilla and husband Jose Seelin
filed their "Answer in Cross-claim" dated October 31, 1983 (Rollo, p. 30). The heirs WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
of Sofia O'Farrel y Patino, et al. filed their Answer in Intervention dated November
CONSIDERATIONS the order of February 13, 1984, is hereby
10, 1983.
ordered amended, reconsidered and modified by this same Court
as follows:
However, earlier on November 21, 1982, private respondent presented a motion
for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. (a) The order directing the NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION
Acting on such motion, the trial court 3 denied judicial deposit in its order dated
CORPORATION OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS to deposit the
February 13, 1984, the decretal portion of which reads:
amounts it received under the implementation of the LAND
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT which is not questioned by the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, all or the full amount the plaintiff, plaintiff, Eternal Gardens, is hereby ordered set aside for the
Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation have already paid reason that the titles to ownership, the North Philippine Union
the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Mission Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists on the lots subject
Day Adventist is hereby ordered to deposit the same to this Court matter of the aforesaid agreement is not established invalid, and
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this order considering that the alleged titles of intervenors are not proven yet by competent
real or true owner of the subject properties in question, due evidence;
hearing of this court has yet to be undergone in order to decide as
to who is the true owner which is a prejudicial question. Hence the
(b) The motion to require Eternal Gardens to deposit the balance
motion dated November 21, 1983 of the NPUM for the Eternal
under the Land Development Agreement is likewise hereby
Gardens Corporation to deposit the balance due and unpaid is
ordered denied considering the fact the aforesaid plaintiff had not
hereby ordered denied and the opposition thereto dated
denied its obligations under the aforesaid contract; and
December 19, 1983 is hereby ordered granted.
(c) The trial or hearing is hereby ordered as scheduled to proceed
The contract between the Eternal Gardens Corporation and the
on November 29, 1984 and on December 6, 1984 at 8:30 in the
North Philippine Union Mission dated October 16, 1976 is ordered
morning per order of this Court dated October 4, 1984 in order to
and declared ineffective as of today, February 13, 1984 because
determine the alleged claims of ownership by the intervenors and
the subject matter of the sale is not existing between the all claims and allegations of each party to the instant" case will be
contracting parties until after the question of ownership is resolved considered and decided carefully by this court on just and
by this court. The court will order the revival of the contract if the
meritorious grounds. (Rollo, p. 39)
North Philippine Union Mission will win.
Said Orders were assailed twice in the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of
Appeals) and in the Supreme Court as follows:
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In G.R. No. 73569 it appeared that on January 11, 1985, MISSION filed a motion Presiding Judge, Branch CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Eternal
to dismiss the Interpleader and the claims of the Maysilo Estate and the Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation, and Heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion It
Intervenors and to order the Eternal Gardens to comply with its Land Management was raffled to the Second Special Division. MISSION assailed the February 14,
with MISSION. 1985 and June 25, 1985 orders as violative of due process and attended by grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petition was however
On January 28, 1985, the trial court passed a resolution, the dispositive portion of dismissed in the decision of said Appellate Court, promulgated on December 4,
which reads: 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court, after a lengthy, WHEREFORE, for want of merit the petition for certiorari and
careful judicious study and perusal of all the stand of each and mandamus under consideration cannot be given due course and
everyone of all the parties participating in this case, hereby orders is accordingly, DISMISSED, without any pronouncement, as to
the dismissal of the interpleader, and the interventions filed by the costs. The restraining order embodied in Our Resolution of July
intervenors, heirs of Pedro Banon, heirs of O'Farrel, heirs of 31, 1985, is hereby lifted. (Rollo, G.R. No. 73569 p. 232)
Rivera, heirs of Maria del Concepcion Vidal, consolidated with the
Maysilo Estate as represented by receiver Arturo Salientes the The private respondent challenged the above decision in the Supreme Court in
heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion, and Lilia Sevilla Seeling G.R. No. 73569. In its resolution dated June 11, 1986, the Supreme Court denied
the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, as follows:
This Court likewise orders the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial
Parks Corporation to comply with the Land Development G.R. No. 73569 (North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the
Agreement dated October 6, 1978, it entered into with the North Seventh Day Adventists vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.)
Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the
Adventists. (Rollo. p. 68) petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolved to DENY the
same for lack of merit. (Ibid p. 263)
The heirs of the Maysilo Estate moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned
order of dismissal, the hearing of which was requested to be set on February, 28, Said resolution has become final and executory on July 16, 1986. (Ibid p. 269)
1985. However, the trial judge, on February 14, 1985 issued the following orders:
Earlier in 1983, the heirs of the late spouses Vicente Singson Encarnacion and
Considering Motions for Reconsideration filed, the Court resolves Lucila Conde filed Civil Case No. C-11836 for quieting of title with Branch CXXII,
that the same be GRANTED and instead of a hearing of the said Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, where petitioner and private respondent were
motions on February 20, 1985, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing on the named as defendants.
merits shall be held. (Rollo, p. 68)
Said case is still pending in the lower Court.
In spite of the February 14, 1985 order, MISSION filed on March 6, 1985 a motion
for Writ of Execution of the resolution of January 28, 1985. This was denied on In the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794, MISSION, herein private respondent filed a
June 25, 1985. The said court further set the case for pre-trial and trial on July 18, petition for certiorari with the then Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-
1985. G.R. No. 04869 praying that the aforementioned Orders of February 13, 1984 and
October 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court be set aside and that an order be
It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus to the Intermediate Appellate Court issued to deposit in court or in a depositor trustee bank of any and all payments,
(Court of Appeals), docketed as AC-G.R. Sp No. 06696 "North Philippine Union plus interest thereon, due the private respondent MISSION under the Land
Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists, vs. Hon. Antonia Corpus-Macandog
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Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be paid to whomever may be accruing installments within ten (10) days from notice with a
found later to be entitled thereto, with costs. (Rollo, G.R. No. 73794 p. 38) reputable commercial bank in a savings deposit account, in the
name of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with the details to
The Intermediate Appelate Court, acting through its First Special Cases be reported or manifested to this Court within ten (10) days from
Division 4 dismissed the petition in its decision on February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. the time the deposit/deposits are made, such deposits not to be
38-48). In its Resolution 5 promulgated on September 5, 1985, the Court however, withdrawn without authority from this Court. (Rollo, p. 162)
reversed its decision, thus:
Petitioner's Memorandum With Prayer for the Deferment of Time to Make Deposit
WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders its decision of February 27, (Rollo, p. 218-236) was filed on July 14, 1987. Its prayer was granted for a period
1986, and sets aside the questioned portions of the respondent of ten (10) days for the purpose, in the resolution of July 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 238).
Court's orders of February 13 and October 26, 1984. The private Private respondent filed its Opposition to Deferment of Time to Make Deposit
respondent is hereby ordered to deposit whatever amounts are (Rollo, pp. 239-253) on July 24, 1987 to which petitioner filed its Reply to
due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, Opposition on August 4, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 256-267). Both were noted by the Court
1976 with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent in its resolution dated September 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 270). On August 25, 1987,
court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to private respondent filed its Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply to Opposition (Rollo, pp.
whoever shall be found entitled thereto. No costs. (Rollo, p. 25) 271-292).
Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was Petitioner filed its Supplemental Memorandum with Reply to Opposition (To
denied for lack of merit in a resolution promulgated on February 13, 1986, which Deferment of time to Make Deposit) on August 31, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 294-313) and a
states: Sur-rejoinder on September 1, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 304-315).
The private respondent Eternal Gardens Memorial Park The main issues in this case are:
Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's resolution
promulgated September 5, 1985 requiring it "to deposit whatever I
amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement
of October 6, 1976 ...," which was strongly opposed by the Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion
petitioner North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution of
Adventists, is hereby denied for lack of merit, reiterating as it does, February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the resolution of
the very same issues and arguments that were passed upon and September 5, 1985, that petitioner Eternal Gardens deposit
considered by the Court in the very same resolution sought to be whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development
reconsidered. (Rollo, p. 27) Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the
respondent court.
Hence, this petition. On July 8,1987, the Third Division of this Court issued the
following resolution: II
... the court RESOLVED to give due course to this petition and Whether or not the dismissal of AC-G.R. SP No. 06696 (North
require the parties to file memoranda. Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists vs. Hon.
Macandog, et al.) by the Second Special Cases Division of the
In the meantime, to avoid possible wastage of funds, the Court IAC which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73569
RESOLVED to require the private respondent 6 to DEPOSIT its
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constitutes a basis for the dismissal of the case at bar on the As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader,
ground of res adjudicata. aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the
petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is
I a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit
from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the
expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto." (Rollo, p. 24).
There is no question that courts have inherent power to amend their judgments, to
make them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgments have
not yet attained finality (Villanueva v. Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory
Pinamalayan Branch II, 119 SCRA 288 [1982]). In fact, motions for reconsideration and mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million
are allowed to convince the courts that their rulings are erroneous and improper pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be
Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 543-544 [1985]; Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. v. considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is
CFI of Lanao del Sur (32 SCRA 317 [1970]) and in so doing, said courts are given violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs
sufficient opportunity to correct their errors. against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which
requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner
made to a bank approved by the Court. (Rollo, p.-25)
admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay
certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts
due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. Such Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turn-about, presently
admissions in the complaint were reaffirmed in open court before the Court of claiming in its memorandum that there is a novation of contract so that the
Appeals as stated in the latter court's resolution dated September 5, 1985 in A.C. amounts due under the Land Development Agreement were allegedly
G.R. No. 04869 which states: extinguished, and the requirement to make a deposit of said amounts in a
depositary bank should be held in abeyance until after the conflicting claims of
ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTC-Caloocan City, has finally been
The private respondent (MEMORIAL) then reaffirms before the
Court its original position that it is a disinterested party with resolved.
respect to the property now the subject of the interpleader case ...
All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been
established, riot only in the lower courts and in the Court of Appeals but also in the
In the light of the willingness, expressly made before the court,
affirming the complaint filed below, that the private respondent Supreme Court where such deposit was required in "the resolution of July 8, 1987
(MEMORIAL) will pay whatever is due on the Land Development to avoid wastage of funds.
Agreement to the rightful owner/owners, there is no reason why
the amount due on subject agreement has not been placed in the II
custody of the Court. (Rollo, p. 227).
The claim that this case should be barred by res judicata is even more untenable.
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's
objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2)
assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and
a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program (4) there is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject
(Rollo, p. 252). matter, and of causes of action Arguson v. Miclat 135 SCRA 678
[1985]; Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344 [1984]).
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There is no argument against the rule that parties should not be permitted to DECISION
litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains NACHURA, J.:
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate (Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]). This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 26,
But a careful review of the records shows that there is no judgment on the merits in 1998 and its Resolution2dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37739
G.R. No. 73569 and in the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794; both of which deal on dismissing the petition filed by petitioners Josephine and Subhash Pasricha.
mere incidents arising therefrom.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised is the propriety of the grant of the motion for
reconsideration without a hearing thereon and the denial of the motion for Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of
execution, while in the case at bar, what is assailed is the propriety of the order of Lease3 whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24,
respondent appellant court that petitioner Eternal Gardens should deposit 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa
whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly
reputable bank to be designated by the Court. In fact, there is a pending trial on rentals, as follows:
the merits in the trial court which the petitioner insists is a prejudicial question
which should first be resolved. Moreover, while there may be Identity of parties and For Rooms 32/35:
of subject matter, the Land Development Contract, there is no Identity of issues as
clearly shown by the petitions filed.
From March 1, 1991 to August 31, 1991 - P5,000.00/P10,000.00
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b) this
case (together with all the claims of the intervenors on the merits) is REMANDED
From September 1, 1991 to February 29, 1992 - P5,500.00/P11,000.00
to the lower court for further proceedings; and (c) the resolution of the Third
Division of this Court of July 8, 1987 requiring the deposit by the petitioner (see
footnote No. 6) of the amounts contested in a depositary bank STANDS (the From March 1, 1992 to February 28, 1993 - P6,050.00/P12,100.00
Motion for Reconsideration thereof being hereby DENIED for reasons already
discussed) until after the decision on the merits shall have become final and
executory. From March 1, 1993 to February 28, 1994 - P6,655.00/P13,310.00
[G.R. NO. 136409 : March 14, 2008] From March 1, 1996 to February 29, 1997 - P8,857.81/P17,715.61
Page 10 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person
From March 1, 1998 to February 28, 1999 - P10,717.95/P21,435.89 authorized to receive payment.14 To further justify their non-payment of rent,
petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units (rooms) subject
From March 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000 - P11,789.75/P23,579.484 matter of the lease contract, except Room 35. Petitioners eventually paid their
monthly rent for December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that
respondent waived its right to collect the rents for the months of July to November
For Rooms 22 and 24: 1992 since petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and
34.15However, they again withheld payment of rents starting January 1993
because of respondent's refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38. 16 To show
Effective July 1, 1992 - P10,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.5 good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared
the check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January
For Rooms 33 and 34: 1994.17 Petitioners further averred in their Amended Answer18 that the complaint
for ejectment was prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the
barangay for conciliation.
Effective April 1, 1992 - P5,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.6
For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference
was terminated. Thereafter, they submitted their respective position papers.
For Rooms 36, 37 and 38:
On November 24, 1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint
Effective when tenants vacate said premises - P10,000.00 with an increment of for ejectment.19 It considered petitioners' non-payment of rentals as unjustified.
10% every two years.7 The court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of
the obligation; petitioners should have deposited their payment in the name of
Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, respondent company. On the matter of possession of the subject premises, the
water bills and the use of telephone cables.8 court did not give credence to petitioners' claim that private respondent failed to
turn over possession of the premises. The court, however, dismissed the complaint
The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, because of Ms. Bautista's alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the
32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease contracts.9 While the contracts were in corporation.
effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of
private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1,
Bautista).10 Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.11 After in Civil Case No. 94-72515, reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision in this
that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay wise:
the stipulated rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter
to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside and
the accrued rentals amounting to P916,585.58.12 Because petitioners still refused another one is rendered ordering defendants-appellees and all persons claiming
to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its rights under them, as follows:
representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila.13 The case was raffled to Branch XIX and was docketed as Civil Case No.
143058-CV. (1) to vacate the leased premised (sic) and restore possession thereof to plaintiff-
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises appellant;
starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified
Page 11 of 507
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and directed the RTC to issue a new writ of execution of its decision, with the
(2) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P967,915.80 representing the accrued exception of the award of attorney's fees which the CA deleted.31
rents in arrears as of November 1993, and the rents on the leased premises for the
Petitioners now come before this Court in this Petition for Review
succeeding months in the amounts stated in paragraph 5 of the complaint until fully on Certiorari raising the following issues:
paid; andcralawlibrary
I.
(3) to pay an additional sum equivalent to 25% of the rent accounts as and for
attorney's fees plus the costs of this suit. Whether this ejectment suit should be dismissed and whether petitioners are
entitled to damages for the unauthorized and malicious filing by Rosario (sic)
SO ORDERED.20
Bautista of this ejectment case, it being clear that [Roswinda] - whether as general
The court adopted the MeTC's finding on petitioners' unjustified refusal to pay the manager or by virtue of her subsequent designation by the Board of Directors as
rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in
dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld Ms. the corporation's attorney-in-fact - had no legal capacity to institute the ejectment
Bautista's authority to represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a
board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied from her power as a suit, independently of whether Director Pacana's Order setting aside the SEC
general manager/treasurer of the company.21 revocation Order is a mere scrap of paper.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari .22 On March 18, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus II.
Motion23 to cite Ms. Bautista for contempt; to strike down the MeTC and RTC
Decisions as legal nullities; and to conduct hearings and ocular inspections or
delegate the reception of evidence. Without resolving the aforesaid motion, on May Whether the RTC's and the Honorable Court of Appeals' failure and refusal to
26, 1998, the CA affirmed24 the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorney's resolve the most fundamental factual issues in the instant ejectment case render
fees.25
said decisions void on their face by reason of the complete abdication by the RTC
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.26
Thereafter, and the Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes of their constitutional duty not only to
they filed several motions asking the Honorable Justice Ruben T. Reyes to inhibit
from further proceeding with the case allegedly because of his close association clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which a decision is based but
with Ms. Bautista's uncle-in-law.27
also to resolve the decisive factual issues in any given case.
In aResolution28 dated December 10, 1998, the CA denied the motions for lack of
merit. The appellate court considered said motions as repetitive of their previous III.
arguments, irrelevant and obviously dilatory.29 As to the motion for inhibition of the
Honorable Justice Reyes, the same was denied, as the appellate court justice
stressed that the decision and the resolution were not affected by extraneous Whether the (1) failure and refusal of Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes to inhibit
matters.30 Lastly, the appellate court granted respondent's motion for execution
himself, despite his admission - by reason of his silence - of petitioners' accusation
Page 12 of 507
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of the board of directors.37 Thus, any person suing on behalf of the corporation
that the said Justice enjoyed a $7,000.00 scholarship grant courtesy of the uncle- should present proof of such authority. Although Ms. Bautista initially failed to show
in-law of respondent "corporation's" purported general manager and (2), worse, his that she had the capacity to sign the verification and institute the ejectment case
on behalf of the company, when confronted with such question, she immediately
act of ruling against the petitioners and in favor of the respondent "corporation" presented the Secretary's Certificate38 confirming her authority to represent the
company.
constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of petitioners' property without due
process of law.32 There is ample jurisprudence holding that subsequent and substantial compliance
may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice. 39 In
In addition to Ms. Bautista's lack of capacity to sue, petitioners insist that Novelty Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court faulted the appellate court for
respondent company has no standing to sue as a juridical person in view of the dismissing a petition solely on petitioner's failure to timely submit proof of authority
suspension and eventual revocation of its certificate of registration. 33 They likewise to sue on behalf of the corporation. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,41 we upheld the
question the factual findings of the court on the bases of their ejectment from the sufficiency of a petition verified by an employment specialist despite the total
subject premises. Specifically, they fault the appellate court for not finding that: 1) absence of a board resolution authorizing her to act for and on behalf of the
their non-payment of rentals was justified; 2) they were deprived of possession of corporation. Lastly, in China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International
all the units subject of the lease contract except Room 35; and 3) respondent Philippines, Inc,42 we relaxed the rules of procedure because the corporation
violated the terms of the contract by its continued refusal to turn over possession ratified the manager's status as an authorized signatory. In all of the above cases,
of Rooms 36, 37 and 38. Petitioners further prayed that a Temporary Restraining we brushed aside technicalities in the interest of justice. This is not to say that we
Order (TRO) be issued enjoining the CA from enforcing its Resolution directing the disregard the requirement of prior authority to act in the name of a corporation. The
issuance of a Writ of Execution. Thus, in a Resolution34 dated January 18, 1999, relaxation of the rules applies only to highly meritorious cases, and when there is
this Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective immediately until substantial compliance. While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to
further orders. promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of
court dockets is a laudable objective, we should not insist on strict adherence to
The petition lacks merit. the rules at the expense of substantial justice.43 Technical and procedural rules are
intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice; and a deviation from
We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the ejectment case. the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective, for,
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended and after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. 44
eventually revoked respondent's certificate of registration on February 16, 1995,
records show that it instituted the action for ejectment on December 15, 1993. As to the denial of the motion to inhibit Justice Reyes, we find the same to be in
Accordingly, when the case was commenced, its registration was not yet order. First, the motion to inhibit came after the appellate court rendered the
revoked.35 Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court, the SEC later set assailed decision, that is, after Justice Reyes had already rendered his opinion on
aside its earlier orders of suspension and revocation of respondent's certificate, the merits of the case. It is settled that a motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed
rendering the issue moot and academic.36 after a member of the court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case,
the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on the action of
We likewise affirm Ms. Bautista's capacity to sue on behalf of the company despite the court x x x (only to) raise an objection of this sort after the decision has been
lack of proof of authority to so represent it. A corporation has no powers except rendered."45 Second, it is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one
those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to substantiate the
from or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers suspicion. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially when weighed
through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. against a judge's sacred pledge under his oath of office to administer justice
Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural without regard for any person and to do right equally to the poor and the rich.
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial
Page 13 of 507
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source, resulting in an opinion on the merits based on something other than what the refusal of respondent to allow petitioners to use the leased properties, except
the judge learned from his participation in the case.46 We would like to reiterate, at room 35; 2) respondent's refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3)
this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts of litigants who, for just about respondent's refusal to accept payment tendered by petitioners.
any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own
purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment. 47 Petitioners' justifications are belied by the evidence on record. As correctly held by
the CA, petitioners' communications to respondent prior to the filing of the
We now come to the more substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners may complaint never mentioned their alleged inability to use the rooms. 52 What they
be validly ejected from the leased premises. pointed out in their letters is that they did not know to whom payment should be
made, whether to Ms. Bautista or to Pacheco.53 In their July 26 and October 30,
Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the elements to be 1993 letters, petitioners only questioned the method of computing their electric
proved and resolved are the fact of lease and the expiration or violation of its billings without, however, raising a complaint about their failure to use the
terms.48 Specifically, the essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: 1) the fact of rooms.54 Although petitioners stated in their December 30, 1993 letter that
lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied; 2) the expiration or termination of respondent failed to fulfill its part of the contract,55 nowhere did they specifically
the possessor's right to hold possession; 3) withholding by the lessee of refer to their inability to use the leased rooms. Besides, at that time, they were
possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to already in default on their rentals for more than a year.
possess; 4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the
terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the action within If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of the nine (9) rooms subject
one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.49 of the contract of lease, and considering that the rooms were intended for a
business purpose, we cannot understand why they did not specifically assert their
It is undisputed that petitioners and respondent entered into two separate contracts right. If we believe petitioners' contention that they had been prevented from using
of lease involving nine (9) rooms of the San Luis Building. Records, likewise, show the rooms for more than a year before the complaint for ejectment was filed, they
that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the should have demanded specific performance from the lessor and commenced an
latter refused to heed the demand; thus, they remained in possession of the action in court. With the execution of the contract, petitioners were already in a
premises. The only contentious issue is whether there was indeed a violation of position to exercise their right to the use and enjoyment of the property according
the terms of the contract: on the part of petitioners, whether they failed to pay the to the terms of the lease contract.56 As borne out by the records, the fact is that
stipulated rent without justifiable cause; while on the part of respondent, whether it respondent turned over to petitioners the keys to the leased premises and
prevented petitioners from occupying the leased premises except Room 35. petitioners, in fact, renovated the rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of
the premises and they had the right to the use and enjoyment of the same. They,
This issue involves questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the likewise, had the right to resist any act of intrusion into their peaceful possession of
evaluation of the evidence presented. The MeTC, the RTC and the CA all found the property, even as against the lessor itself. Yet, they did not lift a finger to
that petitioners failed to perform their obligation to pay the stipulated rent. It is protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation of the contract by the lessor.
settled doctrine that in a civil case, the conclusions of fact of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive, and What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners' non-
cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court.50 Albeit the rule admits of payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should
exceptions, not one of them obtains in this case.51 be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the
case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the
To settle this issue once and for all, we deem it proper to assess the array of provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and
factual findings supporting the court's conclusion. of the Rules of Court on interpleader.
The evidence of petitioners' non-payment of the stipulated rent is overwhelming. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:
Petitioners, however, claim that such non-payment is justified by the following: 1)
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Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from
without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by making payments.
the consignation of the thing or sum due.
Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases: a justification for non-payment of rentals. Although the two contracts embraced the
lease of nine (9) rooms, the terms of the contracts - with their particular reference
xxx to specific rooms and the monthly rental for each - easily raise the inference that
the parties intended the lease of each room separate from that of the
(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect; others.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
x x x x. There is nothing in the contract which would lead to the conclusion that the lease
of one or more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9)
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to the
judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same. Notably,
case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.57 respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms actually delivered to,
and used by, petitioners.
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment
of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an It may also be mentioned that the contract specifically provides that the lease of
obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not Rooms 36, 37 and 38 was to take effect only when the tenants thereof would
imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that they made a written tender of payment vacate the premises. Absent a clear showing that the previous tenants had
and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient vacated the premises, respondent had no obligation to deliver possession of the
to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, subject rooms to petitioners. Thus, petitioners cannot use the non-delivery of
still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well- Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as an excuse for their failure to pay the rentals due on the
settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in other rooms they occupied.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
order that the effects of payment may be produced.59
In light of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every right to exercise his right
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: to eject the erring lessees. The parties' contracts of lease contain identical
provisions, to wit:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. - Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment of rental on the fifth (5th) day of
whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not each month, the amount owing shall as penalty bear interest at the rate of FOUR
disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants percent (4%) per month, to be paid, without prejudice to the right of the LESSOR
to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. to terminate his contract, enter the premises, and/or eject the LESSEE as
hereinafter set forth;62
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the Moreover, Article 167363 of the Civil Code gives the lessor the right to judicially
property (or on the right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a eject the lessees in case of non-payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of
person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the
of one liability.61 owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another, who undertakes to pay
the rent therefor.64 For failure to pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in
the leased premises.
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Status Quo THE ANTECEDENTS
Order dated January 18, 1999 is hereby LIFTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1998 in CA- The Central Bank bills
G.R. SP No. 37739 are AFFIRMED.
I. First set of CB bills
SO ORDERED.
The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of
seven Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of ₱ 70 million, issued on
January 2, 1994 and would mature on January 2, 1995.2 As evidenced by a
"Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994,3 the RCBC sold these CB bills to the
G.R. Nos. 154470-71 September 24, 2012 BOC.4 As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment"5 of even date, the BOC, in
turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB.6 The BOC delivered the Detached
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, Assignments to the PDB.7
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC
PILIPINAS, Respondent. Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70 million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as
evidenced by a Trading Order8 and a Confirmation of Sale.9 However, instead of
x-----------------------x delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as
evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a "note: ** substitution in
G.R. Nos. 154589-90 lieu of 06-29-94" – referring to the Treasury Bills.10 Nevertheless, the PDB retained
possession of the Detached Assignments. It is basically the nature of this April 15
transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent. The transfer of the first set of seven CB bills
BRION, J.: On April 20, 1994, according to the BOC, it "sold back"11 to the PDB three of the
seven CB bills. In turn, the PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital
Development Corporation (Bancap). On April 25, 1994, the BOC bought the three
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
CB bills from Bancap – so, ultimately, the BOC reacquired these three CB
45,1 on pure questions of law, filed by the petitioners Bank of Commerce (BOC)
bills,12 particularly described as follows:
and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). They assail the January 10, 2002 and
July 23, 2002 Orders (assailed orders) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 143, in Civil Case Nos. 94-3233 and 94-3254. These orders Serial No.: 2BB XM 045351
dismissed (i) the petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) the 2BB XM 045352
"counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for 2BB XM 045353
interpleader filed bythe BSP; and denied the BOC’s and the BSP’s motions for
reconsideration. Quantity: Three (3)
Page 16 of 507
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Denomination: Php 10 million Serial No.: BB XM 045373
BB XM 045374
Total Face Value: Php 30 million
Issue date: January 3, 1994
ii. CB bill nos. 45347-50 Maturity date: January 2, 1995
On April 20, 1994, the BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Denomination: Php 10 million
Equities Corporation13 which transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust
Total Face value: Php 20 million
Corporation (All Asia). On September 30, 1994, All Asia further transferred the four
CB bills back to the RCBC.14
On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills 18 (April 19
On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. transaction). In turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment
When the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC Bank of the Philippines, which in turn sold it to the BOC.19
purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill,15 particularly described as follows:16
PDB’s move against the transfer of
the first and second sets of CB bills
Serial No.: 2BB XM 045348
Quantity: One (1) On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB
informed20 the Officer-in-Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities
Denomination: Php 10 million Department,21 Lagrimas Nuqui, of the PDB’s claim over these CB bills, based on
the Detached Assignments in its possession. The PDB requested the BSP22 to
Total Face Value: Php 10 million record its claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB
bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or
As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI transfer."23
Capital and Insular Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the
amount of this CB bill on maturity, the RCBC paid back its transferees, reacquired Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations
these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC – ultimately, the BOC acquired Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue,
these three CB bills. Servicing and Redemption of the Public Debt)24 which requires the presentation of
the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP.25
All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.
In a July 25, 1994 letter, the PDB clarified to Nuqui that it was not "asking for the
II. Second set of CB bills transfer of the CB Bills…. rather it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that
whoever is in possession of said bills is not a holder in due course," and, therefore
the BSP should not make payment upon the presentation of the CB bills on
On April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a total
maturity.26 Nuqui responded that the BSP was "not in a position at that point in time
face value of ₱ 20 million to the PDB and (ii) delivered to the PDB the
to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not privy to
corresponding Detached Assignment.17 The two CB bills were particularly
all acts and time involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills. Nuqui added
described as follows:
that the BSP’s action shall be governed by CB Circular No. 28, as amended. 27
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo RTC granted the PDB’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory
Zialcita that (i) a notation in the BSP’s books be made against the transfer, injunction.35 In both petitions, the PDB identically prayed:
exchange, or payment of the bonds and the payment of interest thereon; and (ii)
the presenter of the bonds upon maturity be required to submit proof as a holder in WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed x x x that, after due notice and hearing, the
due course (of the first set of CB bills). The PDB relied on Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Writs of Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction, be issued; (i) commanding the BSP
Circular No. 28.28 This provision reads: and Nuqui, or whoever may take her place -
(4) Assignments effected by fraud – Where the assignment of a registered bond is (a) to record forthwith in the books of BSP the claim of x x x PDB on the [two sets
secured by fraudulent representations, the Central Bank can grant no relief if the of] CB Bills in accordance with Section 10 (d) (4) of revised C.B. Circular No. 28;
assignment has been honored without notice of fraud. Otherwise, the Central and
Bank, upon receipt of notice that the assignment is claimed to have been secured
by fraudulent representations, or payment of the bond the payment of interest
(b) also pursuant thereto, when the bills are presented on maturity date for
thereon, and when the bond is presented, will call upon the owner and the person payment, to call (i) x x x PDB, (ii) x x x RCBC x x x, (iii) x x x BOC x x x, and (iv) x
presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims.If it then appears that x x ALL-ASIA x x x; or whoever will present the [first and second sets of] CB Bills
the person presenting the bond stands in the position of bonafide holder for value,
for payment, to submit proof as to who stands as the holder in due course of said
the Central Bank, after giving the owner an opportunity to assert his claim, will
bills, and, thereafter, act accordingly;
pass the bond for transfer, exchange or payments, as the case may be, without
further question.
and (ii) ordering the BSP and Nuqui to pay jointly and severally to x x x PDB the
following:
In a December 29, 1994 letter, Nuqui again denied the request, reiterating the
BSP’s previous stand.
(a) the sum of ₱ 100,000.00, as and for exemplary damages;
In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the
PDB filed29 with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and (b) the sum of at least ₱ 500,000.00, or such amount as shall be proved at
Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, the trial, as and for attorney’s fees;
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3233 (covering the first set of CB bills) and Civil
Case 94-3254 (covering the second set of CB bills) against Nuqui, the BSP and (c) the legal rate of interest from the filing of this Petition until full payment
the RCBC.30 of the sums mentioned in this Petition; and
The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first (d) the costs of suit.36
set of CB bills) and the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills),
there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non- After the petitions were filed, the BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills –
issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. the first and second sets of CB bills (collectively, subject CB bills).
The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused"31 the first set of CB bills
with the BOC, as security collateral. Defenses of the BSP and of the BOC37
On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that
paying the face value of the CB bills on maturity.32 On January 10, 1995, the PDB the PDB has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of
filed an Amended Petition, additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia. 33 In a the CB bills. Contrary to the PDB’s "warehousing theory," 38 the BOC asserted that
January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were consolidated.34 On January 17, 1995, the the (i) April 15 transaction and the (ii) April 19 transaction – covering both sets of
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CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title (i) to the BOC a. Ordering the dismissal of the PDB’s petition for lack of merit;
(in the April 15 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in
substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to b. Determining which between/among [PDB] and the other claimants is/are
Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the PDB’s delivery of the 2nd set of CB lawfully entitled to the ownership of the subject CB bills and the proceeds
bills to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution. thereof;
The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the c. x x x;
PDB’s case because (i) the PDB is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the
BOC acquired these bills from the PDB, as to the 1st set of CB bills, and from
d. Ordering PDB to pay BSP and Nuqui such actual/compensatory and
Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB bills, in good faith and for value. The BOC also
exemplary damages… as the RTC may deem warranted; and
asserted a compulsory counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.
e. Ordering PDB to pay Nuqui moral damages… and to pay the costs of
On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) the suit.41
4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a
"person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not
presented to the BSP any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the Subsequent events
BSP’s books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an "owner."39 According to
the BSP – The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader –
Section 10 d. (4) applies only to a registered bond which is assigned. And the 4. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate
issuance of CB Bills x x x are required to be recorded/registered in BSP’s books. In their respective claims on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the
this regard, Section 4 a. (1) of CB Circular 28 provides that registered bonds "may subject CB bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed
be transferred only by an assignment thereon duly executed by the registered of only upon order of the RTC.42
owner or his duly authorized representative x x x and duly recorded on the books
of the Central Bank." Accordingly, on June 9, 199543 and August 4, 1995,44 the BOC and the PDB
entered into two separate Escrow Agreements.45 The first agreement covered the
xxxx first set of CB bills, while the second agreement covered the second set of CB
bills. The parties agreed to jointly collect from the BSP the maturity proceeds of
The alleged assignment of subject CB Bills in PDB’s favor is not these CB bills and to deposit said amount in escrow, "pending final determination
recorded/registered in BSP’s books.40(underscoring supplied) by Court judgment, or amicable settlement as to who shall be eventually entitled
thereto."46 The BOC and the PDB filed a Joint Motion,47 submitting these Escrow
Agreements for court approval. The RTC gave its approval to the parties’ Joint
Consequently, when Nuqui and the BSP refused the PDB’s request (to record its Motion.48 Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity proceeds of the CB bills by
claim), they were merely performing their duties in accordance with CB Circular
crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with 50% each
No. 28.
of the maturity proceeds of the amount in escrow.49
Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and In view of the BOC’s acquisition of all the CB bills, All Asia50 moved to be dropped
among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and as a respondent (with the PDB’s conformity51 ), which the RTC granted.52 The
willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure that
RCBC subsequently followed suit.53
payment is made to the rightful owner. The BSP prayed that judgment be
rendered:
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In light of the developments, on May 4, 1998, the RTC required the parties to The RTC cannot entertain the BOC’s counterclaim, regardless of its nature,
manifest their intention regarding the case and to inform the court of any amicable because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive
settlement; "otherwise, th[e] case shall be dismissed for lack of the proceeds of the CB bills.
interest."54 Complying with the RTC’s order, the BOC moved (i) that the case be
set for pre-trial and (ii) for further proceeding to resolve the remaining issues The BOC opposed62 the PDB’s Omnibus Motion. The PDB filed its Reply.63
between the BOC and the PDB, particularly on "who has a better right over the
subject CB bills."55 The PDB joined the BOC in its motion.56
In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s
counterclaim and the BSP’s counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding
On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead and, that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s
accordingly, required the BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills.64 With the
claimants to comment thereon.57 In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration,65 the BOC and the BSP
Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier separately filed the present petitions for review on certiorari.66
arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.58
THE BOC’S and THE BSP’S PETITIONS
In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective
transfer of the nine CB bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to
The BOC argues that the present cases do not fall within the limited provision of
deliver to the BOC, as buyer in the April 15 transaction and ultimate successor-in-
Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28, which contemplates only of three situations:
interest of the buyer (Bancap) in the April 19 transaction, either the original first, where the fraudulent assignment is not coupled with a notice to the BSP, it
subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus whatever income that may have can grant no relief; second, where the fraudulent assignment is coupled with a
been earned during the pendency of the case.59
notice of fraud to the BSP, it will make a notation against the assignment and
require the owner and the holder to substantiate their claims; and third, where the
That BOC prayed: case does not fall on either of the first two situations, the BSP will have to await
action on the assignment pending settlement of the case, whether by agreement or
1. To declare BOC as the rightful owner of the nine (9) CB bills and as the by court order.
party entitled to the proceeds thereof as well as all income earned
pursuant to the two (2) Escrow Agreements entered into by BOC and The PDB’s case cannot fall under the first two situations. With particular regard to
PDB. the second situation, CB Circular No. 28 requires that the conflict must be between
an "owner" and a "holder," for the BSP to exercise its limited jurisdiction to resolve
2. In the alternative, ordering PDB to deliver the original subject of the conflicting claims; and the word "owner" here refers to the registered owner giving
sales transactions or the value thereof and whatever income earned by notice of the fraud to the BSP. The PDB, however, is not the registered owner nor
way of interest at prevailing rate. is it in possession (holder) of the CB bills.67Consequently, the PDB’s case can only
falls under the third situation which leaves the RTC, as a court of general
Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC jurisdiction, with the authority to resolve the issue of ownership of a registered
admitted60 the BOC’s Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory bond (the CB bills) not falling in either of the first two situations.
Counterclaims.
The BOC asserts that the policy consideration supportive of its interpretation of CB
In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion,61 questioning the RTC’s Circular No. 28 is to have a reliable system to protect the registered owner; should
jurisdiction over the BOC’s "additional counterclaims." The PDB argues that its he file a notice with the BSP about a fraudulent assignment of certain CB bills, the
petitions pray for the BSP (not the RTC) to determine who among the conflicting BSP simply has to look at its books to determine who is the owner of the CB bills
claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of the bona fide holder for value. fraudulently assigned. Since it is only the registered owner who complied with the
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BSP’s requirement of recording an assignment in the BSP’s books, then "the The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
protective mantle of administrative proceedings" should necessarily benefit him complaint/petition and not by the defenses set up in the answer. 70 In filing the
only, without extending the same benefit to those who chose to ignore the petition with the RTC, the PDB merely seeks to compel the BSP to determine,
Circular’s requirement, like the PDB.68 pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party legally entitled to the proceeds of the
subject CB bills, which, as the PDB alleged, have been transferred through
Assuming arguendo that the PDB’s case falls under the second situation – i.e., the fraudulent representations – an allegation which properly recognized the BSP’s
BSP has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills – the more jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the CB bills.
recent CB Circular No. 769-80 (Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank
Certificates of Indebtedness) already superseded CB Circular No. 28, and, in The PDB adds that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts should refrain
particular, effectively amended Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28. The from determining a controversy involving a question whose resolution demands the
pertinent provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80 read: exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the present case, the BSP’s special
knowledge and experience in resolving disputes on securities, whose assignment
Assignment Affected by Fraud. – Any assignment for transfer of ownership of and trading are governed by the BSP’s rules, should be upheld.
registered certificate obtained through fraudulent representation if honored by the
Central Bank or any of its authorized service agencies shall not make the Central The PDB counters that the BOC’s tri-fold interpretation of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB
Bank or agency liable therefore unless it has previous formal notice of the fraud. Circular No. 28 sanctions split jurisdiction which is not favored;but even this tri-fold
The Central Bank, upon notice under oath that the assignment was secured interpretation which, in the second situation, limits the meaning of the "owner" to
through fraudulent means, shall immediately issue and circularize a "stop order" the registered owner is flawed. Section 10 (d) 4 aims to protect not just the
against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the Certificate including the payment registered owner but anyone who has been deprived of his bond by fraudulent
of interest coupons. The Central Bank or service agency concerned shall continue representation in order to deter fraud in the secondary trading of government
to withhold action on the certificate until such time that the conflicting claims have securities.
been finally settled either by amicable settlement between the parties or by order
of the Court. The PDB asserts that the existence of CB Circular No. 769-80 or the abolition of
Nuqui’s office does not result in depriving the BSP of its jurisdiction: first, CB
Unlike CB Circular No. 28, CB Circular No. 769-80 limited the BSP’s authority to Circular No. 769-80 expressly provides that CB Circular No. 28 shall have
the mere issuance and circularization of a "stop order" against the transfer, suppletory application to CB Circular No. 769-80; and second, the BSP can always
exchange and redemption upon sworn notice of a fraudulent assignment. Under designate an office to resolve the PDB’s claim over the CB bills.
this Circular, the BSP shall only continue to withhold action until the dispute is
ended by an amicable settlement or by judicial determination. Given the more Lastly, the PDB argues that even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve
passive stance of the BSP – the very agency tasked to enforce the circulars the issue of ownership of the CB bills, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over
involved - under CB Circular No. 769-80, the RTC’s dismissal of the BOC’s the BOC’s so-called "compulsory" counterclaims (which in truth is merely
counterclaims is palpably erroneous. "permissive") because of the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees.
These counterclaims should, therefore, be dismissed and expunged from the
Lastly, since Nuqui’s office (Government Securities Department) had already been record.
abolished,69 it can no longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation
covered by CB Circular No. 28. The abolition of Nuqui’s office is not only THE COURT’S RULING
consistent with the BSP’s Charter but, more importantly, with CB Circular No. 769-
80, which removed the BSP’s adjudicative authority over fraudulent assignments.
We grant the petitions.
Broadly speaking, jurisdiction is the legal power or authority to hear and determine On January 3, 1949, Congress created the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central
a cause.80 In the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, it refers to the authority
Bank) as a corporate body with the primary objective of (i) maintaining the internal
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and external monetary stability in the Philippines; and (ii) preserving the CHAPTER II
international value and the convertibility of the peso.90 In line with these broad AUTHORITY OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL
objectives, the Central Bank was empowered to issue rules and regulations
"necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the SECTION 4. Supervisory Powers. — The operations and activities of banks shall
powers assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank."91 Specifically, be subject to supervision of the Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall include the
the Central Bank is authorized to organize (other) departments for the efficient following:
conduct of its business and whose powers and duties "shall be determined by the
Monetary Board, within the authority granted to the Board and the Central 4.1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of
Bank"92 under its original charter. operation for uniform application to all institutions or functions covered,
taking into consideration the distinctive character of the operations of
With the 1973 Constitution, the then Central Bank was constitutionally made as the institutions and the substantive similarities of specific functions to which
country’s central monetary authority until such time that Congress 93 shall have such rules, modes or standards are to be applied;
established a central bank. The 1987 Constitution continued to recognize this
function of the then Central Bank until Congress, pursuant to the Constitution, 4.2. The conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and
created a new central monetary authority which later came to be known as the
regulations if the circumstances so warrant as determined by the Monetary
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Board;
Under the New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653),94 the BSP is given the 4.3. Overseeing to ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with;
responsibility of providing policy directions in the areas of money, banking and
credit; it is given, too, the primary objective of maintaining price stability, conducive
to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy, and of promoting and 4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from
maintaining monetary stability and convertibility of the peso.95 the last date of examination to determine whether an institution is
conducting its business on a safe or sound basis: Provided, That the
deficiencies/irregularities found by or discovered by an audit shall be
The Constitution expressly grants the BSP, as the country’s central monetary immediately addressed;
authority, the power of supervision over the operation of banks, while leaving with
Congress the authority to define the BSP’s regulatory powers over the operations
of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. Under 4.5. Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution (2-D); or
R.A. No. 7653, the BSP’s powers and functions include (i) supervision over the
operation of banks; (ii) regulation of operations of finance companies and non- 4.6. Enforcing prompt corrective action. (n)
bank financial institutions performing quasi banking functions; (iii) sole power and
authority to issue currency within the Philippine territory; (iv) engaging in foreign The Bangko Sentral shall also have supervision over the operations of and
exchange transactions; (v) making rediscounts, discounts, loans and advances to exercise regulatory powers over quasi-banks, trust entities and other financial
banking and other financial institutions to influence the volume of credit consistent institutions which under special laws are subject to Bangko Sentral supervision. (2-
with the objective of achieving price stability; (vi) engaging in open market Ca)
operations; and (vii) acting as banker and financial advisor of the
government.1âwphi1 For the purposes of this Act, "quasi-banks" shall refer to entities engaged in the
borrowing of funds through the issuance, endorsement or assignment with
On the BSP’s power of supervision over the operation of banks, Section 4 of R.A. recourse or acceptance of deposit substitutes as defined in Section 95 of Republic
No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) elaborates as follows: Act No. 7653 (hereafter the "New Central Bank Act") for purposes of relending or
purchasing of receivables and other obligations. [emphasis ours]
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While this provision empowers the BSP to oversee the operations and activities of denominational exchange that may be directly affected thereby. [Boldfacing
banks to "ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with," the existence of supplied]
the BSP’s jurisdiction in the present dispute cannot rely on this provision. The fact
remains that the BSP already made known to the PDB its unfavorable position on Again, the books of the BSP do not show that the supposed assignment of subject
the latter’s claim of fraudulent assignment due to the latter’s own failure to CB Bills was ever recorded in the BSP’s books. [Boldfacing supplied]
comply96 with existing regulations:
However, the PDB faults the BSP for not recording the assignment of the CB bills
In this connection, Section 10 (b) 2 also requires that a "Detached assignment will in the PDB’s favor despite the fact that the PDB already requested the BSP to
be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank x x x." In record its assignment in the BSP’s books as early as June 30, 1994.97
fact, in a memo dated September 23, 1991 xxx then CB Governor Jose L. Cuisia
advised all banks (including PDB) xxx as follows:
The PDB’s claim is not accurate. What the PDB requested the BSP on that date
was not the recording of the assignment of the CB bills in its favor but the
In view recurring incidents ostensibly disregarding certain provisions of CB circular annotation of its claim over the CB bills at the time when (i) it was no longer in
No. 28 (as amended) covering assignments of registered bonds, all banks and all possession of the CB bills, having been transferred from one entity to another and
concerned are enjoined to observe strictly the pertinent provisions of said CB (ii) all it has are the detached assignments, which the PDB has not shown to be
Circular as hereunder quoted: compliant with Section 10 (b) 2 above-quoted. Obviously, the PDB cannot insist
that the BSP take cognizance of its plaint when the basis of the BSP’s refusal
xxxx under existing regulation, which the PDB is bound to observe, is the PDB’s own
failure to comply therewith.
Under Section 10.b. (2)
True, the BSP exercises supervisory powers (and regulatory powers) over banks
x x x Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous (and quasi banks). The issue presented before the Court, however, does not
notice to the Central Bank and its use is authorized only under the following concern the BSP’s supervisory power over banks as this power is understood
circumstances: under the General Banking Law. In fact, there is nothing in the PDB’s petition
(even including the letters it sent to the BSP) that would support the BSP’s
jurisdiction outside of CB Circular No. 28, under its power of supervision, over
(a) x x x
conflicting claims to the proceeds of the CB bills.
(b) x x x
BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a
class of cases which does not include
(c) assignments of treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness in the adjudication of ownership of the
registered form which are not provided at the back thereof with assignment CB bills in question
form.
In United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,98 the Court considered the
(d) Assignment of securities which have changed ownership several times. BSP as an administrative agency,99exercising quasi-judicial functions through its
Monetary Board. It held:
(e) x x x
A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and
Non-compliance herewith will constitute a basis for non-action or withholding of other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
action on redemption/payment of interest coupons/transfer transactions or adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency
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includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such
powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the agency.104
active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical
knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be Scattered provisions in R.A. No. 7653 and R.A. No. 8791, inter alia, exist,
handled by regular courts. A "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the conferring jurisdiction on the BSP on certain matters.105 For instance, under the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required situations contemplated under Section 36, par. 2106 (where a bank or quasi bank
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner) and Section
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion 37107 (where the bank or its officers willfully violate the bank’s charter or by-laws, or
of a judicial nature. the rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board) of R.A. No. 7653, the
BSP may place an entity under receivership and/or liquidation or impose
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi- administrative sanctions upon the entity or its officers or directors.
judicial powers or functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP
Monetary Board is an independent central monetary authority and a body Among its several functions under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP is authorized to engage
corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated to provide policy in open market operations and thereby "issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable
directions in the areas of money, banking and credit. It has power to issue evidences of indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral" in the following manner.
subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without
justifiable reason, to administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records
SEC. 90. Principles of Open Market Operations. – The open market purchases
and others, needed in its examination, to impose fines and other sanctions and to
and sales of securities by the Bangko Sentral shall be made exclusively in
issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653, in particular, accordance with its primary objective of achieving price stability.
explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in
determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and
quasi-banks, which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct xxxx
some form of investigation or hearing regarding the same. [citations omitted]
SEC. 92. Issue and Negotiation of Bangko Sentral Obligations. – In order to
The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency provide the Bangko Sentral with effective instruments for open market operations,
created, pursuant to constitutional mandate,100 to carry out a particular the Bangko Sentral may, subject to such rules and regulations as the Monetary
governmental function.101 To be able to perform its role as central monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the principles stated in Section 90 of
authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and administrative autonomy. In general, this Act, issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of
administrative agencies exercise powers and/or functions which may be the Bangko Sentral: Provided, That issuance of such certificates of indebtedness
characterized as administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or shall be made only in cases of extraordinary movement in price levels. Said
quasi-judicial, or a mix of these five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by evidences of indebtedness may be issued directly against the international reserve
statute.102 of the Bangko Sentral or against the securities which it has acquired under the
provisions of Section 91 of this Act, or may be issued without relation to specific
types of assets of the Bangko Sentral.
While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'être for its
creation103 and proliferation dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters
over which it may exercise this power must find sufficient anchorage on its The Monetary Board shall determine the interest rates, maturities and other
enabling law, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Once found, characteristics of said obligations of the Bangko Sentral, and may, if it deems it
the quasi-judicial power partakes of the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, advisable, denominate the obligations in gold or foreign currencies.
that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its peculiar competence and
expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks Subject to the principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, the evidences of
by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral to which this section refers may be acquired
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by the Bangko Sentral before their maturity, either through purchases in the open To reiterate, open market operation is a monetary policy instrument that the BSP
market or through redemptions at par and by lot if the Bangko Sentral has employs, among others, to regulate the supply of money in the economy to
reserved the right to make such redemptions. The evidences of indebtedness influence the timing, cost and availability of money and credit, as well as other
acquired or redeemed by the Bangko Sentral shall not be included among its financial factors, for the purpose of stabilizing the price level.116 What the law
assets, and shall be immediately retired and cancelled. 108 (italics supplied; grants the BSP is a continuing role to shape and carry out the country’s monetary
emphases ours) policy – not the authority to adjudicate competing claims of ownership over the
securities it has issued – since this authority would not fall under the BSP’s
The primary objective of the BSP is to maintain price stability. 109 The BSP has a purposes under its charter.
number of monetary policy instruments at its disposal to promote price stability. To
increase or reduce liquidity in the financial system, the BSP uses open market While R.A. No. 7653117 empowers the BSP to conduct administrative hearings and
operations, among others.110 Open market operation is a monetary tool where the render judgment for or against an entity under its supervisory and regulatory
BSP publicly buys or sells government securities111 from (or to) banks and financial powers and even authorizes the BSP Governor to "render decisions, or rulings x x
institutions in order to expand or contract the supply of money. By controlling the x on matters regarding application or enforcement of laws pertaining to institutions
money supply, the BSP is able to exert some influence on the prices of goods and supervised by the BSP and laws pertaining to quasi-banks, as well as regulations,
services and achieve its inflation objectives.112 policies or instructions issued by the Monetary Board," it is precisely the text of the
BSP’s own regulation (whose validity is not here raised as an issue) that points to
Once the issue and/or sale of a security is made, the BSP would necessarily make the BSP’s limited role in case of an allegedly fraudulent assignment to simply (i)
a determination, in accordance with its own rules, of the entity entitled to receive issuing and circularizing a ‘"stop order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption
the proceeds of the security upon its maturity. This determination by the BSP is an of the certificate of indebtedness, including the payment of interest coupons, and
exercise of its administrative powers113 under the law as an incident to its power to (ii) withholding action on the certificate.
prescribe rules and regulations governing open market operations to achieve the
"primary objective of achieving price stability."114As a matter of necessity, too, the A similar conclusion can be drawn from the BSP’s administrative adjudicatory
same rules and regulations facilitate transaction with the BSP by providing for an power in cases of "willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any
orderly manner of, among others, issuing, transferring, exchanging and paying banking law or any order, instruction or regulation issued by the Monetary Board,
securities representing public debt. or any order, instruction or ruling by the Governor."118 The non-compliance with the
pertinent requirements under CB Circular No. 28, as amended, deprives a party
Significantly, when competing claims of ownership over the proceeds of the from any right to demand payment from the BSP.
securities it has issued are brought before it, the law has not given the BSP the
quasi-judicial power to resolve these competing claims as part of its power to In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial authority to the BSP cannot possibly
engage in open market operations. Nothing in the BSP’s charter confers on the extend to situations which do not call for the exercise by the BSP of its supervisory
BSP the jurisdiction or authority to determine this kind of claims, arising out of a or regulatory functions over entities within its jurisdiction.119
subsequent transfer or assignment of evidence of indebtedness – a matter that
appropriately falls within the competence of courts of general jurisdiction. That the The fact alone that the parties involved are banking institutions does not
statute withholds this power from the BSP is only consistent with the fundamental necessarily call for the exercise by the BSP of its quasi-judicial powers under the
reasons for the creation of a Philippine central bank, that is, to lay down stable law.120
monetary policy and exercise bank supervisory functions. Thus, the BSP’s
assumption of jurisdiction over competing claims cannot find even a stretched-out
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
justification under its corporate powers "to do and perform any and all things that
argues against BSP’s purported
may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes" of R.A. No. 7653. 115
authority to adjudicate ownership
issues over the disputed CB bills
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Given the preceding discussions, even the PDB’s invocation of the doctrine of In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is misplaced. primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction
In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress may create administrative to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
agencies endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Necessarily, also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
Congress likewise defines the limits of an agency’s jurisdiction in the same manner requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
as it defines the jurisdiction of courts.121 As a result, it may happen that either a administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
court or an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over a specific matter involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
or both have concurrent jurisdiction on the same. It may happen, too, that courts remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
and agencies may willingly relinquish adjudicatory power that is rightfully theirs in jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a
favor of the other. One of the instances when a court may properly defer to the claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
adjudicatory authority of an agency is the applicability of the doctrine of primary enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
jurisdiction.122 regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body."
As early as 1954, the Court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under the
following terms: Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in
administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes determination by the Bureau of Energy Development as the administrative agency
xxx ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court
does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to
resolution of labor-management controversies xxx meant such jurisdiction to be
the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like
exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that
coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. [emphases ours]
under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, claims of ownership or entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and indebtedness finds complement in the similar absence of any technical matter that
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the would call for the BSP’s special expertise or competence.125 In fact, what the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered."123 (emphasis ours) PDB’s petitions bear out is essentially the nature of the transaction it had with the
subsequent transferees of the subject CB bills (BOC and Bancap) and not any
matter more appropriate for special determination by the BSP or any administrative
In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,124 the Court ruled that while an
agency.
action for rescission of a contract between coal developers appears to be an action
cognizable by regular courts, the trial court remains to be without jurisdiction to
entertain the suit since the contract sought to be rescinded is "inextricably tied up In a similar vein, it is well-settled that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation
with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts
not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to [the construing such rule or regulation.126 While there are exceptions127 to this rule, the
plaintiff] would be in line with the country’s national program and objective on coal- PDB has not convinced us that a departure is warranted in this case. Given the
development and over-all coal-supply-demand balance." It then applied the non-applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the BSP’s own position, in
doctrine of primary jurisdiction – light of Circular No. 769-80, deserves respect from the Court.
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Ordinarily, cases involving the application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction are SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the
initiated by an action invoking the jurisdiction of a court or administrative agency to same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest
resolve the substantive legal conflict between the parties. In this sense, the whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
present case is quite unique since the court’s jurisdiction was, originally, invoked to disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants
compel an administrative agency (the BSP) to resolve the legal conflict of to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
ownership over the CB bills - instead of obtaining a judicial determination of the
same dispute. The remedy of an action of interpleader131 is designed to protect a person against
double vexation in respect of a single liability.7 It requires, as an indispensable
The remedy of interpleader requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no
Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
in initially assuming jurisdiction over the PDB’s petition for mandamus, prohibition disputed by the claimants.132
and injunction.128 While the RTC agreed (albeit erroneously) with the PDB’s view
(that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however, dismissed not only the BOC’s/the Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
BSP’s counterclaims but the PDB’s petition itself as well, on the ground that it proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the
lacks jurisdiction. possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability. 133
This is plain error. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a
new action arises,134 where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought
Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating
non-waiver of jurisdiction.129believes that jurisdiction over the BOC’s counterclaims the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an
and the BSP’s counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the allowance of the PDB’s petition even an action. Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:
becomes imperative because courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua
sponte.130 SEC. 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order
requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of
Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these justice so require, the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid
two would lead the trial court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDB’s or delivered to the court.
petition, its decision would have to be set aside on appeal because the BSP has
no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when it dismissed the PDB’s This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSP’s motion to interplead. The
petitions and the BOC’s counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction, the PDB itself "agreed that the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the
trial court seriously erred because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims PDB and the BOC subsequently entered into two separate escrow agreements,
over the CB bills falls within its general jurisdiction. covering the CB bills, and submitted them to the RTC for approval.
Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the In granting the BSP’s motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has
PDB’s petition but on the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent
even this correct alternative is no longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent with the rules and the parties’ conduct - and accordingly required the BOC to
below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining conflicting claims amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon. Suddenly, however, the
over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by
Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:
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the PDB’s argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDB’s petition - which means nature of a motion,142 seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the
that it did not actually compel the BSP to resolve the BOC’s and the PDB’s claims. conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the
rightful or legitimate owner"143 of the subject CB bills.
Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only
dismiss the PDB’s petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the
parties’ conflicting claims – not the BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."
been actually filed, the RTC could not have really granted the relief originally Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong,
sought in the PDB’s petition since the RTC’s order granting the BSP’s motion to that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself
interplead - to which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.
dismissal of the PDB’s petition. This is not altered by the fact that the PDB
additionally prayed in its petition for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to
"against the public respondents" because the grant of the order to interplead govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of
effectively sustained the propriety of the BSP’s resort to this procedural device. the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or
Interpleader complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required
to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting
1. as a special civil action claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-
claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of
What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader Rule 62.
suit through an original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance
becomes understandable if it is considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, 2. the payment of docket fees covering BOC’s counterclaim
the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSP’s books;
consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the issue
to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an of ownership of the CB bills, the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees
alternative position, made only in the BSP’s Answer.135 prevents the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the BOC’s "counterclaims."
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the We disagree with the PDB.
specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the
provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions.136 Indeed, Rule 62 does not To reiterate and recall, the order granting the "PDB’s motion to interplead," already
expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although resulted in the dismissal of the PDB’s petition. The same order required the BOC
separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in to amend its answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment, presumably to
relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court137 does not include a complaint- conform to the nature of an answer-in interpleader. Perhaps, by reason of the
in-interpleader as a claim,138 a form of defense,139 or as an objection that a BOC’s denomination of its claim as a "compulsory counterclaim" and the PDB’s
defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This failure to fully appreciate the RTC’s order granting the "BSP’s motion for
does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" (with the PDB’s conformity), the PDB mistakenly treated the BOC’s
interpleader" runs counter to general procedures. claim as a "permissive counterclaim" which necessitates the payment of docket
fees.
Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141 allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from
the court through the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with As the preceding discussions would show, however, the BOC’s "claim" - i.e., its
counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the assertion of ownership over the CB bills – is in reality just that, a "claim" against
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the stakeholder and not as a "counterclaim,"144 whether compulsory145or In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of
permissive. It is only the BOC’s alternative prayer (for the PDB to deliver to the docket fee by the claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual
BOC, as the buyer in the April 15 transaction and the ultimate successor-in-interest manner in which the interpleader suit was initiated and the circumstances
of the buyer in the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or surrounding it, we surely cannot deduce from the BOC’s mere failure to specify in
the value thereof plus whatever income that may have been earned pendente lite) its prayer the total amount of the CB bills it lays claim to (or the value of the
and its prayer for damages that are obviously compulsory counterclaims against subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April 19 transactions, in its alternative
the PDB and, therefore, does not require payment of docket fees.146 prayer) an intention to defraud the government that would warrant the dismissal of
its claim.149
The PDB takes a contrary position through its insistence that a compulsory
counterclaim should be one where the presence of third parties, of whom the court At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOC’s "counterclaims," for purposes of
cannot acquire jurisdiction, is not required. It reasons out that since the RCBC and payment of filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-
All Asia (the intervening holders of the CB bills) have already been dropped from interpleader, must be assessed the payment of the correct docket fee arising from
the case, then the BOC’s counterclaim must only be permissive in nature and the their respective claims. The seminal case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge
BOC should have paid the correct docket fees. Asuncion150 provides us guidance in the payment of docket fees, to wit:
We see no reason to belabor this claim. Even if we gloss over the PDB’s own 1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
conformity to the dropping of these entities as parties, the BOC correctly argues payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
that a remedy is provided under the Rules. Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
Court reads: reglementary period.
SEC. 12. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims
the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless
determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment
brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained. of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. [underscoring ours]
Even then, the strict characterization of the BOC’s counterclaim is no longer
material in disposing of the PDB’s argument based on non-payment of docket This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:
fees.
SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The
When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this
payment of the requisite docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge
relief from the court. It is the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise.
pleading, accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the claim or the nature of the action.147 However, only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the
the non-payment of the docket fee at the time of filing does not automatically interpleader suit, and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever
cause the dismissal of the case, so long as the fee is paid within the applicable in the subject matter." By constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action,
prescriptive or reglementary period, especially when the claimant demonstrates a Section 7 in effect only aims to actually compensate the complainant-in-
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.148 interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught
in a legal crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants, for the faultless
trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-interpleader are actually the
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ones who make a claim - only that it was extraordinarily done through the EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners,
procedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves the duty to pay the vs.
docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.151 BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be DECISION
overemphasized:
NACHURA, J.:
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of
order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 3, 2001, in CA-G.R.
the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the CV No. 67784, and its Resolution2 dated November 19, 2001. The assailed
case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.152 Decision affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Makati City, Branch 136, dated May 9, 2000 in Civil Case No. 98-411.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED.
The Planters Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee,
Trial Court its comment or answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerce’s represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease 4 with
Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, as previously Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and
ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to
Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from Planters lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street,
Development Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their payment, and to Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental
resolve with DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner
over the proceeds of the Central Bank bills. terminated as provided in the contract.5 The contract of lease contained the
following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case:
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his
duly authorized representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate
appropriate amount of docket fees separately due the Bank of Commerce and stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the property, and
Planters Development Bank as conflicting claimants in Bangko Sentral ng that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax,
Pilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision. charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where
the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental
SO ORDERED. herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge
corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the
event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be
reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental,
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;
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During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment on the
with petitioners. In a letter7 dated December 29, 1997, petitioners advised case as follows:
respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its
monthly rentals. In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed 1) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of Value-Added Tax
as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT (VAT) of 10% of the rent for [the] use of the leased premises;
therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the
VAT law had long been in effect.8
2) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of any rental
adjustment, there being no [extraordinary] inflation or devaluation, as
On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing provided in the Seventh Condition of the lease contract, to justify the
the former that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to same;
condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent
opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation
3) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the total amount
to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court of P1,119,102.19, said amount representing payments erroneously made
in various cases.9 by plaintiff as VAT charges and rental adjustment for the months of
January, February and March, 1999; and
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by
petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.
4) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the amount of P1,107,348.69,
said amount representing the balance of plaintiff's rental deposit still with
On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for defendants.
purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the
lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.10 The case was docketed as Civil
SO ORDERED.13
Case No. 98-411 before the RTC of Makati.
The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of
On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and
paying the VAT since it was not a new tax that would call for the application of the
damages against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after
sixth clause of the contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to collect the
the demand made by the former.11 Before respondent could file an answer,
demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation
petitioners filed a Notice of Dismissal.12 They subsequently refiled the complaint
as provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati; the case was raffled to Branch 139 made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by petitioners, the court
and was docketed as Civil Case No. 53596.
ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid,
notwithstanding the well-established rule that in an action for declaratory relief,
Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought
improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the by or awarded to the parties.
obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the
parties. The trial court, however, was not persuaded, and consequently, denied the
Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
motion.
modification the RTC decision. The fallo reads:
After trial on the merits, on May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED
against petitioners. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 98-411 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that the order for the return of the balance of the
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
rental deposits and of the amounts representing the 10% VAT and rental V.
adjustment, is hereby DELETED.
WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER SINCE
No pronouncement as to costs. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS IN BREACH WHEN THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
SO ORDERED.14
In fine, the issues for our resolution are as follows: 1) whether the action for
The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the declaratory relief is proper; 2) whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT
decisional rules on the matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 7716; and 3) whether the amount of rentals due the
court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the respondent, petitioners should be adjusted by reason of extraordinary inflation or devaluation.
particularly the restitution of its excess payment.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,
Petitioners now come before this Court raising the following issues: contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The
I.
only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that
WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 1250 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. under the circumstances. 15
II. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as
follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN FILIPINO PIPE other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the
AND FOUNDRY CORP. VS. NAWASA CASE, 161 SCRA 32 AND terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
COMPANION CASES ARE (sic) APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
III. between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other
WHETHER OR NOT IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN THE CASE forms of action or proceeding.16
OF DEL ROSARIO VS. THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
164 SCRA 562, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case,
ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW. except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract
when the petition was filed.
IV.
We do not agree.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY THE 10% After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that
VALUE ADDED TAX IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF RA followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their
7716. contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously
fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment of VAT and
subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the for rental adjustment allegedly brought about by extraordinary inflation or
trial court the petition for declaratory relief. devaluation. Both the trial court and the appellate court found no merit in
petitioners' claim. We see no reason to depart from such findings.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action
for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another As to the liability of respondent for the payment of VAT, we cite with approval the
court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ratiocination of the appellate court, viz.:
ventilated in the same forum.
Clearly, the person primarily liable for the payment of VAT is the lessor
We are not convinced. who may choose to pass it on to the lessee or absorb the same. Beginning
January 1, 1996, the lease of real property in the ordinary course of
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation17 we held that business, whether for commercial or residential use, when the gross
the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a annual receipts exceed P500,000.00, is subject to 10% VAT.
separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to Notwithstanding the mandatory payment of the 10% VAT by the lessor, the
the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been actual shifting of the said tax burden upon the lessee is clearly optional on
resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it the part of the lessor, under the terms of the statute. The word "may" in the
was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be statute, generally speaking, denotes that it is directory in nature. It is
preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion. In this case,
the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the despite the applicability of the rule under Sec. 99 of the NIRC, as
pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the amended by R.A. 7716, granting the lessor the option to pass on to the
rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings lessee the 10% VAT, to existing contracts of lease as of January 1, 1996,
pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. the original lessor, Ponciano L. Almeda did not charge the lessee-appellee
the 10% VAT nor provided for its additional imposition when they renewed
We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol18 where the contract of lease in May 1997. More significantly, said lessor did not
actually collect a 10% VAT on the monthly rental due from the lessee-
the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be
appellee after the execution of the May 1997 contract of lease. The
threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was
inevitable implication is that the lessor intended not to avail of the option
already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition.
This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the granted him by law to shift the 10% VAT upon the lessee-appellee. x x x.19
instant case.
In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying
the VAT.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the
instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the
pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing.
the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once This provision clearly states that respondent can only be held liable for new
and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract of lease, that is, after May 1997,
stipulations subject of this controversy. and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where the leased premises are
located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be
considered as a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth
Now, on the substantive law issues.
stipulation.
Page 35 of 507
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Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of [E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the
extraordinary inflation or devaluation. purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond
the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase or
Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly
because the contract stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of
while the Code speaks of extraordinary inflation or deflation. They insist that the the obligation.24
doctrine pronounced in Del Rosario v. The Shell Company, Phils. Limited20 should
apply. The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of
extraordinary inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250
Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the of the Civil Code. We would like to stress that the erosion of the value of the
contracting parties, and such determination must take into account the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This intention, once characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of
ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract. 21 the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time,
such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary
phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent
While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or
an official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence
devaluation" as compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we
of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation
find that when the parties used the term "devaluation," they really did not intend to
are not to be applied. 25
depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Condition No. 7 of the contract should,
thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its
letter 22
That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' dated
Resolution dated November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED.
January 26, 1998, where, in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on
condition No. 7, petitioners made explicit reference to Article 1250 of the Civil
Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus, the application of Del Rosario is not SO ORDERED.
warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article 1250 should be
considered.
Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, DECISION
without a corresponding increase in business transaction. There is inflation when
there is an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods, QUISUMBING, J.:
resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level. 23 In a
number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes
extraordinary inflation, thus:
Page 36 of 507
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Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him reconsideration but it was denied.
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE4
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads: remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his judicial determination.6
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law. For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
IT IS SO ORDERED.3 capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido. RULE 63
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen. Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
California. declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry ...
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
Page 37 of 507
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The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8 Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage. Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the 1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
legislators in its enactment? Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
Brief Historical Background can.
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order 2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
1988. Article 26 thereof states: considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in supplied.)
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. Legislative Intent
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
now provides: where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
Page 38 of 507
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obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
foreign citizenship by naturalization? was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the
Philippine law and can thus remarry. Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to spouse.
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12 Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
remarry.
Page 39 of 507
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that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of
we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, Title, and Damages2against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a
had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1279373 situated
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject
aforecited evidence in his favor. property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.4 During the
lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.5
ASIDE.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's family members,6 continued to
No pronouncement as to costs. occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their residences
thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were
claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it,
SO ORDERED.
petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however,
refused to heed petitioners' demand.7
Page 40 of 507
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RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691,11amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before
involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners' action to recover the same was outside the to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that: of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or
property with assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the
same without prejudice.12 Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1,
dismissing their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for
quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second
seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioner's Complaint should not have paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action
been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court 13 states that an to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to
action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.14 Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions,
where the assessed value of the real property involved does not
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners' Motion for exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.18 The
Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads:
to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises
exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners]
does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per do not dispute the assessed value of the property at P410.00 under Tax
Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.
was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.15
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.19
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they
prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:
Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive
I
jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their
joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single
Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.16 And even if the two causes of action WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS
action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint. 17 MOTU PROPRIO.20
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners' Motion. It Petitioners' statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only
clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of challenging the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio.
causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instant Petition, however, the
of the Rules of Court, which provides: Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC
Page 41 of 507
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committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' Complaint for lack of Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by
jurisdiction. Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership
required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
The Court rules in the negative. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they
also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the
need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.22
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed,
a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second
this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read
written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
thereunder.21
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It
RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of repeatedly uses the word "may" - that an action for quieting of title "may be
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring
to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the
general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or
wit: an option.23
xxx
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph
that:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or
or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the
Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.) civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically
refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria.
Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property
involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the
jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC,
therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no prejudice, petitioners' Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.
actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. 24 Since
the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative As for the RTC dismissing petitioners' Complaint motu proprio, the following
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith,
and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon
available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject
commission of wrongs.25 matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis
action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the supplied.)
action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners' Complaint, acted in complete accord with
the institution of the action.26 law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal
In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when
petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which
property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter's express is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
direct challenge to petitioners' title. a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ
the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an of certiorari.
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An
accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one's recovery of of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868,
possession over the real property as without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to
owner.27 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of
proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.
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SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due
regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the
subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to
suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July
17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents. WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective
MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
RESOLUTION the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately
executory."9
MENDOZA, J.:
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor memoranda.10
General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by the Brief Statement of the Antecedents
petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic,
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive
departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their
nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution 11 and the 1935
petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Constitution12vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was
to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of
House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate
themselves with the members of the legislative body. 13
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing
the same in the following manner: Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative
powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the
the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the
Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the
evils of political pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the
This disposition is immediately executory.
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Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the
assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and
appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise: As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision Ruling of the Court
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and by
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe
and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate.
to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on
each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in
rotation. the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite
purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and
altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2) defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision,
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. 18 It has been the situation in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the
since then. Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one
(1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have,
in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were
decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is
Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be
one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering
broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper
separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace
adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain
the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both
oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the
intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote
a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
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of at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the
nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then
were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
Houses.
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987
sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, Constitution x x x.
is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to
justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further
keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that
because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole application is impossible or inadequate without them."
body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise
language in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the
whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give
Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as
the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases
inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of
and underscoring supplied)
war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and
impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and
recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the opinion,29 which reads:
other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as
to the other branches of government. 8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation
of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will
in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives
officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for
by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead
branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation
the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring
Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative supplied)
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply
gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. opined:
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As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch and should
of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only. prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of
Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of our legislative equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 underscoring supplied]
Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a
representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution has Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any
contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives,
is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of
composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress. Not
representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a
ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly
the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC,
members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
xxx It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more
influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because
and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent
constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed
the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as of members of Congress.
another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other
hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should
the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the first time through the
furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts
justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress done in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches,
with the other two co-equal branches of government. because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void
from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches
to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords
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no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial
all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, construction.
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard
doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation: 32 the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its
powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of
a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
reliance upon a law creating it.33 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby
DENIED.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is
immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was
ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what SO ORDERED.
respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the
exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law
something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court
action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the
rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M.
principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or SABITSANA, Petitioners,
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the vs.
Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even though the JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A.
omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.
was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as DECISION
that would be judicial legislation."37
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
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A lawyer may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client's petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot
word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owes his client his in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same,
undivided loyalty. which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The Complaint13 prayed, among
others, that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter, and TD No.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the January 25, 2007 5327 be declared null and void and of no effect; that petitioners be ordered to
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CV respect and recognize Juanito’s title over the lot; and that moral and exemplary
No. 79250, and its January 11, 2008 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.
Reconsideration.4
In their Answer with Counterclaim,14 petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to
Factual Antecedents Juanito is null and void absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto
(Soledad); that they acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that the
Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the
On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of
Sale5 in favor of respondent Juanito Muertegui6 (Juanito) over a 7,500-square Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case,
meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot) located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is
merely ₱1,230.00.
Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued
in 1985 in Garcia’s name.7
The evidence and testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses during trial reveal that
Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer at the time Garcia sold
took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. the lot to Juanito, and that as such, he was consulted by the family before the sale
was executed; that after the sale to Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into actual,
They also paid the real property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.
public, adverse and continuous possession of the lot, and planted the same to
coconut and ipil-ipil; and that after Domingo Sr.’s death, his wife Caseldita,
On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner succeeded him in the possession and exercise of rights over the lot.
Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of
absolute sale.8 The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 6,
On the other hand, Atty. Sabitsana testified that before purchasing the lot, he was
1992.9 TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a new one, TD No. 5327, 10 was issued in
told by a member of the Muertegui family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen),
Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes,
that the Muertegui family had bought the lot, but she could not show the document
Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he
introduced concrete improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were of sale; that he then conducted an investigation with the offices of the municipal
destroyed by a typhoon. and provincial assessors; that he failed to find any document, record, or other
proof of the sale by Garcia to Juanito, and instead discovered that the lot was still
in the name of Garcia; that given the foregoing revelations, he concluded that the
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of Muerteguis were merely bluffing, and that they probably did not want him to buy
the lot under the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, the property because they were interested in buying it for themselves considering
in a letter11 dated August 24, 1998 addressed to the Department of Environment that it was adjacent to a lot which they owned; that he then proceeded to purchase
and Natural Resources’ CENRO/PENRO office in Naval, Biliran, opposed the the lot from Garcia; that after purchasing the lot, he wrote Caseldita in October
application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the 1991 to inform her of the sale; that he then took possession of the lot and gathered
application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting ipil-ipil for firewood and harvested coconuts and calamansi from the lot; and that
ownership has been resolved. he constructed a rip-rap on the property sometime in 1996 and 1997.
On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Case No. B-109712 for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against herein
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On October 28, 2002, the trial court issued its Decision 15 which decrees as follows: Ruling of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of Petitioners appealed to the CA20 asserting that the sale to Juanito was null and
the plaintiff and against the defendants, hereby declaring the Deed of Sale dated 2 void for lack of marital consent; that the sale to them is valid; that the lower court
September 1981 as valid and preferred while the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17 erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code; that the Complaint should have
October 1991 and Tax Declaration No. 5327 in the name of Atty. Clemencio C. been barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; that respondent had no cause of
Sabitsana, Jr. are VOID and of no legal effect. action; that respondent was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses; and that they should be the ones awarded attorney’s fees and litigation
The Provincial Assessor and the Municipal Assessor of Naval are directed to expenses.
cancel Tax Declaration No. 5327 as void and done in bad faith.
The CA, through its questioned January 25, 2007 Decision,21 denied the appeal
Further, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is ordered to pay plaintiff Juanito and affirmed the trial court’s Decision in toto. It held that even though the lot
Muertigui, represented by his attorney-in-fact Domingo Muertigui, Jr. the amounts admittedly was conjugal property, the absence of Soledad’s signature and consent
of: to the deed did not render the sale to Juanito absolutely null and void, but merely
voidable. Since Garcia and his wife were married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code22should apply; and under the said
a) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not
void, but merely voidable. In the absence of a decree annulling the deed of sale in
b) ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and favor of Juanito, the same remains valid.
c) Costs. The CA added that the fact that the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito was not
notarized could not affect its validity. As against the notarized deed of sale in favor
SO ORDERED.16 of petitioners, the CA held that the sale in favor of Juanito still prevails. Applying
Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the CA said that the determining factor is petitioners’
The trial court held that petitioners are not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Atty. good faith, or the lack of it. It held that even though petitioners were first to register
Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer, and was informed beforehand by the sale in their favor, they did not do so in good faith, for they already knew
Carmen that her family had purchased the lot; thus, he knew of the sale to Juanito. beforehand of Garcia’s prior sale to Juanito. By virtue of Atty. Sabitsana’s
After conducting an investigation, he found out that the sale was not registered. professional and confidential relationship with the Muertegui family, petitioners
With this information in mind, Atty. Sabitsana went on to purchase the same lot came to know about the prior sale to the Muerteguis and the latter’s possession of
and raced to register the sale ahead of the Muerteguis, expecting that his the lot, and yet they pushed through with the second sale. Far from acting in good
purchase and prior registration would prevail over that of his clients, the faith, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana used his legal knowledge to take advantage of his
Muerteguis. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code,17 the trial court declared that clients by registering his purchase ahead of them.
even though petitioners were first to register their sale, the same was not done in
good faith. And because petitioners’ registration was not in good faith, preference Finally, the CA declared that Juanito, as the rightful owner of the lot, possessed
should be given to the sale in favor of Juanito, as he was the first to take the requisite cause of action to institute the suit for quieting of title and obtain
possession of the lot in good faith, and the sale to petitioners must be declared null judgment in his favor, and is entitled as well to an award for attorney’s fees and
and void for it casts a cloud upon the Muertegui title. litigation expenses, which the trial court correctly held to be just and equitable
under the circumstances.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but the trial court denied19 the
same. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
Decision dated October 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants- exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
appellants. expenses and costs."26 Petitioners thus conclude that the Decision in Civil Case
No. B-1097 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioners next insist that the lot, being unregistered land, is beyond the coverage
Issues of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, and instead, the provisions of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529 should apply. This being the case, the Deed of Sale in favor of
Juanito is valid only as between him and the seller Garcia, pursuant to Section 113
Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:
of PD 1529;27 it cannot affect petitioners who are not parties thereto.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE On the issue of estoppel, laches and prescription, petitioners insist that from the
time they informed the Muerteguis in writing about their purchase of the lot, or in
CASE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE
October 1991, the latter did not notify them of their prior purchase of the lot, nor did
SUBJECT LAND WAS ONLY ₱1,230.00 (AND STATED MARKET VALUE
respondent interpose any objection to the sale in their favor. It was only in 1998
OF ONLY ₱3,450.00).
that Domingo Jr. showed to petitioners the unnotarized deed of sale. According to
petitioners, this seven-year period of silence and inaction on the Muerteguis’ part
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1544 OF THE should be taken against them and construed as neglect on their part to assert their
CIVIL CODE INSTEAD OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE rights for an unreasonable length of time. As such, their action to quiet title should
(P.D. NO. 1529) CONSIDERING THAT THE SUBJECT LAND WAS be deemed barred by laches and estoppel.
UNREGISTERED.
Lastly, petitioners take exception to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE expenses, claiming that since there was no bad faith on their part, such award may
COMPLAINT WAS ALREADY BARRED [BY] LACHES AND THE not be considered just and equitable under the circumstances. Still, an award of
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. attorney’s fees should remain the exception rather than the rule; and in awarding
the same, there must have been an express finding of facts and law justifying such
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION award, a requirement that is absent in this case.
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO
PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES TO THE Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the questioned CA Decision and
RESPONDENT.24 Resolution; the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. B-1097; the deletion of
the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in respondent’s favor; and a
Petitioners’ Arguments declaration that they are the true and rightful owners of the lot.
Petitioners assert that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the Respondent’s Arguments
case. They argue that since the assessed value of the lot was a mere ₱1,230.00,
jurisdiction over the case lies with the first level courts, pursuant to Republic Act Respondent, on the other hand, counters that a suit for quieting of title is one
No. 7691,25 which expanded their exclusive original jurisdiction to include "all civil whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein jurisdiction of the RTC. He likewise insists that Article 1544 applies to the case
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed because there is a clear case of double sale of the same property to different
Page 51 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
buyers, and the bottom line thereof lies in petitioners’ lack of good faith in entering Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.
into the subsequent sale. On the issue of laches/estoppel, respondent echoes the
CA’s view that he was persistent in the exercise of his rights over the lot, having What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for the
previously filed a complaint for recovery of the lot, which unfortunately was system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344
dismissed based on technicality. expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third
party with a better right. The question to be resolved therefore is: who between
On the issue of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, respondent finds refuge in petitioners and respondent has a better right to the disputed lot?
Article 2208 of the Civil Code,28citing three instances which fortify the award in his
favor – petitioners’ acts compelled him to litigate and incur expenses to protect his Respondent has a better right to the lot.
interests; their gross and evident bad faith in refusing to recognize his ownership
and possession over the lot; and the justness and equitableness of his case.
The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an
unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized
Our Ruling document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who
was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to
The Petition must be denied. petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no
longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting the sale between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the
of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real requirement of a public document under the Civil Code,33 is only for convenience,
property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to and not for validity or enforceability.34 And because it remained valid as between
real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners,
for his ownership thereof had ceased.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by
petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s
registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his rights. The mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right
application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the land, having previously
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. 35 Neither could it
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules. validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void. Registration
does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws
do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. 36
Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.
The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2
September 2013, which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in
the Department of Finance (DOF). EO 140 states that the CPRO "shall be
responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and
procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement
of the same." Section 3 of EO 140 provides that "CPRO shall be composed of its
SECOND DIVISION organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by
G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015 DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other
agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. x x x." Section 9 of EO 140 states
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA that it shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY, AND THE BUREAU OF general circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine
CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, IN HIS Star on 17 September 2013.
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioners, v. HON.
MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE JUDGE, On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC)
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, HON. FELICITAS O. LARON- Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon (Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs
CACANINDIN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel
COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 17, RONNIE C. SILVESTRE, EDWARD P. DELA holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including respondents in
CUESTA, ROGEL C. GATCHALIAN, IMELDA D.CRUZ, LILIBETH S. SANDAG, this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked." CPO
RAYMOND P. VENTURA, MA. LIZA S. TORRES, ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, MA. 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (Secretary
LOURDES V. MANGAOANG, FRANCIS AGUSTIN Y. ERPE, CARLOS T. SO, Purisima).
MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, CARMELITA M. TALUSAN,1] AREFILES H.
CARREON,2] AND ROMALINO G. VALDEZ, Respondents. On 30 September 2013, respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
DECISION before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On 1 October 2013, Executive
Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any
person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO 189-2013. Thereafter,
CARPIO, J.: the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Laron-Cacanindin.
The Case In the assailed Order of 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended
Executive Judge Dela Cruz's 72-hour TRO for 20 days or until 21 October 2013.
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She then set the hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on 18 October 4. Whether CPO 189-2013 was validly issued.
2013.
The Ruling of this Court
On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before
this Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory Jurisdiction over the Petition
injunction. Petitioners alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting
public officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches,
Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that respondents failed to exhaust all subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or
administrative remedies available to them before filing the petition before the RTC. controlled corporations with original charters.5 The CSC is the sole arbiter of
Petitioners also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with controversies relating to the civil service.6 The rule is that disciplinary cases and
application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification,
subject of an action for declaratory relief. promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion,
and separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.7 This rule is
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and embodied in Section 1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules)
CSC. Respondents further alleged that EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code which states:cralawlawlibrary
when it became effective immediately after its publication. SECTION 1. x x x.
In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO As used in these Rules, any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in
140 to justify their filing of an action for declaratory relief. As regards its effectivity, the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include
petitioners alleged that EO 140 states that it shall "take effect immediately upon promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, secondment,
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." reassignment, demotion and separation, x x x.
In an Order dated 21 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' Under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, "[a] detail is the movement of an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. employee from one department or agency which is temporary in nature, which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself issuance of another appointment." CPO 189-2013 is an order detailing personnel
from further hearing the case. from the BOC to CPRO under the DOF.
The Issues A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were
questioning their mass detail and reassignment to CPRO. According to
The issues for determination by this Court are the following:cralawlawlibrary respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove
them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a
personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory
relief filed by respondents; However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents.
Respondents further assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013.
2. Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies in Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued even before EC) 140,
filing the action before the RTC; pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents
alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued to beat the deadline of the Commission on
3. Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20 October
became effective immediately after its publication; and 2013 due to the scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond
the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No.
personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance 200,11 is clear on this issue. It states:cralawlawlibrary
of the action. Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other than
Petitioners allege that respondents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies after fifteen days following the completion of the law's publication.12 Thus, it is
before filing the case with the RTC. within the discretion of the legislature, or the Executive Department in this case,
whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-day period13 as long as there is
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative
compliance with the requirement of publication.
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence.8The doctrine entails lesser
Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take effect immediately
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. 9Therefore, upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was
direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative remedies are available, is a published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As such,
ground for dismissal of the action.
EO 140 took effect on 17 September 2013.
The doctrine, however, is not without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1)
In addition, the Court already ruled that "[interpretative regulations and those
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; agency and not the public, need not be published."14 EO 140 is an internal
(3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably regulation that affects primarily the personnel of the DOF and the BOC. It remains
prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small as
valid even without publication.
to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6)
Validity of CPO 189-2013
where judicial intervention is urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may
cause great and irreparable damage; (8) where the controverted acts violate due
Respondents assail the validity of CPO 189-2013. Respondents allege that under
process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies had
EO 140, CPRO shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the
been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The organic personnel was
remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto
supposed to be augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel.
proceedings.10cralawrednad
Respondents allege that they were detailed to CPRO even before its organic
personnel could be constituted.
In this case, respondents allege that CPO 189-2013 is contrary to law and
unconstitutional. Respondents assail CPO 189-2013 as patently illegal, arbitrary,
We rule for respondents.
and oppressive. This case clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be resorted to by respondents.
Section 3 of EO 140 provides:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement. The CPRO shall be composed
Effectivity of EO 140
of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and
Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2 October 2013, fifteen days
reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from
after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents
other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not. In addition, the CPRO, upon
argue that when CPO 189-2013 was issued, EO 140 was not yet effective.
Page 56 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
approval of the DOF Secretary, may hire or engage technical consultants to that respondents were occupying professional, technical, and scientific positions
provide necessary support in the performance of its mandate. that would have allowed their detail for the maximum period provided under
Respondents were supposed to augment and reinforce the existing organic Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules. Further, CSC Resolution No. 021181 did
not distinguish between an ordinary employee and an employee occupying
personnel of CPRO. Yet, at the time of respondents' detail, CPRO had not been
professional, technical, and scientific position. Hence, it should have been
formally organized. CPRO had no organic personnel that had been approved by
specified that the maximum period of respondents' detail should not exceed one
the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary. The DOF Secretary had yet
year.
to promulgate rules and regulations and to prescribe procedures and processes to
enable CPRO to effectively exercise its powers and duties, as required by Section
4 of EO 140. Petitioners assert, and we quote:cralawlawlibrary
There is a cancer of corruption we must extinguish. The drive to rid the
government of graft and corruption deserves the support of everyone.
In addition, under Section 8, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules, a detail is temporary
in nature. In fact, detail of employees is only allowed for a maximum, period for
The principle of good governance cannot, should not, be trivialized nor
those occupying professional, technical, and scientific positions. 15 Section 8, Rule
VII of the Omnibus Rules provides:cralawlawlibrary oversimplified by tenuous whimpering and individualism intended to detract from
SEC. 8. A detail is the movement of an employee from one department or agency the urgent need to cleanse the Republic from a mainstream culture of unabated
corruption, perpetuated with impunity and sense of self-entitlement. The issue at
to another which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank,
hand is not about who, but what; it is not about individual loss, but about national
status or salary and does not require the issuance of another appointment.
gain. Whether from the birth pains of reform, this nation can gain a foothold, nay, a
stride into restoring this nation into its prideful place from the clutches of a
The employee detailed receives his salary only from his mother unit/agency.
"kleptocratic mafia" that had gained a strangehold into one of the nation's primary
Detail shall be allowed only for a maximum period in the case of employees sources of revenue.17
occupying professional, technical and scientific position. If the employee believes Indeed, we commend and support the reforms being undertaken in the different
that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the agencies of the government. However, we cannot allow department heads to take
Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be shortcuts that will undermine and disregard the basic procedures of the law.
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We sustain the validity of
Section 2 of CSC Resolution No. 021181, dated 13 September 2002, 16 clarified the
Executive Order No. 140. We rule that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
maximum period of detail of employees. It states:cralawlawlibrary
over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents. We further rule that
Section 2. Duration of the detail. The detail shall be allowed only for a maximum
period of one year. Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with the Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was not validly issued.
consent of the detailed employee. The extension or renewal of the period of the
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
detail shall be within the authority of the mother agency.
Peralta,*Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she may
Leonen, J., see separate dissenting opinion.
appeal his/her case to the proper Civil Service Commission Regional Office.
Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by said
regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further appealed to the Endnotes:
Commission en banc.
In this case, CPO 189-2013 did not provide for the period of respondents' detail. It *
only provided that the order "shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner Designated acting member per Raffle dated 10 August 2015.
revoked," making the detail of respondents indefinite. There was nothing to show
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1Carmelita M. Talusan withdrew as petitioner in Civil Case No. 13-130820, noted that the detail shall be allowed "only for a limited period in the case of employees
by the trial court in its Order dated 4 October 2013. Rollo, p. 58. occupying professional, technical and scientific positions."
2Arefiles H. Carreon manifested his intent to withdraw as petitioner in Civil Case 16 As contained in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002.
No. 13-130820 per letter to counsel dated 16 October 2013. Id. at 119.
17Rollo, p. 10.
3 Id. at 57-63.
7Olanda v. Bugayong, 459 Phil. 626 (2003). The Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over questions regarding
personnel actions affecting civil service employees.3 It is the sole arbiter that
8AdditionHills Mandahiyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v. Megaworld decides controversies regarding the civil service at first instance. 4 Courts should
Properties & Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 175039, 18 April 2012, 670 SCRA 83. not directly assume jurisdiction based on allegations of unconstitutionality and
invalidity of government regulations when the question, in essence, involves a
9 Id. personnel action.
10Vigilar v. Aquino, 654 Phil. 755 (2011). This is a Petition for certiorari and prohibition with very urgent prayer for the
immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
11Providing for the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a mandatory injunction5 filed by the Department of Finance and the Bureau of
Newspaper of General Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Customs before this court, assailing the Manila Regional Trial Court's Order 6dated
Effectivity. October 1, 2013 issued by Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr., the
Order7 dated October 4, 2013 issued by Presiding Judge Felicitas O. Laron-
12Nagkakaisang Maralila ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services- Cacanindin, and all other subsequent Orders preventing the implementation of
Philippine Veteran Affairs Office, Department of National Defense, G.R. No. Customs Personnel Order No. B-1 89-2013.8 The Department of Finance and
187587, 5 June 2013, 697 SCRA 359. Bureau of Customs also pray for the dismissal of the Petition for declaratory relief
filed by private respondents before the Regional Trial Court of
13Tañadav. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986), Resolution on Motion for Manila.9cralawrednad
Reconsideration.
On September 2, 2013, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No.
14 Id. 14010 creating the Customs Policy Research Office in the Department of
Finance.11 The Customs Policy Research Office shall review the Bureau of
15 Section 26(6), Chapter V, Book V, Title I of Executive Order No. 292 provides Customs' administration policies, rules, and procedures, and provide
Page 58 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
recommendations for their improvement.12 Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140 3. DELA CUESTA, EDUARD PALAFOX Collector of Customs VI (26)
provides for the composition of the Customs Policy Research 4. BELMONTE, RICARDO RACIMO Collector of Customs VI (26)
Office:cralawlawlibrary 5. MOLINA, ADELINA SANTOS ESTRELLA Collector of Customs VI (26)
SECTION 3. Personnel and Staffing Complement. The [Customs Policy
6. SILVESTRE, RONNIE CRUZ Collector of Customs VI (26)
Research Office] shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the 7. MANDANGAN, MACABANTUG
Collector of Customs V (25)
[Department of Finance] Secretary, augmented and reinforced by [Department of DIMAPUNTUG
Finance] and [Bureau of Customs] personnel as well as those detailed or 8. BAUZON, PR1SCILLA DE VERA Collector of Customs V (25)
seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the [Department of Finance] or 9. CRUZ, IMELDA DE JESUS Collector of Customs V (25)
not. In addition, the [Customs Policy Research Office], upon approval of the 10. TOGONON, MA. SONIA IRINEA
Collector of Customs V (25)
[Department of Finance] Secretary, may hire or engage technical consultants to CALUYO
provide necessary support in the performance of its mandate.13 11. SANDAG L1LIBETH SUMBILLA Collector of Customs V (25)
Executive Order No. 140 was published on September 17, 2013 in Manila Bulletin 12. VENTURA, RAYMOND P. Collector of Customs V (25)
and Philippine Star.14Section 9 of Executive Order No. 140 13. ROQUE, TERESITA SIOSON Collector of Customs V (25)
provides:cralawlawlibrary 14. TORRES, MA. LIZA SEBASTIAN Collector of Customs V (25)
SECTION 9. Effectivity. This Order shall take effect immediately upon publication 15. MARTIN, MARITESS THEODOSSIS Collector of Customs V (25)
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.15 16. ALCARAZ, ARNEL CRUZ Collector of Customs V (25)
On September 17, 2013, or on the same day of publication of Executive Order No. 17. ALCID, TOMAS LADERA Collector of Customs V (25)
140, Bureau of Customs Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon issued 18. MANGAOANQ MA. LOURDES
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013,16with the approval of Department of Collector of Customs V (25)
VILLAMAR
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima.17 Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 19. ERPE, FRANCIS AGUSTIN YANCHA Collector of Customs V (25)
detailed 27 Bureau of Customs personnel to the Customs Policy Research Office
20. VILLAGARCIA, ROGELIO VELACRUZ Collector of Customs V (25)
under the Department of Finance.18 Thus:
September 17, 2013 21. ZAMORANOS, MARIETTA DANTE Collector of Customs V (25)
22. TAN, JUAN NAT1VIDAD Collector of Customs V (25)
CUSTOMS PERSONNEL ORDER 23. TALUSAN, CARMELITA MANAHAN Collector of Customs V (25)
No. B-189-2013 24. CARREON, AREFILES HAMOY Collector of Customs V (25)
25. PACARDO, RUSTUM LANUEVO Collector of Customs V (25)
Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140, series of 2013, the Customs Policy 26. VALDEZ, ROMALINO GABRIEL Collector of Customs V (25)
Research Office ("the CPRO") shall be composed of its organic personnel, 27. PABLO, TALEK J. Collector of Customs V (25)
augmented and reinforced by personnel from the Department of Finance and
Bureau of Customs as well [as] those detailed or seconded from other agencies.
All orders, circulars, memoranda, issuances contrary to or inconsistent herewith
Pursuant to the foregoing, the following personnel are detailed from the Bureau of
are hereby revoked and/or modified, and all concerned shall be guided
Customs to [Customs Policy Research Office] under the Department of
accordingly.
Finance:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Order shall be effective immediaitely and valid until sooner revoked.
FULL NAME POSITION TITLE AND SALARY
(Surname, First Name) GRADE For strict compliance.
1. GATCHALIAN, ROGEL CRUZ Collector of Customs VI (26)
2. SO, CARLOS TAN Collector of Customs VI (26)
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(signed) temporary restraining order to 20 days after finding that Customs Personnel Order
ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON No. B-189-2013 had "violate[d] the rules on detail because it failed to provide the
Commissioner of Customs duration of the detail."39 In the same Order, Judge Laron-Cacanindin stated that
the Order was without prejudice to further findings of the court after trial on the
APPROVED:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary merits of the main case for declaratory relief.40cralawrednad
(signed) In the Order41 dated October 21, 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied the
CESAR V. PURISIMA employees' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.42 The denial of their
Secretary application for a writ of preliminary injunction prompted six (6) of the employees
Department of Finance who filed the Petition to report to the Customs Policy Research Office.43 The
Date:________19 returning employees reasoned that they reported for work so they would not be
charged with insubordination.44cralawrednad
Only 1220 of the affected employees complied with the directive in Customs
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 and reported to the Customs Policy Research
Office after its effectivity on September 17, 2014.21cralawrednad On October 21, 2013, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs filed this
Petition for certiorari and prohibition.45cralawrednad
The other 1522 affected employees refused to comply with the Order23 and instead
This court required the 15 employees to file a Comment on the Petition. 46 After
filed on September 30, 2013 a Petition24 for declaratory relief with an application
filing the Comment,47the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs were
for a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction before the
ordered to file a Reply.48cralawrednad
Regional Trial Court of Manila.25cralawredcralawrednad
The 15 employees assailed the validity of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189- In their Petition for certiorari, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs
argued that the Civil Service Commission, not the Regional Trial Court, had
2013.26 They argued that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 violated (a)
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and that the 15 employees failed to
Section 70327 of Republic Act No. 1937 or the Tariff and Customs Code;28 (b) their
exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing their Petition for
right to security of tenure as career service officers defined under Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7 of Executive Order No. 292;29 and (c) Section 3 of declaratory relief.49 According to the Department of Finance and Bureau of
Executive Order No. 140.30 They further argued that Customs Personnel Order No. Customs, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was a personnel action, and
questions involving personnel actions in the civil service should be lodged before
B-189-2013 was invalid for having been issued prior to the effectivity of Executive
the Civil Service Commission.50cralawrednad
Order No. 140.31 They relied on Article 232 of the Civil Code that provides that laws
become effective 15 days after complete publication.33cralawrednad
Further, the Department of Finance and Bureau of Customs argued that some of
On October 1, 2013, Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. granted a 72-hour the requirements for filing a Petition for declaratory relief were absent.51 First, a
temporary restraining order to stop the implementation of Customs Personnel declaratory relief is available only when the government issuance being
questioned is a national law or an ordinance of general application, 52 Since
Order No. B-189-2013.34 The case was then raffled to Branch 17 presided by
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was an internal personnel order whose
Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin (Judge Laron-Cacanindin).35cralawrednad
application was limited within the Bureau of Customs, it cannot be a subject of a
Petition for declaratory relief.53 Second, the declaratory relief was no longer
On October 4, 2013,36 the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs filed
a Motion to Dismiss.37They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction available because Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 had been breached
over the employees' Petition for declaratory relief and that the requisites for the prior to the filing of the Petition.54 The 15 employees allegedly committed a breach
when they failed to report to the Customs Policy Research Office upon the
filing of a Petition for declaratory relief were lacking.38cralawrednad
effectivity of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 on September 17,
2013.55 Third, a declaratory relief was not available to the 15 employees because
In the Order dated October 4, 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended the
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they had an adequate remedy with the Civil Service Commission.56cralawrednad I.
Regarding the duration of the detail, the Department of Finance and Bureau of The Constitution confers jurisdiction over the Civil Service Commission for cases
Customs argued that the detail was not indefinite and that pursuant to Civil Service involving the civil service. Article IX(B), Section 1(1) of the Constitution
Commission Resolution No. 02118157 or the Policies on Detail, the detail shall only provides:cralawlawlibrary
last for at most, one (1) year.58cralawrednad SECTION 1.(1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commissioncomposed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be
In their Comment dated January 8, 2014, the 15 employees countered that the natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction as the main issue was the validity and least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and
constitutionality of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013.59 The resolution of must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
this issue required the exercise of judicial review, which was beyond the immediately preceding their appointment. (Emphasis supplied)
competence of the Civil Service Commission.60cralawrednad
As part of the Civil Service Commission's mandate to administer the civil service,
Article IX(B), Section 3 of the Constitution provides:cralawlawlibrary
Since the 15 employees' Petition for declaratory relief alleges that Customs SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is unconstitutional and invalid, those allegations Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
should suffice for the Regional Trial Court to assume jurisdiction. 61cralawrednad
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
According to the 15 employees, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
unconstitutional for violating their right to security of tenure.62 Their detail to the
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
Customs Policy and Research Office amounts to constructive dismissal63 as they President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
are now "mere researchers[.]"64cralawrednad (Emphasis supplied)
The 15 employees argue that all the requisites for the filing of a Petition for The Constitution gives the Civil Service Commission quasi-judicial powers through
declaratory relief are present.65 They claim that Customs Personnel Order No. B- Article IX(A), Sections 6 and 7, which provide:cralawlawlibrary
189-2013 is a government regulation, affecting their rights, duties, rank, and SECTION 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules
status.66 Hence, Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is a proper subject of a concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules,
Petition for declaratory relief.67 They also argue that Customs Personnel Order No. however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
B-189-2013 is void, producing no effect.68 According to them, a void or
unconstitutional law or issuance cannot be a source of an obligation so it cannot SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
be breached.69cralawrednad any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
This case should consider the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
First, whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over private respondents' otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
Petition for declaratory relief; each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis
Second, whether all the requisites for the filing of a Petition for declaratory relief supplied)
are present; and As the "central personnel agency of the Government,"70 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3, Section 12(11) of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code
Finally, whether Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is void because of its of 1987 provides:cralawlawlibrary
indefinite term.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions. — The [Civil Service] Commission shall 3. Decisions of national agencies and local
have the following powers and functions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary government units within their geographical
boundaries relative to personnel actions and non-
.... disciplinary cases brought before it on appeal; and
(11)Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly ....
or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and SECTION 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. — Heads of Departments,
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have
who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission,74 over their respective
contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and officers and employees.chanrobleslaw
executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme ....
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of
a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied) B. Non-Disciplinary
Further, for the implementation of Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section
12(11) of Executive Order No. 292,71 Sections 5(B)(3), 6(B)(3), and 7(B)(2) of Civil 2. Complaints on personnel actions and other non-disciplinary actions of their
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 or the Revised Uniform respective personnel. (Emphasis supplied)
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lay down the different offices of
the civil service where complaints involving personnel actions should be filed. As the "central personnel agency of the Government"75 with quasi-judicial
Hence:cralawlawlibrary powers76 and as the body tasked to administer the civil service,77 the Civil Service
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper.72 — The Civil Commission is the "sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following service[,]"78 including personnel actions, as this court has ruled.79cralawrednad
cases:cralawlawlibrary
.... The material allegations in the Complaint or Petition and the character of the relief
sought determine which court has jurisdiction.80 In private respondents' 44
B. Non-Disciplinary paragraphs in their Petition for declaratory relief filed before the Regional Trial
.... Court, they alleged:cralawlawlibrary
8. On 17 September 2013, without waiting for [Executive Order] No. 140's
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third effectivity on 2 October 2013, the [Bureau of Customs] issued [Customs Personnel
level officials;73 and Order] No. B-189-2013, signed by [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner Rozzano
Rufino B. Biazon and approved by [Department of Finance] Secretary, Cesar V.
.... Purisima on even date. [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013
states:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. — The Civil Service Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140, series of 2013, the Customs Policy
Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following Research Office (the "CPRO") shall be composed of its organic personnel,
cases:cralawlawlibrary augmented and reinforced by personnel from the Department of Finance and
.... Bureau of Customs as well as those (sic) detailed or seconded from other
agencies. Pursuant to the foregoing, the following personnel are detailed from the
B. Non-Disciplinary Bureau of Customs to [the Customs Policy Research Office] under the Department
.... of Finance:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
....
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
9. Thus, [private respondents'] original and permanent appointments in plantilla 15. Section 2 of [Republic Act] No. 6656 [or An Act to Protect the Security of
positions as Collectors of Customs VI and V were effectively and constructively Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
revoked even before the effectivity of [Executive Order] No. 140 creating the Government Reorganization] further provides that due notice and hearing are
[Customs Policy Research Office]. required to remove a public officer or employee pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, viz:cralawlawlibrary
They are all "detailed" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] without any No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid
appointment papers providing for their specific functions, status, salary grades, cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removalexists when,
ranks, and designation. By virtue of the assailed issuance, [private pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
respondents'] were all removed from their respective permanent positions as redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
Collectors of Customs to form a supposed "research body." meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law.
10. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM), pursuant to [Executive
16. Thus, while the necessity and indispensability of reorganization when public
Order] No. 140 has not even approved the composition of the organic personnel of
interest demands may be justified, civil service employees, much more career
the [Customs Policy Research Office]. Neither has the [Department of Finance] service officers with permanent appointments like [private respondents], cannot
appeared to. have made the requisite recommendation for that purpose, as be removed, suspended, or demoted from office except for cause provided by law.
mandated by [Executive Order] No. 140.
....
11. While they have not been officially notified thereof, [private respondents] were
reliably informed of the issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 18. In this case, [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-l89-2013 allegedly "detailed" all
and [petitioners'] attempt to unlawfully "detail" them to the [Customs Policy 15[private respondents], together with 12 other Collectors of Customs, to an
Research Office]. advisory capacity of a policy coordinating body (CPRO) under the guise of
reorganization, thus effectively rendering vacant the 27 positions of collector of
.... customs throughout the country.
13. While the [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner's authority to reorganize is 19. Section 8, Rule VII of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 91-
recognized, it is neither absolute nor unbridled. The exercise thereof should not 1631, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,"
violate the law and the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution clearly mandates that provides that a "detail" is "the movement of an employee from one department or
"no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
agency to another which is temporary in nature, which does not involve a reduction
for cause provided by law." in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of another
appointment."
14. Section 703 of [Republic Act] No. 1937, as amended, provides
that:cralawlawlibrary 20. The patent nullity of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 is readily
Assignment of Customs Officers and Employees to other duties. - The
apparent since Section 703 of [the Tariff and Customs Code] merely authorizes the
Commissioner of Customs may, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, [Bureau of Customs] Commissioner to assign or move [Bureau of Customs]
assign any employee of the Bureau of Customs to any port, service, division or
personnel only within the Bureau. Since the [Customs Policy Research Office] is a
office within the Bureau or assign him duties as the best interest of the service may
newly created "office" outside of the [Bureau of Customs], the [Bureau of Customs]
require, in accordance with the staffing pattern or organizational set-up as may be Commissioner's issuance of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 which
prescribed by the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of the Secretary of "details" [private respondents] to the [Customs Policy Research Office] is clearly
Finance: Provided, that such assignment shall not affect the tenure of office of the
an ultra vires act, and is therefore invalid. In fact, the [Bureau of Customs]
employees nor result in the change of status, demotion in rank and/or deduction of
Commissioner's own admission proves this ultra vires and invalid issuance,
salary.
thus:cralawlawlibrary
Page 63 of 507
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"It is more than a reshuffle because [private respondents] have actually newspapers of general circulation. On 17 September 2013, however, the [Bureau
been transferred to the [Department of Finance], out of the Bureau of Customs" of Customs] already issued [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013, which is
Biazon said in an ANC interview, confirming news first reported by the Philippine based on [Executive Order] No. 140, and attempted to serve copies thereof to
Daily Inquirer. "Instead of just reassignment [to] another port, they're [respondents] on 26 to 27 September 2013 supposedly just in time before the
basically reassigned to another office." COMELEC election ban on personnel movement takes effect on 28 September
2013.
"After their transfer out of the [Bureau of Customs], the next-in-rank collectors or
division heads are taking over as officers-in-charge of the different ports," he said. 25. More importantly, [Executive Order] No. 140 mandates that the transfer of
21. There is no bona fide reorganization that took place. [Private [Bureau of Customs] personnel should merely augment or reinforce the organic
respondents'] mass"detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] was without personnel of the [Customs Policy Research Office]. Obviously, without any organic
personnel, there is still nothing to augment or reinforce. . . . Hence, [private
any clear or definite direction as to their career status and functions. As a
respondents'] "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] absent any
consequence, [private respondents] were intentionally and effectively placed on a
compliance with the requirements under [Executive Order] No. 140, was surely
"floating status."
carried out in bad faith, and was meant to illegally remove [private
respondents] from their respective permanent positions, in blatant violation of the
22. Furthermore, [Executive Order] No. 140 clearly provides that the [Customs
law and the Constitution.
Policy Research Office] shall be composed of its organic personnel, and that said
policy research body - after the organization of its own organic personnel - shall
26. It should also be stressed that [private respondents] were appointed as
merely be augmented and reinforced by Department of Finance and Bureau of
Collectors of Customs with Position Titles VI and V, with specific functions, duties,
Customs personnel. Despite the absence of any organic personnel, much less
approval from the Department of Budget and Management or even a titles, and ranks clearly provided for in their respective appointment papers. In
contrast, their supposed "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] under
recommendation from the [Department of Finance], [private respondents] have, in
speed haste, already been ordered to be "detailed" by the [Bureau of Customs] to [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 does not even provide for a definite
the [Customs Policy Research Office], and thus, effectively removed from their period of duty, their titles, new functions, or ranks.
current respective permanent positions.
27. Moreover, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05, otherwise known as
23. The landmark case of Dario v. Mison, et al., where the Supreme Court voided the "Guidelines on Designation" it is clear that:cralawlawlibrary
....
the personnel reorganization within the [Bureau of Customs], is highly instructive in
this case, thus:cralawlawlibrary
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are B. Designees can only be designated to positions within the level they are currently
pursued in good faith. occupying. However, Division Chiefs may be designated to perform the duties of
third level positions
....
First level personnel cannot be designated to perform the duties of second level
24. By no stretch of the imagination can the issuance of [Customs Personnel positions.
Order] No. B-189-2013 be said to have been carried out in good faith. The undue
haste in issuing [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 clearly shows that ....
respondents are attempting to beat the deadline on the COMELEC election ban
29. The basis of [private respondents'] reassignment or the exigency necessary
on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 28 October 2013 due to the
to remove them from their positions is likewise inexistent. Such blanket "detail"
forthcoming Barangay Elections. It cannot be denied that [Executive Order] No.
relinquishes [private respondents'] permanent positions as Collectors of Customs
140, which was signed by the President on 2 September 2013, has yet to take
without due process and is contrary to their Constitutional right to security of
effect on 2 October 2013, which is 15 days after its publication in two (2)
tenure. Clearly, the disparity between the positions of a Collector of Customs and a
Page 64 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
mere researcher is blatant. Therefore, the transfer from the former to the latter of [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 on 17 September 2013 simply, has
unmistakeably denotes demotion.... no legal basis, and is therefore premature and patently invalid. To deprive [private
respondents] of their permanent positions as Collectors of Customs and to "detail"
.... all 15 of them indefinitely as members of a research body on the basis of an invalid
[Bureau of Customs] and [Department of Finance] order are not only illegal but
30. In the case of Pastor v. City of Pasig, the Supreme Court held that a also unconstitutional for being violative of [private respondents'] right to security of
reassignment or even detail which is indefinite and which results in a reduction of tenure.
rank and status is effectively a constructive dismissal from the service. . . .
37. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
.... affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative,
as if it had not been passed. . . . For these reasons, [Customs Personnel Order]
31. The principles on constructive dismissal clearly find analogous application to No. B-189-2013 should be nullified and set aside, and its enforcement enjoined.
[private respondents]. By definition, constructive dismissal is a quitting because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when 38. . . . The consequence [of implementing Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-
there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. The test of constructive 2013] that is also readily obvious is the chaos entailed in port operations, the
dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have collection of much needed Government revenues and public service as [private
felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act respondents] perform functions either as District Collectors of all the 17 Collection
amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive Districts in the country, or as Deputy Collectors for administration, assessment and
dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this operation in those different ports.
situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the
coercive acts of the employer. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that the ....
management prerogative to transfer an employee "cannot be used as a subterfuge
by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker." 41. It cannot be overemphasized that the issuance of [Customs Personnel Order]
No. B-189-2013 is illegal, and blatantly violates existing law and the Constitution.
32. Evidently, [private respondents'] "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research As above mentioned, respondents intend to have [Customs Personnel Order] No.
Office] operated as a blanket and forced relinquishment of their permanent B-189-2013 immediately effective. Thus, there is a manifest urgency for this
positions as Collectors of Customs in violation of their right to security of tenure. In Honorable Court to immediately restrain [petitioners] from implementing [Customs
view thereof, it behooves upon this Honorable Court to correct such abuse of Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 upon receipt of this petition and before the
powers and retain [private respondents] to their rightful ranks. matter can be heard on notice. Otherwise, grave injustice and irreparable injury
would be suffered by [private respondents], in that:cralawlawlibrary
.... (a)[Executive Order] No. 140, on which [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-
2013 is based, has yet to take effect upon publication in two (2) newspapers of
35. ... in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, laws
general circulation. [Executive Order] No. 140 was published in the 17
and executive issuances shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the September 2013 issue of the Manila Bulletin, hence, it will only take effect on 2
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
October 2013. [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 cannot be given any
circulation.
effectivity as it is invalid for being blatantly premature and without legal basis;
36. In this case, [Executive Order] No. 140 was published in the 17 September (b)[Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 violates [Executive Order] No. 140,
2013 issue of the broadsheet newspaper, Manila Bulletin. Thus, following the
as the latter mandates that the [Department of Finance], with the approval of the
above legal standards, it is clear that [Executive Order] No. 140 has yet to take
[Department of Budget and Management], has to recommend the composition
legal effect on 2 October 2013. In other words, the [Bureau of Customs'] issuance
of the organic personnel of the [Customs Policy Research Office]. No such
Page 65 of 507
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recommendation by the [Department of Finance], much less the approval of the As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in
[Department of Budget and Management], has been made. In fact, [Executive the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include
Order] No. 140 provides that the transfer of [Bureau of Customs] personnel appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-
should merely augment or reinforce the organic personnel of the [Customs employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. (Emphasis supplied)
Policy Research Office]. Obviously, without any organic personnel, there is still
The assailed Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is a personnel action
nothing to augment or reinforce. The [Customs Policy Research Office] is thus
because it details 27 employees from the Bureau of Customs to the Customs
in limbo, as there is yet no organic personnel in place;
Policy Research Office. It is a movement of personnel in the civil service.
(c) [Customs Personnel Order] No. B-189-2013 is also contrary to Section 703 of Cases involving personnel actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil
[Republic Act] No. 1937, as amended, which provides that "(t)he Commissioner
Service Commission and not within the trial courts' jurisdiction.82cralawrednad
of Customs may, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, assign any
employee of the Bureau of Customs to any port, service, division or
The issue is not novel.
office within the Bureau or assign him duties as the best interest of the service
may require." Even Commissioner Biazon, in an interview with [the ABS-CBN In Olanda v. Bugayong,83 respondent Leonardo G. Bugayong (Bugayong), as
News Channel] admitted that "it is more than a reshuffle because they have President of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy, relieved petitioner
actually been transferred to the [Department of Finance], out of the Bureau of
Menelieto A. Olanda (Olanda) from his post as the Dean of the College of Marine
Customs." The Commissioner of Customs thus committed an illegal and ultra
Engineering of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy84 and imposed a three
vires act in "detailing" [private respondents] to the [Customs Policy Research
(3)-month suspension85 on the latter for allegedly "misusing classified
Office], an office admittedly outside the [Bureau of Customs]; and
information."86 Olanda filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales a
Petition for "quo warranto, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
(d)[private respondents'] "detail" to the [Customs Policy Research Office] is of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages, claiming that there was no valid
[petitioners'] scheme to constructively dismiss and demote [private cause to deprive him of his position[.]"87cralawrednad
respondents]. [Customs Personnel Order] No. B- 189-2013 operates as a
blanket and forced relinquishment of [private respondents'] permanent positions
This court ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction.88 Hence:cralawlawlibrary
as Collectors of Customs in violation of their constitutional right to security of Disciplinary cases and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees in
tenure. [Private respondents] are all "detailed" to the [Customs Policy Research the civil service including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
Office] without any appointment papers providing for their specific functions,
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation" are
status, salary grades, ranks, and designation, thereby intentionally and within the exclusivejurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission which is the sole
effectively placing them on "floating status."
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
(e)[Private respondents] would be unduly displaced from their permanent positions ....
with the appointment and/or designation by the [Bureau of Customs] of new
Collectors of Customs.81 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It was thus error for the trial court, which does not have jurisdiction, to, in the first,
An examination of the text of the Petition for declaratory relief readily shows that
[sic] place take cognizance of the petition of petitioner assailing his relief as Dean
private respondents originally questioned a personnel action. They essentially
and his designation to another position. This leaves it unnecessary to dwell on the
questioned their detail to the Customs Policy and Research Office.
issues herein raised by petitioner.
Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 of Executive Order No. 292 WHEREFORE, the petition is, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
defines a personnel action:cralawlawlibrary
court, hereby DENIED.
SECTION 26. Personnel Actions. — . . .
SO ORDERED.89 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Page 66 of 507
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In Casimina v. Judge Legaspi,90 petitioner Pablo B. Casimina (Casimina), General ....
Manager of the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority, issued Special Order
No. 82, which reassigned private respondent Emmanuel T. Illera (Illera), Port It was thus error, because beyond its competence, for the respondent Trial Court
Manager of the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex, from Iloilo to the central office in to take cognizance of the quo warranto and mandamus action instituted by Dr.
Quezon City.91 After the denial of his request for reconsideration,92 Illera filed for Regino which was in essence a protest against the appointment of Dr.
injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary Mantala.106 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
injunction against Casimina before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo "to restrain
In all these cases, this court upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
[Casimina] from transferring him to the central office in Quezon over complaints involving the movement of personnel in the civil service.
City."93cralawrednad
II.
Casimina filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of,
among others, lack of jurisdiction.94 This court ruled that the trial court has no
The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction precludes trial courts from
jurisdiction over the Petition.95 "[T]his case falls within the jurisdiction of the Civil
resolving a controversy involving a question that is within the a exclusive
Service Commission (CSC) because it involves the movement of government
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.107 The doctrine disallows courts "to
personnel to promote order and efficiency in public service."96cralawrednad
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
In Mantala v. Salvador,97 Dr. Julia P. Regino (Regino) filed a formal protest before
competence."108cralawrednad
the Committee on Evaluation and Protest of the Department of Health questioning
the appointment of Dr. Mariquita J. Mantala (Dr. Mantala).98 The Committee on
In Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Company, Inc.,109 the
Evaluation and Protest upheld Dr. Mantala's appointment.99Upon appeal and
plaintiff Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers filed a Complaint before the Court of
reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission also upheld Dr. Mantala's
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) against the Samar Mining Company, Inc.
appointment.100 The Resolution of the Civil Service Commission became final and
(Samar Mining) alleging breach of their closed-shop agreement.110 Samar Mining
executory.101 Regino then filed an action for quo warranto and mandamus before
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the regular courts had no jurisdiction over the
the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City.102The trial court annulled and set aside
subject matter of the Complaint.111 Samar Mining argued that the Court of
Dr. Mantala's appointment and directed the Secretary of Health to withdraw Dr.
Industrial Relations (now National Labor Relations Commission) had jurisdiction
Mantala's appointment and to issue another for Regino.103 Dr. Mantala then filed a
over cases involving conditions of employment.112 The Court of First Instance
Petition for Review on certiorari before this court.104 This court granted the Petition
granted the Motion to Dismiss.113cralawrednad
and annulled the Decision of the trial court:105
Disciplinary cases, and cases involving "personnel actions" affecting employees in
Upon appeal, this court applied the "exclusion theory," 114 i.e., "where jurisdiction is
the civil service—including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer,
conferred in express terms upon one court, and not upon another [and where] it
reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation,"
has been held that it is the intention that the jurisdiction conferred shall be
and, of course, employment status and qualification standards—are within the
exclusive"115 and upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Constitution declares
Relations (now National Labor Relations Commission).116 Hence:cralawlawlibrary
the Commission to be "the central personnel agency of the Government," having
But judicial wisdom in this particular matter would seem to favor adherence to the
power and authority to administer the civil service; to promulgate its own rules
exclusion theory, what with the litigant's ordinary duty to exhaust administrative
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices; and to
remedies and the "doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction," sense-making
render decision in "any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
and expedient,
date of its submission for decision or resolution," which decision, or order or ruling
"That the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
"may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
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experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence." When
purposes of the regulatory statute administered." (42 Am. Jut., 698.)117 petitioner's recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance
This court also made a similar ruling in Javier v. Court of Appeals.118 In Javier, with the procedure prescribed in [Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service], the [Court of Appeals] may not be faulted for refusing to
Normito Javier (Normito) was "employed by private respondent Jebsens Maritime,
acknowledge petitioner before it.137 (Emphasis supplied)
Inc. as a boatswain[.]"119 Normito, however, died at sea.120 Upon learning of her
husband's death, Lolita Javier (Lolita) went to the office of Jebsens Maritime, Inc. Hence, considering the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to
and the latter "promised to give the corresponding death benefits[.]"121 After hear and decide administrative cases, including those involving personnel actions,
Jebsens Maritime, Inc. had failed to pay the promised death benefits, Lolita filed a as granted by the Constitution, the Regional Trial Court cannot assume jurisdiction
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for a sum of money for herself based on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.
and on behalf of her six (6) minor children against Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and its
shipmaster.122cralawrednad In sustaining the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over the Petition for
declaratory relief, the ponencia held that the case falls under an exception to the
This court ruled that under Section 3(d)123 of Executive Order No. 247 or the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.138 The ponencia
Reorganization Act of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, it was states:cralawlawlibrary
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration that had original and In this case, respondents allege that [Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013]
exclusive jurisdiction over Lolita's Complaint and that the trial court had no is contrary to law and unconstitutional. Respondents assail [Customs Personnel
jurisdiction over the subject matter of her Complaint.124 Hence, under the doctrine Order No. B-189-2013] as patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive. This case
of primary administrative jurisdiction, the trial court cannot resolve the clearly falls within the exceptions where exhaustion of administrative remedies
controversy.125cralawred This court ordered the Regional Trial Court to dismiss the need not be resorted to by respondents.139
case for lack of jurisdiction.126cralawrednad Private respondents, citing Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) v.
In Catipon, Jr. v. Japson,127 respondent Jerome Japson (Japson), "a former Senior Dominguez,140 likewise argue that exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
Member Services Representative of [the] [Social Security System,] Bangued, filed administrative remedies apply.141 Hence:cralawlawlibrary
a letter-complaint [before] the Civil Service Commission-[Cordillera Administrative
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to
Region] Regional Director[.]"128 He alleged that petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr.
other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the
(Catipon) made deliberate false entries in his application to take the Civil Service
instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
Professional Examination.129 The Civil Service Commission-Cordillera
oppressive.142
Administrative Region Regional Director found Catipon guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.130cralawrednad The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply and,
consequently, its exceptions.
Catipon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. 131 The
Court of Appeals held that instead of filing the appeal before the Court of Appeals, The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is different from the doctrine of
Catipon should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission, based on Sections exhaustion of administrative remedies.
5(A)(1),132 43,133 and 49134 of the Civil Service Commission Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.135cralawrednad Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, when an administrative
agency is granted primary jurisdiction over the subject matter, the courts "cannot
This court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals136 and or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
held:cralawlawlibrary jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the
The [Court of Appeals] is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the administrative tribunal[.]"143 The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction
petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court presupposes that the administrative agency has jurisdiction over the subject matter
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while the court does not. The Complaint or Petition, therefore, cannot be filed
before the court. As the issue is jurisdictional, there should be no exception to the The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies likewise
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction. When the complaint or petition is do not apply because the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the
filed before a court with no subject matter jurisdiction, the court has no other option dispute in the first place. In order for the exceptions to apply, the court to which the
but to dismiss the case.144cralawrednad petition was prematurely filed should have jurisdiction; otherwise, the orders of the
court would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders rendered
On the other hand, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, by tribunals and agencies that do not have subject matter jurisdiction are null and
before a party may seek intervention from the court, he or she should have already void.153Hence, the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
exhausted all the remedies in the administrative level.145 If there is still a remedy remedies should not be applicable since the Regional Trial Court, the court to
available within the administrative machinery, "then such remedy should be which the Petition for declaratory relief was filed, lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
exhausted first before [the] court's judicial power can be sought." 146 The doctrine of and any order or decision rendered by it would be null and void.
exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that both the courts and the
administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction. This is because non- Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan
observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) cited by private respondents finds no application
affect the court's jurisdiction.147 In Soto v. Jareno,148this court here. In KBMBPM, petitioners questioned the takeover by the Department of
ruled:cralawlawlibrary Agriculture of the management of petitioner KBMBPM, a service cooperative
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not organized by and composed of vendors of the New Muntinlupa Public
affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line Market.154 There is no personnel action involved in KBMBPM. Hence, private
of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive respondents' reliance on the case is misplaced.
the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If
not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can The ponencia held that "[w]hen respondents raised the issue of validity and
then take cognizance of the case and try it.149 (Emphasis supplied) constitutionality of [Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013], the issue took the
case beyond the scope of the [Civil Service Commission's] jurisdiction because the
Hence, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that the
matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the [Regional Trial Court] did
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or petition.
Otherwise, it can never have the power to take cognizance of the case as not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action."155cralawrednad
contemplated by Soto.
The constitutional issues alleged in the Petition for declaratory relief do not suffice
for the Regional Trial Court to assume jurisdiction.
While both the court and the administrative agency have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the general rule is that the courts, because of comity, practicality,
The Civil Service Commission cannot be ousted from its jurisdiction "by the simple
and convenience, will not interfere with the administrative process until the process
comes to an end.150 This is because availing administrative remedies entails lesser expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an
expenses and results in a speedier resolution of controversies. 151 On the other issue"156 that clearly involves a personnel action.157cralawrednad
hand, since the court and the administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction,
In Corsiga v. Judge Defensor,158 petitioner Eduardo Corsiga (Corsiga), "then
exceptions may be warranted by the circumstances,152 and the court may choose
Regional Irrigation Manager of the [National Irrigation Administration], Region VI,
to assume jurisdiction over the controversy.
issued Regional Office Memorandum (ROM) No. 52, reassigning private
Hence, when jurisdiction is exclusively granted to an administrative agency, the respondent [Romeo Ortizo (Ortizo)] to [the] Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. Here, System[.]"159 Ortizo filed before the "Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City a complaint
for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining
considering that the Civil Service Commission is granted exclusive jurisdiction over
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction."160 He argued that the transfer or
cases involving personnel actions, the doctrine of primary administrative
assignment without his consent is a violation of his constitutional right to security of
jurisdiction, not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies.
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tenure.161 Corsiga moved to dismiss the Petition for lack of Reform,]"171 not in the regular courts. This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court
jurisdiction.162cralawrednad had no jurisdiction.172
The Court likewise ruled in the similar case of [Department of Agrarian Reform] v.
This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over Ortizo's Cuencathat "[a]ll controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive
Complaint.163 Hence:cralawlawlibrary Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of
It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal
grievance procedure in Rule XII, Section 6 of the same rules, that decisions of or constitutional in nature." In said case, it was noted that the main thrust of the
lower level officials be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service allegations in the Complaint was the propriety of the Notice of Coverage and "not x
Commission. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission, in turn, may be elevated x x the 'pure question of law' spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405
to the Court of Appeals. Under this set up, the trial court does not have — but x x x the annulment of the DAR's Notice of Coverage." The Court thus held
jurisdiction over personnel actions and, thus, committed an error in taking that:cralawlawlibrary
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 22462. The trial court should have dismissed the To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary
case on motion of petitioner and let private respondent question RMO[sic] No. 52 step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the
before the NIA Administrator, and then the Civil Service Commission. As held in propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under
Mantala vs. Salvador, cases involving personnel actions, reassignment included, the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted
affecting civil service employees, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly
Service Commission.164 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
Despite allegations of Regional Office Memorandum No. 52's constitutional The legal recourse undertaken by Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
infirmities, this court still upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Corporation, et al. is on all-fours with the remedy adopted by the private
Commission over cases involving personnel actions. respondents in Cuenca. In this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et al. cloaked the issue as a constitutional question — assailing the
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development constitutionality of administrative issuances promulgated to implement the agrarian
Corporation,165 Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation and the other reform law — in order to annul the titles issued therein. In Cuenca, private
respondents (Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, et al.) are respondents assailed the constitutionality of EO 45 in order to annul the Notice of
registered owners of a parcel of land in Negros Oriental.166 The Department of Coverage issued therein. The only difference is that in Cuenca, private
Agrarian Reform placed a substantial portion of the land under the coverage of the respondents directly filed with the RTC their complaint to obtain the aforesaid
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. reliefs while in this case, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et
6657.167 Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1989, Administrative Orders No. al. filed their original petition for certiorari with the RTC after the protest of Trinidad
12, Series of 1989, No. 9, Series of 1990, and No. 2, Series of 1996, Valley Realty and Development Corporation against the coverage of its
Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1990, Joint DAR-LRA Memorandum landholding under CARP was dismissed by the DAR Regional Director and such
Circular No. 20, Series of 1997, and Executive Order No. 405, among others, dismissal was affirmed by DAR OIC Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce. But in both
(collectively, Orders) were then issued.168cralawrednad cases, it is evident that the constitutional angle was an attempt to exclude the
cases from the ambit of the jurisdictional prescriptions under RA
Private respondents Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation, et al. filed 6657.173 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for declaration of unconstitutionality Invocations of issues of validity and constitutionality of Customs Personnel Order
through certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Land Registration No. B-189-2013 will not suffice for the courts to assume jurisdiction, if the order
Authority, the Department of Agrarian Reform, and the beneficiaries under the
sought to be declared invalid is a personnel action. Since the questioned order is a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program questioning the Orders.169 This was
personnel action, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission as the
later amended to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles.170 In its Answer,
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service must be upheld.
the Department of Agrarian Reform asserted that "jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters is exclusively vested in the [Department of Agrarian
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In any case, detail of government personnel to other offices does not involve and In Republic v. Roque,181 this court enumerated the requisites for a petition for
violate the employees' security of tenure in the absence of any grave abuse of declaratory relief to prosper:cralawlawlibrary
discretion or improper motive or purpose.174cralawrednad Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief: first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over private respondents' other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
Petition for declaratory relief. ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach
IV. of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
Private respondents rely on Commissioner of Customs, et al. v. Hypermix Feeds adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
Corporation.175 They argue that based on Hypermix, "[t]he determination of adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency proceeding.182 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
contravenes the law or the [Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular The third and sixth requisites are absent. The Complaint before the lower court did
courts."176 They add that the "Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the not simply ask for a declaration of a hypothetical breach. Adequate relief through
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential the Civil Service Commission was also available.
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts."177cralawrednad Executive Order No. 140 was published on September 17, 2013. According to
Section 9, Executive Order No. 140 shall take effect immediately. On September
In Hypermix, Hypermix Feeds Corporation filed a Petition for declaratory relief 17, 2013, Bureau of Customs Commissioner Rozzano Rufmo B. Biazon issued
before the Regional Trial Court, with the Petition challenging the validity and Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013. On September 30, 2013, private
constitutionality of Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) 27-2003.178 CMO 27-2003 respondents filed their Petition for declaratory relief. There was no denial by
classified wheat according to (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and private respondents that they did not report for work upon Custom Personnel
(3) port of discharge, and imposed different tariff rates depending on such Order No B-189-2013's effectivity.183 Private respondents Arnel C. Alcaraz, Ma.
classification.179This court concluded that "a petition for declaratory relief is the Lourdes V. Mangaoang, Romalino G. Valdez, Lilibeth S. Sandag, Ma. Liza S.
right remedy given the circumstances of the case."180Hypermix cannot be applied Torres, and Raymond P. Ventura only reported for work after the trial court's denial
because the circumstances in that case differ from the circumstances here of their application for a writ of preliminary injunction.184cralawrednad
as Hypermix does not involve a personnel action.
By not reporting for work upon the issuance of Customs Personnel Order No. B-
V. 189-2013 on September 17, 2015, private respondents committed a breach of the
Order. Since they committed the breach prior to the filing of their Petition for
A petition for declaratory relief may prosper only if there is no breach or violation declaratory relief, the petition is no longer available.
yet of the assailed government regulation, and adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. In Martelino, et al. v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, et
al.,185 petitioners (Martelino, et al.) obtained housing loans from respondents
Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:cralawlawlibrary National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Development Mutual
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, Fund.186 National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Development
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, Mutual Fund directly released the proceeds of the housing loans to the subdivision
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).187cralawrednad
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a Shelter did not complete the subdivision pursuant to its subdivision
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis supplied) plan.188 Martelino, et al. then filed a Petition for declaratory relief to determine
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whether they can suspend payment to National Home Mortgage Finance and demolition of a hotel owned by Boracay West Cove.195 On June 10, 2011,
Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund because of Shelter's failure to Executive Order No. 10 was implemented partially. 196cralawrednad
complete the subdivision and whether interests and penalties should also be
suspended.189cralawrednad To stop the implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Aquino filed a Petition for
certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals.197 The Court
This court found that at the time of the filing of their Petition for declaratory relief, of Appeals dismissed the Petition on the ground that the correct remedy was for
Martelino, et al. already suspended payment of their amortizations to National Aquino "to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Development Mutual Court."198cralawrednad
Fund.190 Hence, this court concluded that the Regional Trial Court cannot assume
jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief.191 Hence:cralawlawlibrary This court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and stated:cralawlawlibrary
Indeed, under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach
before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of
executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. In this an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights
case, the petitioners had stated in their petition that respondents assessed them and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance
interest and penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extra-judicial sale arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or
and threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other petitioners, all in disregard violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory
of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to complete the relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the
subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one thing: petitioners had already state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a
suspended paying their amortization payments. Unfortunately, their actual form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment, for their
guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer assume jurisdiction over the action for In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by
declaratory relief because its subject initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. [Executive Order No. 10's] enforcement and implementation. The closure and
No. 957 and relied upon — correctly or otherwise — by petitioners, and assumed demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued
by the RTC to be Rep. Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged [Executive Order
said in Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:cralawlawlibrary No. 10]. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper
. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure an authoritative remedy given such a situation.199(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, In City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,200 the City of Lapu-
contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
Lapu and the Province of Bataan demanded from the Philippine Economic Zone
issues arising from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach Authority payment of real property taxes.201 The Philippine Economic Zone
or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or
Authority filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court,
contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
"praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property
declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action....
taxes."202 This court ruled that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to
Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in
decide Philippine Economic Zone Authority's Petition for declaratory relief. 203 This
favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or
court explained:cralawlawlibrary
clarify short of a judgment or final order.192 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
We rule that the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority] erred in availing itself of a
In Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan,193 petitioner Crisostomo B. Aquino petition for declaratory relief against the City. The City had already issued demand
(Aquino) is "the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove letters and real property tax assessment against the [Philippine Economic Zone
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove)."194 The Office of the Mayor of Authority], in violation of the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority's] alleged tax-
Malay, Aklan issued Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011, ordering the closure exempt status under its charter.The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the
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subject matter of [Philippine Economic Zone Authority's] petition for declaratory Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an
relief, had already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had no action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief. action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before
There are several aspects of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the institution of the action.209
"the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
Private respondents argue that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 is void,
proceedings in question belong." It is conferred by law, which may either be the
producing no effect. Hence, "there is actually no breach, real or imaginary, to
Constitution or a statute. Jurisdiction over the subject matter means "the nature of speak of in this case."210cralawrednad
the cause of action and the relief sought." Thus, the cause of action and character
of the relief sought as alleged in the complaint are examined to determine whether
Subscribing to petitioners' theory will render ineffective the phrase before breach
a court had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Any decision rendered by a court
or violation thereof found in Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court when a
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is void.204 (Emphasis
petitioner questions the validity of a written instrument or governmental regulation.
supplied, citations omitted)
By arguing that the instrument or regulation questioned is void at the onset, a
Further, Tambunting, Jr. v. Spouses Sumabat205 declared that when a court petitioner may file any time a petition for declaratory relief with no regard to
assumed jurisdiction over a Petition for declaratory relief when there was already a whether he or she violated the "void" instrument or regulation.
breach of the subject instrument or government regulation, the orders made by
that court would be null and void for want of jurisdiction.206 Hence:cralawlawlibrary Private respondents' belated compliance with Customs Personnel Order No. B-
In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory 189-2013 cannot cure the defect of want of jurisdiction. In Gomez v. Palomar, etc.,
relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been et al.,211 this court declared:cralawlawlibrary
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such The prime specification of an action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought
circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one "before breach or violation" of the statute has been committed. Rule 64, section 1
or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to treat an action
judgment or final order. for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only if the breach or violation
occurs after the filing of the action but before the termination thereof.
Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing
of Civil Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took Hence, if, as the trial court itself admitted, there had been a breach of the statute
cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its decision before the filing of this action, then indeed the remedy of declaratory relief cannot
was void and without legal effect. As this Court held in Arevalo v. be availed of much less can the suit be converted into an ordinary
Benedicto:cralawlawlibrary action.212 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Furthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders its Considering that there was already a breach of Customs Personnel Order No. B-
judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal
189-2013 when private respondents filed their Petition for declaratory relief, the
effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be
Regional Trial Court can no longer act on the Petition for want of jurisdiction.
obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts
performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering further, that the
For a Petition for declaratory relief to prosper, there should be no other adequate
decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of relief available to petitioners.213 "If adequate relief is available through another form
law, and, hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment of action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for
cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.207 (Emphasis
declaratory relief."214cralawrednad
supplied, citations omitted)
This was reiterated in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al.208 where this court In Ferrer, Jr., et al. v. Mayor Roco, Jr., et al.,215 this court affirmed the dismissal of
declared:cralawlawlibrary a Petition for declaratory relief where the doctrine of primary administrative
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jurisdiction applied because it meant that there was another adequate remedy 189-2013 should be read as valid only for a period of one (1) year. Consistency in
available to petitioners.216cralawrednad executive issuances is of utmost importance.220 As much as possible, it is the duty
of the courts to harmonize and reconcile them.221cralawrednad
Here, private respondents' correct remedy was to file a Complaint or Petition
before the Civil Service Commission to assail their detail to the Customs Policy In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Presiding Judge Angeles,222 this
Research Office. Since they have another adequate remedy available to them, court ruled:cralawlawlibrary
their Petition for declaratory relief must fail. Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is,
admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among the administrative
All told, a Petition for declaratory relief was not an available remedy for private bodies affected by the edict, but not an abolition of executive power. Consistency
respondents. It was, therefore, error for the Regional Trial Court to assume in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the absence
jurisdiction over private respondents' Petition for declaratory relief. The Orders of of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each
the Regional Trial Court dated October 1, 2013, October 4, 2013, and October 21, other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in the construction of
2013 are declared void for want of jurisdiction. All other Orders of the Regional statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt a construction of a
Trial Court pursuant to private respondents' Petition for declaratory relief are also statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
void for lack of jurisdiction. provisions. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter
as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of
The Regional Trial Court should be directed to dismiss private respondents' the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old
Petition for declaratory relief. one.223 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Similarly, this court should also uphold as much as possible the validity of Customs
VI. Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 as a valid exercise of executive power to
conform to the Policies on Detail.
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 provides that it "shall be effective
immediately and valid until sooner revoked."217cralawrednad "Every inten[t] of the law should lean towards its validity, not its
invalidity."224 Hence, the duration of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013,
Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 021181 entitled Policies on Detail and being independent and severable from the order of detail itself, should be the only
dated September 13, 2002 "govern[s] the detail of employees in all agencies of the provision declared void.
government."218 Section 2 of Policies on Detail provides:cralawlawlibrary
Section 2. Duration of the Detail - the detail shall be allowed only for a maximum Since there is no record that private respondents consented to be detailed for
period of one year. Details beyond one year may be allowed provided it is with the more than one (1) year from September 17, 2013, Customs Personnel Order No.
consent of the detailed employee. The extension or renewal of the period of the B-189-2013, while effective for the duration of one (1) year from enactment,
detail shall be within the authority of the mother agency. already ceased to take effect.
If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he/she may The ponencia ruled that Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 violates
appeal his/her case to the proper Civil Service Commission Regional Section 3 of Executive Order No. 140 because at the time of its issuance, the
Office. Pending appeal, the detail shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by Customs Policy Research Office had no organic personnel yet. 225cralawred The
said regional office. Decision of said regional office may be further appealed to the ponencia also ruled that the Department of Finance Secretary had not yet issued
Commission en banc.219 (Emphasis supplied) rules and regulations for the Customs Policy Research Office.226cralawrednad
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 's provision stating that "[t]his Order
shall be effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked" appears contrary to There is nothing in Executive Order No. 140 that requires that the organic
Section 2 of Resolution No. 02-1181. Pursuant, however, to Section 2 of Civil personnel of the Customs Policy Research Office must first be organized and that
Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1181, Customs Personnel Order No. B- rules must first be issued by the Department of Finance Secretary before the
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Bureau of Customs can start forming its team that will augment and reinforce the Jesusa Garcia and City Accountant Edna Centeno (Echiverri, et al.) before the
organic personnel of the Customs Policy Research Office. Courts should avoid as Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of the Government Service
much as possible any construction invalidating administrative issuances.227 Unless Insurance System Act.4 Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman issued
there is a clear violation of Executive Order No. 140, Customs Personnel Order an Order5 of Preventive Suspension (Order of Suspension) on July 18, 2011
No. B-189-2013 should remain valid. against Echiverri, et al., to last until the administrative adjudication is completed
but not to exceed six (6) months.6
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition should be GRANTED. Private respondents' Petition
for declaratory relief filed before the Regional Trial Court should Aggrieved by the Order of Suspension, Echiverri, et al. elevated the matter to the
be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals (CA). While Echiverri, et al. were able to obtain a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction from the CA Special
14th Division, nevertheless, in its Decision7 dated January 2, 2012, the
CA affirmed the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman and lifted and set aside
November 22, 2017 the TRO. The decretal portion of the CA Decision of January 2, 2012 provides:
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
this Court is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the assailed Order
EDGAR R. ERICE, Complainant dated July 18, 2011 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-11-0401-
vs. G is hereby AFFIRMED.
PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO C. SISON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
125, CALOOCAN CITY, Respondent SO ORDERED.8
DECISION A week later, or on January 9, 2012, Echiverri, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 with the RTC of
CAGUIOA, J.: Caloocan City, which was docketed as Special Civil Action No. C-1060
(2012)10 Named as Respondents in the Petition/or Declaratory Relief were Erice
(Complainant in the present administrative matter) and the Department of Interior
This is an administrative matter1 filed by Edgar R. Erice (Erice) against the now- and Local Government (DILG). Echiverri, et al. prayed that the RTC "make a
retired Judge Dionisio C. Sison (Judge Sison) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting
Branch 125, Caloocan City, for violation of Section 8, paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 of adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of [their] suspension."11
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,2 in particular: (i) gross misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, (ii) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order
as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding, and (iii) gross On even date, RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72- hour ex-parte
ignorance of the law or procedure.3 Order to enjoin the DILG and Erice from implementing the Order of
Suspension. Subsequently, the case was raffled and assigned to Judge Lorenza
R. Bordios.12
BACKGROUND
In the summary hearing held on January 10, 2012, Erice and the DILG questioned
The facts leading to the filing of the complaint are as follows: the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the matter, considering that the object of
the Petition for Declaratory Relief were the CA Decision and the Order of
Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed a complaint against Suspension of the Ombudsman. They also raised the matter of forum shopping,
then Mayor Enrico R. Echiverri, City Treasurer Evelina Garma, Budget Officer with Erice and the DILG pointing out that Echiverri, et al. had a pending Motion for
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Reconsideration13 filed with the CA and a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the process in allowing them to file their written comment and to argue against the
Implementation of the Order of Preventive Suspension 14 with the Office of the Motion to Dissolve.24
Ombudsman.15
2. There was no "deplorable haste" in issuing the TRO and writ of preliminary
However, Judge Bordios inhibited herself from proceeding with the case on injunction because "of the limited time provided by the Rules of Court," in
January 11, 2012. The case was subsequently re-raffled to herein Respondent particular, Rule 58, Section 5; and that Erice' s counsel, "knowing this time
Judge Sison.16 constraint x x x should have made himself always ready to go to trial and to
present his testimonial and documentary evidences (sic)."25
On the same day, January 11, 2012, with the case now pending before Judge
Sison, Erice and the DILG reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to 3. While admitting that the DILG's counsel appeared before him and that he denied
Dissolve. That afternoon, Judge Sison noted that the 72-hour TRO of the Order of the OSG's claim of the right to cross-examine, Judge Sison claims that Erice failed
Suspension would be expiring the next day, on January 12, 2012, and that the to produce evidence that he made such rulings and therefore "should not be
parties ought to finish with the presentation of evidence before noon of January 12, believed."26
2012. Counsel for the DILG informed Judge Sison that the OSG was not informed
that the summary hearing would proceed at 2:00 p.m. of January 11, 2012 before The Office of the Court
Branch 125. Nevertheless, Judge Sison proceeded with the hearing and allowed Administrator (OCA) Report dated
Echiverri, et al. to present their evidence until 5:00 p.m. that day.17 November 4, 2014
The next day, at 8:00 a.m., the summary hearing continued. The OSG invoked its In its Report27 dated November 4, 2014, the OCA recommended that:
right to cross-examine the witnesses earlier presented by Echiverri, et al. but
Judge Sison denied the same, allegedly without consulting the records from x x x [R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law
Branch 126 that would indicate that the OSG had made reservations to this effect and FINED in the amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a warning
on January 10, 2012. At 9:15 a.m., Judge Sison issued an Order18 extending the
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.28
TRO to 20 days, inclusive of the 72-hour TRO earlier granted by Judge Kwong.19
The basis for the OCA's recommendation are as follows:
On the day scheduled for the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, January 17, 2012,
Judge Sison stated that he would hear evidence in support of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction. This compelled Erice to file an Urgent Motion to First, insofar as the alleged haste is concerned, indeed, this Court had ruled
lnhibit.20 Without ruling on the Motion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued in Leviste v. Alameda29 that "the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per
the Order21 granting the writ of preliminary injunction.22 se an indication of bias."30 Nevertheless, Judge Sison's act of issuing a TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction against Erice and the DILG to enjoin the latter from
enforcing the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension constitutes a violation of Section
For his part, in refuting the charges against him, Judge Sison denied any 14 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770,31 which provides:
allegations of the violation of the right to due process of Erice and the DILG in
allowing the summary hearing to proceed and Echiverri, et al. to present evidence
even though the OSG was not informed of said hearing.23 Judge Sison submitted SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
that: an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there
is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
1. There is no basis for the claim of bias and partiality because the reason for the
extension of the 72-hour TRO to a 20-day TRO was to accord Echiverri, et al. due
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No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, with a modification on the penalty
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. imposed on Judge Sison.1awp++i1
Second, in a similar case, Ogka Benito v. Balindong,32 therein Respondent Judge Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Balindong issued a 72-hour TRO and extended the same for 20 days, against the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC. It requires the judge to
enforcement of a DILG Department Order implementing a decision to suspend an perform his/her duty to be acquainted with the basic legal command of law and
official for nine months. This Court found that Judge Balindong's act constituted rules.38 Consequently, a judge becomes liable for gross ignorance of the law when
gross ignorance of the law for violating Section 14 of RA 6770. Judge Balindong there is a patent disregard for well-known rules so as to produce an inference of
was fined ₱30,000.00.33 bad faith, dishonesty and corruption.39
Third, the OCA observed that although denominated as a Petition for Declaratory Against these parameters, Judge Sison failed to perform his basic duty to be
Relief, it was clear that Echiverri, et al. merely sought the injunction to prevent the acquainted with the fundamentals of the very law he was tasked to uphold, and
implementation of the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension. In this regard, it is the this conclusion remains unchanged notwithstanding the Court's supervening
CA that has appellate jurisdiction over the administrative cases resolved by the Decision in Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals.40 In Carpio Morales, the Court: (1)
Ombudsman. Thus, Judge Sison cannot relax the rules, take cognizance of the declared as unconstitutional Section 14(2)41 of RA 6770, and (2) declared as
case, and issue a TRO and writ of injunction which are beyond his authority. 34 ineffective the policy in Section 14(1)42 of RA 6770 against the issuance of a
provisional injunctive writ by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
The OCA noted that this is Judge Sison's second offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-07- investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman until the Court adopts the
2050, he was found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and was fined same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
₱l0,000.00. Considering that this is Judge Sison's second offense, the penalty of issued therefor.43
suspension should have been imposed on him; however, since he was due for
compulsory retirement on December 9, 2014, the OCA recommended that in lieu Be that as it may, the subsequent declaration of the policy in Section 14(1) of RA
of suspension, Judge Sison should be meted a penalty of fine equivalent to one (1) 6770 as ineffective and of Section 14(2) as invalid, does not serve to exonerate
month's salary.35 Judge Sison from administrative liability because he failed to consider and act in
accordance with the basic principle of judicial stability or non-
This Court's Resolutions interference.44 Pursuant to this principle, where decisions of certain administrative
bodies are appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the
In a Resolution dated February 23, 2015, this Court noted the OCA Report dated RTCs and their actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC.45
November 4, 2014 recommending that Judge Sison be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be fined an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary, Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the
with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction
severely.36 to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in
disciplinary cases,46 more so, because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated August 5, 2015, this Court, acting on Judge January 10, 2012 and proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January
17, 2012 against the enforcement of the Ombudsman Order of Suspension, the
Sison's request for the payment of his terminal leave, resolved the same in his
CA had already affirmed that very same Order of Suspension in its Decisiondated
favor, and released the terminal leave benefits after retaining the amount
January 2, 2012.
equivalent to his two (2) months' salary, to answer for whatever penalty the Court
may impose against him in his pending administrative cases. 37
In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that court
orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory
DISCUSSION
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relief.47 They are not included within the purview of the words "other written
instrument"48 in Rule 6349 of the Rules of Court governing petitions for declaratory REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OF THE
relief. The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi- COMELEC AND COA
judicial bodies,50 and this is anchored on the
principle ofresjudicata.51 Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-
judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. 52 The
losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an G.R. No. 206987 September 10, 2013
action for declaratory relief.53
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the vs.
RTC "make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of the
[order of] preventive suspension,"54 effectively putting into question the CA- DECISION
affirmed Ombudsman Order of Suspension - a matter clearly beyond the ambit of
the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled with the deference to the basic precepts of
jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other conclusion than that Judge Sison PEREZ, J.:
acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.1âwphi1 Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the
As a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to canvass the votes cast for petitioner
01-8-10-SC, the penalty for gross ignorance of the law or procedure ranges from a Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) in the recently held 2013 Party-
fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00 to List Elections.
dismissal.55 Inasmuch as Judge Sison had already retired on December 9, 2014,
the imposition of the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible. In lieu of On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution
suspension, a fine may still be imposed.56 Considering that this is not Judge canceling petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation on three
Sison's first offense, the Court finds that the fine of Forty Thousand Pesos grounds, to wit:1
(₱40,000.00) is justified under the circumstances.57 In light of this Court's
Resolution dated August 5, 2015, the fine shall be charged against the retained I.
amounts from Judge Sison.
Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds retired Judge Dionisio C. Sison GUILTY of marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 of
gross ignorance of the law under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as R.A. No. 7941 and espoused in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, and is hereby ordered to PAY A FINE of Forty Labor Party v. Commission on Elections and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be deducted from his terminal leave benefits Commission on Elections.
earlier retained pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated August 5, 2015, with the
remaining amount to be released to Judge Sison immediately. II.
SO ORDERED. There is no proof showing that nominees Arthur J. Tariman and Julius D.
Labandria are actually nominated by ANAD itself. The Certificate of
Nomination, subscribed and sworn to by Mr. Domingo M.Balang, shows
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that ANAD submitted only the names of Pastor Montero Alcover, Jr., "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the
Baltaire Q. Balangauan and Atty. Pedro Leslie B. Salva. It necessarily arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
follows, that having only three (3) nominees, ANAD failed to comply with hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts
the procedural requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all
No. 9366. in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 6
III.
ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the promulgated the assailed Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a
2007 National and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. summary evidentiary hearing, thus violating its right to due process. It is to be
7166 ("R.A. No. 7166"). noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on23 August
2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD’s president, authenticated
ANAD went before this Court challenging the above-mentioned resolution. In documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Comelec,2 the Court remanded the case to the COMELEC to ANAD’s qualifications.7
for re-evaluation in accordance with the parameters prescribed in the aforesaid
decision. ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have called for another
summary hearing after this Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-
In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013,3 the COMELEC affirmed the evaluation in accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and Comelec . This is a superfluity.
disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that
while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political ANAD was already given the opportunity to prove its qualifications during the
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and summary hearing of 23 August 2012, during which ANAD submitted documents
regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its and other pieces of evidence to establish said qualifications. In re-evaluating
failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 ANAD’s qualifications in accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong
Elections. Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the COMELEC need not have called another
summary hearing. The Comelec could, as in fact it did,8 readily resort to
documents and other pieces of evidence previously submitted by petitioners in re-
Hence, the present petition raising the issues of whether or not the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without the appraising ANAD’s qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the
benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause, qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the summary hearing
of 23 August2012 continued until election day and even there after.
and whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted only
three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures in the 2007Elections.4 As to ANAD’s averment that the COMELEC erred in finding that it violated election
laws and regulations, we hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency
We dismiss the petition. tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings,
conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.9
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a petition for
certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three
nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing
the exercise of discretion.5
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for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and a. The amount of contribution, the date of receipt, and the full name,
Appropriating Funds Therefor).10 Such factual finding of the COMELEC was based profession, business, taxpayer identification number (TIN) and exact home
on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by petitioner during the 22 and business address of the person or entity from whom the contribution
and 23 August 2012summary hearings.11 was received; (See Schedule of Contributions Received, Annex "G")
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is essential as the said provision is a b. The amount of every expenditure, the date thereof, the full name and
safeguard against arbitrariness.1âwphi1Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941rids a party-list exact address of the person or entity to whom payment was made, and the
organization of the prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to purpose of the expenditure; (See Schedule of Expenditures, Annex "H")
switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to the COMELEC.
A Summary Report of Lawful Expenditure categorized according to the list
In Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec,12 the Court discussed the importance of Sec.8 of R.A. No. specified above shall be submitted by the candidate or party treasurer
7941 in this wise: within thirty (30) days after the day of the election. The prescribed form for
this Summary Report is hereby attached to these Rules as Annex "H-1."
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part
of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list c. Any unpaid obligation, its nature and amount, the full name and exact
that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will home and business address of the person or entity to whom said
not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees obligation is owing; and (See Schedule of Unpaid Obligations, Annex "I")
of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess d. If the candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution,
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall
nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the reflect such fact;
people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not
for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of e. And such other information that the Commission may require.
any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people,
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing The prescribed form for the Statement of Election Contributions and Expenses is
the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their attached to these Rules as Annex "F." The Schedules of Contributions and
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list Expenditures (Annexes "G" and "H", respectively) should be supported and
of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ accompanied by certified true copies of official receipts, invoices and other similar
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such documents.
circumvention.
An incomplete statement, or a statement that does not contain all the required
Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANAD’s failure to submit a proper Statement information and attachments, or does not conform to the prescribed form, shall be
of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC considered as not filed and shall subject the candidate or party treasurer to the
Resolution No. 9476, viz: penalties prescribed by law.
Rule 8, Sec. 3. Form and contents of statements. – The statement required in next As found by the COMELEC, ANAD failed to comply with the above-mentioned
preceding section shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the candidate or requirements as the exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of a list of total
by the treasurer of the party. It shall set forth in detail the following: contributions from other persons, a list of official receipts and amounts without
corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order slips and
donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were advanced
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subject to reimbursement or donated.13 This factual finding was neither contested Registrar, Register of Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S.
nor rebutted by ANAD. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O. CHENG, Respondents.
We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the x-----------------------x
rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts
of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence G.R. No. 199115
in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns
the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
– created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself – on a level
vs.
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. 14
DECISION
As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to PEREZ, J.:
comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections. 15 Thus, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it issued the assailed No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to
Resolution dated 11 May 2013. the Ombudsman.1 Hand in hand with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated
to investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of the people, criminal and
In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees, as well
200,972 votes.16 As such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast as private persons in conspiracy with the former.2 There can be no equivocation
for it are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the about this power-and-duty function of the Ombudsman.
House of Representatives.
Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the Petition, one is for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No.
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. 192685; and (2) the other is for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court docketed as G.R. No. 199115.
SO ORDERED.
Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution3 of the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-C-07-0444-J, dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against
respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin), Francis Serrano (Serrano),
Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS Order4 denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint
charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of
the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
G.R. No. 192685 July 31, 2013 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner, The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of
vs. Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 113171, which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on the administrative aspect of the
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mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of Republic Act No. Malayan Towers. Finally, Interim Receiver Mr. Fortunato Cruz is appointed as
3019 against the Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis supplied).
Ombudsman issued a Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding Espenesin guilty of
Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the penalty of one (1) month Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its
suspension. On motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the Ombudsman favored obligations to MICO under the JPDA and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April
Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and recalled the one-month suspension 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of Agreement
the Ombudsman had imposed on the latter. (MOA),7 allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development
and completion of The Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA,
These consolidated cases arose from the following facts. ASB had already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of the ₱640,847,928.48
purchase price of the realty.8
On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance
Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of
the construction of a condominium building to be known as "The Malayan Tower." The Malayan Tower representing their investments. It provides, in pertinent part:
Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the heart of the
Ortigas Business District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital
cost of construction and development of the condominium building. investment in the Project, each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net
saleable area of the Building that their respective contributions to the Project bear
A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof, and on the
contract, with MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing under the JPDA. basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction
Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will vest on ASB only upon full Costs (as defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled
payment of the purchase price. to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to,
adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
for Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, the SEC issued a (i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule
sixty (60) day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against the 2 hereof.
ASB Group of Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board,
body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from disposing of (ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from
paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c)
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an
appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of the ASB Group of
aggregate purchase price of ₱640,085,267.30 as set forth
Companies.5 Subsequently, the SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved
in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of
the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the ASB Group of Companies, thus: said presales);
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23
allotted parking spaces were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to January 2007, wrote respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief
its release, another set of CCTs covering the same subject units but with MICO as Financial Officer of MICO, respectively, introducing himself as an unsecured
registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of the ASB
Group of Companies.13Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name
the subject units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the
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MOA, and actually, already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of 5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry
Pasig City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units should have benefited of Deeds, committed an offense in connection with his official
him and other unsecured creditors of ASB because the latter had categorically duties by allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced
informed them previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool by respondent Serrano into altering the questioned CCTs; and
created under the Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately,
Ampil demanded that Yuchengco and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the 5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest
CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s name. partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable
negligence.
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.
6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of
As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public MICO, as principals by inducement and conspirators of Espenesin and
Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Serrano, are likewise liable for falsification of the CCTs and violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.15
Ombudsman, alleging the following:
As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-affidavits:
1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and intercalated Espenesin and Serrano filed individually, while Yuchengco and Cheng filed jointly.
and substituted the name of MICO under the entry of registered owner in Respondents’ respective counter-affidavits uniformly denied petitioner’s charges
the questioned CCTs covering the subject units of The Malayan Tower; and explicated as follows:
2. The alterations were done without the necessary order from the proper Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their intention was only to
court, in direct violation of Section 10814 of Presidential Decree No. 1529; cause the necessary rectification on certain errors made on the CCTs in issue; (ii)
that since the CCTs were not yet issued and released to the parties, it is still within
3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code by: his authority, as part of the registration process, to make the necessary
amendments or corrections thereon; (iii) that no court order would be necessary to
effect such changes, the CCTs still being within the control of the Register of
3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents;
Deeds and have not yet been released to the respective owners; (iv) that the
amendments were made not for the purpose of falsifying the CCTs in issue but to
3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine documents; make the same reflect and declare the truth; and (v) that he merely made the
corrections in accordance with the representations of respondent Serrano who he
3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO now appearing believed to be guarding and representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.
as registered owner of the subject units in Malayan Tower; and
Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in issue are not
3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak something false yet owned by ASB; (ii) that these units were specifically segregated and reserved
when ASB is the true owner of the subject units, and not MICO. for MICO in order to answer for any excess in the estimated cost that it will expend
in the completion of the Malayan Tower; (iii) that ASB is only entitled to these
4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the reserved units only after the Malayan Tower is completed and that the units are not
felonious acts of respondents; utilized to cover for the increase in the cost expended by MICO pursuant to
Section 4(c) of the MOA; (iv) that the Malayan Tower was still incomplete at the
5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019: time when the alterations were made on the CCT, hence, the claim of ownership of
ASB over the reserved units is premature and totally baseless; (v) that prior to the
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fulfillment of the resolutory condition, that is, after the completion of the Malayan On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman
Tower and there remains a balance in the Remaining Construction Cost, the units found Espenesin liable for Simple Misconduct. However, on motion for
still rightfully belongs to MICO; and (vi) that the alteration was made merely for the reconsideration of Ampil praying for a finding of guilt against Espenesin for Grave
purpose of correcting an error. Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman reconsidered its earlier resolution
and recalled the one-month suspension meted on Espenesin.
Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while adopting the foregoing arguments of
Espenesin and Serrano, further averred that: (i) Ampil has no legal personality to Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
file this suit, he being merely an unsecured creditor of ASB whose interest was not before the appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the
definitively shown to have been damaged by the subject controversy; (ii) that their Ombudsman’s resolution absolving Espenesin of not just Grave Misconduct and
participation as respondents and alleged co-conspirators of Serrano and Dishonesty, but also of Simple Misconduct.
Espenesin was not clearly shown and defined in the complaint; (iii) the CCTs
issued in the name of ASB have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
the time when the alterations were effected, hence, the same could still be made Ombudsman’s failure to find probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification
subject of appropriate amendments; (iv) that the CCTs in issue named in favor of of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, and for their
ASB were mere drafts and cannot legally be considered documents within the commission of corrupt practices under
strict definition of the law; (v) that court order authorizing to amend a title is
necessary only if the deed or document sought to be registered has already been
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and second, raising grievous error
entered in the registration book; and (vi) that MICO is the duly registered owner of
of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Ombudsman’s absolution of Espenesin
the land on which Malayan Tower stands and ASB was merely referred to as the from administrative liability.
developer.16
To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether probable
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685
cause exists to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under
dismissing Ampil’s complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether
Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for their commission of corrupt
respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units. The
Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA
and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is
the foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical finding adamant on the existence of probable cause to bring respondents to trial for
that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the Ombudsman falsification of the CCTs, and for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act
did not have probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin has been held administratively liable
because the last element of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document by the Ombudsman for altering the CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No.
speak something false, had not been established. 192685, the Ombudsman had not yet reversed its previous resolution finding
Espenesin liable for simple misconduct. He insists that the admission by
respondents Espenesin and Serrano that they altered the CCTs should foreclose
Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to all questions on all respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s, Yuchengco’s and
indict respondents for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Cheng’s) liability for falsification and their commission of corrupt practices, under
the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. In all, Ampil
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted with grave
Ombudsman denied Ampil’s motion and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. abuse of discretion.
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G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s
complaint. (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, (g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
unjust, improper, or inefficient"17 brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct
of preliminary investigation is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, are constitutionalized as protectors of the people, who "shall act (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government x x x, and shall, x x x notify the complainants of the (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
action taken and the result thereof."18 vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied).
The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that
are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause
prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of official pressure to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of
and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed
misfeasances committed by public officers.19 over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue
circumstances, to determine the existence of probable cause or the lack of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
thereof.20 On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one "for:
powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of
criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court Republic Act No. 3019, as amended."24 The Ombudsman even prefaced the
on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17
which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess September 2007 against respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and
of jurisdiction.22 Violation of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended."25
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s
discretion in determining probable cause: The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by
the specific allegations in Ampil’s complaint-affidavit that:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear violations of
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid Section 3 paragraph (a) and/or (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as
oppression or multiplicity of actions; the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act x x x;
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Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute inexcusable negligence; and
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent preference.28
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is tasked, among
offense. others, to review deeds and other documents for conformance with the legal
requirements of registration.29 Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
xxxx Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for
Other Purposes provides:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – The office of the Register of
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of office is situated.
licenses or permits or other concessions.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are: presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies
with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears
(1) the offender is a public officer; the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly
cancelled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to
reason therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
perform an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or
with Section 117 of the Decree.
influenced to commit an act;
x x x Espenesin justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs were still xxxx
under the possession and control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been
distributed to the owners, amendments can still be made thereon. If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not legally
authorized to determine the respective rights of the parties to the MOA when
It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the amendment was deciding on the petition for amendment and cancellation of title, all the more with
made, were obviously complete. From its face, we can infer that all have attained the Registrar of Deeds who is legally not empowered to make such determination
the character of a binding public document. The signature of Espenesin is already and to cause an automatic amendment of entries in the Registration Book on the
affixed thereon, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have basis of his unauthorized determination.
already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig
City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations to the contrary must be Espenesin’s liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized amendment of
convincingly and positively proven, otherwise, the presumption holds that the the CCTs in issue. This is regardless of whether the amendment had made the
CCTs issued in the name of ASB were regular and the contents thereon binding. CCTs speak of either a lie or the truth. What defines his error is his inability to
comply with the proper procedure set by law.33 (Emphasis supplied).
Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-
requisite before all these CCTs can be legally categorized as genuine documents. We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require
The fact that the same had already been signed by x x x Espenesin in his capacity certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term itself implies, probable cause is
as Register of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon appeared concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral certainty; 34 it is
to have been entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.35 It is sufficient that based on the
Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine documents preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission
drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer whose complained of constitutes the offense charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in
signature appears thereon. The law has made it so clear that it is the entry of the Raro v. Sandiganbayan,36 that:
title in the Registration Book that controls the discretion of the Register of Deeds to
effect the necessary amendments and not the actual delivery of the titles to the x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
named owners.
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section 108 of P.D. crime for which he was prosecuted.37
1529 is strictly called for. The provision is clear that upon entry of a certificate of
title (which definitely includes Condominium Certificate of Title) attested to by the Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be
Register of Deeds, no amendment shall be effected thereon except upon lawful
well-founded on such state of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a
order of the court.
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe — or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion — that it is so.38
In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were entered in
the Registration Book on March 11, 2005 at exactly 11:55 a.m., the notations A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
thereon were thereafter amended by Espenesin when Atty. Serrano purportedly
likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe
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that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and 1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The Malayan Tower
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of with the Office of the Register of Deeds, Pasig City;
guilt.39
2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture agreement, the MOA,
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is which Espenesin followed in the initial preparation and issuance of the
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the titles;
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 40 3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASB’s name were released,
Serrano returned and requested that some titles issued in the name of
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a ASB be changed to MICO because those titles were supposedly
pronouncement of guilt. erroneously registered to ASB; and
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute 4. Just on Serrano’s utterance and declaration which Espenesin readily
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable believed because he considered Serrano the representative of both
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to parties, and without any other documentation to base the amendment on,
procure a conviction.41 (Emphasis and italics supplied). Espenesin erased the name of ASB on those specified titles and replaced
it with the name of MICO.
In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he altered, nay
corrected, 38 certificates of title which we again reproduce for easy reference: Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serrano’s word alone that a supposed
error has been committed. Even if ownership of the units covered by the amended
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be CCTs has not been categorically declared as ASB’s given the ongoing dispute
issued in consonance with the sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were between the parties, the MOA which Espenesin had previously referred to,
correspondingly issued as per request, some in the name of MICO and some in allocates those units to ASB:
the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and
requested that some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital
because allegedly there was error in the issuance. investment in the Project, each party shall be entitled to such portion of all the net
saleable area of the Building that their respective contributions to the Project bear
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof, and on the
know and considered the representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB basis of the total costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction
Realty Corporation on those specified titles and placed instead the name Malayan Costs (as defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties shall respectively be entitled
Insurance Company. to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to,
adjustments as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the Remaining Construction Cost):
error committed in the issuance of titles. And since they were well within our
capacity to do, the titles not having been released yet to its owner, we did what we (i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule
believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake.42 2 hereof.
The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima facie case of (ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
gross negligence:
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(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate Espenesin disregarded the well-established practice necessitating submission of
purchase price of ₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all required documents for registration of property in the Philippines:
paid and unpaid proceeds of said pre-sales);
Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the Register of Deeds:
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which
shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project; and, 1. Common Requirements
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy + 2
the Remaining Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly duplicate copies)If the original copy cannot be produced, the
described in Schedule 4 hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon duplicate original or certified true copy shall be presented
completion of the Project and determination of its actual construction accompanied with a sworn affidavit executed by the interested
costs. If the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining party why the original copy cannot be presented.
Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.43
o Owner’s copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owner’s copy if one
The MOA even recognizes and specifies that: has been issued. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to certain o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered land.
buyers as set forth in Schedule 1 hereof, and in order to protect the interests of (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
these buyers and preserve the interest in the Project, the goodwill and business
reputation of Malayan, Malayan has proposed to complete the Project, and ASB
2. Specific Requirements
has accepted such proposal, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein,
including the contribution to the Project (a) by Malayan of the Lot and (b) by ASB
of its interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell. 1. Deed of Sale/Transfer
xxxx xxxx
Section 3. Recognition of ASB’s Investment. The parties confirm that as of the date For Corporation
hereof, ASB invested in the Project an amount equivalent to its entitlement to the
net saleable area of the Building under Section 4 below, including ASB’s interest 1. Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution to Sell or
as buyer under the Contract to Sell.44 Purchase (Original Copy + Duplicate Copy)
One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units remains in 2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee corporation) (1
dispute and, by necessary inference, does not lie as well in MICO. By his baseless Certified Copy of the Original)
reliance on Serrano’s word and representation, Espenesin allowed MICO to gain
an unwarranted advantage and benefit in the titling of the 38 units in The Malayan 3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Tower. (SEC) that the Articles of Incorporation had been
registered . (1 Certified Copy of the Original)
That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 exists is amply supported by the fact that
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4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
Transfer, affidavit/certificate of the Condominium respondents Espenesin and Serrano committed prohibited acts listed in Sections
Corporation that the sale/transfer does not violate the 60- 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
40 rule.(Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general assertions that the
5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate of the two, as officers of MICO, benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a
Condominium Management. (Original Copy) dearth of evidence pointing to their collective responsibility therefor. While the fact
of alteration was admitted by respondents and was affirmed in the Ombudsman’s
6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is finding of fact, there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and Cheng to the act.
required.(Original copy of the Court Order)
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft
Additional Requirements case exists against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are
xxxx
entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.46 In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman
11. Condominium Projects made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary
Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate investigation aspect of this case. We do not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack
Copy) thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and Serrano on the former’s good faith in
effecting the alteration and the pending arbitration case before the Construction
Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Industry Arbitration Commission involving the correct division of MICO’s and ASB’s
Copy) net saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are matters of defense which they
should raise during trial of the criminal case.
If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first time in
the name of the registered owner, require the following: As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of
public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in these cases, may give rise to civil,
o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and Land
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently
Use Regulatory Board (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
of the others.47
o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the
Ombudsman’s last ruling that Espenesin is not administratively liable.
o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy) 45
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than Serrano, who he particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. 48
"came to know and considered as representative of both parties," and Serrano’s
interpretation of the MOA that Serrano had brought with him.
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In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
must be manifest49 and established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall
necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct. 50 Thus, a person impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in
charged with Grave Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as
grave.51 provided in the preceding section.
In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or
Ombudsman’s own finding, present. Corruption, as an element of Grave amendment upon a certificate of title.
Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.52 This has already been Espenesin already signing the CCTs issued in ASB’s name as "only a part of the
demonstrated as discussed above. And, there is here a manifest disregard for issuance process because the final step in the titling procedure is indeed the
established rules on land registration by a Register of Deeds himself. As he release of the certificate of title."53 The Ombudsman further ruled:
himself admits in his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the specified
CCTs because he believed that Serrano’s request for the re-issuance thereof in
Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely rectified what was
MICO’s name constituted simple error.
represented to this office as error in the preparation of typing or the certificates,
hence, it is wrong to subject him to an administrative sanction. This is bolstered by
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides: the fact that, at the time of release (and perhaps even up to the present time),
there was no final determination yet from the land registration court as to who has
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or a better right to the property in question.54(Emphasis supplied).
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate
of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesin’s
Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of misconduct. It highlights Espenesin’s awareness and knowledge that ASB and
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the MICO are two different and separate entities, albeit having entered into a joint
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, venture for the building of "The Malayan Tower."
may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of
any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the
the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
reason for Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was
heed Serrano’s bidding. He heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is
made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate
constituted by law as "a public repository of records of instruments affecting
certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or
registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is
that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment
marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will Serrano sought was to correct simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could have
thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has
then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an authenticated writing to
been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution;
ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His
or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the
actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation
claim of bona fides mistake.
of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate,
or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond
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Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same order together with similar certificates of title and shall constitute the registration
MOA, in the initial preparation and issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. book for titled properties.
Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds who is required by law to be a member of the legal
profession,55 possesses common sense and prudence to ask for documents on Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may
which to base his corrections. Reliance on the mere word of even the point person be issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary
for the transaction, smacks of gross negligence when all transactions with the instrument relating to the same land shall be in like form, entitled "Transfer
Office of the Register of Deeds, involving as it does registration of property, ought Certificate of Title", and likewise issued in duplicate. The certificate shall show the
to be properly recorded and documented. number of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact
that it was originally registered, giving the record number, the number of the
That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration original certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration book in
of property, whether as an original or a subsequent registration, brooks no which the latter is found.
argument. Again, and it cannot be overlooked that, Espenesin initially referred to a
MOA albeit Serrano worked on the registration transaction for both ASB and Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer
MICO. Subsequently, Serrano returns, bearing ostensible authority to transact certificate of title in the record, is simultaneous with the signing by the Register of
even for ASB, and Espenesin fails to ask for documentation for the correction Deeds. The signature on the certificate by the Registrar of Deeds is accompanied
Serrano sought to be made, and simply relies on Serrano’s word. by the dating, numbering and sealing of the certificate. All these are part of a single
registration process. Where there has been a completed entry in the Record Book,
We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require documentation which as in this case where the Ombudsman found that "the signature of Espenesin is
would serve as his basis for the correction. The amendment sought by Serrano already affixed on the CCTs, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles
was not a mere clerical change of registered name; it was a substantial one, have already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of
changing ownership of 38 units in The Malayan Tower from one entity, ASB, to Pasig City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no longer
another, MICO. Even just at Serrano’s initial request for correction of the CCTs, a tamper with entries, specially the very name of the titleholder. The law says that
red flag should have gone up for a Registrar of Deeds.1âwphi1 the certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof.
Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration Book where the To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well
prohibition to erase, alter, or amend, without court order, applies." We disagree that "there is no final determination yet from the land registration court as to who
with Espenesin. Chapter IV on Certificate of Title of Presidential Decree No. has a better right to the property in question." Espenesin’s attempt to minimize the
1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie the claim of Espenesin: significance of a Registrar of Deed’s signature on a CCT only aggravates the lack
of prudence in his action. The change in the titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to
Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of MICO was an official documentation of a change of ownership. It definitely cannot
Deeds of the original and duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the be characterized as simple error.
same shall be entered in his record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed
and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate of Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public
title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall officer’s deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded
forthwith send notice by mail to the registered owner that his owner's duplicate is as grave when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees. disregard of established rules are present.57 In particular, corruption as an element
of grave misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his
Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
shall be filed in the Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive contrary to duty and the rights of others.58
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In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No. 11-13833 which dismissed, on the ground
legal rules.59 The penalty for Grave Misconduct is dismissalfrom service with the of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service, Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a small
including government-owned or controlled corporation.60 claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma Mondejar (respondent).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The The Facts
Resolution of the Ombudsman dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to file the On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule
necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. of Procedure for Small Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect from
3019 against public respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for
Francis Serrano. the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.7
The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect
Appeals dated 28 September 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113171 and the Order payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom
dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J are REVERSED is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From
and SET ASIDE. Respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family consumed a
Misconduct and we, thus, impose the penalty of DIMISSAL from service. However, total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed
due to his retirement from the service, we order forfeiture of all his retirement pay rate of ₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge of ₱11.60
and benefits. for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to ₱28,580.09.8 However,
respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of
SO ORDERED. ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite petitioner’s repeated demands. 9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she
religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water
consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would be adjusted
G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014 only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her
unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water per
month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water consumption
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis
vs. of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.10
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN
MONDEJAR, Respondent.
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the
adjusted water charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.11
RESOLUTION
The MTCC Ruling
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since petitioner
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23, was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water
2011and Order3 dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then, it can only charge
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respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated
₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that February 16, 2012, hence, the instant petition.
respondent had made total payments equivalent to ₱1,685.99 for the same period,
she should be considered to have fully paid petitioner.14 The Issue Before the Court
The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and Land Use The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing
Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) Decision15dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of
No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v. Dona Carmen I Subdivision, the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
et al., as source of its authority to impose new water consumption rates for water
consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that
The Court’s Ruling
petitioner complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its
consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the rates to be charged,
and (b) that the HLURB approved of the same.16 The petition is meritorious.
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
the exact date when it actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b)
that the parties had a formal agreement containing the terms and conditions SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the
thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The
obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of ₱75.00 per month decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for
should still be the basis for respondent’s water consumption charges for the period civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005.18 Based on petitioner’s computation,
respondent had only paid ₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00 obligation for said period. The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Thus, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to
₱1,200.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of receipt of Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-
the extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until fully paid.19 stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may,
thus, immediately move for its execution.25 Nevertheless, the proscription on
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an
Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish with certainty respondent’s certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance
collected. Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
The RTC Ruling In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ
of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.,
certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non- the Court ruled:
appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 2322of the Rule
of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special
supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any
pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded. plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without
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exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts
certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 33
determines the propriety of certiorari.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals: the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34 certiorari petitions assailing its
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This
the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC
remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so defined as a which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC
"remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy,
remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto
x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly for its proper disposition.
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the
inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011
and Resolution dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833 is
respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with
nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the court] to supplant the decision dispatch.
of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent to pay
the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded." 28 Verily, a petition for SO ORDERED.
certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action29 designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon
petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The
RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of
whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013
controversy.30
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the vs.
remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as
small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling. represented by its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper DECISION
forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
certiorari.31Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party
unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the
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Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum 7 issued by the casino’s
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the Branch Manager, Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with
Resolution2 dated September 30, 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72
CA"".G.R. SP No. 110048, which outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or
by herein petitioner Mark Jerome S. Maglalang (petitioner). Also assailed is the dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-
appellate court's Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which denied petitioner's explanation8 dated January 10, 2009.
motion for reconsideration.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum 9 dated March 19,
The facts follow. 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of
Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for
which was operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Reconsideration10 seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in
Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or controlled corporation existing by the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a
virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869.4 reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion,
petitioner also filed a Motion for Production11 dated April 20, 2009, praying that he
be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the
Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was
recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the
performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia
Board supposedly containing the latter’s factual findings. In a letter-reply12 dated
Nakasato5 (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an
undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed ₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00 bills. June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not indicate his authority
There were 45 ₱1,000.00 and ten ₱500.00 bills for the total amount of ₱50,000.00. therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion. Petitioner received said
letter-reply on June 17, 2009.
Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board.
However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five
clusters worth ₱10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for ₱10,000.00 Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum 13 dated June
each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of ₱40,000.00 to Cecilia. 18, 2009 practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum.
Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out ₱40,000.00. She Attached therewith is another Memorandum 14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by
then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for Human Resource and Development, Atty.
cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting on
recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills. May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and Petitioner received said memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.
correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that
Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is
continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt
take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the
them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision
respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse
which he submitted on the same day of the incident.6 to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day
suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense 1. IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
which is punishable only by reprimand. FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN DENYING THE LATTER’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION[;]
In its assailed Resolution16 dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed
the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust 2. IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS
administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUSPENSION OF THE
2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,17 the CA held that the CSC has PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY INVOLVED IS
jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all NOT MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;]
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such 3. IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY
as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration18 which the CA denied PETITIONER IN A MANNER WHICH IS UTTERLY CONTRARY TO LAW
in the assailed Resolution19 dated November 26, 2009. In denying the said motion, AND JURISPRUDENCE[;]
the CA relied on this Court’s ruling in Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica 20 citing
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where this Court held as 4. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION AS TO
follows:
THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT[;]
It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987
Constitution] government-owned or controlled corporations shall be considered 5. IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING
part of the Civil Service only if they have original charters, as distinguished from THAT THE ASSAILED DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE
those created under general law.
RESPONDENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD[; AND]
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869
on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the 6. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION
employee with the management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF
the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably
RESPONDENT WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
to the Administrative Code of 1987.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.22
Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and
power inter alia to:
jurisprudence that provide that when the penalty involved in an administrative case
is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and over the said administrative case. As authority, petitioner invokes our ruling in
employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving Geronga v. Hon. Varela23which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I,
dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known as The Administrative
Commission. Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides that the CSC may entertain appeals only,
among others, from a penalty of suspension of more than 30 days. Petitioner
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and asserts that his case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to
substantial error of judgment the CSC. Thus, he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a
petition for certiorari.25
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself
or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary,
that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A
first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen
the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system
as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose
of the case.
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(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same. The Ombudsman was not
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman
is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not cannot be questioned. Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative
exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to
office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross
appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a
in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual
department head. (Emphasis supplied.) findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or
reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a
Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 4730 of E.O. No. 292 finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of
essentially providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC. discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.It bears stressing that
Correlatively, we are not unaware of the Concurring Opinion of then Chief Justice the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special
Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit: civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely
Service Law.1âwphi1 For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under
agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is
amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy reason for grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies
only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not
employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the
quasijudicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.33
not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-
emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted
from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari
appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal
a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed. standing and should therefore be set aside.
Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the
unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of
Francisco,32 we held: discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari
Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent
month is final and unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual
matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or
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when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas,
facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this Court is Jr.(VestidasJr.)were charged before the CTA under an Information which reads:
not a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in
order. That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated named accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as
September 30, 2009 and November 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring and
SP No. 110048 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858
cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security
No pronouncement as to costs. Premium 2012, subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration under Import Entry
No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of
SO ORDERED. Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing
No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons
of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties
amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred
Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in violation of
G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013 the above-captioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in
the amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).4
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE CAESAR A. In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and VestidasJr.pleaded "Not Guilty" to
CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE the aforementioned charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held on
JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; September 5, 2012 followed by thepre-trial on September 13, 2012. Both the
and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO MENDOZA VESTIDAS, prosecution and the defense agreed to adopt the joint stipulations of facts and
JR., Respondents. issues entered in the course of the preliminary conference.
PER CURIAM: The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whoessentially observed5 the
physical examination of Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted6 by the
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained7 the process of electronic filing under the
review the March 26, 20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged
Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-285, ordering the dismissal of the case misdeclared goods therein.
against the private respondents for violation of Section 36023 in relation to
Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer
Codeof the Philippines, as amended, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. of Evidence on December 10, 2012.
b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection
not presented as evidence; and Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15,
2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case.
c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification
of the two accused as the ones responsible for the supposed Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
misdeclaration. theCTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by
the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the caseagainst Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the
its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish theirguilt witnesses failed to positively identifythe accused as responsible forthe
beyond reasonable doubt. misdeclaration of goods.
According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
showing that the certified true copies of the public documents offered in evidence
against both accused were in fact issued by thelegal custodians." 8 It cited Section At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, whichprovidesthat"when the original of periodfor the filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition itself statedthat a copy of the
a document is a public record, it should not generally be removed from the office or May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its
place in which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its contents may be promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the
proven using secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain to the certified developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr. (Atty.
true copy of the original document issued by the public officer in custody Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
thereof.Hence, the CTA wrotethat the certified true copiesof the public documents judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties.
offered in evidence should have been presented in court. According toAtty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the
May 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.Thus, it was prayed that the petitionbe given
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to comply due course despite its late filing.
with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.
copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody." Considering that the private Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureis explicit in stating
documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became part of public thatcertiorarishould be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present the certified judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
true copies of thedocuments. inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.13 While there are recognized
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this
party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for recourse, the end result would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a
his/her failure to comply with the rules.15 criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court,it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this case, a perusal of
was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the records show the challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose any indication of grave
that the petition was filedonly on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the abuse of discretion on its partor denial of due process.The records are replete with
due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact,
only be unfairto the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.1âwphi1
attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons
proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of
leniency. judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
incoming court processes that neededto be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked and hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in
toeffectively curb smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.
revenue every year.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of
The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
suspectthat the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by designfrom equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to
the failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.18
to identify the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this petition on time
challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs ofa reluctantand WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26, 2013 and
subduedattitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in May 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are AFFIRMED.
government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the
administration of justice. Verily, the lawyersrepresenting the offices under the The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation for
executive branchshould be reminded that theystill remain as officers of the possible criminal or administrative offenses committed by the Run After the
courtfrom whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG),
not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and handling of the subject complaint for
goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
similar activities.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Secretary
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with of Finance, the Collector of Customs, and the Office of the Ombudsman for their
the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal guidance and appropriate action.
case and the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been
eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the first place,
SO ORDERED.
presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.
(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but
Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support of the studies of because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in
his brothers Antonio and Federico, view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in
the United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year-
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received
of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving Nadal,
(a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct a certification of good moral character. 11
and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th
meeting on 02 September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly
meeting on 31 January 1980, and further amended at its 1017th against the advice of his counsel. 12The motion was placed on the agenda of the
B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988).5 February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day before said date, Senator Shahani
wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's case be
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT6 rendered a decision in SDT Case deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting.
No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his
STFAP application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for
but finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information about the reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to accommodate the
income of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item on its agenda.
Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993
studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by agenda but in view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was
paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June 1992]." As such, the deferred.
SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and
required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the
Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the
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"material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes, pending
beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila
(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement in his STFAP
Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone application that he was granted scholarship while he was in high
call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received
records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed financial assistance, then the conditional votes would be
that Nadal Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. The
case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty Chairman requested the President to make the verification as
of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the soon as possible the next day. In answer to a query, the Chairman
verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo, there
would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.
U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that
"a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional
considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the votes.
respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in
the investigation and the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for The Chairman himself did not vote. 13
his AdeMU high school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983
does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty as charged' before the SDT,"
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect
since the formal charges against him do not include withholding of information that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That
regarding scholarship grants received from other schools. evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza
Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal
At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into "guilty" as the members voted as follows: six members — guilty, three members —
executive session where the following transpired: not guilty, and three members abstained. 14Consequently, the BOR imposed on
Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-
The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or
the Secretary to reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with
decisions of the Board in executive session, with only the Board 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of
members present. records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. 15
A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that
guilty or not guilty as charged of willful withholding of information "after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely
in relation to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his) financial
Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed for obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature take its
Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding
of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph the case. 16
(a), Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct
and Discipline, as amended. However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A.
during the Executive Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:
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After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows: decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case
No. 91-026 entitled University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P.
a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent; Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the
Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon Room, Westin Phil.
Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.
b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision
rendered on 28 March 1993, exonerating petitioner from all the
charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No. 91-026; SO ORDERED.
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana,
litigation expenses of at least P150,000.00. Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on
the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile witness.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17 On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued the following Order:
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In
admitted that there was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although
the conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he was "not morally inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular,
convinced that there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers
Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently
axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose
with his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all
Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards
honesty and integrity are requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar laid down by the academic institution.
examinations. This is the reason why a certification of good moral character is one
of the documents that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules
fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of
proved, is a ground for disqualifying him. students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents
are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually
To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools.
respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in
connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, indispensable to the successful management of the college. The
the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a
invoked and rightfully exercised. step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread The Solicitor General for respondents.
upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise
of academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung
wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him
from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first NARVASA, J.:
semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the University
officials helplessly watching him complete his academic requirements for taking
A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government
the Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in
power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals
effect render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally
of the martial law regime. Relief to the victims must be as it is hereby extended by
imposed upon him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to
the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning
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as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained 3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money
of. and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of
Lands) had the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit
Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien on the "and by selling it
1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale
from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring being deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the
about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan sale being applied to the payment of the costs of the court and all installments due
City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was or to become due; and
cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The
Tuasons took possession of their property. 4) in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the
land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance," the certificate of title
Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one over the land to issue and become effective in the manner provided by the Land
morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the Registration Act. 1
land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the
other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding 2 that Carmel had failed to
the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona complete payment of the price. It adjudged that —
fide occupants thereof."
... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made
law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest
powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on
invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier which the dwellings of the members of said Association 3 stand.
purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government, and
several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land the land now occupied by the members of said association has
bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the
Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to
Under these statutes: segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the
Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the
1) a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase (if he did not wish to law and public policy.
lease) the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or
on installment; the interested buyer was given a certificate of sale, which was Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and
regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in the and at the all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the
interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of
of the government; the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and
sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." 4
2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and
any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree
explicitly declared to 'be invalid as against the Government ... and ... in all respects contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that
subordinate to its prior claim;" the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact
the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of
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the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the
occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of
physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition
absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived
of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the
"occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants. constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the
provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and
But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory
Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be
as they, in the following imperious manner: compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the petition, 7 he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081, dated or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or
September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause
22, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation 8 they
contracts between the government and the original purchasers, had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price
are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social
subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter, justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the
covering lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were
1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 (LRC PSD-1730), all of Tala Estate, left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park
Caloocan City, are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that
initio as against the Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.
Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605, covering lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all
in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons,
subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa
declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands by the
Government; and that said lots are declared open for disposition same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and
and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition.
Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended.
The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ
of certiorari 9 may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike
On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or
caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following: ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ
of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions,
MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to
certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions
considered cancelled as against the Government and the property
One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition to intervene These arbitrary, capricious and oppressive decrees, tailored to suit the deposed
substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit 18 and was President's every wish and whim, were the product of unrestrained power, as the
consequently given due course by the Court. They are therefore covered by this deposed President took over the entire government with the imposition of martial
judgment. law in September, 1972. Such unrestrained exercise of power was heightened by
the Court's majority pronouncement in April, 1983 (even as martial law had been
WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and lifted at least on paper two years earlier by Proclamation No. 2045 in January,
void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the 1981) that in times of grave emergencies, "The President takes absolute
inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the command, for the very life of the nation and its government, which, incidentally,
memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only
respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him
restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them." 1
desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No.
293. No pronouncement as to costs. It certainly cannot be gainsaid that such judicial abdication turned back the clock
to lese majeste and dismantled the intricate system of reenforcing rules, principles
Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, and procedures that have evolved through centuries of struggle for the more
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes JJ., concur. efficacious protection through independent courts of the individual's right to life,
liberty and property and due process of law, so that they would no longer have to
depend upon prayers for the purpose.
This concurrence is to express the fervent prayer that we have learned well our
lesson that absolute power corrupts absolutely and that as Thomas Jefferson
warned (which sadly proved to be true in our case), "a single consolidated
government would become the most corrupt government on earth."
Separate Opinions We have won back our freedoms and restored democracy with three great
departments of government, and separation of powers and checks and balances.
As Rizal taught us, freedom must be nurtured and cherished, not abused, else we
lose or forfeit it. We must reconsecrate ourselves to the supremacy of the Rule of
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: Law and renew once more our faith in and adherence to the force of law, rather
than the law of force-for only in the Rule of Law may a democracy survive and
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries G.R. No. 203124 June 22, 2015
back, Parliament would at times enact bills or statutes which declared certain
persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex PROVINCE OF LEYTE, herein represented by MR. RODOLFO BADIABLE, in
Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modem terms, a bill of his capacity as the ICO-Provincial Treasurer, Province of Leyte, Petitioner,
attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It vs.
envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life or liberty ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
or property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat.
While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and DECISION
penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal
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PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: damage that it stands to suffer from the Province of Leyte’s acts is irreparable as
there is no assurance that it will be able to recover such losses.10
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated
September 21, 20112 and August 3, 20123of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. The RTC Ruling
SP No. 04575, which dismissed petitioner Province of Leyte's (Province of Leyte)
petition for certiorari before it on the ground of, inter alia, lack of proof of service of In an Order11 dated April 18, 2008, the RTC denied EDC’s motion on the ground
such petition to the adverse party, respondent Energy Development Corporation that its grant would in effect dispose of the cases before it. However, on EDC’s
(EDC). motion,12 the RTC issued an Order13 dated July 17, 2009 setting aside its earlier
order, and accordingly, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in
The Facts its favor. Contrary to its earlier ruling, the RTC held that the main action would not
be disposed of even though, in the meantime, the Province of Leyte would be
Sometime in 2006 and 2007, the Province of Leyte issued four (4) separate enjoined from collecting franchise taxes from EDC. The RTC further noted that in
franchise tax assessments against EDC which the latter, in turn, protested case EDC is ultimately held liable for said taxes, the injunction bond would initially
separately. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied all protests, EDC and substantially answer for the Province of Leyte’s claim. On the other hand, if
appealed such denials before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6 EDC is compelled to pay such taxes pending resolution of the cases before the
(RTC), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 2006-05-48, 2006-05-49, 2006-07-77, and RTC and is subsequently adjudged not liable to pay the same, there is no
2007-08-03.4 Upon motion of EDC, the RTC issued an Order5 dated February 4, assurance that it could recover its operational losses.14
2008 directing the consolidation of said appeals.6
Aggrieved, the Province of Leyte elevated the matter before the CA by way of a
Notwithstanding the pendency of the cases before the RTC, the Province of Leyte petition for certiorari.15
issued another tax assessment against EDC on February 27, 2008, with the
Assistant Provincial Treasurer verbally intimating to EDC that he was under strict The CA Ruling
instruction from the Governor to enforce the collection of tax through the available
administrative remedies upon the lapse of the sixty (60)-day period mentioned in In a Resolution16 dated September 21, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition on the
the assessment.7 ground that, inter alia ,"there was no proper proof of service of the [p]etition to the
adverse party. Certainly, registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient
This prompted EDC to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary proper proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail."17
Injunction8 dated April 4, 2008 praying that the RTC enjoin the Province of Leyte
"from assessing, or attempting to assess, collecting or attempting to collect The Province of Leyte moved for reconsideration,18 which was, however, denied in
franchise taxes from, and availing [itself] of enforcement remedies or actions a Resolution19 dated August 3, 2012; hence, this petition.20
against [EDC] until [the pending cases before the RTC] shall have been resolved
with finality."9 The Issue Before the Court
In support of its motion, EDC averred that it does not have a franchise; hence, the
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
Province of Leyte’s assessment of franchise taxes against it is contrary to law and
dismissed the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it due to its failure to
would result in the payment of illegally exacted taxes if not enjoined. It was further
provide proof of service of the same on EDC.
claimed that should the Province of Leyte’s actions continue, EDC’s operations will
be seriously imperiled and will altogether cease, resulting in loss of substantial
revenues amounting to approximately Twenty One Million Pesos (21,000,000.00) The Court's Ruling
per day, as well as loss of jobs for its employees. Finally, EDC contends that the
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The petition is meritorious. registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
At the outset, it must be stressed that the instant case was elevated to the CA via together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to
a petition for certiorari which is, by nature, an original and independent action, and the addressee.
therefore, not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of.21 Being an original action, there is a need for the Relying on Aramburo v. CA,25 the CA held that while the Province of Leyte
CA to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case before it can presented the registry receipt, it failed to include the registry return card; hence,
resolve the same on the merits. Naturally, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the there was no valid proof of service to EDC, which must then result in the dismissal
person of the petitioner – which is the Province of Leyte in this case – upon the of the Province of Leyte’s petition.26
filing of the certiorari petition. On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), which covers cases originally filed before the CA, provides how the The CA erred in this regard.
CA is able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent:
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules provides the procedural requirements in filing
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. – The court shall original actions before the CA, to wit:
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its
order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.
submission to such jurisdiction.
– The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the
Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA , the latter acquires jurisdiction factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed
over the person of the respondent upon: ( a ) the service of the order or resolution for.
indicating the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or ( b ) the
voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction. In the case at bar,
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates
records reveal that the CA served its Resolution22 dated November 4, 2009 showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof
indicating its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it, i.e., was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and
directing EDC to file a comment to the petition, among others. In fact, the EDC
when notice of the denial thereof was received.
complied with such directive by filing its comment23 dated December 14, 2009 to
such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties to
the instant case. It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service
thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
Despite the foregoing, the CA still opted to dismiss the Province of Leyte’s petition
original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
before it on the ground that, inter alia, there was no proper proof of service of the
thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other
petition to EDC in accordance with Section 13, Rule 13, of the Rules,24 which
documents relevant or pertinent thereto
reads:
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall
SEC. 13. Proof of Service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a written be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.1âwphi1
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of
the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of
service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed before the CA should include
of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If proof of service to the other party. Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the such party of the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already
Considering that in this case, the CA had already issued a Resolution dated
November 4, 2009 directing EDC to file a comment which the latter had complied
with, it cannot be denied that EDC was already aware of the certiorari proceedings G.R. No. 207145 July 28, 2015
before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over its person. The CA,
therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural mishap
and resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice. The GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN
Court’s pronouncement in Barra v. Civil V. APOLINARES, MA. LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M.
INTIA, RUBEN C. CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA
NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION,
Service Commission27 is instructive on this matter: INC., Petitioners,
vs.
Courts should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do not FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
really impair the proper administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of Budget and Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his capacity as
technicalities, every litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III,
proper and just determination of his case, free from the constraints of in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
technicalities. Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment (CSC), Respondents.
of justice, and even the Rules of Court expressly mandates that "it shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and DECISION
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 28
PERALTA, J.:
Verily, the demands of justice require the CA to resolve the issues before it,
considering that what is at stake here are taxes, albeit locally imposed in this case,
which are the nation’s lifeblood through which government agencies continue to Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
operate and with which the State discharges its functions for the welfare of its Rules of Court filed by the officers and members of the Philippine Public Health
constituents.29 Thus, it is far better and more prudent for the Court to excuse a Association, Inc. (PPHAI) assailing the validity of Joint Circular No. 1 1dated
technical lapse and afford the parties a substantive review of the case in order to November 29, 2012 of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
attain the ends of justice than to dismiss the same on mere technicalities. 30 Department of Health (DOH) as well as Item 6.5 of the Joint Circular2 dated
September 3, 2012 of the DBM and the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
In view of the foregoing discussion and the fact that the CA had dismissed the
case on purely procedural grounds, the Court deems it appropriate to remand the The antecedent facts are as follows:
case to the CA to thresh out its merits.
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated Carta of Public Health Workerswas signed into law in order to promote the social
September 21, 2011 and August 3, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. and economic well-being of health workers, their living and working conditions and
SP No. 04575 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. CA-G.R. SP No. 04575 is terms of employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped
REINSTATED and REMANDED to the CA, which is DIRECTED to resolve the to deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper
case on the merits. qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government
Section 21. Hazard Allowance. - Public health workers in hospitals, sanitaria, rural 6.3. Longevity Pay.- A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%)of the
health units, main health centers, health infirmaries, barangay health stations, present monthly basic pay shall be paid to public health workers for every five (5)
clinics and other health-related establishments located in difficult areas, strife-torn years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified by the
or embattled areas, distressed or isolated stations, prisons camps, mental Head of Agency/Local Chief Executives commencing after the approval of the Act.
hospitals, radiation exposed clinics, laboratories or disease-infested areas or in (April 17, 1992)
areas declared under state of calamity or emergency for the duration thereof which
expose them to great danger, contagion, radiation, volcanic activity/eruption, xxxx
occupational risks or perils to life as determined by the Secretary of Health or the
Head of the unit with the approval of the Secretary of Health, shall be 7.1.1. Eligibility to Receive Hazard Pay.- All public health workers covered under
compensated hazard allowances equivalent to at least twenty-five percent RA 7305 are eligible to receive hazard pay when the nature of their work exposes
(25%) of the monthly basic salary of health workers receiving salary grade 19 and them to high risk/low risk hazards for at least fifty percent (50%) of their working
below, and five percent (5%) for health workers with<="" b=""> hours as determined and approved by the Secretary of Health or his authorized
representatives.
Section 22. Subsistence Allowance. - Public health workers who are required to
render service within the premises of hospitals, sanitaria, health infirmaries, main xxxx
health centers, rural health units and barangay health stations, or clinics, and other
health-related establishments in order to make their services available at any and
7.2.1. Eligibility for Subsistence Allowance
all times, shall be entitled to full subsistence allowance of three (3) meals which
may be computed in accordance with prevailing circumstances as
determined by the Secretary of Health in consultation with the Management- a. All public health workers covered under RA 7305 are eligible to
Health Worker's Consultative Councils, as established under Section 33 of this receive full subsistence allowance as long as they render actual
Act: Provided, That representation and travel allowance shall be given to rural duty.
health physicians as enjoyed by municipal agriculturists, municipal planning and
development officers and budget officers. b. Public Health Workers shall be entitled to full Subsistence
Allowance of three (3) meals which may be computed in
Section 23. Longevity Pay.- A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent accordance with prevailing circumstances as determined by the
(5%)of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to a health worker for every five (5) Secretary of Health in consultation with the Management-Health
years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified Workers Consultative Council, as established under Section 33 of
by the chief of office concerned, commencing with the service after the approval of the Act.
this Act.4
c. Those public health workers who are out of station shall be
entitled to per diems in place of Subsistence Allowance.
Subsistence Allowance may also be commuted.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
xxxx xxxx
7.2.3 Rates of Subsistence Allowance 8.3 The Subsistence Allowance shall be ₱50for each day of actual full-time
service, or ₱25for each day of actual part-time service.
a. Subsistence allowance shall be implemented at not less than
Ph₱50.00 per day or Ph₱1,500.00 per month as certified by head xxxx
of agency.
9.0 Longevity Pay (LP)
xxxx
9.1 Pursuant to Section 23 of R.A. No. 7305, a PHW may be granted LP at 5% of
d. Part-time public health workers/consultants are entitled to one- his/her current monthly basic salary, in recognition of every 5 years of continuous,
half (1/2)of the prescribed rates received by full-time public health efficient, and meritorious services rendered as PHW. The grant thereof is based on
workers.6 the following criteria:
On July 28, 2008, the Fourteenth Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4, entitled 9.1.1 The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and
Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the
Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the 9.1.2 He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been
Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and found guilty of any administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered
for other Purposes, approved by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June by the 5-year period.
17,2009, which provided for certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its IRR.
In a letter9 dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget
On September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed and Management and Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed their opposition
issuances, DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules to the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same diminishes the
on the grant of Step Increments due to meritorious performance and Step benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.
Increment due to length of service.7 Specifically, it provided that "an official or
employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not Unsatisfied, petitioners, on May 30, 2013, filed the instant petition raising the
eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service."8 Shortly following issues:
thereafter, on November29, 2012, respondents DBM and DOH then circulated the
other assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, the
relevant provisions of which state: I.
7.0. Hazard Pay. - Hazard pay is an additional compensation for performing WHETHER RESPONDENTS ENRIQUE T. ONA AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD
hazardous duties and for enduring physical hardships in the course of performance ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED SUBSTANTIVE
of duties. DUE PROCESS WHEN THEY ISSUED DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S.
2012 WHICH:
As a general compensation policy, and in line with Section 21 of R. A. No. 7305,
Hazard Pay may be granted to PHWs only if the nature of the duties and A) MADE THE PAYMENT OF HAZARD PAY DEPENDENT ON
responsibilities of their positions, their actual services, and location of work expose THE ACTUAL DAYS OF EXPOSURE TO THE RISK INVOLVED;
them to great danger, occupational risks, perils of life, and physical hardships; and
only during periods of actual exposure to hazards and hardships.
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B) ALLOWED PAYMENT OF SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE AT V.
₱50 FOR EACH DAY OF ACTUAL FULL-TIME SERVICE OR ₱25
FOR EACH DAY OF ACTUAL PART-TIME SERVICE WITHOUT WHETHER RESPONDENTS' ISSUANCE OF DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO.
CONSIDERATION OF THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES AS 1, S. 2012 IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF
DETERMINED BY THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH IN LEGISLATIVE POWER BY ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES WHEN THE SAME WAS
CONSULTATION WITH THE MANAGEMENT HEALTH ISSUED SANS CONSULTATION WITH PROFESSIONAL AND HEALTH
WORKERS' CONSULTATIVE COUNCILS; WORKERS' ORGANZATIONS AND UNIONS.
C) REQUIRED THAT LONGEVITY PAY BE GRANTED ONLY TO Petitioners contend that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion when
PHWs WHO HOLD PLANTILLA AND REGULAR POSITIONS; they issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 and DBM-CSC Joint
AND Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 which prescribe certain requirements on the grant of
benefits that are not otherwise required by RA No. 7305. Specifically, petitioners
D) MADE THE JOINT CIRCULAR EFFECTIVE ON JANUARY 1, assert that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular grants the payment of Hazard Pay only if
2013, BARELY THREE (3) DAYS AFTER IT WAS PUBLISHED IN the nature of the PHWs' duties expose them to danger when RA No. 7305 does
A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION ON DECEMBER not make any qualification. They likewise claim that said circular unduly fixes
29, 2012, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON PUBLICATION. Subsistence Allowance at ₱50 for each day of full-time service and ₱25 for part-
time service which are not in accordance with prevailing circumstances determined
II. by the Secretary of Health as required by RA No. 7305. Moreover, petitioners fault
respondents for the premature effectivity of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular which
they believe should have been on January 29, 2012 and not on January 1, 2012.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS FRANCISCO T. DUQUE AND FLORENCIO B.
As to the grant of Longevity Pay, petitioners posit that the same was wrongfully
ABAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THEY ISSUED
granted only to PHWs holding regular plantilla positions. Petitioners likewise
DBM-CSC JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S. 2012 DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 2012
criticize the DBM-CSC Joint Circular insofar as it withheld the Step Increment due
WHICH PROVIDED THAT AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO
LONGEVITY PAY UNDER EXISTING LAW SHALL NO LONGER BE GRANTED to length of service from those who are already being granted Longevity Pay. As a
result, petitioners claim that the subject circulars are void for being an undue
STEP INCREMENT DUE TO LENGTH OF SERVICE.
exercise of legislative power by administrative bodies.
III.
In their Comment, respondents, through the Solicitor General, refute petitioners'
allegations in stating that the assailed circulars were issued within the scope of
WHETHER RESPONDENTS' ISSUANCE OF DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. their authority, and are therefore valid and binding. They also assert the authority
1, S. 2012 IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF of Joint Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009, approved by the President, in
LEGISLATIVE POWER BY ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES WHEN RESPONDENT accordance with the prescribed procedure. Moreover, respondents question the
ONA ALLOWED RESPONDENT ABAD TOSIGNIFICANTLY SHARE THE remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition used by petitioners for the assailed circulars
POWER TO FORMULATE AND PREPARE THE NECESSARY RULES AND were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative, and not of their judicial or
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE MAGNA CARTA. quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his legal rights of the parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.14 Quasi judicial functions apply to the
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in actions and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies required to
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.15 Ministerial
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.16
xxxx
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights under which
adverse claims are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to determine the law and
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. 17 In this case,
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject
circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative
require.10
functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in
their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by
Thus, on the one hand, certiorari as a special civil action is available only if: (1) it is administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction from the separation of the branches of the government.18
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.11 Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie against herein
respondents' issuances. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the
aforesaid administrative issuances illegal because petitions for certiorari seek
On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1) it is directed against a solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, and not to correct just any error committed
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi- by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless
judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person acted without such court, board, or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.19
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It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition since generally, the a. Subsistence allowance shall be implemented at not less than Ph₱50.00 per day
purpose of the same is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in or Ph₱1,500.00 per month as certified by head of agency.
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of xxxx
jurisdiction, the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.20
d. Part-time public health workers/consultants are entitled to one-half (1/2)of the
prescribed rates received by full-time public health workers.
Be that as it may, We proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised in the
petition in order to finally resolve the doubt over the Joint Circulars' validity. For
Third, the condition imposed by the DBM-DOH Joint Circular granting longevity
proper guidance, the pressing issue of whether or not the joint circulars regulating
pay only to those PHWs holding regular plantilla positions merely implements the
the salaries and benefits relied upon by public health workers were tainted with
qualification imposed by the Revised IRR which provides:
grave abuse of discretion rightly deserves its prompt resolution. With respect to the
infirmities of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular raised in the petition, they cannot be said
to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion for not only are they 6.3. Longevity Pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the
reasonable, they were likewise issued well within the scope of authority granted to present monthly basic pay shall be paid to public health workers for every five (5)
the respondents. In fact, as may be gathered from prior issuances on the matter, years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified by the
the circular did not make any substantial deviation therefrom, but actually Head of Agency/Local Chief Executives commencing after the approval of the Act.
remained consistent with, and germane to, the purposes of the law. (April 17, 1992)
First, the qualification imposed by the DBM-DOH Joint Circular granting the 6.3.1. Criteria for Efficient and Meritorious Service A Public Worker shall have:
payment of Hazard Pay only if the nature of PHWs' duties expose them to danger
and depending on whether the risk involved is high or low was merely derived from a. At least a satisfactory performance rating within the rating period.
Section 7.1.1 of the Revised IRR of RA No. 7305, duly promulgated by the DOH in
collaboration with various government health agencies and health workers' b. Not been found guilty of any administrative or criminal case within the rating
organizations in November 1999, to wit: period.
SECTION 7.1.1. Eligibility to Receive Hazard Pay. - All public health workers As can be gleaned from the aforequoted provision, petitioners failed to show any
covered under RA 7305 are eligible to receive hazard pay when the nature of their real inconsistency in granting longevity pay to PHWs holding regular plantilla
work exposes them to high risk/low risk hazards for at least fifty percent (50%) of positions. Not only are they based on the same premise, but the intent of longevity
their working hours as determined and approved by the Secretary of Health or his pay, which is paid to workers for every five (5) years of continuous, efficient and
authorized representatives.21 meritorious services, necessarily coincides with that of regularization. Thus, the
assailed circular cannot be invalidated for its issuance is consistent with, and
Second, fixing the Subsistence Allowance at ₱50 for each day of full-time service germane to, the purposes of the law.
and ₱25 for part-time service was also merely a reiteration of the limits prescribed
by the Revised IRR, validly issued by the Secretary of Health pursuant to Section Anent petitioners' contention that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for
3522 of RA No. 7305, the pertinent portions of which states: its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 providing that its
implementing rules shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in a
Section 7.2.3 Rates of Subsistence Allowance newspaper of general circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same
with the University of the Philippines Law Center-Office of the National
Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The
New Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the
PROHIBITION BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of December
31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit
conference was held on March 27, 2008 at the BSP during which the BSP officials
and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as
G.R. No. 191424 August 7, 2013 the other bank officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted
during the said examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on BSP’s
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE consolidated findings and risk asset classification through a letter, dated April 8,
SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER, 2008.4
vs.
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit
THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. of the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank.
Vivas appealed the cancellation to BSP.5 Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB)
DECISION issued Resolution No. 1255, dated September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the following serious
MENDOZA, J.: findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination: 1]
negative capital of ?14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%;
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2"
order or writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from with a Management component rating of "1"; and 3] serious supervisory concerns
closing EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the particularly on activities deemed unsafe or unsound.6 Vivas claimed that the BSP
receivership thereof. The petition likewise prays that the management and took the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain
operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers. hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner.7
The Facts Through its letter, dated September 30, 2008, the BSP furnished ECBI with a copy
of the Report of Examination (ROE) as of December 31, 2007. In addition, the BSP
directed the bank’s BOD and senior management to: 1] infuse fresh capital of
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking
?22.643 million; 2] book the amount of ?28.563 million representing unbooked
institution with principal office in Centro Sur, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. Record shows
valuation reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October
that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005.1Notwithstanding,
31, 2008; and 3] take appropriate action necessary to address the
petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his principals acquired the controlling interest
violations/exceptions noted in the examination.8
in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new
management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof
highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. In view of those findings, certain Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-
measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. 2 On observance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had
In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued On the basis of the examination findings as of 30 September 2009 as reported by
Resolution No. 726,14 dated May 14, 2009, imposing monetary penalty/fine on the Integrated Supervision Department (ISD) II, in its memorandum dated 17
ECBI, and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for February 2010, which findings showed that the Eurocredit Community Bank, Inc. –
the filing of appropriate legal action. The BSP also wrote a letter,15 dated May 26, a Rural Bank (Eurocredit Bank) (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become
2009, advising ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771, which essentially due in the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable assets to
required the bank to follow its directives. On May 28, 2009, the ISD II reiterated its meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to
demand upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP examiners to conduct a general its depositors and creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order
examination on June 3, 2009.16 of the Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and
unsound banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or
In its June 2, 2009 Letter-Reply,17 ECBI asked for another deferment of the dissipation of the assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the Board
examination due to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal of Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the bank’s financial health
before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied and viability despite considerable time given to address the bank’s financial
problems, and that the bank had been accorded due process, the Board, in
He contends that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with
Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this
arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership
Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from
without due and prior hearing in violation of his and the bank’s right to due
continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership. The petitioner
presents the following process. He adds that respondent PDIC actually closed ECBI even in the absence
of any directive to this effect. Lastly, Vivas assails the constitutionality of Section
30 of R.A. No. 7653 claiming that said provision vested upon the BSP the
ARGUMENTS: unbridled power to close and place under receivership a hapless rural bank
instead of aiding its financial needs. He is of the view that such power goes way
(a) beyond its constitutional limitation and has transformed the BSP to a sovereign in
its own "kingdom of banks."25
It is grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction to apply the general
law embodied in Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act as opposed to the The Court’s Ruling
specific law embodied in Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural Banks Act of 1992.
The petition must fail.
(b)
Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy
Even if it assumed that Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act is applicable, it is
still the gravest abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No.
execute the law with manifest arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, and bad faith, 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under
violation of constitutional rights and to further execute a mandate well in excess of Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship,
its parameters. receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition
for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653 read:
(c)
Section 30. –
The power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural
banks under receiverships is unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of x x x x.
the powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of Section 2, Article VIII of the
Philippine Constitution.24
The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the
Vivas submits that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in
they erroneously applied Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, instead of Sections 11 and excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
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excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI
stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished.
days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule
receivership, liquidation or conservatorship. that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.29
Prohibition is already unavailing Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with
the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy
under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later
process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from of said motion.
exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its
jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance.26 In our jurisdiction, the rule on The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
prohibition is enshrined in Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, to omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
wit: Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Emphases supplied]
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the
with certainty and praying that the judgment be rendered commanding the case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified Pilipinas.30
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as the law and justice require.
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
x x x x.
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the
which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
an act perceived to be illegal.27 As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party
is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.28 court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important
reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law. 31 In the case
to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution
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at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of substantially prejudicial to the interest of the Government, depositors or creditors,
the investigating team. to take over the management of such bank when specifically authorized to do so
by the Monetary Board after due hearing process until a new board of directors
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the and officers are elected and qualified without prejudice to the prosecution of the
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the persons responsible for such violations under the provisions of Sections 32, 33
RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either and 34 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended.
court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional x x x x.
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, The thrust of Vivas’ argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and,
prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.32 The hence, its placement under receivership was unwarranted and improper. He
judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and asserts that, instead, the BSP should have taken over the management of ECBI
attention of the Court. and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and
14 of R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is limited only to supervision and
The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion management take-over of banks, and not receivership.
In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with
issuance of the assailed Resolution No. 276. arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership
without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states
Vivas insists that the circumstances of the case warrant the application of Section that the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due
11 of R.A. No. 7353, which provides: hearing.33 He adds that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the same should
prevail over R.A. No. 7653 which is a general law.
Sec. 11. The power to supervise the operation of any rural bank by the Monetary
Board as herein indicated shall consist in placing limits to the maximum credit The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that
allowed to any individual borrower; in prescribing the interest rate, in determining ECBI was given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial
the loan period and loan procedures, in indicating the manner in which technical standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and examiners met with the
assistance shall be extended to rural banks, in imposing a uniform accounting representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings. 34 There
system and manner of keeping the accounts and records of rural banks; in were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007
instituting periodic surveys of loan and lending procedures, audits, test-check of and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written explanation of
cash and other transactions of the rural banks; in conducting training courses for such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.35 More
personnel of rural banks; and, in general, in supervising the business operations of importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI
the rural banks. to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its motion for
The Central Bank shall have the power to enforce the laws, orders, instructions, reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural
Bank Act.
rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board, applicable to rural
banks; to require rural banks, their directors, officers and agents to conduct and
manage the affairs of the rural banks in a lawful and orderly manner; and, upon Close Now, Hear Later
proof that the rural bank or its Board of Directors, or officers are conducting and
managing the affairs of the bank in a manner contrary to laws, orders, instructions,
rules and regulations promulgated by the Monetary Board or in a manner
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At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela,36 the
business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing. Section Court reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it was justified
30 of R.A. No. 7653 provides, viz: as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:
Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. – Whenever, upon report of The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for
the head of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP
that a bank or quasi-bank: when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts
are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national
of business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors,
extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the
community; government.37[Emphasis supplied]
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court also wrote that
Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or
x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine
depositors or creditors; or the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day,
resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and
disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community. 39
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has
become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a
dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate
Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking public.40 Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against financially
institution. [Emphases supplied.] distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in
the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.
x x x x.
Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking
institution to do business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as
Accordingly, there is no conflict which would call for the application of the doctrine
receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is summary and
that a special law should prevail over a general law. It must be emphasized that
R.A .No. 7653 is a later law and under said act, the power of the MB over banks, expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and executory, but may
including rural banks, was increased and expanded. The Court, in several cases, be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition for certiorari to be filed by the
stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the capital stock.
upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without need for prior hearing. It is
Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that
not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and
is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself and the general
determination of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the closure and
public. The protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a summary
receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653, has
been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under closure.
receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in
business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors. In the case of
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In the case at bench, the ISD II submitted its memorandum, dated February 17, discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can
2010, containing the findings noted during the general examination conducted on be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what
ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30, 2009. The memorandum underscored the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
the inability of ECBI to pay its liabilities as they would fall due in the usual course legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature
of its business, its liabilities being in excess of the assets held. Also, it was noted to the delegate."43
that ECBI’s continued banking operation would most probably result in the
incurrence of additional losses to the prejudice of its depositors and creditors. On "There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
top of these, it was found that ECBI had willfully violated the cease-and-desist delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
order of the MB issued in its June 24, 2009 Resolution, and had disregarded the standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
BSP rules and directives. For said reasons, the MB was forced to issue the conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the
assailed Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership. In addition, the MB only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
stressed that it accorded ECBI ample time and opportunity to address its monetary must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of
problem and to restore and improve its financial health and viability but it failed to the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests
do so. are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective essentially legislative."44
measures enunciated in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified.
Management take-over under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 was no longer feasible In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative
considering the financial quagmire that engulfed ECBI showing serious conditions authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the
of insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI under receivership would banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively
effectively put a stop to the further draining of its assets. monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances
warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable
parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner of
Lastly, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No. enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and
7653, as the legislature granted the MB a broad and unrestrained power to close latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its
and place a financially troubled bank under receivership. He claims that the said objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and the
provision was an undue delegation of legislative power. The contention deserves economy.
scant consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
Preliminarily, Vivas’ attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 30 of R.A. No.
7653 constitutes collateral attack on the said provision of law. Nothing is more SO ORDERED.
settled than the rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally
attacked as constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally.41 A collateral attack on a presumably valid law is not permissible.
Unless a law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its
validity stands.42
G.R. No. 186613 August 27, 2013
Be that as it may, there is no violation of the non-delegation of legislative
power.1âwphi1 The rationale for the constitutional proscription is that "legislative ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN
Page 138 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of a Municipal
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, PETITIONERS, Administrator for which he received an annual salary of ₱210,012.00.8
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSION ON Following an audit on various local disbursements, Maximo Andal (Andal), the
AUDIT, AS REPRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL STATE AUDITOR OF LAGUNA Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation Memorandum
MAXIMO L. ANDAL, RESPONDENT. (AOM) No. 2006-007-1009 dated 6 October 2006 addressed to petitioner Corales
who was asked to comment/reply. The aforesaid AOM, in sum, states that: 1)
DECISION petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator (during the second
and third terms of petitioner Corales) was without legal basis for having been
PEREZ, J.: repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; 2) petitioner Dr.
Angeles can be considered, however, as a de facto officer entitled to the
emoluments of the office for the actual services rendered; 3) nonetheless, it is not
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
nullify the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 15 September 2008 and 20 February the Municipality of Nagcarlan that should be made liable to pay for petitioner Dr.
2009, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101296 and, in Angeles’ salary; instead, it is petitioner Corales, being the appointing authority, as
explicitly provided for in Article 169(I) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
effect, to reinstate the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus3 filed by herein
the Local Government Code of 1991,10 as well as Section 5, Rule IV of the
petitioners Rosendo R. Corales (Corales) and Dr. Rodolfo R. Angeles (Dr.
Omnibus Rules of Appointments and Other Personnel Actions;11 4) a post audit of
Angeles) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Laguna. The
payrolls pertaining to the payment of salaries, allowances and other incentives of
assailed Decision annulled and set aside the Order4 dated 17 May 2007 of Branch
32, and the Order5 dated 5 September 2007 of Branch 29, both of the RTC of San petitioner Dr. Angeles from 15 July 2001 up to 31 May 2006 12 partially amounted to
Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-6370 (07), which respectively denied ₱1,282,829.99; and 5) in view thereof, it is recommended that an appropriate
Notice of Disallowance be issued for the payment of salary expenses incurred
herein respondent Republic of the Philippines’ (Republic) Motion to Dismiss
without legal basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the aforestated amount. 13
petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. The Court of Appeals thereby ordered the dismissal of petitioners’ Petition
for Prohibition with the court a quo. The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioner Corales, together with
denied for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed petitioner Dr. Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
Decision. against Andal and the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of
San Pablo City, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SP-6370 (07) and originally
raffled to Branch 32. Petitioners sought, by way of prohibition, to require the Office
The antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows:
of the Provincial Auditor, through Andal, to recall its AOM and to eventually desist
from collecting reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid to and
Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for the latter’s services as Municipal
three (3) consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. In his first Administrator. Petitioners similarly sought, by way of mandamus, to compel the
term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to then members of the Sangguniang Bayan, as a collegial body, to recall its
the position of Municipal Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously Resolutions denying confirmation to petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment as
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sangguniang Bayan) Municipal Administrator and in their stead to confirm the validity and legitimacy of
per Resolution No. 98-646 dated 22 July 1998. During his second and third terms such appointment.14
as municipal mayor, petitioner Corales renewed the appointment of petitioner Dr.
Angeles. But, on these times, the Sangguniang Bayan per Resolution No. 2001-
In its turn, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on Andal’s behalf, who was
0787 dated 12 July 2001 and 26 subsequent Resolutions, disapproved petitioner
impleaded in his official capacity, filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Petition for
Dr. Angeles’ appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as the latter’s
purported unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr. Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It was specifically contended therein
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
that: (1) the issuance of the AOM was merely an initiatory step in the gainsaid. Rather than a mere nominal party, therefore, the [respondent] is an
administrative investigation of the Commission on Audit (COA) to allow petitioner indispensable party to the petition for prohibition and may thus seek its dismissal,
Corales to controvert the findings and conclusions of the Sangguniang Bayan in its given that under the attendant facts there is a yet no actual case or controversy
Resolution No. 2001-078, as well as those of then Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. in calling for [therein] respondent court’s exercise of its judicial power.
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 124 s. 2002; (2)
it was only after the completion of the said investigation that a resolution will be Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Thus, as a condition precedent for
issued as regards the propriety of the disbursements made by the Municipality of the exercise of judicial inquiry, there must be an actual case or controversy, which
Nagcarlan in the form of salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles during his tenure as exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
Municipal Administrator; and (3) instead of resorting to judicial action, petitioner claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. x x x.
Corales should have first responded to the AOM and, in the event of an adverse An actual case or controversy thus means an existing case or controversy that is
decision against him, elevate the matter for review to a higher authorities in the appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
COA.15 With these, petitioners’ petition should be dismissed, as petitioner Corales decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
has no cause of action against Andal - his resort to judicial intervention is
premature and he even failed to avail himself of, much less exhaust, the [Herein petitioners] x x x have failed to show the existence of an actual case or
administrative remedies available to him.16 controversy that would necessitate judicial inquiry through a petition for prohibition.
As the OSG aptly observed, the issuance of the AOM is just an initiatory step in
In its Order dated 17 May 2007, the trial court denied the said Motion to Dismiss the investigative audit being then conducted by Andal[,] as Provincial State Auditor
on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party.17 The subsequent motion for of Laguna to determine the propriety of the disbursements made by the Municipal
its reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated 5 September 2007. 18 Government of Nagcarlan. While Andal may have stated an opinion in the AOM
that [herein petitioner] Corales should reimburse the government treasury for the
Respondent Republic, as represented by COA, as represented by Andal, salaries paid to [herein petitioner Dr. Angeles] in light of the repeated disapproval
consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing and/or rejection of the latter’s appointment by the Sangguniang [Bayan] of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Nagcarlan, there is no showing whatsoever of any affirmative action taken by
the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007, Andal to enforce such audit observation. What Andal did, as the AOM
as it unjustly denied respondent’s right to actively prosecute the case through a unmistakably shows, was to merely request [petitioner] Corales to submit a
mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear showing that the reply/comment to the audit observation and in the process afford the latter an
Petition for Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest. 19 opportunity to controvert not only Andal’s opinion on salary reimbursement but the
other statements therein expressed by the other members of the audit team.
On 15 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
granting respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside In the absence moreover of a showing that [petitioners], particularly [petitioner]
the RTC Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 and, accordingly, Corales, sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of the issuance of the AOM,
dismissing petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition with the court a quo. 20 The Court of there is no reason to allow the continuance of the petition for prohibition which
Appeals justified its decision in the following manner: was, after all, manifestly conjectural or anticipatory, filed for a speculative purpose
and upon the hypothetical assumption that [petitioner] Corales would be eventually
x x x We agree with the OSG’s contention that the [herein respondent Republic], compelled to reimburse the amounts paid as [petitioner Dr. Angeles’] salaries
herein represented by the COA and specifically by Andal in the latter’s capacity as should the audit investigation confirm the irregularity of such disbursements. This
Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, is not merely a nominal party to the petition for Court will not engage in such speculative guesswork and neither should
prohibition. x x x. That the [respondent] naturally has an interest in the respondent court x x x.21 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
disposition/disbursement of said public funds as well as in the recovery thereof
should the ongoing investigative audit confirm the illegality thereof cannot be
V.
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FOR : Hon. ROSENDO R. CORALES (Section 443 (d), RA 7160) and considering that
Municipal Mayor the appointment never became effective. As
Nagcarlan, Laguna such, his assumption and continued holding of
the office of the Municipal Administrator find no
FROM : Mr. MAXIMO L. ANDAL legal basis.
State Auditor IV
Audit Team Leader
However, [petitioner Dr. Angeles] may claim
salary for the services he has actually rendered.
May we have your comment/reply on the following audit observation. Please return As held in one case (Civil Liberties Union [v.]
the duplicate within fifteen (15) days upon receipt by filling up the space provided Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317), a de facto
for with your comments. officer is entitled to emoluments of the office for
the actual services rendered. Here, [petitioner
Dr. Angeles] can be considered as a de facto
AUDIT OBSERVATION MANAGEMENT COMMENT officer. x x x, as held in the Corpuz case cited
above, the Supreme Court ruled that a public
The appointment of [herein petitioner Dr. official who assumed office under an incomplete
Angeles] as Municipal Administrator was appointment is merely a de facto officer for the
repeatedly denied not confirmed/ concurred duration of his occupancy of the office for the
by Sangguniang Bayan hence, the validity of reason that he assumed office under color of a
the appointment as per opinion/rulings by known appointment which is void by a reason of
the then Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. of the some defect or irregularity in its exercise.
DILG in opinion No. 124 s.2002 was without
legal basis.
It is worthy to emphasize along that line that
while [petitioner Dr. Angeles] may be entitled to
DILG Opinion No. 124 s[.]2002 states that the the salary as a de facto officer, the municipality
continued discharge of powers by [petitioner Dr. cannot be made liable to pay his salaries.
Angeles] as Municipal Administrator appears to Instructive on this point is Article 169 (I) of the
have no legal basis. A person may assume Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
public office once his appointment is already Government Code of 1991 which explicitly
effective. The Supreme Court in one case (Atty. provides, thus:
David B. Corpuz [v.] Court of Appeals, et al[.],
G.R. No. 123989, 26 January 1998) held that
"The appointing authority shall be liable for the
where the assent or confirmation of some other
payment of salary of the appointee for actual
office or body is required, the appointment may
services rendered if the appointment is
be complete only when such assent or
disapproved because the appointing authority
confirmation is obtained. Until the process is
issued it in willful violation of applicable laws,
completed, the appointee can claim no vested
rules and regulations thereby making the
right in the office nor invoke security of tenure.
appointment unlawful."
Since the appointment of a Municipal
Administrator requires sanggunian concurrence
ROLANDO TAN, ELENA TAN and LAMBERTO TAN, petitioners, King averred that in February 2002, the spouses Roderick Lim Go and Grace Tan-
vs. Go (spouses Go) proposed to him a business transaction wherein the spouses Go
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMES B. MONTERO, in his would borrow cash from King in exchange for which Roderick Go would issue
capacity as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and the PEOPLE OF THE postdated checks corresponding to the amount borrowed plus interest. Roderick
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Go’s parents, Go Tong Go and Lucy Go, and brother, Nelson Go, assured King
that whatever checks Roderick Go would issue would be funded on their due dates
and that the checking account at the United Overseas Bank, Carbon Branch, Cebu
DECISION City is their joint account. King agreed to the business proposal. Thereafter,
Roderick Go started issuing checks, inclusive of interest, in exchange for the cash
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: given by King. The checks when presented for encashment were initially honored
by the drawee bank; consequently, King reposed his trust and confidence in
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the November 24, 2003 spouses Go.
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74450 dismissing the petition
for prohibition and injunction, which sought to enjoin the Presiding Judge of the On March 22, 2002, the spouses Go, together with herein petitioners Rolando Tan
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, from further proceeding with Crim. (father of Grace Tan-Go), Elena Tan (mother of Grace Tan-Go), asked ₱100
Case Nos. 64381, 64383, 64385, 64386 and 64387; and the July 14, 2004 Million from King allegedly for the renovation of their movie houses in Butuan City.
Resolution2 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. However, King could only accommodate ₱40 Million, in exchange for which,
Roderick Go issued several checks to King in the amount of ₱61.28 Million,
In a Letter-Complaint dated June 26, 2002, James L. King (King) charged Roderick inclusive of the interest for three months.
Lim-Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, John Doe and Peter Doe with violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and Estafa involving two checks both dated June At first, the checks issued by Go were honored by the drawee bank when
21, 2002, to wit: (1) United Overseas Bank Philippines (UOB) Check No. presented. However, on June 24, 2002, when several of the checks he issued
00082597 in the amount of ₱20 Million; and (2) UOB Check No. 00082599 in the were about to fall due, Roderick Go requested King for a meeting. While at the
amount of ₱7.9 Million. agreed meeting place, Roderick Go allegedly attacked King with a box cutter and
told him that all the checks that he issued would be dishonored and for this reason
Subsequently or on July 10, 2002, King filed a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit he had to injure, kidnap and kill him. This incident is the subject of a separate
involving five additional checks, to wit: (1) UOB Check No. 0000082596 dated criminal case. Thereafter, all the checks dated June 21, 23 and 24, 2002 issued by
June 21, 2002 in the amount of ₱7 Million; (2) UOB Check No. 0000082598 dated Roderick Go were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
June 21, 2002 in the amount of ₱26.68 Million; (3) UOB Check No. 0000082434 Despite repeated demands, no payment was made; hence, King filed a complaint
dated June 23, 2002 in the amount of ₱2.6 Million; (4) UOB Check No. for violation of BP Blg. 22 and Estafa.
0000082495 dated June 24, 2002 in the amount of ₱7 Million; and (5) UOB Check
No. 0000082494 dated June 24, 2002 in the amount of ₱18 Million. The All the accused, except Roderick Go, submitted their counter-affidavits. In their
Joint Counter-Affidavit3 dated August 8, 2002, petitioners denied meeting King on
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
March 22, 2002; that only Roderick Go could be held liable for the bouncing On November 11, 2002, five informations for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the
checks considering that he alone issued the same; that King’s first supplemental Revised Penal Code were filed against Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong
complaint-affidavit contradicted his second supplemental complaint-affidavit. In the Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, and herein petitioners, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
first supplemental complaint-affidavit, Roderick Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, John Doe CBU- 64381, 64383, 64385, 64386, and 64387 and raffled to the Regional Trial
and Peter Doe were made respondents as co-conspirators relative to the issuance Court, Branch 5 of Cebu City. From the above-quoted adverse Resolution of public
of the bouncing checks, while in the second supplemental complaint-affidavit, respondent Montero, only Roderick Go and Grace Tan-Go separately appealed to
petitioners were made co-conspirators over the same checks but under totally the Secretary of Justice.
different circumstances. Thus, petitioners claim that the criminal cases filed against
them were an afterthought and prayed that the same be dismissed. On November 18, 2002, before any warrant of arrest could be issued, petitioners
posted bail. The following day or on November 19, 2002, they were arraigned and
The preliminary investigation of the subject criminal cases was initially assigned to pleaded not guilty.
1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor/Officer-in-Charge Cesar Tajanlangit who
voluntarily inhibited himself. On October 10, 2002, then Secretary of Justice On December 17, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction
Hernando B. Perez issued Department Order (D.O.) No. 369,4 designating public with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 7 before the
respondent 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hermes Montero (Montero) to Court of Appeals. They sought to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the
continue with the preliminary investigation of these cases, and, if the evidence subject criminal cases against them and prayed that the same be dismissed.
warranted, to file the appropriate informations in court.
On November 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision
In a Joint Resolution5 dated November 8, 2002, public respondent Montero found dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It found that (1) petitioners failed to avail
probable cause for the following crimes: themselves of other plain, speedy and adequate remedies to challenge the public
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause; (2) the petition failed to establish that it falls
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the following criminal Informations under any of the exceptions to the general rule that the court will not issue writs of
shall be filed against: prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain a criminal
prosecution; (3) public respondent Montero was duly authorized by the Secretary
(1) Roderick L. Go, alias ‘Edu Ting’, for violation of B.P. 22 on seven (7) counts; of Justice to conduct the preliminary investigation and, if the evidence so
warranted, to file the corresponding informations relative to the subject criminal
cases; (4) petitioners failed to prove that public respondents acted with grave
(2) Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong Go, Lucy Go and Nelson Go, for
estafa on two (2) counts anent (a) UOB Check No. 00082597 dated June 21, 2002 abuse of discretion; and (5) petitioners’ claims contesting the public prosecutor’s
in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00; and (b) UOB Check No. 00082599 dated June finding of probable cause are matters of defense that should be threshed out
during the trial of the criminal cases and not through the extraordinary remedy of
21, 2002 in the amount of ₱7,800,000.00;
prohibition.
(3) Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, [petitioners]
Rolando Tan, Elena Tan and Lamberto Tan, for estafa on five (5) counts anent (c) After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners interposed the instant
UOB Check No. 0000082596 dated June 21, 2002, in the amount of petition raising nine issues8revolving around the factual and legal bases of the
finding of probable cause for estafa against them as well as the authority of public
₱7,000,000.00, (d) UOB Check No. 0000082598 dated June 21, 2002, in the
respondent Montero to file the subject criminal cases with the trial court.
amount of ₱26,680,000.00, (e) UOB Check No. 0000082434 dated June 23, 2002,
in the amount of ₱2,600,000.00, (f) UOB Check No. 0000082495 dated June 24,
2002, in the amount of ₱7,000,000.00, and (g) UOB Check No. 0000082494 dated At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioners are asking us to review the
June 24, 2002, in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00.6 Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed their petition for prohibition.
By participating in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, petitioners NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO
have actively litigated the issues regarding the factual and legal bases of the REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
finding of probable cause against them as well as the authority of public REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
respondent Montero to file the subject criminal informations. This is clearly borne vs.
by the tenor of the Resolution dated December 17, 2004 issued by the Secretary HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of
of Justice. Yet, these issues are exactly the same issues being raised by Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.
petitioners before this Court through the instant petition which is separate and
distinct from the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice whose aforesaid
Resolution is not the one before us for review. To reiterate, what is before us for DECISION
On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to
reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co- do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of
accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s
Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. exercise of judicial discretion.
Arellano.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and
On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be
Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is
Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way
lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In
Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
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compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two
bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he other persons.
had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not
available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the
of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the
Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution
for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr., 9 we
reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Mogul,10 that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any
Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus, we held:
Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou7:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
of a grave abuse of such discretion. the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to
Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused.
find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due
prosecute him. process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to
dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse
motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the
of discretion that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive.
Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for
mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation,
he should have "deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of
withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of our Decision in
Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before
People v. Montesa, Jr.12:
this Court, challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his
motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged
rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation
discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the and directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the
Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the
against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new
prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed
of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez should should stand.13
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the
court found probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an
adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is
that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the G.R. No. 161735 September 25, 2007
body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A.
dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.23 METEORO, Petitioners,
vs.
In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,Respondent.
available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when
refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a DECISION
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of either.24 The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an NACHURA, J.:
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution
of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the Court assailing the June 18, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
respondent judge in the case at bar.25 G.R. SP No. 68989 and the January 15, 2004 Resolution3 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
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In 1989, petitioner Sanchez, a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), was based on the Commission’s finding that the list submitted by Galvante was not
discharged from the service for allegedly losing his service firearm. Petitioner actually of the constables whose applications for absorption were indorsed for
Meteoro, also a constable, was likewise discharged from the service in 1990 for approval, but of those whose applications were still to be reviewed, evaluated and
being absent without leave. On appeal, they were both cleared of all charges. They disposed of. In other words, the 126 named in the list were still to be interviewed
then applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up and their applications to be deliberated upon by the PNP Special Committee. 13
to the integration of the PC into the Philippine National Police (PNP).4
On November 15, 2001, however, the RTC rendered its Decision 14 in the
On January 27, 1998, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued mandamus case declaring as void ab initio NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061
Resolution No. 98-037 considering as absorbed into the police force, among and ruling in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
others, those who had been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or
criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had their cases dismissed, and who Accordingly, therefore, the petition is hereby granted. The Director-General of the
subsequently filed petitions for reinstatement that were not acted upon by the Philippine National Police is hereby directed to immediately issue absorption
PNP.5 Then, on April 3, 1998, NAPOLCOM orders to the petitioners.
issued Resolution No. 98-105 affirming and confirming the absorption into the Resolution No. 99-061 is declared void ab initio.
PNP, effective on January 27, 1998, of the 126 ex-PC constables named in the list
submitted by Director Edgar C. Galvante of the PNP Directorate for Personnel and
IT IS SO ORDERED.15
Records Management (DPRM).6 Petitioners Sanchez and Meteoro are in numbers
90 and 122, respectively, of the Galvante list.7
On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 18, 2003 Decision,16 reversed the ruling of
the trial court and ruled that a writ of mandamus could not be issued because
Subsequently, on May 28, 1998, NAPOLCOM Commissioner Rogelio A. Pureza
petitioners had not established with distinct clarity their right to be absorbed into
issued a Memorandum to then Chief of the PNP Santiago Alino for the issuance of
the PNP. The CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
absorption orders to the 45 PC constables included in the initial batch of those
covered by the PNP Board Resolutions.8 Petitioner Sanchez is in number 45 of
that list.9 WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the trial court dated
November 15, 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the PNP, the
constables in the list requested the assistance of the Secretary of the Department SO ORDERED.17
of Interior and Local Government (DILG). On July 29, 1998, the Office of the
Secretary of the DILG sent a memorandum to respondent Roberto T. Lastimoso, The appellate court later denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in the
then the Chief of the PNP, endorsing the constables’ entreaties and requesting for likewise assailed January 15, 2004 Resolution.18
a feedback thereon.10
Aggrieved, petitioners brought the case before us via a petition for review on
Without any response from the Chief of the PNP, and their pleas for the issuance certiorari, raising for our disposition the following issues:
of the absorption orders still unacted upon, petitioners instituted, on September 30,
1998, a petition for mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35659 in the I
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. 11
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO
During the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 99- BE ABSORBED IN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE.
061 on April 19, 1999 recalling the earlier Resolution No. 98-105.12 The recall was
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II. reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the
PC into the PNP in 1990 when R.A. No. 697523 was enacted. Thus, we no longer
WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 99-061 IS VOID FOR BEING speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service because the Philippine
VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 7965 AND ITS Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which is, as we
IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTIONS NO. 98-037 AND 98-105. held in Gloria v. De Guzman,24 technically an issuance of a new appointment. The
power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
III.
should possess the qualifications required by law.25 Consequently, it cannot be the
subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.26
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL THE RESPONDENT TO ABSORB THE
Furthermore, the petitioners do not have a clear legal right over the issuance of the
PETITIONERS IN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE.19
absorption orders.1âwphi1 They cannot claim the right to be issued an
appointment based on the NAPOLCOM issuances, specifically Resolution Nos.
The petition has no merit. 98-037 and 98-105. Suffice it to state that R.A. No. 6975 clearly provides that the
power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of "Police Officer I" to "Senior Police
We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that the remedy Officer IV" to which petitioners may be appointed27 is vested in the PNP regional
of mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when refused, of a director or in the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, and not in the
ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. The NAPOLCOM, thus:
issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.20 In Manila International Airport Authority Section 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members.—The appointment of the
v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc.,21 we emphasized, through officers and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
the erudite and eloquent ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be
issued only when the applicant’s legal right to the performance of a particular act
sought to be compelled is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted by (a) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV.—Appointed by the PNP regional
law or is inferable as a matter of law, thus: director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for the national
headquarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission.
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one
x x x28
hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the
other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded
of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a Even if, for the sake of argument, petitioners can derive a right from NAPOLCOM
duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105, still their right collapses and their mandamus
function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and petition becomes moot with the issuance by NAPOLCOM of Resolution No. 99-061
to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal recalling the approval of their absorption. The trial court should then have
right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief immediately dismissed the mandamus petition when the OSG submitted a copy of
sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.22 Resolution No. 99-061 because well-settled is the rule that courts will not resolve a
moot question.29
Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the PNP Chief’s issuance of the orders for
the absorption of herein petitioners in the police force is not compellable by a writ Also improper is the trial court’s declaration that NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-
of mandamus precisely because the same does not involve a performance of a 061 is void ab initio. In the petition filed below, only the Chief of the PNP is
ministerial duty. Let it be noted that petitioners were discharged from the PC impleaded as the party-defendant.30 NAPOLCOM was never impleaded. As it was
service, subsequently cleared of the charges against them, applied for the latter, a separate entity, which had issued Resolution No. 99-061, NAPOLCOM
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was an indispensable party over which the trial court should have acquired Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local
jurisdiction. Since it was not impleaded, NAPOLCOM remains a stranger to the government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to
case, and strangers are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. 31 The enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as which state:
to those present.32
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 18, 2003 health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta.
Decision and the January 15, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded
SP No. 68989 are AFFIRMED. by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the
south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,]
SO ORDERED. PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig
River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta,
Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F.
Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can
zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL
amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole
responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section
455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies.
Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof. Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the
MOU and the resolutions.14However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended
of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect
with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing
and the scale down program. it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’
compliance with the provisions of this MOU. Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already
unauthorized parties. imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined,
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear
resolution, the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only for a period of and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. 17
six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
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Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and
to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal
right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18 September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is
to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is
members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of G.R. No. 193462 February 4, 2014
petitioners to institute this proceeding.
DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner,
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the vs.
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the COMMISSION ON
of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the AUDIT, Respondents.
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his DECISION
ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
PEREZ, J.:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
This is a petition for mandamus1 to compel:
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to
obey it.23
1.) the Commission on Audit (COA) to audit and examine the funds of the
Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), and
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions
passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. 2.) the MECO to submit to such audit and examination.
This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and
13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. The antecedents:
Prelude
Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true, Office (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
Order No. 2011-698 does not offer the strongest certainty that they would not be
replicated in the future. In the first place, Office Order No. 2011-698 did not state (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
any legal justification as to why, after decades of not auditing the accounts of the
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state any
determination regarding the true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by
the COA, in fact, only appears in the memorandum 70 it submitted to this Court for (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
purposes of this case. the election law in question;
Thus, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order No. 2011-698 appears to be (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
entirely dependent upon the judgment of the incumbent chairperson of the COA; are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
susceptible of being undone, with or without reason, by her or even her successor.
Hence, the case now before this Court is dangerously capable of being repeated (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
yet evading review. of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Verily, this Court should not dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground of We rule that the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance,
mootness. involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly
neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen,
Standing of Petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file the instant mandamus petition.
The second preliminary issue is concerned with the standing of the petitioner to file To be sure, petitioner does not need to make any prior demand on the MECO or
the instant mandamus petition. The COA claims that petitioner has none, for the the COA in order to maintain the instant petition. The duty of the COA sought to be
latter was not able to concretely establish that he had been aggrieved or compelled by mandamus, emanates from the Constitution and law, which explicitly
prejudiced by its failure to audit the accounts of the MECO.71 require, or "demand," that it perform the said duty. To the mind of this Court,
petitioner already established his cause of action against the COA when he
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alleged that the COA had neglected its duty in violation of the Constitution and the 4. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
law. fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; and
In view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of "non-
petition, as earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last procedural issue in favor governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity xxx from or through the
of a resolution on the merits.76 government" is Section 29(1)80 of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial
authority over the following non-governmental entities:
II
1. Non-governmental entities "subsidized by the government";
To the merits of this petition, then.
2. Non-governmental entities "required to pay levy or government share";
The single most crucial question asked by this case is whether the COA is, under
prevailing law, mandated to audit the accounts of the MECO. Conversely, are the 3. Non-governmental entities that have "received counterpart funds from
accounts of the MECO subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA? the government"; and
Law, of course, identifies which accounts of what entities are subject to the audit 4. Non-governmental entities "partly funded by donations through the
jurisdiction of the COA. government."
Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution,77 the COA was vested with Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, however, limits the audit of the foregoing non-
the "power, authority and duty" to "examine, audit and settle" the "accounts" of the governmental entities only to "funds xxx coming from or through the
following entities: government."81 This section of the Audit Code is, in turn, substantially reproduced
in Section 14(1), Book V of the Administrative Code.82
1. The government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities; In addition to the foregoing, the Administrative Code also empowers the COA to
examine and audit "the books, records and accounts" of public utilities "in
2. GOCCs with original charters; connection with the fixing of rates of every nature, or in relation to the proceedings
of the proper regulatory agencies, for purposes of determining franchise tax."83
3. GOCCs without original charters;
Both petitioner and the COA claim that the accounts of the MECO are within the
audit jurisdiction of the COA, but vary on the extent of the audit and on what type
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of auditable entity the MECO is. The petitioner posits that all accounts of the 4. GOCCs
MECO are auditable as the latter is a bona fide GOCC or government
instrumentality.84 On the other hand, the COA argues that only the accounts of the The Administrative Code defines a GOCC:91
MECO that pertain to the "verification fees" it collects on behalf of the DOLE are
auditable because the former is merely a non-governmental entity "required to pay
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized
xxx government share" per the Audit Code.85
as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government
We examine both contentions. directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the
case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its
The MECO Is Not a GOCC or capital stock: x x x.
Government Instrumentality
The above definition is, in turn, replicated in the more recent Republic Act No.
We start with the petitioner’s contention. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, to wit:92
Petitioner claims that the accounts of the MECO ought to be audited by the COA (o) Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporation (GOCC) refers to any agency
because the former is a GOCC or government instrumentality. Petitioner points out organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to
that the MECO is a non-stock corporation "vested with governmental functions public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
relating to public needs"; it is "controlled by the government thru a board of Government of the Republic of the Philippines directly or through its
directors appointed by the President of the Philippines"; and it operates "outside of instrumentalities either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock
the departmental framework," subject only to the "operational and policy corporations, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock: x x
supervision of the DTI."86 The MECO thus possesses, petitioner argues, the x.
essential characteristics of a bona fide GOCC and government instrumentality. 87
GOCCs, therefore, are "stock or non-stock" corporations "vested with functions
We take exception to petitioner’s characterization of the MECO as a GOCC or relating to public needs" that are "owned by the Government directly or through its
government instrumentality. The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentalities."93 By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC:
instrumentality. first, its organization as stock or non-stock corporation;94 second, the public
character of its function; and third, government ownership over the same.
Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by
reason of some "special function or jurisdiction" they perform or exercise, are Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
allotted "operational autonomy" and are "not integrated within the department
framework."88 Subsumed under the rubric "government instrumentality" are the In this case, there is not much dispute that the MECO possesses the first and
following entities:89 second attributes. It is the third attribute, which the MECO lacks.
2. chartered institutions, The organization of the MECO as a non-stock corporation cannot at all be denied.
Records disclose that the MECO was incorporated as a non-stock corporation
3. government corporate entities or government instrumentalities with under the Corporation Code on 16 December 1977.95 The incorporators of the
corporate powers (GCE/GICP),90 and MECO were Simeon R. Roxas, Florencio C. Guzon, Manuel K. Dayrit, Pio K. Luz
The purposes for which the MECO was organized also establishes its non-profit Consistent with its corporate purposes, the MECO was "authorized" by the
character, to wit:97 Philippine government to perform certain "consular and other functions" relating to
the promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan. 99The full
1. To establish and develop the commercial and industrial interests of extent of such authorized functions are presently detailed in Sections 1 and 2 of
Filipino nationals here and abroad and assist on all measures designed to EO No. 15, s. 2001:
promote and maintain the trade relations of the country with the citizens of
other foreign countries; SECTION 1. Consistent with its corporate purposes and subject to the conditions
stated in Section 3 hereof, MECO is hereby authorized to assist in the
2. To receive and accept grants and subsidies that are reasonably performance of the following functions:
necessary in carrying out the corporate purposes provided they are not
subject to conditions defeatist for or incompatible with said purpose; 1. Formulation and implementation of a program to attract and
promote investments from Taiwan to Philippine industries and
3. To acquire by purchase, lease or by any gratuitous title real and businesses, especially in manufacturing, tourism, construction and
personal properties as may be necessary for the use and need of the other preferred areas of investments;
corporation, and in like manner when they are
2. Promotion of the export of Philippine products and Filipino
4. To do and perform any and all acts which are deemed reasonably manpower services, including Philippine management services, to
necessary to carry out the purposes. (Emphasis supplied) Taiwan;
The purposes for which the MECO was organized are somewhat analogous to 3. Negotiation and/or assistance in the negotiation and conclusion
those of a trade, business or industry chamber,98 but only on a much larger scale of agreements or other arrangements concerning trade,
i.e., instead of furthering the interests of a particular line of business or industry investment, economic cooperation, technology transfer, banking
within a local sphere, the MECO seeks to promote the general interests of the and finance, scientific, cultural, educational and other modes of
Filipino people in a foreign land. cooperative endeavors between the Philippines and Taiwan, on a
people-to-people basis, in accordance with established rules and
regulations;
Finally, it is not disputed that none of the income derived by the MECO is
distributable as dividends to any of its members, directors or officers.
4. Reporting on, and identification of, employment and business
Verily, the MECO is organized as a non-stock corporation. opportunities in Taiwan for the promotion of Philippine exports,
manpower and management services, and tourism;
The MECO Performs Functions with a Public Aspect.
5. Dissemination in Taiwan of information on the Philippines,
especially in the fields of trade, tourism, labor, economic
The public character of the functions vested in the MECO cannot be doubted cooperation, and cultural, educational and scientific endeavors;
either. Indeed, to a certain degree, the functions of the MECO can even be said to
partake of the nature of governmental functions. As earlier intimated, it is the
SECTION III. BOARD OF DIRECTORS It is significant to note that none of the original incorporators of the MECO were
shown to be government officials at the time of the corporation’s organization.
Article 3. At the first meeting of the regular members, they shall organize and Indeed, none of the members, officers or board of directors of the MECO, from its
constitute themselves as a Board composed of five (5) members, including its incorporation up to the present day, were established as government appointees
Chairman, each of whom as to serve until such time as his own successor shall or public officers designated by reason of their office. There is, in fact, no law or
have been elected by the regular members in an election called for the purpose. executive order that authorizes such an appointment or designation. Hence, from a
The number of members of the Board shall be increased to seven (7) when strictly legal perspective, it appears that the presidential "desire letters" pointed out
circumstances so warrant and by means of a majority vote of the Board members by petitioner—if such letters even exist outside of the case of Mr. Basilio—are, no
and appropriate application to and approval by the Securities and Exchange matter how strong its persuasive effect may be, merely recommendatory.
Commission. Unless otherwise provided herein or by law, a majority vote of all
Board members present shall be necessary to carry out all Board resolutions. The MECO Is Not a Government Instrumentality; It Is a Sui Generis Entity.
During the same meeting, the Board shall also elect its own officers, including the The categorical exclusion of the MECO from a GOCC makes it easier to exclude
designation of the principal officer who shall be the Chairman. In line with this, the the same from any other class of government instrumentality. The other
Chairman shall also carry the title Chief Executive Officer. The officer who shall government instrumentalities i.e., the regulatory agencies, chartered institutions
head the branch or office for the agency that may be established abroad shall have and GCE/GICP are all, by explicit or implicit definition, creatures of the law. 110 The
the title of Director and Resident Representative. He will also be the Vice- MECO cannot be any other instrumentality because it was, as mentioned earlier,
Chairman. All other members of the Board shall have the title of Director. merely incorporated under the Corporation Code.
xxxx
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Hence, unless its legality is questioned, and in this case it was not, the fact that the We agree that the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of "verification
MECO is operating under the policy supervision of the DTI is no longer a relevant fees" is subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. However, We digress from the
issue to be reckoned with for purposes of this case. view that such accounts are the only ones that ought to be audited by the COA.
Upon careful evaluation of the information made available by the records vis-à-vis
For whatever it is worth, however, and without justifying anything, it is easy enough the spirit and the letter of the laws and executive issuances applicable, We find
for this Court to understand the rationale, or necessity even, of the executive that the accounts of the MECO pertaining to the fees it was authorized to collect
branch placing the MECO under the policy supervision of one of its agencies. under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, are likewise subject to the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.
It is evident, from the peculiar circumstances surrounding its incorporation, that the
MECO was not intended to operate as any other ordinary corporation. And it is not. Verification Fees Collected by the MECO
Despite its private origins, and perhaps deliberately so, the MECO was
"entrusted"111 by the government with the "delicate and In its comment,117 the MECO admitted that roughly 9% of its income is derived
precarious"112 responsibility of pursuing "unofficial"113 relations with the people of a from its share in the "verification fees" for overseas employment documents it
foreign land whose government the Philippines is bound not to recognize. The collects on behalf of the DOLE.
intricacy involved in such undertaking is the possibility that, at any given time in
fulfilling the purposes for which it was incorporated, the MECO may find itself The "verification fees" mentioned here refers to the "service fee for the verification
engaged in dealings or activities that can directly contradict the Philippines’ of overseas employment contracts, recruitment agreement or special powers of
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. Such a scenario can only truly attorney" that the DOLE was authorized to collect under Section 7 of EO No.
be avoided if the executive department exercises some form of oversight, no 1022,118 which was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 1 May 1985.
matter how limited, over the operations of this otherwise private entity. These fees are supposed to be collected by the DOLE from the foreign employers
of OFWs and are intended to be used for "the promotion of overseas employment
Indeed, from hindsight, it is clear that the MECO is uniquely situated as compared and for welfare services to Filipino workers within the area of jurisdiction of
with other private corporations. From its over-reaching corporate objectives, its [concerned] foreign missions under the administration of the [DOLE]."119
special duty and authority to exercise certain consular functions, up to the
oversight by the executive department over its operations—all the while Joint Circular 3-99 was issued by the DOLE, DFA, the Department of Budget
maintaining its legal status as a non-governmental entity—the MECO is, for all Management, the Department of Finance and the COA in an effort to implement
intents and purposes, sui generis. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1022.120 Thus, under Joint Circular 3-99, the
following officials have been tasked to be the "Verification Fee Collecting Officer"
Certain Accounts of the MECO May on behalf of the DOLE:121
Be Audited By the COA.
1. The labor attaché or duly authorized overseas labor officer at a given
We now come to the COA’s contention. foreign post, as duly designated by the DOLE Secretary;
The COA argues that, despite being a non-governmental entity, the MECO may 2. In foreign posts where there is no labor attaché or duly authorized
still be audited with respect to the "verification fees" for overseas employment overseas labor officer, the finance officer or collecting officer of the DFA
documents that the latter collects from Taiwanese employers on behalf of the duly deputized by the DOLE Secretary as approved by the DFA Secretary;
DOLE.114 The COA claims that, under Joint Circular No. 3-99, the MECO is
mandated to remit to the national government a portion of such "verification 3. In the absence of such finance officer or collecting officer, the alternate
fees."115 The COA, therefore, classifies the MECO as a non-governmental entity duly designated by the head of the foreign post.
"required to pay xxx government share" per the Audit Code. 116
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Since the Philippines does not maintain an official post in Taiwan, however, the authority for the MECO to collect the "reasonable fees," vested unto it by the
DOLE entered into a "series" of Memorandum of Agreements with the MECO, executive order.
which made the latter the former’s collecting agent with respect to the "verification
fees" that may be due from Taiwanese employers of OFWs.122 Under the 27 The "consular fees," although held and expended by the MECO by virtue of EO
February 2004 Memorandum of Agreement between DOLE and the MECO, the No. 15, s. 2001, are, without question, derived from the exercise by the MECO of
"verification fees" to be collected by the latter are to be allocated as follows: (a) consular functions—functions it performs by and only through special authority
US$ 10 to be retained by the MECO as administrative fee, (b) US $10 to be from the government. There was never any doubt that the visas, passports and
remitted to the DOLE, and (c) US$ 10 to be constituted as a common fund of the other documents that the MECO issues pursuant to its authorized functions still
MECO and DOLE.123 emanate from the Philippine government itself.
Evidently, the entire "verification fees" being collected by the MECO are Such fees, therefore, are received by the MECO to be used strictly for the purpose
receivables of the DOLE.124 Such receipts pertain to the DOLE by virtue of Section set out under EO No. 15, s. 2001. They must be reasonable as the authorization
7 of EO No. 1022. requires. It is the government that has ultimate control over the disposition of the
"consular fees," which control the government did exercise when it provided in
Consular Fees Collected by the MECO Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001 that such funds may be kept by the MECO "to
defray the cost of its operations."
Aside from the DOLE "verification fees," however, the MECO also collects
"consular fees," or fees it collects from the exercise of its delegated consular The Accounts of the MECO Pertaining to the Verification Fees and Consular Fees
functions. May Be Audited by the COA.
The authority behind "consular fees" is Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. The Section 14(1), Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit
said section authorizes the MECO to collect "reasonable fees" for its performance accounts of non-governmental entities "required to pay xxx or have government
of the following consular functions: share" but only with respect to "funds xxx coming from or through the government."
This provision of law perfectly fits the MECO:
1. Issuance of temporary visitors’ visas and transit and crew list visas, and
such other visa services as may be authorized by the DFA; First. The MECO receives the "verification fees" by reason of being the collection
agent of the DOLE—a government agency. Out of its collections, the MECO is
2. Issuance, renewal, extension or amendment of passports of Filipino required, by agreement, to remit a portion thereof to the DOLE. Hence, the MECO
citizens in accordance with existing regulations, and provision of such is accountable to the government for its collections of such "verification fees" and,
other passport services as may be required under the circumstances; for that purpose, may be audited by the COA.
3. Certification or affirmation of the authenticity of documents submitted for Second. Like the "verification fees," the "consular fees" are also received by the
authentication; and MECO through the government, having been derived from the exercise of consular
functions entrusted to the MECO by the government. Hence, the MECO remains
accountable to the government for its collections of "consular fees" and, for that
4. Providing translation services.
purpose, may be audited by the COA.
Evidently, and just like the peculiarity that attends the DOLE "verification fees,"
Tersely put, the 27 February 2008 Memorandum of Agreement between the DOLE
there is no consular office for the collection of the "consular fees." Thus, the
and the MECO and Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001, vis-à-vis, respectively, the
"verification fees" and the "consular fees," grant and at the same time limit the
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authority of the MECO to collect such fees. That grant and limit require the audit by THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS,
the COA of the collections thereby generated. and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),Respondents.
Conclusion x-----------------------x
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P.
entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial CUDIA, and on her own behalf,Petitioner-Intervenor.
relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non- DECISION
governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
"verification fees" it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the "consular fees" it PERALTA, J.:
collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such "verification fees" and
"consular fees" should be audited by the COA. The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment
to uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying
times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
dilemma between what is true and right as against his security, well-being,
Manila Economic and Cultural Office is hereby declared a non-governmental pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that
entity. However, the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and
pertaining to: the verification fees contemplated by Section 7 of Executive Order
chooses the fore. This is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is
No. 1022 issued 1 May 1985, that the former collects on behalf of the Department
championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of one's
of Labor and Employment, and the fees it was authorized to collect under Section
basic rights and privileges.1
2(6) of Executive Order No. 15 issued 16 May 2001, are subject to the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.
The Procedural Antecedents
No costs.
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in
SO ORDERED. behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and
Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary restraining order
(TRO).2
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015 In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and
instead, required respondents to file their comment on the petition. 3
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military
Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son
own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the
vs. petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), the motion and resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition. 5
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class
country's premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also.
City. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called being late Sir.20
"petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with
honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the
Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy. request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging
to the same section who were also late.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL
cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing
Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published out that, based on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As
schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that
was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in ENG412 Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on January 24,
was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H). 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
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Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:
Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor
Report stated: 1. How could this be lying?
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating 2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come
that his 4th period class ended at l 500H that made him late in the succeeding up to that honor report)?
class.22
3. What are his assumptions?
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL
Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and
that it was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations with their instructors and
carefully reviewed for I did not violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to
classmates as well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?)
Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to and for the following reasons:
answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on the
matter, was on emergency leave.
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and
finalized given the fact that no face-to-face personal conversation
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly
conveying: was the issue at hand.
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report
2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.
dated november. When maj hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i
reconsideration of meted punishment) further supports my
told, i wud presume they wil finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.) 23
explanation in my delinquency report.
The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who 4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not
reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not in the same time reference when just a lecture in a typical classroom instruction but includes every
the latter asked her.
transaction and communication a teacher does with her students,
especially that in our case some cadets asked for queries, and I
Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. am given instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our
He averred: CLASS. Her transaction and communication with our other
classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a little
Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bit.
bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor,
Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under
regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered my instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have
our question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our section grade, so I business with me, it is reasonable enough for him to say
waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the that "Our class was dismissed a bit late" (dealing with
room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I
immediately went to our 5ti period class which is ENG412.
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matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45 seconds to 1 The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until
minute and 30 seconds) early morning the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against
him, as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second
on time (1500H). night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia again appeared
and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr.
Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among
(signed)
M COSTALES the HC voting members followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The
members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted their
accomplished ballot sheets together with their written justification. The result was
w/ attached certification 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL
Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1
5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay CL Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber
and did not attempt to conceal anything that happened or I did. adjoining the court room for further deliberation. After several minutes, they went
out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed of the unanimous
Company[,] and I had a conversation with regards (sic) to the votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed in
same matter for which he can give important points of my case. the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.
7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC
for Ms. Costales. 24 Chairman, the full text of which stated:
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary WRITTEN APPEAL
investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot
Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1 14 NOVEMBER 2013
CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL
Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members. 25 Soon after, This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my
the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that the explanation on this delinquency report when I received it, is that "Our class was
case be formalized. dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th period class ... etc".
Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes
The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I (sic) to
Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the explanation that came
were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R. into my mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining
Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. that delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no intention to be
Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. late). In my statements, I convey my message as "since I was not the only one left
Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the term "CLASS", I used the
4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who word "DISMISSED" because I was under instruction (to wait for her to give the
observed the trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA,
Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet lCL ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that made me decide to
3CL Umaguing.28
Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein
Dr. Costales attested:
XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR- a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj. Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;
Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly
his rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication. 41 b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt
Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, Committee;
until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a
letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-
for immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet fledge graduating cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March
1CL Cudia's requests.42 2014;
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of
following events transpired: Cudia's Case.50
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres.
Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the Aquino and Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin.
AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44 The President recommended that they put in writing their appeal, requests, and
other concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial Cudia would not join the graduation but it was without prejudice to the result of the
of Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests for extension of time to file an Appeal appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked
Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished with a Gen. Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar
copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality and presumption of Lopez supervising the group conducting the review.
regularity of the HC proceedings.45Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed an
Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB. Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia
received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff,
Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It held:
thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was
issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA
of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to conduct a deliberate CRAB in denying the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was
investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the
the inquiry was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal
considered but also to investigate possible involvement of other cadets and from the date he was informed of the final verdict on January 21, 2014, when the
members of the command related to the incident and to establish specific violation decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the PMA
of policy or regulations that had been violated by other cadets and members of the CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son
HC.49 at the Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy's
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policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due 2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and
process considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy;
PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy. Thus, the previous finding and
recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of 2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for
"Lying" and recommending his separation from the Academy is sustained. the degree of Bachelors of Science; and
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of 2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official
merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final transcript 'of his academic records for his BS degree,
Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL Cudia's without conditions therein as to his status as a PMA cadet.
appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board tasked
to probe the case submitted its final report to the President.53 Pursuant to the
3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet
administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23,
Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal and civil suits against
2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the officers and members of the Honor Committee named
the case for purposes of DND review and recommendation for disposition by the hereunder, for violation of the Honor Code and System and the
President.54
Procedure in Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the
secrecy of the ballot, tampering the true result of the voting,
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive part of
CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029, concluding and recommending as follows: the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of
justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental rights to dignity, non-
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights- discrimination and due process, which led to the infringement of
CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS his right to education and even transgressing his right to a good
against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA life.
officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA
to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good 3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the
life. AFP
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to 3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the
competent authorities for their immediate appropriate action on the following AFP
recommendations:
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-
Not Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being 3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.
null and void; to uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty"
voting result and make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY
in favor of Cadet Cudia; 3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose 3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the
hands rest the ends of justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to: AFP
3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP 7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a
law defining and penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is
3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in
the AFP this jurisdiction;
3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of 8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as
the AFP priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination
law; and
3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of
the AFP 9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to
ensure respect and protection of the rights of those who testified
for the cause of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
Cudia.
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the
foregoing CHR recommendations.
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent
authorities should investigate and file appropriate charges against
Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service
of Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the to the complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief
protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at
of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the
the PMA Holding Center;
Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent
authorities should investigate Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG SO RESOLVED.55
for his failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a
competent Tactical Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP
case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the Spouses
administrative remedies; Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March
Armed Forces of the Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military
immediately cause the comprehensive review of all rules of Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff
procedures, regulations, policies, including the so-called practices Cudia.
in the implementation of the Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt
new policies, rules of procedures and relevant regulations which After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of II
the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE
The Issues
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are: JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
I. III
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS
P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT 57
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents
A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, presented the issues below:
Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have
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PROCEDURAL GROUNDS THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO
IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT
I. AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE ACADEMY.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION
AND MANDAMUS. Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful
statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
III.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE Committee.
RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL
REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded
CUDIA'S APPEAL. to Cadet Cudia.
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed
CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA. from the PMA.58
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus 6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by
may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully Dr. Costales, the new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, to this officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his vote, and other
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and new evidence if there is any;
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or is allowed to participate actively in the proceedings as well as in the cross-
duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of examinations during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses against
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, him; and
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs: Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed
against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of
A. xxx discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding: respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by
a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold
petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of
the 8 Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;
a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to
require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his
Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which
the Honor Committee; he is not entitled by law.68
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as
full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards.63 argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari
whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.
graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the
commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when the Factual nature of the issues
graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet
1 CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court
to make findings of fact because it sets forth several factual disputes which
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412 class
and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and his explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the investigation
and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC, and the allegation that
a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the executive
discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are session/"chambering."
within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore,
beyond the province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues.
PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are
Rather than determining which between the two conflicting versions of the parties
discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief.
is true, the case allegedly centers on the application, appreciation, and
Borrowing the words of Garcia:
interpretation of a person's rights to due process, to education, and to property; the
interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the conclusion on
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case
appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in involves questions of fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to
the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this settle mixed questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.
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There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being completed.
admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence
on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family
dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation
correct is a question of law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual from the APP officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior
matters for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which was attended by
more importance is the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's family the night before,
process, to education, and to property in the context of the Honor Code and the foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In
Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof. Notably, even any case, petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-
support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint and should DOLE73 rulings.
refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they
argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain We rule for petitioners.
civil liberties by virtue of his entry into the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys
academic freedom authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA. In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
These issues, aside from being purely legal being purely legal questions, are of until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale
first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical ruling. behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that "courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been
given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition committed in the administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United
pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical
there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative process. While Cadet case involving a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his
1 CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy remedies within the military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being
level - the determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted according to the designed both to preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities and
established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant to conserve judicial resources.
of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the
evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may
the guilty cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB - he still
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
appealed to the President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions
affecting the military. It is contended that the President's power over the persons
and actions of the members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) 1. when there is a violation of due process;
Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1
(also known as "The National Defense Act''). As such, the President could still 2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents' view, the filing of this petition
while the case is pending resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if 3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of justice should shy excess of jurisdiction;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review
ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; in cases attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to military
affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
entail a substantial consideration of legitimate governmental interest. They
unreasonable;
suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper will set an institutionally
dangerous precedent, opening a Pandora's box of other challenges against the
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; specialized system of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's
mandate to train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; and procedure necessarily must impose h different standard of conduct compared
with civilian institutions.
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
and Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-
and-balance machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any of its officials acts
intervention.76 without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial non-interference in military
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and
Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and
despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings
fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of military tribunals on account of issues posed concerning due process and
of the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP violations of constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa 83 decided by this
Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial power to determine
objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. whether the APP and the members of the court martial acted with grave abuse o.f
discretion in their military investigation.
Court's interference within military affairs
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v.
Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial intervention would pose Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not
substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a deferential review the courts, with superintendence and control over the military because the courts
of military statutes and regulations since political branches have particular generally lack the competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military
expertise and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff v. decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that
Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the
Court that the military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S. cases
discipline from that of the civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts' cited by respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is Respondents rightly argued.
the minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind
each cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that
of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound
although both Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of
thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the
due process, the latter case is more apropos since it specifically deals with the
member of the so-called "Long Gray Line." minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural rights of
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case
development. It defines the desirable values they must possess to remain part of of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142
the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a military
organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to
character building, it should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is best
satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit:
adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer of
the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
the cadets' character development and as ways by which the Academy has
of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
that graduates have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and moral
case.143
standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary
system as a whole is characterized as "correctional and educational in nature
rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases
prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
loyalty to the service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates. prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings
"137Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential part of the
investigation or hearing;146and that the required proof in a student disciplinary
action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt
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nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a bound by the existing norms that are logically applied through the Code and
conclusion."147 System in order to realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of character -
men of integrity and honor.151
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to
the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:
meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:149 2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice
System but it does not demean its Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise through
is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative legalism and its technicalities, the objective of building the character of the cadets
proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an Honor System tries to examine both the action and the intention.152
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long
as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue
in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy. It has been said
that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business is to
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-
process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to
to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process
evidence on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that
presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through last for several days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with
pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, legal and procedural' points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are
there is no denial of due process.150 irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal
proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be tolerated
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and,
conducted to investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to
attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the Honor Code achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154 Considering that the case of
guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of first impression in the sense that this Court has not
interested in legal precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold previously dealt with the particular issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due
the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some guidance.
justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S.
advantage. military code produced a salutary effect in the military justice system of the
Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
substantive way. Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal systems may
avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a
be used to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when a flexible concept, requiring consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances
cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the and calling for such procedural protections as the particular situation
Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the demands.156 Hagopian opined:
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution
from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by
factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further,
finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an
by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the findings is administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1 no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel."
CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel
therefor are discussed below seriatim: because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
As to the right to be represented by a counsel – More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the
to be represented by a counsel who could actively participate in the proceedings other aspects of the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature,
like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does
if remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a not proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and
PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an observer without any right to intervene educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to develop
and demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to them, he was the facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the
not sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if hearing taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by
he would like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was already counsel.167
nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO.
Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to
right to answer the charges against him or her with the assistance of counsel, if representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in military academy
desired. disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the policy of
"treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad
Auditor General165 in asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary
administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate
lCL Cudia's academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully and educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was
understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the confidentiality of the HC ruled that the importance of informality in the proceeding militates against a
proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In any event, requirement that the cadet be accorded the right to representation by counsel
respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a before the Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the
counsel's advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing. training and education needed to understand his rights and express himself, the
cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v.
Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to have
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
immediately inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered
that it is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only
Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and
recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters sometime in remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC as the
February-March 2014. Even then, he received no decision/recommendation on his sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower
case, verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement exercises pushed through the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the
with no written decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from cadet's dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA
the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the blindly followed the HC's finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
Cudia family received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in
laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases used by the CRAB and Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all
even by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB records without requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is
and the PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents cannot claim
uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and
substantial, and whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the Office of the
account. AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained
the findings and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved
In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally the appeal filed by the subject Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of
declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a written document so as to protect the the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was
integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was
pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding
CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia because it Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same things
was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a copy twice. This raised a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never
thereof. undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report,
and the Final Investigation Report was drafted merely as an afterthought when the
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional lack of written decision was pointed out by petitioners so as to remedy the
mandate stating that "[no] decision shall be rendered by any court without apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and review.
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based,"179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of
Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a decision issued in the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL
disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook also has Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the
no written rule on the matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it findings of the HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang
and that irregularities in its proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good
rule for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due process be afforded at father of cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham trial by the
every stage of developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate Honor Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang
hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a cadet from the military was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty awarded because
academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the
Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the
separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of established procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to
the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness.
Finally, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang
and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of Cadets 1 CL
of the case. The Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other
2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it "unusual" that the CRAB would
do the same things twice and suspect that it never undertook an in-depth
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cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively evaded clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his
responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales. being late in class is proper, since there is evidence indicating that a breach of
regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable cause to believe that he
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and was involved in the breach of regulations.189
determined to destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the
former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013, For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-
respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the
failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the HC. Further, Code." Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a tremendous duty far
he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC more superior to their personal feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help
Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the others by guiding them to accept the truth and do what is right, rather than
representatives of the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman tolerating actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be
is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if characteristically honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the
Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia believed that there was bias against him, he should have dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what
resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did, although he was later proven to have erred in his
Honor Code Handbook. accusation. Note that even the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook
recognizes that interpretation of one's honor is generally subjective. 193
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the
PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and
stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL
standing, the separation militates against PMA' s mission to produce outstanding, Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latter's downfall, their
honorable, and exceptional cadets. nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the
preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding
The Court differs with petitioners. Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the
proceedings/hearings conducted were merely a farce because the three
personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying the existence of a
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of
conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence, and integrity of the other
actual bias, petitioners' allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-
members who constituted the majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and
motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the
substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this baseless
challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome
insinuation.
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same
individual poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be implemented.187 Cadet 1 CL Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After the result of the
secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room
without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be
asked to explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to change his vote, he was made
awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares an
to cast a new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was
identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time as a future
leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to the discarded and replaced. There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0
accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or issue may be that was mentioned in the HC formal report.
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should
manipulation since, under the rules, it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a jury type of
votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that discussion called "executive session" or "chambering," which is intended to elicit
permits the HC Chairman to order the "chambering" of a member who voted the explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of
contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to reconsider in order to reflect a the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over the manifest proof of guilt. The
unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff or the President assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab
sanctioning the HC procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of
Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that such practice
own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation was in place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of
from the established procedures, the second deliberation should be considered Cadet 1CL Cudia.
null and void.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a the personal conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other
substantive right which cannot be unceremoniously changed without a voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change one's vote to speak of
corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System since a vote may only be considered as final when the Presiding Officer has
Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the purpose of voting by affixed his signature.
secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy behind the
provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument
to vote what is in his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure or that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit 7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that
out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked
Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT
nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting members of the Honor Committee
because of the confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0) votes
"Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi." Then for not guilty.
I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi
na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] 9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was
mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung GUILTY of LYING. After that, all persons inside the courtroom went back
pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to to barracks.
Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si
Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196 10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt
Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March boto? ., I answered: "Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo."
12, 2014, which he submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to the following: They also asked who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt
Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Jocson talked to me.
Code violation committed by Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member,
we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether the reported 11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department
Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not. of Naval Warfare to asked (sic) permission if it is possible not to attend the
Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine the Academy.
(9) voting members of the Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for
Lying. 12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was
about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him
and before the presiding Officer told the members to vote, I was confused and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?"
of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
investigation to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to give Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin
my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote "NOT GUILTY" with a lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako yung
reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta
arrive at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be muna kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga
enlightened with the other's justifications. nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty.
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Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based
Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: on what is in the heart and mind of the voting member is not necessarily diluted by
"Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. " 197 the fact that a second/final voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL
Mogol before the CRAB:
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura,
as the lone dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of other HC members, 13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights
who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or regarding the case at hand. The other members, on the other hand, would be
pressure. For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented given the chance to explain their votes as well as their insights to the dissenting
assuming they actually exist, could have been the best way to ensure that he was voter. The decision to change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his
free to express his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her vote despite
decision. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee. 200
his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what made
him change his mind. His use of general statements like he "was confused of the It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is
case " and "saw things that enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice to definitely not evidence.1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and proved because a
establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the admission of person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has
·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was the only one who been regularly performed.201
was given another ballot sheet while in the chamber and that he accomplished it in
the barracks which he only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue.
found, the announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC came Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently
out from the chamber and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura submitted his accomplished denied that he was pressured by the other voting members of the HC. His
ballot sheet.
representation must be accepted as it is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily
elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was "chambered,"
We rule for respondents. he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the
faith that Cadet 1 CL Lagura observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides: every cadet must be his or her own Final' Authority in honor; that he or she should
not let other cadets dictate on him or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board Code implies that any person can have confidence that a cadet and any graduate
will call for the members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. of the PMA will be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions, words and
A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of ways are sincere and true.203
violating the Honor Code.198
As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and
conducting "executive session" or "chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for
given leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases taking into account the being harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC
exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be a proceedings.
unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure, 199 We still
rule that there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering" Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no
considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot automatically be clear time reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what was the exact
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time of dismissal - whether it should be the dismissal inside the room or the For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no
dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet intent to deceive or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his
1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting members. They explanation. His .. statements were clear and unambiguous but were given a
claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five minutes narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges that
before the class was set to end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes "[e]xperience demonstrates that human communication is imperfect at best, and
earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that some actions are often misinterpreted."
Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H,
he did not state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects
the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before the scheduled end of class. not only his outstanding academic performance but proves his good conduct
during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-average grades in
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to
query such that his business was already finished as soon as she gave an answer. lie is, therefore, far from the truth.
However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he was no On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL
longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr. Costales never Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to
categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion. lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements
Her text messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted in his written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the following:
during its investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in her class
on November 14, 2013. First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation,
Dr. Costales testified that a class is dismissed as long as the instructor is not there
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed
class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. from the time they have answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia
If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500- stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had an LE
1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I
claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late. stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx"
Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the
that what appears to have caused confusion in the minds of respondents is just a afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."
matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying.
It is malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness.
language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend his next class.
that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave, while "class" refers to a body of However, he initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He
students meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these was not under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
two words do not have definite and precise meanings but are generic terms. Other
than the words "class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body,
actually be used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he
Dr. Costales clarified her statements in her written explanation. She explained that
said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not correct, but it is not false or
the "instruction to wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not
not true.
her initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet
Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it was them who wanted to
meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation, his
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subsequent class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL
In the informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC, Cudia justified that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit
Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in late by our instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration of
the afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:
marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class started as scheduled (3 :05 in the
afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204 I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class
ended 1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also.
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
intention to mislead or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting words in his being late Sir.207
explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is highly improbable
that he used incorrect language to justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments are In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed
tenable. quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined
Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon in one U.S. case as follows:
factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long standing
A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly
rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he
if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it
is no evidence that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are
is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208
not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were
committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly
manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is present in this case, all and completely telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof.
investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points. violation are:
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the 1. The act and/or omission, and
Philippines (CCAFP) states: "We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate
among us those who do. " 2. The intent pertinent to it.
The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to
Code by lying if they make an oral or written statement which is contrary to what is commit or omit the act itself.209
true or use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is
expected that every cadet's word is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:
that it is true without qualification; and that the cadets must answer directly,
completely and truthfully even though the answer may result in punitive action 1. Do I intend to deceive?
under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206
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2. Do I intend to take undue advantage? go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be
said that he already lost control over the circumstances.
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable
thing.210 It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led
to confusion in the minds of respondents and eventually commenced the HC
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple
ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved by inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful
unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this case, explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of capitalizing
on the use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter is that the Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his
ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational institution, does Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic
not correspond to what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year
the words are not generic and have definite and precise meaning. stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense
charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
Narciso already constitute a "class." The Court cannot agree that such term similar thing at another time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his
includes "every transaction and communication a teacher does with her students." identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific
Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code
should have been accurate by pinpointing who were with him when he was late in violation.
the next class. His deceptive explanation is made more obvious when compared
with what Cadets 1 CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
was: "We approached our instructor after our class."212
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the
five or fifteen minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is
even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a
admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR cadet's dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from
that he was already dismissed when he passed his LE paper.213 During the the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore,
hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to his presumed to know that the Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or
request to see the results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a huge
phrases "under my instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter of falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been
explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured
CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek
classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time because the to assure that only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and
consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is constitutionally
argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL permissible for the military "to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of
Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits
him. Given such situation, a responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
constraint has the last say, that is, to politely decline the invitation and immediately
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
acceptance that violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the
dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the
CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of
sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he human rights violations involving civil and political rights. 224 As held in Cariño v.
entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in Andrews219 wherein it was held Commission on Human Rights225and a number of subsequent cases,226 the CHR is
that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary,
only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not
and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the
empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or
district court, thus:
controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
has violated the Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as
their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-
of scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court
tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an unconstitutionally of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
have suffered ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be more compassionate
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
--or even more effective in achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to the
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
question of whether the harsher penalty violates due process.220
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
Nature of the CHR Findings function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's xxxx
recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional body mandated by the
1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by SO ORDERED.
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as DECISION
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x." REYES, J.:
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this
authority.1âwphi1 To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for
to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
of a judgment. "226 to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with
with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 grave abuse of discretion.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche though it
may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all" of his existence. The Facts
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity,
its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's
member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for,
independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound
the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the
among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process character.
itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the
undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to
disqualified."25 the next level court, it would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they
have had less than one year of service on the bench.26 (Citations omitted and
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended emphasis in the original)
appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that
does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and
determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the
differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service
President. Persons with this qualification are neither automatically selected nor do
provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be
they automatically become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an
measured by experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment
array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot
between lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any
have served less than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as basis.
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational
the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate
basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between
and competency to set criteria for applicants that refer to the more general lower court judges with five year experience and those with less than five years of
categories of probity, integrity and independence. experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed
policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which
that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is
is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the
based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of
qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of
the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional.
judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional
standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of "proven competence." In
Due Process
determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for
lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level
Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The petitioner said
courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said policy should
deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law have been published.
and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one
to acquire professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in
place improved procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to
the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to
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issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the
government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme 1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge
Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative of Regional Trial Court, except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials,
Code. as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive scholastic or educational record and
performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for honesty, integrity,
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of probity and independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and excellent
have been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that potentials for appellate judgeship.
all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or
implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, x x x x (Emphasis ours)
several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly
regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel
published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation
of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of
suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the JBC were so-
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of minded to add special guidelines for determining competence of applicants for
their duties.29
RTC judges, then it could and should have amended its rules and published the
same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy
involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be
competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year
would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the
requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring
selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the
proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant
positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no
prepare for and comply with them.
legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the
possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the
Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the
Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the
list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
guidelines in determining competence, independence, integrity and probity. within the discretion of the JBC.30
Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least five
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the
years of experience as an RTC judge, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE
judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated,
COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects the
performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan. - In addition to the foregoing guidelines the Council should
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates
consider the following in evaluating the merits of applicants for a vacancy in the
the constitutional provision under social justice and human rights for equal
Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
opportunity of employment. The OSG explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,
constitutional provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication
might, for any number of reasons, wish to apply. As with all professions, it is requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges
regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court,
public interest and is central in the administration of justice x x x. Applicants who and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be
meet the constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand the implementing.
competition and rigorous screening and selection process. They must submit
themselves to the selection criteria, processes and discretion of respondent JBC, SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
which has the constitutional mandate of screening and selecting candidates whose
names will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a fair
opportunity is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their QUO WARRANTO
individual merits and abilities, the questioned policy cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has
merely filed an application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he has REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL
no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected and included JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner, v. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, Respondent.
in the list to be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the
JBC. The JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the DECISION
judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only
be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective
applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part TIJAM, J.:
in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right,
the issuance of an injunctive writ is not justified.
Whoever walks in integrity and with moral character walks securely, but he
who takes crooked way will be discovered and punished.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and
selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC
has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate.
Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the - The Holy Bible, Proverbs 10:9 (AMP)
guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and
guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing
circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial Integrity has, at all times, been stressed to be one of the required qualifications of
intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure and judge. It is not new concept in the vocation of administering and dispensing justice.
improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with In the early 1600's, Francis Bacon, philosopher, statesman, and jurist, in his
five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential "Essay LVI: Of Judicature" said "[a]bove all things, integrity is the Judge's portion
applicants, however, should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial and proper virtue." Neither is integrity complex concept necessitating esoteric
positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, philosophical disquisitions to be understood. Simply, it is qualification of being
unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from honest, truthful, and having steadfast adherence to moral and ethical
interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and principles.1 Integrity connotes being consistent doing the right thing in accordance
independence inherent in the latter.cralawred with the law and ethical standards everytime. Hence, every judicial officer in any
society is required to comply, not only with the laws and legislations, but with
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codes and canons of conduct and ethical standards as well, without derogation. As Justice, of the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law,
Thomas Jefferson remarked, "it is of great importance to set resolution, never not and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
to be shaken, never to tell an untruth. There is no vice so mean, so pitiful, so Employees. The Republic accordingly seeks the nullification of respondent's
contemptible and he who permits himself to tell lie once, finds it much easier to do appointment, asserting that her failure to file the required disclosures and her
it second and third time, till at length it becomes habitual, he tells lies without failure to submit the same to the Judicial and Bar Council show that she is not
attending to it, and truths without the world's believing him. This falsehood of the possessed of "proven integrity" demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary.
tongue leads to that of the heart and in time depraves all its good dispositions."
Mental dishonesty and moral mischief breed all that integrity is not. The Case
In our jurisdiction, one cannot be qualified to be member of the Judiciary, lacking Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the
such mandatory requirement of "proven integrity". Inevitably, an appointee to the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of
position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court must be the exemplar of honesty, Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
probity and integrity. The purpose of this requirement is self-evident as the Chief General (OSG) filed the present Petition5 for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
Justice heads the Judiciary and adjudicates cases as member of the Court that of quo warranto to declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of
"has the last word on what the law is."2 Together with other Justices, the Chief the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.
Justice also disciplines members of the Bar for misconduct. The significance of
probity and integrity as requirement for appointment to the Judiciary is The Antecedents
underscored by the fact that such qualifications are not explicitly required of the
President, the Vice-President or the Members of Congress under the Constitution. From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning period of 20 years, respondent
The Constitution, thus, demands in no uncertain terms that the Chief Justice be the served as member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law
embodiment of moral and ethical principles. He or she must be of unquestionable (U.P. or U.P. College of Law), initially as temporary faculty member (from
character, possessed of moral authority to demand obedience to the law and to November 1986 to December 31, 1991) and thereafter, as permanent faculty
impose rule of conduct. Indeed, one who exacts compliance with the law and member until her resignation therefrom on June 1, 2006.6 As regular faculty
ethical standards should be their foremost adherent. member, respondent was paid by the month by U.P.7
No one is above the law and the Constitution, not even Chief Justice who took an Based on the records of the U.P. Human Resources Development Office (U.P.
oath to protect and defend the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. The HRD0),8 respondent was on official leave from the U.P. College of Law for the
Court in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,3 says it tritely "the Chief following periods:
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court." 4 All
public officers whether in the Executive, Legislative or Judicial departments are June 1, 2000 - May 31, 2001
bound to follow the law. If public officer violates the law, he or she shall suffer
punishment, sanctions and adverse consequences. The obligatory force of the law June 1, 2001 - May 31, 2002
is necessary because once we allow exceptions, concessions, waiver, suspension
or non application to those who do not want to follow the law, nobody else will November 1, 2003 - October 31, 2004
obey the law.
June 1, 2004 - February 10, 2005
In this unprecedented case for quo warranto against the incumbent Chief Justice,
the Republic entreats this Court to declare Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno November 1, 2004 - October 31, 2005
(respondent) ineligible to hold the highest post in the Judiciary for failing to.
regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as member of the career February 11, 2005 - May 31, 2006
service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief
When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC Nevertheless, the JBC En Banc subsequently agreed to extend the deadline for
announced32 the opening for application and recommendation of the position of the filing of applications or recommendations to July 2, 2012 and the submission of
Chief Justice. During the 2012 deliberations for the position of the Chief Justice, the other documentary requirements to July 17, 2012. 38
the members of the JBC En Banc were Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
(Justice Peralta) as Acting ex officio Chairman; Undersecretary Michael Frederick On June 25, 2012, the JBC En Banc resolved not to require the incumbent
L. Musngi as ex officio member vice Leila M. De Lima; Senator Francis Joseph G. Supreme Court Justices who are candidates for the Chief Justice position to
Escudero and Representative Niel Tupas as ex officio members representing the submit other documentary requirements, particularly the required clearances.
Congress; Justice Regino C. Hermosisima Jr. as regular member representing the Instead, the JBC En Banc required the incumbent Justices to submit only the
retired Supreme Court Justices; Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman as regular SALNs, bank waiver, medical certificate, laboratory results and the PDS.
member representing the Private Sector; Atty. Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa
as regular member representing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and Atty. On July 2, 2012, respondent accepted several nominations from the legal and the
Jose V. Mejia as regular member representing the academe. The JBC Executive evangelical community for the position of Chief Justice and in support of her
Committee (Execom) was composed of the JBC Regular Members and assisted nomination, respondent submitted to the ORSN her SALNs for the years
by the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO) headed by Atty. Annaliza S. Ty- 2009,39 2010,40 and 2011.41 Respondent also executed waiver of
Capacite (Atty. Capacite). confidentiality42 of her local and foreign bank accounts. 43
The JBC announcement was preceded by an En Banc meeting held on June 4, On July 6, 2012, or even before the deadline of the submission of the documentary
2012 wherein the JBC agreed to require the applicants for the Chief Justice requirements on July 17, 2012, the JBC En Banc came up with long list of the
position to submit, instead of the usual submission of the SALNs for the last two candidates totaling twenty-two (22), respondent included, and scheduled the public
years of public service, all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in interview of said candidates on July 24-27, 2012.44
government service.33 However, for the other judicial vacancies, the JBC required
the submission of only two SALNs.34 Accordingly, in the On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its Special En Banc Meeting,45 deliberated on the
Announcement35 published on June 5, 2012, the JBC specifically directed the candidates for the position of Chief Justice with incomplete documentary
candidates for the Chief Justice post to submit, in addition to the usual requirements. In particular, the JBC examined the list of candidates and their
documentary requirements, the following: compliance with the required submission of SALNs. The minutes of the JBC
(1) Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN): deliberation reveal as follows:
xxxx
a. for those in the government: all previous SALNs (up to
31 December 2011) The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to SALNs,
whether five (5) SALNs would constitute substantial compliance if the candidate
b. for those from the private sector: SALN as of 31 has been in the government service for twenty (20) years.
December 2011
The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the candidates
coming from the government, and identified who among them would be considered
(2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank
to have substantially complied:
accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency Deposits
1. Justice Arturo D. Brion has substantially complied
Act.36 (Emphasis ours)
The JBC announcement further provided that "applicants with incomplete or out-of- 2. Justice Antonio Carpio has substantially complied
date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
Considering that most of my government records in the academe are more than On the scheduled date of the interview on July 24, 2012, despite respondent's
fifteen years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those submission of only SALNs, Atty. Pascual prepared Report Re: Documentary
files. Requirements and SALN of candidates for the Position of Chief Justice of the
Philippines55 wherein respondent was listed as applicant No. 14 with an opposite
In any case, the University of the Philippines has already cleared me of all annotation that she had "COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS" and note stating "Letter
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and 7/23/12 considering that her government records in the academe are more than 15
from administrative charges as of 01 June 2006. Since it is the ministerial duty of years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files."
the Head of the Office to ensure that the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed
and accomplished (CSC Resolution No. 060231 dated 01 February 2006 and CSC The JBC then proceeded to interview the candidates, including respondent who
Memorandum Circular No. 10-2006 dated 17 April 2006), this clearance can be was interviewed on July 27, 2012. On August 6, 2012, the ORSN prepared list of
taken as an assurance that my previous government employer considered the the 20 candidates, respondent included, vis-a-vis their SALN submissions.
SALN requirements to have been met copy of the Clearance dated 19 September Opposite respondent's name was an enumeration of the SALNs she
2011 issued by the University of the Philippine is hereby attached. submitted, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011 and an excerpt from her July 23, 2012 letter
that "considering that [respondent's] government records in the academe are more
In the 05 June 2012 Announcement, the Judicial and Bar Council imposed the than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those
requirement of submitting all previous SALNs for those in the government. As files." On August 13, 2012, the JBC voted on who would be included in the short
pointed out earlier, my service in government is not continuous. The period of my list and on the same day, transmitted to the President its nominations 56 for the
private practice between my service in the University of the Philippines ending in position of Chief Justice, as follows:
2006 and my appointment to the Supreme Court in 2010 presents break in 1. Carpio, Antonio T.
government service. Hence, in compliance with the documentary requirements for
my candidacy as Chief Justice, submitted only the SALNs from end of 2009 up to 2. Abad, Roberto A.
31 December 2011, since am considered to have been returned to public office
and rendered government service anew from the time of my appointment as 3. Brion, Arturo D.
Associate Justice on 16 August 2010.
4. Jardeleza, Francis H.
Considering that have been previously cleared from all administrative
responsibilities and accountabilities from my entire earlier truncated government 5. Sereno, Maria Lourdes P.A.
service, may kindly request that the requirements that need to comply with, be
similarly viewed as that from private sector, before my appointment to the 6. Zamora, Ronalda B.
Government again 2010 as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
7. Leonardo-De Castro, Teresita J.
x x x x51
8. Villanueva, Cesar L.
The letter dated July 23, 2012 was received by the Office of the Administrative and
Financial Services (OAFS) and copies thereof were received by the offices of the A month after respondent's acceptance of her nomination, or on August 24, 2012,
JBC regular members, the ORSN and the OEO.52 The letter, however, was neither respondent was appointed by then President Aquino III as Chief Justice of the
examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated upon either by the Supreme Court.
JBC En Banc or the Execom.53 Although the determination of whether candidate
has substantially complied with the documentary requirements was delegated to On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice,
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an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against the instant petition is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period
respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives (House under Section 11, Rule 66,63 of the Rules of Court since respondent's
Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high transgressions only came to light during the proceedings of the House Committee
crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent on Justice on the allegations of the impeachment complaint filed against her.
failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. Alternatively, the Republic claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi.
The impeachment complaint was endorsed by several members of the House and,
thereafter, was found to be sufficient in form and substance. The respondent filed In justifying resort to petition for quo warranto, the Republic argues that quo
her answer to the impeachment complaint. After the filing of the reply and the warranto is available as remedy even as against impeachable officers, like
rejoinder, the House Committee on Justice conducted several hearings on the respondent. The Republic argues that petition for quo warranto is different from the
determination of probable cause, the last of which was held on February 27, impeachment proceedings because the writ of quo warranto is being sought to
2018.57 question the validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses
her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust
During these hearings, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her while in office.64 Citing the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
SALNs while she was member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that and the cases of Funa v. Chairman Villar65 and Nacionalista Party v. De
she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. During the hearing on Vera,66 the Republic argues that quo warranto may be resorted to even against
February 7, 2018 of the House Committee on Justice, Justice Peralta, as resource impeachable officers and that the respondent's assumption of the position as Chief
person being then the acting ex officio Chairman of the JBC, further claimed that Justice under the color of an executive appointment is public wrong correctible
during the JBC deliberations in 2012, he was not made aware that respondent by quo warranto.
submitted incomplete SALNs nor that respondent's letter dated July 23, 2012 to
the JBC was ever deliberated upon.58 This was confirmed by Atty. Fernan-- The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the
Cayosa;59 by Atty. Capacite, who emphasized that based on the rubber stamp ground that the latter failed to show that she is person of proven integrity which is
received, only the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the OEO an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section
were furnished copies of the letter;60 and by Atty. Pascual on the basis of the 7(3),67 Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the Republic, because
transmittal-letter.61 respondent failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her
integrity remains unproven. The Republic posits that the JBC's ostensible
The foregoing sworn declarations made during the hearings before the House nomination of respondent does not extinguish the fact that the latter failed to
Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the proposal of the comply with the SALN requirement as the filing thereof remains to be constitutional
House Committee for this Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC and statutory requirement.68
relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice which is now presently
docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC; and two, the In sum, the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as
Letter62 dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being candidate for the
the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate quo warranto proceeding position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not proven her
against respondent. integrity which is requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes
that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven
Thus, the present petition. integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
warranto.
The Case for the Republic
The Case for the Respondent
The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo warranto is the
proper remedy to question the validity of respondent's appointment. It alleges that Being circumspect in the examination of every pleading and document on record,
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this Court observes that, initially, the Comment Ad Cautelam dated March 16, It is likewise the argument of respondent that since petition for quo warranto may
2018 filed before Us was neither signed by the respondent herself nor verified to be filed before the RTC, such would result to conundrum because judge of lower
have been read by her and attested by her that the allegations therein are true and court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative
correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records. This Court is not supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to
unaware that under the Rules of Court, specifically Section 4, Rule 7, not all Sections and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the Supreme
pleadings need to be under oath, verified, or accompanied by an affidavit. In fact, Court disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel
the rules on quo warranto do not require the filing of such comment, but pursuant thereof. She theorizes that if Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted
to the dictates of the fundamental right of due process and also the desire of this through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress' "check" on the Supreme
Court to dispose of this case judiciously, impartially, and objectively, this Court Court through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
gave the respondent the opportunity to be heard and oppose the allegations in the
petition by requiring her to file comment thereto. Thus, this Court anticipated Respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66
response from the respondent to take such opportunity to settle the uncertainty of provides that petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the
her nomination and appointment through her comment to the petition. What was "cause of ouster" and not from the "discovery" of the disqualification. Respondent
received by this Court, however, was an unverified Comment repudiating the contends that the supposed "failure" to file the required SALNs allegedly took
Court's jurisdiction, merely signed by counsel, who appeared to be representing place for several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the "cause of ouster" existed even
the respondent. before the respondent was appointed as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012.
Therefore, as early as her appointment, the Republic, through the OSG, already
Wary of the legal implications of such unverified pleading, i.e. possible refutation of had cause of action to seek her ouster. Even assuming that the one-year
the allegations stated therein and repudiation of the signing counsel's authority to prescriptive period may be counted from the Republic's "discovery" of the
represent, this Court in its April 3, 2018 Resolution69 set as condition for the disqualification, the petition would still be time-barred since the Republic would
conduct of Oral Arguments prayed for by respondent, that the latter affirm and have made such "discovery" through U.P., considering that the U.P. HRDO is
verify under oath the truth and veracity of the allegations in the Comment Ad required to submit list of employees who failed to file their SALNs.
Cautelam filed by counsel supposedly on her behalf.
Respondent avers that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
In an Ad Cautelam Partial Compliance/Manifestation dated April 5, 2018, because as public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to
respondent affirmed and verified under oath the truth and veracity of the office was regular. According to respondent, the Republic failed to overcome this
allegations in the said Comment Ad Cautelam through Verification dated April 6, presumption as the documents relied upon by it, i.e., certifications from the U.P.
2018 attached therein. HRDO and the Ombudsman, do not categorically state that respondent failed to
file her SALNs. On the contrary, respondent points out that the U.P. HRDO had
In the said Comment Ad Cautelam, respondent argues that, on the strength of certified that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and
Section 2,70 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and the cases of Mayor Lecaroz v. charges as of June 1, 2006 and that there was no pending administrative charge
Sandiganbayan,71Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan,72In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. against her.
Gonzales,73 and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio,74 the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by It is likewise the contention of respondent that public officers without pay or those
impeachment. Respondent contends that the use of the phrase "may be removed who do not receive compensation are not required to file SALN. Thus, respondent
from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that argues that for the periods that she was on official leave without pay, she was
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than actually not required to file any SALN for the inclusive years. She adds that to
impeachment. According to respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the require the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be qualifications provided for under the Constitution.
removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.
Nonetheless, respondent represents that she continues to recover and retrieve her
Respondent also contends that absent any challenge to her nomination and Respondent's Memorandum also sought to address certain matters raised during
appointment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC and the Oral Arguments.
the President, her appointment can no longer be questioned.
As to where her SALNs are, respondent avers that some of her SALNs were in fact
Respondent reiterates that the instant petition is time-barred. She argues that the found in the records of the U.P. HRDO, and she was able to retrieve copies of
Republic cannot rely on Agcaoili v. Suguitan87 because it mentioned the some of her SALNs from the U.P. Law Center. Without prejudice to her
principle nullum temus occurit regi or "no time runs against the king" only in jurisdictional objections, she attached them to the Memorandum. She argues that
passing, as the "general rule concerning limitation of action in quo the fact that the SALNs for certain years are missing cannot give rise to the
warrantoproceedings." She avers that Agcaoili is in fact authority for the principle inference that they were not filed. She points out that U.P. was only required to
that prescription will definitely run against the State if the rule or statute clearly so keep the SALNs for period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement, after
provides. which the SALN may be destroyed.
Respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's statement as a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole
quoted in Manila Times article to the effect that if respondent continues to ignore and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
and to refuse to participate in the impeachment process, she is clearly liable for character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;
culpable violation of the Constitution.
b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution
Respondent likewise made mention that Justice Tijam and Justice Bersamin wore and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so,
touch of red during the "Red Monday" protest on March 12, 2018 wherein judges whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of
and court employees reportedly called on respondent to make the supreme respondent as Chief Justice;
sacrifice and resign.
c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required
Respondent also calls for the inhibition of Justice De Castro for having allegedly by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
prejudged the issue as regards the validity of respondent's nomination and nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;
appointment in 2012 when Justice De Castro testified under oath during the House
Committee on Justice hearings that respondent should have been disqualified from d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
the shortlist on account of the SALNs she allegedly failed to submit. Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by
the President cured such ineligibility.
At the last minute, respondent also seeks to disqualify Justice Samuel R. Martires
for his purported insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning her "mental" 4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.
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The Ruling of the Court sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and
remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. x x x.91 (Emphasis ours)
Preliminary Issues
Clearly, herein movant-intervenors' sentiments, no matter how noble, do not, in
any way, come within the purview of the concept of "legal interest" contemplated
Intervention is an ancillary remedy restricted in purpose and in time
under the Rules to justify the allowance of intervention. Movant-intervenors failed
to show any legal interest of such nature that they will "either gain or lose by the
Intervention is remedy by which third party, not originally impleaded in the
direct legal operation of the judgment". Even the IBP's assertion of their
proceedings, becomes litigant therein for certain purpose: to enable the third party "fundamental duty to uphold the Constitution, advocate for the rule of law, and
to protect or preserve right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. 90 safeguard the administration of justice", being the official organization of all
Philippine lawyers, will not suffice. Admittedly, their interest is merely out of
Nevertheless, the remedy of intervention is not matter of right but rests on the
"sentimental desire" to uphold the rule of law. Meanwhile, Senators De Lima and
sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal
Trillanes' claimed legal interest is mainly grounded upon their would be
interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result as
participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of
spelled out under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, as follows: impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court.
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. A person who has legal interest in the matter in
Nevertheless, the fact remains that as of the moment, such interest is still
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the Senate. It bears
so situated as to be adversely affected by distribution or other disposition of
stressing that the interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant.92
be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the Indeed, if every person, not parties to the action but assert their desire to uphold
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in the rule of law and the Constitution, were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
separate proceeding.
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and interminable.93
Each of the movant-intervenors in this case seek to intervene as citizens and
taxpayers, whose claimed interest to justify their intervention is their "sense of Emphatically, quo warranto proceeding is an action by the government against
patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine individuals unlawfully holding an office. Section 1, Rule 66 provides:
Constitution". The movant-intervenors further assert "public right" to intervene in Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation
the instant case by virtue of its "transcendental importance for the Filipino people of public office, position or franchise may be commenced by verified petition
as whole". Apart from such naked allegations, movant-intervenors failed to brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
establish to the Court's satisfaction the required legal interest. Our jurisprudence is (a) person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
well-settled on the matter: position or franchise;
Intervention is not matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when
the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute (b) public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies person to constitutes ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
intervene is his possession of legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so (c) An association which acts as corporation within the Philippines without being
situated as to be adversely affected by distribution or other disposition of property legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as The remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in any private
qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of direct and
individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as public
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
question of governmental legitimacy and not merely private quarrel among rival
direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and
claimants.94
material, concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or
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resolves to deny the motion for intervention of Senators De Lima and Trillanes.
Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell,95 historically traced the nature of quo
warranto proceedings as crime which could only be prosecuted in the name of the No basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the
King by his duly authorized law officers. In time, the criminal features of quo case
warranto proceedings were modified and as such, the writ came to be used as
means to determine which of two claimants was entitled to an office and to order The instant petition comes at the heels of the recently-concluded hearings on the
the ouster and the payment of fine against the usurper. This quasi-criminal nature determination of probable cause in the impeachment complaint against respondent
of quo warranto proceedings was adopted in some American states. before the House Committee on Justice. Several Members of the Court, both
Nonetheless, Newman explains that the Code of the District of Colombia, which incumbent and retired, were invited, under pain of contempt, to serve as resource
was the venue of the case, continues to treat usurpation of office as public wrong persons. Those Members who were present at the Committee hearings were
which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members
Thus: are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge and insofar as
In sense in very important sense every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in material and relevant to the issues being heard. For lack of particularity, the Court
the enforcement of law, in the administration of law, and in having only qualified supposes that the attendance of some of its Members in the House Committee
officers execute the law. But that general interest is not private, but public interest. hearings is the basis of movant-intervenor Saguisag's motion to recuse.
Being such, it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District Attorney,
who are expected by themselves or those they authorize to institute quo On the other hand, respondent was more emphatic when she sought affirmative
warrantoproceedings against usurpers in the same way that they are expected to relief, in the form of the inhibition of six (6) Justices, of the Court, whose jurisdiction
institute proceedings against any other violator of the law. That general public she questions and assails. Specifically, respondent prays for the inhibition of
interest is not sufficient to authorize private citizen to institute such proceedings, Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza,
for, if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer would have the same interest Noel Gimenez Tijam, Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro and Samuel R. Martires
and the same right to institute such proceedings, and public officer might, from the fundamentally on the ground of actual bias for having commonly testified before
beginning to the end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title. the House Committee on Justice on the impeachment case.
The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an action for quo
warranto is when such individual has claim over the position in question. Section of As for Justice Samuel R. Martires, respondent concludes Justice Martires'
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides: manifested actual bias based on his statements during the Oral Arguments which
Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming purportedly tended to question respondent's mental and psychological fitness.
to be entitled to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
In particular, respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's
another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
statement as quoted in Manila Times article to the effect that if respondent
In this case, the movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled continues to ignore and to refuse to participate in the impeachment process, she is
to the questioned position nor are they the ones charged with the usurpation clearly liable for culpable violation of the Constitution.
thereof.
Respondent cites the article entitled, "Appear in Congress or vialate Constitution,"
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the movants-intervenors, in their dated December 4, 2017, where Justice Tijam was purportedly quoted to have
respective Motions, presented nothing more than mere reiteration of respondent's said:
allegations and arguments in her Comment. Impeachment is constitutional process and mandate enshrined in the Constitution.
Justices took an oath to defend, preserve, protect the Constitution. If Chief
For these reasons, the Court, in its Resolution96 dated April 3, 2018, resolved to Justice Sereno continues to ignore and continues to refuse to participate in
deny the motions for intervention respectively filed by Capistrano et al., and the impeachment process, ergo, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of
Zarate et al., and to note the IBP's intervention. For similar reasons, the Court the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Ultimately, the cause for inhibition simmers to the question of whether, in so "Impeachment is [neither] an assault on the Judiciary nor an infringement on the
appearing and testifying before the House Committee on Justice, the Members of independence of the Judiciary, because it is enshrined in the Constitution.
the Court are precluded from hearing and deciding the instant petition for quo Parenthetically, when the SC strikes down acts of Congress and acts of the
warranto. To this, the Court answers in the negative. President and the Executive Department for being unlawful and unconstitutional,
the SC is not assaulting the independence of Congress and the Executive
Jurisprudence recognizes the right of litigants to seek disqualification of judges. Department because the expanded power of judicial review is enshrined in the
Indeed, elementary due process requires hearing before an impartial and Constitution," Tijam pointed out.
disinterested tribunal. "A judge has both the duty of rendering just decision and the
duty of doing it in manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as Sereno, he said, should be role model when it comes to respecting the
to his integrity."97 Constitution.99 (Emphasis ours)
Notably, respondent conveniently and casually invoked only portion of the article
However, the right of party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of judge who
which suited her objective of imputing bias against Justice Tijam.
does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter's sacred duty to decide cases
As, to the act of wearing red tie which purportedly establishes Justices Tijam and
without fear of repression. The movant must therefore prove the ground of bias
Bersamin's prejudice against her, the argument is baseless and unfair. There is no
and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify judge from basis, whether in logic or in law, to establish connection between piece of clothing
participating in particular trial. "[W]hile it is settled principle that opinions formed in and magistrate's performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to
the course of judicial proceedings, based on the evidence presented and conduct
the contrary, the red piece of clothing was merely coincidental and should not be
observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the
deemed sufficient ground to disqualify them.
judge."98
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, et al.,100 this
A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila Times article Court explained that:
reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was only to prod respondent to
[T]he second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1,101 does not give judges unfettered
observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing case. The inhibition must be for
the ideals of public accountability, thus:
just and valid causes, and in this regard, We have noted that the mere imputation
He added that he wanted to encourage Sereno to show up at the Congress
of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge
hearings "to respect and participate in the impeachment (process), and to
is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
defend herself and protect the institution."
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith,
Sereno, he said, should be role model when it comes to respecting the
malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from
Constitution.
the decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so
gross and patent as to produce an ,ineluctable inference of bad faith or
"Impeachment is not an invention of politicians. It was drafted by the framers of the malice.102 (Citations omitted)
Constitution. Media, which propagates the myth that impeachment is numbers
game, hence, is political and arbitrary, fails to emphasize the fact that the rule of In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As
the majority is the essence of democracy," the magistrate stressed. to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices
participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable
Considering the legal basis and nature of an action for quo waranto, this Court Further, the PET Rules provide that petition for quo warranto, contesting the
cannot shirk from resolving the instant controversy in view of the fact that election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty
respondent is an impeachable officer and/or in view of the possibility of an to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by any registered voter who has
impeachment trial against respondent. voted in the election concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the
winner.161 Despite disloyalty to the Republic being crime against public
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or order162 defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus may likewise be
invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office treated as "other high crimes,"163 constituting an impeachable offense, quo
warranto as remedy to remove the erring President or Vice-President is
Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by nevertheless made expressly available.
impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,156Cuenco v.
Fernan,157 In Re Gonzales,158Jarque v. Desierto159 and Marcoleta v. Borra.160 It In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of quo
should be stressed, however, that none of these cases concerned the validity of an warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases
impeachable officer's appointment. Lecaroz involved criminal charge against of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. MacapagalArroyo,164 the Court took
mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against
against impeachable officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath
Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of person to occupy public Indeed, respondent's case is peculiar in that her omission to file her SALN also
position. It is direct proceeding assailing the title to public office.178 The issue to be formed part of the allegations against her in the Verified Complaint for
resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying public Impeachment. Verily, the filing of the SALN is Constituional requirement, and the
position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, transgression of which may, in the wisdom of the impeachment court, be
was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found interpreted as constituting culpable violation of the Constitution. But then,
to be not qualified and without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the respondent, unlike the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office.179 In other words, while Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, apart from having to comply
impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising with the Constitutional SALN requirement, also answers to the unique
his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to Constitutional qualification of having to be person of proven competence, integrity,
hold the position to begin with. probity, and independence-qualifications not expressly required by the
fundamental law for the other impeachable officers.181 And as will be extensively
Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such remedy is demonstrated hereunder, respondent's failure to file her SALNs and to submit the
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same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity. In other words, when may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court's function of harmonizing the laws
Member of the Supreme Court transgresses the SALN requirement prior to his or and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or
her appointment as such, he or she commits violation of the Constitution and omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
belies his or her qualification to hold the office. It is not therefore accurate to place official's qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
Members of the Supreme Court, such as, respondent, on absolutely equal plane invalid is properly the subject of quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites
as that of the other impeachable officers, when more stringent and burdensome for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even
requirements for qualification and holding of office are expressly placed upon if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being continuing requirement but
them. nonetheless committed during the incumbency of validly appointed and/or validly
elected official, cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of
In the same vein, the fact that the violation of the SALN requirement formed part of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned
the impeachment complaint does not justify shifting responsibility to the Congress, is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or
no matter how noble the respondent and the intervenors portray such act to be. disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
The fact remains that the Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to
occupy the position of Chief Justice, an obviously legal question, which can be Judicial power versus Judicial restraint and fear of constitutional crisis
resolved through review of jurisprudence and pertinent laws. Logic, common
sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
breached. To abdicate from resolving legal controversy simply because of enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
sanction the initiation of process specifically intended to be long and arduous and instrumentality of the Govemment.183
compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon
their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible In the presence of all the requisites184 for the Court's exercise of judicial review,
removal of public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under there can be no doubt that the exercise thereof is not discretionary upon the Court,
existing laws and case law. Evidently, this scenario would involve waste of time, nor dependent upon the whims and caprices of any of its Members nor any of the
not to mention unnecessary disbursement of public funds. parties. Even in cases rendered moot and academic by supervening events, the
Court nevertheless exercised its power of review on the basis of certain
Further, as an impeachment court, the Senate is tribunal composed of politicians recognized exceptions.185 Neither is its exercise circumscribed by fear of
who are indubitably versed in pragmatic decision making and cognizant of political displeasing co-equal branch of the government. Instead, the Constitution makes it
repercussions of acts purported to have been committed by impeachable crystal clear that the exercise of judicial power is duty of the Court.
officials.182 As representatives of the Filipino people, they determine whether the
purported acts of highest ranking officials of the country constitute as an offense to As such, the exercise of judicial power could never be made dependent upon the
the citizenry. Following this premise, the impeachment tribunal cannot be expected action or inaction of another branch of the government. The exercise of judicial
to rule on the validity or constitutionality of the Chief Justice's appointment, nor can restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the
their ruling be of jurisprudential binding effect to this Court. To authorize Congress. sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced.
to rule on public officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and
balances as it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is For one, at the time of the filing of, and even during the pendency of the resolution
exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto. of the instant petition, no impeachment trial has been commenced by the Senate.
In fact, it will be purely skeptical, nay lackadaisical, on the part of the Court to
Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obliviate confusion assume, at the time the petition was filed, that the House of Representatives will
in the future as to when quo warranto as remedy to oust an ineligible public official affirm favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment and that trial will
In this case, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning respondent's Neither can respondent successfully invoke Act No. 3326215 as mentioned in her
qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster. Table of Authorities.216 Respondent refers to Section 1217 thereof which provides
for the prescriptive periods for violations penalized by special acts and municipal
As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright as to whether ordinances. Plainly, Act No. 3326 is inapplicable to the instant petition as
or not she filed her SALNs covering the period of her employment in U.P. Recall respondent is not being sought to be penalized for violation of the laws relating to
that during her application for the Chief Justice position, the JBC required the the non-filing or incomplete, irregular or untruthful filing of SALNs. At any rate,
submission of her previous SALNs. In response to the JBC, respondent never even the theorized applicability of Act No. 26 will not work to respondent's
categorically stated that she filed the required SALNs. Instead, she cleverly hid the advantage given that Section 2218 thereof provides that the prescriptive period shall
fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the said be reckoned either from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, or if
documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was such be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the
not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
same are more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of "all
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and Finally, it bears to stress that this Court finds it more important to rule on the merits
from administrative charges as of June 1, 2006"212 in Clearance213 dated of the novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us than to dismiss
September 19, 2011. the case outright merely on technicality. The Court cannot compromise on the
importance of settling the controversy surrounding the highest position in the
Even up to the present, respondent has not been candid on whether she filed the Judiciary only to yield to the unacceptable plea of technicality. It is but more
required SALNs or not. While respondent stated in her Comment that she filed the prudent to afford the Republic, as well as the respondent, ample opportunities to
required SALNs when she was still connected with the U.P. College of Law,214 she present their cases for proper and just disposition of the case instead of dismissing
again offered as support the U.P. Clearance above-cited; that she was considered the petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate
as coming from private practice when she was nominated as Associate Justice of consideration in providing for one-year prescriptive period was public interest, so is
the Supreme Court, hence, should not be required to submit those SALNs; and it the same consideration which prompts this Court not to act nonchalantly and idly
that it was not feasible for her to retrieve said SALNs from U.P. as her records watch title to the public office in question be continuously subjected to uncertainty.
therein are more than 15 years old. Notably, these are mere reiterations of her Indeed, dismissal of cases on technicality is frowned upon especially where public
representations before the JBC. interest is at the other end of the spectrum.
Hence, until recently when respondent's qualification for office was questioned III.
during the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice on the Respondent is Ineligible as Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief
impeachment complaint against the respondent, there was no indication that would Justice
have prompted the Republic to assail respondent's appointment, much less
question the wisdom or reason behind the said recommending and appointing To arrive at judicious appreciation of the parties' respective contentions as to
authorities' actions. The defect on respondent's appointment was therefore not respondent's qualification for the position of Chief Justice, the Court first reviews
discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure. the supervisory authority exercised by it over the JBC, and visits the JBC's rules
and procedure relating to the acceptance and nomination of respondent as Chief
Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the Justice.
part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek
So too, the JBC's exercise of discretion is not automatically equivalent to an In fine, the Court has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over the
exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the JBC, to insure that the JBC faithfully executes its duties as the Constitution
scope of the Comi's supervisory and corrective powers. The primary limitation to requires of it. Wearing its hat of supervision, the Court is thus empowered to
the JBC's exercise of discretion is that the nominee must possess the minimum inquire into the processes leading to respondent's nomination for the position of
qualifications required by the Constitution and the laws relative to the position. Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's contention that respondent was
While the resolution of who to nominate as between two candidates of equal ineligible to be candidate to the position to begin with.
qualification cannot be dictated by this Court upon the JBC, such surrender of
choice presupposes that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified. The Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away
question of whether or not nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is by the JBC
determined based on facts and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the
exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating body. As emphasized, the JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself
when it prescribed the qualifications absolutely required of person to be eligible for
Thus, along this line, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of appointment as Member of the Court.
policy or wisdom as to place the JBC's actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving. Questions of policy or wisdom The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in
refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution:
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government."230 any lower collegiate court unless he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
Baker v. Carr231 gives the classic definition of political question: been for fifteen years or more judge of lower court or engaged in the practice of
x x x [p]rominent on the surface of ruiy case held to involve political question is law in the Philippines.
found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate
political department; or lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards (2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is citizen of the Philippines and
of kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of court's undertaking member of the Philippine Bar.
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to (3) Member of the Judiciary must be person of proven competence, integrity,
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from probity, and independence. (Emphasis ours)
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.
Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our
Obviously, the exercise of the JBC's discretion in the nomination process is not full fundamental law is clear that member of the Judiciary must be person of proven
as it is limited by the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the laws for competence, integrity, probity and independence. The inclusion of subsection is
every position. It does not involve aquestion of policy but simply determination, explained in this wise:
based on facts, of whether candidate possesses the requisite qualifications or not. xxxx
The JBC neither assumes an existence separate from the Judiciary as it is not
intended to be an independent Constitutional body but merely Constitutional office MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
created and expressly subjected to the Court's supervision. Judicial encroachment
upon the exercise of wisdom of co-equal branch of the government, which is the My amendment is to add new subsection (3) on Section which reads: MEMBER
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OF THE Judiciary MUST BE PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or
INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE. advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire
to become Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given this
Before the Committee decides on whether or not to accept the amendment, would realistic situation, there is need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC's
like to explain it first. guiding precepts and principles." set of uniform criteria had to be established in the
ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
Mr. Presiding Officer, this is moral provision lifted with modifications from the possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for
"Canons of Judicial Ethics." The reputation of our justices and judges has been the sake of transparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in
unsavory. hate to say this, but it seems that it has become the general rule that the writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set in the
members of the Judiciary are corrupt and the few honest ones are the exceptions. determination of competence, "probity and independence," soundness of physical
We hear of justices and judges who would issue injunctive relief to the highest and mental condition, and "integrity."
bidder and would decide cases based on hundreds of thousands, and even
millions, mercenary reasons. As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid
down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately
The members of the deposed Supreme Court, with few exceptions, catered to the equated to an applicant's good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
political likings and personal convenience of Mr. Marcos by despicably irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.
surrendering their judicial independence. Why should we resist incorporating That is why proof of an applicant's reputation may be shown in certifications or
worthy moral principles in our fundamental law? Why should we canalize our testimonials from reputable government officials and non-governmental
conservative thoughts within the narrow confines of pure legalism? organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation,
and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct discreet
I plead to the members of the Committee and to my colleagues in this background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation
Constitutional Commission to support my amendment in order to strengthen the and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked.
moral fiber of our Judiciary. Let not our Constitution be merely legal or political As qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the
document. Let it be moral document as well. quality of person's character."234 (Emphasis ours)
The case of Jardeleza, however, is not the first time this Court interpreted the
x x x232 requirement of integrity. In Samson v. Judge Caballero,235 this Court dismissed
Requirement of these traits stems from the need to ensure the strength and judge for "obvious lack of integrity" in making false statement in his Personal Data
sustainability of the third branch of the government. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Sheet (PDS). Meanwhile, in Re: Judge Jaime V. Quitain,236 this Court declared
Co., Inc.,233 sufficiently explains the state interest involved in safeguardingjudicial Judge Quitain to be dishonest and lacking in integrity when he failed to disclose in
integrity: his PDS that he was imposed penalty of dismissal from service in an administrative
Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving case filed against him.
disputes. The power and the prerogative of court to perform this function rest, in
the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen's respect for Emphatically, integrity is not only prerequisite for an aspirng Member of the Court
judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity. Judicial but is likewise continuing requirement common to judges and lawyers alike. Canon
integrity is, in consequence, state interest of the highest order. of the New Code of Judicial Conduct237 provides:
An approximation of what defines the term "integrity" was made by the Court CANON 2
in Jardeleza, as follows: INTEGRITY
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
"whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence,
to the personal demeanor of judges.
integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are
(d) liabilities, and; (5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. It shall be the duty of every public
The documents must be filed: official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and
information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and frequency
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office; prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and (C) Accessibility of documents. (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall
be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law.
documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their
assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain (3) Any person requesting copy of statement shall be required to pay reasonable
from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the
Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also cost of certification.
their business interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if
possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government. (4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for period of
ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.
statements jointly or separately.
(D) Prohibited acts. It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of statement filed under this Act for:
Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the
Ombudsman; (b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for
dissemination to the general public.
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme xxxx
Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with
the Office of the President. Section 11. Penalties. (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether
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or not he holds office or employment in casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or assets, liabilities and net worth in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable
regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with fine not accumulation of wealth. The importance of requiring the submission of complete,
exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months salary or suspension not exceeding one truthful, and sworn SALN as measure to defeat corruption in the bureaucracy
(1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is necessary to
hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by heavier particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the opportunities for official
penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. corruption, and maintain standard of honesty in the public service. Through the
Violations of Sections 7, or of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not SALN, the public can monitor movement in the fortune of public official; it serves
exceeding five (5) years, or fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or as valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and
both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to wealth. The failure to file truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of
hold public office. the officer and normally amounts to dishonesty.249
As respondent acutely relates her dissent in Philippine Savings Bank:250
(b) Any violation hereof proven in proper administrative proceeding shall be
In the present case, because of the fact that the Chief Justice is public officer, he is
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of public official or employee, even if no constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform positive duty to disclose all of
criminal prosecution is instituted against him. his assets and liabilities. This already operates as the consent required by law.
xxxx The Offices of the Chief Justice and of the 14 Associate Justices of the Supreme
The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and Court are an express creation of the Constitution, which vests them with explicit
accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in powers necessary for the proper functioning of democratic government.
dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section of R.A. No.
3019, as amended provides: Foremost is the principle that public office is by virtue of the peoples mandate to
Section 9. Penalties for violations. x x x exercise sovereign function of the government. Hence, public office is public trust
or agency. Appended to the constitutional principle that public office is public trust
(b) Any public officer violating any of the provisions of Section of this Act shall be is the tenet that public officers occupy very delicate positions that exact certain
punished by fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand standards generally not demanded from or required of ordinary citizens.
pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year and six months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court. Those who accept public office do so cum onere, or with burden, and are
considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits.
The violation of said section proven in proper administrative proceeding shall be They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of public officer, even if no criminal relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public
prosecution is instituted against him. has the right to demand the performance of those duties.
Bolh Section of R.A. No. 6713 and Section of R.A. No. 3019 require the
One of these burdens or duties is explicitly articulated in Sec. 17 of Art. XI of the
accomplishment and submission of true, detailed and sworn statement of assets
1987 Constitution, viz:
and liabilities.247 Further, under Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, non-compliance with
this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or fine, it may also
xxxx
result in disqualification to hold public office. As the Court explained in Hon.
Casimiro, et al. v. Rigor:248
This provision reqmres all public officers and employees, regardless of rank, to
x x x The requirement of filing SALN is enshrined in the Constitution to promote
declare their assets and liabilities upon their assumption of office, as may be
transparency in the civil service and serves as deterrent against government
required by law. However, it likewise imposes positive duty and heavier onus on
officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law,
the President; the Vice-President; and members of the Cabinet, Congress, the
every government official or employee must make complete disclosure of his
Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions and other Constitutional offices and
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officers of the Armed Forces with general or flag ranks to publicly disclose their
assets and liabilities.251 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original) FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
Faithful compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even
RULE 5.08 A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by
more exacting when the public official concerned is member of the Judiciary.
law. (Emphasis ours)
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Usman,252 the Court emphasized:
From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or government
employee must make and submit complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and xxxx
net worth in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth. This Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on person's
serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income integrity
and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance with the constitutional
policy to eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government, and to To recapitulate, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires that member of
ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven integrity means that the
the end in view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption applicant must have established steadfast adherence to moral and ethical
and maintaining standard of honesty in the public service. principles.255
In the present case, respondent clearly violated the abovequoted laws when The necessity of having integrity among the members of the judiciary is clearly
he Jailed to file his SALN for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation discussed in the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct:256
either why he failed to file his SALN for five (5) consecutive years. While Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The components of integrity
every office in the government service is public trust, no position exacts are honesty and judicial morality. judge should always, not only in the discharge of
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual official duties, act honourably and in manner befitting the judicial office; be free
than seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with from fraud, deceit and falsehood; and be good and virtuous in behaviour and in
the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative character. There are no degrees of integrity as so defined. Integrity is absolute. In
policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of the judiciary, integrity is more than virtue; it is necessity.
justice.253 (Emphasis ours)
Failure to file the SALN is clearly violation of the law. The offense is penal in
The above holds necessarily true considering that the obligation of members of the character and is clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
Judiciary to file their respective SALNs is not only statutory requirement but forms employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as deterrent to graft and
part of the mandatory conduct expected of judge so that an "honorable competent corruption. For these reasons, public official who has failed to comply with the
and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice and thus promote the unity requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the
of the country, the stability of government, and the well-being of the people."254 Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public office. In De Castro v.
Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman,257 We held:
The Code of Judicial Conduct, in no uncertain terms, provide: Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES officers and employees. The Constitution requires that all public officers and
employees be, at all times, accountable to the people; serve with utmost
RULE 5.02 A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealing that tend to responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice; and
reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance lead modest lives. Public office is public trust; it must be treated as privilege rather
of judicial activities or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come than right, and rest firmly upon one's sense of service rather than entitlement. In
before the court. judge should so manage investments and other financial interests this light, the Court deems it necessary to reiterate, as final note, its
as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualifications. pronouncement in Casimiro v. Rigor:
The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of
xxxx public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate,
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in The Court is mindful of the duty of public officials and employees to disclose their
similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in assets, liabilities and net worth accurately and truthfully. In keeping up with the
accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in the Code. constantly changing and fervent society and for the purpose of eliminating
corruption in the government, the new SALN is stricter, especially with regard to
The Rules implementing R.A. No. 6713 thus authorize only certain officials of the the details of real properties, to address the pressing issue of transparency among
Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments, and the Constitutional those in the government service. Although due regard is given to those charged
Commissions and Constitutional offices to establish compliance procedures for the
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with the duty of filtering malicious elements in the government service, it must still amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal the
be stressed that such duty must be exercised with great caution as grave truth or to make false statements.283
consequences result therefrom. Thus, some leeway should be accorded the public
officials. They must be given the opportunity to explain any prima facie appearance On its face, the SALNs filed by respondent covering her years of government
of discrepancy. To repeat, where his explanation is adequate, convincing service in U.P., appear to have been executed and filed under suspicious
and verifiable, his assets cannot be considered unexplained wealth or illegally circumstances:
obtained.281 (Emphasis ours)
5. Respondent's inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete (a) Respondent's SALN as of December 31, 1996 was accomplished and
requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirms or ratifies notarized only on June 29, 1998, or two years late;
her compliance with the SALN requirement.
(b) Her SALN as of December 31, 1998 was filed only in 2003, or five years late;
Respondent, both in her pleadings and in the Oral Arguments, harps on the
(c) Her SALNs for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2002 were notarized only on
purported failure of the JBC to exclude her from the list of shortlisted applicants.
She points to at least eleven times that the JBC could have disqualified her due to August 21, 2003;284
her lack of SALNs but failed to do so. Hence, she argues that she is deemed to
(d) Both the 1996285 and 1997286 SALNs were subscribed and sworn to by
have substantially complied with the legal requirements at the time of her
respondent before Zenaida P. Cruz (Administrative Officer IV, Human Resource
application.
Development and Records Section, U.P. Law Center) on June 29, 1998. However,
under the Notarial Registry of Eugenia A. Borras, four SALNs of respondent were
Respondent's argument is specious. The invalidity of respondent's appointment
springs from her lack of qualifications. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates acknowledged before her on August 21, 2003 as cited in the next preceding
for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite paragraph. It appears thus that there were two SALNs for 1997 executed by
respondent;
proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. It must be
underscored that the JBC En Banc included respondent in the shortlist for the
(d) She failed to file her SALNs for 2004, 2005, and 2006 which were the years
position of Chief Justice without deliberating her July 23, 2012 Letter. Without
prejudice to this Court's ruling in A.M No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC, when she received the bulk of her fees from the PIATCO cases. As respondent
the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered respondent eligible divulged, she received from the Republic, through the OSG, the following fees 287 in
relation to the PIATCO cases:
because it does not appear that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs was
squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and Year Income
subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court
from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the 2004 P7,055,513.56
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance
founded upon an innocent mistake.282 Again, without prejudice to the outcome of 2005 P11,532,226.00
the pending administrative matter, it appears that respondent's inclusion was made
under the erroneous belief that she complied with all the legal requirements 2006 P2,636,006.64
concomitant to the position.
2007 P4,673,866.36
Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation
of the Constitutional and statutory requirements 2008 P4,070,810.93
Further, the failure to file truthful SALN not only puts in doubt the integrity of the 2009 P301,552.00
officer, but such failure to file truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise
Page 267 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
TOTAL P30,269,975.49
j) It is contrary to human experience that the SALNs purportedly recovered by
(e) Her SALN for 2006 was accomplished only on July 27, 2010 and unsubscribed, respondent's husband were not stamped received by the UP HRDO. It is unusual
only to be later on claimed by respondent to have been really intended as SALN as that respondent did not bother to demand that her personal copy be duly stamped
of July 27, 2010; received with particulars as to the date and initial, at least of the party who
received the same as proof that she timely filed her SALN.
The SALNs that she submitted in support of her application for Chief Justice
likewise bear badges of irregularities: (k) There is no indication from the stamped "Certified Photocopy" and initialed by
(f) Her SALN for 2009 was not accomplished under oath, was likewise belatedly Rosemarie Pabiona on the SALNs that she is the official custodian of the same,
filed only on June 22, 2012 and indicates therein that she was an Associate and whether the photocopies of the original are on file, contrary to Section 24, Rule
Justice of the Court when her appointment came only on August 16, 2010; 1322 of the Rules of Court.
The above circumstances betray respondent's intention to falsely state material
(g) Her SALNs for 2006 and 2009 did not reflect the fees she received as counsel fact and to practice deception in order to secure for herself the appointment as
for the Republic in the PIATCO cases. Chief Justice. It is therefore clear as day that respondent failed not only in
complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying
The Bureau of Internal Revenue's (BIR) Report shows that respondent received her lack of integrity, honesty and probity.288
from the OSG the total gross amount of P32,494,805.27 as fees from 2004 to 2009
for the PIATCO cases. The BIR Report also shows that she paid the withholding Consistently, the Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of
taxes on said fees in the total amount of Php4,599,504.71. By mathematical dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
computation, respondent would have had Php27,895,300.56 as her net disposable discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures. For instance, in Rabe v.
income. This net disposable income was not reflected in respondent's SALN for Flores,289 the Court unanimously imposed the ultimate penalty of dismissal from
2006 (which she claims to really be her SALN as of July 27, 2010) nor in her SALN service upon regional trial court interpreter with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
as of 2009. Her SALN for 2009 revealed net worth of only Php17,936,353.00; and accrued leaves and with prejudice to re-employment for dishonesty and for
failure to disclose her business interest, which was "stall in the market" for
(h) The unaccounted income from the PIATCO cases could not have been due to continued period of four years.The Court stressed that it is the obligation of an
losses or liabilities considering that respondent have had an increase in her net employee to submit sworn statement as the "public has right to know" the
worth from 2002 to 2009. Her SALN for 2002 shows net worth of only employee's assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests.
Php3,804,000.00 while her SALN for 2009 shows net worth of Php17,936,353.00,
her net worth thus increased by Php14,132,353.00. While the BIR Report shows The dockets of the Sandiganbayan itself show that several charges for violationof
that respondent received approximately Php27M in disposable net income, her R.A. No. 6713 for failure to file and for untruthful declarations in the SALNs
SALN only shows an increase of approximately Php14M in net worth. The resulted to plea of guilt from the accused, lest the latter run the risk of being
difference between the two, in the amount of estimatedly Php13M, was imprisoned.290 Interestingly, the Sandiganbayan concluded
conspicuously missing in the SALNs filed by respondent; criminal case291 against certain Rogelio Pureza, then Senior Superintendent of the
Philippine National Police, who was charged with counts of violation of Section in
(i) There is glaring difference between the two 2010 SALNs filed. The total value of relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 for failure to file his annual SALN for the
respondent's personal properties in the "SALN as of July 27, 2010" is years 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. In the course of the investigation by the Office
Php9,000,000.00, while the value of her personal properties as declared in her of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military relative to an anonymous letter of
"SALN as of December 31, 2010" increased to Php11,723,010. Respondent, concerned resident of Kalookan City on the alleged illegal activities and
therefore, enjoyed an increase of approximately Php2,700,000.00 in personal unexplained wealth of several policemen, Pureza was found to have no record of
properties in just span of five (5) months after having been appointed as Associate his SALN from 1989 to 1993 on file with the PNP Records Center. In handing guilty
Justice. verdict, the Sandiganbayan reasoned that the non-existence of the SALs with the
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Records Center of the PNP proved that the accused did not file his SAL for 1990 to used as parameter for determining substantial compliance.293
1993. The Sandiganbayan observed that even assuming that the accused had
indeed filed his SAL with the PNP and his records were lost during the transfer of With this, the JBC proceeded to go over, one by one, the compliance of the
records, he could have easily and conveniently obtained copy of his SAL from candidates with the lacking documentary requirements. For instance, Justice Abad
either the CSC or the Office of the Military Ombudsman. was considered as having substantially complied because he submitted SALNs in
his year-stint with the OSG and because the filing of the SALN at the time Justice
It is thus plainly obvious that the courts do not take violations of the SALN laws Abad joined the government was not yet required. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan
slightly even as against lowly public officials. lacked SALNs but that he was trying to get them from the Civil Service
Commission and so, regular member Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman moved that
With more reason should such test of dishonesty and lack of integrity be applied in the SALNs he submitted be considered as substantial compliance. Congressman
the instant case when respondent failed to file her SALNs for several years and for Rufus B. Rodriguez did not submit even one SALN which prompted Justice Peralta
those years that she filed, the SALNs so filed prove to be untruthful. to remark that Congressman Rodriguez may no longer be interested.
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento also submitted incomplete SALNs, but there
C. was no mention whether the SALNs he submitted were considered as substantial
Respondent failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination compliance. Similarly, for respondent, the JBC determined that she did not submit
pursuant to the JBC rules her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the
filing thereof during those years was already required. There was no indication that
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the by respondent for her 20 years as professor in the U.P. College of Law and two
applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered years as Associate Justice, as substantial compliance.
for nomination
We revisit the pertinent portions of the aforesaid Minutes as follows:
Further compounding respondent's woes is the established and undisputed fact III. Deliberation on Candidates with Incomplete Documentary Requirements:
that she failed to submit the required number of SALNs in vjolation of the rules set
by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. xxxx
To recall, the announcement for the opening of the application and Justice Peralta suggested that the Council examine the matrix per candidate as
recommendation of the position of Chief Justice in 2012 was preceded by JBC En follows:
Bancmeeting where the members thereof agreed that applicants who were
previously in the government service must submit all previous SALNs. This Justice Roberto A. Abad
agreement was reflected in the JBC's announcement published on June 5, 2012,
where it was made clear that applicants from the government shall submit, in The Executive Officer reported that Justice Abad lacks the Statement of Assets,
addition to the usual documentary requirements, all previous SALNs, with warning Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the years 1982-1983.
that those with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be
interviewed or considered for nomination. Justice Peralta mentioned that Justice Abad joined the government in the late
70's and during that time there was no R.A. 6713 yet. He added that Justice
As extensively quoted, the minutes292 of the JBC deliberation held on July 20, Abad might no longer locate them.
2012 show that the JBC deliberated on the candidates who submitted incomplete
SALNs and then determined who among them are to be considered as having Senator Escudero said that SALNs were not yet required at that time.
"substantially complied." Senator Francis G. Escudero, as then ex officio member,
suggested that "at least an attempt to comply with particular requirement" can be The Executive Officer said that Justice Abad had been with the OSG from 1982 to
Senator Escudero said that it would be more proper for the JBC to ask the 16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora has lacking SALNs and MCLE cert.
candidate for the reason; however, in the case of Justice Abad, he opined that he
substantially complied with the requirements of the JBC. xxxx
From the foregoing discourse, it appears that respondent was specifically singled
Justice Lagman agreed with the Senator.
out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit single piece of SALN
for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. This is in obvious contrast with
There being no objection, the Council agreed that Justice Abad had
the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or whose years in
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED with the requirements of the JBC.
government service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
6713.
xxxx
The minutes of the JBC En Banc meeting also show that Senator Escudero moved
The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to SALNs,
that the determination of whether candidate has substantially complied with the
whether five (5) SALNs would constitute substantial compliance if the candidate
requirements be delegated to the Executive Committee.294 In the end, it appears
has been in the government service for twenty (20) years. that the JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of the past ten (10)
SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position.295 This, as
The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the candidates
much, was confirmed by Atty. Pascual during the Congressional hearings. 296
corning from the government, and identified who among them, would be
considered to have substantially complied: From the foregoing, it is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away with the
requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance
1. Justice Arturo D. Brion - has substantially complied; therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10
years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient.
2. Justice Antonio T. Carpio - has substantially complied;
Conformably thereto, the following candidates submitted their respective letters as
xxxx
regards the submission of the SALNs:
5. Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza - has complied;
(a) Justice De Castro submitted letter297 dated July 17, 2012 with the attached
SALNs for 16 years covering the period 1997 to 2011, from the time she became
6. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro - has substantially complied;
an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan on September 23, 1997 until
December 2011 as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. She also disclosed
xxxx
that her SALN from February 19, 1973 until November 30, 1978 which she filed
during her employment in the Supreme Court, could no longer be located. She
10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
also disclosed that her personal files, including her SALNs that she filed while
employed at the Department of Justice from December 1, 1978 to September 22,
The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her
1997, were among those burned when the third floor of the DOJ was gutted by fire
SALNs for period of ten (10) years, (sic) that is, from 1986 to 2006.
in late 1996 or early 1997. In any case, upon inquiry from the CSC, she was told
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that her SALNs filed as DOJ employee were already disposed of, as it was way
Justice Brion 12 SALNs
beyond the statutory ten (10) year period.
Justice Velasco 19 SALNs
(b) Jose Manuel Diokno submitted sworn and verified statement298 dated July 17,
2012, stating therein that while he served as General Counsel of the Senate Blue
Justice Leonardo-De Castro 15 SALNs
Ribbon Committee and as Special Counsel to the Board of Directors of the
Development [Bank] of the Philippines, his engagement was only as consultant on Justice Abad 7 SALNs
contractual basis and as such, was not required to file SALN.
This belies respondent's representation that the JBC maintained its requirement
(c) Justice Carpio submitted letter299 dated July 23, 2012 stating that he resigned that the candidates submit all previous SALNs. If such were the case, only those
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel effective January 31, 1996 and as such, he candidates determined to have complied should have been shortlisted, and the
did not submit SALN for the year 1995 because the submission for that year was others, including respondent, should not have qualified. In any case, the
on April 30, 1996 when he was no longer employed with the government. requirement of submitting SALNs within the ten-year period instead of all previous
Nevertheless, the clearance issued by the Office of the President certifies that SALNs is more in keeping with the law. Recall that Section 8, paragraph C(4) of
Justice Carpio has submitted his SALN and that he has no pending criminal or R.A. No. 6713 provides that the filed SALNs need not be retained by the receiving
administrative case. officer or the custodian after more than ten years from the filing or receipt thereof,
and actually allows such documents to be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing
(d) Justice Abad submitted an attestation300 dated July 23, 2012 that he does not investigation.
have copy of his SALNs for the years 1968 to 1974, 1976 to 1980 and 1982 to
1983. Be that as it may, records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-
incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to have
(e) Dean Amado Valdez wrote letter301 dated July 23, 2012 saying that he could no substantially complied was respondent, who submitted only SALNs, i.e., 2009,
longer find the SALNs covering the years 1985 to 1987, 2002 to 2003 and 2004 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so.
representing the years of his intermittent government service. He said that in, any
case, the assets reflected in the SALN which he already filed were acquired after Instead of complying, respondent offered, by way of her letter dated July 23,
he left government service as shown by his income tax returns for the periods from 2012, justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that
2005 to 2011. she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in
2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her government records
Notably, Jose Manuel Diokno and Dean Amado Valdez were not included in the are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared
short list. her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
That such was the standing requirement of the JBC from at least the incumbent These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that respondent
Associate Justices applying for the position of Chief Justice is evident from the fact submitted only SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an
that five (5) out of six (6) applicants who were incumbent Associate Justices, attempt on respondent's part to comply.
namely: (1) Justice Carpio; (2) Justice Brion; (3) Justice Velasco; and (4) Justice
De Castro were determined to have completely complied with the SALN Respondent sought to be excused from complying with the SALN requirement
requirement; and (5) Justice Abad was determined to have substantially complied. because, allegedly, the SALNs requested from her (1995-1999 as respondent
These Justices submitted the following numbers of SALNs:302 alleged) from U.P., are old and thus "infeasible to retrieve." But the Republic,
through the OSG, was able to present before the Court copies of respondent's
Justice Carpio 14 SALNs SALNs for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 from the
U.P. HRDO. These files, therefore, are not "infeasible to retrieve." Also, in
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comparison with the other nominees, the SALNs which the latter could no longer Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical
produce are much older in age than the SALNs which respondent regarded as conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the public trust. They
"infeasible to retrieve". For instance, Justice Abad had no copy of his SALN from should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary. And
1968-1974, 1976-1980 and 1981-1983 while Justice Leonardo-De Castro had no because of their critical position in the judicial bureaucracy, this Court as overseer
copy of her SALNs from 1973-1978. is duty-bound to insure that the integrity of the judicial system is preserved and
maintained, by pursuing that ever-vigilant search for the virtues of competence,
Respondent likewise sought special treatment as having complied with the integrity, probity and independence mandated by no less than the Constitution
submission of the SALN by submitting Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P. itself.304 (Citations omitted)
HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as substitute for SALNs. The Indubitably, respondent not only failed to substantially comply with the submission
import of said clearance is limited only to clearing respondent of her academic and
of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. The contents of respondent's
administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
Letter dated July 23, 2012 itself betray an exercise of dishonesty and disposition to
administrative charges as of the date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But such
deceive in an attempt to secure for herself the appointment as Chief Justice.
could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as compliance with the In Ombudsman v. Peliño,305 We held:
SALN requirement. Obviously, an administrative officer, performing ministerial and Under the laws governing civil service, dishonesty is classified as grave offense
administrative duties, could not have certified respondent's compliance with the the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. person
filing of SALNs which is statutory, and not merely an administrative, requirement.
aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor anq faithful compliance with
the law. Nothing less is expected. This ideal standard ensures that only those of
In all these, respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file
known probity, competence and integrity are called to the challenge of public
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to
service. It is understood to imply disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
disclose material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
of integrity especially from Member of the Supreme Court. On this score, the lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
observations of the Court in the case of OCA v. Judge Estacion, Jr.303 ring special
Dishonesty is malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one's ability to perform
significance:
his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of public officer or
He concealed from the appointing authority, at the time he applied for the judicial
employee.306
post until his appointment, information regarding the criminal charges for homicide
and attempted homicide filed against him. Such fact would have totally eluded the For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered respondent for
Court had it not been complained of by one Mrs. Ruth L. Vda. de Sison who, interview as it already required the submission of, at least, the SALNs
incidentally, is the mother of one of the victims. x x x corresponding to the immediately preceding 10 years up to December 31, 2011.
xxxx Parenthetically, the Court observes that the circumstances surrounding the receipt
of, and the action or non-action of the JBC, on respondent's Letter dated July 23,
x x x Respondent did not honestly divulge all that the appointing authority ought to 2012 likewise leave much to be desired. The Letter, while ostensibly sent to and
know to correctly discern whether he is indeed fit for the judicial post. He received by the JBC on the same date, does not appear to have been brought to
continuously suppressed vital information on his personal circumstances under the the attention of the JBC En Banc. Excerpts307 from the Report of the House
false belief that he can mislead the Court and get away with it for good. What Committe on Justice on this point is revealing:
respondent did, or omitted to do, was calculated deception committed not only Justice Peralta, who was acting Chief Justice and ex officio Chairman of the JBC
against the Court but against the public as well, clearly indicative of his lack of at the time, testified that he never learned about the non-submission of the SALNs
moral rectitude to sit as magistrate, and sufficiently repulsive that it detracts from by then-applicant [respondent], and that he also never saw the letter submitted by
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Dismissal indeed is the the [r]espondent explaining why she could not submit her SALNs. He stated that
appropriate retribution for such kind of transgression. had he known about these matters, he could have raised these issues during the
en banc meeting of the JBC. Atty. [Maria Milagros N. Fernan-]Cayosa likewise
2009
Quarterly Income Declared Income
Over (Under)
Period from PIATCO Case per VAT Return
(Php) Q1 344,243.65 301,552.00 -42,691.65
(Php) (Php)
Total Undeclared
2005
Income Subject -16,656,980.39
to VAT
Q3 1,398,807.50 - -1,398,807.50
On this matter, respondent avers in her Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad
Q4 7,234,455.44 667,333.33 -6567122.11 Cautelam that she was not given the chance to be heard on this new matter in the
Republic's Memorandum, which makes reference to new documents, totally alien
2006 to and outside of the matters raised in the Republic's Petition, Reply, and other
previous submissions.
Q1 - 469,375.00 469,375.00
There is no truth to the allegation that respondent was not afforded the opportunity
Q2 - 1,416,664.25 1,416,664.25 to address this matter or that this matter is "totally alien" to this proceedings. This
matter was actually brought up during the Oral Argument. In its Memorandum, the
Q3 1,539,546.28 - -1,539,546.28 Republic explained that during the Oral Argument, some Members of the Court
raised questions regarding respondent's income as counsel in the PIATCO cases
and the payment of the corresponding taxes thereto, hence, the inclusion of the
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
same in its Memorandum.312 In the same way, respondent could have addressed internal rules an misrepresented that the TRO was issued upon the
the same in her Memorandum Ad Cautelam, instead she opted to do so in recommendation of the Member-in-charge;
belatedly filed Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam.
(14) Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the
At any rate, respondent's argument in the said Reply/Supplement, implying that Maute cases outside of Mindanao;
the allegations on the tax fraud are unfounded, and that in including this matter,
which is mere reiteration of the discussion in Article of the Articles of (15) Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship
Impeachment, the OSG usurped the sole power of the House of Representatives benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to
to initiate and prosecute the Articles of Impeachment in blatant disregard of the spouses of deceased judges and Justices;
Constitution,313 deserve scam consideration.
(16) Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay Angeles-
It bears stressing that respondent is not being prosecuted for tax fraud in this case. Mendoza as Chief of the Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the
The Court did not discuss the merits of the said tax fraud nor did the Court made approval of the Court En Banc;
any conviction against the respondent as regards the said offense. Neither is this
Court's finding of respondent's lack of proven integrity during her application (17) Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several high-ranking
anchored upon this act. This matter is cited as corroborative circumstance to positions in the Supreme Court;
respondent's non-filing of certain SALNs, already established in this case. Notably,
the Congress had already determined that probable cause exist that respondent (18) Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what transpired during
committed the said offense. the Supreme Court En Banc deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged
involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs and undermined the co-
Further, respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of equal power of the Executive Department by ordering the Executive Secretary
candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts committed during her himself to file cases against the judges;
incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters of public record and also
determined to be constituting probable cause for impeachment: (19) Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor General, now
(9) Caused the procurement of brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document
Php5,000,000.00; involving national security against the latter;
(10) Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public bidding (20) Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in
and who received excessive compensation amounting to more than the Sandiganbayan without legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the
Php11,000,000.00; President to appoint members of the Judiciary;
(11) Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel (21) Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that there
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief were Justices who requested to do away with the voting of recommended
Justices meeting; applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court;
(12) Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the (22) Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals Associate
Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta from the shortlist of nominees for the position of
Court En Banc; Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals;
(13) Issued Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of (23) Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives
Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's on the alleged misuse of the tobacco funds in the Province of Ilocos Norte by
The willful non-filing of SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of probity and lack The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
of integrity. Moreso if the non-filing is repeated in complete disregard of the proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
mandatory requirements of the Constitution and the law. obstructing the administration of justice.324 The rationale for this rule is for the
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law, to be immune from every
Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be retained after extraneous influence; for the case to be decided upon evidence produced in court;
more than ten years by the receiving office or custodian or repository unless these and for the determination of such facts be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
are the subject of investigation pursuant to the law. Thus, to be in keeping with the symphathies. In fine, what is sought to be protected is the primary duty of the
spirit of the law requiring public officers to file SALNs to manifest transparency and courts to administer justice in the resolution of cases before them. 325
accountability in public office if public officers cannot produce their SALNs from
their personal files, they must obtain certification from the office where they filed Thus, it is generally inappropriate to discuss the merits of and make comments on
and/or the custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event cases sub judice and such acts may even result to contempt of court. In US. v.
that said offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, Sullen326 it was stated:
said offices must certify the valid and legal reason of their non-availability, such as In clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business
by reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or earthquake, or by reason unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of
of the allowed destruction after ten years under Section of R.A. No. 6713. verdicts; or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not
hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must
V. be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance to the Sub Judice Rule free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right
will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as last resort, as an
Perhaps owing to novelty, the instant case has opened pandora's box of individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as
unsolicited opinions, streaming in abundance from those professed legal and non- an unprejudiced tribunal.
legal experts alike. This flurry of opinions, demonstrations, public and media In Our jurisdiction, this rule finds legal basis on the Court's power of contempt.
appearances made by the parties themselves or at their behest, or by their lawyers Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
and spokespersons, had demonstrably shifted the plane from what should
Page 280 of 507
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Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
counsel, person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect litigation or dispute pending before any court or administrative agency.
contempt:
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of
xxxx judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational
independence of the judiciary.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice; SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in
order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the
x x (Emphasis ours) maintenance of judicial independence.
The oft-cited defense of persons charged with indirect contempt for violating
the sub judice rule is their right to free speech. Needless to say, this Court would CANON - INTEGRITY
be the first in line of combat in legal battle to uphold such constitutionally-protected
Integrity is essentially not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also
right. However, when actions, posing to be innocent exercise of such right,
to the personal demeanor of judges.
"impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice" or "make
serious and imminent threat thereto", this Court will not hesitate to call out and
punish the same.327 In Sheppard v. Maxwell,328 the US Supreme Court reminds SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that although the freedom of expression should be given great latitutde, it must not that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observer.
be so broad as to divert the trial away from its objective which is to adjudicate both
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith
criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting.
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
The sub judice rule finds more austere application to members of the Bar and of seen to be done.
the Bench as the strict observance thereof is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct: CANON - IMPARTIALITY
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but to the process by which the decision is made.
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT. SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession, and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Rule 13.02 A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against party.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while proceeding is before or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial
CANON - INDEPENDENCE
of any person or issue.
Judicial independence is pre-requisite to the rule of law and fundamental
CANON - PROPRIETY
guarantee of fair trial. judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial
Page 281 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
SECTION 2. As subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal These public appearances,330 to name few, are as follows:
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in way that Event Source Quotation
is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. s
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, 'Speak Video: "Kung
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always Truth to <https://web.facebook.com/juliusnleonen/videos/889 manalo
conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office Power' 291114607029/> ang quo
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. forum in Article: warranto,
UP <https://www.rappler.com/nation/201854-sereno- mapupunt
Lawyer speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant reasons: one, Diliman, quo-warranto-destroyjudicial-independence> a tayo sa
because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and two, the signficant Quezon diktaturya,
dangers that lawyer's speech poses to the trial process.329 As such, actions in City " she said
violation of the sub judice rule may be dealt with not only through contempt on May 5, "Talagang
proceedings but also through administrative actions. 2018 wawasaki
n
It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of the completel
Government and even men and women learned in law had succumbed to the y ng quo
tempting affray that tends to divert the instant quo warranto action from its primary warranto
purpose. Even worse, respondent and her spokepersons chose to litigate na ito ang
respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the Court, before judiciary."
several media-covered engagements. Through her actuations, respondent
appears to have forgotten that this is court action for quo warranto, and as such, "Pag itong
the concomitant rule on sub judice unnegotiably applies. Worst still, respondent quo
who is lawyer and who asserts right to the Chief Justice position and therefore warranto
must foremost be aware of the rule, continues to conjure public clamor against the natuloy,
Court and its Members with regard to this pending case in Court. hindi na
right and
It is interesting to note that respondent initially refused to participate in the reason,
congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint. When this petition for quo kundi will
warranto was filed, respondent continuously refuses to recognize this Court's will na
jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the process and answering the charges nu'ng
against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious resolution of the matter, whoever
respondent opted to proceed to nationwide campaign, conducting speeches and is on top.
accepting interviews, discussing the merits of the case and making comments So
thereon to vilify the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the impartiality kailangan
of the Members of the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary, and natin
falsely impute ill motives against the government that it is orchestrating the pigilan ito
charges against her. It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess ..." she
deprivation of due process when she herself chose to litigate her case before the said.
media.
Page 282 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Integrated Article: "Ano po
Bar of the <https://businessmirror.com.ph/sereno-sees- ang tawag "The
Philippine dictatorship-after-filingof-quo-warranto-petition- sa booming
s (IBP) against-her/> kondisyon voice of
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PUNO, J.: On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against
respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258. 3 The
Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a decision was rendered granting the
court1 granting his petition for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without
Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was
back salaries and benefits. deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the
same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of
positions of Port Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits
Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to September 1975, Acting appurtenant thereto.
Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs
Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988.2On March 1, 1988, he
Page 301 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to
the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed
President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for possession of the office.14 If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment
Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. 15 If, however, the
moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be
accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made rendered as follows:
on March 19, 1996.4cräläwvirtualibräry
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position,
decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be
contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the
respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered
warranto petition.5cräläwvirtualibräry determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires."
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of
Appeals questioning the order of the trial court.6 On November 27, 1997, the Court If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the
of Appeals dismissed the petition.7 Hence, this recourse. office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:
Petitioner claims that: (1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no (2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
longer be issued, considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the
case now occupies the subject position."8 (3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. 16
The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule
66 of the Revised Rules of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent
upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some in the discretion of the court and on the relief sought.17 In the case at bar, petitioner
franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution prayed for the following relief:
and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or
authority from the state.9 In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether
proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise excluded from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation
or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, Service of the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the
or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.10 The action may be
one legally appointed and entitled thereto.
commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal11 against
individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute
a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for."18
corporation without being legally incorporated.12 The action may also be instituted
by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.13cräläwvirtualibräry
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"WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age
granting this petition for quo warranto by: of sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible,
petitioner now prays for the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from
1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and decision.23cräläwvirtualibräry
2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of
back wages and other monetary benefits appurtenant thereto from the time they the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive.
were withheld until reinstated."19 Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and
benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition
for quo warranto.24cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III,
Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the
court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted from the contested position and that IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of
petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner did not specifically pray for Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41801 is affirmed.
his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other
monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were SO ORDERED.
withheld until reinstated."
The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner
prays for its execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite
respondent Olores' appointment because the subject position was never vacant to G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006
begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have
vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent
Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON
respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.20cräläwvirtualibräry PETER P. CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and
PERFECTO NIXON C. TABORA, Petitioners,
vs.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P.
successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.21 A MALLARI, Respondents.
judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even
though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from
the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as DECISION
such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally
and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
to which he lays claim.22 In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed
by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the This resolves the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order1 of the
trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued
against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals on July 13, 2005.
did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
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On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in the
Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining exercise jurisdiction over these cases." Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the
Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority, promulgated on
filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide
2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said Securities and Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective
corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within the
supposedly belonged to Respondents. respective provincesin the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the
Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon.
On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as "special court" (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-
Regional Trial Court in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified 11-03-SC).
petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga
City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01
action for quo warrantoshould be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising which took effect on March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the directed that "all SEC cases originally assigned or transmitted to the regular
respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court
receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another
administrative jurisdiction. On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on
April 1, 2001.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners
(respondents below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and
raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction to try and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A
jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the
petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide these cases to the "special
the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda. courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .
On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the
which read as follows: prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative
Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate
of intra-corporate relations, between and among stockholders, members or dispute.
associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which originally under PD 902-A approved
on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to
and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a
approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01
Code, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5, of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby
Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the Court of general jurisdiction or ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under
Page 304 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a
intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;" and (3) the petition was
intended merely to delay the proceedings in the trial court because when the case
The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and was transferred to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court, said court granted
preliminary injunction set on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled. petitioners’ motion to hold the proceedings in view of the present petition pending
before this Court.
For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is
better left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon. Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante,
alleging that on January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of
14 armed men, assaulted the premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking
SO ORDERED. 2
away the daily hospital collections estimated at ₱400,000.00.
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and,
instead, immediately elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Order of July 13, 2005. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure governs appeals from judgments or final orders. 4 The Order dated
July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein petitioners’ prayer in their Answer for
The petition raises the following issues: the dismissal of respondents’ case against them. As a consequence of the trial
court’s refusal to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case to
I another branch of the Regional Trial Court that had been designated as a special
court to hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order was merely
WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS interlocutory as it does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something
NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY more to be done on its merits. Such being the case, the assailed Order cannot
TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under Rule 45. As we held in Tolentino v.
TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION Natanauan, 5 to wit:
II In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
reiterated the well-settled rule that:
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED
JANUARY 23, 2001 WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY . . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not
BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16, appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such
2005. 3 order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the
judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an
In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
due course and dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is from the final judgment.6
inappropriate in this case because the Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an
interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under Rule 45 of the 1997 It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the chance there is for more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine
wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that "all decisions and Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the Court proceeded to give due course to a case
final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating thus:
the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
inappropriate to assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp
the perpetuation of an apparent error committed below that could only serve to an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the technical
flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation
adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against
so basic as that submitted by the parties.8
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously office, position or franchise;
cognizable by the SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No.
902-A), and the propensity of the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to
xxxx
look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a petition for review
on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper
court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits. As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules
no longer contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of
law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain
actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or
persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as
board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No.
controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice
8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1,
Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo
the petition for quo warrantofiled by respondents before the trial court since what is
warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public
being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act
officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warrantoagainst corporations, or
against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. The Interim Rules provide thus:
902-A as amended)."11
Section 1. (a) Cases covered. – These Rules shall govern the procedure
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows: to be observed in civil cases involving the following:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of xxxx
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme (2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or
Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court association relations, between and among stockholders, members,
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx or associates, and between, any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a associates, respectively;
corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed
trustees, officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
associations; designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours)
xxxx The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the present action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides
SEC. 5. Venue. – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that
and tried in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the
principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association concerned. principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus,
xxx (Emphasis ours) pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional
Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which
shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein
Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC (effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of Respondents.
the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this Court Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over
designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit: respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the
case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should
have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative
Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Albay (Legaspi City) Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases
Sorsogon (Sorsogon) Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor previously cognizable by the SEC.
Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to
2003, which provides that: order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The
only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for
1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes
the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,13 the Court held that the trial court, having
12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same
(b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal
Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are which was clothed with jurisdiction.
hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial
Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Note, further, that respondents’ petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005.
Property Rights which fall within their jurisdiction and those cases A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission; provided therein that such petitions shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of
Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court.
xxxx Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for
Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents should have
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having been in effect for
arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for almost two years by
National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective provinces with the time respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why
The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized DECISION
said trial court to order the transfer of respondents’ petition to the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City is specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. BERSAMIN, J.:
No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC
should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for
designated Special Commercial Court,had been in effect for almost two years.
certiorari and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Thus, the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines
can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the
Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.
substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of thereby implements.
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET
ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No.
Common Antecedents
T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled "Jose Pierre
A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is ordered DISMISSED.
The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups
duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their
SO ORDERED.
intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, 2 CIBAC, through its
president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from
which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010 in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales;
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of
CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner, acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list
vs. of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7,
2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of
G.R. No. 180443 nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3)
Borje.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed
petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the
Page 308 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72
Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were dated July 18, 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2
not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and
rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and
family life. holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the respective cases.
COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking
the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo
seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P.
Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation
total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by
was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation. Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied,
however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of
E.M. 07-054.
Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-
members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a 05413 thuswise:
petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9 WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby
approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the
to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order
hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of 1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60
dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and 2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14,
2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela 3. Armi Jane R. Borje
Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
SO ORDERED.
Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their the president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as
respective cases. such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-
Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of
submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
Page 309 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva The issues are the following:
as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the
party's representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; (a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was
accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that
(b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of
the nominees.
(c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional
and violates the Party-List System Act; and
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official
second nominee of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
(d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of
as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15 the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of
nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of
Precís of the Consolidated Cases the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to Ruling
compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.
The petitions are granted.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated A
on January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in The Court has jurisdiction over the case
E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin,
Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively,
and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list
of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804). 17 He organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question
alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of
7941.18the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses
herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.
inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as
Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was
an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal We do not agree.
(HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being
raised by Lokin. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly
a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds
For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually
for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can
seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC. only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for in the preceding elections.
Issues
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A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case
or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a
the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ
voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another
parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the court.19
respondent may be unseated.
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party- possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the
list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party- same issue.20
list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is
not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act
unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as
for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.21
of disqualification for her.
Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed
COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and
COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount
Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or to res judicata in the other.24
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim
in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court
him as the second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No.
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional seat in the House of
mandamus against the COMELEC. Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60
and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the
B nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases."
He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to
Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list
obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as organizations with pending disputes.
a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the
in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the
Page 311 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend
of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling
withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination. and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 27
certiorari and the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum
shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they were based To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following
on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different. requisites to be valid:28
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from
of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope
that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception
not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted.
of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be
the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the
nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should
people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not receive a restricted construction.
for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of
any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list E
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted
circumvention. only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he
becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance
D to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall
Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive be placed last in the list of nominees.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name
has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b)
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four
when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee
instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
becomes incapacitated.
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
not falling under any of the three exceptions.
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We agree with Lokin. The success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on
the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system,
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.
of an election,40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add
anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law
for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should postulates that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously
not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and
consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 41 fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued,
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45
under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. F
The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42
An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added law and the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of
nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,43because it has merely reworded and its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force
rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology. nor the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid
source of any right, obligation, or power.
The explanation does not persuade.
Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the
to phrase anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the
original word or phrase is not altered. others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and
ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could
only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the
nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed
of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the
September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC,
Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly
which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of
issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action.
the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied
the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of
the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list
organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent
the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations. that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee
once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.
We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941
of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
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(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 the COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion
approving Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as
its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their The Facts
substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi
Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle 2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under
Against Corruption in the House of Representatives. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due
course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010
Corruption in the House of Representatives. elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit. eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a
SO ORDERED. local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. 9 On the Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15She claimed her right to be proclaimed as
same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate
and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution,
to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his
Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 201010 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio,
office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus,
Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.
candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not
take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated
yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray.
24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath
Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the
of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by
prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]."11 Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying The COMELEC’s Rulings
Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En
Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected
and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating:
interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten
(10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-
sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one Intervention" filed by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this
(1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice,
of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13 before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent 1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion;
portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo;
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for 3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN
having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their
(1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible
May 2010 Elections. period of five (5) days from receipt thereof;
WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and 5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election
compliance. Director of Region III to cause the implementation of this Resolution and
disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local Government.
SO ORDERED.17
SO ORDERED.19
In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer
considered Lonzanida’s qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011.
is not eligible to hold and discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the The Issues
vacancy resulting from Lonzanida’s disqualification."18 The Resolution further
stated:
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanida’s removal.
We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
could never be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same
second placer in the elections. The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is
Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of
jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanida’s disqualification and
ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELEC’s 2 February 2011 Resolution and
itself. Hence, Lonzanida’s name, as already ordered by the Commission on
12 January 2011 Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San
February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official candidates
Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government
for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Code’s rule on succession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby: The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing
jurisprudence that a false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to
1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. eligibility in the number of terms elected and served is a material fact that is a
LONZANIDA; ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second,
they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to
2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo; the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a
material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy
3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of under Section 78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory construction to
Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for
of San Antonio, Zambales; cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear
and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the
qualification of a candidate to elective office.
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short,
Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.
Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right
of votes for the position of Mayor. to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
Qualifications and Disqualifications
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for
the qualifications of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
and Section 40 of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent
Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
xxxx
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
age on election day.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code are specifically enumerated:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position: Sec. 68. Disqualifications. ‒ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he
is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by
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the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections supplied)
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign of candidacy:
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
laws. (Emphasis supplied) therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
country."20 All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily,
offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled: without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. x x x
A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12
items of information in the certificate of candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by name; gender; age; place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil
final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for
constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68. election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period
of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies
False Material Representation four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the
be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to the
contents of the certificate of candidacy: Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of candidacy
should also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ‒ A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
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The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from
being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect 2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually
upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are
as follows: Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
of prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the
principal penalty. Art. 42. Prisión mayor — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor
shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that
xxxx of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender
shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
— The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public
office shall produce the following effects: The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
may have held, even if conferred by popular election. disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any
election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty
of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal
office or to be elected to such office.
Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification
exercise of any of the rights mentioned. and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence. states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held. explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification:
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification.
— The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that
office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects: appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the
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accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article
Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment. the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of
conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective
during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible
Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961. perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the
judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory
penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public . 26
office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which
lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides: Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility,
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of
candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender
material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who
perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said
suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If
penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
public office during the period of disqualification.
expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be explained in Fermin:
applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually"
refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration
between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a
material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she
according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for
public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already
hold public office perpetually.” likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of
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before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the three-term limit rule
the winning candidate.28(Emphasis supplied) constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to
cancel Morales’ certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the
Latasa, Rivera and Ong: cancellation of Francis Ong’s certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the
"petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ong’s certificate of candidacy
The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-term limit rule.
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public Loong, Fermin and Munder:
office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office.” When Possession of a Disqualifying Condition
The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification
dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of choice,29 is found both in the
Constitution30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap
terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and
office in the next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a
ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another
Section 74, the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for elective public country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his
office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available
the public office. multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the
mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds
Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny
due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section
78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that 78 was discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with respect to the
he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition
any false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional
after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated "*Having served three (3) term[s] as Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false
municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and
First Division cancelled Latasa’s certificate of candidacy for violation of the three- clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of
term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum’s petition was one based on false
COMELEC En Banc’s denial of Latasa’s motion for reconsideration. representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68.
Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly
We cancelled Marino Morales’ certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:
on Elections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term
limit, having been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to
terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made
him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code,
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through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered
would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in
It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voter’s
discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day registration. Moreover, Munder’s certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in
period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumb-mark. The
of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and declared that his
petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or
to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a cancellation of Munder’s certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarip’s petition
remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s certificate
warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition.
procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.
The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the
At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety
legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered
protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second
in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of
need to remedy this so-called “procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is
the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our
the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that lack of substantive
Legislature to decide and remedy.41 qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under
Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidate’s possession of a petition under Section 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant
the required one-year residency requirement was raised in a petition for status in a foreign country.
disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a
one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status,
petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the
5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 780043 and filed the petition under possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government
Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in
supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under
disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68
raise the said grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a are specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to the specific
ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting
of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidate’s opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule
possession of the required one-year residency requirement, as distinguished from and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in
permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed the enumeration in Section 68.
under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.
The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida’s possession of a disqualifying
In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate condition (violation of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification
of candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for
Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munder’s disqualification on 13 disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus
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Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of
foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be the enforcement and administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of
filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidate’s certification of his elections.
eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as a condition for eligibility,
the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
legis doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue.
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his candidacy, and much less to valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELEC’s 2
eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the February 2011 Resolution with approval:
certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of
terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in
As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second
determining a candidate’s eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to
Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of
and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the
a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in
elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that
its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution
he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme
more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run
Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one
for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanida’s representation that he
ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that
was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to
have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under
Legal Duty of COMELEC Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent
to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since
respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San
Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for
suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be
final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.48 (Boldfacing and
the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. underscoring in the original; italicization supplied)
The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government not qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law. cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on
such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the
on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC highest number of votes.
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."46 The WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011
disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal and the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-
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158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge their
Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated,
is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime.4
the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued
SO ORDERED. Office Order No. 106,5 designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of
the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was then reassigned to the Legal and
Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The service vehicle and
the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other
employees.
G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013
Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated
respondent as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No.
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, 24,6 which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the
vs. name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid
EMERSON S. CARLOS, Respondent. his salary beginning November 2010.
DECISION Petitioner sought a clarification7 from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB)
as to the proper classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply, 8 Executive
SERENO, CJ.: Director Maria Anthonette Allones (Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated
that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified and could not be considered
Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further stated that a
filed by Emmanuel A. de Castro (petitioner) seeking to oust respondent Emerson perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a
S. Carlos (respondent) from the position of assistant general manager for coterminous position. In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum
operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). Circular Nos. 1 and 2.
On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and
AGM0.1 His appointment was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that
Council in MMDA Resolution No. 09-10, Series of 2009.2 He took his oath on 17 it was a demotion in rank.
August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani F. Fernando.3
Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly
Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of payroll,9 petitioner sent a letter on 5 December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, assistant
the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP general manager (AGM) for Finance and Administration; and Lydia Domingo,
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010. Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an action or a
response from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as
OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 states: AGMO through a letter addressed to the Office of the President on 17 December
2010.10
2. All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career
Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall
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However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) 1 and 2. Respondent likewise raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct
appointed respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA.11 On 10 January 2011, the recourse to the Supreme Court by petitioner, who thereby failed to adhere to the
latter took his oath of office. doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent, filed its As to the procedural issue, petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is
Comment on 19 August 2011.12However, upon motion of petitioner, it was warranted by the urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable need
disqualified from representing respondent. Thus, a private law firm 13entered an for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil servants.
appearance as counsel for respondent and adopted the Comment filed by the Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the Philippines is the
OSG.14 appointing authority, petitioner doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court
justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against
Petitioner filed his Reply on 17 November 2011. a presidential appointment.
ISSUES Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
Petitioner raises the following issues15 for the consideration of this Court: mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not
exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court
and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 16 The
(1) Whether respondent Emerson S. Carlos was validly appointed by President hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Aquino to the position of AGMO of the MMDA;
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so
(2) Whether petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position of AGMO; remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
and fundamental charter and immemorial tradition."17 A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition. 18
(3) Whether or not respondent should pay petitioner the salaries and financial
benefits he received during his illegal tenure as AGMO of the MMDA. A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special
and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. 19 The
THE COURT’S RULING rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate
demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those
Petitioner contends that Section 2(3), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s
guarantees the security of tenure of employees in the civil service. He further docket.20
argues that his appointment as AGMO is not covered by OP Memorandum
Circular No. 2, since it is not a CES position as determined by the CESB. In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he
filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that
On the other hand, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES; may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites
thus, in order to have security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale
Service official (CESO). Respondent maintains that the function of an AGM is for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
executive and managerial in nature. Thus, considering that petitioner is a non-
CESO occupying a CES position, he is covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos.
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Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow authority. He shall be vested with the rank, rights, privileges, disqualifications, and
a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the prohibitions of a Cabinet member.
exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid
justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be The Chairman shall be assisted by a General Manager, an Assistant General
dismissed. Manager for Finance and Administration, an Assistant General Manager for
Planning and an Assistant General Manager for Operations, all of whom shall be
Nature of the AGMO Position appointed by the President with the consent and concurrence of the majority of the
Council, subject to civil service laws and regulations. They shall enjoy security of
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the tenure and may be removed for cause in accordance with law. (Emphasis
Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit. supplied)
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative
use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, Code of 1987, provides for two classifications of positions in the civil service:
thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has career and non-career.24
been forfeited."21 Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he
must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, 25 as
has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22 contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is coterminous with that
of the appointing authority; or subject to the latter’s pleasure; or limited to a period
The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the
2, which applies to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the appointment was made.26
executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by
these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-CES Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an
position. AGMO holds a career position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically
provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the core characteristic of a career
In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.
contentious position of AGMO of the MMDA.
CES vs. non-CES
Career vs. non-career
Career service includes the following:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7924,23 otherwise known as the MMDA
Charter, specifically created the position of AGMO. It reads as follows: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required;
Sec. 4 Metro Manila Council. x x x.
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
xxxx include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;
The Council shall be headed by a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the
President and who shall continue to hold office at the discretion of the appointing
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are Upon petitioner’s separate inquiry on the matter,31 the CESB similarly responded
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the that the AGMO’s position could not be considered as belonging to the
Department of Foreign Affairs; CES.32 Additionally, Executive Director Allones said that petitioner was not covered
by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, to wit:
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall
maintain a separate merit system; A cursory perusal of your appointment papers would show that it does not bear
any indication that you are holding a coterminous appointment. Neither your
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing position as AGMO can be considered as created in excess of the authorized
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career staffing pattern since RA 7924, the law that created the MMDA clearly provided for
service; and such position. As further stated above, your position will not fall under paragraph
No. 2 of OP MC 1 because it is not yet considered as belonging to the CES.
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.27 (Emphasis Hence, we posit that you are not covered by OP MC 1 and 2.33
supplied)
However, contrary to Executive Director Allones’ statement, the CESB, through
Resolution No. 799 already declared certain positions meeting the criteria set
In Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals and PCSO,28 the Court clarified
therein as embraced within the CES.
the positions covered by the CES:
It is worthy of note that CESB Resolution No. 799 was issued on 19 May 2009,
Thus, from the long line of cases cited above, in order for a position to be covered
even prior to petitioner’s appointment on 29 July 2009. Moreover, as early as 31
by the CES, two elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a
May 1994, the above classification was already embodied in CSC Resolution No.
position enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3)
34-2925, circularized in CSC Memorandum Circular 21, Series of 1994.
of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director, Chief of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as those Resolution No. 799 classified the following positions as falling within the coverage
enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such of the CES:
position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential
appointee. Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered a. The Career Executive Service includes the positions of Undersecretary,
as one covered by the third-level or CES. (Emphasis supplied) Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, regional Director
(department-wide and bureau-wide), Assistant Regional Director (department-wide
In sum, there are two elements required for a position to be considered as CES: and bureau-wide), and Chief of Department Service;
1) The position is among those enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, b. Unless provided otherwise, all other managerial or executive positions in the
Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987 OR a position of equal government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
rank as those enumerated and identified by the CESB to be such position of equal charters are embraced within the CES provided that they meet the following
rank; AND criteria:
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i.) The position is a career position; c. Mobilize the participation of local government units, executive departments or
agencies of the national government, and the private sector in the delivery of
ii.) The position is above division chief level; and, metro-wide services; and
iii.) The duties and responsibilities of the position require performance of executive d. Operate a central radio communication system.
and managerial functions.
He shall perform such other duties as are incidental or related to the above
Without a doubt, the AGMO position is not one of those enumerated in the above- functions or as may be assigned from time to time.
cited paragraph(a) but it clearly falls under paragraph(b) considering that it belongs
to a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. The An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises
nature of AGMO is clear from the provisions of the MMDA Charter. management over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the
First, we have already determined that an AGMO is a career position that enjoys activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or
security of tenure by virtue of the MMDA Charter. supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving
functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.
Second, it is undisputed that the position of AGMO is above the division chief level,
which is equivalent to the rank of assistant secretary with Salary Grade 29. 34 For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the
CES.
Third, a perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and
responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and In relation thereto, positions in the career service, for which appointments require
managerial functions. examinations, are grouped into three major levels:35
Section 12.4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7924 Sec. 8. Classes of positions in the Career Service. — (1) Classes of positions in
provides the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of an AGMO, as follows: the career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped
into three major levels as follows:
12.4 Assistant General Manager for Operations
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service
positions which involve non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-
The Assistant General Manager for Operations shall perform the following
supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate
functions:
studies;
a. Establish a mechanism for coordinating and operationalizing the delivery of
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions
metro-wide basic services;
which involve professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or
supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division
b. Maintain a monitoring system for the effective evaluation of the implementation Chief levels; and
of approved policies, plans and programs for the development of Metropolitan
Manila;
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be
classified by the CESB, petitioner’s appointment is still deemed coterminous
With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945 issued on 14 June 2011, which reads:
requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations
administered by the CES Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility WHEREAS, on November 23, 2010, the Supreme Court in the case of PCSO v.
upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires eligibility, he either earns CSC, G.R. NO. 185766 and G.R. No. 185767 limited the coverage of positions
the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has belonging to the CES to positions requiring Presidential appointments.
previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment
to that position provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for WHEREAS, in the same vein, CES positions have now become synonymous to
the position. Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is third level positions by virtue of the said ruling.
that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a permanent
one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it is
appointment to the position was permanent.
hereby RESOLVED, to issue the following guidelines to clarify the policy on the
coverage of CES and its classification:
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles
to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and 1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly
when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the
enumerated under Section 7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the
government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary as
Administrative Code of 1987 namely:
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Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service,
no classification of position is necessary to place them under the coverage of the SO ORDERED.
CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in which case a position
classification is required, in consultation with the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM).
iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of DECISION
executive and managerial functions.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified as part of
the CES would be deemed co-terminus with the appointing authority. (Emphasis In the same manner that this Court is cautioned to be circumspect because one
supplied) party is the son of a sitting Justice of this Court, so too must we avoid abjuring
what ought to be done as dictated by law and justice solely for that reason.
Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo
whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino. Court, as amended, by Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte, Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives,
Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary General, House of
non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes
that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a (Reyes), Representative, Lone District of the Province of Marinduque .
showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper
is immaterial.41 Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May
13, 2013 elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;"2 thus, he
disregarding the hierarchy of courts and petitioner’s lack of cause of action against seeks the following reliefs:
respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to the
position of AGMO of the MMDA. a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering said respondent to administer the
proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the
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position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto.
petitioner to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and
exercise the powers and prerogatives of said position of Marinduque But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and national
representative; elections were held on May 13, 2013.
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution
[MARILYN] BARUA-YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE of the COMELEC First Division, to wit:
the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
Q. Velasco, herein petitioner, in her stead; and hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
Commission (First Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.7
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN,
PREVENT and PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from A copy of the foregoing resolution was received by the Provincial Election
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
Supervisor of Marinduque, through Executive Assistant Rossini M. Oscadin, on
Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
May 15, 2013.
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and
DIRECTING her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position.3
Likewise, Reyes's counsel, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, received a copy of the same on
May 16, 2013.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the present petition are:
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution,
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and
the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone
Elections (COMELEC) a petition4 to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of District of Marinduque.
Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that
Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that she On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in
is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-born the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case
Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is
single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected Also on the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed
to."5 The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled "Joseph Socorro B. against Reyes in the HRET docketed as HRET Case No. 13-027,
Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes." entitled "Christopher P Matienzo v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality8 in SPA
hence, Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled. The dispositive part of said No. 13-053 (DC), which provides:
resolution reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. lapsed since the date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO Court restraining its execution, the Resolution of the Commission en
REYES is hereby CANCELLED.6 banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.9
Page 333 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes. and May 14, 2013; CAUSE the PROCLAMATION of LORD ALLAN JAY Q.
VELASCO as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari docketed Lone District of Marinduque, during the May 2013 National and Local Elections. 12
as GR. No. 207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections
and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the At noon of June 30, 2013, it would appear that Reyes assumed office and started
COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for reconsideration of the March 27, discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division cancelling her . Certificate of
Candidacy (for material misrepresentations made therein); and (ii) the June 5, On July 9, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting on the motion for reconsideration of
2013 Certificate of Finality. Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19, 2013 denial of Velasco's
petition and declared null and void and without legal effect the proclamation of
In the meantime, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Reyes. The dispositive part reads:
COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 13-010, entitled "Rep. Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco
vs. New Members/Old Members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is
the Lone District of Marinduque and Regina Ongsiako Reyes," assailing the hereby GRANTED. The assailed June 19, 2013 Resolution of the First Division is
proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void. REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
On June 19, 2013, however, the COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition in Corollary thereto, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA
SPC No. 13-010. ONGSIAKO REYES is declared NULL and VOID and without any legal force and
effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is hereby proclaimed the
On June 25, 2013, in G.R. No. 207264, this Court promulgated a Resolution winning candidate for the position of representative in the House of
dismissing Reyes's petition, viz.: Representatives for the province of Marinduque.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
IN VIEW OF THE· FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no Significantly, the aforequoted Resolution has not been challenged in this Court.
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 On July 10, 2013, in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), the COMELEC En Banc, issued an
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.10 Order (i) granting Tan's motion for execution (of the May 14, 2013 Resolution);
and (ii) directing the reconstitution of a new PBOC of Marinduque, as well as the
Significantly, this Court held that Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which proclamation by said new Board of Velasco as the duly elected Representative of
has jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the House of the Lone District of Marinduque. The fallo of which states:
Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby GRANTS the instant
requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of Motion. Accordingly, a new composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
office.11 Marinduque is hereby constituted to be composed of the following:
On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 1. Atty. Ma. Josefina E. Dela Cruz - Chairman
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc) in SPA No. 13-053 (DC), wherein he prayed that:
2. Atty. Abigail Justine Cuaresma-Lilagan - Vice Chairman
[A]n Order be issued granting the instant motion; and cause the immediate
3. Dir. Ester Villaflor-Roxas - Member
EXECUTION of this Honorable Commission's Resolutions dated March 27, 2013
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4. Three (3) Support Staffs On November 27, 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 207264.
For this purpose, the Commission hereby directs, after due notice to the parties,
the convening of the New Provincial Board of Canvassers of Marinduque on July On December 3, 2013, said motion was treated as a second motion for
16, 2013 (Tuesday) at 2:00 p.m., at the COMELEC Session Hall. gth Floor. PDG reconsideration and was denied by this Court.
Intramuros, Manila and to PROCLAIM LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO as the
duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two
Marinduque in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. letters to Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative
of the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
Further, Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas is directed to submit before the New
Provincial Board of Canvassers (NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
congressional candidate Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in the 2013 National and Local requesting, among others, that he be allowed to assume the position of
Elections. Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
Finally, the NPBOC of the Province of Marinduque is likewise directed to furnish On December 11, 2013, in SPC No. 13-010, acting .on the Motion for Issuance of
copy of the Certificate of Proclamation to the Department of Interior and Local a Writ of Execution filed by Velasco on November 29, 2013, praying that:
Government (DILG) and the House of Representatives.14
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of execution be ISSUED to
On July 16, 2013, the newly constituted PBOC of Marinduque proclaimed herein implement and enforce the May 14, 2013 Resolution in SPA No. 13-053, the July
petitioner Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for 9, 2013 Resolution in SPC No. 13-010 and the July 16, 2013 Certificate of
the Lone District of Marinduque with 48,396 votes obtained from 245 clustered Proclamation of Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as Representative of
precincts.15 Marinduque. It is further prayed that a certified true copy of the writ of execution be
personally served and delivered by the Commission's bailiff to Speaker Feliciano
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally Belmonte for the latter's implementation and enforcement of the aforementioned
convened in a joint session. On the same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected May 14, 2013 Resolution and July 9, 2013 Resolution and the July 16, 2013
Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of the Certificate of Proclamation issued by the Special Board of Canvassers of the
Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Honorable Commission.19
Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
the COMELEC issued an Order20 dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter
On July 23, 2013, Reyes filed a Manifestation and Notice of Withdrawal of alia, that all copies of its Resolutions in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC No. 13-
Petition "without waiver of her arguments, positions, defenses/causes of action as 010, the Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013, the Order dated July 10, 2013,
will be articulated in the HRET which is now the proper forum."16 and the Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16, 2013 be forwarded and
furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.
On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration17 (of this Court's June
25, 2013 Resolution in GR. No. 207264) filed on July 15, 2013, was denied by this On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
Court, viz.: reiterating the above-mentioned request but to no avail.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.18 reiterating his earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes
Hence, until and unless the HRET grants any quo warranto petition or election Further, records with the HRET show that the following cases have been filed
protest filed against respondent Reyes, and such HRET resolution or resolutions against respondent Reyes:
become final and executory, respondent Reyes may not be restrained from
exercising the prerogatives of Marinduque Representative, and respondent Sec. (i) Case No. 13-036 (Quo Warranto), entitled Noeme Mayores Tan &
Gen. Barua-Yap may not be compelled by mandamus to remove respondent Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes;
Reyes :S name from the Roll of Members of the House.
(ii) Case No. 13-037 (Quo Warranto), entitled Eric D. Junio v. Regina
II. Ongsiako Reyes;
CODILLA v. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, GIVEN THAT (iii) Case No. 13-027 (Quo Warranto ), entitled Christopher Matienzo v.
PETITIONER, BEING MERELY THE SECOND PLACER IN THE MAY 13, 2013 Regina Ongsiako Reyes; and
ELECTIONS, CANNOT VALIDLY ASSUME THE POST OF MARINDUQUE
REPRESENTATIVE. (iv) Case No. 13-028 (Election Protest), entitled Lord Allan Jay
Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes.33
Hence, respondents Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap may not be
compelled by mandamus to, respectively, administer the proper oath to petitioner
And in view of the cases filed in the HRET, the OSG insists that:
and register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
If the jurisdiction of the COMELEC were to be retained until the assumption of It is necessary to clarify the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the present petitions for quo
office of the winner, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the election, warranto, considering the parties' divergent postures on how the Tribunal should
then there would obviously be a clash of jurisdiction between the HRET and the resolve the same vis-a-vis the Supreme Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
COMELEC, given that the 2011 HRET Rules provide that the appropriate cases
should be filed before it within 15 days from the date of proclamation of the winner. The petitioners believe that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over their petitions. They
If, as the June 25, 2013 Resolution provides, the HRET's jurisdiction begins only pray that "after due proceedings," the Tribunal "declare Respondent REGINA
after assumption of office, at noon of June 30 following the election, then quo ONGSIAKO REYES DISQUALIFIED/INELIGIBLE to sit as Member of the House of
warranto petitions and election protests filed on or after said date would be Representatives, representing the Province of Marinduque." In addition, the
dismissed outright by the HRET under its own rules for having been filed out of petitioner Eric Del Mundo Junio urges the Tribunal to follow the Supreme Court
time, where the winners have already been proclaimed within the period after the pronouncement in G.R. No. 207264.
May elections and up to June 14.34
On the other hand, Victor Vela Sioco, in his Petition-In-Intervention, pleads for the
In recent development, however, the HRET promulgated a Resolution on outright dismissal of the present petitions considering the Supreme Court final
December 14, 2015 dismissing HRET Case Nos. 13-036 and 13-037,35 the twin ruling in G.R. No. 207264. For her part, respondent Regina Reyes prays too for the
petitions for quo warranto filed against Reyes, to wit: dismissal of the present petitions, albeit after reception of evidence by the
contending parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the September 23, 2014 Motion for
Reconsideration of Victor Vela Sioco is hereby GRANTED. The September 11, The constitutional mandate of the Tribunal is clear: It is "the sole judge of all
2014 Resolution of [the] Tribunal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of [House] Members."
Accordingly, the present Petitions for Quo Warranto are hereby DISMISSED for Such power or authority of the Tribunal is echoed in its 2011 Rules of the House of
lack of jurisdiction.36 Representatives Electoral Tribunal: "The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
In the said Resolution, the HR.ET held that "the final Supreme Court ruling in GR. Representatives."
No. 207264 is the COGENT REASON to set aside the September 11, 2014
Resolution."37 xxxx
To make clear, the September 11, 2014 Resolution of the HRET ordered the In the present cases, before respondent Regina Reyes was proclaimed on May 18,
dismissal of a Petition-In-Intervention filed by one Victor Vela Sioco (Sioco) in the 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution of May 14, 2013 in SPA No. 13-
twin petitions for quo warranto, for "lack of merit." Further, the HRET directed "the 053 (DC), had already resolved that the COMELEC First Division correctly
hearing and reception of evidence of the two Petitions for Quo Warranto against x cancelled her COC on the ground that she lacked the Filipino citizenship and
x x Respondent [Reyes] to proceed. "38 Sioco, however, moved for the residency requirements. Thus, the COMELEC nullified her proclamation. When
reconsideration of the said September 11, 2014 HR.ET Resolution based on the Regina Reyes challenged the COMELEC actions, the Supreme Court En Banc, in
argument that the latter was contrary to law and jurisprudence given the Supreme its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207246, upheld the same.
Court ruling in G.R. No. 207264.
With the COMELEC's cancellation of respondent Regina Reyes' COC, resulting in
Subsequently, the December 14, 2015 Resolution of the HRET held that- the nullification of her proclamation, the Tribunal, much as we would want to,
cannot assume jurisdiction over the present petitions. The jurisdiction of the HRET
The Tribunals Jurisdiction begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. And to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a
Page 338 of 507
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valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office, so the Supreme "x x x there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner [Regina Reyes] on 18
Court pronounced in its Resolution of June 25, 2013 in G.R. No. 207264, thus: May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and
x x x, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered effective assumption of office."
a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution: The Supreme Court has spoken. Its pronouncements must be respected. Being
the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, and by constitutional design, the
xxxx Supreme Court is "supreme in its task of adjudication; x x x. As a rule, all decisions
and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a Supreme Court whose judgment is final." This Tribunal, as all other courts, must
take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of the Supreme Court. 39
candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives x x x.
xxxx Incidentally, it appears that an Information against Reyes for violation of Article 1
77 (Usurpation of Official Functions) of the Revised Penal Code, dated August 3,
2015, has been filed in court,40 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Regina
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House Ongsiako Reyes. "41
of Representatives?
The Issue
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
The issue for this Court's resolution boils down to the propriety of issuing a writ
of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, perform the specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition.
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
The Ruling
and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.xx x
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of The petition has merit.
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office x x x. At the outset, this Court observes that the respondents have taken advantage of
this petition to re-litigate what has been settled in G.R. No. 207264. Respondents
are reminded to respect the Entry of Judgment that has been issued therein on
Based on the above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court, a valid proclamation is
the first essential element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the October 22, 2013.
House of Representatives over which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such
element is obviously absent in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily
was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification was upheld by the Supreme apparent that this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo
Court. On this ground alone, the Tribunal is without power to assume jurisdiction warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
over the present petitions since Regina Reyes "cannot be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives," as declared by the Supreme Court En Banc in A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the
G.R. No. 207264. It further stresses: use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul
duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not her proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally mandated to
convert this petition to one for quo warranto. resolve any questions regarding her election, the returns of such election, and her
qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives especially so that she
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person has already been proclaimed, taken her oath, and started to discharge her duties
may file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the Lone District of the
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal situation
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such between Velasco and Reyes.
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided
subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14,
of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled due to her non-
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.43 eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner. That
established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal particular decision of the COMELEC was promulgated even before Reyes' s
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court's final and
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be This Court will not give premium to the illegal actions of a subordinate entity of the
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official the COMELEC En Banc cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the
discretion or judgment.44 winning candidate on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May
16, 2013, a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap received the said decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly show that the
have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to much argued proclamation was made in clear defiance of the said COMELEC En
register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, Banc Resolution.
Fifth. In view of the foregoing, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL Put in another way, contrary to the view that the resort to the jurisdiction of the
BASIS to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the HRET is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, such recourse is not a legally
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she HAS NO available remedy to any party, specially to Velasco, who should be the sitting
LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a quo Member of the House of Representatives if it were not for the disregard by the
warranto proceeding before the HRET. leadership of the latter of the binding decisions of a constitutional body, the
COMELEC, and the Supreme Court
And this is precisely the basis for the HRET' s December. 14, 2015 Resolution
acknowledging and ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the twin petitions for quo Though the earlier existence of the twin quo warranto petitions filed against Reyes
warranto filed against Reyes. Its finding was based on the existence of a final and before the HRET had actually no bearing on the status of finality of the decision of
Page 341 of 507
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the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010. Nonetheless, their dismissal pursuant to the state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
HRET' s December 14, 2015 Resolution sustained Velasco's well-defined, clear authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
and certain right to the subject office. or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution
of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th
Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered
and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May
character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of this case. As we have previously 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
stated, the administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives become final and executory.
for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and
the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be
Speaker of the House of Representatives to administer the oath to the rightful obeyed by all officials of the land There is no alternative to the rule of law except
Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-General to enter said the reign of chaos and confusion.
Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. (Citations
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is omitted.)
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the Similarly, in this case, by virtue of (i) COMELEC en bane Resolution dated May 14,
subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely 2013 in SPA No. 13-053 (DC); (ii) Certificate of Finality dated June 5, 2013 in SPA
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has No. 13-053 (DC); (iii) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated June 19, 2013 in SPC
a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. No. 13-010; (iv) COMELEC en banc Resolution dated July 10, 2013 in SPA No.
13-053 (DC); and (v) Velasco's Certificate of Proclamation dated July 16,
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A 2013, Velasco is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ of Mandamus.
In view of finality of the rulings in G.R. No. 207264, SPA No. 13-053 (DC) and SPC On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted the Ordinance No.
No. 13-010, there is no longer any issue as to who is the rightful Representative of 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila 's First District in
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; therefore, to borrow the Tondo, covered by TCT Nos. 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register
pronouncement of this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Reynato S. of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants
Puno, in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,48 "[t]he rule of law demands that its Decision pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law
except the reign of chaos and confusion."
One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists
of 343.10 square meters. It is covered by TCT No. 138272 which was derived from
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent Hon. TCT No. 70869 issued in the name of Feliza De Guia.1 After her death, the estate
Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Speaker, House of Representatives, shall administer of Feliza De Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise
the oath of office of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco as the duly-elected agreement, which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. And public Manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986.2 In 1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the
respondent Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, Secretary General, House of heirs of Feliza De Guia, died, as a result of which his estate, consisting of his
Representatives, shall register the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco in share in the properties left by his mother, was partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia.3 On April
office. This Decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
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15, 1994, Edgardo De Guia was issued TCT No. 215593, covering Lot 1-C.4On On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot
July 29, 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name l-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square
TCT No. 217018 was issued.5 meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A.
No. 7279. However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream
The property was subsequently sold on January 24,1996 to Demetria De Guia to International Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the other modes of acquisition of lands
whom TCT No. 226048 was issued.6 enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it
can resort to expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the
On September 26, 1997, petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for Court of Appeals gave judgment for respondents and enjoined petitioner from
expropriation, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the Regional Trial Court, expropriating Lot 1-C. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202 and 138273, which included herein WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all GIVEN DUE COURSE and accordingly GRANTED. The Order, dated
surnamed are Serrano.7 On November 12, 1997, respondents filed a consolidated December 15, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration issued
answer, in which they alleged that their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had by the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, in Civil Case
acquired Lot l-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona fide occupants of No. 94-72282 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let a writ of
the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot l-C injunction issue perpetually enjoining the same respondent court from
would result in their disclosure, it being the only residential land left to them by proceeding with the complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-
their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation 72282,14
because dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to
only about 50 square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that In its resolution, dated February 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied
judgment be rendered declaring Lot l-C exempt from expropriation and ordering two motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner.l5 Hence this petition. Petitioner
the cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. contends that the Court of Appeals erred in --
226048,8 regarding the pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282. for eminent domain
filed by petitioner.9 1) Giving due course to the petition of the Serranos under Rule 65
notwithstanding its own declaration of the impropriety of the resort to the
Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, writ and filing thereof with the wrong appellate court;
directing petitioner to deposit the amount of Pl,825,241.00 equivalent to the
assessed value of the properties.10 After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial 2) Concluding that the Order of October 9, 1998 which authorizes the
court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998, directing the issuance of a immediate entry of the City as the expropriating agency into the property
writ of possession in favor of petitioner.ll sough to be expropriated upon the deposit of the provisionally fixed fair
market value thereof as tantamount to condemnation of the property
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that without prior showing of compliance with the acquisition of other lands
the expropriation of Lot l-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants enumerated in Sec. 9 of R.A. 7279 ergo a violation of due process of the
thereof, landless; that Lot l-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 Serranos by the doctrinaire application of FILSTREAM ruling and
provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square corrollarily,
meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriations; that respondents
would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot l-C 3) In prohibiting permanently, by writ of injunction, the trial court from
which consists of only 343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not proceeding with a complaint for expropriation of the City in Civil Case No.
meant to deprive an owner of the entire residential land but only that in excess of 94-72282.16
300 square meters.12
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial 3. Whether or not Lot 1-C is or may be exempted from expropriation
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with pursuant to R.A. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and Housing Act of 1992.20
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified It is clear that respondents raised in issue the propriety of the expropriation of their
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainly and praying property in connection with RA. No. 7279. Although what was discussed at length
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such in their petition before the Court of Appeals was whether or not the said property
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as laws and could be considered a small property within the purview of the exemption under
justice may require. the said law, the other provisions of the said law concerning expropriation
proceedings need also be looked into to address the first issue raised by the
Respondents' petition before the Court of Appeals alleged that the trial court had respondents and to determine whether or not expropriation of Lot 1-C was proper
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals properly considered relevant
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order, dated December 15, 1998, provisions of R A. No.7279 to determine the issues raised by respondents.
resolving that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation and ordering the issuance Whether or not it correctly applied the doctrine laid down in Filstream in resolving
of the writ of possession in favor of petitioner.18 the issues raised by respondents, however, is a different matter altogether, and
this brings us to the next point.
Second. Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for deciding issues not raised in the
trial court, specifically the question of whether or not there was compliance with Third. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously presumed that Lot
§§9 and 10 of RA. No. 7279. It argues that the sole defense set up by respondents 1-C has been ordered condemned in its favor when the fact is that the order of the
in their petition before the Court of Appeals was that their property was exempted trial court, dated December 15, 1998, merely authorized the issuance of a writ of
from expropriation because it comes within the purview of a "small property" as possession and petitioner's entry into the property pursuant to Rule 67, §2. At that
defined by R.A. No. 7279 . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should not have stage, it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA. No. 7279,
applied the doctrine laid down by this Court in the Filstream19 case as such issue §§9 - 10 have been complied with since no evidentiary hearing had yet been
was not raised by respondents in their petition before the Court of Appeals. conducted by the trial court.21
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement and Sites and Services or BLISS sites
officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved which have not yet been acquired, and;
and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to
the parties.
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the
government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageously
upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply.
value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these The local government units shall give budgetary priority on-site
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.22 In this development of government lands.
case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial
duty of the court to issue the writ of possession. SEC. 10. Modes of Lands Acquisition. -- The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, amount others, community mortgage,
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
requirements laid down in §§9 - 10 of RA. No. 7279 and reiterated the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
in Filstream ruling. This is error. The ruling in the Filstream was necessitated expropriation: Provided, however; That expropriation shall be resorted to
because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided,
that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, further; That were expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this
still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the Act: Provided finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be
requirements provided in RA. No. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the
the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted expropriation without first trying the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
other modes of acquisition enumerated in § 10 of the law.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed
RA. No 7279 in pertinent parts provide: properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the
Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of Before us is a petition for review1 of the 30 March 1992 Decision2 and 14 August
evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had 1992 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930. The Court of
complied with the requirements.23 The determination of this question must await Appeals affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Tabaco,
that hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the Albay in Civil Case No. T-552.
condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation
proceedings consist of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is The Antecedents
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and,
second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of the
private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three Petitioner National Power Corporation ("NPC") is a public corporation created to
commissioners.24 generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit
electric power nationwide.4 NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and
exercise the right of eminent domain.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 16,1999, and resolution, dated
February 23, 2000, of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and the order of the
trial court, dated December 15,1998, is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED Private respondent Antonino Pobre ("Pobre") is the owner of a 68,969 square-
to the trial court to further proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The
Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709.
SO ORDERED.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he
named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision." On 12 January 1966, the then
Court of First Instance of Albay approved the subdivision plan of the Property. The
Register of Deeds thus cancelled TCT No. 4067 and issued independent titles for
the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising and selling the lots.
G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004
On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, water and steam were present beneath the Property. The Commission on
vs. Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE, respondents. and potentially for commercial or industrial use.
First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots
DECISION from the approved subdivision plan.
Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case
against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property.5 On 23
October 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPC's
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC began On 27 March 1987, the trial court admitted all of Pobre's exhibits and upheld its
drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation Order dated 30 August 1985. The trial court considered the case submitted for
case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by decision.
NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some
portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC On 29 April 1987, the trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. The
continued with its dumping. dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff to pay
the subject of this petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and unto the defendant:
maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No.
7396 and Republic Act No. 5092.7 NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the
(1) The sum of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY
Philippine National Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY (P3,448,450.00)
the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered PESOS which is the fair market value of the subdivision of
the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession to
defendant with an area of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty
NPC.
nine (68,969) square meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum
from September 6, 1979 until the whole amount is paid, and upon
On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for payment thereof by the plaintiff the defendant is hereby ordered to
expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for execute the necessary Deed of Conveyance or Absolute Sale of
just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of the property in favor of the plaintiff;
damages.
(2) The sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case (P150,000.00) PESOS for and as attorney's fees.
on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already
abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre's opposition.
Costs against the plaintiff.
On 8 January 1985, the trial court granted NPC's motion to dismiss but the trial
SO ORDERED.9
court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court
admitted Pobre's exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to object.
On 13 July 1987, NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision. On 30
October 1987, the trial court issued its Order denying NPC's motion for
On 30 August 1985, the trial court ordered the case submitted for decision since
reconsideration.
NPC failed to appear to present its evidence. The trial court denied NPC's motion
to reconsider the submission of the case for decision.
NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 30 March 1992, the Court of Appeals
upheld the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorney's fees. The
NPC filed a petition for certiorari8 with the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
questioning the 30 August 1985 Order of the trial court. On 12 February 1987, the
Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed NPC's petition but directed the lower court
to rule on NPC's objections to Pobre's documentary exhibits. WHEREFORE, by reason of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of attorney's fees is
deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Court of Appeals denied NPC's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution NPC claims that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors that warrant
dated 14 August 1992. reversal of the appellate court's decision:
The Ruling of the Trial Court 1. In not annulling the appealed Decision for having been rendered by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction;
In its 69-page decision, the trial court recounted in great detail the scale and scope
of the damage NPC inflicted on the Property that Pobre had developed into a 2. In holding that NPC had "taken" the entire Property of Pobre;
resort-subdivision. Pobre's Property suffered "permanent injury" because of the
noise, water, air and land pollution generated by NPC's geothermal plants. The 3. Assuming arguendo that there was "taking" of the entire Property, in not
construction and operation of the geothermal plants drastically changed the excluding from the Property the 8,311.60 square-meter portion NPC had
topography of the Property making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision. The previously expropriated and paid for;
chemicals emitted by the geothermal plants damaged the natural resources in the
Property and endangered the lives of the residents.
4. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court
at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 6, 1979 until fully paid, is
NPC did not only take the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property, but also just and fair;
the remaining area of the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had rendered
Pobre's entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. The Property has become
5. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25.00 per
useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre's entire Property and pay for it.
square meter only as what NPC and Pobre had previously mutually
agreed upon; and
The trial court found the following badges of NPC's bad faith: (1) NPC allowed five
years to pass before it moved for the dismissal of the second expropriation case;
6. In not totally setting aside the appealed Decision of the trial court. 11
(2) NPC did not act on Pobre's plea for NPC to eliminate or at least reduce the
damage to the Property; and (3) NPC singled out Pobre's Property for piecemeal
expropriation when NPC could have expropriated other properties which were not Procedural Issues
affected in their entirety by NPC's operation.
NPC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, insists that at the time that
The trial court found the just compensation to be P50 per square meter or a total it moved for the dismissal of its complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a
of P3,448,450 for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC failed to contest motion for summary judgment on NPC. Thus, NPC as plaintiff had the right to
this valuation. Since NPC was in bad faith and it employed dilatory tactics to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. NPC relies on Section 1, Rule 17
prolong this case, the trial court imposed legal interest on the P3,448,450 from 6 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then in effect. NPC argues that the dismissal
September 1979 until full payment. The trial court awarded Pobre attorney's fees of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case
of P150,000. including Pobre's counterclaim.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals NPC's belated attack on Pobre's claim for damages must fail. The trial court's
reservation of Pobre's right to recover damages in the same case is already
beyond review. The 8 January 1985 Order of the trial court attained finality when
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the
NPC failed to move for its reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period.
appellate court deleted the award of attorney's fees because Pobre did not
properly plead for it.
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NPC opposed the order only on 27 May 1985 or more than four months from the were present the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiff's
issuance of the order. will.20 The defending party and even the courts were powerless to prevent the
dismissal.21 The courts could only accept and record the dismissal.22
We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for not considering NPC's objections against
the subsistence of Pobre's claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious
its assignment of errors nor discussed it in its appellant's brief. NPC also failed to that this rule was not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section
question the trial court's 8 January 1985 Order in the petition for certiorari12 it had 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, provided that:
earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this Court that NPC now
vigorously assails the preservation of Pobre's claim for damages. Clearly, NPC's SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by
opposition to the existence of Pobre's claim for damages is a mere afterthought. the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
Rules of fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless
for the first time on appeal.13 otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except
that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
We must correct NPC's claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just "shortly" after plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on
it had filed the complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated several times or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
to the trial court its desire to dismiss the expropriation case it filed on 5 September compromised without approval of the court.
1979,14 it was only on 2 January 1985 that NPC filed its notice of dismissal. 15 It
took NPC more than five years to actually file the notice of dismissal. Five years is While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the "service of answer or summary judgment,"
definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously dilly-dallied in filing its notice of the Rules then did not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in
dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobre's property rights. eminent domain cases.23 In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the
defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of his
Even a timely opposition against Pobre's claim for damages would not yield a objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in
favorable ruling for NPC. It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court the complaint.24 In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the
that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as motion to dismiss took the place of the answer.
jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions
in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases. The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his "motion to
dismiss/answer"25 even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private notice of dismissal of the complaint on 2 January 1985. However, as early as 10
property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just December 1984, Pobre had already filed with the trial court and served on NPC
compensation.16 The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the his "motion to dismiss/answer." A certain Divina Cerela received Pobre's pleading
local governments, other public entities and public utilities17 such as NPC. on behalf of NPC.26 Unfortunately for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964
Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent Rules of Court could not save its cause.
domain.18 "Eminent Domain" was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A
prescribed method of expropriation is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the
"Expropriation." complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion
for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the complaint.27 Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of
general rule that the dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the
discretion of the court.19 For as long as all of the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 same applies.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision. NPC's facilities such as steam wells, nag
dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered wells, power plants, power lines, and canals had hemmed in Pobre's Property.
damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to NPC's operations of its geothermal project also posed a risk to lives and
dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain properties.
conditions.28The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of
Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other We uphold the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Questions of facts
civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right. 29 are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may
only raise questions of law.37 Moreover, factual findings of the trial court,
The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this
deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in Court.38 We thus find no reason to set aside the two courts' factual findings.
court.30 The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is
payment of just compensation and there is due process of law. 31 NPC points out that it did not take Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC
argues that assuming that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 square-meter
If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject portion that it had successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been
to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry excluded from the 68,969 square-meter Property that Pobre claims NPC had
because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, damaged.
withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If
it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use,32 then it We are not persuaded.
becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.33However, when the
defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the
In its 30 October 1987 Order denying NPC's motion for reconsideration, the trial
dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his
court pointed out that the Property originally had a total area of 141,300 square
damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action. 34
meters.39 Pobre converted the Property into a resort-subdivision and sold lots to
the public. What remained of the lots are the 68,969 square meters of
Thus, NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal land.40 Pobre no longer claimed damages for the other lots that he had before the
of Pobre's claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 expropriation.
Rules of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant's claim for
damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case law holds that in the
Pobre identified in court the lots forming the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC
event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made had the opportunity to object to the identification of the lots.41 NPC, however, failed
either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the to do so. Thus, we do not disturb the trial and appellate courts' finding on the total
institution of the expropriation case.35 The dismissal of the complaint can be made
land area NPC had damaged.
under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's right to recover
damages either in the same or in another action.36 The trial court in this case
reserved Pobre's right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property
become final due to NPC's own fault.
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the
Factual Findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts Bind the Court expropriated land to the landowner.42However, when possession of the land
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor
feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is
The trial and appellate courts held that even before the first expropriation case, to demand payment of just compensation.43
Pobre had already established his Property as a resort-subdivision. NPC had
wrought so much damage to the Property that NPC had made the Property
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In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer requirements.48 NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing the appropriate
possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of
is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre procedural due process.
and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC
had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property. From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for
Pobre's entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC
In United States v. Causby,44 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second
property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it
domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such taking is thus compensable. had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to
Pobre's repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on
In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property his Property.
without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the
property owner may demand payment of just compensation.45 This principle is in NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the
accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from
public use without just compensation.46 Pobre.49 NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had
already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its
In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro utter disregard for Pobre's property rights.
Guivelondo,47 the Court compelled the National Housing Authority ("NHA") to pay
just compensation to the landowners even after the NHA had already abandoned Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings
the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a government agency could not to determine the just compensation for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property.
initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, and then just decide Pobre must be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation
not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary and from NPC.
capricious and was condemned by the Court in the strongest possible terms. NHA
was held liable to the landowners for the prejudice that they had suffered. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.50 The trial and
appellate courts endeavored to meet this standard. The P50 per square meter
In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to expropriation valuation of the 68,969 square-meter Property is reasonable considering that the
proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no Property was already an established resort-subdivision. NPC has itself to blame for
point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 not contesting the valuation before the trial court. Based on the P50 per square
square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the meter valuation, the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre
trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages that is P3,448,450.
NPC had to pay Pobre.
The landowner is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its the taking up to the time of full payment by the government.51 In accord with
complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of jurisprudence, we fix the legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum. 52 The legal
recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of interest should accrue from 6 September 1979, the date when the trial court issued
the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before the writ of possession to NPC, up to the time that NPC fully pays Pobre. 53
commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot
We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it.54 We also
waived when the government itself initially violates procedural
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cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not appeal from the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Public Works and
decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of attorney's fees. 55 Highways), petitioner,
vs.
Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages to Pobre. ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent.
The court may award temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, if the court finds that a party has DECISION
suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved with certainty from
the nature of the case.56As the trial and appellate courts noted, Pobre's resort- QUISUMBING, J.:
subdivision was no longer just a dream because Pobre had already established
the resort-subdivision and the prospect for it was initially encouraging. That is, until
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated October 30, 2003 of the Court of
NPC permanently damaged Pobre's Property. NPC did not just destroy the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65066 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the
property. NPC dashed Pobre's hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential
Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 4378, for
as a resort-subdivision. enforcement of easement of right-of-way (or eminent domain).
The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority.
Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in
Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of eminent
Bading, Butuan City. His ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title
domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with circumspection and utmost
Nos. RT-10225 and RT-10646. These properties are subject to a 60-meter wide
regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we hold NPC liable for exemplary perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other
damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages or corrective damages are imposed, similar works of the government or public enterprise, at no cost to the government,
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
except only the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected.
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.57
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with Andaya to enforce
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of
the 60-meter easement of right-of-way. The easement was for concrete levees and
the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project. The
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. National Power Corporation is ordered to pay
parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.
Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter
Property at P50 per square meter. National Power Corporation is directed to pay
legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 On December 13, 1995, the Republic instituted an action before the Regional Trial
until fully paid. Upon National Power Corporation's payment of the full amount, Court of Butuan City to enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain.
Antonino Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in The trial court issued a writ of possession on April 26, 1996.3 It also constituted a
National Power Corporation's favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine the just compensation. Eventually,
to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000, respectively. the trial court issued an Order of Expropriation upon payment of just
No costs. compensation.4 Later, the Board reported that there was a discrepancy in the
description of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic thus amended
its complaint, reducing the 60-meter easement to 10 meters, or an equivalent of
SO ORDERED.
701 square meters.
On December 10, 1998, the Board reported that the project would affect a total of
10,380 square meters of Andaya’s properties, 4,443 square meters of which will be
for the 60-meter easement. The Board also reported that the easement would
G.R. No. 160656 June 15, 2007 diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As a result, it
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
recommended the payment of consequential damages amounting to ₱2,820,430 NO COSTS.
for the remaining area.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic reduced the
easement to 10 meters or an equivalent of 701 square meters, the Board still Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Republic contested the awards
granted it 4,443 square meters. He contended that the consequential damages of severance damages and attorney’s fees while Andaya demanded just
should be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters. Thus, the just compensation for his entire property minus the easement. Andaya alleged that the
compensation should be ₱11,373,405. The Republic did not file any comment, easement would prevent ingress and egress to his property and turn it into a catch
opposition, nor objection. basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. As a result, his entire
property would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. He thus demanded
After considering the Board’s report, the trial court decreed on April 29, 1999, as ₱11,373,405 as just compensation based on the total compensable area of 9,679
follows: square meters.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court decides as follows: The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision by imposing a 6% interest
on the consequential damages from the date of the writ of possession or the actual
a) That the plaintiff is legally entitled to its inherent right of expropriation to, viz.: 1) taking, and by deleting the attorney’s fees.
the lot now known as lot 3291-B-1-A, portion of lot 3291-B-1, (LRC) Psd-255693,
covered by TCT No. RT-10225, with an area of 288 sq. m.; and 2) the lot now Hence, the instant petition. Simply put, the sole issue for resolution may be stated
known as lot 3293-F-5-B-1, portion of lot 3293-F-5-B (LRC) Psd-230236, covered thus: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal easement
by TCT No. RT-10646, with an area of 413 sq. m., both of the Butuan City Registry of right-of-way on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and
of Deeds, it being shown that it is for public use and purpose --- free of charge by uninhabitable?
reason of the statutory lien of easement of right-of-way imposed on defendant’s
titles; It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the
Republic. Andaya’s transfer certificates of title7 contained the reservation that the
b) That however, the plaintiff is obligated to pay defendant the sum of TWO lands covered thereby are subject to the provisions of the Land Registration
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY Act8 and the Public Land Act.9 Section 11210 of the Public Land Act provides that
(P2,820,430.00) PESOS as fair and reasonable severance damages; lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters
in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works
c) To pay members of the Board of Commissioners, thus: for the chairman --- of the government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS and the two (2) members at value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this,
FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS each; the Court of Appeals declared that all the Republic needs to do is to enforce such
right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to pay
d) To pay defendant’s counsel FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as any just compensation.11 Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square
meters necessary for the construction of the floodwalls without paying for it.
Attorney’s fees; and finally,
We are, however, unable to sustain the Republic’s argument that it is not liable to
e) That the Registry of Deeds of Butuan City is also directed to effect the issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Titles for the aforementioned two (2) lots in the name of pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement on Andaya’s
the Republic of the Philippines, following the technical description as appearing in property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable.
"Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the
pages 6, 7, and 8 of the Commissioner’s Report.
government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property
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or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material Butuan City, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 4378, is AFFIRMED with
impairment of the value of his property.12 Using this standard, there was MODIFICATION as herein set forth.
undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden
was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo, Branch 33 for the determination of the final just compensation of the compensable
the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use area consisting of 5,937 square meters, with interest thereon at the legal rate of
of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and 6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or actual taking until fully
turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River. paid.
For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, No pronouncement as to costs.
which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
land.13 One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person
SO ORDERED.
shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in
expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy,
Section 9, Article III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.14
G.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008
Finally, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that just
compensation should be paid only for 5,937 square meters of the total area of ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner,
10,380 square meters. Admittedly, the Republic needs only a 10-meter easement vs.
or an equivalent of 701 square meters. Yet, it is also settled that it is legally entitled DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
to a 60-meter wide easement or an equivalent of 4,443 square meters. Clearly, SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
although the Republic will use only 701 square meters, it should not be liable for AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondents.
the 3,742 square meters, which constitute the difference between this area of 701
square meters and the 4,443 square meters to which it is fully entitled to use as x ----------------------------------------- x
easement, free of charge except for damages to affected existing improvements, if
any, under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
G.R. No. 174166 April 18, 2008
In effect, without such damages alleged and proved, the Republic is liable for just
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
compensation of only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
possession or the actual taking until full payment is made. For the purpose of
vs.
determining the final just compensation, the case is remanded to the trial court.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SALACNIB BATERINA, respondents.
Said court is ordered to make the determination of just compensation payable to
respondent Andaya with deliberate dispatch.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 30, 2003 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 65066, modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be
Bid Documents. The following amendments were made on the Bid issued from time to time. Said amendments shall only cover items
Documents: that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponent's
proposal.
a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, the
proponent shall include in its financial proposal an additional On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where
percentage of gross revenue share of the Government, as follows: certain clarifications were made. Upon the request of prospective bidder
People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC
warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules
i. First 5 years 5.0% and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed
ii. Next 10 years 7.5% Payment submitted by the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and
iii. Next 10 years 10.0% that the challengers' technical and financial proposals would remain
confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources
contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and
b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent, subject to
subject of the price challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those
Guaranteed Payment which need not be of equal amount, but fees and charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be subject to
payment of which shall start upon site possession. regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public
Utility Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's
c. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain query on the matter with the Department of Justice.
the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design,
construction, and/or operation and maintenance phases of the In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled "Answers
project as the case may be. For purposes of pre-qualification, this to the Queries of PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September 3 and 10,
capability shall be measured in terms of: 1996." Paircargo's queries and the PBAC's responses were as follows:
i. Proof of the availability of the project proponent and/or 1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet the required
the consortium to provide the minimum amount of equity minimum equity requirement as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the
for the project; and Bid Documents considering that the capitalization of each member
company is so structured to meet the requirements and needs of
ii. a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that their current respective business undertaking/activities. In order to
the project proponent and/or the members of the comply with this equity requirement, Paircargo is requesting PBAC
consortium are banking with them, that the project to just allow each member of (sic) corporation of the Joint Venture
proponent and/or the members are of good financial to just execute an agreement that embodies a commitment to
standing, and have adequate resources. infuse the required capital in case the project is awarded to the
In prequalification, the agency is interested in one's financial a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of
capability at the time of prequalification, not future or potential PAIRCARGO;
capability.
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of
A commitment to put up equity once awarded the project is not PAGS;
enough to establish that "present" financial capability. However,
total financial capability of all member companies of the c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General
Consortium, to be established by submitting the respective Banking Act) on the amount that Security Bank could legally invest
companies' audited financial statements, shall be acceptable. in the project;
2. At present, Paircargo is negotiating with banks and other d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO
institutions for the extension of a Performance Security to the joint Joint Venture, for prequalification purposes; and
venture in the event that the Concessions Agreement (sic) is
awarded to them. However, Paircargo is being required to submit
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of
a copy of the draft concession as one of the documentary
the Philippine requirement in the operation of a public utility.
requirements. Therefore, Paircargo is requesting that they'd (sic)
be furnished copy of the approved negotiated agreement between
the PBAC and the AEDC at the soonest possible time. The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had
considered the issues raised by the latter, and that based on the
documents submitted by Paircargo and the established prequalification
A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is included in the Bid criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had
Documents. Any material changes would be made known to
prequalified to undertake the project. The Secretary of the DOTC
prospective challengers through bid bulletins. However, a final
approved the finding of the PBAC.
version will be issued before the award of contract.
The PBAC then proceeded with the opening of the second envelope of the
The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of
Paircargo Consortium which contained its Technical Proposal.
the Bid Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin
Project) and to submit the same with the required Bid Security.
On October 3, 1996, AEDC reiterated its objections, particularly with
respect to Paircargo's financial capability, in view of the restrictions
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo imposed by Section 21-B of the General Banking Act and Sections 1380
and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services,
and 1381 of the Manual Regulations for Banks and Other Financial
Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively,
Intermediaries. On October 7, 1996, AEDC again manifested its objections
Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC.
and requested that it be furnished with excerpts of the PBAC meeting and
On September 23, 1996, the PBAC opened the first envelope containing
the accompanying technical evaluation report where each of the issues
the prequalification documents of the Paircargo Consortium. On the they raised were addressed.
following day, September 24, 1996, the PBAC prequalified the Paircargo
Consortium.
Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to
proposal submitted by the Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 the ARCA. The First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999; the
working days or until November 28, 1996 within which to match the said
Second Supplement on September 4, 2000; and the Third Supplement on
bid, otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo.
June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements).
As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then xxxx
DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a
notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDC's failure to match the
proposal. Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and
operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts
with various service providers to offer international airline airport services,
On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support,
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. x x x.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to
PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service
PIATCO. providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the
implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before this Court a
On April 11, 1997, the DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements.
second-pass approval of the NEDA-ICC.
On October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of the
On April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petitioning workers, filed a motion for intervention and a petition-in-
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and intervention.
Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC,
the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his capacity
On October 24, 2002, Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez
as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee. and Constantino Jaraula filed a similar petition with this Court.
xxxx
On December 11, 2002, another group of Congressmen, Hon. Jacinto V. Hence, the fallo of the Court's Decision in Agan reads:
Paras, Rafael P. Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie B. Villarama, Prospero
C. Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. WHEREFORE, the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and
Macaranbon, moved to intervene in the case as Respondents-Intervenors. Restated Concession Agreement and the Supplements thereto are set
They filed their Comment-In-Intervention defending the validity of the aside for being null and void.7
assailed agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions.
In a Resolution8 dated 21 January 2004, the Court denied with finality the Motions
During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria for Reconsideration of its 5 May 2003 Decision in Agan filed by therein
Macapagal Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 respondents PIATCO and Congressmen Paras, et al., and respondents-
Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang Palace, stated that she will intervenors.9 Significantly, the Court declared in the same Resolution that:
not "honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch's legal offices
have concluded (as) null and void."3
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures
comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds
The Court first dispensed with the procedural issues raised in Agan, ruling that (a) have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to
the MIAA service providers and its employees, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 155001 take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as
and 155661, had the requisite standing since they had a direct and substantial builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in
interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts which accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly
would affect their source of livelihood;4 and (b) the members of the House of enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.10 (Emphasis
Representatives, petitioners in G.R. No. 155547, were granted standing in view of ours.)
the serious legal questions involved and their impact on public interest. 5
It is these afore-quoted pronouncements that gave rise to the Petition in Gingoyon.
As to the merits of the Petitions in Agan, the Court concluded that:
Republic v. Gingoyon (G.R. No. 166429)
In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite
financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent According to the statement of facts in Gingoyon:
PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further,
considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have
substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the
the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The
the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession Agreement is similarly null Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation
and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under Sections regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings
4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession were commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce
Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the
which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the Government has raised
among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations jurisdictional questions before those two bodies.
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was 5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just
filed on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the compensation within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing
RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, so, the RTC is obliged to comply with the standards set under Rep. Act
and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules. Considering that the NAIA 3
expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary consists of structures and improvements, the valuation thereof shall be
restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in determined using the replacements cost method, as prescribed under
a Resolution dated 14 January 2005.11 Section 10 of the Implementing Rules.
The Court resolved the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines and Manila (6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the
International Airport Authority in Gingoyon in this wise: RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining
just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall
In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows: apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its
Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan.
(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be
observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there (7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision
must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said
and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be decision.
conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.
(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires
the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions
standards or methods for the determination of just compensation. of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the
pronouncements made by the Court herein.12
(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession
in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO The decretal portion of the Court's Decision in Gingoyon thus reads:
is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of
NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the
orders dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said
(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the orders are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the
acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international 1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004
airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the
the conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand
encompasses "the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex,
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Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA compliant with the pronouncement in the 2004 Agan Resolution, and is in
3 facilities; accord with law and equity. In contrast, the Government's position, hewing
to the strict application of Rule 67, would permit the Government to
2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized acquire possession over the NAIA 3 and implement its operation without
[to] start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport having to pay PIATCO a single centavo, a situation that is obviously unfair.
Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to Whatever animosity the Government may have towards PIATCO does not
the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project; acquit it from settling its obligations to the latter, particularly those which
had already been previously affirmed by this Court.14
3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality
of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO The Court, in the same Resolution, denied all the three motions for intervention of
by the Government. Asakihosan Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Congressman Baterina, and
ruled as follows:
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to
the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of We now turn to the three (3) motions for intervention all of which were filed
this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the after the promulgation of the Court's Decision. All three (3) motions must
commissioners decreed therein. be denied. Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby judgment by the court. Since this case originated from an original action
LIFTED. filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motions-in-
intervention in this case if ever was before and not after resolution of this
case. To allow intervention at this juncture would be highly irregular. It is
No pronouncement as to costs.13 extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the pendency of
the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them allege such
Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision were filed by therein lack of knowledge.
petitioners Republic and MIAA, as well as the three other parties who sought to
intervene, namely, Asakihosan Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Takenaka and Asahikosan rely on Mago v. Court of Appeals wherein the
Congressman Baterina. Court took the extraordinary step of allowing the motion for intervention
even after the challenged order of the trial court had already become final.
In a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, this Court denied with finality the Motion Yet it was apparent in Mago that the movants therein were not impleaded
for Partial Reconsideration of therein petitioners and remained faithful to its despite being indispensable parties, and had not even known of the
assailed Decision based on the following ratiocination: existence of the case before the trial court, and the effect of the final order
was to deprive the movants of their land. In this case, neither Takenaka
Admittedly, the 2004 Resolution in Agan could be construed as mandating nor Asahikosan stand to be dispossessed by reason of the Court's
the full payment of the final amount of just compensation before the Decision. There is no palpable due process violation that would militate the
Government may be permitted to take over the NAIA 3. However, the suspension of the procedural rule.
Decision ultimately rejected such a construction, acknowledging the public
good that would result from the immediate operation of the NAIA 3. Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has
Instead, the Decision adopted an interpretation which is in consonance not been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing
with Rep. Act No. 8974 and with equitable standards as well, that allowed intervention at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and
the Government to take possession of the NAIA 3 after payment of the Asahikosan have not been judicially proved or conclusively established as
proffered value of the facilities to PIATCO. Such a reading is substantially
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be negotiating, re-bidding, awarding or otherwise entering into any
considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari. In the concession contract with PIATCO and other third parties for the operation
case of Representative Baterina, he invokes his prerogative as legislator of the NAIA-IPT III Project.
to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to
compensate PIATCO, as well as that as a taxpayer, as the basis of his Other relief and remedies, just and equitable under the premises, are
legal standing to intervene. However, it should be noted that the amount likewise prayed for.16
which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to PIATCO was
derived from the money deposited by the Manila International Airport AEDC bases its Petition on the following grounds:
Authority, an agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a
legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National
Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by I. PETITIONER AEDC, BEING THE RECOGNIZED AND
Congress. UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL PROPONENT, HAS THE EXCLUSIVE,
CLEAR AND VESTED STATUTORY RIGHT TO THE AWARD OF THE
NAIA-IPT III PROJECT;
It is also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be
duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before lower courts. There is
no compelling reason to disregard the established rules and permit the II. RESPONDENTS HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO PROTECT
interventions belatedly filed after the promulgation of the Court's PETITIONER AEDC AS THE UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL
Decision.15 PROPONENT AS A RESULT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
NULLIFICATION OF THE AWARD OF THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT TO
PIATCO[; and]
Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and
Communications and Manila International Airport Authority (G.R. No. 169914)
III. RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS OR AUTHORITY TO TAKE
OVER THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT, TO THE EXCLUSION OF
Banking on this Court's declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III
PETITIONER AEDC, OR TO AWARD THE PROJECT TO THIRD
Project to PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) PARTIES.17
filed before this Court the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying of this Court that:
At the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and
unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive,
(1) After due hearing, judgment be rendered commanding the clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof. However, the Petition of
Respondents, their officers, agents, successors, representatives or
AEDC should be dismissed for lack of merit, being as it is, substantially and
persons or entities acting on their behalf, to formally award the NAIA-APT
procedurally flawed.
[sic]III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC and to execute and formalize with
Petitioner AEDC the approved Draft Concession Agreement embodying
the agreed terms and conditions for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITY
Project and directing Respondents to cease and desist from awarding the
NAIA-IPT Project to third parties or negotiating into any concession A petition for mandamus is governed by Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
contract with third parties. Procedure, which reads –
(2) Pending resolution on the merits, a Temporary Restraining Order be SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board,
issued enjoining Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf from law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
Senator Osmeña: In his separate opinion in Agan, former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted
that "[T]here was effectively no public bidding to speak of, the entire bidding
xxxx process having been flawed and tainted from the very outset, therefore, the
award of the concession to Paircargo's successor Piatco was void, and the
Concession Agreement executed with the latter was likewise void ab initio. x x x.29"
To capture the tenor of the proposal of the distinguished Gentleman, a
subsequent paragraph has to be added which says, "IF THERE IS A (Emphasis ours.) In consideration of such a declaration that the entire bidding
COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL, THE ORIGINAL PROPONENT SHALL process was flawed and tainted from the very beginning, then, it would be
HAVE THE RIGHT TO EQUAL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE senseless to re-open the same to determine to whom the project should have been
COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL." properly awarded to. The process and all proposals and bids submitted in
participation thereof, and not just PIATCO's, were placed in doubt, and it would be
foolhardy for the Government to rely on them again. At the very least, it may be
In other words, if there is nobody who will submit a competitive proposal, declared that there was a failure of public bidding. 30
then nothing is lost. Everybody knows it, and it is open and transparent.
But if somebody comes in with another proposal – and because it was the
idea of the original proponent – that proponent now has the right to equal In addition, PIATCO is already close to finishing the building of the structures
the terms of the original proposal. comprising NAIA IPT III,31 a fact that this Court cannot simply ignore. The NAIA
IPT III Project was proposed, subjected to bidding, and awarded as a build-
operate-transfer (BOT) project. A BOT project is defined as –
SENATOR GONZALES:
A contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent undertakes
That is the idea, Mr. President. Because it seems to me that it is utterly the construction, including financing, of a given infrastructure facility,
unfair for one who has conceived an idea or a concept, spent and invested and the operation and maintenance thereof. The project proponent
in feasibility studies, in the drawing of plans and specifications, and the operates the facility over a fixed term during which it is allowed to charge
project is submitted to a public bidding, then somebody will win on the facility users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges not exceeding
basis of plans and specifications and concepts conceived by the original those proposed in its bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the contract
proponent. He should at least be given the right to submit an to enable the project proponent to recover its investment, and operating
equalizing bid. x x x.27 (Emphasis ours.) and maintenance expenses in the project. The project
proponent transfers the facility to the government agency or local
As already found by this Court in the narration of facts in Agan, AEDC failed to government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term that shall not
match the more advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30- exceed fifty (50) years. This shall include a supply-and-operate situation
day working period expired on 28 November 1996;28 and, without exercising its which is a contractual arrangement whereby the supplier of equipment and
right to match the most advantageous proposal, it cannot now lay claim to the machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest of the
award of the project. Government so requires, operates the facility providing in the process
technology transfer and training to Filipino nationals.32 (Emphasis ours.)
The bidding process as to the NAIA IPT III Project was already over after the
award thereof to PIATCO, even if eventually, the said award was nullified and The original proposal of AEDC is for a BOT project, in which it undertook
voided. The nullification of the award to PIATCO did not revive the proposal nor re- to build, operate, and transfer to the Government the NAIA IPT III facilities. This is
open the bidding. AEDC cannot insist that this Court turn back the hands of time
Page 368 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
clearly no longer applicable or practicable under the existing circumstances. It is and length of operation; otherwise, AEDC will be unjustly enriched at the expense
undeniable that the physical structures comprising the NAIA IPT III Project are of the Government.
already substantially built, and there is almost nothing left for AEDC to construct.
Hence, the project could no longer be awarded to AEDC based on the theory of Again, as aptly stated by former Chief Justice Panganiban, in his separate opinion
legal impossibility of performance. in Agan:
Neither can this Court revert to the original proposal of AEDC and award to it only If the PIATCO contracts are junked altogether as I think they should be,
the unexecuted components of the NAIA IPT III Project. Whoever shall assume the should not AEDC automatically be considered the winning bidder and
obligation to operate and maintain NAIA IPT III and to subsequently transfer the therefore allowed to operate the facility? My answer is a stone-cold 'No.'
same to the Government (in case the operation is not assumed by the Government AEDC never won the bidding, never signed any contract, and never built
itself) shall have to do so on terms and conditions that would necessarily be any facility. Why should it be allowed to automatically step in and benefit
different from the original proposal of AEDC. It will no longer include any from the greed of another?33
undertaking to build or construct the structures. An amendment of the proposal of
AEDC to address the present circumstances is out of the question since such an The claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project, after the award thereof
amendment would be substantive and tantamount to an entirely new proposal,
to PIATCO was set aside for being null and void, grounded solely on its being the
which must again be subjected to competitive bidding.
original proponent of the project, is specious and an apparent stretch in the
interpretation of Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic
AEDC's offer to reimburse the Government the amount it shall pay to PIATCO for Act No. 7718, and Rule 10 of the IRR.
the NAIA IPT III Project facilities, as shall be determined in the ongoing
expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Pasay City, cannot restore AEDC to
In all, just as AEDC has no legal right to the NAIA IPT III Project, corollarily, it has
its status and rights as the project proponent. It must be stressed that the law
no legal right over the NAIA IPT III facility. AEDC does not own the NAIA IPT III
requires the project proponent to undertake the construction of the facility, which this Court already recognized in Gingoyon as owned by PIATCO; nor
project, including financing; financing, thus, is but a component of the
does AEDC own the land on which NAIA IPT III stands, which is undisputedly
construction of the structures and not the entirety thereof. owned by the Republic through the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA). AEDC did not fund any portion of the construction of NAIA IPT III, which
Moreover, this "reimbursement arrangement" may even result in the unjust was entirely funded by PIATCO. AEDC also does not have any kind of lien over
enrichment of AEDC. In its original proposal, AEDC offered to construct the NAIA NAIA IPT III or any kind of legal entitlement to occupy the facility or the land on
IPT III facilities for $350 million or P9 billion at that time. In exchange, AEDC would which it stands. Therefore, nothing that the Government has done or will do in
share a certain percentage of the gross revenues with, and pay a guaranteed relation to the project could possibly prejudice or injure AEDC. AEDC then does
annual income to the Government upon operation of the NAIA IPT III. In Gingoyon, not possess any legal personality to interfere with or restrain the activities of the
the proferred value of the NAIA IPT III facilities was already determined to be P3 Government as regards NAIA IPT III. Neither does it have the legal personality to
billion. It seems improbable at this point that the balance of the value of said demand that the Government deliver or sell to it the NAIA IPT III facility despite the
facilities for which the Government is still obligated to pay PIATCO shall reach or express willingness of AEDC to reimburse the Government the proferred amount it
exceed P6 billion. There is thus the possibility that the Government shall be had paid PIATCO and complete NAIA IPT III facility at its own cost.
required to pay PIATCO an amount less than P9 billion. If AEDC is to reimburse
the Government only for the said amount, then it shall acquire the NAIA IPT III
AEDC invokes the Memorandum of Agreement, purportedly executed between the
facilities for a price less than its original proposal of P9 billion. Yet, per the other
DOTC and AEDC on 26 February 1996, following the approval of the NAIA IPT III
terms of its original proposal, it may still recoup a capital investment of P9 billion
Project by the National Economic Development Authority Board in a Resolution
plus a reasonable rate of return of investment. A change in the agreed value of the
dated 13 February 1996, which provided for the following commitments by the
NAIA IPT III facilities already built cannot be done without a corresponding parties:
amendment in the other terms of the original proposal as regards profit sharing
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a. commitment of Respondent DOTC to target mid 1996 as the time frame that such commitment was to pursue the project specifically with AEDC. Likewise,
for the formal award of the project and commencement of site preparation in the second clause,36 it was emphasized that the DOTC shall pursue the project
and construction activities with the view of a partial opening of the under Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by
Terminal by the first quarter of 1998; Republic Act No. 7718. And most significantly, the tenth clause of the same
document provided:
b. commitment of Respondent DOTC to pursue the project envisioned in
the unsolicited proposal and commence and conclude as soon as possible 10. Nothing in this Memorandum of Understanding shall be understood,
negotiations with Petitioner AEDC on the BOT contract; interpreted or construed as permitting, allowing or authorizing the
circumvention of, or non-compliance with, or as waiving, the provisions of,
c. commitment of Respondent DOTC to make appropriate arrangements and requirements and procedures under, existing laws, rules and
through which the formal award of the project can be affected[;] regulations.37
d. commitment of Petitioner AEDC to a fast track approach to project AEDC further decries that:
implementation and to commence negotiations with its financial partners,
investors and creditors; 24. In carrying out its commitments under the DOTC-AEDC MOU,
Petitioner AEDC undertook the following activities, incurring in the process
e. commitment of Respondent DOTC and Petitioner AEDC to fast track tremendous costs and expenses.
evaluation of competitive proposals, screening and eliminating nuisance
comparative bids;34 a. pre-qualified 46 design and contractor firms to assist in the NAIA-IPT III
Project;
It is important to note, however, that the document attached as Annex "E" to the
Petition of AEDC is a "certified photocopy of records on file." This Court cannot b. appointed a consortium of six (6) local banks as its financial advisor in
give much weight to said document considering that its existence and due June 1996;
execution have not been established. It is not notarized, so it does not enjoy the
presumption of regularity of a public document. It is not even witnessed by anyone. c. hired the services of GAIA South, Inc. to prepare the Project Description
It is not certified true by its supposed signatories, Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. for Report and to obtain the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) for
DOTC and Chairman Henry Sy, Sr. for AEDC, or by any government agency the NAIA-IPT III Project;
having its custody. It is certified as a photocopy of records on file by an Atty.
Cecilia L. Pesayco, the Corporate Secretary, of an unidentified corporation.
d. coordinated with the Airline Operators Association, Bases Conversion
Development Authority, Philippine Air Force, Bureau of Customs, Bureau
Even assuming for the sake of argument, that the said Memorandum of of Immigration, relative to their particular requirements regarding the NAIA-
Agreement, is in existence and duly executed, it does little to support the claim of IPT III [P]roject; and
AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The commitments undertaken by
the DOTC and AEDC in the Memorandum of Agreement may be simply
e. negotiated and entered into firm commitments with Ital Thai, Marubeni
summarized as a commitment to comply with the procedure and requirements
Corporation and Mitsui Corporation as equity partners. 38
provided in Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR. It bears no commitment on the part of the
DOTC to award the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC. On the contrary, the document
includes express stipulations that negate any such government obligation. Thus, in While the Court may concede that AEDC, as the original proponent, already
the first clause,35 the DOTC affirmed its commitment to pursue, implement and expended resources in its preparation and negotiation of its unsolicited proposal,
complete the NAIA IPT III Project on or before 1998, noticeably without mentioning the mere fact thereof does not entitle it to the instant award of the NAIA IPT III
Instead, AEDC took pains to present to this Court that allowing it to take over and
Thus, the maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the
operate NAIA IPT III at present would be beneficial to the Government. This Court
Paircargo Consortium is only P528,525,656.55, representing 15% of its
must point out, however, that AEDC is precisely making a new proposal befitting
entire net worth. The total net worth therefore of the Paircargo Consortium,
after considering the maximum amounts that may be validly invested by the current status of the NAIA IPT III Project, contrary to its own argument that it is
each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project merely invoking its original BOT proposal. And it is not for this Court to evaluate
cost, an amount substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity AEDC's new proposal and assess whether it would truly be most beneficial for the
Government, for the same is an executive function rather than judicial, for which
investment required for the project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or
the statutes and regulations have sufficiently provided standards and procedures
30% of the project cost.
for evaluation.
The purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine, at
It can even be said that if the award of the NAIA IPT III Project was merely a
the earliest opportunity, the ability of the bidder to undertake the project.
matter of choosing between PIATCO and AEDC (which it is not), there could be no
Thus, with respect to the bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification
doubt that PIATCO is more qualified to operate the structure that PIATCO itself
stage, the law requires the government agency to examine and determine
the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost of the project by built and PIATCO's offer of P17.75 Billion in annual guaranteed payments to the
considering the maximum amounts that each bidder may invest in Government is far better that AEDC's offer of P135 Million.
the project at the time of pre-qualification.
Hence, AEDC is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, there being no specific,
certain, and clear legal right to be enforced, nor duty to be performed that is clearly
xxxx
and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station.
l) The President's direct intervention in the disposition of this mandamus 2. Consequently, the parties have decided to amicably settle the instant
case was a clear imposition that Petitioner AEDC had not choice but to case and jointly move for the dismissal thereof without any of the
accept. To do otherwise was to take a confrontational stance against the parties admitting liability or conceding to the position taken by the other in
most powerful man in the country then under the risk of catching his ire, the instant case.
which could have led to untold consequences upon the business interests
of the stakeholders in AEDC. Thus, Petitioner AEDC was constrained to 3. Petitioner, on the other hand, and the respondents, on the other hand,
agree to the signing of a Joint Motion to Dismiss and to the filing of the hereby release and forever discharge each other from any and all
same in court. liabilities, direct or indirect, whether criminal or civil, which arose in
connection with the instant case.
m) Unbeknownst to AEDC at that time was that simultaneous with the
signing of the July 12, 1997 Concession Agreement, the DOTC and 4. The parties agree to bear the costs, attorney's fees and other expenses
PIATCO executed a secret side agreement grossly prejudicial and they respectively incurred in connection with the instant case. (Emphasis
detrimental to the interest of Government. It stipulated that in the event ours.)
that the Civil Case filed by AEDC on April 16, 1997 is not resolved in a
manner favorable to the Government, PIATCO shall be entitled to full
AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President
reimbursement for all costs and expenses it incurred in order to obtain the
Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in
NAIA IPT III BOT project in an amount not less than One Hundred Eighty
the afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the
Million Pesos (Php 180,000,000.00). This was apparently the reason why doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition.
the President was determined to have AEDC's case dismissed
immediately.
The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as
follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or
n) On February 9, 1999, after the Amended and Restated Concession
order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "ARCA") was signed without stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been
Petitioner AEDC's knowledge, Petitioner AEDC signed a Joint Motion to rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
Dismiss upon the representation of the DOTC that it would provide AEDC
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
with a copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement. x x x. 45
subject matter and of cause of action.46 All of the elements are present herein so
as to bar the present Petition.
On 30 April 1999, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing with
prejudice Civil Case No. 66213 upon the execution by the parties of a Joint First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was
Motion to Dismiss. According to the Joint Motion to Dismiss –
issued on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise
agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not
The parties, assisted by their respective counsel, respectfully state: appealable.47
The AEDC further claims that the DOTC committed fraud when, without AEDC's It is obvious that the assertion by AEDC of its vitiated consent to the Joint Motion
knowledge, the DOTC entered into an Amended and Restated Concession to Dismiss Civil Case No. 66213 is nothing more than an after-thought and a
Agreement (ARCA) with PIATCO. The fraud on the part of the DOTC purportedly desperate attempt to escape the legal implications thereof, including the barring of
also vitiated AEDC's consent to the compromise agreement. It is true that a judicial its present Petition on the ground of res judicata.
compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof; and
that the extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the It is also irrelevant to the legal position of AEDC that the Government asserted
decision approving it.54 However, once again, AEDC's allegations of fraud are in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO was void. That the
unsubstantiated. There is no proof that the DOTC and PIATCO willfully and Government eventually took such a position, which this Court subsequently
deliberately suppressed and kept the information on the execution of the ARCA upheld, does not affect AEDC's commitments and obligations under its judicially-
from AEDC. The burden of proving that there indeed was fraud lies with the party approved compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 66213, which AEDC signed
making such allegation. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The willingly, knowingly, and ably assisted by legal counsel.
burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given
on either side. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed.55 In addition, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental change in the
Government's position since Civil Case No. 66213, contrary to the allegation of
Moreover, a judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of AEDC. The Government then espoused that AEDC is not entitled to the award of
fraud in accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for the NAIA IPT III Project. The Government still maintains the exact same position
relief from judgment. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the presently. That the Government eventually reversed its position on the validity of
petition for relief must be filed: its award of the project to PIATCO is not inconsistent with its position that neither
should AEDC be awarded the project.
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be For the foregoing substantive and procedural reasons, the instant Petition of AEDC
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the should be dismissed.
judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
C) Article 1412(2) of the New Civil Code allows the Government to 2. Ordering the Branch Manager, Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran
demand the return of what it has given without any obligation to comply Branch to immediately release the sum of P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO;
with its promise.
Return of Service of the Writs shall be made by the Sheriff of this court
D) The payment of compensation to PIATCO is unconstitutional, violative immediately thereafter;58
of the Build-Operate-Transfer Law, and violates the Civil Code and other
laws. 57 The RTC of Pasay City, in an Order, dated 15 June 2006, denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of its Order and Writ of Execution filed by the Government and
On 27 October 2005, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order admitting the Petition Fortes. Baterina, meanwhile, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition
in Intervention of Baterina, et al., as well as the Complaint in Intervention of for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Manuel L. Fortes, Jr. and the Answer in Intervention of Gina B. Alnas, et al. The Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CA-G.R. No.
Republic sought reconsideration of the 27 October 2005 Order of the RTC of 95539, assailing the issuance, in grave abuse of discretion, by the RTC of Pasay
Pasay City, which, in an Omnibus Order dated 13 December 2005, was denied by City of its Orders dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006 and Writ of Execution
the RTC of Pasay City as regards the intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes, dated 27 March 2006.
but granted as to the intervention of Alnas, et al. On 22 March 2006, Baterina, et
al. filed with the RTC of Pasay City a Motion to Declare in Default and/or Motion for During the pendency of CA-G.R. No. 95539 with the Court of Appeals, the RTC of
Summary Judgment considering that the Republic and PIATCO failed to file an Pasay City issued an Order, dated 7 August 2006, denying the Urgent
answer or any responsive pleading to their Petition for Prohibition in Intervention. Manifestation and Motion filed by the Republic in which it relayed willingness to
comply with the Order and Writ of Execution dated 27 March 2006, provided that
the trial court shall issue an Order expressly authorizing the Republic to award
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concessions and lease portions of the NAIA IPT III to potential users. The following B. THE TRO IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THIS
day, on 8 August 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order denying the COURT'S DECISION WICH HAD ATTAINED FINALITY.
intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes in Case No. 04-0876CFM. In a third
Order, dated 9 August 2006, the RTC of Pasay City directed PIATCO to receive II
the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 from the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran
Branch.
THE REPUBLIC IS SUFFERING IRREPARABLE DAMAGE.
By 24 August 2006, the Republic was all set to comply with the 9 August 2006 III
Order of the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, the representatives of the Republic and
PIATCO met before the RTC of Pasay City for the supposed payment by the
former to the latter of the proferred amount. However, on the same day, the Court THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST BE PROHIBITED FROM GIVING DUE
of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 95539, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) COURSE TO A PETITION THAT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND
enjoining, among other things, the RTC of Pasay City from implementing the SUBSTANCE.
questioned Orders, dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006, or "from otherwise
causing payment and from further proceeding with the determination of just A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING.
compensation in the expropriation case involved herein, until such time that
petitioner's motion to declare in default and motion for partial summary judgment 1. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS RULED THAT
shall have been resolved by the trial court; or it is clarified that PIATCO PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING.
categorically disputes the proferred value for NAIA Terminal 3." The TRO was to
be effective for 30 days. Two days later, on 26 August 2006, the Republic filed with 2. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LOST HIS STANDING
the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, which AS AN INTERVENOR.
the appellate court scheduled for hearing on 5 September 2006.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
While the Urgent Motion to lift the TRO was still pending with the Court of Appeals, HE IS ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
the Republic already filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With
Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
C. THE BOND POSTED IS INSUFFICIENT.
Injunction, attributing to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion in granting
the TRO and seeking a writ of prohibition against the Court of Appeals to enjoin it
from giving due course to Baterina's Petition in CA-G.R. No. 95539. The Republic IV
thus raises before this Court the following arguments:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PETITION IS
I SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE, THE SAME HAS BECOME
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO AN EXCESS OR LACK OF A. THE MOTION TO DECLARE IN DEFAULT AND/OR MOTION
JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN
ORDER. RESOLVED.
A. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S DECISION IN GINGOYON B. PIATCO HAS CATEGORICALLY DISPUTED THE
CONSTITUTES THE "LAW OF THE CASE". PROFFERED VALUE FOR NAIA TERMINAL III.59
(b) The Resolution date 24 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals be SET Nonetheless, Baterina, as the private respondent in the instant Petition, presented
ASIDE; and his own prayer that a judgment be rendered as follows:
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 95539 be ORDERED DISMISSED. A. For this Honorable Court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion to relax
procedural rules consistent with Metropolitan Traffic Command v.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.60 Gonong and deem that justice would be better served if all legal
issuesinvolved in the expropriation case and in Baterina are resolved in
On 4 September 2006, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw this case once and for all, to DECLAREthat:
Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals
stating, among other things, that it had decided to withdraw the said Motion as it i. TERMINAL 3, as a matter of law, is public property and thus not
had opted to avail of other options and remedies. Despite the Motion to Withdraw a proper object of eminent domain proceedings; and
filed by the Government, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, dated 8
September 2006, lifting the TRO it issued, on the basis of the following – ii. PIATCO, as a matter of law, is merely the builder of TERMINAL
3 and, as such, it may file a claim for recovery on quantum
In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Gingoyon case meruit with the Commission on Audi[t] for determination of the
upholding the right of PIATCO to be paid the proferred value in the amount amount thereof, if any.
of P3,002,125,000.00 prior to the implementation of the writ of possession
issued by the trial court on December 21, 2004 over the NAIA Passenger B. To DIRECT the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 to
Terminal III, and directing the determination of just compensation, there is dismiss the expropriation case;
no practical and logical reason to maintain the effects of the Temporary
Restraining Order contained in our Resolution dated August 24, 2006. C. To DISMISS the instant Petition and DENY The Republic's application
Thus, We cannot continue restraining what has been mandated in a final for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit;
and executory decision of the Supreme Court.
D. To DECLARE that the P3 Billion (representing the proferred value of
WHEREFORE, Our Resolution dated 24 August 2006 be SET ASIDE. TERMINAL 3) paid to PIATCO on 11 September 2006 as funds held in
Consequently, the Motion to Withdraw the Motion to Lift the Temporary trust by PIATCO for the benefit of the Republic and subject to the
Restraining Order is rendered moot and academic.61 outcome of the proceedings for the determination of recovery on quantum
meruit due to PIATCO, if any.
There being no more legal impediment, the Republic tendered on 11 September
2006 Land Bank check in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 representing the
In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution
NAIA IPT III is already public property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe
compensation for NAIA IPT III. He is asking the Court to make a definitive ruling on before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of
this matter considering that it was not settled in either Agan or Gingoyon. respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties
must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such
We disagree. Contrary to Baterina's stance, PIATCO's entitlement to just and propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.64
equitable consideration for its construction of NAIA IPT III and the propriety of the
Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings were already recognized and The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness
upheld by this Court in Agan and Gingoyon. of the Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings:
The Court's Decisions in both Agan and Gingoyon had attained finality, the former The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy
on 17 February 2004 and the latter on 17 March 2006. available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated
process for the determination of just compensation and the payment
This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21 thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly
January 2004 in Agan that for the Government of the Republic to take over the unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building
NAIA IPT III facility, it has to compensate PIATCO as a builder of the structures; complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an
and that "[t]he compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned
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by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the property on Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we
which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the
ejectment. Court's prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that
the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal
expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be
Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the guaranteed, if not enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the
takeover by the Government of NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court will be severely
acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral diminished.65 (Emphasis ours.)
exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities
stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the The Court, also in Gingoyon, categorically recognized PIATCO's ownership over
Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful the structures it had built in NAIA IPT III, to wit:
order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the
structures. There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the
facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution
xxxx squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just
compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and 3. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings
the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO's ownership.
real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment
dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment
Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to proceedings.
be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such xxxx
case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The
instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are
on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development real property owned by PIATCO. x x x (Emphasis ours.)66
Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."
It was further settled in Gingoyon that the expropriation proceedings shall be held
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974,67 thus:
the Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying
the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not
the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such
contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just
goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate
compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the
possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a
Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such
built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained.
payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably
Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain
requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner
proceedings in this case.
before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974
guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures
the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered
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value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the
the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered value" may
the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the
which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by
Resolution. which "proffered value" should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial
determination of the propriety of the proffered value.
And finally, as to the determination of the amount due PIATCO, this Court ruled
in Gingoyon that: In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have
deposited the amount of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation,
Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately representing the assessed value of the property. The making of the
pay" the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was
hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current undertaken under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No.
relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no
improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As stated impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value
above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial
subject to immediate payment should be limited to "the value of the determination of the proffered value, the Government is not strictly
improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7," with required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered
Section 7 referring to the "implementing rules and regulations for the value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards
equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land." enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.68
Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the
improvements/structures are to be based using "the replacement cost Gingoyon constitutes as the law of the case for the expropriation proceedings,
method." However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be docketed as Case No. 04-0876CFM, before the RTC of Pasay City. Law of the
considered in determining the just compensation. case has been defined in the following manner –
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also By "law of the case" is meant that "whatever is once irrevocably
mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
accordance with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case" so long as
amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that the "facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
such amount conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but of the case before the court" (21 C.J.S. 330). And once the decision
to principles of equity as well. becomes final, it is binding on all inferior courts and hence beyond their
power and authority to alter or modify (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of
Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately Prisons, G.R. L-15548, October 30, 1962).69
ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such
valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 A ruling rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and, even if
permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long
take possession of the property without having to await precise ago.70
determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states
that "in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of The extensive excerpts from Gingoyon demonstrate and emphasize that the Court
utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of had already adjudged the issues raised by Baterina, which he either conveniently
the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the overlooked or stubbornly refused to accept.
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The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which b. The Petition in G.R. No. 174166 is hereby likewise DISMISSED for being moot
were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters and academic.
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or No costs.
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have
been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred SO ORDERED.
to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if
the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having
settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all G.R. No. 189239 November 24, 2010
the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed
or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN
conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO AND FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER
finally solved.71 LAS PIÑAS, LINDA LAYDA, RESTITUTO MARIANO, SPS. ARNOLD AND
MIRIAM MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, SPS.
Since the issues Baterina wishes to raise as an intervenor in Case No. 04- ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN AND
0876CFM were already settled with finality in both Agan and Gingoyon, then there ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE TUAZON, SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS.
is no point in still allowing his intervention. His Petition-in-Intervention would only JOSEFINA AND JOEL YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS.
be a relitigation of matters that had been previously adjudicated by no less than WILMA AND MARIO ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS,
the Highest Court of the land. And, in no manner can the RTC of Pasay City in FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO, Petitioners,
Case No. 04-0876CFM grant the reliefs he prayed for without departing from or vs.
running afoul of the final and executory Decisions of this Court FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG
in Agan and Gingoyon. REALTY CORPORATION,Respondents.
While it is true that when this Court, in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, DECISION
dismissed the Motions for Intervention in Gingoyon, including that of Baterina, it
also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly CARPIO MORALES, J.:
litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts. This does not
mean, however, that the said movants-in-interest were assured of being allowed
Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty
as intervenors or that the reliefs they sought as such shall be granted by the trial
Corporation (respondents), co-owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Parañaque
courts. The fate of their intervention still rests on their interest or legal standing in
City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21712 and 21713, filed a
the case and the merits of their arguments.
complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners
before the Parañaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject
a. The Petition in G.R. No. 169914 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and lots since 1980 but ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.
SO ORDERED.1 (emphasis in the original) There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo that the case for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court would not bar, suspend or abate the
ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had failed to consider the fact that the
The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, case for expropriation was already decided by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
they still maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a 196 way back in the year 2006 or 2 years before the court a quo rendered its
better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of Possession for the project judgment in the unlawful detainer case in the year 2008. In fact, there was already
beneficiaries have yet to be named. a Writ of Possession way back in the year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation
case by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo has no valid
reason to disregard the said final judgment and the writ of possession
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already issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Parañaque The petition fails.
and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty
Development Corporation and make another judgment concerning In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private
possession of the subject properties contrary to the final judgment of the property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing
Regional Trial Court, Branch 196.4 (emphasis in the original) project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional
provisions on social justice.9
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they
maintained that respondents’ "act of allowing several years to pass without As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not
requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an ejectment case against them amounts to suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil
acquiescence or tolerance of their possession."5 action regarding ownership.
By Decision of May 27, 2009,6 the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53810 enlightens, however:
present evidence to rebut respondents’ allegation of possession by tolerance, and
considering petitioners’ admission that they commenced occupation of the property
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or
without the permission of the previous owner ─ Pilipinas Development Corporation
expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or
─ as indicium of tolerance by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying
of respondents. Held the appellate court:
said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by
the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of
Where the defendant’s entry upon the land was with plaintiff’s tolerance from the the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
date and fact of entry, unlawful detainer proceedings may be instituted within one
year from the demand on him to vacate upon demand. The status of such
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the
defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or lessee, the term of whose lease, has
landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the
expired but whose occupancy is continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. (emphasis and
same rule applies where the defendant purchased the house of the former lessee, underscoring supplied)
who was already in arrears in the payment of rentals, and thereafter occupied the
premises without a new lease contract with the landowner.7
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the
benefits of the suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer assert a better
the appellate court, citing Republic v. Gingoyon,8 held the same does not signify
right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of
the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Thus it disposed:
expropriation proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence,
they are entitled to continue staying there.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court a quo is REVOKED and SET ASIDE. The Decision Petitioners’ position does not lie.
of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 3, 2008 is hereby REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION [by] deleting the award for attorney’s fees.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19
of the Local Government Code (LGC):
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26,
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
2009, hence, the filing of the present petition for review.
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domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously Respecting petitioners’ claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots,
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the state so.13 Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper ordinance.
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based
on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for
That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by
petitioners to claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof.
the proper court, based on the fair market value of the property.
For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can be
considered to be beneficiaries.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation11 clearly outlines the stages of expropriation,
viz: In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their
possession is by mere tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: v. Pascual:14
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant’s
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies
the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
date of the filing of the complaint x x x. against them. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. (emphasis and
taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) underscoring supplied)
commissioners x x x .lavvphi1
Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have They stepped into the shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with
been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation. petitioners. Even if early on respondents made no demand or filed no action
Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained the
write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, status quo – allowed petitioners’ possession by tolerance.
it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation
proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such
issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that
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G.R. No. 193936 December 11, 2013 YCLA filed its Answer6 dated July 9, 1998, alleging that the Complaint should be
dismissed outright due to NPC’s failure to allege the public use for the intended
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, expropriation of its properties.
vs.
YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. On April 30, 1999, the parties moved, inter alia, for the constitution of a Board of
Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount
DECISION of just compensation to be paid by the NPC. Thus, on even date, the RTC issued
an order terminating the pre-trial conference and directing the constitution of a
REYES, J.: Board of Commissioners, which would submit a report and recommendation as to
the reasonable amount of just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated September 23, 2010 of
Meanwhile, on June 4, 1999, the RTC, acting on NPC’s urgent ex- parte motion,
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86508, which affirmed with
issued a writ of possession placing NPC in possession of the properties sought to
modification the Decision3 dated May 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
be expropriated.
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, in Civil Case No. R-4600.
The Facts On May 2, 2001, the Board of Commissioners submitted its Report,7 which fixed
the amount of just compensation of the subject properties at ₱500.00 per sq m.
YCLA objected to the amount recommended by the Board of Commissioners,
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government owned and claiming that the amount of just compensation should be fixed at ₱900.00 per sq m
controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development of considering the improvements in their properties.
hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NPC is thus authorized to exercise
the power of eminent domain to carry out the said purpose.4
On October 19, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing YCLA to submit its
written manifestation, together with supporting documents, on its position on the
Respondent YCLA Sugar Development Corporation (YCLA) is the registered proper valuation of the subject properties. NPC was likewise given 15 days to
owner of three parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, covered comment thereon. Trial on the determination of the reasonable amount of just
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-5209, T-21280 and T-78583. compensation ensued thereafter.
In order to complete its 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Consequently, YCLA filed a motion asking the RTC to direct the Board of
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would Commissioners to conduct an ocular inspection over the subject properties and,
traverse several private properties, including the said parcels of land owned by thereafter, amend/revise the Board of Commissioner’s Report dated May 2, 2001.
YCLA. YCLA’s motion was granted by the RTC on July 25, 2003.
Accordingly, on December 2, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint5 for expropriation with Meanwhile, on November 25, 2002, the RTC rendered a Partial Decision as
the RTC against YCLA and several other individuals. The NPC sought the regards the amount of just compensation that would be paid by the NPC to the
expropriation of a portion of the parcels of land owned by the said defendants for other defendants.
the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by
the construction of transmission lines. The portion of YCLA’s properties that would
On September 15, 2003, the Board of Commissioners submitted its second
be affected by the construction of NPC’s transmission lines has an aggregate area
Report,8 which fixed the just compensation of the subject properties at ₱1,000.00
of 5,846 square meters.
On May 12, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision,10 which adopted the report and The CA held that the RTC’s determination of the amount of just compensation was
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners, viz: reasonable notwithstanding that it was merely based on the Report submitted by
the Board of Commissioners. The RTC pointed out that there was no showing that
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered directing the plaintiff National the said Report was tainted with irregularity, fraud or bias. Nevertheless, the CA
Power Corporation to pay herein defendant YCLA the total amount of modified the award rendered by the RTC, by fixing the amount of just
[P]5,786,000.00 representing the value of the expropriated lands owned by the compensation to ₱900.00 per sq m instead of ₱1,000.00 per sq m, since YCLA
said defendant and its 26 molave trees which were cut down to make way for the only sought an award of ₱900.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject
plaintiff[’s] project, with legal interest from the time the plaintiff had actually took properties in the proceedings before the RTC.
possession of the subject properties on 19 April 1999 until full payment has been
made. The Issue
SO ORDERED.11 Essentially, the issue presented to the Court for resolution is whether the RTC and
the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just
The RTC pointed out that the Board of Commissioner’s Report dated May 2, 2001, compensation of the subject properties.
which recommended that the amount of just compensation be fixed at ₱500.00 per
sq m, was arrived at without conducting an ocular inspection of the subject The NPC posits that the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15,
properties. That, upon YCLA’s request, the Board of Commissioners subsequently 2003 lacks factual basis; that both the RTC and the CA erred in giving credence to
conducted an ocular inspection of the subject properties, which prompted them to the Report dated September 15, 2003 as to the recommended amount of just
revise their earlier recommendation. compensation for the subject properties. NPC maintains that the amount of
₱900.00 per sq m that was fixed by the CA as just compensation is excessive
Unperturbed, NPC appealed the RTC Decision dated May 12, 2005 to the CA, considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural
alleging that the RTC erred in relying on the recommendation of the Board of lands at the time it filed the complaint for expropriation. Thus, NPC prayed that the
Commissioners as regards the amount of just compensation. NPC claimed that the
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Court fix the amount of just compensation for the subject properties at ₱500.00 per considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on December 2,
sq m pursuant to the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated May 2, 2001. 1997.
On the other hand, YCLA contends that the RTC and the CA aptly relied on the Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report dated
Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, pointing out that the September 15, 2003, merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount of
Board of Commissioners was in the best position to determine the amount of just ₱1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties based on
compensation considering that its members undertook intensive ocular inspection actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of
of the subject properties. "reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the Report dated September
15, 2003 is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn
The Court’s Ruling declarations of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed.
The petition is partly meritorious. The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at
arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to,
acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can be
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary
not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
evidence.16 The amount of just compensation could only be attained by using
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. A
and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary
evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court. 17
a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives Under the Rules of Court, any evidence – whether oral or documentary – is
and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
government.14 witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand.18
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the
of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation determination of the amount of just compensation due the land owner in
proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just compensation contained in
the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the commissioners’ report of land prices, in turn, is based on various factors such
the complaint.15 as the fair market value of the property, the value of like properties. Thus, it
becomes imperative that the commissioners’ report of land prices be supported by
pertinent documents, which impelled the commissioners to arrive at the
In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the
CA relied heavily on the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, recommended amount for the condemned properties, to aid the court in its
2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection of the determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, the commissioner’s
report becomes hearsay and should thus not be considered by the court.
subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the Board of Commissioners’
recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was based on the
prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in
attention of the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject part, the report submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely
properties in 2003 cannot be used to determine the amount of just compensation advisory and recommendatory in character.1âwphi1 It may also recommit the
report or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners.19 In this case, the
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lower courts gave full faith and credence to the Board of Commissioners' Report We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to
dated September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by any the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because
documentary evidence. Section 31 of Act No. 31352 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three
public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general
Considering that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the circulation.3
subject properties is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and the CA
should be set aside. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision4 dated
November 26, 2010 and Resolution5 dated September 28, 2011 of the Court of
Nevertheless, the Court cannot fix the amount of just compensation for the subject Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80616.
properties at ₱500.00 per sq m pursuant to the Board of Commissioners' Report
dated May 2, 2001. The said Report suffers from the same infirmity as the Report The facts of the case are as follows:
dated September 15, 2003 - it is unsupported by any documentary evidence and
its recommendation as regards the amount of just compensation are based on the Petitioner Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land located at
prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2001. Bayanbayanan, Marikina City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. N-107226 and N-230337 in favor of respondent The Manila Banking
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition Corporation to secure his ₱265,000 loan. The real estate mortgage provides that
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 23, 2010 of the Court all correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of extrajudicial
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86508 and the Decision dated May 12, 2005 of the actions shall be sent to petitioner Ramirez at his given address, to wit:
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, in Civil Case
No. R-4600 are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the trial court for the N) All correspondence relative to this MORTGAGE, including demand letters,
proper determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Decision. summons, subpoenas or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial actions shall
be sent to the MORTGAGOR at the address given above or at the address that
SO ORDERED. may hereafter be given in writing by the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE, and
the mere act of sending any correspondence by mail or by personal delivery to the
said address shall be valid and effective notice to the MORTGAGOR for all legal
purposes and the fact that any communication is not actually received by the
FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE MORTGAGOR, or that it has been returned unclaimed to the MORTGAGEE, or
that no person was found at the address given, or that the address is fictitious or
cannot be located, shall not excuse or relieve the MORTGAGOR from the effects
of such notice.8
G.R. No. 198800 December 11, 2013
Respondent filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
JOSE T. RAMIREZ, Petitioner, mortgage9 before Atty. Hipolito Sañez on the ground that Ramirez failed to pay his
vs. loan despite demands. During the auction sale on September 8, 1994, respondent
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent. was the only bidder for the mortgaged properties.10 Thereafter, a certificate of
sale11 was issued in its favor as the highest bidder.
DECISION
In 2000, respondent demanded that Ramirez vacate the properties.12
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In its answer, respondent claimed that the foreclosure proceedings were valid. What is the legal effect of violating paragraph N of the deed of mortgage
which requires personal notice to the petitioner-mortgagor by the
The trial court ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were null and respondent-mortgagee bank?18
void and the certificate of sale is invalid. The fallo of the Decision14 dated June 30,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 193, Marikina City, in Civil Case No. Ramirez insists that the auction sale as well as the certificate of sale issued to
2001-701-MK reads: respondent are null and void since no notice of the foreclosure and sale by public
auction was personally given to him in violation of paragraph N of the real estate
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff mortgage which requires personal notice to him of said extrajudicial foreclosure. 19
[Ramirez] and against the defendant [bank], whose counterclaim is hereby
dismissed, declaring the Certificate of Sale of the properties covered by TCT Nos. In its comment, respondent counters that under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, no
N-10722 and N-23033, as null and void and ordering the defendant [bank] to pay personal notice to the mortgagor is required in case of a foreclosure sale. The
the following: bank claims that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does not impose an
additional obligation to it to provide personal notice to the mortgagor Ramirez. 20
1) One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
We agree with Ramirez and grant his petition.
2) Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages;
The CA erred in ruling that absence of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to
3) Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as Attorney’s fees; and Ramirez as required by paragraph N of the real estate mortgage will not invalidate
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. We rule that when respondent failed to send the
4) Costs of suit. notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez, it committed a contractual
breach of said paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on
SO ORDERED.15 September 8, 1994 null and void. Thus, we reverse the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution.
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled that absence of personal
In Carlos Lim, et al. v. Development Bank of the Philippines,21 we held that unless
notice of foreclosure to Ramirez as required by paragraph N of the real estate
the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
mortgage is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.16 The fallo of the
assailed CA Decision reads: proceedings is not necessary because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the
posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice
in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the parties stipulated in
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated June 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial paragraph N of the real estate mortgage that all correspondence relative to the
Court of Marikina, Branch 193 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new mortgage including notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor
one is entered AFFIRMING the validity of the Certificate of Sale of the properties Ramirez at his given address. Respondent had no choice but to comply with this
covering TCT Nos. N-10722 and N-23033. contractual provision it has entered into with Ramirez. The contract is the law
between them. Hence, we cannot agree with the bank that paragraph N of the real
SO ORDERED.17 estate mortgage does not impose an additional obligation upon it to provide
personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
As we explained in Metropolitan Bank v. Wong,22 the bank’s violation of paragraph extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and had not filed prematurely
N of the real estate mortgage is sufficient to invalidate the extrajudicial foreclosure an unlawful detainer case against Ramirez, he would not have been forced to
sale: litigate and incur expenses.25
[A] contract is the law between the parties and … absent any showing that its We delete aforesaid monetary awards, except the award of costs of suit. Nothing
provisions are wholly or in part contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, supports the trial court’s award of moral damages. There was no testimony of any
or public policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the courts. Section 3, Act No. physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
3135 reads: wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury26 suffered by
Ramirez. The award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear showing that
"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than Ramirez actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless
twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the nights, wounded feelings or similar injury.27 Ramirez’s testimony28 is also wanting
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, as to the moral damages he suffered.
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and city." Similarly, no exemplary damages can be awarded since there is no basis for the
award of moral damages and there is no award of temperate, liquidated or
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and compensatory damages.29 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
(2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage damages.30
contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. In this case,
petitioner and respondent in entering into a contract of real estate mortgage, We likewise delete the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees since the trial court
agreed inter alia: failed to state in the body of its decision the factual or legal reasons for said
award.31
"all correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters,
summonses, subpoenas, or notifications of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall Indeed, even the instant petition32 does not offer any supporting fact or argument
be sent to the MORTGAGOR…." for us to affirm the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of any However, we agree, with the trial court’s award of costs of suit to Ramirez. Costs
action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course unless otherwise
opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of provided in the Rules of Court.33 These costs Ramirez may recover are those
foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to stated in Section 10, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court.34 For instance, Ramirez may
render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.1âwphi1 recover the lawful fees he paid in docketing his action for annulment of sale before
the trial court. We add thereto the amount of ₱3,530 or the amount of docket and
We reiterated the Wong ruling in Global Holiday Ownership Corporation v. lawful fees paid by Ramirez for filing this petition before this Court.35 We deleted
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company23and recently, in Carlos Lim, et al. v. the award of moral and exemplary damages; hence, the restriction under Section
Development Bank of the Philippines.24 Notably, all these cases involved 7, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court36 would have prevented Ramirez to recover any
provisions similar to paragraph N of the real estate mortgage in this case. cost of suit. But we certify, in accordance with said Section 7, that Ramirez’s action
for annulment of sale involved a substantial and important right such that he is
On another matter, we note that the trial court awarded moral and exemplary entitled to an award of costs of suit. Needless to stress, the purpose of paragraph
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit to Ramirez. In granting said monetary N of the real estate mortgage is to apprise the mortgagor, Ramirez, of any action
awards, the trial court noted that if the bank followed strictly the procedure in the
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
that the mortgagee-bank might take on the subject properties, thus according him Records show that sometime in June 1998, petitioner Anita J. Marquez (Anita)
the opportunity to safeguard his rights. 37 extended a loan in the amount of ₱500,000.00 to a certain Benjamin Gutierrez
(Gutierrez). As security therefor, Gutierrez executed a Deed of Real Estate
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition, REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision Mortgage6 dated June 16, 1998 over a parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with
dated November 26, 2010 and Resolution dated September 28, 2011 of the Court an area of 660 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80616. The extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings (TCT) No. T-134437 (subject property), registered under the name of Benjamin A.
and auction sale conducted by Atty. Hipolito Safiez on September 8, 1994 and the Gutierrez, married to Liwanag Camerin (Sps. Gutiererez). The mortgage was duly
Certificate of Sale over the mortgaged properties covered by TCT Nos. N-10722 annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. T-13443, which Sps. Marquez had
and N-23033, issued in favor of respondent The Manila Banking Corporation, are verified as clean prior to the mortgage.8
hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the
Costs against respondent The Manila Banking Corporation. extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject property. At the public auction sale held on
January 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest bidder for the amount of
SO ORDERED. ₱1,171,000.00.9 Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property within the
prescribed period therefor, title was consolidated under TCT No. T-4193910 on
November 5, 2001 (in the name of Anita J. Marquez, married to Nicasio C.
Marquez) which, however, bore an annotation of adverse claim 11 dated March 2,
2000 in the names of respondents-spouses Carlito and Carmen Alindog (Sps.
Alindog). Said annotation was copied from an earlier annotation on TCT No. T-
G.R. No. 184045 January 22, 2014 13443 made only after the subject property’s mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ, Petitioners, Subsequently, or on March 21, 2000, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for annulment
vs. of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale with prayer for damages against
SPOUSES CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG, Respondents. Sps. Marquez and a certain Agripina Gonzales (Gonzales) before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1966 (annulment case). In their complaint,12 Sps.
DECISION Alindog alleged that they purchased13 the subject property from Gutierrez way
back in September 1989, but were unable to secure a certificate of title in their
names because Gonzales – to whom they have entrusted said task – had
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
deceived them in that they were assured that the said certificate was already being
processed when such was not the case.14Eventually, they found out that the
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February property had already been mortgaged to Sps. Marquez, and that when they tried to
29, 2008 and Resolution3 dated August 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in contact Gonzales for an explanation, she could no longer be found. Separately,
CA-G.R. SP No. 97744 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sps. Alindog averred that when the mortgage was executed in favor of Sps.
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 (RTC) in issuing the Orders Marquez, Gutierrez was already dead.15
dated November 14, 20054and January 17, 2007[[5 ]] in SCA No. TG-05-2521.
Based on these orders, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against
In their defense,16 Sps. Marquez disputed Sps. Alindog’s ownership over the
petitioners-spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez (Sps. Marquez),
subject property, arguing that the purported sale in the latter’s favor was never
enjoining them from taking possession of the property subject of this case despite
registered and therefore, not binding upon them. Further, they insisted that their
the consolidation of their title over the same.
certificate of title, TCT No. T-41939, was already indefeasible, and cannot be
attacked collaterally.
The Facts
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Meanwhile, on March 16, 2005, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of Aggrieved, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration,27 essentially pointing out that,
a writ of possession17 (ex-parte petition) before the RTC, docketed as LRC Case as the confirmed and registered owners of the subject property, they are entitled to
No. TG-05-1068, claiming that the same is ministerial on the court’s part following its possession as a matter of right. They argued that pursuant to Sections 728 and
the consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the subject property. 829 of Act No. 3135,30 as amended by Act No. 4118,31 the RTC was legally bound
Impleaded in said petition are Sps. Gutierrez, including all persons claiming rights to place them in possession of the subject property pending resolution of the
under them. annulment case. Further, it is their position that the purpose for the issuance of the
injunctive writ – i.e., to restrain the implementation of the writ of possession – had
The RTC Rulings and Subsequent Proceedings already been rendered moot and academic by its actual enforcement in the
interim.
In an Order18 dated August 1, 2005, the RTC granted Anita’s ex-parte petition and
thereby directed the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. Consequently, a For their part, Sps. Alindog filed a Motion for Approval of Cash Bond and to Regain
notice to vacate19 dated September 23, 2005 was issued by Acting Sheriff Possession32 of the subject property.
Teodorico V. Cosare (Sheriff Cosare) against Sps. Gutierrez and all persons
claiming rights under them. Sps. Alindog were served with a copy of the said In an Order33 dated January 17, 2007, the RTC denied the motion of Sps.
notice to vacate on September 27, 2005.20 Marquez, while granted that of Sps. Alindog. Unperturbed, Sps. Marquez elevated
the case to the CA on certiorari.34
Claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury if the implementation of the writ of
possession in favor of Sps. Marquez would be left unrestrained, Sps. Alindog The CA Ruling
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with prayer for damages,21 in a separate case docketed as In a Decision35 dated February 29, 2008, the CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition as
SCA No. TG-05-252122(injunction case) which was raffled to the same court. it found no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part when it issued the
injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject
While it appears that the RTC issued a 72-hour TRO on September 29, 2005 in property. It observed that Sps. Alindog had indeed "adduced prima facie proof of
Sps. Alindog’s favor, records nonetheless show that said order was not extended their right to possess the subject property"36 while the annulment case was
to a full 20-day TRO.23 To this end, the Sheriff’s Return24 dated November 14, pending, adding that the latter’s "right to remain in possession"37 proceeds from
2005 shows that Sheriff Cosare was able to implement the writ of possession on the fact of the subject property’s earlier sale to them. Thus, while Sps. Marquez
November 11, 2005, turning over the possession of the subject property to Sps. concededly had a right to possess the subject property on account of the
Marquez. consolidation of the title in their names, the CA nonetheless found no fault on the
part of the RTC for "proceeding with caution"38 in weighing the conflicting claims of
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC, through an the parties and subsequently issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in Sps.
Order25 dated November 14, 2005, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Alindog’s favor.
Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property until after the
controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. The said issuance was based Dissatisfied, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration39 which was, however,
on the RTC’s appreciation of the initial evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog, denied in a Resolution40 dated August 6, 2008, hence, this petition.
concluding that they appear to have a right to be protected. Thus, notwithstanding
the consolidation of Sps. Marquez’s title over the subject property, the RTC The Issue Before the Court
granted Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief, holding that any further
dispossession on their part would cause them irreparable injury. 26 The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued the injunctive writ which
enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property.
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The Court’s Ruling As may be seen, the law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of
possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath
The petition is meritorious. for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the
case of property with Torrens title; and upon the filing of such motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court
It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is
to issue the order for a writ of possession. Under the legal provisions above
entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in
copied, the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the
possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without
bond) of the redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in China Banking filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No
Corp. v. Sps. Lozada41 (China Banking Corp.), citing several cases on the matter, discretion is left to the court. And any question regarding the regularity and validity
of the sale (and the consequent cancellation of the writ) is left to be determined in
explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser should issue
a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such question is not to be
as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of
raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since,
the court, viz.:42
under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte.
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by
Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation wherein the
Act No. 3135, as amended. The purchaser at the public auction sale of an
purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period
extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance
for redemption. Upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of
with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which provides:
the appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of
the writ of possession in the purchaser’s favor.
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may
petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or
In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, the Court reasoned
any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption
that if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the RTC has the power
period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a
during the period of redemption to issue a writ of possession on the ex parte
period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale
was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the application of the purchaser, there is no reason why it should not also have the
same power after the expiration of the redemption period, especially where a new
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form
title has already been issued in the name of the purchaser. Hence, the procedure
or an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, may be availed of by a purchaser
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the
seeking possession of the foreclosed property he bought at the public auction sale
Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative
Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in after the redemption period has expired without redemption having been made.
the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each
case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees xxxx
specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety six as amended by Act Numbered Twenty- It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after
that a writ of possession issue addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said
property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately. property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in
his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer
The Court expounded on the application of the foregoing provision in De Gracia v. can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period
San Jose, thus: except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused its discretion when it issued the
injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
property. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 49 Here,
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is defied existing jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by
subsequently granting Sps. Alindog's prayer for injunctive relief. The RTC's finding
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
anent the initial evidence adduced by Sps. Alindog constitutes improper basis to
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in their favor since, in the
first place, it had no authority to exercise any discretion in this respect.
Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually Jurisprudence is clear on the matter: without the exception under Section 33, Rule
exclusive. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) 39 of the Rules availing, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser of an extra-judicially foreclosed property - such as Sps.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33,45 Rule Marquez in this case - should come as a matter of course, and, in such regard,
39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the constitutes only a ministerial duty on the part of the court. Besides, it was improper
mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure for the RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary injunction since the act sought to
unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. In the be enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ of possession, had already been
recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno,46 citing the case accomplished in the interim and thus, rendered the matter moot. Case law
of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that "the phrase ‘a third party who is instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or consummated
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as act).50 Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had
that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
rendered Sps. Alindog's injunction petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City (San Fernando),
writ was altogether improper. La Union, Branch 66, which issued a writ of possession in favor of respondent
Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank).
All told, by acting averse to well-settled jurisprudential rules and resultantly
depriving Sps. Marquez of their right of possession over the subject property, the The facts are not disputed.
Court therefore concludes that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in this case.
In effect, the CA's contrary ruling thereto is hereby reversed and set aside, which LZK Holdings obtained a ₱40,000,000.00 loan from Planters Bank on December
consequentially leads to the nullification of the writ of preliminary injunction issued 16, 1996 and secured the same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in
by the RTC in favor of Sps. Alindog, and the reinstatement of the writ of La Union. The lot measures 589 square meters and is covered by Transfer
possession issued by the same court in favor of Sps. Marquez. It must, however, Certificate of Title No. T-45337.
be noted that these pronouncements are without prejudice to any separate action
which Sps. Alindog may file in order to recover ownership of the subject property.
On September 21, 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage thereon due to LZK Holdings'
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008 failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the
and Resolution dated August 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. auction sale and its certificate of sale was registered on March 16, 1999.
97744, as well as the Orders dated November 14, 2005 and January 17, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 in SCA No. TG-05-2521 are
On April 5, 1999, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, a
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction complaint for annulment of extra judicial foreclosure, mortgage contract,
in SCA No. TG-05-2521 is NULLIFIED, while the Writ of Possession in LRC Case promissory note and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed for the issuance of a
No. TG-05-1068 is REINSTATED.
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank.
SO ORDERED.
On December 27, 1999, Planters Bank filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.
On March 13, 2000 or three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings'
G.R. No. 187973 January 20, 2014 redemption period, the RTC-Makati issued a TRO effective for 20 days enjoining
Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property. On April 3, 2000, the
LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, RTC-Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the same
vs. purpose3 but the writ was issued only on June 20, 2000 upon LZK Holdings'
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent. posting of a ₱40,000.00 bond.
RESOLUTION In the meantime, Planters Bank succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the
property on April 24, 2000. However, the proceedings for its ex-parte motion for
REYES, J.: the issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the RTC-San Fernando in
an Order dated May 11, 2000 in view of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC-Makati. Planters Bank moved for reconsideration but its motion
This resolves the appeal filed by petitioner LZK Holdings and Development was denied by the RTC-San Fernando in an Order dated September 1, 2000.4
Corporation (LZK Holdings) assailing the Decision1 dated January 27, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 103267 affirming the Order2dated April
Page 396 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Meanwhile, upon motion of LZK Holdings, the RTC-Makati declared as null and xxxx
void the consolidated title of Planters Bank in an Order 5 dated June 2, 2000. Such
ruling was affirmed by the CA in a Decision6 dated February 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. x x x [Planters Bank], as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, may apply for a writ
SP No. 59327. When the matter reached the Court via G.R. No. 164563, we of possession during the redemption period. In fact, it did apply for a writ on
sustained the CA's judgment in our Resolution7 dated September 13, 2004. December 27, 1999, well within the redemption period. The San Fernando RTC,
given its ministerial duty to issue the writ, therefore, should have acted on the ex
Planters Bank also appealed the May 11, 2000 Order of the RTC-San Fernando parte petition. The injunction order is of no moment because it should be
which held in abeyance the resolution of its ex parte motion for the issuance of a understood to have merely stayed the consolidation of title. As previously stated,
writ of possession. This time, Planters Bank was victorious. The CA granted the an injunction is not allowed to prohibit the issuance of a writ of possession. Neither
appeal and annulled the assailed order of the RTC-San Fernando. Aggrieved, LZK does the pending case for annulment of foreclosure sale, mortgage contract,
Holdings sought recourse with the Court in a petition for review docketed as G.R. promissory notes and damages stay the issuance of said writ.
No. 167998.8 In Our Decision dated April 27, 2007, we affirmed the CA's ruling and
decreed that Planters Bank may apply for and is entitled to a writ of possession as Lastly, the trial on the merits has not even started. Until the foreclosure sale of the
the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale, viz: property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, petitioner is
bereft of valid title and of the right to prevent the issuance of a writ of possession to
"A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to [Planters Bank]. Until then, it is the trial court's ministerial function to grant the
recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possessory writ to [Planters Bank]. "9 (Citations omitted)
possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment. It may be issued in case
of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. Armed with the above ruling, Planters Bank filed before the RTC-San Fernando a
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. motion to set ex-parte hearing for the issuance of a writ of possession. LZK
Holdings opposed the motion. In an Order dated April 2, 2008, the RTC-San
Under said provision, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a Fernando denied the opposition and set the hearing on April 14, 2008. On April 8,
foreclosure sale either within the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a 2008, the RTC-San Fernando issued another Order10 declaring the scheduled
bond, or after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond. hearing moot and academic and granting Planter Bank's ex-parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession which was filed as early as December 27, 1999.
We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of The decretal portion of the order reads:
possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of
the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pet1t10n is hereby granted, hence the
to the trial court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as order setting the case for ex-parte hearing on April 14, 2008 is rendered moot and
well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a academic by this order. Let [a] Writ of Possession issue in favor of Planters
subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135. Such question Development Bank and the Deputy Sheriff of this Court is hereby directed to place
cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ, since the proceeding is ex Planters Development Bank or any of its authorized representatives in possession
parte. The recourse is available even before the expiration of the redemption of the subject parcel of land, together with all the improvements existing thereon,
period provided by law and the Rules of Court. covered by TCT- 45337 of the Register of Deeds for the province of La Union
against LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (referred to as
To emphasize the writ's ministerial character, we have in previous cases LZK) including all other persons/occupants who are claiming rights under them and
disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as we have held that issuance of who are depriving [Planters Bank] of its right to possess the above-described
the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the property upon the filing of bond by (Planters Bank] in the amount of two million
foreclosure itself. pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in GOLDENWAY MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
nature.1âwphi1 It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only vs.
and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding EQUITABLE PCI BANK, Respondent.
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is
sought an opportunity to be heard.
DECISION
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a
non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed
in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 25 (Citations omitted) set aside the Decision1 dated November 19, 2010 and Resolution2 dated January
31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91120. The CA affirmed
Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the R TC did the Decision3 dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of-
not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting Planters Valenzuela City, Branch 171 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 295-V -01.
Bank's motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to participate.
The facts are undisputed.
Anent the correct amount of surety bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner)
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA.26The executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) over
allegations of incorrect computation of the surety bond involve factual matters its real properties situated in Valenzuela, Bulacan (now Valenzuela City) and
within the competence of the trial court to address as this Court is not a trier of covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-
facts. The RTC found the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 to be sufficiently equivalent to 214528 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. The mortgage
the use of the property for a period of twelve (12) months. We are bound by such secured the Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) loan granted by respondent to
factual finding especially considering the affirmation accorded it by the CA. petitioner and was duly registered.4
In fine, the decision of the CA is in accordance with the law and jurisprudence on As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially
the matter. It correctly sustained the Order of the RTC in issuing a writ of foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. During the public auction, the
possession in favor of Planters Bank. mortgaged properties were sold for ₱3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a
Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On February
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-
dated January 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 103267 is 152630, T-151655 and T-214528.5
AFFIRMED.
On December 7, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint7 for specific performance and In the present petition, it is contended that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is
damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of inapplicable considering that the contracting parties expressly and categorically
redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption agreed that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage shall be in accordance with
period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. Petitioner argued that applying Act No. 3135. Citing Co v. Philippine National Bank 11 petitioner contended that the
Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage executed in 1985 would result right of redemption is part and parcel of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage itself
in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection and attaches thereto upon its execution, a vested right flowing out of and made
clause under the Constitution. Additionally, petitioner faulted the respondent for dependent upon the law governing the contract of mortgage and not on the
allegedly failing to furnish it and the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC of Valenzuela mortgagee’s act of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged properties. This Court
City with a Statement of Account as directed in the Certificate of Sale, due to which thus held in said case that "Under the terms of the mortgage contract, the terms
petitioner was not apprised of the assessment and fees incurred by respondent, and conditions under which redemption may be exercised are deemed part and
thus depriving petitioner of the opportunity to exercise its right of redemption prior parcel thereof whether the same be merely conventional or imposed by law."
to the registration of the certificate of sale.
Petitioner then argues that applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present
In its Answer with Counterclaim,8 respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of redemption under the
claim that it was unaware of the redemption price which is clearly provided in real estate mortgage contract. Such impairment would be violative of the
Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, and that petitioner had all the opportune time to constitutional proscription against impairment of obligations of contract, a patent
redeem the foreclosed properties from the time it received the letter of demand derogation of petitioner’s vested right and clearly changes the intention of the
and the notice of sale before the registration of the certificate of sale. As to the contracting parties. Moreover, citing this Court’s ruling in Rural Bank of Davao City,
check payment tendered by petitioner, respondent said that even assuming Inc. v. Court of Appeals12 where it was held that "Section 119 prevails over
arguendo such redemption was timely made, it was not for the amount as required statutes which provide for a shorter period of redemption in extrajudicial
by law. foreclosure sales", and in Sulit
On January 8, 2007, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint v. Court of Appeals,13 petitioner stresses that it has always been the policy of this
as well as the counterclaim. It noted that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 47 of Court to aid rather than defeat the mortgagor’s right to redeem his property.
R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial.
Aside from the fact that petitioner’s attempt to redeem was already late, there was
Petitioner further argues that since R.A. No. 8791 does not provide for its
no valid redemption made because Atty. Judy Ann Abat-Vera who talked to Atty.
retroactive application, courts therefore cannot retroactively apply its provisions to
Joseph E. Mabilog of the Legal Division of respondent bank, was not properly
contracts executed and consummated before its effectivity. Also, since R.A. 8791
authorized by petitioner’s Board of Directors to transact for and in its behalf; it was
is a general law pertaining to the banking industry while Act No. 3135 is a special
only a certain Chan Guan Pue, the alleged President of petitioner corporation, who law specifically governing real estate mortgage and foreclosure, under the rules of
gave instruction to Atty. Abat-Vera to redeem the foreclosed properties.9
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
statutory construction that in case of conflict a special law prevails over a general interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and
law regardless of the dates of enactment of both laws, Act No. 3135 clearly should expenses incurred by the bank or institution from the sale and custody of said
prevail on the redemption period to be applied in this case. property less the income derived therefrom. However, the purchaser at the auction
sale concerned whether in a judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right
The constitutional issue having been squarely raised in the pleadings filed in the to enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of
trial and appellate courts, we shall proceed to resolve the same. the confirmation of the auction sale and administer the same in accordance with
law. Any petition in court to enjoin or restrain the conduct of foreclosure
The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. proceedings instituted pursuant to this provision shall be given due course only
3135,14 as amended by Act No. 4118. Section 6 thereof provides: upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in an amount fixed by the court
conditioned that he will pay all the damages which the bank may suffer by the
enjoining or the restraint of the foreclosure proceeding.
SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in
accordance with this provision until, but not after, the registration of the certificate
of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be
trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Owners of
term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be property that has been sold in a foreclosure sale prior to the effectivity of this Act
governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred shall retain their redemption rights until their expiration. (Emphasis supplied.)
and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of
Under the new law, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons
Civil Procedure,15 in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this which are allowed to exercise the right of redemption only "until, but not after, the
Act. registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale" and in no case more than three
(3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.16
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of
the certificate of sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate May the foregoing amendment be validly applied in this case when the real estate
mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan mortgage contract was executed in 1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when R.A.
obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage No. 8791 was already in effect?
judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance
with Act No. 3135, as amended.
We answer in the affirmative.
However, Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 otherwise known as "The General Banking
Law of 2000" which took effect on June 13, 2000, amended Act No. 3135. Said When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court
provision reads: must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that
every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality. 17 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there
SECTION 47. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. — In the event of foreclosure, is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must
whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.18Indeed, those who petition this Court to
security for any loan or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
debtor whose real property has been sold for the full or partial payment of his therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.19
obligation shall have the right within one year after the sale of the real estate, to
redeem the property by paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Petitioner’s contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violates the constitutional The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based
proscription against impairment of the obligation of contract has no basis. on the nature of the properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence,
for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution20 is to safeguard the industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and
contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be
modify the rights and obligations of the parties.21 Impairment is anything that underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the
diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if a subsequent law 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of
changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking
dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of system.28 In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one
the rights of the parties.22 of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of
our banks.1âwphi1 It cannot therefore be disputed that the said provision
amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the classification and germane to the purpose of the law.
one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period
commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the This legitimate public interest pursued by the legislature further enfeebles
certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is petitioner’s impairment of contract theory.
likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section
47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner
whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135. prescribed by the statute,29 and within the prescribed time limit, to make it
effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to contract and to property, it
Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare.30 The concept of
discriminates mortgagors/property owners who are juridical persons is equally police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
bereft of merit. "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege.1âwphi1 It is not intended to prohibit legislation which done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.31
is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be
treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to
imposed.23 Equal protection permits of reasonable classification.24 We have ruled the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
that one class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from
based on reasonable and real distinctions.25 If classification is germane to the time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the
present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal necessity.32 Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
protection guarantee.26 must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. The right granted by
this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of
regulation.33 Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking industry
We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of
which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with
redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.27 public interest.34
On January 19, 2001, petitioner effected the consolidation of its ownership over
the subject property and TCT No. 311043 was issued in its name on March 2,
2001.
G.R. No. 167420 June 5, 2009
During the pre-trial conference on September 18, 2002, respondent offered to
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, redeem the property for the foreclosed amount of ₱1,531,474.53, but petitioner
vs. refused. Instead of continuing with the trial, the parties agreed to submit the case
RUPERTO JOSE H. MATEO, represented by WARLITA MATEO, as Attorney- for summary judgment.
in-Fact, Respondent.
On October 21, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
DECISION which reads:
PERALTA, J.: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ALLOWING the plaintiff to redeem
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Allied Banking from the defendant the property now covered by TCT No. T-311043 in the name of
Corporation (petitioner) seeking to reverse the Decision1 dated October 21, 2004, the defendant, upon payment of the amount of ₱1,531,474.53, plus one (1)
as well as the Order2 dated February 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), percent as interest for one (1) month only, and ORDERING the defendant to
Branch 35, Santiago City, docketed as SCA No. 35-0145 for legal redemption with accept the tender of redemption of the plaintiff and to deliver the proper certificate
prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. of redemption to the latter and finally, ordering the defendant to indemnify the
plaintiff ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and cost of the suit.3
On February 19, 1996, Ruperto Jose Mateo (respondent) obtained a loan from
petitioner in the amount of ₱950,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, In so ruling, the RTC found that: (1) respondent had the right to redeem the
respondent executed in favor of petitioner a deed of real estate mortgage over a foreclosed property from petitioner, as the one year period to redeem had not yet
parcel of land registered in respondent’s name under Transfer Certificate of Title expired when respondent filed the instant case; (2) even prior to the filing of the
(TCT) No. 236351 of the Register of Deeds of Isabela. He likewise executed a case, respondent had sent petitioner several faxed letters to show his sincere
promissory note in the amount of ₱950,000.00. Subsequently, respondent incurred desire to avail himself of the right to redeem the property from petitioner; (3)
Page 403 of 507
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respondent already offered to pay the foreclosed price of ₱1,531,474.53 as in fact have been deposited in court and not anywhere else; (4) the offer to redeem in the
he had consigned ₱1.1 million in the Land Bank. The trial court also found that amount of ₱1,531,474.53 was made only during the pre-trial conference, which
respondent began to exercise the right to redeem on August 10, 1999 when he, was already way past the redemption period; and (5) the redemption price should
through Warlita, sent a letter to petitioner on his intention to redeem; thus, applying be based on Section 47 of the General Banking Act.
Section 28, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, respondent should pay as redemption
price the foreclosed amount of ₱1,531,474.53, plus one percent interest for the In his Comment, respondent claims that the petition should be denied outright,
month that lapsed until August 10, 1999. because it raises questions of fact and not purely of law; that the issue as to the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the amount tendered by respondent is a question of
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order 4 dated fact, as the Court should consider the factual evidence in relation to the
February 10, 2005.lavvphi1 computation of the purchase price paid by petitioner during the foreclosure sale
and the price offered by respondent; that he offered to pay petitioner’s purchase
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC ruled that respondent’s offer of amount of ₱1,531,474.53 during the pre-trial conference; that he can still exercise
₱1,531,474.53 made during the pre-trial conference already covered petitioner’s the right of redemption over the subject property; and that a previous tender of
bid price at the foreclosure auction sale, which already incorporated the interest, payment and consignation is only proper but is not essential when the
penalties, attorney’s fees and other expenses of sale; that such purchase price redemptioner exercises his right to redeem the foreclosed property through the
should be the basis of the redemption price, plus interest at one percent, in order filing of a judicial action within the period of redemption.
to afford respondent a greater chance to redeem the foreclosed property.
In its Reply, petitioner argues that the case was decided on stipulation of facts by
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court, the parties; thus, any appeal from a judgment based on stipulation of facts can
alleging that: only be on questions of law; that, whether under Section 28, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court or Section 47 of the General Banking Act, the minimum redemption
amount is ₱1,531,474.53, which was the amount paid by petitioner during the
THE LOWER COURT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
foreclosure sale.
IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THAT:
Preliminarily, the Court would first address the procedural matter raised by
respondent: that the petition should be denied outright because it raises questions
I. It is considered sufficient tender and consignation the amount which was
of fact and not purely of law. Respondent claims that the issue as to the sufficiency
less than the price for which the property was bought and in the manner
not in conformity with the law and settled jurisprudence. or insufficiency of the amount tendered by respondent is a question of fact, which
could not be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
II. It applied the provisions of Sec. 28, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and
We are not persuaded.
Act No. 3135 in the computation of the redemption price even when the
said basis has been superseded by Sec. 78 of the General Banking Act
(now Section 47 of RA 8791).5 Notably, it was already stipulated upon by the parties that respondent offered ₱1.1
million as redemption price before the filing of this action; thus, the issue is not the
amount of redemption price, but the sufficiency of the amount offered by
Petitioner contends that: (1) the RTC erred in considering the various offers made
respondent that would warrant the redemption of the foreclosed property. This is a
by respondent to redeem the subject property for the amount of ₱1.1 million as
question of law as it calls for the correct application of law and jurisprudence on
sufficient tender of payment for purposes of redemption; (2) the tender to be legally
the matter, which is within the purview of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
sufficient must be for the amount of the purchase price, plus the agreed interest
rate on the principal obligation; (3) the RTC erred in considering the deposit of
₱1.1 million with Land Bank as sufficient consignation, since the amount should The Court will now address the main issues presented, to wit:
Page 404 of 507
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(1) Whether or not respondent still has the right to redeem the subject And Section 78 provides:
property; and
Sec. 78. In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any
(2) Whether or not Section 78 of the General Banking Act6 should be mortgage on real estate which is security for any loan granted before the passage
applied to the computation of the redemption price. of this Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or debtor whose real
property has been sold at public auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or
Section 6 of Act No. 3135,7 as amended by Act No. 4118, provides for a valid partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit institution, within the
redemption, to wit: purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the real
estate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the
property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, or the
SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs, and judicial and other
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned by reason of the execution
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less the income received
from the property.
the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive,8 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are not inconsistent with the provisions In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Veloso,10 the Court had occasion to state the
of this Act. requirements for the redemption of the foreclosed property. The Court held:
Considering that petitioner is a banking institution, the determination of the The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to
redemption price for the foreclosed property should be governed by Section 78 of redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be
the General Banking Act. Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 9 is accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes
instructive: the exercise of the right to repurchase.
x x x Petitioner’s contention that Section 78 of the General Banking Act governs In several cases decided by the Court where the right to repurchase was held to
the determination of the redemption price of the subject property is meritorious. have been properly exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of payment for
In Ponce de Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, this Court had occasion to the full amount of the repurchase price. Otherwise, the offer to redeem is
rule that Section 78 of the General Banking Act had the effect of amending Section ineffectual. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid
6 of Act No. 3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned when the tender of the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption
mortgagee is a bank, as in this case, or a banking or credit institution. The period fixed by law can easily be circumvented.11
apparent conflict between the provisions of Act No. 3135 and the General Banking
Act was, therefore, resolved in favor of the latter, being a special and subsequent In this case, it was stipulated upon by the parties that the real estate mortgage
legislation. This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Sy v. Court of over respondent’s property was foreclosed in the amount of ₱1,531,474.53, and
Appeals where we held that the amount at which the foreclosed property is that respondent offered the amount of ₱1.1 million as redemption price before the
redeemable is the amount due under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding filing of the complaint. It has been held that the tender of payment must be for the
obligation of the mortgagor plus interest and expenses in accordance with Section full amount of the purchase price, i.e., the amount fixed by the court in the order of
78 of the General Banking Act. It was, therefore, manifest error on the part of the execution or the amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with
Court of Appeals to apply in the case at bar the provisions of Section 30, Rule 39 interest thereon at the rate specified in the mortgage; and all the costs, and judicial
of the Rules of Court in fixing the redemption price of the subject foreclosed and other expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned by reason of the
property. execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less the income
Page 405 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
received from the property. Thus, the amount of ₱1.1 million offered by respondent private respondent could not thereby be expected to tender payment
was ineffective, since not only did the amount not include the interest but it was simultaneously with the filing of the action on said date.13
even below the purchase price. Such offer did not effect a valid redemption, and
petitioner was justified in refusing to accept such offer. As above-stated, for the action to be considered filed in good faith, the filing of the
action must have been for the sole purpose of determining the redemption price
The RTC found that the instant case for legal redemption must prosper, as the and not to stretch the redemptive period indefinitely. In this case, it was sufficiently
one-year period to redeem had not yet expired when respondents filed the case. shown that respondent’s offer of ₱1.1 million was even below the amount paid by
Notably, respondents filed the instant case on July 21, 2000 which was within one petitioner in the foreclosure sale. Notably, in petitioner’s Answer to respondent’s
year from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on July 21, 1999. The question complaint, it had alleged that, as of June 16, 2000, the redemption price of the
now is whether such judicial redemption is proper under the circumstances. foreclosed property consisting of the amount due under the mortgage deed, the
interest specified in the mortgage and all the costs and expenses incurred by
In Hi Yield Realty, Inc v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court held: petitioner from the sale and custody of the property already amounted to
₱2,058,825.73.14 Yet, during the pre-trial conference, respondent merely offered to
What is the redemptioner’s option therefore when the redemption period is about pay the amount of the auction price alone which was ₱1,531,474.53, without any
payment of interest. In fact, respondent never even consigned such amount in
to expire and the redemption cannot take place on account of disagreement over
court to show good faith.
the redemption price?
According to jurisprudence, the redemptioner faced with such a problem may It is not difficult to understand why the redemption price should either be fully
preserve his right of redemption through judicial action which in every case must offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can
the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good
be filed within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court action to
faith.15 Thus, the Court finds that respondent’s action for legal redemption was not
enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, would have the
filed in good faith. It was not filed for the purpose of determining the correct
effect of preserving his redemptive rights and "freezing" the expiration of the one-
redemption price, but to stretch the redemption period indefinitely.16
year period. This is a fair interpretation provided the action is filed on time and in
good faith, the redemption price is finally determined and paid within a reasonable
time, and the rights of the parties are respected. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated October
21, 2004, as well as the Order dated February 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 35, Santiago City, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Stated otherwise, the foregoing interpretation, as applied to the case at bar, has
three critical dimensions: (1) timely redemption or redemption by expiration date action for legal redemption filed by respondent is hereby DISMISSED.
(or, as what happened in this case, the redemptioner was forced to resort to
judicial action to "freeze" the expiration of the redemption period); (2) good faith as SO ORDERED.
always, meaning, the filing of the private respondent’s action on August 13, 1993
must have been for the sole purpose of determining the redemption price and not
to stretch the redemptive period indefinitely; and (3) once the redemption price is
determined within a reasonable time, the redemptioner must make prompt
payment in full. G.R. No. 169568, October 22, 2014
Conversely, if private respondent had to resort to judicial action to stall the ROLANDO ROBLES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. CLARA C.
expiration of the redemptive period on August 13, 1993 because he and the ESPIRITU, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO FIDEL YAPCINCO, PATROCINIO B.
petitioner could not agree on the redemption price which still had to be determined, YAPCINCO, MARIA CORAZON B. YAPCINCO, AND MARIA ASUNCION B.
YAPCINCO-FRONDA, Respondents.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
DECISION this decision shall have become final and executory the defendant shall not have
paid the obligation herein ordered paid, the properties mortgaged shall be sold by
BERSAMIN, J.: the Provincial Sheriff at Public Auction, and the proceeds thereof to be applied and
disposed of in accordance with law.
The dispute involves the ownership of a judicially-foreclosed parcel of land sold at
B. Dismissing the third-party complaint of defendant Fernando Yapcinco against
a public auction, but which sale was not judicially confirmed. On one side is the
Jose C. Marcelo; and
petitioner, the successor in interest of the purchaser in the public auction, and, on
the other, the heirs of the mortgagor, who never manifested interest in redeeming
the property from the time of the foreclosure. C. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
The Case
Assailed herein are the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) Apolinario Cruz was adjudged the highest bidder in the public auction held on
respectively promulgated on February 24, 2005 and September 12, 2005 in CA- March 18, 1959. In his favor was then issued the certificate of absolute sale, 6 and
G.R. No. 79824 entitled Rolando Robles, represented by Atty. Clara C. Espiritu v. he took possession of the property in due course. However, he did not register the
Fernando Fidel Yapcinco, et al.,1 reversing and setting aside the decision rendered certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of sale issued.
on July 7, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, in Tarlac City (RTC). 2
On September 5, 1972, Apolinario Cruz donated the property to his grandchildren,
Antecedents namely: Carlos C. de la Rosa, Apolinario Bernabe, Ferdinand Cruz, and petitioner
Rolando Robles.7 On August 29, 1991, however, Apolinario Bernabe falsified a
The property in litis was originally registered under Transfer Certificate (TCT) No. deed of absolute sale, whereby he made it appear that Yapcinco had sold the
20458 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the name of Fernando F. Yapcinco, property to him, Ma. Teresita Escopete, Orlando Santos and Oliver Puzon.8 As a
married to Maxima Alcedo.3 In May 4,1944, Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on consequence, the Register of Deeds cancelled Yapcinco's TCT No. 20458 and
the property in favor of Jose C. Marcelo to secure the performance of his issued TCT No. 243719 in their names as co-vendees.9 The sale was annotated
obligation. In turn, Marcelo transferred his rights as the mortgagee to Apolinario on TCT No. 20458. It appears that another instrument dated August 28, 1991 was
Cruz on October 24, 1944.4 When Yapcinco did not pay the obligation, Apolinario annotated on TCT No. 20458 purportedly releasing and cancelling the mortgage.
Cruz brought an action for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in the Court of First Both instruments were annotated on February 11, 1992.10
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, which rendered its decision on July 27, 1956 ordering
Patrocinio Y. Kelly, the administratrix of the estate of Yapcinco, who died during On February 3, 1993, Carlos C. dela Rosa and Ferdinand Cruz, the other donees,
the pendency of the action, to pay Apolinario Cruz the indebtedness secured by filed a complaint for the nullification of the contract of sale, cancellation of title and
the mortgage plus interest; and in case of the failure to pay after 90 days from the reconveyance against Apolinario Bernabe and his co-vendees, but the case was
date of the decision, the property would be sold at a public auction,5 to not aggressively pursued inasmuch as the parties were first degree cousins. 11
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On January 2, 2000, the respondents, all heirs of the Spouses Yapcinco, instituted
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders decision to the following effect: an action against Apolinario Bernabe and his co-vendees in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tarlae City for the annulment of TCT No. 243719, document
A. Ordering the defendant Patrocinio Y. Kelly, as judicial administratrix of the restoration, reconveyance and damages. They claimed that although the property
intestate estate of Fernando Yapcinco, to pay to Apolinario Cruz the total amount had been mortgaged, the mortgage had not been foreclosed, judicially or extra-
of P6,000.00, representing the mortgage indebtedness of the defendant in favor of judicially;12 that the property was released from the mortgage per Entry No. 32-
plaintiff, together with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum payable from 2182 in the Memorandum of Incumbrances; and that the deed of absolute sale
May 4, 1944, until all payment thereof; and if after ninety (90) days from the date of between Fernando Yapcinco and Bemabe, et aL. was void and ineffectual
Page 407 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
because the Spouses Yapcinco had already been dead as of the date of the nevertheless authorized to cancel TCT NO. 354067 and issue a
sale.13 new one in name [the] of Apolinario Cruz, even without the
surrender of the owner's copy;chanrobleslaw
Defendants Apolinario Bernabe and his co-vendees were declared in default.
2. declaring as null and void the extra-judicial settlement of the
On September 13, 2001, the RTC, Branch 64, in Tarlae City rendered its judgment estate of late the Fernando Yapcinco as far as the subject land is
declaring TCT No. 243719 and the deed of absolute sale dated concerned;chanrobleslaw
August 28, 1991 null and void. As a consequence, TCT No. 243719 was 3. claim for damages of both parties are denied.
cancelled, and TCT No. 20458 in the name of Yapcinco was restored.14
SO ORDERED.17
On December 17, 2002, the petitioner filed an action for the nullification of
document, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages against the
respondents (Civil Case No. 9436).15 He averred that the heirs of Yapcinco had The RTC opined that the respondents could not claim to have no knowledge that
acted in bad faith in causing the issuance of TCT No. 354061 because they had the property in litis was no longer part of the estate of the late Fernando F.
known fully well that the property had long been excluded from the estate of Yapcinco; that one of them had substituted the late Fernando F. Yapcinco in the
Yapcinco by virtue of the CFI decision dated July 27, 1956, and which the CA judicial foreclosure proceedings, and even appealed the adverse decision to the
affirmed on April 25, 1958; that a certificate of absolute sale was issued in the CA; that they could not argue that they were not bound by the foreclosure of the
name of Apolinario Cruz as early as 1959; and that he had a vested right in the mortgage due to the nonregistration of the certificate of sale because as between
property pursuant to the deed of donation executed on September 5, 1972 by the parties registration was not a requisite for the validity of the foreclosure; and
Apolinario Cruz in his favor, among others. that they did not redeem the property until the present. 18
The respondents countered that TCT No. 20458 contained an annotation to the Decision of the CA
effect that the property had been released from the mortgage by virtue of an
instrument dated August 28, 2001; and that, in any case, the certificate of absolute The respondents appealed to the CA, insisting that the RTC erred, as follows: (1)
sale and the deed of donation relied upon by the petitioner were not even inscribed in declaring TCT No. 354061 as null and void, and issuing a new one to Apohnario
in TCT No. 20458.16 Cruz and including the subject land in his estate; (2) in holding that res
judicata applied; (3) in not honoring that the TCT No. 20458 was free from any lien
Ruling of the RTC and encumbrances; (4) in finding that they were aware of the proceedings in Civil
Case No. CA-G.R. No. 19332-R; (5) in not considering prescription, laches and
On July 7, 2003, the RTC rendered its judgment, disposing estoppels to bar the action; and (6) in not considering that they had the better right
thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary to the property.19
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff by declaring On February 24, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 20 reversing the
the subject land covered by TCT No. 354067 to be owned by the late Apolinario judgment of the RTC, and holding that due to the nonregistration of the certificate
Cruz and is part of his estate; and of sale, the period of redemption did not commence to run. It also held that
Apolinario Cruz never acquired title to the property and could not have conveyed
and transferred ownership over the same to his grandchildren through the deed of
1. declaring null and void TCT No. 354067 and that a new title be
donation;21 and that contrary to the RTC's finding, Patrocinio Yapcinco's
issued to Apolinario Cruz. Defendants should deliver to plaintiff or
knowledge of Apolinario Cruz' interest over the subject property was not
to this Court the owner's copy of TCT No. 354067; if they will not
tantamount to registration. It found that Patrocinio Yapcinco Kelly, the
do so after finality of this judgment, the Registry of Deeds is
administratrix of the estate of Fernando F. Yapcinco, and Patrocinio B. Yapcinco,
Page 408 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
one of the respondents, were two different persons, such that it could not be of redemption;25cralawred that the respondents were aware of the auction sale and
concluded that the respondents had knowledge of the sale. Accordingly, it even actually participated in the proceedings leading to the foreclosure, but they
concluded that the heirs of Fernando F. Yapcinco had the right to include the never tried to exercise their equity of redemption, before or even after the
property as the asset of the estate of Fernando F. Yapcinco.22 foreclosure sale;26 that the family of Apolinario Cruz had been occupying the
property for more than 40 years from the time of the foreclosure sale; and that the
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but on September 12, 2005, the CA respondents should not be allowed to recover the lot on the basis of the non-
denied his motion for reconsideration, observing that there had been no order registration of the certificate of sale.
confirming the auction sale; hence, the respondents were never divested of their
rights and interest in the property.23 The petitioner argues that the non-registration of the certificate of sale did not
affect the title acquired by Apolinario Cruz as the purchaser in the judicial
Issues foreclosure of mortgage;27 that the respondents' actual knowledge of the judicial
foreclosure was equivalent to automatic registration; that the doctrine of
In this appeal, the petitioner posits the following indefeasibility of Torrens title was not absolute, and should yield to the right of
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary another person based on equitable principles of laches;28 that the finality of the
judgment rendered in the judicial action for foreclosure of mortgage was valid and
I binding on the respondents as the successors-in-interest of the judgment debtor;
and that whether or not respondent Patrocinio Yapcinco and Patrocinio Yapcinco
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT Kelly were the same persons, or whether Patrocinio Yapcinco was only the
APOLINARIO CRUZ, AS PURCHASER IN A JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF daughter of the latter who was the administratrix was irrelevant because the
SALE, NEVER ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY THE respondents remained charged with knowledge of the foreclosure sale by virtue of
MERE OMISSION TO REGISTER THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE. their being the successors-in-interest of the mortgagor.29
II In contrast, the respondents maintain that they were lawfully entitled to the
property in litis because there was no registration of the certificate of sale or
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT confirmation from the court;30 that even the deed of donation executed by
RESPONDENTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF, AND THUS COULD NOT BE Apolinario Cruz was not registered;31 that the issue revolved on whether or not
BOUND BY, THE FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE THAT WAS EARLIER there was a valid transfer of ownership;32 and that with the release of mortgage
CONDUCTED AS THE SAME WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE REAL FACTS being validly registered in the Office of Registry of Deeds of Tarlac on February 11,
AND CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT TO THE INSTANT CASE. 1992, thereby rendering the title free from any lien and encumbrances, they
already had the right to transfer the property in their names.33
Ill
Ruling of the Court
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
WHATEVER RIGHTS BEING CLAIMED BY THE RESPONDENTS IN THE The petition for review is meritorious.
INSTANT CASE ARE ALREADY BARRED BY
LACHES.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Before anything more, the Court clarifies that the failure of Apolinario Cruz to
register the certificate of sale was of no consequence in this adjudication. The
registration of the sale is required only in extra-judicial foreclosure sale because
The petitioner insists that the rules and principles relied upon by the CA were
the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right of
applicable only to extra-judicial foreclosure, not to a judicial foreclosure like the one redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial
herein; that the importance of registration of the certificate of sale was true only in foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor,
extrajudicial sale where it would be the reckoning point for the exercise of the right
Page 409 of 507
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except in mortgages with banking institutions.34 The equity of redemption is the Yapcinco to exercise the equity of redemption, the property was sold at the public
right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership sale, and Apolinario Cruz was declared the highest bidder. Under the
of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the circumstances, the respondents as the successors-in-interest of Fernando F.
judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the Yapcinco were fully bound by that decision and by the result of the ensuing
confirmation of the sale.35In this light, it was patent error for the CA to declare that: foreclosure sale.
"By Apolinario Cruz's failure to register the 18 March 1958 Certificate of Absolute
Sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds, the period of redemption did not In this regard, determining whether Patrocinio Yapcinco Kelly, the adminsitratrix of
commence to run."36 the estate, and respondent Patrocinio Yapcinco were one and the same person
was not necessary. Even if they were not one and the same person, they were
The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the foreclosure sale, was both bound by the foreclosure proceedings by virtue of their being both
Section 3, Rule 7037 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provided that: "Such successors-in-interest of Fernando F. Yapcinco.
sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior incumbrances upon the
property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, it shall Although the respondents admitted the existence of the mortgage, they somehow
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in denied knowledge of its foreclosure. Yet, in asserting their superior right to the
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law." property, they relied on and cited the entry dated February 11, 1992 concerning
The records show that no judicial confirmation of the sale was made despite the the release of mortgage inscribed on TCT No. 20458. This duplicity the Court
lapse of more than 40 years since the date of the sale. Hence, it cannot be said cannot countenance. Being the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late
that title was fully vested in Apolinario Cruz. Fernando F. Yapcinco, they could not repudiate the foreclosure sale and its
consequences, and escape such consequences that bound and concluded their
However, the Court will not be dispensing true and effective justice if it denies the predecessor-in-interest whose shoes they only stepped into.40 Given their position
petition for review on the basis alone of the absence of the judicial confirmation of on the lack of judicial confirmation of the sale in favor of Apolinario Cruz, they
the sale. Although procedural rules are not to be belittled or disregarded should have extinguished the mortgage by exercising their equity of redemption
considering that they insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, it is through paying the secured debt. They did not do so, and, instead, they sought the
equally true that litigation is not a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence annulment of TCT No. 243719 and caused the issuance of another title in their
grant to the courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of name.
even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need
to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to an opportunity to be Even assuming that there was no foreclosure of the mortgage, such that the
heard.38 The Rules of Court itself calls for a liberal construction of its rules with the respondents did not need to exercise the equity of redemption, the legal obligation
view of promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive to pay off the mortgage indebtedness in favor of Apolinario Cruz nonetheless
disposition of every action and proceeding.39 devolved on them and the estate of Fernando F. Yapcinco. They could not
sincerely rely on the entry about the release or cancellation of the mortgage in TCT
To better serve the ends of justice, the Court holds that the real issue to consider No. 20458, because such entry appeared to be unfounded in the face of the lack of
and resolve is who between the parties had the better right to the property, not any showing by them that either they or the estate of Fernando F. Yapcinco had
whether there was a valid transfer of ownership to Apolinario Cruz. settled the obligation.
It was not denied that Fernando F. Yapcinco, as the mortgagor, did not pay his The petitioner did not tender any explanation for the failure of Apolinario Cruz to
obligation, and that his default led to the filing of the action for judicial foreclosure secure the judicial confirmation of the sale. Fie reminds only that Apolinario Cruz
against him, in which he actively participated in the proceedings, and upon his and his successors-in-interest and representatives have been in actual, notorious,
death was substituted by the administratrix of his estate. In the end, the decision in public and uninterrupted possession of the property from the time of his purchase
the action for judicial foreclosure called for the holding of the public sale of the at the foreclosure sale until the present.
mortgaged property. Due to the subsequent failure of the estate of Fernando F.
We partially grant the petition. While We fully agree with the CA that MBTC was Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the
not able to prove the amount claimed, We however, find that neither were bid price vis-a-vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory
respondents able to timely setup their claim for refund. counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee
against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence
Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim is needed in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of
one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are absolutely
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines a compulsory counterclaim incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties,
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within in the findings of the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the
the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except issue of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due.
that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be
set up in the action for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same.
opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of
It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
interposed at the time he files his Answer,30 and that failure to do so shall
jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in
effectively bar such claim.31 As it appears from the records, what respondents
an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.27chanrobleslaw initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees.32 Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the
recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in
time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA.33 Unfortunately, respondents'
several cases, utilized the following tests:28chanrobleslaw
belated (assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely
raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess,
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely
the same? if any, is already barred. With this, We now resolve the substantive issues of this
case.
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the
The CA erred in ruling that the total amount due was PhP 12,891,397.78
compulsory counterclaim rule?
Basic is the rule that a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as
the defendant's counterclaim? of Court should only cover questions of law.34 Moreover, findings of fact of the CA
are generally final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on
appeal.35 This rule, however, admits of several exceptions,36 such as when the
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that
findings of fact are conflicting, manifestly mistaken, unsupported by evidence or
the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
the result of a misapprehension of acts, or when the findings are contrary to that of
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is
Page 414 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
the trial court, as in this case. 11. 473414 (BD-240/97)48 P 288,975.66
12. 473412 (BD-244/97)49 P 62,982.53
To recall, the CA, in its assailed Decision, made the following findings as regards 13. 473411 (BD-245/97)50 P 156,038.85
the amount due on the loan against which the proceeds from the auction sales are 14. 473413 (BD-251/97)51 P 767,512.30
to be applied:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 15. 473431 (BD-252/97)52 P 557,497.45
In the application for extrajudicial foreclosure sale dated March 6, 1998, the total TOTAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 12,891,397.78
amount due as of February 10, 1998 was stated to be P11,216,783.99. The This belies the findings of the CA that PhP 12,891,397.78 is the resulting value of
plaintiff categorically declared that P11,216,783.99 was the total amount due on PhP 11,216,783.99 plus interest and other charges. Consequently, the CA's
February 10, 1998. By the time the auction sales were conducted, in May 1998, as conclusion that there is an excess of PhP 722,602.22, after deducting the amount
reflected in the certificate of Sale, the principal amount was said to be of PhP 12,891,397.78 from the total bid price of PhP 13,614,000, is erroneous.
P12,891,397.78. What is the meaning of the change from total amount due to
principal amount? If from February to May 1998, a matter of three months, the Nevertheless, while the CA's factual finding as to the amount due is flawed,
amount sought to be collected ballooned to P12,891,397.78, the increase could petitioner, as discussed below, is still not entitled to the alleged deficiency balance
have resulted from no other source than the interest and other charges under the of PhP 2,628,520.73.
promissory notes after the defendants incurred in default. Thus, the amount of
P12,891,397.78 as of May 1998, must mean the principal and interest and MBTC failed to prove that there is a deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73
other charges. The statement in the certificates of sale that it is the principal
amount is a subtle change in language, a legerdemain to suggest that the amount To support its deficiency claim, petitioner presented a Statement of
does not include the interest and other charges.37 (emphasis added, citations Account,53 which refers to the amounts due as of May 5, 1998, the date of the first
omitted) foreclosure sale, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In short, the CA concluded that the amount of PhP 12,891,397.78 is actually Statement of Account as of May 05, 1998
comprised of the PhP 11,216,783.99 due as of February 10, 1998, plus additional PN No. Principal Amt Outs. PDI Penalty
interest and other charges that became due from February 10, 1998 until the date 1 BD#216/97 489,219.20 54,808.77 49,166.53
of foreclosure on May 5, 1998. 2 BD#222/97 167,289.35 18,613.61 16,310.71
3 BD#225/97 291,732.50 32,683.72 27,422.86
The appellate court is mistaken. 4 BD#226/97 44,694.50 5,007.24 4,201.28
5 BD#229/97 435,229.25 48,760.10 44,393.38
By simply adding the figures stated in the PNs as the principal sum, it can readily
be seen that the amount of PhP 12,891,397.78 actually pertains to the aggregate 6 BD#238/97 365,238.55 40,918.83 33,236.71
value of the fifteen (15) PNs, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 7 BD#233/97 105,000.00 11,763.50 9,082.50
PN No. Amount 8 BD#244/97 62,982.53 7,056.13 5,290.53
1. 277894 (BDS-143/97)38 P 6,500,000.00 9 BD#236/97 497,649.70 56,135.10 38,070.20
2. 281728 (BD-216/97)39 P 959,034.20 10 BD#240/97 145,950.00 16,463.20 11,165.18
3. 281735 (BD-222/97)40 P 508,580.83 11 BD#245/97 156,038.85 17,481.55 11,897.43
4. 281736 (BD-225/97)41 P 291,732.50 12 BD#239/97 210,421.50 22,605.52 15,360.77
5. 281737 (BD-226/97)42 P 157,173.12
13 BD#251/97 572,470.15 64,574.86 38,232.57
6. 281745 (BD-229/97)43 P 449,812.25
7. 281747 (BDS-94854.696.00.999)44 P 105,000.00 14 BD#252/97 557,497.45 47,896.46 31,110.63
8. 281749(BD-236/97)45 P 525,233.93 16 BDS#143/97 6,500,000.00 573,681.89 336,818.28
9. 281750 (BD-238/97)46 P 1,310,099.36 17 BDS#218/97 1,800,000.00 93,536.05 74,401.15
10. 473410 (BD-239/97)47 P 251,725.00 18 Fire Insurance 49,238.69 0.00 1,698.73
Page 415 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
TOTAL 12,450,652.22 1,111,986.53 747,859.44 57. Firstly, it should be noted that respondents' total unpaid obligations inclusive of
GRAND TOTAL 14,310,498.19 interest and penalties as of 10 February 1998 amounted to Php 11,216,783.99.
Applying the proceeds from the auction sales to the foregoing amount, according This amount was the subject of petitioner Metrobank's Petitions for Extra]udicial
to petitioner, would result in a deficiency balance of PhP 2,443,143.43. Afterwards, Foreclosure of Mortgage and NOT Php 12,891,397.78 which is the total principal
the said amount allegedly earned interest for four (4) months in the amount of PhP amount of respondents' loan obligations at the time when they obtained said loans
185,377.30,54 bringing petitioner's claim for deficiency judgment to a total of PhP as shown in the Promissory Notes and the Certificates of Sale. After the execution
2,628,520.73.55chanrobleslaw of the Promissory Notes, payments were made, although insufficient, which
resulted in the balance of PhP 11,216,783.99 as of February 1198 inclusive of
We are not convinced. interest and penalties.58 xxx
If the total amount due as of February 10, 1998 is PhP 11,216,783.99 is already
We have already ruled in several cases56 that in extrajudicial foreclosure of inclusive of interests and penalties, the principal amount, exclusive of interests and
mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the charges, would naturally be lower than the PhP 11,216,783.99 threshold. How
mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. 57 In ascertaining petitioner made the determination in its Statement of Account that the principal
the deficit amount, Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is elucidating, to amount due on the date of the auction sale is PhP 12,450,652.22 is then
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary questionable, nay impossible, unless respondents contracted another loan anew.
Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. — The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the Moreover, the amounts petitioner itself supplied would result in the following
sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be computation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be PhP
Total outstanding obligation as of February 10, 1998
paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the 11,216,783.99
court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after 1,373,238.04 Add: Alleged May 5, 1998 public auction sale expenses
payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the (no Consistent Add: Additional interests and charges earned between
person entitled to it. (emphasis added) data) February 10, 1998 to May 5, 1998
Verily, there can only be a deficit when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to (no consistent
Subtotal: Amount due as of May 5, 1998
cover (1) the costs of foreclosure proceedings; and (2) the amount due to the data)
creditor, inclusive of interests and penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure. 10,374,000.00 Less: May 5 Bid Price to be applied to the amount due
419,166.67 Add: Alleged May 6, 1998 public auction sale expenses
a. Petitioner failed to prove the amount due at the time of foreclosure (no consisted
Add: Interests and charges earned from May 5 to 6, 1998
data)
Having alleged the existence of a deficiency balance, it behooved petitioner to 3,240,000.00 Less: May 6 Bid Price to be applied to the amount due
prove, at the very least, the amount due at the date of foreclosure against which PhP Total: Deficiency reflected in the Statement of Account from May 5
the proceeds from the auction sale would be applied. Otherwise, there can be no 2,443,143.43 to September 18, 1998
basis for awarding the claimed deficiency balance. Unfortunately for petitioner, it As can be gleaned, petitioner failed to sufficiently explain during the proceedings
failed to substantiate the amount due as of May 5, 1998 as appearing in its how it came up with the alleged "deficiency" in the amount of PhP 2,443,143.43,
Statement of Account. as per the Statement of Account. Reversing the formula, petitioner's claim would
only be mathematically possible if the missing interest and penalties for the
To recall, MBTC admitted that the amount due as of February 10, 1998 is PhP three-month period—from February 10, 1998 to May 6, 1998—amounted to
11,216,783.99, inclusive of interests and charges. As alleged in the PhP 3,047,954,73,59 which is inconsistent with MBTC's declaration in its Statement
petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of Account as of May 5, 1998.60 Needless to say, this amount is not only
unconscionable, it also finds no support from any of the statement of accounts and
loan stipulations agreed upon by the parties.
Page 416 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Given MBTC's conflicting, if not irreconcilable, allegations as to the amount due as 10. Statement of Account (Exhibit DD).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of the date of foreclosure—as noted in the statement of accounts, the petition for Curiously, petitioner never offered as evidence receipts proving payment of filing
foreclosure, and the promissory notes—the computation offered by MBTC cannot
fees, publication expenses, Sheriffs Commission on Sale, attorney's fee,
be accepted at face value. Consequently, there can then be no basis for
registration fee for the Certificate of Sale, insurance premium and other
determining the value of the additional interests and penalty charges that became
miscellaneous expenses, all of which MBTC claims that it incurred. Instead,
due, and, more importantly, whether or not there was indeed a deficiency balance
petitioner urges the Court to take judicial notice of the following
at the time the mortgaged properties were foreclosed. expenses:64cralawred
May 5, 1998 auction
In addition, it is noticeable that petitioner's presentation of the computation is
sale expenses
circuitous and needlessly lengthened. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the petition,
Filing Fee PhP 52,084.00
in its complaint,61 reply,62 pre-trial brief,63among others, did it make a simple
Publication Expenses 24,267.75
computation of respondents' obligation as well as the amounts to be applied to it,
Sheriffs Commission
or even a summary thereof, when it could have easily done so. 207,560.00
on Sale
Registration fee and
b. Petitioner failed to prove the amount of expenses incurred in foreclosing
other Miscellaneous 32,644.50
the mortgaged prop erties
Expenses
Attorney's Fees (10%
Another obstacle against petitioner's claim for deficiency balance is the burden of
of total amount 1,005,744.37
proving the amount of expenses incurred during the foreclosure sales. To recall, claimed)
petitioner alleged that it incurred expenses totalling PhP 1,373,238.04 and PhP Fire Insurance 50,937.42
419,166.67 for the first and second public auction sales, respectively. However, in Sub-total PhP 1,373,238.04
claiming that there is a deficiency, petitioner only submitted the following pieces of
evidence, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
May 6, 1998 auction
1. The fifteen (15) promissory notes (Exhibits A to O); sale expenses
Publication Expenses 24,267.75
2. Continuing Surety Agreement (Exhibit P);
Sheriffs Commission
64,880.00
on Sale
3. Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibits Q & R);
Registration fee and
other Miscellaneous 16,593.00
4. Petition for Sale under Act. No. 3135, as amended (Exhibit S); Expenses
Attorney's Fees (10%
5. Notices of Sheriff s Sale (Exhibits T & U);
of total amount 313,425.92
claimed)
6. Affidavits of Publication (Exhibits V & W); Sub-total PhP 419,166.67
Petitioner's argument is untenable.
7. Certificates of Posting and a Xerox copy thereof (Exhibits X & Y);
First, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the attorney's fees being claimed by
8. Certificates of Sale (Exhibits Z & AA);
petitioner because although 10% was the rate agreed upon by the parties, We
have, in a line of cases, held that the percentage to be charged can still be fixed by
9. Demand Letters (Exhibits BB & CC); and
Third, the claims for registration fees and miscellaneous expenses were also never
Page 418 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013 children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated with
particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA for their expenses.
FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO
ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of
FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of 3,164 square meters originally owned by
FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867
LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. issued in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina)
FIGURACION, Petitioners, with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he
vs. remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent. second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina).6
DECISION On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over the eastern
half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
REYES, J.:
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed
Certiorari1
At bar is a Petition for Review on under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication9adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as
assailing the Decision2 dated December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina. 10 On
CA-G.R. CV No. 58290, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated June the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over Lot No. 707
26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49. in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the
The RTC decision (1) dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla’s (Emilia) cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their
complaint for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title names.12
and damages, and (2) annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
petitioner Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina). In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the
Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she
The Facts built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.13
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents
May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse. The other petitioners – threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to
Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was
(Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez – and respondent Emilia initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement
were Carolina and Leandro’s children.4 was reached by the parties.14 On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia instituted the
herein Complaint15 for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of
the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244,
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta,
reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages.
Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his lifetime. These properties
were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square meters originally covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P;5 and (2) Lot No. 705 measuring In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative
2,900 square meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both lands were registered defenses: (1) the respondent’s cause of action had long prescribed and that she is
in the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the suit; (2) TCT No. 42244 in
executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real properties in favor of his six (6) the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and
Page 419 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition person, but for a division or partition of the entire lot. Such partition should result in
is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to a
repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.16 The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is
indeed premature considering that there is a pending legal controversy with
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into: (1) whether or not Lot respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the income from Lot No. 2299 and of
Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of Leandro; and (2) whether or not the expenses for the last illness and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for which the
respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot No. 707.17 lots appear to have been intended.
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered its Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
Decision dated June 26, 1997 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition, reconveyance, the decision appealed from in Civil Case No. U-5826 is hereby VACATED and
quieting of title and damages is hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 707 covered by
self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 TCT No. 42244 to be owned by appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein
are hereby declared null and void. respondent], ½ pro indiviso share, appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner],
¼ pro indiviso share, and appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], ¼ pro
No costs. indiviso share, who are hereby directed to partition the same and if they could not
agree on a partition, they may petition the trial court for the appointment of a
commissioner to prepare a project of partition, in accordance with the procedure as
SO ORDERED.18
provided in Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since
their ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs whose respective No pronouncement as to costs.
shares thereto must still be determined in estate settlement proceedings. Anent
Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half (½) SO ORDERED.20
share to Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to
Agripina was void. While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed Respondent Emilia appealed the CA’s decision to the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, it refused to adjudicate the ownership of the 154322. In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the
lot’s eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the appeal, concurring with the CA’s ruling that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705
estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.19 would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in
dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, the estate of Leandro.
2001, ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707. The CA
explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under judicial The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole
administration since Carolina had long sold her ½ pro indiviso share to Felipa and error committed by the CA:
Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 as
her own, the sale affected only her share and not that belonging to her co-owner, THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS
Agripina. The proper action in such case is not the nullification of the sale, or for CONTRARY TO LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID DOWN
the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
The Arguments of the Parties Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners
before the RTC and the CA.
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of
ownership because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit
fact a deed of donation that contained no acceptance and thus, void. The the issue with regard to Lot No. 707 as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is
petitioners attached a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim and stressed on the following the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No. 707. The petitioners’ supporting
portions, viz: theory for this issue was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28, 1961
was rendered ineffective by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa
I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen, single and a and Hilaria."27 On appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory
resident [of] San Vicenter (sic), Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for and in by questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed of Quitclaim. They
consideration of the sum of ONE PESO ([P]1.00), Philippine Currency and the claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the manner required
services rendered by my niece EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years old, single, Filipino by law.28
citizen and a resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, do hereby by
these presentsw (sic) RENOUNCE, RELEASE and forever QUITCLAIM in favor of The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural
EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and assigns the ONE[-]HALF (1/2) eastern tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in
portion of the following parcel of land more particularly described and bounded as Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
follows to wit[.]22
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant
They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that evoke has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment
questions of law, because: (a) it has not been registered with the Register of of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and
Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as 1961; (b) a certification dated June 3, which is within the issues framed by the parties.
2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, shows that it does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not
Office of the National Archives which is the depository of old and new notarized pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party
documents has no record of the Deed of Quitclaim as evidenced by a certification deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the
dated May 19, 2003;23 and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who supposedly notarized court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to
the Deed of Quitclaim was not commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. 29 The Court had likewise,
certification dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
Pangasinan.24 brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be
be considered an onerous donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further
by the rules on contracts and not by the formalities for a simple donation. 25 evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of
it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.30
The Court’s Ruling
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof
would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
Page 421 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, 31this ownership.37 In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what
exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand. respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly found by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Contrary to the petitioners’ assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the
supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an
that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the evidence already adduced by undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the
the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners themselves death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she
have acknowledged when they attached in the petition several certifications 32 in likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalio’s death. Faustina’s share,
support of their new argument. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the however, passed on to her daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18,
province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts. 33 1949. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the
share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot
petitioners involving the nature and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their alienate the shares of her other co-owners – nemo dat qui non habet.38
failure to advance these questions during trial, the petitioners are now barred by
estoppel34 from imploring an examination of the same. Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. As co-
owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits
The respondent can compel the pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate the lot but only in so
partition of Lot No. 707 far as the extent of her portion was affected.39
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria
Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected
property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to only Carolina’s pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired
set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It only what corresponds to Carolina’s share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his
would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
is first definitely resolved.35 consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-
owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.40
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707
from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner
thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. It is well to recall that the Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa
petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the Deed of Quitclaim. was a valid conveyance but only insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-
Instead, they averred that it has been rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in ownership is concerned. As Carolina’s successors-in-interest to the property,
the name of Felipa and Hilaria―this contention is, of course, flawed. Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right in the property than what
Carolina is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee
parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.41 Hilaria and Felipa did not
the certificate of title.36 Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already been
of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru
disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share
Page 422 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the former’s place in the co-ownership and In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the
as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.42 exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was created by force of law and the two of
them were considered a trustee of the respondent’s undivided share.47 As trustees,
The respondent’s right to demand they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration.
for partition is not barred by In Ringor v. Ringor,48 the Court had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
acquisitive prescription or laches
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by
The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Hilaria another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens
and Felipa over Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 was an express repudiation of Certificate of Title in Jose’s name did not vest ownership of the land upon him. The
the co-ownership with respondent Emilia. Considering the period of time that has Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title
already lapsed since then, acquisitive prescription has already set in and the already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The
respondent is now barred by laches from seeking a partition of the subject lot. Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust.
It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one
The contention is specious. does not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration
can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the
lands in Jose’s name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a
other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership.43 The Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs.1âwphi1 The beneficiaries are entitled
act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The
conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of intended trust must be sustained.49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon
is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period
occupation and possession exercised by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the
required by law.44
time it was registered in their names. The only evidence of possession extant in
the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria and Felipa their names for taxation purposes.50 Prescription can only produce all its effects
in effecting the registration of the entire Lot No. 707 in their names thru TCT No. when acts of ownership, or in this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to
42244 did not serve to effectively repudiate the co-ownership. The respondent built the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-
her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981 without any opposition from the owners cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague or
petitioners. Hilaria also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for uncertain.51
the years 1983-1987.45 These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa
failed to assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the
manifest that they recognized the subsistence of their co-ownership with
alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
respondent Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962. Their acts
constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn negates the establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is
presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain a plea of not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive
and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and
prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint
partition will lie.52 The petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence of possession
owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were
essential for the reckoning of the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription.
apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run.46
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] disposing as follows:
for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The
said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a
and more particularly described as follows: Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in
question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition, as
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 follows:
hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City,
and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd- A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly
292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and
and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x [2] Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City,
bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and
Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661,
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for
that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale[3] was executed by the
sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the
The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is
Page 425 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third portion intention of purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of continuing
of the land in question. their co-ownership thereof.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs. Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a
contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby
SO ORDERED.[10] the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by
"redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a
share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from
the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim
Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents
his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
bought the subject lot from the Bank.
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the
CA. The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing
the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of
and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately
the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that
when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact
a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents'
father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the
parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28,
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was issued in favor of the
Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE
any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on
RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST
July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive
(EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE
ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE
RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF
death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.[11]
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. [15] In the
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime,
respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank. petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became
over the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA with the following assignment of
the defendants, as follows: errors:
1. Declaring the extra-judicial settlement of estate of Antonio Feliciano null I. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING IN
and void; EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF ANTONIO
FELICIANO (EXHIBIT "B")[;]
2. Declaring the sale of the property in question to Pedro Canoza, Felisa
Feliciano and Jacinto Feliciano null and void; II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING
AS NULL AND VOID THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF
3. Declaring the original certificate of Title No. 364 in the name of Pedro ANTONIO FELICIANO (EXHIBIT "B")[;]
Canoza and the certificates of titles in the name of defendants over Lot
1874-Cad-344, Bustos Cadastre (Tax Declaration No. 1402) as null and III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING
void; AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT "C") IN FAVOR OF
JACINTO FELICIANO, FELISA FELICIANO AND PEDRO CANOZA[;]
4. Ordering defendants to reconvey ownership and possession of said
property to plaintiffs subject to a just and equitable partition thereof by and IV. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING
between all interested parties. O.C.T. NO. 364 IN THE NAME OF PEDRO CANOZA AND CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE OF DEFENDANTS AS NULL AND VOID[; AND]
No pronouncement as to cost.
V. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING
DEFENDANTS TO RECONVEY OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE
SO ORDERED.16
SUBJECT PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFFS SUBJECT TO A JUST AND EQUITABLE
PARTITION THEREOF BY AND BETWEEN ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.18
The trial court explained that by operation of law, the plaintiffs (herein petitioners)
have as much right as Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina Feliciano to inherit the
On June 26, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing
property in question, and they cannot be deprived of their right unless by
the trial court’s decision. The CA held,
disinheritance for causes set forth in the law. When Leona Feliciano, Pedro
Feliciano, Maria Feliciano and Salina Feliciano appropriated the disputed lot solely
to themselves through the extrajudicial settlement of estate, they committed a WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED.
fraudulent act. To the extent that Doroteo and Esteban were deprived of their Accordingly, the Decision dated August 3, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
rightful share, the said out-of-court settlement was annullable, said the trial court. 11 (XI), Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 819-M-93 is hereby REVERSED AND
The trial court also declared that Pedro Canoza was not a buyer in good faith of SET ASIDE and plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint is ordered DISMISSED for being
time-barred.
Page 429 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
SO ORDERED.19 Essentially, the issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in reversing the
trial court’s decision.
The CA ruled that prescription had set in, citing the case of Pedrosa v. Court of
Appeals,20 which held that the applicable prescriptive period to annul a deed of Petitioners allege that the CA gravely erred in granting the appeal and in
extrajudicial settlement is four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. It dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription of action because that issue
reasoned that when petitioners filed the instant complaint for the annulment of the was never raised on appeal, nor defined as one (1) of the issues outlined and
extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Feliciano’s estate, more than four (4) years had limited in the pre-trial order.
elapsed from the issuance of the free patents. As regards the portion claimed by
the late Jacinto Feliciano, sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the free We do not agree.
patent was issued to him before petitioners filed the complaint, while in the case of
Canoza, fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in
While respondents have not assigned the defense of prescription in their appeal
Canoza’s favor. Hence, according to the CA, the action for the annulment of the
before the CA, they raised such defense in their December 1, 1993 Answer as one
documents had prescribed. (1) of their affirmative defenses.22 In their brief before the CA, respondents
specifically prayed for the reliefs mentioned in their respective answers before the
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was trial court. Thus, by reference, they are deemed to have adopted the defense of
denied by the CA in the Resolution dated January 15, 2004 for lack of merit. prescription, and could not properly be said to have waived the defense of
prescription.
Hence, this petition.
Moreover, Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following: provides that when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
the action is already barred by the statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN claim. Thus, in Gicano v. Gegato,23 we held:
GRANTING THE APPEAL BY ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION, DESPITE We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action
THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION HAS on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record
NOT BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AS AN ISSUE, NOR ASSIGNED AS show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to
AN ERROR, NOR DEFINED IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS AMONG dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or
THE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED; even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
B. ASSUMING THAT PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION MAY BE TAKEN AS statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been
A GROUND FOR DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT EVEN IF NOT RAISED declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
ON APPEAL, NOR ASSIGNED AS AMONG THE ERRORS COMMITTED, demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN satisfactorily apparent on the record: either in the averments of the plaintiffs
HOLDING THAT THE ACTION PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS, OR IN complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. (Underscoring supplied.)
NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE;
But did the CA nonetheless commit error when it held that the applicable
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN prescriptive period is four (4) years?
NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.21
Petitioners argue that the CA erroneously treated the action they filed at the trial
court as one (1) for annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and applied the four
Page 430 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
(4)-year prescriptive period in dismissing the same. They contend that the action Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed
they filed was one (1) for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles, Recovery of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud
of Real Property and Damages, and as such, their action was imprescriptible as held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.28 However, the records show that
pursuant to Article 141024 of the Civil Code. petitioners’ complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16)
years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on
Respondents, for their part, maintain that the CA did not err in holding that the November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro Canoza
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979. As petitioners are deemed to
had no knowledge of the partition and did not consent thereto, is merely fraudulent have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free
and not void. They stress that the action to rescind the partition based on fraud Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within the allowable
prescribes in four (4) years counted from the date of registration, which is period. The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1)
constructive notice to the whole world. essentially for reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since
petitioners’ cause of action accrued. The CA committed no error in dismissing their
complaint.
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and
Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the
other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed was WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of June 26, 2003 and Resolution dated January 15, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in
their shares in the estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without CA-G.R. CV No. 61888 are AFFIRMED.
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious.25 Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud With costs against petitioners.
could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however,
must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.1avvphi1 SO ORDERED.
On May 12, 2002, the heirs of the deceased executed a Deed of Extrajudicial 2. That plaintiff and defendant are legal heirs of the deceased, Pacifico S.
Settlement of Estate of the Late Pacifico Brobio with Waiver. In the Deed, Brobio[,] who died intestate and leaving without a will, on January 10,
petitioner and Pacifico’s other children, in consideration of their love and affection 2002, but leaving several real and personal properties (bank deposits),
for respondent and the sum of ₱150,000.00, waived and ceded their respective and some of which were the subject of the extra-judicial settlement among
shares over the three parcels of land in favor of respondent. According to them, compulsory heirs of the deceased, Pacifico Brobio. x x x.
petitioner, respondent promised to give her an additional amount for her share in
her father’s estate. Thus, after the signing of the Deed, petitioner demanded from 3. That in consideration of the said waiver of the plaintiff over the listed
respondent the promised additional amount, but respondent refused to pay, properties in the extra-judicial settlement, plaintiff received the sum of
claiming that she had no more money.3 ₱150,000.00, and the defendant executed a "Promissory Note" on June
15, 2003, further committing herself to give plaintiff a financial assistance
A year later, while processing her tax obligations with the Bureau of Internal in the amount of ₱600,000.00. x x x.
Revenue (BIR), respondent was required to submit an original copy of the Deed.
Left with no more original copy of the Deed, respondent summoned petitioner to 4. That on its due date, June 15, 2003, defendant failed to make good of
her office on May 31, 2003 and asked her to countersign a copy of the Deed. her promise of delivering to the plaintiff the sum of ₱600,000.00 pursuant
Petitioner refused to countersign the document, demanding that respondent first to her "Promissory Note" dated May 31, 2003, and despite repeated
give her the additional amount that she promised. Considering the value of the demands, defendant had maliciously and capriciously refused to deliver to
three parcels of land (which she claimed to be worth ₱20M), petitioner asked for the plaintiff the amount [of] ₱600,000.00, and the last of which demands
₱1M, but respondent begged her to lower the amount. Petitioner agreed to lower it was on October 29, 2003. x x x.6
to ₱600,000.00. Because respondent did not have the money at that time and
petitioner refused to countersign the Deed without any assurance that the amount
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,7 respondent admitted that she
would be paid, respondent executed a promissory note. Petitioner agreed to sign signed the promissory note but claimed that she was forced to do so. She also
the Deed when respondent signed the promissory note which read — claimed that the undertaking was not supported by any consideration. More
specifically, she contended that —
31 May 2003
10. Defendant was practically held "hostage" by the demand of the
This is to promise that I will give a Financial Assistance to CARMELA B. plaintiff. At that time, defendant was so much pressured and was in [a]
MANGAHAS the amount of ₱600,000.00 Six Hundred Thousand only on June 15, hurry to submit the documents to the Bureau of Internal Revenue because
2003. of the deadline set and for fear of possible penalty if not complied with.
Defendant pleaded understanding but plaintiff was adamant. Her hand
(SGD) could only move in exchange for 1 million pesos.
EUFROCINA A. BROBIO4 11. Defendant, out of pressure and confused disposition, was constrained
to make a promissory note in a reduced amount in favor of the plaintiff.
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The circumstances in the execution of the promissory note were obviously 2. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
attended by involuntariness and the same was issued without attorney’s fees; and
consideration at all or for illegal consideration.8
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the costs of this suit.
On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. The RTC found that the alleged "pressure and confused disposition" SO ORDERED.10
experienced by respondent and the circumstances that led to the execution of the
promissory note do not constitute undue influence as would vitiate respondent’s On February 21, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the
consent thereto. On the contrary, the RTC observed that —
complaint.11 The CA found that there was a complete absence of consideration in
the execution of the promissory note, which made it inexistent and without any
It is clear from all the foregoing that it is the defendant who took improper legal force and effect. The court noted that "financial assistance" was not the real
advantage of the plaintiff’s trust and confidence in her by resorting to a worthless reason why respondent executed the promissory note, but only to secure
written promise, which she was intent on reneging. On the other hand, plaintiff did petitioner’s signature. The CA held that the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three
not perform an unlawful conduct when she insisted on a written commitment from properties, as expressed in the deed of extrajudicial settlement, may not be
the defendant, as embodied in the promissory note in question, before affixing her considered as the consideration of the promissory note, considering that petitioner
signature that was asked of her by the defendant because, as already mentioned, signed the Deed way back in 2002 and she had already received the consideration
that was the only opportunity available to her or which suddenly and unexpectedly of ₱150,000.00 for signing the same. The CA went on to hold that if petitioner
presented itself to her in order to press her demand upon the defendant to satisfy disagreed with the amount she received, then she should have filed an action for
the correct amount of consideration due to her. In other words, as the defendant partition.
had repeatedly rebuffed her plea for additional consideration by claiming lack of
money, it is only natural for the plaintiff to seize the unexpected opportunity that
Further, the CA found that intimidation attended the signing of the promissory note.
suddenly presented itself in order to compel the defendant to give to her [what is]
Respondent needed the Deed countersigned by petitioner in order to comply with
due [her]. And by executing the promissory note which the defendant had no
a BIR requirement; and, with petitioner’s refusal to sign the said document,
intention of honoring, as testified to by her, the defendant clearly acted in bad faith respondent was forced to sign the promissory note to assure petitioner that the
and took advantage of the trust and confidence that plaintiff had reposed in her. 9
money promised to her would be paid.
The RTC also brushed aside respondent’s claim that the promissory note was not
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision. In a Resolution dated
supported by valuable consideration. The court maintained that the promissory July 9, 2008, the CA denied petitioner’s motion.12
note was an additional consideration for the waiver of petitioner’s share in the
three properties in favor of respondent. Its conclusion was bolstered by the fact
that the promissory note was executed after negotiation and haggling between the In this petition for review, petitioner raises the following issues:
parties. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation of the facts of
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: this case when it found that intimidation attended the execution of the
promissory note subject of this case.
1. Ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱600,000.00) which she committed to pay to plaintiff 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it found that the promissory
under the promissory note in question, plus interest thereon at the rate of note was without consideration.
12% per annum computed from the date of the filing of the complaint;
Nowhere is it alleged that mistake, violence, fraud, or intimidation attended the Q And in fact, you were the one [who] personally wrote the amount of
execution of the promissory note. Still, respondent insists that she was "forced" ₱600,000.00 only as indicated in the said promissory note?
into signing the promissory note because petitioner would not sign the document
required by the BIR. In one case, the Court – in characterizing a similar argument
A Yes, sir.
by respondents therein – held that such allegation is tantamount to saying that the
other party exerted undue influence upon them. However, the Court said that the
fact that respondents were "forced" to sign the documents does not amount to COURT:
vitiated consent.15
Q So, just to clarify. Carmela was asking an additional amount of ₱1-M for
There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power her to sign this document but you negotiated with her and asked that it be
over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of lowered to ₱600,000.00 to which she agreed, is that correct?
choice.16 For undue influence to be present, the influence exerted must have so
overpowered or subjugated the mind of a contracting party as to destroy his free A Yes, Your Honor. Napilitan na po ako.
agency, making him express the will of another rather than his own.17
Q But you negotiated and asked for its reduction from ₱1-M to
Respondent may have desperately needed petitioner’s signature on the Deed, but ₱600,000.00?
there is no showing that she was deprived of free agency when she signed the
promissory note. Being forced into a situation does not amount to vitiated consent A Yes, Your Honor.18
where it is not shown that the party is deprived of free will and choice. Respondent
still had a choice: she could have refused to execute the promissory note and Contrary to the CA’s findings, the situation did not amount to intimidation that
resorted to judicial means to obtain petitioner’s signature. Instead, respondent vitiated consent.1awphil There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is
chose to execute the promissory note to obtain petitioner’s signature, thereby compelled to give his consent by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
agreeing to pay the amount demanded by petitioner. imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants, or ascendants.19 Certainly, the payment of
We join the RTC in holding that courts will not set aside contracts merely because
solicitation, importunity, argument, persuasion, or appeal to affection was used to FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
obtain the consent of the other party. Influence obtained by persuasion or
argument or by appeal to affection is not prohibited either in law or morals and is
not obnoxious even in courts of equity.20 March 12, 2014
On the issue that the promissory note is void for not being supported by a G.R. No. 187944
consideration, we likewise disagree with the CA.
VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner,
A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or consideration.21The vs.
presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-
mere assertion that it has no consideration. To overcome the presumption, the DELANTAR, Respondents.
alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence. 22 The
burden to prove lack of consideration rests upon whoever alleges it, which, in the DECISION
present case, is respondent.
REYES, J.:
Respondent failed to prove that the promissory note was not supported by any
consideration. From her testimony and her assertions in the pleadings, it is clear For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and
that the promissory note was issued for a cause or consideration, which, at the Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
very least, was petitioner’s signature on the document.1avvphi1 No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix
Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to
It may very well be argued that if such was the consideration, it was inadequate. reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, 5 and Municipal
Nonetheless, even if the consideration is inadequate, the contract would not be Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26,
invalidated, unless there has been fraud, mistake, or undue influence.23 As 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No.
previously stated, none of these grounds had been proven present in this case. R-49832, respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of
Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer instituted
The foregoing discussion renders the final issue insignificant. Be that as it may, we against the respondents.
would like to state that the remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one
under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property is still Antecedents
owned in common.24 Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot
properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in
partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person. Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA Decision dated February 21, 2008 used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner
and its Resolution dated July 9, 2008 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres
decision dated May 15, 2006 is REINSTATED. (Asuncion):9
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Lot No. TCT No. Heirs who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their
successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot
1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.16
1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena Padilla,
married to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios), The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25,
married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica);10 and (4)2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their
Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married to Teresita Curso (Teresita) expense all the improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made
solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.17
1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the
1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro
MTCC ruling.18
1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia)
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for
Review19 filed before the CA.
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the
subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the
subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the
1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting concept of owners for several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a
the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice of lis
Asuncion.11 pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution
on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v.
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the
CA,20 the respondents emphasized that "even if one is the owner of the property,
Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a
the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the
landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply insisting that
physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to
Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2. 12
a summary action of ejectment."21 The respondents also invoked the doctrine
enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. on the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit involving
Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where
requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the
already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s relatives. resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition
However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the of the issue of possession.
records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged
signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which
to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a
was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being
complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs
spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents instead
covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A.14
referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now
lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person,
respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded
petition.1âwphi1 She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios,
Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
following year after its supposed execution.
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’ possession of the vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners. unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
which they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
document captioned as an "Agreement,"23 dated February 23, 1957, showed that of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person
1907-A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos with damages and costs.
and Asuncion and the waiver must have been executed in order to be fair to
Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained
ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita. in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:
The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in
action. The certification to file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of
Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who had no real physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that date. The absence of contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by
filed. the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession
In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to
argued that their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the continue in possession.
respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which
Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered useless in What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the
the event that the latter’s complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder
former’s ancestral house demolished. within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is
legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful
The Ruling of the CA detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was
disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue
unlawful detainer. The CA explained: of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not
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characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the
legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out
constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents’] by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession
possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
[the respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected
as its new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how or when
[Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’] possession of the land. In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she alleged that
Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied, the case of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to the present
between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of
on the other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She
of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera,
of the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a the contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an
case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the complainant is not
respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because necessary.27Instead, what is required is a better right of possession. Further, the
[Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert
[Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in- ownership over the disputed property.
interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of
[Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s
detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the
Motion for Reconsideration.
start of the possession which he later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in
the case at bar.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and I
when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently
truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the
RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the II
municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated: partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can
abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from
another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years Carmencita’s Allegations
through a summary action for ejectment. Although admittedly[,] petitioner may
validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot The instant petition lacks merit.
from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time
of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful
Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The detainer are present in the case at bar.
respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants
unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new
"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
owner, whose recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to
collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper."37
unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of
real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions
same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs.29 available to recover possession of real property, viz:
(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40 civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the
Court declared:
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents "x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from
entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.41 Carmencita was likewise one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is
conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and
respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with
about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue
substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,
lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or
became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the
Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where
former to vacate the property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical
requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession
for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof. regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have
superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to
recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment
courts."
of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol xxxx
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning,
Page 440 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We "THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case
note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer will include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.["]
and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would
mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the "confusion, "To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of
disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot
case. on which it stands."46 (Citation omitted)
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant
go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is
claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that
well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage
the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of
wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of
permanent, unjust and probably irreparable. the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition
for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencita’s
an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." complaint be granted, the respondents’ house, which has been standing in the
Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing
judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of
case.45 (Citations omitted) the general rule.
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the
from which the Amagan case sprang: jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not
been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership
detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand,
by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x need not be exposed to the risk of having their house demolished pending the
x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where
written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely
physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.["] IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.
"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009
action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action.
SO ORDERED.
Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to
the possession of the premises in question.["]
10. [Subject property] having been given to [Teodoro Teodoro] as a devisee in the 9. That however, due to [respondents’] failure as substituted heirs to execute the
order, dated May 18, 1994, a Motion for the Revival of Judgment was filed and
approved will of Petra Teodoro, it became his absolute property to the exclusion of
heard before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Honorable
all others;
Court x x x resolved x x x the extent of the allowance and admission to probate the
holographic will of the late Petra Teodoro, where a Certificate of Allowance dated
11. Sometime in July 2004, [Teodoro Teodoro] as the absolute owner and February 14, 1990 was subsequently issued, as its Decision dated June 29, 1989
possessor thereof, decided to demolish the already dilapidated ancestral house in became final and executory, affect the revival of judgment.
the subject property to clear the same for other available uses/purposes. x x x.
xxxx
12. By means of force and intimidation, [Teodoro Teodoro] was ousted likewise
prevented by [respondents] from entering the subject property. [Respondents]
13. While it is true that the dilapidated ancestral house in the subject property was
have also onverted/appropriated for themselves the exclusive use of the subject
demolished; however, the said act, as suggested by [Teodoro Teodoro] was
property into their own parking lot and other personal use, to the exclusion and
allowed by [respondents] (who had their respective houses built in the same lot
damage of [Teodoro Teodoro];5 (Emphasis supplied).
where the same is constructed) in order to have the same be partitioned among
themselves. As [Teodoro Teodoro] was constantly complaining that the property
In their Answer, respondents asserted their own ownership and possession of the left to him and his siblings is less than the subject property given to the
subject property, countering that: [respondents] in area, they agreed verbally that if the ancestral house will be
demolished, a surveyor would be at ease in surveying the same and determine if
5. It is worth to mention that [respondents] Danilo Espino and Rosario Santiago are indeed the area is more than that allotted to [Teodoro Teodoro], which in that case,
residing thereat for more than fifty (50) years, while [respondents] Paulina Litao as per agreement, the excess, if any will suffice the lack in area of [Teodoro
and Rufina dela Cruz are resident of the subject place for more than sixty (60) Teodoro]. It was however found out that the area of the subject property was less
years, most of them residing thereat since birth, at the time that their grandmother than the area that should be allocated and apportioned as shares of [respondents],
Maria Teodoro is still living and residing thereat.
14. The putting of signs "No Trespassing" posted at the frontage of the subject The RTC, in its appellate jurisdiction over forcible entry cases, acting on Teodoro
property is an allowable act by owners, residing thereat to protect their property Teodoro’s appeal, adopted the factual findings of the MTC, but reversed the ruling,
against intruders, hence there is nothing wrong for [respondents] to put the same. ruled in favor of Teodoro Teodoro and ordered the ejectment of respondents from
x x x. the subject property. It pithily ruled, thus:
15. There is no truth, as what [Teodoro Teodoro] claimed in paragraph 12 of his But the bottom line for resolution in this case is who has the prior physical
complaint that he was ousted and prevented from entering the subject property by possession of the subject parcel. x x x.
[respondents], because in the first place he could not be ousted thereat, as he is
not in possession of the said property.6 (Emphasis theirs). The late Petra Teodoro’s share to the inheritance of his father Genaro is admittedly
the old ancestral house and the lot over which it stands. x x x.
After trial, the MTC dismissed the complaint, ruling on the issue of ownership and
ultimately resolving the issue of who between Teodoro Teodoro and respondents [Teodoro Teodoro] claims right to possession only over said portion (now the
had a better right to possess the subject property: vacant space x x x not the entire lot 2476 until he was displaced therefrom by the
[respondents] through force). [Teodoro Teodoro] does not contest the perimeter
x x x [Teodoro Teodoro’s] claim of ownership over the subject lot stemmed from area of Lot 2476 where [respondents] are residing. He has acknowledged in clear
the approved and duly probated Holographic Will of Petra Teodoro. Although it its terms that the rest of the area of Lot 2476 is occupied by [respondents]. The
undisputed that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the subject lot prior to assailed decision recognized that Petra Teodoro was in actual possession of the
her demise and that she left a Holographic Will wherein the subject lot was lot prior to her death. It is [Teodoro Teodoro’s] argument that Petra Teodoro,
bequeathed to [Teodoro Teodoro], the probate of her last will has not finally settled tacked [from by Teodoro Teodoro], has had prior physical possession of the
the question of ownership over the subject lot. Clearly, the subject lot still forms controverted portion of lot 2476. He went on arguing that regardless of whether or
part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro. In the absence of an actual and not the duly probated will completely settled the issue of partition of the remaining
approved partition plan among his heirs, the subject lot remains part of the Genaro estate of Genaro Teodoro, he has the prior actual and physical possession of the
Teodoro’s estate. Since his children Santiago, Maria, Petra, Maraino and Ana are vacant space where the old ancestral house formerly stands, passed on to him by
all deceased, their children or grandchildren by right of representation have the the late Petra Teodoro, a fact [respondents] deny. [Respondents] even belied that
right to inherit from their ancestor. they have ousted and restrained [Teodoro Teodoro] from entering the subject
property.
xxxx
Said pretension is however negated by evidence showing the barricaded vacant
A person who claims that he has a better right to real property must prove his space or disputed area consisting of 120 square meters, more or less
ownership of the same x x x. Clearly, [Teodoro Teodoro] has failed to prove his (approximate width of lot is 7.55 meters, approximate length is 17.9 meters with
ownership over the property or that of his devisee Petra Teodoro. Thus, the court indented portion measuring 1.5 meters deep x x x), where the cemented portion of
is convinced that the possession of [respondents] over the subject lot should not the flooring of the bakery near the national road lease by [respondents] is still
be disturbed, until and unless the question of ownership over the same shall have existing x x x and over which he exercised control and constructive possession. x x
been finally resolved before the appropriate court. x.
xxxx xxxx
Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel
(3) did not solely or unilaterally cause the demolition of the ancestral
is a part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of an
house such a fact equating to his exclusive ownership of the subject
approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over which the property and complete control and dominion over it; and
legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to
exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession.
(4) cannot tack his alleged possession of the subject property to that of
Petra Teodoro simply by virtue of the latter’s holographic will, leading to
This Court disagrees with the said ruling applying the plethora of cases decisive of
the issue of ownership which is insignificant in forcible entry cases.
the issue and consistent with the established jurisprudence that the lower court
cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership-such issue being inutile in an
ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession. In all, the appellate court found that Teodoro Teodoro (substituted by his heirs
Nelson and Rolando Teodoro at that juncture) "failed to discharge the burden of
proof that he had prior actual physical possession of the subject [property] before it
Given the foregoing, [Teodoro Teodoro] has established a valid claim to institute
was barricaded by [respondents] to warrant the institution of the forcible entry suit."
the eviction suit against [respondents] over the disputed area or vacant portion of The appellate court disposed of the case, thus:
Lot 2476 and for him to be restored therein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision [dated] 28 February
xxxx
2007 and Resolution dated 26 June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 81 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the instant case
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding reversible error on the appealed is DISMISSED for lack of merit.9
judgment, the same is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered as follows:
Hence, this appeal by certiorari filed by the heirs of Teodoro Teodoro raising the
following errors in the appellate court’s dismissal of the complaint:
1. Ordering that [Teodoro Teodoro] be restored in the lawful possession of
the disputed area of Lot 2476 and for the eviction therefore of
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to take notice of relevant facts
[respondents] on said portion; and
such as petitioner Teodoro’s exercise of possessory rights over the subject
property, among others, which if properly considered, will justify a different
2. [Respondents] to pay the costs of the suit.8 conclusion.
With the reversal of the MTC’s ruling, respondents then appealed the RTC’s 2. The Honorable Court of Appeals misappreciated undisputed facts such
decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC, likewise as the respondents’ fencing of the vacant area cleared by petitioner
4. There is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in the On the other hand, respondents assert possession likewise by virtue of ownership
assailed Decision.10 manifested in their residence at Lot No. 2476 spanning more than five (5) decades,
reckoned even from the time Maria, respondents’ grandmother and sister of Petra,
was alive and resided thereat.15
The assigned errors define the issue for our resolution which is whether or not the
act of respondents in barricading the frontage of the portion of Lot No. 2476 on
which stood the ancestral house occupied by Petra amounted to Teodoro Respondents trace their possession from the extrajudicial partition of the
Teodoro’s unlawful dispossession thereof through the forcible entry of commingled properties of the siblings Maria, respondents’ direct ascendant, Petra
respondents. and Mariano, father of Teodoro Teodoro, progeny and heirs of
Genaro.16 According to respondents, from the partition, the heirs of all three
Genaro children possessed and occupied their respective shares: respondents
The ground rules in forcible entry cases:11
received Lot No. 2476 which encompasses herein subject property, while Teodoro
Teodoro and his siblings received a different property, "a 667 residential lot at
(1) One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive Bambang, Bulacan, Bulacan."
another of physical possession of real property.
Also, respondents aver that, through respondent Rosario Santiago, they paid for
(2) Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical Lot No. 2476’s realty taxes. Respondents counter that the subject property was not
possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the solely bequeathed to Teodoro Teodoro as it is part of Petra’s estate for disposition
defendant (herein respondents). This requirement implies that the to her legitimate heirs, including herein respondents. Lastly, on Teodoro Teodoro’s
possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the claim that he had solely effected the demolition of the ancestral house,
beginning. respondents contend that they had allowed the demolition upon the understanding
that the parties would then completely partition the subject property, as that portion
(3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material is centrally located in Lot No. 2476 where the respondents actually reside.
possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by Given both parties respective claims of ownership over the subject property via
the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the court from taking succession from their ascendants Maria, Petra and Mariano Teodoro, who are all
cognizance of the case. compulsory heirs of Genaro in whose name the subject property is still registered,
the MTC ruled that respondents cannot be disturbed in their possession of the
(4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and subject property "until and unless the question of ownership over the same [is]
the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue finally resolved before the appropriate court."
deprivation thereof. In this case, both parties assert prior and exclusive
physical possession in the concept of owner12 acquired through In contrast, the RTC, without categorically resolving the issue of ownership of Lot
succession13 from the same decedent, their aunt and grand aunt, No. 2476, ruled that on the portion of Lot No. 2476 where the ancestral house
respectively, Petra. In turn, Petra inherited the property from her father used to stand, Teodoro did establish his prior physical possession over the subject
Genaro, in whose name the subject property is still registered. property resulting in his right to institute the ejectment suit against respondents.
Page 446 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Significantly, the RTC confirmed respondents’ physical possession of, and Co-ownership, the finding of both the MTC at first instance and by the RTC on
residency at, Lot No. 2476. appeal, is sufficient. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
There would yet be another turn of events. The appellate court, albeit refusing to Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or
touch and rule on the issue of ownership, declared that there lacked conclusive right belongs to different persons.
evidence of Teodoro Teodoro’s prior actual physical possession over the subject
property. Thus, the appellate court dismissed Art. 1078. When there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
Teodoro Teodoro’s complaint for lack of merit. debts of the deceased.
We are now asked for a final ruling. Certainly, and as found by the trial courts, the whole of Lot No. 2476 including the
portion now litigated is, owing to the fact that it has remained registered in the
We grant the petition. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and restore name of Genaro who is the common ancestor of both parties herein, co-owned
the decision of the RTC on the appeal reversing the MTC. property. All, or both Teodoro Teodoro and respondents are entitled to exercise
the right of possession as co-owners.
We affirm the finding of fact by the RTC which is decisive of the issue that has
remained unresolved inspite of a summary procedure and two appellate reviews of Neither party can exclude the other from possession. Although the property
the forcible entry case filed by Teodoro Teodoro. The RTC said: remains unpartitioned, the respondents in fact possess specific areas. Teodoro
Teodoro can likewise point to a specific area, which is that which was possessed
by Petra. Teodoro Teodoro cannot be dispossessed of such area, not only by
Analyzing the facts of the case, the lower [court] concluded that the subject parcel
virtue of Petra's bequeathal in his favor but also because of his own right of
is a part of the estate of the late Genaro Teodoro and in the absence of an
approved partition among the heirs, remains a community property over which the possession that comes from his co-ownership of the property. As the RTC
legal heirs of Genaro Teodoro have the right to inherit. All therefore are entitled to concluded, petitioners, as heirs substituting Teodoro
exercise the right of dominion including the right of possession.17 (Emphasis
supplied). Teodoro in this suit, should be restored in the lawful possession of the disputed
area.
The RTC’s comment that it "disagrees with the said ruling" only meant that "the
lower court cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership" since such WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
ownership issue is "inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question CA-G.R. SP No. 99805 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
of possession."18 And so the RTC ruled that Teodoro Teodoro should be restored Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 634-M-06 is REINSTATED. No
in the lawful possession of the disputed area of Lot No. 2476 in light of the finding pronouncement as to costs.
of the MTC that the subject lot still forms part of the estate of the late Genaro
Teodoro. It is from this same fact that the MTC reached the contrary conclusion SO ORDERED.
that Teodoro Teodoro’s complaint should be dismissed because he has "failed to
prove his ownership."19
In the sense that Teodoro Teodoro has not proven exclusive ownership, the MTC A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580 October 6, 2010
was right.1âwphi1 But exclusive ownership of Lot No. 2476 or a portion thereof is [Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]
not in this case required of Teodoro Teodoro for him to be entitled to possession.
DECISION In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for
immediate execution,3 stating:
BERSAMIN, J.:
A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for
This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding the defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby
Judge of Branch 25 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ordered, elevated to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate proceedings
ignorance of the law, disregard of the law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering and disposition.
an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Government
Officials. In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for Execution dated
July 8, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.
The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s SO ORDERED.
Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV
was decided on June 22, 2004 by respondent Judge,1 who disposed as follows: According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about
the matter. Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that "if you think the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the court is wrong, file a motion for reconsideration." With that, the plaintiff filed a
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter as follows: motion for reconsideration, which respondent Judge nonetheless denied in his
order dated July 28, 2004,4thuswise:
(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen.
Luna St., Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff; Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the
defendant which was perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will
(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in be taken on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff
rentals from February 2003 to July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the thru counsel.
further sum of Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the continued
use and occupation of the premises starting August 2003 until the same is The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the records of
finally vacated and possession thereof is turn-over to plaintiff; this case to the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorney’s fees; and SO ORDERED.
(d) to pay the costs of suit. The complainants averred that respondent Judge’s denial of their motions had
rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the
SO ORDERED. possession of the premises. They further averred that respondent Judge’s refusal
to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue advantage to
the defendant to the plaintiff’s damage and prejudice.
In his comment dated September 16, 2004,5 respondent Judge denied the In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,7 then Court Administrator Presbitero
charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had lost J. Velasco, Jr., now Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the administrative complaint against respondent Judge be re-docketed as a regular
Rules of Court (which provides that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and ₱5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due with more severely, based on an evaluation of the charges, as follows:
course to the defendant’s notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the
orders in good faith and with no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did
facts, applicable rules, and jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed not act on complainants’ motion for immediate execution.
lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing so should be considered as error of
judgment on his part. Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the parties in Civil Case No. "SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
176394-CV, and had absolutely no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant
defendant; that the complainants did not submit evidence to show that the orders to stay execution files a supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court
had been issued for a consideration, material or otherwise, or that his issuance of and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing
the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith.
down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency
of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from
In their reply dated September 22, 2004,6 the complainants contended that time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the
respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on Municipal Trial Court. XXXX XXXX XXXX."
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which referred to appeals from the
Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained provisions on appeal from the
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and which provided in its
sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment case. The losing
Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should
party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to
be governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it,
notice of appeal in general; and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate court from
19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes
ministerial and imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104
The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that SCRA 401 as cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs.
appeal in forcible entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612, 626).
a notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by filing of a notice of appeal and a
sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July
pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment 2004 on 13 July 2004; he however failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to the
appealed from. They asserted that respondent Judge’s invocation of good faith
filing of such notice of appeal, more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants
and error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly
have already filed their Motion for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting
neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due course to the
for immediate execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due course appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to
Page 449 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that, "In appeals by notice of appeal,
Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the RTC. This fact is clear the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon perfection of the appeals filed on
from Judge Rabaca’s Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties." Moreover
Clerk of Court to forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court and more importantly, the herein complainants filed their Motion for Execution
immediately. even before the defendant had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion was
therefore still well within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate
execution of Judge Rabaca’s decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case. It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the
He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution. The plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of
relevant question that we should resolve however is whether such error is an error the Court in a number of cases involving the same issue posed before the
of judgment or an error amounting to incompetence that calls for administrative respondent judge. Respondent Judge is expected to know this and his justification
discipline. of erroneous application of the law, although mitigating, could not exculpate him
from liability.
Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainant’s Motion for
execution because he honestly thought that when he gave due course to the We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.
defendant’s appeal which was seasonably filed, and ordered the elevation of the
records to the appellate court, his court already lost jurisdiction over the case.. In Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate
making his ruling, respondent asserts he relied on the provisions of Section 9, Rule execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas
41 of the Rules of Court. This provision reads as follows: bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiff’s motion for immediate
execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendant’s failure to file the
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court clearly
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal imposes such duty, viz:
of the other parties.
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is
He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter OCA rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
IPI No. 03-1513-MTJ: Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
Bunyi-Medina, MeTJ wherein the Court said that- sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed
in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the
Respondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost jurisdiction to entertain the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the
motion for execution after the perfection of the appeal and after she issued an appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to
order to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court for review. time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial
The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however different from Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
those prevailing in the instant case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower
court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
within which to perfect the appeal had already lapsed before the complainant
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other
therein moved for the execution of the execution judgment. Clearly therefore,
papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
appeal had already been perfected. In the instant case, although the defendant
had filed his appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed since the plaintiff still
had his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had not yet xxx
lapsed. The provision relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically, Section 9,
Page 450 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of The recommended penalty of ₱5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same
the defendant’s appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of or similar act would be dealt with more severely is also correct. The Court
the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant Administrator rationalized the recommendation of the penalty thuswise:
did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution.
The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, ‘Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure’ is
appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the classified as serious offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to
appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the dismissal. However, we find respondent’s acts not ingrained with malice or bad
perfection of the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
credibly justify his omission to act according to the provision by claiming good faith corrupt motive, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith.1avvphil A rule as clear disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs. Judge
and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the
implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or amount of five thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held that
lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an respondent’s lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability but
as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It not for gross ignorance of the law.
was not so herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been
We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even if
assigned many such cases, he was not a trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior
respondent Judge’s omission would have easily amounted to gross
experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed
the abject inanity of his excuses.
ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8,8 Rule 140,
of the Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish
We agree with the complainants’ insistence, therefore, that respondent Judge’s
that malice or bad faith impelled his omission to act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or a
omission to apply Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow
corrupt motive attended his omission to act demands a downgrading of the liability.
the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the plaintiff’s motion for
In the absence of any showing that he had been held guilty of any other
immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt about his authority to grant the
administrative offense,9 and without our attention being called to other
motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he could have easily circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judge’s dark motives for his
and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he well
inaction, we should find and consider the recommended penalty of ₱5,000.00 with
knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action.
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he did not
severely to be commensurate to the offense.10
corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a duty
enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively accountable.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding
Judge of Branch 25, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the
This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to
law and procedure, and, accordingly, impose upon him a fine of ₱5,000.00 with
adhere always to the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or
severely.
unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient
supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil action under Rule 70
and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which is to SO ORDERED.
prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should
always be borne in mind.
DECISION That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the plaintiffs,
they had already been in open and continuous possession of the same parcel of
CARPIO MORALES, J.: land;
Assailed via Petition for Review are issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), VI
Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284, to wit: Order1 dated August
26, 2005 which dismissed petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs have
prematurity, and Order2 dated January 2, 2006 which denied petitioners' motion for continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said fishpond and since then,
reconsideration. had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of
the fishponds;ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In issue is one of law - whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an
independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had VII
occurred.
That the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation is at
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) least P300,000.00more or less, while the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff
claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at least P100,000.00 more or less, and the yearly income
Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate Fishpond of the fishpond of plaintiff Alberto Benedicto is at least P100,000.00 more or less;
Lease Agreement Nos. 5674,3 56944 and 56955 in their respective favor were
approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-
VIII
five (25) years or until December 31, 2024.
That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant Ernesto L.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the blue guards from the
unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of
to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners'
the plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up
fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlingsowned by
barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the
petitioners.
milkfish and carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs;
On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court
IX
(MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary
Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages, docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 1331,6 13327 and 1333,8 against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and That on succeeding days, defendant's men continued their forage on the fishponds
respondent. of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and
fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even
the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the
In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC
materials taken away by defendant's men. Religious icons were also stolen and as
a complaint for damages against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No, 04-
an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons;
12284, alleging, inter alia,
Page 452 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
x x x The only issue is whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for
forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for
XIII damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession
by respondent of the premises.
That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto
Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is Petitioners meet the issue in the affirmative. Respondents assert otherwise.
without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code
which states: The petition is impressed with merit.
"Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession by the means established by the laws and rules of the SEC. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the
Court."9 (Underscoring supplied) and praying for the following reliefs: complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution
of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum of at compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and
least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the
least P300,000.00 each by way of actual damages and such other amounts as defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
proved during the trial; render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as
justice requires. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each
as moraldamages; The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents"
or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or
3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each "fair rental value of the property" and attorney's fees and costs. 13
as exemplarydamages;
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas14 reiterates the long-established rule that the
4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the
as attorney's fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
counsel by way of appearance fees.10 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary property:
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss11 petitioners' complaint for damages on three Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to
grounds - litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping. award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in
ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or
the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
By the assailed Order12 of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC
Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession,
dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a
damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on the
forcible entry cases has been made." sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but
which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x15 (Emphasis,
Hence, the present Petition for Review . underscoring and italics supplied; citations omitted)
In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their
two complaints, thus:
illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession
thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against
petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res
x x x
adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory
damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages'moral and exemplary
in addition to actual and compensatory constitutes splitting a single cause of 4.07 Considering that defendants' act of forcibly grabbing possession of the
action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be
of the second action becomes imperative. adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff
incurred as a result thereof.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations'
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically
the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant
wit:
PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter
"Subject Premises") situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street,
Page 454 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of
for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x 19 (Emphasis in the original;
property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as underscoring supplied)
Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed:
Annex "A."
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action,
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of
Premises, and established thereon the now famous "Seafood Market Restaurant." which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action)
arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the
x x x leased premises to the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses
suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing
any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of approximately loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.
forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant
Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award
and stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of
plaintiff's will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and compensatory
premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00
possession of the subject premises. The illegal high-handed manner of gestapo for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the
like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were
follows: x x x x already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this
cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject adjudicata.
Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment
therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed
actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the
property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are MeTC. x x x20 (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and without
lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the
way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex "B" the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages
letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with
latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. respondent's alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and
properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants' possession. other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel
built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even
x x x decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had
occurred.
12. Defendant's unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its
obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the
the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
Page 455 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not
present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners' complaint for Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated June 20,
damages.21 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which reversed the
Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision3 dated October 8, 2010 of the
jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil
premises and attorney's fees.22 Case No. 862.
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with
elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada
forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.23 Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-
named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said
Petitioners' filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven hundred
sixty-nine (769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite
as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and
occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause
issued by Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
of action.
The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2, 2006 issued by to Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284 are amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the case was returned to the
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. court.5cralawlawlibrary
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to REINSTATE Civil After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint,
Case No. 04-12284 to its docket and to conduct proceedings thereon with the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
dispatch.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of
SO ORDERED. defendants Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and
Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting under
them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with damages, Unlawful
Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 202354, September 24, 2014
SO ORDERED.6
AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner, v. VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY,
CYNTHIA ANACAY-GUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY
ROY ISRAEL AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING AUTHORITY UNDER The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential
THEM, Respondents. elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had
permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of the subject property was
unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand letter sent by
DECISION petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and
strategy, and in petitioner’s own “Sinumpaang Salaysay”, are more consistent with
Page 456 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
an action for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from the attorney’s fees.
discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical
possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after SO ORDERED.7
the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no
jurisdiction over the case.
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period, the above decision became final and executory.8cralawlawlibrary
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper
remedy considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an execution. At the hearing held on January 4, 2012, respondents were given a
agreement and she was only forced to take legal action when respondents
period of ten days within which to file their comment. At the next scheduled
reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of the period
hearing on February 6, 2012, respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a
agreed upon.
Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation informing the court that on the
same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did CA, copies of which were served to petitioner thru her counsel and to the RTC.
not state that respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated that said
that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded to the request of respondents
manifestation was “tantamount to [a] comment to the pending motion” and thus
to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise
gave petitioner’s counsel a period of ten (10) days within which to file her Reply
to vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer
and thereafter the incident will be submitted for resolution.9cralawlawlibrary
because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she
allowed them to stay there for one year. On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that
respondents’ occupation of the property without petitioner’s consent can be
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated
converted to a contract, such agreement not being prohibited by law nor contrary
August 22, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial
to morals or good customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an unlawful detainer
Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
action, the RTC found that petitioner’s complaint was filed within the prescribed
dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 17
one-year period counted from the time the final demand to vacate was received by
is AFFIRMED.
the respondents on July 24, 2008.
SO ORDERED.10
The fallo of the Decision of the RTC states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial The CA held that the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the
Court of Silang-Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the defendants and all claiming under detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has
their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property and surrender possession and lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer,
control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for
Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use thereof starting from July 2008 respondents to vacate the property.
until the same is paid in full, with interests thereon at twelve (12%) percent per
annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as moral Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful
damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary possessor of the subject property, she availed of the wrong remedy to recover
damages; and (4) pay the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publiciana or accion
On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the proceedings (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
before the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said court’s adverse plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.16cralawlawlibrary
decision. They also stress that resort to certiorariwas proper and the suspension
of procedural rules was justified by compelling circumstances such as the In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
imminent destruction of the only property possessed by respondents who are
indigent, respondents’ lack of awareness of unfavorable judgment rendered on 3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st ,
appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar as the jurisdictional Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE
requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack of showing that resort METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 issued by the
to certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being no prejudice Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto
caused to the other party. attached as Annex “B”;
After a thorough review of the records and the parties’ submissions, we find neither 4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She
reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA. had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in
May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the and occupied the same;
court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. 11 In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring 5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The
the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides defendants requested for time to leave and she acceded to said request. The
a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the end of May, 2008;
without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land 6. Inspite of several repeated demands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate
or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal the subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay
termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or reasonable compensation for their illegal use and occupancy of the subject
implied.14cralawlawlibrary property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex “C”;
The MCTC and CA both ruled that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint make 7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay
out a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer. Lalaan 1st for possible conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to
vacate the subject property. Thus, the said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a TO FILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as Annex “D”;
cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary x x x x17chanrobleslaw
Page 458 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
The above complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his
does not describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the
by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may
such lawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents’ bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to
occupation in May 2007. Such possession could not have been legal from the start set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession of the defendant in forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and
termination of the right to possess.18cralawlawlibrary underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did not
action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful
case. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
detainer.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough
would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
Villegas:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
distinction should be made. complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of
the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging
demand to vacate. that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which
was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their
xxxx deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for
unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private
start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own
of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
Page 459 of 507
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occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. . The appellate court, in
full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by Lastly, petitioner’s argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and
their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the It is well-settled that a court’s jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, render judgment on the action.20 Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction
their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based
in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] on it is void.21cralawlawlibrary
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June
forcible entry x x x. 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when DECISION
entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that “sometime in May, 2007,
she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and BRION, J.:
occupied the same”, as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that
respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and
without petitioner’s consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Esperanza
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and Supapo and Romeo Supapo2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011
the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court’s ruling and granting reliefs decision3 and August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
prayed for by the petitioner. SP No. 111674.
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final. 16
Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons
claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same.
in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416 registered and
titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the
thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for
Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the City reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of
Assessor of Caloocan.7 the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were
extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ
an overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year. 8 During one of their WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for
visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of
built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-
de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one. 9 45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby
permanently ENJOINED from further executing or implementing its decision dated
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of March 18, 1996.
the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa SO ORDERED.
Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for
mean that people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court
own, and that it was not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate
convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO
DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20
reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused
is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses
vacate the subject premises.
for preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1) there is another action pending
between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by
prior judgment.
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was
pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An The MeTC Ruling23
Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already prescribed, the
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary action having been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article
hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to vacate
in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit
denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration. should have been filed is counted from the time the certificate to file action was
issued. The certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more than ten
RTC.24 (10) years thereafter.
The RTC Ruling25 Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA. 29
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has The CA Ruling30
prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC. The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion
publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has action had prescribed.
jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1)
year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the complaint for The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: Order dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA
declared NULL and VOID.
decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition.
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245
The Petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:
SO ORDERED.26
(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the publiciana where the assessed value of the property does not exceed
court's jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land is P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila; and
determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive that
jurisdiction on all complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of (2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is
the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction. imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The Respondents' Case33
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the
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ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the
wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata. issue of ownership.36
Issues Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the
subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or the respondents should
The issues for resolution are: have the right of possession.
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property,
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. 38
Our Ruling
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and
granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
The petition is meritorious.
Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action
(P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in
has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
Metro Manila.
Accion Publiciana and
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
the Jurisdiction of the
MeTC
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
exclusive original jurisdiction:
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.34
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.
claim of ownership.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to
recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the Section 3 of the same law provides:
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
the parties has the right to possess the property.35 Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of xxxx
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements,
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value complaint for accion publiciana.
of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value The cause of action
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, has not prescribed
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.) The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for
being filed out of time.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value.40 The They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may
assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the lose his possession:
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.41
xxxx
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
regardless of the value of the property involved? possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file
of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the
the value of the property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the
distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.
which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if
within.43 (Emphasis supplied.) Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over
the subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has because of laches.
jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and
the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, publiciana more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued.
and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the
are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.44 subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax
declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration. system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in
1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence,
authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.47
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In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater probative weight
allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the
subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did not
that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason
subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses
disturbed in their possession.48 Supapo's title.
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's
have no legal basis. TCT, this Court merely recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the
stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most
[now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 50].51 effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is
the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states: ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will
also erode public confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more
adverse possession. abrasive, if not even violent.58
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same
land is also entitled to the possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the
the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership.53 Corollary to this pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches must adduce in court
rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule
occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible. 54 on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the
Torrens Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records
property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over and
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.56 appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3)
finally, they filed the action publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or allegation of laches.
transfer of the property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the
defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to
certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale. recover possession of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.
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The action is not barred While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no
by prior judgment identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal
case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They of the subject property.
contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of
the action publiciana. First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by
the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the
respondents to challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability Spouses Supapo.
(i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction under the Anti-
Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined the Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the
execution of the respondents' conviction because their criminal liability had been prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is
extinguished by the repeal of the law under which they were tried and convicted. It an action to recover possession of the subject property.
follows that their civil liability arising from the crime had also been erased.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced. filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by
prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property
Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of and recover its possession.
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).62
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially of res judicata has still no basis.
tried on the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final
judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity
them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same of causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties. 65
claim, demand or cause of action.63
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue
The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are: directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before
a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
(1) The former judgment or order must be final; settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits; the two actions is the same.66
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint
matter and the parties; and under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this
reason alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of
issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents (accused
Res judicata is not present in this case.
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therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the only issue Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered owners
in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the of a parcel of land located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, and
respondents to possess and occupy the subject property. covered by TCT No. T-53000. The San Mariano Academy structures are built on
the property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on
Final Note April 25, 1990. Because the former owners, Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita
(Spouses Erorita), failed to redeem it, the title was consolidated in the buyers’
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of name.
determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This
adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As
The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate the
such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the
school on the property. The Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita
determination of the issue of ownership.
as the San Mariano Academy’s administrators.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of Twenty
August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674. Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but had failed to pay rentals since 1990. The
Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to continue to run the
SO ORDERED. school without rental out of goodwill and friendship.
On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the
property. Although the Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not
immediately close the school without clearance from the Department of Education,
G.R. No. 195477 Culture, and Sports to whom they are accountable.
SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA, Petitioners, On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of
vs. possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the defendants Hernan,
SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO, Respondents. Susan, and the Spouses Erorita.2
DECISION In their joint answer, the defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed
because they cannot be forced to vacate and to pay the rentals under their factual
BRION, J.: circumstances.
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners to challenge the After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial. However, the
July 28, 2010 decision1 and January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of defendants-Eroritas failed to appear despite notice. Thus, the RTC declared them
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 92770. The CA affirmed the Regional Trial in default and ordered the Spouses Dumlao to present evidence ex parte.
Court's (RTC) decision ordering the petitioners to vacate the property.
On June 4, 2007, the RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao’s favor. It ordered the
THE ANTECEDENTS defendants (1) to immediately vacate the property and turn it over to the Spouses
Dumlao, and (2) to pay accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney’s fees. The
Because the tax declaration showed that the assessed value of the property and Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint.
its improvements exceeded P20,000.00, the CA concluded that the RTC had
jurisdiction. On the first issue, the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an
action and jurisdiction over the case.5Jurisdiction does not depend on the
Citing Barbosa v. Hernandez,4 the CA held that this case involves an action for complaint’s caption.6 Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer;
possession of real property and not unlawful detainer. otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then,
claim lack of jurisdiction.7
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially,
the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of
possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and
In their petition, the Spouses Erorita essentially argue that: (a) the RTC had no deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one
jurisdiction because the allegations in the complaint show a case for unlawful year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property.8 A complaint
detainer; and (b) Hernan and Susan were improperly impleaded as parties to this for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be
case. considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional
facts is omitted.9
In their comment, the respondents argue that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction
because this case involves issues other than physical possession; (b) even A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to
assuming the RTC initially had no jurisdiction, the petitioners’ active participation allow the petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b)
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in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the In Figueroa v. People,15 we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is
petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised
the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to
within a year from the last demand to vacate (February 12, 2004). apply.16 Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."17
allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA
7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the
regardless of the property’s assessed value.10 application of the estoppel by laches doctrine.1âwphi1 As in Figueroa, the present
petitioners assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting
The CA incorrectly applied our ruling in Barbosa. In that case, the complaint did lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches.
not state that (i) possession was unlawfully withheld and (ii) the complaint was filed Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not
within a year from the last demand. Because these special jurisdictional facts for constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam.
an unlawful detainer case were lacking, we held that the case should be accion
publiciana over which the RTC has jurisdiction Thus, the general rule should apply.1âwphi1 The petitioners timely questioned the
RTC's jurisdiction.
In the present case, however, the complaint clearly contained the elements of an
unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The Issue not raised before the lower court
RTC had no jurisdiction over this case.
On the second issue, it is settled that issues that have not been raised before the
Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, 11 the RTC’s lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.18 Basic consideration of
decision is void. due process dictates this rule.19
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time. We note that the second issue raised by the petitioners were not raised before the
lower courts. The petitioners only raised this issue in their petition before this
With the jurisdictional issue resolved, we now examine whether the petitioners Court. Thus, we need not discuss this issue at our level.
timely raised this issue.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28, 2010 decision and
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 92770 are
time, or even for the first time on appeal.12 An exception to this rule is the principle hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we DECLARE the June 4,
of estoppel by laches.13 2007 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction.
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if SO ORDERED.
the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.14 In that case, lack of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the
questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in
several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered G.R. No. 197743, March 12, 2018
a decision adverse to the movant.
TIJAM, J.: On August 11, 1954, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting the
Subdivision's offer of donation and its proposed contract. The Resolution also
authorized the City Mayor to execute the deed of donation on the City's behalf. 8
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the July 20, 2011 Amended Decision1 rendered by the Court of The parties submitted divergent accounts on what happened after Resolution No.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90547 which reconsidered its March 7, 2011 89 was passed.
Decision,2 annulling the June 20, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 26 of Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC 2005-0030, and reinstating According to the City, the City Mayor of Naga, Monico Imperial (Mayor Imperial),
the February 14, 2005 Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Branch 1 of and the registered landowners, Macario and Gimenez, executed a Deed of
Naga City in Civil Case No. 12334 dismissing the ejectment case instituted by Donation9 on August 16, 1954, whereby the latter donated five hectares of land
petitioners. (subject property), two hectares of which to be. used as the City Hall site, another
two hectares for the public plaza, and the remaining hectare for the public market.
The Facts By virtue of said Deed, the City entered the property and began construction of the
government center. It also declared the five-hectare property in its name for tax
As culled by the CA from the records, the facts of the case are as follows: purposes.10 Thereafter, the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the
On July 3, 1954, Eusebio M. Lopez, Sr., Soledad L. Dolor, Jose A. Gimenez and Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC), the Fire Department and other government
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. (Lopez Jr.), as the President, Secretary, Treasurer and General agencies and instrumentalities entered the same property and built their offices
Manager of the City Heights Subdivision (Subdivision), respectively, wrote to the thereon.11
mayor of the City of Naga (City), offering to construct the Naga City Hall within the
premises of the Subdivision. Their letter indicated that the City Hall would be built In contrast, petitioners averred that the landowners' plan to donate five hectares to
on an area of not less than two hectares within the Subdivision, which would be the City did not materialize as the contract to build the City Hall was not awarded
designated as the open space reserved for a public purpose. The letter, which also to the Subdivision. As early as August 23, 1954, Lopez Jr., the Subdivision's
indicated the terms of the construction contract, provided that the City would be General Manager, supposedly wrote to Macario telling him to suspend the signing
free to accept another party's offer to construct the City Hall if it found the same to of the deed of donation as the Municipal Board could not agree on the specific site
be more favorable.5 where the City Hall would be built. Petitioners alleged that the construction contract
was eventually awarded by the Bureau of Public Works (BPW) to a local
The City's Municipal Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 75, dated July 12, contractor, Francisco O. Sabaria (Sabaria), who won in a public bidding. Mayor
1954, asking the Subdivision for a bigger area on which the City Hall would stand. Imperial opposed the award, arguing that he and not the BPW had the authority to
Consequently, on July 30, 1954, the Subdivision amended its offer and agreed to initiate the public bidding for the project. The BPW, however, asserted its authority
donate five hectares to the City. The area is a portion of the land registered in the to bid out and award the contract on the ground that national funds would be used
names of Macario Mariano (Macario) and Jose A. Gimenez (Gimenez) under
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for the project. Mayor Imperial and Sabaria litigated the issue, with the former the City to pay them a monthly rental of P2.5 million from the date it received the
losing before the trial court and subsequently withdrawing his appeal before the demand to vacate until it surrendered possession, as reasonable compensation for
CA. Afterwards, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 11 dated January 20, the use of the property.19
1959 authorizing the City Mayor to enter into a contract with Sabaria for the
construction of the City Hall.12 Arguing that the issue involved is one of ownership, the City moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.20 After the MTC denied the motion on March 22,
Petitioners claimed that on February 5, 1959, Macario and officers of the 2004,21 the City filed its Answer.22 The parties subsequently submitted their
Subdivision met with Mayor Imperial to demand the return of the five-hectare lot as respective Position Papers23 and evidence.24
the condition for the donation was not complied with. Mayor Imperial purportedly
assured them that the City would buy the property from them. The purchase, Petitioners averred that there was no donation of the subject property to the City
however, did not materialize. Petitioners alleged that ten years later, or on May 14, as the obligation to donate on the part of Macario and Gimenez, conditioned on the
1968, Macario wrote to Lopez Jr., instructing him to make a follow-up on the City's Subdivision undertaking the construction of the City Hall therein, was abrogated
payment for the subject lot. On December 2, 1971, Macario died without receiving when the City eventually awarded the construction contract to Sabaria. Petitioners
payment from the City.13 further alleged that Macario thereafter demanded the return of the property but
was assured by Mayor Imperial that the City would buy the same. The purchase,
In 1976, a certain Tirso Mariano filed an action for partition of Macario's estate. however, never materialized despite Macario's supposed reminder to Mayor
The action was opposed by Macario's widow, Irene, and their adopted children, Imperial of his assurance. Petitioners, thus, argued that the City's possession of
Jose (Jose) and Erlinda (Erlinda) Mariano. As an offshoot of this action, a petition the subject property was by mere tolerance which ceased when they required its
to annul Jose and Erlinda's adoption was instituted.14 return.25
Irene died in 1988. Jose died the following year which was also when his and The City countered that the donation actually took place, as evidenced by a Deed
Erlinda's adoption was declared valid and legal by the appellate court. In 1994, of Donation dated August 16, 1954, making the City the owner and lawful
Irene's marriage to one Rolando Reluccio (Reluccio) was declared bigamous and possessor of the subject property. This was supposedly why the subject property
void ab initio. And after a protracted litigation, Jose, then represented by his heirs, had long been declared in the City's name for tax purposes. Granting there was no
and Erlinda were declared as Irene's heirs to the exclusion of Reluccio who was donation, the City stressed that ownership of the premises automatically vested in
also declared to be without right to represent Irene in Macario's estate.15 it when they were designated as open spaces of the subdivision-project, donation
thereof being a mere formality. The City also argued that since the property was
On March 11, 1997, the probate court issued letters of administration to one of the already occupied by several government offices for about 50 years, recovery
petitioners herein, Danilo David S. Mariano (Danilo), for the administration of thereof was no longer feasible and the landowners may simply demand just
Irene's estate. In September 2003, Danilo demanded upon then City Mayor of compensation from the City. The City further contended that the complaint was
Naga, Jesse M. Robredo, to vacate and return the subject property. When the City dismissible on the grounds of laches and prescription. In any case, the City
did not comply, petitioners, as heirs of Jose and Erlinda, filed a Complaint 16 for averred that it could not be ejected from the premises as it possessed the rights of
unlawful detainer against the City, docketed as Civil Case No. 12334. 17 a builder in good faith.26
The Unlawful Detainer Case Petitioners in turn denied that laches had set in because Macario supposedly
made a demand for the City to return the property, and subsequently, to abide by
In their Complaint, filed on February 12, 2004,18 petitioners asked the MTC to Mayor Imperial's commitment to purchase the same. Furthermore, as heirs of
order the City and all agencies, instrumentalities or offices claiming rights under it, Macario and Irene, they themselves sought to recover the subject property after
including the LTO, NBI, DOLE, PPC and the Fire. Department, to vacate the learning of their rights thereto through Danilo who collated Irene's properties
subject property, shown in the Sketch Plan as Blocks 25 and 26 (LRC) Psd-9674, following his appointment as administrator of her estate.27
and to return possession thereof to them. In addition to attorney's fees, they asked
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Petitioners also argued that title to the property, which remained registered in the Macario A. Mariano and Jose A. Gimenez, and to peacefully surrender and deliver
names of Macario and Gimenez, was indefeasible and could not be lost by its physical possession to the [petitioners], including all the improvements and
prescription or be defeated by tax declarations. They further asserted that the structures erected thereon which were built in bad faith as they are now forfeited in
requirement of open space in the subdivision for public use was already satisfied favor of plaintiffs-appellants;
with the landowners' donation of road lots, measuring 120,280 square meters, to
the City as annotated on TCT No. 671. They posited that Presidential Decree (PD) (2) For the [respondent] to pay [petitioners] the amount of P2,500,000.00 per
No. 95728, enacted in 1976, as amended by PD No. 121629, which defined "open month by way of reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the
space," should not be applied because it was not yet in effect when the subdivision property in question reckoned from November 30, 2003 until such time that the
plan was approved in 1962.30 [respondent] shall have actually vacated the subject property;
Petitioners contended that the City was a builder in bad faith because it continued (3) For the [respondent] to pay [petitioners] Attorney's fees in the amount of
to construct the City Hall and allowed other government agencies to build their P587,159.60; and
offices on the subject property, knowing that the donation had been aborted when
the condition therefor was not fulfilled and that its avowed purchase of the property (4) For the [respondent] to pay the cost of the suit.
was not forthcoming.31
SO ORDERED.34
The MTC's Ruling The RTC held that the MTC could have resolved the issue of ownership if only to
resolve the issue of possession. It ruled against the existence of the Deed of
In its February 15, 2005 Decision, the MTC gave weight to the Deed of Donation, purportedly acknowledged before a notary public for Manila, finding that
Donation.32 Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of the award of the construction contract to Sabaria released Macario and Gimenez
jurisdiction. It reasoned that the City's defense, which involved a claim of from the obligation to execute said deed. Furthermore, the fact that the subject
ownership, removed the issue from the case of unlawful detainer.33 property remained registered in Macario and Gimenez's names and no annotation
of the purported donation was ever inscribed on the title proved that the City
The RTC's Ruling recognized that its possession was by mere tolerance of the landowners. This
finding, said the RTC, was bolstered by the Certification35 issued on August 27,
On the City's appeal, the RTC set aside the MTC's dismissal. The dispositive 2003 by the Records Management Archive Office of the National Archives that it
portion of the RTC's June 20, 2005 Decision reads as follows: had no record of such Deed, and a similar Certification36 from the Office of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered [petitioners] having proved and convinced Clerk of Court of the Manila RTC as repository of notarial reports of notaries public
this Court by preponderance of evidence that the lower court committed a serious for Manila. The RTC also noted that the purported Deed of Donation was unsigned
and reversible error in rendering the herein assailed decision, accordingly, the by the donors and indicated merely the letters "SGD" opposite their names. 37
DECISION dated February 14, 2005 of the Court a quo is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Consequently, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioners] The RTC explained that since the subject land was titled under the Torrens system
and against [respondent] ORDERING the latter of the following: in the name of Macario and Gimenez, the tax declaration in the City's name could
not prevail, and the property could not be subject of acquisitive prescription. It also
(1) For the [respondent] City Government of Naga, including all other government held that petitioners were not guilty of laches, noting the several cases they had to
instrumentalities, agencies and offices claiming right of possession through and file to establish their right to inherit from, and to recover or preserve the estate of,
under it which are but not limited to Land Transportation Office, National Bureau of Macario and Irene, as well as Danilo's discovery of the subject property as part of
Investigation, Department of Labor and Employment, Philippine Postal the latter's estate following the issuance to him of letters of administration over
Corporation, Fire Department and all other offices and buildings which are all Irene's estate in 1997. Finally, the RTC agreed with petitioners that the road lots
claiming rights under [respondent] to immediately vacate the subject properties, donated to the City in 1963 satisfied the requirement of open space in the
Blocks 25 and 26 (LRC) Psd-9674 forming part of TCT No. 671 in the name of subdivision at that time, and that the City was a builder in bad faith. 38
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All other aspects of the assailed Decision dated June 20, 2005 and Order dated
The City moved for the Presiding Judge's inhibition on the ground of bias. July 15, 2005 are hereby affirmed.
Subsequently, it also filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 20, 2005
Decision with a motion for new trial based on newly discovered SO ORDERED.42
evidence39 consisting of additional documents purportedly showing that the subject
In reaching this decision, the CA ratiocinated that:
property was already donated to the City.40 On July 15, 2005, the RTC issued an
[T]here could be no donation of the subject five (5) hectares of land by the
Order denying said motions.41
landowners, DON MACARIO and Jose Gimenez (or GIMENEZ) to the City of Naga
because the donee failed to present the original deed of donation before the trial
The CA's March 7, 2011 Decision court, and did not give a satisfactory explanation of the loss of the same. As
against the Letter dated May 14, 1968 written by DON MACARIO instructing
Partly granting the City's appeal, the CA inter alia directed the City to pay only half Eusebio Lopez, Sr., then City Heights Subdivision President, to do a follow-up of
of the monthly rental, which it reduced to P500,000, because the subject property the City's proposal to buy the five (5) hectare-lot, We held the latter document to
was co-owned by Macario and Gimenez. The dispositive portion of the CA's be a conclusive proof that the donation that DON MACARIO and the City of Naga
Decision reads: intended was not consummated.43
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The CA's July 20, 2011 Amended Decision
The assailed Decision dated June 20, 2005 rendered by the Regional Trial Court Both parties moved for reconsideration of the CA's March 7, 2011 Decision.44 After
(RTC) of Naga City (Branch 26), in Civil Case No. RTC 2005-0030 (For: a re-examination of the case records and the evidence adduced by the parties, the
Ejectment) is hereby MODIFIED in that: CA, on My 20, 2011, rendered an Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
(1) The City of Naga is hereby ORDERED to pay to the respondents as heirs of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Don Macario Mariano half of the adjudged monthly rental for the use and City of Naga is GRANTED.
enjoyment of the questioned property, or in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php250,000.00), for the period November 3, 2003 until the City Our Decision promulgated on March 7, 2011 is RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, the
of Naga finally vacates that portion it has been occupying, or until such time when Decision dated June 20, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City
the City expropriates the same private property; (Branch 26), in Civil Case No. RTC 2005-0030 {For: Ejectment),
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated February 14, 2005
(2) The portion of the assailed Decision where all the other government rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naga City (Branch 1), in Civil Case
instrumentalities and agencies, including but not limited to the Land Transportation No. 12334, is hereby REINSTATED without prejudice to the filing by either party of
Office, National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Labor and Employment, an action regarding the ownership of the property involved.
Philippine Postal Corporation, Fire Department, Municipal Trial Court, Regional
Trial Court, which office buildings are standing on the lot in question, are ordered On the other hand, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Don
to immediately vacate therefrom as well as to deliver the physical possession of Macario Mariano of Our Decision dated March 7, 2011 is DENIED.
the improvements and structures they have introduced thereat to the Heirs of Don
Macario Mariano, is DELETED because these other government instrumentalities SO ORDERED.45
and agencies are not parties to the case in the court below; and In so ruling, the CA held that pursuant to the best evidence rule under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the photocopy of the letter dated May 14, 1968
(3) The award of attorney's fees in favor of the Heirs of Don Macario Mariano is was inadmissible and without probative value in the absence of a clear showing
reduced to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00) on equitable grounds. that the original writing was lost or destroyed. As an exception to the best evidence
rule, the CA excused the City's failure to present the original Deed of Donation on
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the basis of the June 11, 2004 Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Presiding Officer, indicating the existence of a Deed of Donation and the fact of
Court of the RTC-Manila that the Deed could not be found in its records as the Donation (Exhibit "6").46
Notarial Reports of Atty. Vicente M. Magpoc, before whom the instrument was The CA thus concluded that the existence and due execution of the Deed of
acknowledged, for the period January 12, 1953 to December 31, 1954, could not
Donation had been duly established, warranting the dismissal of the ejectment
be located and must have been destroyed by water spillage during the fire that
case. The CA also found that petitioners' claim was barred by laches, noting that
razed, their office on November 18, 1981. According to the CA, secondary
the City had been in open, public and adverse possession of the subject property
evidence of the Deed could be admitted because it had been satisfactorily shown,
for 49 years at the time the ejectment case was filed.
through the Certification, that the Deed was lost due to force majeure, thus, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror. The appellate court, however, emphasized that the case being one for unlawful
detainer, its judgment was conclusive only as to possession, and its disquisition on
The CA further held that "the following secondary documents on record sufficiently
the claim of ownership was merely provisional and without prejudice to a separate
confirmed the existence, execution and contents of the subject deed of donation,"
and independent action respecting title to the land.
to wit:
(a) Letter dated July 3, 1954 of the President, Secretary, Treasurer and General Dissatisfied with the CA's Amended Decision, petitioners filed the instant petition
Manager of the City Heights Subdivision (in the persons of Eusebio M. Lopez, Sr., for review.
Soledad L. Dolor, Jose A. Gimenez and Eusebio Lopez, Jr.) to the mayor of Naga
expressing their offer to construct the Naga City Hall within the premises of not
Petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the RTC's Decision, asserting that in
less than two (2) hectares of the Subdivision (Exhibit "1");
admitting secondary evidence of the Deed of Donation, the CA misapplied Section
5, Rule 130 and Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules, Article 749 of the Civil Code,
(b) Resolution No. 75 dated July 12, 1954 issued by the Municipal Board of Naga and Sections 245, 246 and 247 of the Notarial Law. Petitioners fault the CA for
(then a municipality) requesting for a bigger area of land where the City Hall would allegedly disregarding their evidence which received no objection from the City.
stand, from the Subdivision (Exhibit "2");
Finally, petitioners impugn the CA's finding that they were guilty of laches, insisting
that the City's possession was by mere tolerance.47
(c) Letter dated July 30, 1954 of the Subdivision to the City amending its original
offer and agreeing to donate a portion of five (5) hectares. Also, in this Letter, the
The Court's Ruling
Subdivision elaborated on its offer to finance the construction of the same building
and specified the terms of such financing contract (Exhibit "3");
Petitions for review under Rule 45 should cover only questions of law 48 as this
Court is not a trier of facts.49 However, the incongruent factual conclusions of the
(d) Resolution No. 89 dated August 11, 1954 where the then Municipal Board
MTC and the CA on the one hand, and the RTC on the other, compel us to revisit
resolved to accept the Subdivision's offer of donation and of the financing contract
the factual circumstances of the case for the proper dispensation of justice. 50
to construct the government center, and at the same time, to authorize the Mayor
to enter into a final deed of donation in behalf of the then municipality (Exhibit "4");
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
(e) Letter dated November 26, 1955 of the then City Mayor of Naga, Hon. Monico
of the parties - possession de facto and not possession de jure.51 When the
Imperial, to the Naga City Planning Board indicating the fact of donation of the
defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
same parcel of land by the Subdivision to the City (Exhibit "30");
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
(f) Letter dated March 6, 1968 of DON MACARIO referring to the open spaces of
possession,52 or more particularly, to determine who between the parties has the
the Subdivision having been donated to the City of Naga (Exhibit "18");
better right to possess the property.53 Nonetheless, the adjudication is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
(g) Letter dated September 6, 1970 of Hon. Virginia F. Perez, Vice-Mayor and
involving title to the property.54
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The purported Deed of Donation submitted by the City cannot be considered a
In this case, the City, as the defendant in the unlawful detainer case, asserted public document. While it contains an Acknowledgment before a notary public, the
ownership over the subject property by virtue of an alleged donation made in 1954 same is manifestly defective as it was made neither by the alleged donors
by the landowners in its favor. In support of this claim, the City proffered a copy of (Macario and Gimenez) and their respective spouses, or by the donee (the City,
a Deed of Donation dated August 16, 1954. through Mayor Imperial), but only by Eusebio M.Lopez, Faustino Dolor, Soledad
Lirio Dolor and Lopez, Jr., as the Subdivision's President, Vice President,
Purported donation lacked the formalities required for validity Secretary and General Manager, respectively. The Acknowledgment thus reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
Generally, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered IN THE CITY OF MANILA ) s.s.
into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. However,
when the law requires that a contract be in some form to be valid, such x--------------------------------------------x
requirement is absolute and indispensable; its non-observance renders the
contract void and of no effect.55 One such law is Article 749 of the Civil Code of the BEFORE ME, this 16th day of August, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
Philippines which requires that: personally appeared EUSEBIO M. LOPEZ, with Res. Cert. No. A-0232064, issued
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be at Manila, on Feb. 24, 1954; FAUSTINO DOLOR, with Res. Cert. No. A-0295133,
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the issued at Manila on Feb. 7, 1954; SOLEDAD LIRIO DOLOR, with Res. Cert. No.
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. A-4782271, issued at Pasay City on July 27, 1954; and EUSEBIO LOPEZ, JR.,
with Res. Cert. No. A-476353, issued at Naga City on July 8, 1954, all known to
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate me and to me known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of instrument and they acknowledged to me that the same is their free act and
the donor. voluntary deed.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified This instrument relating to a Deed of Donation consist two pages only, including
thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. this page on which this acknowledgement is written and have been signed by the
(Emphasis ours) parties on each and every page thereof.
Thus, donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL, the day, year, and place first above written.
formalities specified in the foregoing provision.56
Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that donation of real property must be made Doc. No. 201; Page No. 70; (SGD) VICENTE M. MAGPOC
in a public instrument to be valid. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) v. Del Rosario,57 We stated: Book No. VI; Series of 1954 Notary Public
A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary public is a public
document. The notary public shall certify that he knows the person Until December 31, 195458
acknowledging the instrument and that such person is the same person who
executed the instrument, acknowledging that the instrument is his free act
and deed. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate instrument. An acceptance made in a separate instrument must also be (Emphasis ours)
in a public document. If the acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the
donor shall be notified in writing of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact Said Deed also shows that Mayor Imperial affixed his signature thereon on August
of such notification.58 (Emphasis ours) 21, 1954, or four days after it was notarized, thus he could not have acknowledged
the same before the notary public on August 16, 1954. Verily, the notary public
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could not have certified to knowing the parties to the donation, or to their execution The City has, for more than 50 years since the donation supposedly took place on
of the instrument, or to the voluntariness of their act. This glaring defect is fatal to August 16, 1954, failed to secure title over the subject property in its name. If the
the validity of the alleged donation. It is settled that a defective notarization will City had acquired ownership of the premises, it is incredible that it would fail to
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. 59 register the donation and have the property titled in its name. That it would remain
passive for such length of time is confounding and does not serve to bolster its
Not being a public document, the purported Deed of Donation is void.60 A void or proprietary or possessory claim to the property. 68
inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning,61 as if it had
never been entered into.62 It is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in At the very least, the City should have caused the annotation of the alleged Deed
civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. 63 on TCT No. 671 immediately after August 16, 1954 or shortly thereafter. Such
inscription would have been binding on petitioners, as Macario and Irene's
Void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court successors-in-interest, as well as on third parties.69
proceeding, including an ejectment suit.64 Thus:
In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, which involves an action for unlawful detainer, the Petitioners, as heirs of a registered owner of the subject property, have the
petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was already sold to them preferred or better right of possession
by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their defense and held that the
contract of sale was void because the agent did not have the written authority of Indeed, title to the subject property remains registered in the names of Macario
the owner to sell the subject land. and Gimenez. The alleged Deed of Donation does not appear to have been
registered and TCT No. 671 does not bear any inscription of said Deed.
Similarly, in Roberts v. Papio, a case of unlawful detainer, the Court declared that
the defense of ownership by the respondent therein was untenable. The contract The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners' superior right to possess
of sale invoked by the latter was void because the agent did not have the written the property in unlawful detainer cases.70 A fundamental principle in land
authority of the owner. A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor registration is that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
of anyone. incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the. person whose name appears
therein. It is conclusive evidence as regards ownership of the land therein
In Ballesteros v. Abion, which also involves an action for unlawful detainer, the described, and the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
Court disallowed the defense of ownership of the respondent therein because the property, including possession.71 Thus, the Court has time and again reiterated the
seller in their contract of sale was not the owner of the subject property. For age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a parcel of land is entitled
lacking an object, the said contract of sale was void ab initio.65 to possession thereof.72
Since void contracts cannot be the source of rights, the City has no possessory
It has likewise been constantly emphasized that when the property is registered
right over the subject property.66 In this light, to resolve whether to admit the copy
of the purported Deed of Donation as secondary evidence will be futile as the under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed
instrument in any case produces no legal effect. legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful
detainer.73 It has even been held that it does not even matter if the party's title to
the property is questionable.74
Circumstances controverting the City's right of possession based on the
alleged donation
Furthermore, it has been held that a certificate of title has a superior probative
Other cogent facts and circumstances of substance engender veritable doubts as value as against that of an unregistered deed of conveyance in ejectment
cases.75Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel,76involving an unlawful detainer
to whether the City has a better right of possession over the subject property than
case, is on point; it instructs:
petitioners, as heirs of Mariano and Irene, based on the purported Deed of
In any case, [W]e sustain the appellate court's finding that the respondents have
Donation.67
the better right to possess the subject property. As opposed to the unregistered
Existence of approved subdivision Plan LRC Psd-9671 with technical descriptions h. Utilities in general. - Unless street areas are conveyed to the city or
for Block 4 with 19 lots, Block 10 with 28 lots; Block 11 with 40 lots; Block 12 with municipality, the approval of a subdivision plan binds the subdivider and his
19 lots; Block 13 with 3 lots; Block 14 with 3 lots; Block 15 with 5 lots; Block 16 successors to permit all public utilities to use the streets for furnishing services to
with 25 lots; Block 17 with 18 lots; Block 18 with 38 lots Block 19 with 44 lots; the subdivision, in accordance with existing municipal or city regulations.90
Block 20 with 45 lots; Block 21 with 11 lots, Block 22 with 9 lots; Block 23 with 18
lots; Block 24 with 17 lots; Block 25 City Hall Site and Block 26 Market Site; Sec. 19. Approval.
Road lots No. 10 to 30 cannot be disposed without prior approval of the court. Date
of order Aug. 23, 1962. Inscribed September 13, 1962 10:35 a.m. xxxx
h. Dedication of streets, highways and ways — The approval of the Final Plan by
(Sgd) ROLANDO G. ALBERTO the Commission shall not be deemed to constitute or effect an acceptance by
the government of the dedication of any street, or other proposed public way
Reg. of Deeds, Naga City85 or space shown on the Plat. The subdivider may, if he so desires, offer to
dedicate all streets, highways, and other ways shown in the approved Final Plat
(Emphasis ours) for public use, but the government may, at its discretion, or upon the
The City had represented to the CA that the Subdivision Plan had been approved recommendation of the National Urban Planning Commission, accept only such
by the National Planning Commission and the then Court of First Instance. 86 No streets, highways and other ways as it deems necessary for public
evidence has been adduced to show that as so approved, the Subdivision Plan purposes. It shall be the duty of the subdivider to improve, repair and maintain all
indicated areas within Blocks 25 and 26 for use as parks, playgrounds or other streets, highways and other ways in the subdivision until their dedication to
recreational purposes. public use is accepted by the government.91 (Emphasis ours)
Parenthetically, even under PD 957, specifically Section 31,92 it was optional on
There is likewise no debate that the subject property is in fact used as the site of the part of the owner or developer of the subdivision to donate the roads and open
the City Hall and other government offices. During the pre-trial conference, the space found therein. Furthermore, under PD 1216, "(t)he-transfer of ownership
parties stipulated that four hectares of the subject property are occupied by the from the subdivision owner-developer to the local government is not automatic but
City Hall and other government agencies.87 While one hectare of the subject requires a positive act from the owner-developer before the city or municipality can
property is admittedly occupied by the Naga Civic Center,88 it has not been acquire dominion over the subdivision roads," such that "until and unless the roads
established that it comprises public open space as contemplated in the Subdivision are donated, ownership remains with the owner-developer."93
Regulations.
The City's reliance on the 1991 White Plains case is misplaced. The case involved
In any event, the City cannot successfully invoke the Subdivision Regulations as Road Lot 1 in the White Plains Subdivision, which had been set aside for the
basis to demand vested proprietary rights over the subject property. Contrary to its proposed Highway 38 of Quezon City. The Court held therein that said road was
position that roads as well as open space in subdivisions instantly belong to the thus withdrawn from the commerce of man as the open space required by law to
government without need of compensation or any overt act of donation, the be devoted for public use, and its ownership was automatically vested in the
Subdivision Regulations indicate that local governments did not automatically Quezon City Government and/or the Republic of the Philippines without need of
become the owner of roads and open space in subdivisions within their jurisdiction compensating the developer, the donation thereof being a mere formality.
and a positive act of conveyance or dedication was necessary to vest ownership in However, as explained by this Court Albon v. Mayor Fernando:94
the city or municipality, thus:
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The ruling in the 1991 White Plains Association decision relied on by both the trial City as the City Hall and market sites within the subdivision, which offer the City
and appellate courts was modified by this Court in 1998 in White Plains clearly had the option to refuse. In fact, the Subdivision's General Manager, Lopez
Association v. Court of Appeals. Citing Young v. City of Manila, this Court held in Jr., appeared to have written to Macario essentially asking him to defer the
its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to donation because while the Municipal Board accepted their offer, they had
the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation. 95 considered "other and better alternative sites near the National Highway."101
Furthermore, in Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc.,96 where the
1991 White Plainscase was similarly applied by the trial court in holding that a The "power of eminent domain" has been defined thus:
The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the sovereign power
subdivision road automatically belonged to the government, the Court ruled:
In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the road lots in to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty, to public purpose."102 (Emphasis ours)
a private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first
acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a
[E]minent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency,
public road. Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner-
as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of
developer.
sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
Contrary to the position of petitioners, the use of the subdivision roads by the provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather
than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described
general public does not strip it of its private character. The road is not converted
as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that
into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's
may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of
passage through it. To repeat, the local government should first acquire them by
a forced purchase by the State.103 (Emphasis ours)
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road. 97
In the instant case, there was no such appropriation or condemnation or forced
Petitioners cannot simply demand just compensation in lieu of recovering
purchase to speak of. The City was not propelled by an imperative need to take
possession as there was no expropriation
the subject property for a public purpose. The City, in taking possession of the
Invoking the case of Alfonso v. Pasay City,97 as cited in Republic v. Court of subject property, was not exercising a sovereign function-as expropriator. In this
Appeals,98 the City argued that recovering possession of the subject property is no light, the Alfonso ruling cannot be applied to petitioners.
longer feasible because it is now occupied and used by the City Hall and other
The City is not entitled to the rights of a builder in good faith
government offices, so that petitioners' remedy is merely to demand payment of
just compensation.
By law, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title
The Court's exact pronouncement in Alfonso states: or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.104 The essence of good faith
As registered owner, (Alfonso) could bring an action to recover possession at any lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim,
and absence of intention to overreach another.105
time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land. However,
said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor
By these standards, the City cannot be deemed a builder in good faith.
feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes. So, the only relief
available is for the City of Pasay to make due compensation, which it could and
should have done years ago since 1925.99 The evidence shows that the contract for the construction of the City Hall by the
Subdivision was an integral component of the latter's offer of donation, constituting
It will be noted, however, that in the cases thus invoked, and in other' cases where an essential condition for the intended conveyance. Thus, by their July 30, 1954
the Court made a similar ruling,100 the government took the property in the letter106 to the Naga City Mayor, the Subdivision and the registered owners of the
exercise of its power of eminent domain. This case clearly involves a different subject property submitted their "amended offer to construct the City Hall for Naga
factual milieu as the subject property was not expropriated by the government. It City within the premises of the subdivision." The letter stated that the City Hall
had been offered by its owners-developers, under certain terms, for donation to the would be erected on not less than two hectares of the five-hectare land to be
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donated by Macario and Gimenez to the City. It also proposed a financing scheme proposal made by Mayor Monico Imperial for the city to buy the land we offered to
for the construction of the City Hall, the construction cost not to exceed P150,000. them.
It is, thus, readily apparent that the construction contract was the impetus for the
offer of donation, and that such offer was made to persuade the City to award the Considering the lapse of time and until now, no clear actions have been made by
contract to the Subdivision. the city, I suggest you take whatever appropriate actions on this matter the
soonest possible time.114
On August 11, 1954, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89107 accepting
The foregoing circumstances ineluctably show that the City knew of a substantial
the Subdivision's July 30, 1954 offer as amended by Lopez Jr.'s oral flaw in its claim over the subject property. The proposed donation was conditioned
representations in the Board's open session as regards the financing aspect of the on the award of the construction contract to the Subdivision. By its Resolution No.
transaction. Consequently, Macario and Gimenez delivered possession of the
89, the City accepted the proposal with all its conditions. Thus, the City could not
subject property to the City government of Naga.108
have been unaware that by awarding the same construction contract to Sabaria, it
no longer had any cause to continue occupying the subject property as the
However, on January 20, 1959, the Municipal Board issued Resolution No.
condition for the proposed donation had not been satisfied. Accordingly, it should
11109 authorizing the City Mayor to enter into a contract with Sabaria for the have vacated the subject property. However, it stayed on and allowed Sabaria to
construction of the City Hall. undertake the construction.
That the Subdivision would, by its July 30, 1954 proposal, undertake the
Furthermore, Macario's September 17, 1959 and May 14, 1968 letters showed that
construction is evident from Lopez Jr.'s letter110 of August 23, 1954 informing
Mayor Imperial had proposed that the Naga City government would just buy the
Macario that he would defer the "making of the plans of the building" until the
subject property from him and Gimenez. Said letters also indicated that Macario
location of the City Hall was settled. That the construction contract was the had long been waiting for the City to act on this proposal but the latter had not
condition for the proposed donation finds support in Macario's September 17, 1959 taken any action. The City, in the meantime, continued to enjoy possession of the
letter111 to Mayor Imperial and May 14, 1968112 letter to Lopez Jr. which indicated
subject property and subsequently allowed other government agencies to build
that in February 1959, or the month after the construction contract was awarded to
their offices in the premises. The proposal, however, was never brought to fruition
Sabaria, Mayor Imperial proposed for the Naga City government to "buy instead"
by the City.
the subject property.
It cannot, thus, be said that the City was of an honest belief that it had a valid right
Macario's September 17, 1959 letter to Mayor Imperial reads:
to the subject property or that its actions had not overreached the landowners.
Joe and I would like to know from you the status of your proposal you have
Accordingly, it cannot be considered to have acted in good faith.
intimated to us during our meeting last February at my residence regarding your
offer for the city government of Naga to buy instead the parcels of land which we
Articles 449 and 450 of the Civil Code provide:
contemplated to donate to the city as city hall and market site. Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right of indemnity.
It has been long since then our last conversation regarding your proposal and have
not heard any positive development from you.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown
in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing
Please advice [sic] us soonest and hope this be given preferential action by your
be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of
Office.113 the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to
His May 14, 1968 letter to Lopez Jr. in turn reads: pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Please be advised to disregard all my previous letters and instructions to you
Thus, petitioners, as hereditary successors of the registered owners of the subject
regarding the donation of the city hall and market sites to the City of Naga. Kindly
property, have the right to appropriate what has been built on the property, without
make immediate representation to the City Mayor and insist on the previous
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any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, and the City has no right to a refund of Given these circumstances, the Court is not disposed to conclude that there was
any improvement built therein.116 an unreasonable or unexplained delay that will render petitioners' claim stale.
The CA ruled that Macario's May 14, 1968 letter was a mere photocopy and could In contrast, the City, despite its claim of having acquired the subject property by
not thus be received as secondary evidence absent a clear showing that its donation in 1954, has itself failed to have the same transferred in its name for a
original had been lost or destroyed. The Court notes, however, that this letter, long period of time. Indeed, the subject property remains registered in the name of
along with Macario's September 17, 1959 missive, were offered by petitioners and petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner.
admitted by the MTC117 without any objection from the City either as to their
admissibility or the purposes for which they were submitted. The rule is that an action to recover possession of a registered land never
prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no
It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be title to registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired
validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 118 This is true even if by by prescription or adverse possession. It follows that a registered owner's action to
its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it recover a real property registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe. 122
had been challenged at the proper time.119 Once admitted without objection, even
though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject Thus, it has been consistently held that registered owners have the right to evict
it.120Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property of the any person unlawfully occupying their property, and this right is imprescriptible and
case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or can never be barred by laches.123 Even if it be supposed that they were aware of
unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence.121 the occupant's possession of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property
Neither laches nor prescription had set in at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at
all.124
It is settled that:
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of Moreover, it is well settled that the rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been only applies to the registered owner but extends to the heirs of the registered
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, owner as well. As explained in Mateo v. Diaz,125 prescription is unavailing not only
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned against the registered owner, but also against his hereditary successors because
or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or the latter step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.126 Consequently,
circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of petitioners, as heirs of registered landowner Macario, cannot be barred by
the court. Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by prescription from claiming possession of the property.
equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate
fraud or injustice.122 Restitution of premises, reasonable rent and attorney's fees
By his September 17, 1959 and May 14, 1968 letters, Macario has been shown to
Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
have taken steps to have the City act on Mayor Imperial's proposal to "buy
Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the
instead" the subject property. His efforts were overtaken, by his death three years
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution
later in 1971. Furthermore, as the RTC found, petitioners had been engaged in
litigation to establish their right to inherit from Macario and Irene, and it was of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
Danilo's discovery of the subject property, following the issuance to him of letters compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and
costs. x x x
of administration over Irene's estate in 1997, that prompted them to issue a
demand for the City to vacate the premises. Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to the return of
the property and to recover damages, which refer to "rents" or "the reasonable
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compensation for the use and occupation of the premises," or the "fair rental value
of the property" and attorney's fees and costs. More specifically, recoverable The fair rental value is to be reckoned from the time of the demand to
damages are "those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, vacate.134 The City received two demand letters from petitioners; the second
or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property."127 "extend(ed)" its stay in the subject property for another two months from the
30th day of the month when it received the initial demand letter on September 10,
The RTC granted petitioners' prayer for a monthly rental of P2.5 million (or P50.00 2003.135 Thus, the reasonable rent was due not from November 3, 2003 as the CA
per square meter) as reasonable compensation for the City's use and occupation declared in its March 7, 2011 Decision, but from November 30, 2003, and should
of the subject property from November 30, 2003 until the premises are actually be paid until the subject property is vacated.
vacated. However, in its March 7, 2011 Decision, the CA reduced the monthly
rental to P500,000.00 (or P10.00 per square meter), holding that: The Court agrees with the CA's holding in its March 7, 2011 Decision that the
The very reason why the monthly rental of the premises surrounding the City Hall amount due to petitioners shall only be half of the reasonable rent as the subject
is as high as that pegged by the lower appellate court (at Php 50.00 per square property was co-owned by Macario with Gimenez. Absent proof to the contrary, the
meter or Php 2,500,000.00 for the 50,000 square meters), is the presence of the portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
local government at the site. It should not, therefore, be burdened too much in the equal.136
computation of the monthly rental when it has contributed in a major way in making
the area an upscale one. Thus, the Court submits that the monthly rental of Php As regards attorney's fees, the RTC awarded the same in the amount of
500,000.00 is just equitable under the circumstances.128 P587,159.60 or 10% of the property's market value based on the tax declarations.
In its March 7, 2011 Decision, the CA reduced the award to P200,000.00 on
There is logic in the CA's ratiocination that the presence of the local government in
equitable grounds, considering the extent of legal services rendered by petitioners'
the subject property enhanced the value of real estate in its vicinity. The Court,
however, cannot lose sight of the fact that the City's occupation of the subject counsel.137
property has been blighted by bad faith. The benefit to the real estate values had
The Court finds either award to be excessive. Indubitably, petitioners were
been at the expense of the rights of Macario and Gimenez and their successors-in-
constrained to litigate to protect their interest.138 However, considering the
interest.
circumstances of the case, including the summary139nature of an unlawful detainer
Furthermore, it has been held that the reasonable compensation contemplated in proceeding, the Court holds that an award of P75,000.00 as attorney's fees is fair
Section 17, Rule 70 "partakes of the nature of actual damages." While the court and reasonable.
may fix the reasonable amount of rent, it must base its action on the evidence
Decision is binding on privies or parties deriving possession from the City
adduced by the parties. The Court has defined "fair rental value" as the amount at
which a willing lessee would pay and a willing lessor would receive for the use of a
In its March 7, 2011 Decision, the CA held that the government offices occupying
certain property, neither being under compulsion and both parties having a
reasonable knowledge of all facts, such as the extent, character and utility of the the subject property, other than the City government of Naga, could not be ordered
property, sales and holding prices of similar land and the highest and best use of to vacate the same because they were not parties to the case.
the property.129
Jurisprudence, however, instructs that:
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in
Petitioners based their prayer for a P50.00 rental rate on the P110.00 monthly rent
personam. x x x Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
per square meter under a 2004 lease contract over another property situated near
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule
the subject premises.130 The burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is
admits of the exception, such that even a non-party may be bound by the
unconscionable or exorbitant rests upon the City. 131 The City, however, has not
judgment in an ejectment suitwhere he is any of the following: (a) trespasser,
adduced controverting evidence as to the. fair rental value of the premises. 132 All
squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate
things considered, the Court finds petitioners' prayer for compensation at less than
the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the
half the rate indicated in said lease contract to be reasonable. 133
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defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) PARDO, J.:
member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.140 (Emphasis ours)
Exceptions (b) and (f) are clearly applicable. There is no dispute that the The case before the Court is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
government offices were allowed by the City to occupy the subject property. Appeals 1 setting aside the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Deriving their possession from the City, they are unmistakably the City's privies in (SEC) 2 declaring respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying a temporary
the occupation of the premises.141 Thus, they too are bound by the judgment in this restraining order issued to respondents to desist from holding a stockholders
case. meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation.
It must be stressed that the ruling in this case is limited only to the determination of On June 28, 1996, SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of
who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a Interport Resources Corporation, directed respondent Ricalde to submit to the
final determination on the issue of ownership and, thus, will not bar or prejudice an SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite time and place for the validation of
action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such proxies and nominations for directors of the firm.
action is brought seasonably before the proper forum.143
On the same date, June 28, 1996, the SEC issued a temporary restraining order
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Amended
(TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding the July 9, 1996
Decision dated July 20, 2011 is SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 20, 2005 of
scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders.
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26 of Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC 2005-0030
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that: (a) petitioners shall be paid only
half of the adjudged monthly rental of P2,500,000; and (b) the award of attorney's Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the meeting on
fees is reduced to P75,000. July 9, 1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay.
SO ORDERED. On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport
Resources Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and void and directed
respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to show
cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them or why they should
not be cited in contempt.
CONTEMPT
At the hearing on July 15, 1996, respondent Manalaysay questioned the validity of
G.R. No. 129521 September 7, 1999 the TRO as well as the contempt proceedings in light of the TRO issued by the
Court of Appeals restraining the SEC from enforcing its TRO. 3
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R.
YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER After the hearing, on July 15, 1996, the SEC issued an order stating:
MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN, petitioners,
vs.
xxx xxx xxx
MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P.
MANALAYSAY, respondents.
VIEWED in this light Atty. Cesar Manalaysay, Manuel D. Recto
and Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde are hereby DECLARED GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT and are correspondingly ORDERED to pay a fine of
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TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos each upon finality of this SO ORDERED.
Order for willfully disobeying and disregarding the July 8, 1996
Order of this Commission. Atty. Cesar Manalaysay is likewise (s/t) ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO
BARRED from practicing his law profession before this
commission for a period of sixty (60) days from date hereof and
Associate Justice
Mr. Recto and Atty. Ricalde are, by this ORDER, prohibited and
barred from acting as President/Chairman and Secretary
respectively of Interport Resources, Inc. within the same period. (s/t) ARTEMON D. LUNA
This Order shall be immediately executory unless otherwise
restrained by a court of competent jurisdiction. Associate Justice
(s/t) PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR. On May 2, 1997, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
However, on June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Chairman
Hence, this appeal.
(s/t) FE ELOISA C. GLORIA
On September 10, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the
Associate Commissioner petition within ten (10) days from notice. 6 On October 7, 1997, respondents filed
their comment. 7 In the main, respondents submit that contempt is criminal in
character and their exoneration from a charge of contempt amounts to an acquittal
(s/t) EDIJER A. MARTINEZ from which an appeal would not lie. 8
Associate Commissioner4
At issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred, as a matter of
law, in setting aside the order of the SEC finding respondents guilty of contempt for
In due time, respondents appealed from the aforesaid order to the Court of disobeying its temporary restraining order to desist from holding the annual
Appeals. stockholders meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9,
1996.
After due proceedings, on April 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision reversing and setting aside the SEC order declaring respondents guilty of We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a
contempt. The dispositive portion reads: criminal offense. 9 The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to
an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Order dated
July 15, 1996, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the
failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A
The cash bond of P50,000.00 may be withdrawn by petitioners. criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the
court. 10
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Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents was civil in nature, While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, 18 the salutary rule
as the temporary restraining order the SEC issued was for the benefit of a party to is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
a case. The contention is untenable. vindictive principle, 19 and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. 20 The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt
"Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal,
nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but
essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required." 11 "In general, for the functions that they exercise. 21
civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his
successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. There was no
protected." 12 If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the charge filed by a private party aggrieved by the acts of respondents. Strictly
power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's temporary restraining order.
to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal The Court of Appeals enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in
cases. The State is the real prosecutor. 13 proceeding with the scheduled stock-holders' meeting was not contumacious as
there was no willful disobedience to an order of the SEC. 22 The disobedience
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by which the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at
the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience. 23
as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose
is primarily compensatory or remedial." 14 The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. The
chairman and commissioners of the SEC must exercise the power of contempt
"But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint. 24
acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the
purpose only of determining the character of punishment to be administered." 15 Finally, the penalty imposed exceeded those authorized in the powers of the
SEC 25 in relation to the 1964 Revised Rules of Court as amended. 26 If the
In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate contempt was committed against a superior court or judge, the accused may be
the dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an fined not exceeding thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) or imprisoned not more
appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a than six (6) months, or both. The SEC suspended respondent Manalaysay from
27
charge of contempt." 16 the practice of law in the SEC, a power vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.
At any rate, the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why they should WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and
not be cited in contempt was highly improper. The Court of Appeals issued on July AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in GA-G.R. SP No. 41400,
8, 1996, a temporary restraining order against the order of the SEC of June 28, promulgated on April 14, 1997.1âwphi1.nêt
1996 directing the Interport Resources Corporation to desist from holding the
stockholders' meeting on July 9, 1996. Contrary to the view of petitioners, the No costs.
effect of the temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals directing the SEC
to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow such meeting to proceed as SO ORDERED.
scheduled. More, the Court of Appeals in its final decision nullified the SEC's
order. 17 Hence, there was no willful disobedience to a lawful order of the SEC.
Respondents were not guilty of contempt.
9. That if the act of issuing a traffic violation receipt for a traffic violation For his part, the respondent sheriff admitted that he personally served copies of
within the city limits of Mandaluyong City by the complainant is considered the respondent judge’s orders on the complainant, but averred that he was merely
by the respondents as an offense, then complainant should be tried for the performing his duties as deputy sheriff of the court. As such, he did not commit
said offense in Mandaluyong City, and not in Las Piñas City where the grave abuse of authority in the performance of his functions.10
respondent judge has no jurisdiction;
Thereafter, the complainant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbawi ng
10. That to the ordinary and lowly understanding of the undersigned Reklamo dated November 26, 2002, where he indicated that he was no longer
complainant, the acts of respondents in arresting him without any warrant interested in pursuing the administrative complaint against the respondent judge.
of arrest before a charge of indirect contempt is heard constitute the The complainant recanted his earlier claim, averring that the respondent judge’s
gravest ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents; and son did not in fact enter a one-way street and that he was standing by the
September 29, 1999 Affidavit he executed during the hearing. He then requested
11. That the manner the respondents are administering justice in Las that his complaint be duly withdrawn.11
Piñas City is despotic and barbaric in the sense that they take the law into
their own hands without due regard for the rights of the others.8 Pursuant to the recommendation12 of the Court Administrator, the Court, in a
Resolution13 dated April 2, 2003, resolved to (a) dismiss the instant administrative
The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez for lack of merit; and (b) refer the matter
the service. against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals for raffle among the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation,
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
report and recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled to Associate Justice (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting
Lucas P. Bersamin. The Investigating Justice, thereafter, submitted his Sealed as such without authority;
Report dated February 26, 2004.
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
According to the Investigating Justice, although the complainant never appeared to
prove the charges against the respondent judge, the facts averred in the complaint (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
appear to be substantially correct and true. Thus, the respondent judge abused his custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court
authority to charge and punish any person for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of held by him.
the Rules of Civil Procedure.14 The Investigating Justice recommended that the
respondent be admonished and warned, pursuant to Section 10(1), Rule 140 of
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
the Rules of Court, and Section 11(c) of the same rule.
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
The respondent judge anchors the justification of his acts against the complainant
on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings
a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. 15 Indeed, the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with the court’s orderly
process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given to the
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for
official duties or in his official transactions; the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the
good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. 16 And,
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt power, however plenary it may
or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly.17 A judge should never allow
being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters of his duties.18
or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s
person adjudged to be entitled thereto; Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that the
complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident
or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under involving the respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the
section 1 of this Rule; complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the
same was refused by some staff member in the latter’s sala.19
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; In Cortes v. Bangalan,20 we held that a judge may not hold a party in contempt of
court for expressing concern on the judge’s impartiality through a motion for
Page 488 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
voluntary inhibition, even if the latter may have felt insulted therein. The Court also apprehension because he was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the
declared, thus: respondent Judge would have no grounds to cite Sison for contempt of
court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have
…[W]hile the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to challenged the issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the
preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and
justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers also administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed.
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately
utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation not for accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of
retaliation and vindication.21 the driver’s license after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines
corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows that the respondent
Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead of Sison.
We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge
should have refrained from ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant,
since the incident involved his own son, and the matter was very personal to him. …[T]he respondent Judge claimed at the hearing that his son "was at that
The fact that the respondent judge insisted that the complainant personally file his time working with (sic) me as my personal driver;" and that his errand was
comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the to secure some papers from the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City involved
Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was deliberately in a "personal case" which the respondent Judge had "filed against a bank
inserted so that the respondent could confront and harass the complainant.22 for specific performance and damages, and since I just suffered a mild
stroke at that time, specifically on June 10, 1999, and the incident took
We also agree with the following ruminations of Justice Bersamin: place (sic) September, I could not at that time personally go to Pasig to
secure the documents I needed for the next hearing of the case so I had to
send my son."
…[T]he respondent judge obviously resented the refusal of Sison to let off
Caoibes III from the traffic violation apprehension. The refusal of Sison
The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate
was apparently aggravated by the son’s reporting to the father that Sison
had supposedly made the remarks of Walang judge, judge Caoibes sa basis by which to consider Sison’s apprehension of his son as indirect
contempt. As indicated earlier, the act complained against must be any of
akin; Kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko. …
those specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires that the person
... obstructed should be performing a duty connected with judicial functions.
As such, the respondent Judge acted oppressively and vindictively.
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks
of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose
of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law herein that Caoibes III, already 25 years at the time of the apprehension,
and its representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed was serving his father as the latter’s personal driver, albeit not officially
remarks should not cause resentment on the part of the respondent Judge employed in the Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be
(whom Sison most likely did not yet know at the time) because he knew, doing anything for his father at the time of his apprehension but was in the
as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing place for his own purposes.23
evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way
street from the wrong direction, regardless of the office or position of the
violator’s father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which
circumspection expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01
Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s attempt to bluffhis way out of the of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that "a judge should so behave at
In the course of the proceedings, or on July 9, 2001, Judge Dolores L. Español, Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT
petitioner, issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is
treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, hereby cancelled, it having been derived from another spurious title with
respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when it TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on
(Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting of title. Consequently, December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise
petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded
confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation with respect to the two (2)
titles for cancellation and to the Assessor’s Office of the Municipality of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious
Petitioner’s Order is partly reproduced as follows:
instruments.
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds
that the instant case is a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED
deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through the extensive use of WITH PREJUDICE, whereas, the private defendant’s counterclaims, which
need further substantiation, are likewise dismissed. However, the said
falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel, Atty.
private defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s)
Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and even the
of action in the interest of justice.
Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private group on one hand, and
some officials and employees of the government agencies responsible for
the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other. SO ORDERED.
Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt,
the Courts are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting
personal gain. of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and
damages filed with the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, presided by then Judge
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified Lucenito N. Tagle.2 Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge’s Decision
document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101 declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and
[1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito See that respondents are responsible therefor.
and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy of
this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents. They
Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty. were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. That same day,
Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they
Confidant’s Office, Supreme Court. Manila. were denied outright by petitioner.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas
Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of
for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in contempt for Appeals granted the petition.
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Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in
dispositive portion of which reads: the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch,
and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign.6 This concept was
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, finding the instant petition to adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. In this
be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. Respondent judge’s July 9, jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the inherent power to
2001 Order, insofar as it declared herein petitioners in direct contempt and punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees
ordered their incarceration for ten (10) days, as well as the Warrant of the very stability of the judicial institution.7 Such stability is essential to the
Arrest, dated July 12, 2001, and the Order of Commitment, dated July 13, preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments,
2001, which the respondent judge issued against the persons of the herein orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very administration
petitioners, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. of justice.8
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking cognizance of the SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of
Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was not misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are guilty as answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
charged. lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by
such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding
same in its Resolution of November 15, 2001.
two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
it be a lower court.
Hence, this petition.
In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one done "in the
The basic question before us is whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of
are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents when Sharcons justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished
filed its complaint for quieting of title. summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may be summarily adjudged in
direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of
The early case of In re Jones3 defined contempt of court as "some act or conduct the act of contumely.
which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some
lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court
and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same." It has also been described as
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After
"a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with
or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation."4 Simply put, it is respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. 5 court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
MENDOZA, J.: On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN
news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, as follows:
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Atty. Diokno
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No.
199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long.
disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng La'O (La ‘O) is one of Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng sasakyan
the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang nangyari
Diokno) is her counsel therein. na yon e tapos na, patay na.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and Ernesto Manzano
146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan,
et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming
where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang nagbigay ng
cases involve an incident which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu- hatol.
Unjieng (son of respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony
Page 494 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them
liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for
Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa yong kasi their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly
kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant because they to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He argues that their
protected him all these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so pronouncements and malicious comments delved not only on the supposed
confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering so many innocent inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the merits of the
individuals. criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-
accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position that the press conference
Atty. Diokno was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of influencing the decision
of the Court in the petition filed before it and the outcome of the criminal cases
before the RTC by drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident
Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company have and the Atimonan incident.
never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the Ortigas
rubout, instead they were commended by their superiors and some like Marantan
were even promoted to our consternation and disgust. Ang problema po e The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation of the sub
judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of their desires, hopes
hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011,
and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede, obstruct
humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon
or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent
wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag
was shown as the utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair
charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na they were killed
indiscriminately and maliciously. comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition is
intended to stifle legitimate speech.
Atty. Diokno
The petition must fail.
Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen
who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is involved in The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
the Atimonan killings – still roam free and remain unpunished. Mr. President, while
obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one
we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that police rub-out will not stop until
liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, 4 which
you personally intervene.
reads:
Ernesto Manzano
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
xxx
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us, I mean degrade the administration of justice[.]
everything shows that they were murdered.
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. 5 This
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner) form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the
court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
Page 495 of 507
Cases – Special Civil Actions (Part 1)
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that
element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 6 complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since
the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that insult on the dignity of the Court either.
such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of
justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court "A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. 8 The specific rationale for freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still
the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice."12 By no stretch of the
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be imagination could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.91âwphi1 to the administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct respondents.
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the
impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against
important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the a possible tendency to influence pending cases.13 The power to punish for
independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two unless necessary in the interest of justice.14 In the present case, such necessity is
rights.10 wanting.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present SO ORDERED.
danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of
speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of
court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat.11 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the
merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,
as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. vs.
JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an
expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This DECISION
is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls
the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no MENDOZA, J.:
malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument
in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.
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For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then
Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, 2 referring the complaint filed by Jill M.
Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his
Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for actuations.
investigation, report and recommendation.
Comment of Judge Paredes
The Facts
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes of Jill. He stated thatJudge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of
with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended
during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, sanctionsagainst Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get
Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never
Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of
Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City, as the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge
one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a
also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other
judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds;
that the marriage scams werealso discussed during meetings of RTC judges and
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about
once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have past and resolvedcases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that
included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis),son of Judge there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge
Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict."4 She was absent from class at Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were
that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal
informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate
decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe resented his advice.
in Tacloban City.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not
Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative
Tormis"5 (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention of the
(6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying
release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and thatdrug
before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested thatFrancis
therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand. should be removed from the judiciary.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee
committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it
accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) for is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be appointed as court
the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, "People of the employees. JudgeTormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a
position in the judiciary.
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Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator
personally accepted a cash bail bond of 6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues
Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record then. Considering the
was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-blown investigation should be
allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on conducted by the CA.
weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he
merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court
and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu
Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was receipt of the records.11
not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only
in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by,
Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the administrative hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective
cases of Judge Tormiscould not be the subject of an administrative complaint memoranda of the parties.
because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge
Reply of the Complainant Tormis’ cases in class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity,
impropriety and lack of delicadezabordering on oppressive and abusive conduct,
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates.
had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made
leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because she administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of his official
could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of whatwas
brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his
administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in everyday life.
the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes,
the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he discussed
still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases were the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case
confidential in nature. was still being investigated; that the administrative case relative to the marriage
scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Executive Judge ofthe MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the
Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a "drug addict." Guiguiocase; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was
unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu
City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from
committing the acts complained of. In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was
reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the
not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was
marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when
already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal
publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence,
Justice of Cebu City. every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights,
IMPARTIALITY Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the CANON 4
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor PROPRIETY
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial
of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or xxx
obstructing the administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out
in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
thatfacts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.23 Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the
involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a
yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the
whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and
Court only on April 2, 2013.24In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
self-restraint. Heshould choose his words and exercise more caution and control
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting
inexpressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-
in contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic
that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in
Conduct.
conduct and in language.26
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety
Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a
objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the
magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did
not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class
discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose
that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no
on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound," 25 as relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated
Justice Diy put it. his intention to taint their reputations.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his committed grave misconduct when he personally received cash bailbond in
class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he
expected of him asa judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No.
his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on
Code mandates: Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and
special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the
CANON 2 executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and
INTEGRITY issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely
followed said procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his act of
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.
to the personal demeanor of judges.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith
in the integrity of the judiciary.1âwphi1Justice must not merely be done but must arrest.
also be seen to be done. (Emphases supplied)
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive
judges are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the
necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court
court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be
administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers
emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge
mustbe free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his incidental to his functions as anExecutive Judge since he was the only judge
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as a private individual. available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for
Custodio alleges that clearly the composition of the membership of the School had Subsequently, on January 31, 2002, Mojica and Pascual formally resigned from
no basis there being no formal admission as members nor election as officers. their administrative posts. As such as a replacement, Atty. Eleuterio A. Pascual
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from receipt WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby ordered to
hereof, to submit a reportand to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money comply with the mandate contained in the order[s] dated March 24 and August 5,
collected by them, more particularly: 2003.
1. ₱4,339,607.54 deposited in the Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural Defendants are further directed toinform the court of the total amount of the funds
Bank of General Trias, Inc.); deposited reserved for teachers’ retirement, and in what bank and under what
account the same is deposited.25
2. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 (Rural
Bank of General Trias, Inc.); Dissatisfied with the rulings made by the trial court, petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for the issuance
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen; of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to nullify, for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003; of jurisdiction, the Orders dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8,
2003 that were issued by the trial court.
5. Accounting on how and how muchdefendants are paying Ms. Daisy
However, the Court of Appeals frustrated petitioners’ move through the issuance of
Romero and three (3) other teachers who already resigned.18
the assailed September 16, 2005 Decision which dismissed outright petitioners’
special civil action for certiorari. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was
On April 18, 2003, petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, also thwarted by the Court of Appeals in the assailed October 9,2006 Resolution.
Exception and Motion to the March 24, 2003 Order of the trial court which contests
the inclusion of specific funds to be turned over to Reynante.19
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and submitted the following issues for
consideration in their Memorandum 26 dated October 3, 2007:
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A. accepting from respondent the requisite bond that is required under the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE On the other hand, respondent maintains that the manner of the issuance of the
TRIAL COURT HAD NOT DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN assailed Orders of the trial court did not violate the due process rights of
ISSUING ITS ORDERS OF 5 AUGUST 2003, 21 AUGUST 2003 AND 8 petitioners. Respondent also claims that a valid ground for the issuance of the
OCTOBER 2003. assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 did exist and that the alleged
failure of the trial court to require the posting of a bond prior to the issuance of a
B. status quoorder was mooted by the assailed Order dated October 8, 2003 which
required respondent and Reynante to file a bond in the amount of ₱300,000.00
each.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN We find the petition to be partly meritorious.
DISREGARDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR INTRACORPORATE CONTROVERSIES PERTAINING TO In the case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary,30 we reiterated what grave abuse of
THE ISSUANCE OF A STATUS QUOORDER AND THE REQUIREMENTS discretion means in this jurisdiction, to wit:
THEREOF.27
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
On the other hand, respondent puts forward the following arguments in her judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
Memorandum28 dated October 9, 2007: enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS WAS CORRECT WHEN IT RULED be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
THAT THE TRIAL COURT (RTC Br. 21) HAD NOT DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING ITS ORDERS OF 5 AUGUST 2003, 21 AUGUST
2003 AND 8 OCTOBER 2003. With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in jurisprudence that
while it is true that the right to due process safeguards the opportunity to be heard
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS WAS CORRECT WHEN IT RULED and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense, the
THAT THE TRIAL COURT (RTC Br. 21) DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF Court has time and again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either
DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A STATUS QUOORDER.29 through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its
side" or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due process
because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.31
In fine, the sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion inissuing the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003, August 21,
2003 and October 8, 2003. In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due process by the trial
court when it issued the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003
and October 8, 2003. The records would show that petitioners were given the
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed September 16, 2005
opportunity to ventilate their arguments through pleadings and that the same
Decision, failed to consider that no adequate proceedings had been accorded to
the petitioners by the trial court for the exercise of its right to be heard on the pleadings were acknowledged in the text of the questioned rulings. Thus,
matters subject of the questioned Orders. Furthermore, petitioners point out that petitioners cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on
the basis of denial of due process.
the Court of Appeals erroneously gave its imprimatur to the trial court’s issuance of
the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 without first requiring and
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However, with respect to the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003, possession of which was given by the trial court to respondent and
we find that the trial court has failed to comply with the pertinent procedural rules Reynante.1âwphi1 It was never intended and can never be considered as the
regarding the issuance of a status quo order. requisite security, in compliance with the express directive of procedural law, for
the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003. In any event, there is
Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the nothing on record to indicate that respondent had complied with the posting of the
last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the bond as directed in the October 8, 2003 Order except for the respondent’s
controversy. It further states that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a unsubstantiated claim to the contrary as asserted in her Memorandum.33
preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and
desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which
prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.32 in fact seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court: i.e., the application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quoorder in an intra-corporate bond.34 In the present case, the Manifestation and Motion, through which
suit such asthe case at bar is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules respondent applied for injunctive relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was
of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which reads: merely signed by her counsel and was unverified.
SECTION 1. Provisional remedies. - A party may apply for any of the provisional In conclusion, we rule that no grave abuse of discretion was present in the
remedies provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the purposes. issuance of the assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial
However, no temporary restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save court. However, we find that the issuance of the assailed August 21, 2003 Status
in exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties and the posting of a bond. Quo Order was unwarranted for non-compliance with the rules. Therefore, the said
status quo order must be set aside.
In the case before us, the trial court’s August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order conflicted
with the rules and jurisprudence in the following manner: At this point, the Court finds it apropos to note that the Status Quo Order on its
face states that the same is effective until the application for the issuance of a
First, the directive to reinstate respondent to her former position as school director temporary restraining order is resolved. However, respondent's prayer for a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in her Complaint still
and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an act already
appears to be pending before the trial court. For this reason, the Court deems it
consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory
necessary to direct the trial court to resolve the same at the soonest possible time.
injunctive relief and not of a status quo order which is limited only to maintaining
the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which immediately
preceded the controversy. It must be remembered that respondentwas already WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
removed as trustee, member of the corporation and curriculum administrator by assailed Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 9,
the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. months 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79791 are hereby AFFIRMED in
prior to her filing of the present case in the trial court. part insofar as they upheld the assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003
Orders of the trial court. They are REVERSED with respect to the assailed August
Second, the trial court’s omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before 21, 2003 Status Quo Order which is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is further DIRECTED to resolve
the issuance of the Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 is in contravention
respondent's application for injunctive relief with dispatch.
with the express instruction of Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
for Intra-Corporate Controversies. Even the subsequent order to post a bond as
indicated in the assailed October 8, 2003 Order did not cure this defect because a SO ORDERED.
careful reading of the nature and purpose of the bond would reveal that it was
meant by the trial court as security solely for the teachers’ retirement fund, the
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