[G.R. No. 129774.
December 29, 1998] ground that the prosecution failed to present
NARCISO A. TADEO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant Ms. Luz M. Sison was the owner of
commercial apartments at 731 Edsa corner
Ermin Garcia, Cubao, Quezon City.
In 1985, petitioners wife leased from
complainant one unit of the apartment at a
monthly consideration of P7,000.00, for a
period of five years. After two years, she also
leased the adjacent apartment at an additional
monthly consideration of P4,000.00. However,
in early 1988, petitioners wife incurred rental
arrears with complainant in the amount
of P113,300.00. In order to settle the account,
petitioner negotiated with complainant. He
issued eight (8) postdated checks dated February
8, 1988 to August, 1988, payable to complainant
covering the unpaid rental arrears
of P113,300.00. All the checks bounced upon
deposit with the drawee bank. After the last
check was returned to complainant unpaid, with
the notation DAIF, meaning drawn against
insufficient funds stamped thereon, on October
13, 1988, complainants counsel wrote petitioner
demanding that the unpaid checks be redeemed
within three (3) days from receipt of the letter.
On October 26, 1988, petitioner wrote
complainant expressing willingness to discuss
the matter with her counsel. However, he did
not redeem the unpaid checks; indeed, he did
not even mention any intention to pay
complainant or to make arrangements for
payment of the dishonored checks.
On January 9, 1989, Assistant Prosecutor Jesus E.
Bigornia, Jr. of Quezon City, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, eight (8)
Informations charging petitioner with violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, which were
consolidated before Branch 94.
On March 29, 1993, at the trial of the cases, the
prosecution presented the testimony of
complainant Luz Sison to prove the charges
against petitioner. After her cross-examination,
the prosecution rested its case, and formally
offered the documentary exhibits marked at the
pre-trial.
On May 15, 1994, without prior leave of court,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence on the
sufficient evidence proving all the elements of
the offense charged. The prosecution filed an
opposition thereto. On November 27, 1994, the
trial court declared that there exists a prima
facie case after the prosecution has presented
its evidence and rested its case and accordingly
denied the demurrer to evidence for lack of
merit. On January 13, 1995, the trial court also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion when the court held that there exists
a prima facie case, disregarding the prosecutions
failure to present as witness a representative of
the drawee bank to testify on the dishonor of the
questioned checks.
HELD:
We do not agree.
It is not required, much less indispensable, for
the prosecution to present the drawee banks
representative as a witness to testify on the
dishonor of the checks because of insufficiency
of funds. The prosecution may present, as it did
in this case, only complainant as a witness to
prove all the elements of the offense charged.
She is a competent and qualified witness to
testify that she deposited the checks to her
account in a bank; that she subsequently
received from the bank the checks returned
unpaid with a notation drawn against
insufficient funds stamped or written on the
dorsal side of the checks themselves, or in a
notice attached to the dishonored checks duly
given to complainant, and that petitioner failed
to pay complainant the value of the checks or
make arrangements for their payment in full
within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such
checks had not been paid by the drawee bank.
Otherwise stated, complainant’s sole testimony
suffices to identify the dishonored checks with
the drawee banks notation stamped or written
on the dorsal side drawn against insufficient
funds or in a notice attached thereto and such
notice of dishonor given to the drawer. A legal
presumption arises that petitioner had
knowledge of the making of the checks, the due
presentment to the drawee bank for payment,
the dishonor and the reason therefor written,
stamped or notice of dishonor attached by the
drawee bank to the returned checks. Such prima
facie presumption proves that petitioner has
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. Unless
rebutted, the prosecution may rely on such
presumption to establish that element of the
offense charged. It is for petitioner, as accused,
to rebut the presumption, disputable as it
is. Otherwise, the presumption would be
sufficient basis to convict.
Consequently, in the case below, the
prosecution has proved all the essential
elements of the offense charged with the sole
testimony of complainant Luz Sison the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision.
[G.R. No. L-4265. March 26, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUIS
PASCUAL, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa,
as defined and penalized in paragraph 5 of article
535 of the Penal Code.
It was at the trial, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that to the prejudice of the complaining witness
the accused appropriated the sum of P310 which
had been intrusted to, and received by him with
the obligation of delivering it to a third person.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred to find him guilty of
the crime of estafa.
HELD:
We think that provisions clearly indicate that in
this class of estafas "deceit with intent to
defraud" in obtaining the money of other
personal property afterwards misappropriated is
not an essential requisite. Indeed, it is clear it
contemplates more especially those cases
wherein the money or other personal property
has been voluntarily intrusted to the offender,
without wrongdoing on his part in obtaining or
receiving it.
With regard to the persons accused in the
present case such fraudulent activity as is
employed by the guilty in order to obtain
possession of the thing, or to effect the fraud,
does not exists, or exists in but few cases and in
limited proportions. Imprudence,
barefacedness, covetousness, and disloyalty
employed in taking advantage of the
opportunity, take here the place formerly
occupied by deceit. It has been rightly stated by
the Supreme Court "that if the crime of estafa
generally contains the element of deceit, the one
specially defined in paragraph 5 of article 535 of
that of the Penal Code (equivalent to No. 5 of art.
535 of that for the Philippines) implies on the
part of the person committing it a more or less
serious abuse of confidence, it being the purpose
of the criminal to obtain a benefit, to the
prejudice or fraud of third persons, availing
himself of any of the means specified in the
code." (Decision of November 26, 1884;"
Commentaries on the Penal Code of 1870, vol. 5,
p. 16.)
It is true that it is sometimes said that "deception
with intent to defraud" is an essential requisite
of the crime of estafa, but while this is true as to
estafas in general, it is not true of those estafas
mentioned in the article under consideration,
except in so far the abuse of confidence in
misappropriating the funds or property after
they have come to the hands of the offender
may be said to be a fraud upon the person
injured thereby.
We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial
to the rights of the accused and the sentence
imposed is within the limits prescribed by law.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence of
the trial court should be, and are hereby,
affirmed.
G.R. No. L-38948 November 18, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TOMAS
MANANSALA, ET AL., defendants.
GALICANO ALON and RICARDO
CABRALES, appellants.
FACTS:
That on or about the 19th day of February, 1932,
in the municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan,
Province of Rizal, the said accused by means of
false and fraudulent representations which may
made to Perfecto Abordo to the effect that they
had for sale six hundred (600) tins of opium, a
prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the
same to him upon paying them P600 in advance
and by means of other similar deceit, induced
the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to
them, as in fact he gave and delivered to them,
the said sum of P600, in consideration of which
the accused gave him a gasoline can which they
represented to contain the 600 tins of opium,
when in truth and in fact, as the said accused
well knew, the said can contained only six small
tin cans containing a black substance which was
not opium, defrauding the said Perfecto Abordo
in the sum of P600 to his damage and prejudice
in said amount.
After the prosecution had rested, the
information was dismissed as to the defendants
Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro
Mendoza for lack of evidence to show that they
had taken part in the commission of the crime.
Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Pedro
Concepcion found the defendants Galicano Alon
and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa.
ISSUE:
WON the judgment rendered is correct
HELD:
Yes. As to the contention of the appellants, the
trial judge found it to be a mere fabrication and
worthy of no credit. The witnesses for the
defense were Miguel Rosales and the appellants
themselves. The evidence shows that Miguel
Rosales had been convicted of the falsification of
commercial documents in twelve cases. The
appellant Galicano Alon had been convicted
of estafa, and the other appellant, Ricardo
Cabrales, had been convicted once of robbery,
once of theft, and three times of estafa. The trial
judge was fully justified in disbelieving the
improbable story of said witnesses.
The crime committed by the appellants is that
of estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph 1
( a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
that any person who shall defraud another
through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of
anything of value which the offender shall
deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even
though such obligation be based on an immoral
or illegal consideration.
As thus, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
with the costs against the appellants.
[ GR No. 1002, Jul 25, 1903 ]
US v. SEGUNDINO MENDEZONA Y
MENDEZONA
2 Phil 353
FACTS:
That on September 10, 1900, Mendezona, sole
manager of the partnership of Mendezona & Co.,
executed before Don Enrique Barrera y Caldes, a
duly authorized notary public, a certain contract
of pledge in favor of the Compania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, by means of public
document No. 724, in which the accused sets
forth and agrees as security for the sums already
advanced by the Compania General de Tabacos
de Filipinas, as well as for those which may
hereafter be advanced up to the sum of
$300,000, Mendezona & Co., represented by
Don Secundino Mendezona, pledge, in favor of
their said creditor, 20,000 bales of Sorsogon,
Legaspi, Tabaco, and Lagonoy hemp, solemnly
affirming that the said 20,000 bales have been
neither assigned, transferred, nor encumbered,
and, in token of the delivery of the possession
thereof, the said Mendezona thereupon
surrendered to the representative of the said
Compania General de Tabacos the keys of the
said warehouses in which were stored the
20,000 bales of hemp pledged.
That on the said 10th day of September, 1900,
the said Mendezona delivered, in the city of
Manila, to the Compania General de Tabacos the
possession of all the hemp that day contained in
the warehouses situated at No. 48 Isla de
Romero Street, by surrendering to the said
company the keys thereof, in accordance with
the terms of the said document No. 724.
That the facts thus set forth and affirmed by the
said Mendezona in the said document were false
and untrue and that this was well known to the
accused, Mendezona.
And that, by virtue and by means of the said false
and fraudulent representations made by the said
Secundino Mendezona y Mendezona, the latter
fraudulently obtained for the partnership of
Mendezona & Co., from the said Compania
General de Tabacos, in consideration of the
pledge falsely and fraudulently made, a credit of
300,000 pesos, of which amount there was
delivered the sum of 207,814.01 pesos;
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of the crime of Estafa
HELD:
In view of the facts established at the trial, as
shown in the preceding statement thereof, can it
be said that the crime of estafa, denned and
punished by article 534, paragraph 3, and article
535, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, has been
committed, as charged in the information, and as
alleged in the brief of the Solicitor-General? Our
answer is in the affirmative.
The best evidence that the accused has
committed the crime of estafa is the
demonstration of the concurrence in the
consummation of the crime of the deceit by
which he proposed to commit the fraud and the
damage suffered by the defrauded corporation.
These two elements are indispensable for the
existence of the crime of estafa, and in support
of our assertion we refer to the doctrine
established by the decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, which are controlling, as they
refer to the interpretation and application of the
Code now in force, which is of Spanish origin.
Upon these grounds, therefore, we hold (1) that
the act which is the object of this prosecution
constitutes the crime of estafa in an amount
superior to 6,250 pesetas, defined and punished
by articles 534, paragraph 3, and 535, paragraph
1, of the Penal Code.
The judgment appealed is reversed and Don
Secundino Mendezona y Mendezona is
convicted for the crime of Estafa.
[ GR No. L-9811, Apr 22, 1957 ]
GEORGE L. TUBB v. PEOPLE OP PHILIPPINES +
101 Phil. 114
FACTS:
On August 15, 1947, accused George L. Tubb
called on complainant William H. Quaaha at the
lattor's office at Dasmarmas St., Manila. The
accused had known Quasha earlier in the same
year 1947 when he was defended by said Quasha
in a court-martial case. During the meeting, Tubb
talked Quasha into investing in the rattan
business, and said that rattan could be bought
for P0.20 a piece in Southern Luzon and sold for
P0.70 a piece in Manila. Quasha delivered the
sum of P6,000.00 to the accused on the following
day, August 16th, with the understanding that
the money shall be used exclusively by the
accused in the purchase of rattan for resale in
Manila; that the rattan so bought shall be
brought to Manila within a few days; and, that
the profit to be realized from the sale shall be
divided equally between the accused and the
complainant after the capital of P6,000.00 has
been returned to the latter.
Sometime in 1948, Quasha met the accused at
the Manila Hotel. Quasha asked the accused
what he (accused) had done with his P6.000.00.
The accused merely said that there was no use
telling what happened, but that he will try to pay
the complainant back as he was then working for
one Gabino Angchuan of Cebu City and could get
money from his said employer. Quasha did not
hear from the accused for a long time again after
their chance meeting at the Manila Hotel. The
complainant wrote to the accused in Cebu City,
care of Gabino Angchuan, but his letter was not
answered. When the complainant heard that the
accused was in Cagayan de Oro, Oriental
Misamis, the complainant wrote to him,
threatening him with a criminal action if he did
not pay within a period of one month.
The trial court convicted the accused of the
crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, subsection 1 (b), of the Revised Penal
Code. Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of the crime of Estafa.
HELD:
It is urged, that there can be no estafa without a
previous demand, which allegedly has not been
made upon herein petitioner, but the
aforementioned query made to him by Quasha,
in the Manila Hotel, was tantamount to a
demand. Besides, the law does not require a
demand as a condition precedent to the
existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so
happens only that failure to account, upon
demand for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
The same way, however, be established by other
proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.
The cases of People vs. Evangelista (69 Phil., 583)
and U.S. vs. Bleibel (34 Phil., 227), relied upon by
the petitioner, are not in point. The offense
charged in the Evangelista case was not
malversation, but of estafa, through false
pretenses. The Bleibel case involved a
commission agent who received from his
employer, some goods, worth P538.11, with the
obligation to return said goods, or the value
thereof. Subsequently, the employer or
principal made a written demand for compliance
with said obligation, but the letter of demand did
not appear to have reached the knowledge of
Bleibel. He having, accordingly, failed to answer
it, the principal filed against him a complaint for
embezzlement. Soon thereafter, but before the
filing of the corresponding information, Bleibel
delivered said sum of P538.11 to his principal. It
was held that mere delay in accounting for said
amount, without competent proof of
misappropriation thereof, does not constitute
embezzlement. Besides, the principal owed
Bleibel P143 for salary, and the former had no
right to hold the latter criminally liable for said
P538.11, "without first having made a
settlement of accounts."
Apart from the fact that none of these
circumstances obtains in the case at bar, a
demand was, as above stated, made in the
Manila Hotel upon the petitioner, and,
worse still, the latter then impliedly, but, clearly,
admitted that he had spent complainant's
money for his (petitioner's) own personal
benefit.
Wherefore, modified only in the sense that
petitioner George L. Tubb is guilty of
embezzlement under
Article 315, paragraph 1(6), of the Revised P
enal Code.
G.R. No. L-22760 November 29, 1971
JOSE T. GALVEZ, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
On April 24, 1959, following the purchase of the
car, Feliciana Camara delivered to Galvez a bank
check, payable to the latter, in the sum of
P2,000, representing the amount which Galvez
said would be required for the purchase of
backpay certificates which in turn would be used
to pay for the car's tax obligations. Galvez cashed
the check shortly thereafter at the Ermita branch
of the Philippine Trust Company in Manila. After
some delay, Galvez gave Feliciana Camara a
certificate of registration supposedly issued by
the Motor Vehicles Office (now Land Transport
station Commission) and a set of plate numbers,
for the newly acquired car. Four months later,
however, the Cameras got wind of information
what the taxes due on their car had not been
paid. It turned out, after verification, that the
Information Entry 663582 appearing in the MVO
file of their car did not correspond to the proper
entry number in the Bureau of Customs files.
Mrs. Camara lost no time in communicating with
Galvez and demanding of the latter the return of
her money. Galvez, for his part, allegedly replied
that he had given the money to another person
The judgment of the court dated February 7 was
then read, convicting the petitioner Galvez of the
crime charged and sentencing him accordingly.
ISSUE:
WON Galvez is guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
The delivery by Camara of the check in Pasay City
and its acceptance by Galvez signified not merely
the transfer to the accused of money belonging
to the complainant. It also marked, as shown by
the chain of events established by the
prosecution, the creation of a fiduciary relation
between the parties. The existence of such
relation either in the form of a trust, commission
or administration, is, of course, an essential
element of the crime of estafa by
misappropriation or conversion.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
[G.R. No. L-9572. July 31, 1956.]
JOAQUIN GUZMAN, Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
FACTS:
That accused Joaquin Guzman was a travelling
sales agent of the New Life Commercial of Aparri,
Cagayan. On March 2, 1903, Guzman left Manila
with 45 cases of different assortments of La
Tondeña wine, in a truck driven by Andres
Buenaventura, with Federico Cabacungan as
washing (helper), on their return trip to Aparri,
by way of Ilocos Norte. Along the route, the
accused made various cash sales of wine and
when they reached Ballesteros, Cagayan, at
about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of March 5,
1953, said accused had in his possession the
amount of P4,873.62. Here, they parked their
truck at the Sambrano Station and the accused
left his companions until supper time at past
7:00 p.m. When they retired for the night, driver
Buenaventura and the accused occupied the
driver’s compartment of the truck,
Buenaventura lying on the driver’s seat and the
accused taking the upper deck with which the
truck was provided. The washing, Cabacungan,
slept in the body of the truck where the wines
were kept. There was a wall between the body
of the truck and the driver’s compartment on
that night all the windows were locked from
inside. In the morning of March 6, 1953, accused
Guzman told the driver that he lost the amount
of P2,840.50, and his firearm license. Upon the
advice of the driver, said accused reported the
matter to the Chief of Police of Ballesteros, who
gave him a certificate of loss of his firearm
license. They were proceeding to their home
journey when, at the outskirts of Ballesteros,
they were met by a tax collector and policeman
Mariano David who told the accused to return to
Ballesteros and execute an affidavit regarding
the alleged theft. Before the accused returned to
Ballesteros, he entrusted to the driver
Buenaventura, the amount of P1,630 in cash and
a check for P403.12 under the proper receipt
with the sales invoices, for delivery to the
manager, Enrique Go, of the company of Aparri.
Driver and washing continued the trip and
arrived at Aparri between 3 and 4 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day. The driver delivered
the money and invoices to Enrique Go and
informed the latter of the loss. Go reported the
matter to the Philippine Constabulary. The PC
investigators and Go picked the accused at his
house at Aparri at 8 o’clock in the morning, on
March 7, 1953, after having failed to see him
(accused) at Ballesteros the previous night.
Questioned at the PC barracks as to how much
money he still had, the accused stated that he
had only P3, in his person. On March 10, 1953,
the accused wrote to Go, requesting him to defer
the filing of the criminal complaint until March
16, 1953, on which date he promised to refund
the amount lost. On March 17, 1953, the said
accused paid the amount of P1,500 to Go. On
April 1, 1953, the accused was prosecuted for
theft for the shortage of P804.70.
ISSUE:
WON the crime charged is proper.
HELD:
No. The Appellant under the above facts, the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that he “had
only the material or physical possession of the
said merchandise or its proceeds, because he
was not the owner thereof he was simply holding
the money for and in behalf of his employer”.
While it is true that Appellant received the
proceeds of his wine sales as travelling salesman
for the complainant, for and in behalf of the
latter as his principal, and that possession of the
agent is possession of the principal, an agent,
unlike a servant or messenger, has both the
physical and juridical possession of the goods
received in agency, or the proceeds thereof,
which takes the place of the goods after their
sale by the agent. His duty to turn over the
proceeds of the agency depends upon his
discharge, as well as the result of the accounting
between him and the principal he may set up his
right of possession as against that of the
principal until the agency is terminated.
As Appellant converted to his own use proceeds
of sales of merchandise delivered to him as
agent, which he received in trust for and under
obligation to deliver and turn over to his
principal, he is guilty of the crime of estafa as
defined by Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (c), of the Revised Penal Code. This
has been the consistent ruling of this Court in
cases where a sales agent misappropriates or
fails to turn over to his principal proceeds of
things or goods he was commissioned or
authorized to sell for the latter.
Under the definition of estafa, it is an essential
element of the crime that the money or goods
misappropriated or converted by the accused to
the prejudice of another was received by him “in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to retain the same.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
reversed, and Appellant Joaquin Guzman
acquitted of the crime of qualified
theft. Appellant should, however, be held in
custody pending the filing of another
information against him for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), of the
Revised Penal Code.
[G.R. No. L-6408. May 24, 1954.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. EPIFANIO
CARULASDULASAN and NICASIO BECAREL
FACTS:
That during the month of December, 1950, in the
municipality of Dalaguete, Province of Cebu, the
accused, being then tenants of Crispin Almagro,
and as such had the express obligation to share
one-half of whatever product they could harvest
from the land of the latter, conspiring together
and helping each other and with deliberate
intent to defraud said Crispin Almagro, the
accused herein having stripped 600 kilos of
abaca planted on their landlord’s land, of which
he was entitled to one-half of this quantity or
300 kilos sold them all without giving said Crispin
Almagro his corresponding share and
appropriated the proceeds thereof for their own
use and benefit and despite several demands
with the aid of the police authorities of the
aforesaid municipality the accused, refused and
still refuse to give the offended party his share
and to his damage and prejudice in the amount
of P330, the value of 300 kilos as his rightful
share."
Upon arraignment the accused asked for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the facts
alleged in the information did not constitute
estafa. As the trial court granted the motion, the
provincial fiscal interposed the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the act committed constitutes the crime of
Estafa.
HELD:
Yes. The Solicitor General is correct that the facts
alleged in the information make up the crime of
estafa defined in subsection 1(b) of article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, which refers to fraud
committed —
"By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other circumstance involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property."
From the facts alleged it is clear that the accused
received from the sale of the abaca harvested by
them a sum of money which did not all belong to
them because one-half of it corresponds to the
landlord’s share of the abaca under the tenancy
agreement. This half the accused were under
obligation to deliver to the landlord. They
therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of
turning it over to him, they appropriated it to
their own use and refused to give it to him
notwithstanding repeated demands. In other
words, the accused are charged with having
committed fraud by misappropriating or
converting to the prejudice of another money
received by them in trust or under circumstances
which made it their duty to deliver it to its
owner. Obviously, this is a form of fraud specially
covered by the penal provision above cited.
The learned trial Judge held the provision
inapplicable on the theory that "the abaca in
question was not received by the accused from
anybody but had been harvested by them, as
tenants, from the plantation of the
complainant." His Honor has obviously
overlooked the fact that what the accused are
charged with having misappropriated is the
landlord’s share of the purchase price received
by them for the abaca which they sold.
Applying the corresponding provision of the
Spanish Penal Code, the Spanish Supreme Court,
in its decision of December 20, 1930, sustained
the conviction for estafa of a tenant (aparcero)
who sold crop gathered from the land held by
him as tenant without giving the landlord his
share thereof.
In any event, supposing that subsection 1(b) of
article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable, still the information alleges sufficient
facts to make the accused criminally liable under
the first paragraph of article 318, which punishes
"any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any other deceit not mentioned in
the preceding articles of this chapter," it being
averred that the accused "with deliberate intent
to defraud" their landlord sold all the abaca
harvested by them from his plantation without
giving the latter his share and appropriated the
proceeds thereof to their own use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of the landlord in the
amount of P330.
In view of the foregoing, the order of dismissal is
revoked and the case remanded to the court
below for further proceedings.
[ GR No. 80544, Jul 05, 1989 ]
ROSEMARIE M. LEE v. JOSEFINA CRUZ RODIL
FACTS:
On or about July 26, 1982 in the City of Manila,
accused, defraud the Philippine Bank of
Communications, being then the duly authorized
representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., after
opening letter of credit with the said bank under
L/C No. 63251 dated July 26, 1982, for the
amount of P154,711.97, covering the purchase
price of a certain merchandise consisting of
23 ctns. Lab. Culture Media in favor of said bank,
received from the latter the necessary document
and thereafter the said merchandise and
forthwith, executed trust receipt for the
aforesaid merchandise dated July 26, 1982, by
virtue of which, the said accused obligated
herself to hold said merchandise in trust with
liberty to sell the same in cash for the account of
the said bank and to account for the proceeds of
the sale thereof, if sold or of returning the said
merchandise to said bank in case of failure to sell
the same, on or before October 24, 1982, but the
said accused, once in possession of the said
merchandise, far from complying with her
aforesaid obligation and despite the lapse of a
long period of time and repeated demands made
upon her to that effect, with intent to defraud,
misappropriate, misapply and convert the said
merchandise or the value thereof, to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Philippine Bank of
Communications in the amount of P154,711.97.
The accused moved to quash this
information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. She
alleges that the violation of a for non-payment of debt. A convincing showing
trust receipt agreement does not
constitute estafa notwithstanding an express
provision in the "Trust Receipts Law" (P.D. 115)
characterizing such violation as estafa. She
attacks P.D. 115 for being unconstitutional.
The trial court, in its order dated August 21,
1987 denied the motion to quash the
information and upheld the constitutionality of
P.D. No.115.
The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied for lack of merit in an order dated
October 12, 1987.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the violation of a trust receipt
agreement constitutes the crime of estafa.
HELD:
We answer in the affirmative in the light of a
specific provision in P.D. No. 115.
The petitioner cites certain cases to support her
stand that the violation of a trust receipt does
not constitute estafa.
"As noted by Justice Street in People vs.
Yu Chai Ho, supra, the conversion by the trustee
in a trust receipt of the proceeds of the sale falls
'most literally and directly under' the provisions
of article 315(1) (b).
Thus, it was held that where, notwithstanding
repeated oral and written demands by the bank,
the petitioner had failed either to turn over to
the said bank the proceeds of the sale of the
goods, or to return said goods if they were not
sold, the petitioner is guilty of estafa under
article 315 (1) (b).
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Sec. 13 of P.D. 115. She contends that it
is violative of the constitutional right that "No
person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax".
The petitioner has failed to make out a strong
case that P.D. 115 conflicts with the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
is needed to overcome the presumption of the
validity of an existing statute.
The criminal liability springs from the violation of
the trust receipt.
"In fine, P.D. 115 is a valid exercise
of police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional provision on non-
imprisonment for non-payment of debt."
An examination of P.D. 115 shows the growing
importance of trust receipts in
Philippine business, the need to provide for the
rights and obligations of parties to a trust receipt
transaction, the study of the problems involved
and the action by monetary authorities, and the
necessity of regulating the enforcement of rights
arising from default or violations of trust receipt
agreements. The legislative intent to meet a
pressing need is clearly expressed. We see no
unconstitutionality in the means deliberately
employed to enforce the integrity of trust
receipts.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's orders are
AFFIRMED and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
G.R. No. L-7561 April 30, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. PABLO
ISAAC alias JOSE DE JESUS
FACTS:
It appears that in the morning of January 19,
1955, in the City of Manila, Philippines, one Dr.
Licerio Velasquez, owner of a jeepney with
license plate No. AC-2553, whose driver was on
vacation and had recommended the appellant to
take his place, entrusted the vehicle to the said
appellant for a "pasada", that is to say, for
transporting passengers for a compensation, the
vehicle being destined for that purpose as its
license plate would indicate. The understanding
was that appellant was to bring back the vehicle
in the evening of that same day and pay P10 "in
hire." But appellant never returned, and after a
search the vehicle was found in a machine shop
in Tarlac, where it was left by appellant allegedly
for the purpose of having it repainted. Arrested
by the police several days later, appellant
voluntarily signed a statement to the effect that,
though he took the vehicle for a "pasada", his
real intention was steal it, for he already had an
agreement with one Mrs. Juana Lim that he
would steal a jeepney and she would wait at the
Balintawak monument. the Court of First
Instance of Manila, convicting the appellant of
qualified theft.
In asking for appellant's acquittal, counsel de
oficio contends that, while appellant may have
committed estafa, he cannot be held guilty of
theft, on the theory that as the possession of the
vehicle was obtained with the consent of its
owner, there has been no illegal taking.
ISSUE:
WON the crime charged is proper.
HELD:
Yes. For as we see it, appellant had only
substituted for the regular driver of a vehicle
devoted to the transportation of passengers for
a fare or compensation and therefore operated
as a public utility; and while his arrangement
with the owner was to turn in, not all the fare
collected, but only a fixed sum known in the
trade as "boundary", still he cannot be legally
considered a hirer or lessee, since it is ordained
in section 26 of the Rules of Regulations of the
Public Service Commission that "no motor
vehicle operator shall enter into any kind of
contract with any person if by the terms thereof
it allows the use and operation of all any of his
equipment under a fixed rental basis." In the eye
of the law then, appellant was not a lessee but
only an employee or agent of the owner, so that
his possession of the vehicle was only an
extension of that of the latter. In other words,
while he had physical or material possession of
the jeepney, the juridical possession thereof
remained in the owner. Under those
circumstances his disposing of the jeepney with
intent of gain and without the consent of its
owner makes him guilty of theft.
Quoting from Ruling Case Law, this Court has
also said in the same case:
A felonious taking is necessary in the crime of
larceny, and generally speaking, a taking which is
done with the consent or acquiescence of the
owner of the property is not felonious. But if the
owner parts with the possession thereof for a
particular purpose, and the person who receives
the possession avowedly for that purpose has
the fraudulent intention to make use of it as the
means of converting it to his own use and does
so convert it, this is larceny, for in such case, the
fraud supplies the place of the trespass in the
taking, or, as otherwise stated, the subsequent
felonious conversation of the property by the
alleged thief will relate back and make the taking
and conversation larceny.
Under this theory, appellant, who according to
this own confession, took the vehicle from its
owner already with the intention of
appropriating it, should also be deemed guilty of
theft.
G.R. No. L-14313 July 26, 1960
DIONISIO ESGUERRA, Petitioner, vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
That on or about and during the period from
January 12, 1952 to March 26, 1952 accused
upon representations made with Yu Yek Huy &
Co., a, thru the Manager of said Company, Yu Yek
Bio, that the said accused had copras ready for
delivery to it, took and received from said Yu Yek
Bio the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (P 4,400.00) under the express
obligation on part of the said accused to deliver
to the said company the equivalent worth of
copras at its bodega at Siain, Atimonan, Quezon
as follows: P2,400.00 worth of copras on or
before January 31, 1952, and P2,000.00 worth of
copras on or before fifteen days from March 11,
1952, or the same sum of money on the
respective dates aforestated but the said
accused once in possession of the said sum of
money and far from complying with aforesaid
obligation, despite repeated demands made
upon him to do so, with intent to defraud the
aforesaid company, misapply, misappropriate
and convert the said amount to his own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of
the Yu Yek Huy & Co., in the aforestated amount
of P4,400.00 Philippine Currency.
Dionisio Esguerra found by the Court of Appeals
guilty of estafa, defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 3, 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in convicting
the accused of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph
3, 2(a), that is, estafa through false pretenses,
when the trial court, the fiscal and the private
prosecutor assured the accused at the trial that
he was being prosecuted for estafa under Art.
315, 1 (b), that is misappropriation of money
received in trust or on commission or for
administration.
HELD:
While we agree with that the appellant cannot
be held guilty of estafa under paragraph 1-b, Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code, we are
nevertheless of the opinion, and so hold, that
appellant is responsible for a violation of
paragraph 3 (2-a) of the same article, which
penalizes any person who shall defraud another
by means of any of the following pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (a) by using fictitious name or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business,
or imaginary transactions or by means of other
similar deceits" (emphasis ours). The
information describes and alleges this means of
committing "swindling" and the evidence
adduced, amply substantiates said allegations.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals held
appellant guilty of estafa under paragraph 3 (2-
a) of Article 315. It is from this decision that the
accused has taken this present appealed
by certiorari.
The issue here is whether after denial of a
motion to quash, precisely on the vagueness of
the information, upon assurance by the fiscal
and the private prosecutor and accepted by the
court that the offense for which the accused was
being prosecuted is that of misappropriation
defined in paragraph 1 (b) of Articles 315,
involving unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
and under which the accused entered trial, the
latter could, on appeal, be convicted of an
entirely different offense with different
elements, that of false pretenses of possessing
property or business made prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. The appellant submits that he could not,
especially when the latter offense is not
adequately alleged in the information.
We incline to agree with the appellant. It is
undisputed that the information contains no
allegation of misrepresentation, bad faith or
false pretense, essential element in the crime of
which appellant was found guilty by the Court of
Appeals. This is so, evidently, because, as already
stated, the fiscal and the private prosecutor
avowedly were prosecuting the accused for the
crime of misappropriation and conversion
committed with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence for which the appellant went to trial
and was convicted by the lower court. It is true
the information states that "the accused,
upon representations (not misrepresentations)
that the accused had copras ready for delivery to
it, took and received" the sum of P4,400.00.
Nowhere does it appear in the information that
these "representations" were false or
fraudulent, or that the accused had no such
copra at the time he allegedly made such
"representations". The falsity or fraudulentness
of the pretense or representation or act being
the very constitutive element of the offense,
allegation to that effect, either in the words of
the law or in any other language of similar
import, must be made in the information if the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him is to be
preserved. In this case, for instance, since the
representation wherefor the money was
delivered is not being charged as false, and since,
if not false, the receipt of the money on such
representation does not constitute an offense,
the motion to quash the information on the
ground that it did not charge an offense or the
allegations therein did not constitute an offense,
should have been granted. Instead, the fiscal and
the private prosecutor assured the court, and
both the court and the accused depended on the
assurance that the offense charged is not that of
misrepresentation or false pretense, but that of
misappropriation and conversion, of
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence. To
convict him now of the very offense which he
correctly assailed was not adequately alleged in
the information and with which the prosecution
expressly stated they were not charging the
accused, could result not only in violating
appellant's constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, but in actually misleading him.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is reversed; the accused is acquitted.
G.R. No. L-15923 June 30, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
BENJAMIN BENITEZ,
FACTS:
The accused Benjamin Benitez was employed by
Jose Cua as collector of rents of the houses
owned by the latter. In the months of July and
August, 1956, the accused made several
collections from his employer's tenants
amounting to P540.00. Having failed to turn over
said amount, or to account for it, to his
employer, upon demand, the accused offered to
work in the former's establishment, the sum
P100.00, to be deducted from his salary every
month until the whole amount of P540.00 is fully
paid. The offer and the conditions for his
employment were accepted by Jose Cua and
reduced to writing.
The accused, however, after working in Cua's
establishment for only a few days, did not report
or show up for work, whereupon Cua wrote to
him a letter demanding settlement of his
account. The accused having failed to pay the
amount of his obligation, a complaint for estafa
was filed against him. He was convicted and
sentenced. From that sentence, he appealed to
the Court Appeals, contending that the lower
court erred in finding him guilty upon his mere
failure to account for and turn over his
collections, there being no proof of
misappropriation or conversion, and in not
considering that his agreement with his
employer converted his criminal liability, if any,
into a mere civil obligation. The questions raised
being purely legal, the case was certified to this
Court.
ISSUE:
WON the crime charged is proper.
HELD:
After going over the record, we entertain no
doubt that the accused has committed estafa.
The accused admits having collected the amount
of P540.00 as rentals from the different tenants
of his employer. It is likewise, admitted that he
failed to account for and turnover said amount
to his employer, upon demand therefor, without
giving any reason or explanation whatsoever.
These circumstances, together with the fact that
the accused even obligated himself to make
restitution, clearly show that the amount of
P540.00, which he was duty bound to deliver to
his employer, was misappropriated by him.
As to the contention that the liability of the
accused is civil only because of the written
agreement between him and his employer, it is
well-settled that criminal liability for estafa is not
affected by compromise or novation of contract,
for it is a public offense which must be
prosecuted and punished by the Government on
its own motion even though complete
reparation should have been made of the
damages suffered by the offended party. The
fact, therefore, that the accused herein had, with
the consent of the offended party, assumed the
obligation of paying the rentals, which he
collected, out of his own salary after he had
committed the misappropriation, does not
obliterate the criminal liability already incurred.
There being no error in the judgment appealed
from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the accused.
G.R. No. L-19567 February 5, 1964
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
SOLEDAD NERY,
FACTS:
On 15 November 1954, in a market stall in
Bacolod City, the said accused received from
Federico Matillano two (2) diamond rings to be
sold by her on commission. The agreement was
for the accused to deliver, on the following the
sum of P230.00 to her principal, to whom the
accused had represented having a ready buyer,
and whatever overprice price could be obtained
in the sale would be retained the accused as her
commission.
Soledad Nery failed to show up on the following
day; after several days, in a casual encounter
with Francisco Matillano, she claimed that her
prospective buyer withdrew from the
transaction and that she was looking for another
buyer. Days, weeks, and months passed; and, his
patience exhausted, Federico brought the
matter to attention of the police authorities of
Bacolod on 5 January 1955. In no time, Soledad
was found and brought to the police station;
then and there, she promised, in writing (Exh.
"A"), to deliver the price of the rings on 25
January 1955.
When the last-mentioned date arrived and
Soledad failed to comply with her promise, a
complaint was filed with the municipal court.
The case was either withdrawn or dismissed,
however, the accused making two payments of
P20.00 each to Federico. After these payments
the accused failed to pay further; hence, the
fiscal filed the corresponding information dated
30 June 1958 with the court of first instance.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable the crime of Estafa.
ISSUE:
WON the crime committed is Estafa even if there
is novation.
HELD:
Yes. it is well-settled that criminal liability for
estafa is not affected by compromise or novation
of contract, for it is a public offense which must
be prosecuted and punished by the Government
on its own motion though complete reparation
should have been made of the damage suffered
by the offended party "a criminal offense is
committed against the People and the offended
party may not waive or extinguish the criminal
liability that the law imposes for the commission
of the offense". The fact, therefore, that the
accused herein had, with the consent of the
offended party, assumed the obligation of
paying the rentals, which he collected, out of his
own salary after he had committed the
misappropriation, does not obliterate the
criminal liability already incurred.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision should be, as it is hereby, affirmed.
LU HAYCO VS CA
138 SCRA 227
FACTS:
Haycu was a former employee of Units optical
with 124 complaints of estafa filed against him
by the company with the office of city fiscal of
manila. After the procedural PI, fiscal filed 75
cases of estafa against Haycu, except as to
the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75
informations commonly charge that Haycu
having collected and received customers of the
company the purchase of goods has converted
the sum of money he collected to his own
personal account with a bank. A civil action for
accounting was filed also by the owner of the
company against Haycu complaining that Haycu
initiated discharging the business functions and
prerogatives of the company thru deceit and
machinations that the owner affixing his
signatures to the power of attorney to open
account in the bank.
ISSUE:
WON that there is no estafa since the element of
misappropriation or conversion was not proven.
HELD:
The disturbance in property rights caused by
misappropriation, though only temporary, is
itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of Art. 315(l -b) of the RPC
In the case at bar, there was a disturbance in the
property rights of Lu Chiong Sun. While the funds
received by Lu Hayco were deposited in his
personal bank accounts, Lu Chiong Sun and Units
Optical could not dispose of the said amounts. At
least, this could be considered as a temporary
prejudice suffered by Lu Chiong Sun, which is
sufficient to constitute conversion in the context
of Art. 315 (1-b) of the RPC.
[G.R. No. 76647. September 30, 1987.]
CECILIO J. AMORSOLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
That on or about the 23rd of March 1983, the
accused, received in trust from one Raul Isidro
two (2) acrylic paintings in the total amount of
P19,000.00 to be sold on commission basis, with
the express obligation on the part of the accused
to account for the proceeds and/or to return the
said acrylic paintings if not sold, but the accused
once in the possession of said paintings, convert
to his own personal use and benefit the proceeds
and despite repeated demands failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to return the
same/or the proceeds thereof, to the damage
and prejudice of said Raul Isidro, in the
aforementioned total amount of P19,000.00."
The Court finds accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
"Whether or not the acts of petitioner
constituted the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
It is well-settled that the essence of estafa thru
misappropriation is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and
"misappropriated" connote an act of using or
disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one’s own use includes, not
only conversion to one’s personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the property
of another without right.
In the instant case, complainant delivered his
paintings to the accused due to his trust in him
since he is the brother of a fellow artist-painter
and also because of a previous business
transaction he had with him. When accused-
petitioner consigned the same paintings to a
third entity (Heritage Gallery) which is not
known to complainant, Accused did not commit
an abuse of the confidence reposed upon him by
the complainant. Petitioner assumed (and the
assumption was correct) that he could do this in
view of the authorization given him to sell the
property and certainly this could include a sale
by consignation.
While it is true that accused had an opportunity
to return the second painting, still it was his
desire to continue with the sale because he
believed that in Mr. Lomotan he had a ready
buyer who could make possible the
accomplishment in full of the agency to sell what
had been entrusted to him. There was no desire
to appropriate anything for himself, no intent to
defraud or prejudice in any way the complainant.
Truth to tell, he gave Lomotan’s check to Isidro.
The fact that it bounced is not the fault of the
accused. Moreover, Accused paid Isidro with the
former’s own check, even if partially, and he
recognized his obligation to pay the balance.
Under the premises, it is obvious that no criminal
intent or liability exists. Thus, his liability is
plainly merely a civil one, as manifested in the
letter of demand dated May 18, 1983, sent to the
accused by Isidro’s counsel.
Accused is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with
which he was charged.
G.R. No. 76262-63 March 16, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. HON. PEDRO G. LAGGUI, Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXIV of the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga and ELISEO SORIANO, respondents.
FACTS:
The private respondent Eliseo F. Soriano issued a
postdated check that bounced. He was charged
by the Provincial Fiscal in two separate
informations, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Crim.
Case No. 2934) and estafa (Crim. Case No. 3007).
After a joint trial of the two cases, respondent
Judge Pedro Laggui of the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga promulgated a joint decision on
September 24, 1986, (1) dismissing the
information in Criminal Case No. 2934 (for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22) for being "fatally
defective" (p. 63, Rollo), and (2) convicting the
accused of estafa in Criminal Case No. 3007.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal of Violation of BP 22 is
improper.
HELD:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the
State alleges that the information is sufficient,
hence, respondent Judge committed an error of
law, and/or gravely abused his discretion, in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 2934. We agree.
The accused was charged with having violated
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
The elements of the offense are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply to account or for Value,
2. the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The "defect" which respondent Judge perceived
in the information was the failure to allege that
the accused, as maker or drawer of the check at
the time of issue, knew of the insufficiency of his
funds in the bank for payment of the check in full
"upon its presentment" (p. 56, Rollo). In the
court's opinion, it was not enough for the
information to have alleged that the accused
knew when he issued the check that he then did
not have sufficient funds in the bank; the
information should have alleged that the
accused knew that he would not have sufficient
funds in the bank to pay the check in full "upon
its presentment". It believed that the absence of
an allegation that the accused foresaw or had
foreknowledge of the insufficiency of his bank
account upon presentment of the check for
payment, was fatal to the information.
In other words the presence of the first and third
elements of the offense constitutes prima
facie evidence that the second element exists.
The maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of his
funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of
his check for insufficiency of funds. This Court
has ruled that:
Violation of the bad checks act is committed
when one makes or draws and issues any check
to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds' or 'having sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank . . . shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period
of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank. (People vs. Manzanilla, 156 SCRA
279, 282.)
G.R. No. 75217-18 September 21, 1987
VICTOR QUE, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FACTS:
Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of Our
minute resolution 1 dated September 22, 1986
denying the main Petition for Review on
certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City convicting herein petitioner of the crime of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on two (2)
counts.
In the main Petition filed on August 25, 1986,
petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of the
appellate court's decision dated January 14,
1986 and the resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the same, on the
grounds that respondent appellate court not
only decided a substantial question of
jurisdiction not in accordance with law and
applicable jurisprudence but also sanctioned the
departure by the lower court from the accepted
judicial procedures on the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction is proper
HELD:
Yes. It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit
or a guarantee. The enactment in question does
not make any distinction as to whether the
checks within its contemplation are issued in
payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee
the said obligation. In accordance with the
pertinent rule of statutory construction,
inasmuch as the law has not made any
distinction in this regard, no such distinction can
be made by means of interpretation or
application. Furthermore, the history of the
enactment of subject statute evinces the definite
legislative intent to make the prohibition all-
embracing, without making any exception from
the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee.
This intent may be gathered from the statement
of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9)
which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the
Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced
to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks,
to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps
of paper" and to restore respectability to checks,
all without distinction as to the purpose of the
issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as
above said is made all the more clear when it is
considered that while the original text of Cabinet
Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso
excluding from the coverage of the law a check
issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of
the bill as approved and enacted by the
Committee on the Revision of Laws in the
Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying
proviso deliberately for the purpose of making
the enforcement of the act more effective
(Batasan Record, First Regular Session,
December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp- 1035-1036).
Consequently, what are important are the facts
that the accused had deliberately issued the
checks in question to cover accounts and that
the checks were dishonored upon presentment
regardless of whether or not the accused merely
issued the checks as a guarantee. (pp. 4-5. Dec.
IAC (pp. 37-38, Rollo)
From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that
is the intention of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and
thus punishable under such law.
Vaca vs. CA
(GR 43596, 31 October 1936)
Facts:
Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of
Ervine International while Fernando Nieto,
Vaca’s son-in-law, is the firm’s purchasing
manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the
General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection
and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China
Bank. When deposited with PCIBank, the check
was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers
failed to pay within the time given (7 days from
notice). A few days later, however, Vaca issued a
check to GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against
Associated Bank, replacing the dishonored
check. GARDS did not return the dishonored
check. Later on, GARDS Acting Operations
Manager filed a criminal suit against Vaca and
Nieto for violation of BP 22. The trial court
sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P10,000 and costs.
Issue:
Whether the drawers had knowledge of
insufficient funds in issuing the check.
Held: Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the
drawer fails to maintain sufficient funds within
90 days after the date of the check, or to make
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee
of such check within 5 days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Herein, the second check supposedly replacing
the dishonored check is actually the payment of
two separate bills, and was issued 15 days after
notice. Such “replacement” cannot negate the
presumption that the drawers knew of the
insufficiency of funds.
Rosa Lim, petitioner,
vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000.
FACTS:
Petitioner bought various jewelries worth
P300,000.00 and P241,668.00 on separate dates
from Maria Antonia Seguan’s store. She issued a
two separate checks for the payment of these.
When Seguan deposited the two checks with her
bank, they were returned with a notice of
dishonor because petitioner’s account
was closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised
to pay Seguan the amounts of the two
dishonored checks. She never did. Both the RTC
and CA found petitioner guilty of violating BP 22
and was sentenced to one year imprisonment for
each of the two violations and ordered to pay
two fines, each amounting to P200,000.00.
Petitioner’s defense was that the checks were
never issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-
existing transaction. The checks were issued to
Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a
security arrangement to cover the value of
jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both the RTC and CA rendered
the appropriate penalty to Rosa Lim?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the
decision of the Court of Appeals. We find
petitioner Rosa Lim guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence
of imprisonment and hereby sentence her only
to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months.
We DELETE the award of moral damages and
attorney's fees. The rest of the judgment of the
trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
shall stand. Costs against petitioner. In Vaca v.
Court of Appeals, we held that in determining
the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P.
No. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The
philosophy is to redeem valuable human
material, and to prevent unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There, we deleted the prison
sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed
on them only a fine double the amount of the
check issued. We considered the fact that
petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good
faith, that no violation of B.P. No. 22 was
committed, "otherwise, they would have simply
accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term." We
do the same here. We believe such would best
serve the ends of criminal justice.
[G.R. No. 26957. September 2, 1927.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIMEON
YUSAY, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Towards the end of March, 1926, Leonor Gil de
Lazaro, the offended party herein, wishing to
redeem certain jewels which she had pawned
through Elpidio Ledesma, her cook, and Primitivo
Magante, a friend, in the pawnshop of C. N.
Hodges in the municipality of La Paz, Iloilo, took
the corresponding pawn tickets, Exhibits C and D
from her wardrobe. As she first had to prepare
her husband’s meal, she gave said tickets to her
trusted servant, Remigia Mediavilla, so that the
latter might take care of them, and afterwards
completely forgot about them. One morning a
week later, the servant asked her mistress’s
permission to visit her brother who was ill, taking
the son of Leonor Gil de Lazaro for whom she
acted as maid, with her. As the boy saw some
guavas in a store underneath a house, which he
wanted to eat, the servant went into said store
to buy them, and there met the accused. On
opening her purse for the money with which to
pay for the guavas, the edges of the pawn tickets
protruded, and the accused, seeing them, took
them and, with a smile, said to the servant:
"What have you here in this paper?" at the same
time he unfolded and examined them. The
servant replied that they were papers which her
mistress had given her to keep for her. The
accused, with the same smile on his lips and in a
honeyed tone switched off the conversation
saying:" Don’t you know that your brother is
lodging at my house? Don’t you want to see him?
He is upstairs in my house right now." As her
object in asking permission was to see her
brother, she went upstairs, taking the child with
her, leaving the papers with the accused. After
having visited her brother, and as the child
wished to go home, Remigia went downstairs,
meeting the accused below who inquired of her:
"Where are you going?," and she answered that
she was going home. After having gone a certain
distance from the house, the servant
remembered the two tickets and went back for
them. The accused did not want to return them
and said to her: "But what are you going to do
with those good-for-nothing tickets?" The
servant insisted upon their return and said: "Be
that as it may, Simeon, you have to give them to
me." The accused, still smiling, told her not to
trouble herself as the tickets had been long
overdue, and that he could not return them as
he did not remember where he had put them
and that perhaps the wind had blown them
away. The accused also advised her to run away
if her mistress scolded her for the disappearance
of said tickets, to run away because he would
give her a share. When the servant saw that all
efforts to secure the return of the tickets were
futile, she returned to her mistress’ house, and
though at first she did not know what to do, at
last she decided to make a clean breast of the
matter to Leonor Gil de Lazaro. When her
mistress learned what had happened, she told
the servant to go back to the accused’s house
and get the tickets from him at any cost. In view
of the fact that the accused did not want to
return the tickets, Leonor Gil de Lazaro ordered
her jewels redeemed, which consisted of two
pairs of gold earrings set with diamonds, valued
at P600; but the pawnshop informed her that
they had already been redeemed by the accused.
Indeed, the accused had already presented
himself at the pawnshop pretending to be the
owner of the jewels, and redeemed them,
identifying said jewels by means of the pawn
ticket numbers.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of Estafa is present in this case.
HELD:
The redemption of pawned jewels by means of
pawn tickets to bearer, effected by a person who
has stolen said tickets, and pretends to own said
jewels, availing himself of the numbers of said
tickets to identify the jewels, but without
presenting the aforesaid tickets, constitutes the
crime of estafa defined in case 1, article 536 of
the Penal Code. There can be no doubt that the
accused-appellant deceived the pawnshop in
order to redeem the jewels, as, if he had not
pretended to be the owner of the same and had
not had himself identified, while he, himself,
identified the jewels by the numbers of the pawn
tickets, he could not have made the redemption.
Of course mere deceit is not sufficient to
constitute estafa as provided for in case No. 1, of
article 535 of the Penal Code; it is also essential
that there be defraudation or damage. In the
present case, the pawnshop was obliged to
return the jewels to Leonor Gil de Lazaro, when
the latter presented herself to redeem them,
otherwise, it would have to pay the value, which
constitutes a damage.
The redemption then, of the jewels in question,
made by the accused-appellant through deceit
consisting in having pretended to be the owner
of the jewels and with damage to the pawnshop,
constitutes the crime of estafa as provided for in
case No. 1 of article 535 of the Penal Code.
People v Temporada
G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008
Facts:
A case was filed against accused-appellant Beth
Temporada of the crime of Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the
Labor Code, as amended and five counts of
estafa under Article 315, par. (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). They further alleged
that the accused recruited and promised
overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants
Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. As technician in Singapore,
and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn
Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory
workers in Hongkong. After collecting the
alleged placement fees are in excees of or
greater than that specified in the scheduled
of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and
without reasons and without fault of the said
complainants, failed to actually deploy them and
failed to reimburse them the expenses they
incurred in connection with the
documentation and processing of their
papers for purposes of their deployment.
The accused-appellant ascribes the lone error
that the trial court gravely erred in finding her
guilty of illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of
estafa despite the insufficiency of the evidence
for the prosecution. The petitioner prays for her
acquittal for the prosecution’s failure to prove
the element of deceit. She argues that her
actions prior to, during and after the filing of the
estafa case against her negated deceit, ill-motive
and and or/ bad faith to abscond with her
obligation to the private complainant. She cite
the cases of People v. Singson and People v
Ojeda where the Court acquitted the accused for
the failure of the prosecution to prove the
element of deceit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in affirming
the judgment of the RTC finding her guilty
of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
No. We find no reversible error in the CA’s
decision. In fact, the offense of estafa, in general,
is committed either by (a) abuse of confidence or
(b) means of deceit. The acts constituting estafa
committed with abuse of confidence are
enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of
Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not essential
requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the
breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or
deceit, which is a usual element in the other
estafas. In this case the charge against the
petitioner and her subsequent conviction
was for estafa committed by abuse of
confidence.
Saddul vs. Court of Appeals
192 SCRA 277
Facts:
In 1973, the petitioner became a vice-president
and director of Amalgamated Motors (Phils.) Inc.
(AMPI for brevity). AMPI was then a wholly-
owned subsidiary of British Leyland. It was the
sole distributor in the Philippines of British and
Japanese heavy equipment, trucks, farm
implements, spare parts, and other automotive
products and machines manufactured by Leyland
International, Land Rover Ltd. (LAND ROVER for
brevity), Avelyn Barfourd, Mitsubishi, and
Furokawa Since 1980, Felimon R. Cuevas had
been a dealer of AMPI for government sales. In
1981, he bought into the company and became
its majority stockholder and president.
Upon Cuevas' ascendancy in the corporation,
Saddul was made a director as well as Executive
Vice-President and General Manager. As such,
he was in charge of the operations of the
company and was "delegated" to make sales of
some units and spare parts.
As distributor not only of British but also
Japanese automotive products, AMPI carried an
inventory of some P15 to P20 million worth of
spare parts of the companies it represented in the
Philippines.
In 1985, LAND ROVER supplied P1.5 million
worth of spare parts to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) through AMPI, but the
merchandise were returned to AMPI because
they were not the correct items needed by the
AFP. The parts were kept by AMPI pending
disposal instructions from LAND ROVER.
On March 4, 1985, Erwin Lyndsay, LAND
ROVER's area manager for Southeast Asia, sent
the following letter to Saddul, Executive Vice-
President and General Manager of AMPI,
regarding the spare parts rejected by the AFP:
Saddul sold some of the spare parts (worth
P143,085.00) to Rover Motor Parts (a different
entity from LAND ROVER) whose president was
Jose P. Garcia. The sales were evidenced by
AMPI Sales Invoices and summarized in the
Statement of Accounts dated June 9, 1986 sent
by AMPI to Rover Motor Parts. Payments were
made by the buyer to Saddul. AMPI's 20%
handling commission on the sale amounted to
P28,617.
Pursuant to LAND ROVER's directive that sale
value of these spare parts be "placed into a
separate client account which will be available to
LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE" ,
Saddul did not deposit the proceeds of the sales
in AMPI's account but held them in trust for LAND
ROVER. "
Saddul was "terminated" by AMPI in the early part
of 1986 for cause or causes that Cuevas did not
disclose, but, according to Edgar Guilatco, a
prosecution witness, Saddul "left the company" .
He thereupon formed his own outfit which he
named "Multipart Motors International, Inc." What
appears in the record is that on May 30, 1986,
Lyndsay wrote a letter to Saddul enclosing "a
note which effectively authorizes you to act as our
distributor" .
On November 10, 1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to
Cuevas requesting for a statement on AMPI's
inventory of British Leyland spare parts. Cuevas
replied by telex that some of those spare parts
had been sold by Saddul who did not turn over
the proceeds to AMPI, and that he (Cuevas) filed
a criminal case against Saddul "to recover the
money so I can remit immediately. On March 26,
1987, Lyndsay sent a reply-telex requesting
information as to "which items have been sold
and at what price and which items remain in
stock" and sought "a reconciliation of this stock"
On June 3, 1987, based on Cuevas' complaint,
an information for estafa in the amount of
P143,085.00 (I.S. No. 86-20607) was filed
against Saddul in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
Despite the advice from Land Rover, AMPI
prosecuted the criminal case against Saddul. On
August 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a
decision finding him guilty of estafa with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence (Art. 315,
subpar. 1-b, Rev. Penal Code).
Issue:
WON the crime charged is proper.
Held:
No. One of the ways of committing the crime of
estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
is:
"(b) By misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust
or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property." (Art. 315, par.
1 subpar. b, Rev. Penal Code.).
The appropriation or conversion of money or
property received, to the prejudice of the owner
thereof, is the essence of estafa through
misappropriation (Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67). The words
"convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of
using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate to one's own use includes, not
only conversion to one's personal advantage, but
also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right.
Conversion is an unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the right of ownership over goods or
personal chattels belonging to another, resulting
in the alteration of their condition or the exclusion
of the owner's rights. It takes place when a person
actually appropriates the property of another to
his own benefit, use, and enjoyment (Trinidad
vs. Court of Appeals, 53 OG 731 citing Bouvier's
Law Dictionary).
The elements of the crime of embezzlement or
estafa with abuse of confidence are:
(a) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such
property by the person who has so received it or
a denial on his part that he received it;
(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to
the injury of another, and
(d) that there be demand for the return of the
property,
The first element of the crime does not exist in
this case because Saddul did not receive the
Leyland Automotive spare parts from Cuevas or
AMPI in trust, on commission, for administration,
or under a duty to make delivery of, or return the
same. Saddul received the Leyland spare parts
from the AFP in trust for LAND ROVER which
authorized him to sell them ("we now authorize
you to undertake the disposal of the parts at the
best possible prices available from your local
market" –
Since Saddul did not convert or divert the
property (he sold them in accordance with the
authority given to him by Land Rover) nor did he
deny that he received them, the second element
of the crime was also not present.
Saddul's failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale
of the spare parts to AMPI or Cuevas did not
constitute a conversion or diversion to the injury
of the latter who, not being the owner of the
property, incurred no loss and suffered no injury
on account of Saddul's retention of the said
proceeds while awaiting Land Rover's
instructions regarding the special account where
he should deposit them. Saddul simply complied
with the directive in Land Rover's letter of March
4, 1985 that the proceeds be "placed into a
separate client account which will be available to
LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE"
(Exh. 1 or F). Implicit in this directive was an
injunction not to deliver the proceeds to AMPI.
The third element of the crime charged is absent.
The fourth and final element of demand for the
return of the property is also lacking. AMPI or
Cuevas made no demand for the return of the
spare parts sold by Saddul because Cuevas
knew that those spare parts were to be sold for
the account of Land Rover.
While it is true that under Lyndsay's letter of
March 4, 1985 (Exh. 1 or F) AMPI was entitled to
a handling commission of 20% of the sale value
of the spare parts (equivalent to P28,617.00)
which Saddul failed to deliver to AMPI, Saddul
explained that he subsequently received
instructions from Land Rover to hold the 20%
commission until AMPI shall have given an
accounting of the remaining Leyland spare parts
(worth P1.2 million) still held by AMPI. (pp. 10, 23-
28, tsn, February 15, 1988.)
That testimony of Saddul was not controverted by
the complainant. On the contrary, it was
confirmed by Lyndsay's letter dated August 6,
1987 to AMPI or Cuevas (Exh. 2) asking for an
accounting of "balance of the parts held by you .
. . upon receipt (of which) ** we will settle your
handling charges at 20% of sales as agreed."
By obeying the instructions of Land Rover to
withhold payment of AMPI's 20% handling charge
(P28,617.00) Saddul did not become liable for
embezzlement to AMPI for he did not receive that
sum from AMPI. It was part of the price he
received from Rover Motor Parts, the buyer of the
spare parts.
Decision: WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the resolution dated April
16, 1990 is granted. The decision dated
September 1, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 06234 is hereby reversed and set
aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de oficio.
Allied Banking Corp. vs. Ordonez
192 SCRA 246
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM, for short) thru its
duly authorized officer, private respondent
Alfredo Ching, entered into a Trust Receipt
Agreement with Allied Bank whereby the latter as
the entruster releases the Dolomites and one Lot
High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Brick to the
possession of PBM, the entrustee, for it to sell
with the obligation turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods, if sold, or to return the same, if
unsold within the stated period.
Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue
amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated
demands, PBM failed and refused to either turn
over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to
return the same.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against
private respondent for violation of PD 115 before
the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. After
preliminary investigation, the Fiscal found a prima
facie case for violation of PD 115 on four (4)
counts and filed the corresponding information in
court. Private respondent appealed the Fiscal's
resolution to the Department of Justice but the
efforts proved to be futile, hence, the case now
was brought before the Supreme Court.
Private respondent claimed that PD 115 covers
goods which are ultimately destined for sale and
not goods for use in manufacture; that at the time
of PBM's application for the issuance of the LC's,
it was not represented to the petitioner that the
items were intended for sale, hence, there was no
deceit resulting in a violation of the trust receipts
which would constitute a criminal liability.
Issue:
Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust
Receipts Law) apply when the goods covered by
a Trust Receipt do not form part of the finished
products which are ultimately sold but are
instead, utilized/used up in the operation of the
equipment and machineries of the entrustee-
manufacturer?
Held:
Yes. Rationale: Section 4 of said PD 115 says in
part: "Sec. 4. What constitutes a trust receipt
transaction. — A trust receipt transaction, within
the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by
and between a person referred to in this Decree
as the entrustee, and another person referred to
in this Decree as the entrustee, whereby the
entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or
security interests over certain specified goods,
documents or instruments, releases the same to
the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's
execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed
document called a 'trust receipt' wherein the
entrustee binds himself to hold the designated
goods, documents or instruments in trust for the
entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the
goods, documents or instruments with the
obligation to turn over to the entruster the
proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust
receipt or the goods, documents or instruments
themselves, if they are unsold or not otherwise
disposed of, in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the trust receipt, . . ."
The trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay
the entruster. Their terms are to be interpreted in
accordance with the general rules on contracts,
the law being alert in all cases to prevent fraud on
the part of either party to the transaction. The
entrustee binds himself to sell or otherwise
dispose of the entrusted goods with the obligation
to turn over to the entruster the proceeds if sold,
or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise
disposed of, in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the trust receipt. A
violation of this undertaking constitutes estafa
under Sec. 13, PD 115.
The non-payment of the amount covered by a
trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee's
obligation to pay. There is no reason why the law
should not apply to all transactions covered by
trust receipts, except those expressly excluded.
Decision: The petition was granted.
Lee vs. Rodil
175 SCRA 100
Facts:
The accused in this case was the duly authorized
representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc..She
opened a letter of credit with the Philippine Bank
of Communications to purchase certain
merchandise consisting of 23 ctns. Lab. Culture
Media in favor of said bank, and right after, they
executed a trust receipt for the aforesaid
merchandise. By virtue of which, the said
accused obligated herself to hold said
merchandise in trust with liberty to sell the same
in cash for the account of the said bank and to
account for the proceeds of the sale thereof, if
sold or of returning the said merchandise to said
bank in case of failure to sell the same, on or
before October 24, 1982. But the accused, once
in possession of the said merchandise, failed to
comply with her aforesaid obligation despite the
lapse of a long period of time and repeated
demands made upon her to that effect. Hence,
information was filed against her for the crime of
Estafa.
She moved to quash the information however it
was denied as well as the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner alleged that the violation of a trust
receipt agreement does not constitute Estafa
notwithstanding an express provision in the
"Trust Receipts Law" (P.D. 115) characterizing
such violation. She attacks P. D. 115 for being
unconstitutional. She contends that it is violative
of the constitutional right that "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax
Issue:
Whether or not the violation of a trust receipt
agreement constitutes the crime of Estafa.
Held:
YES. The criminal liability springs from the
violation of the trust receipt.
Supreme Court pronounced in the Vintola cases
that:
... A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is
endorsed with its own distinctive features and
characteristics. Under that set-up, a bank
extends a loan covered by the letter of credit, with
the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other
words, the transaction involves a loan feature
represented by the letter of credit, and a security
feature which is in the covering trust receipt.
Therefore, the loan feature is separate and
distinct from the trust receipt. The violation of a
trust receipt committed by disposing of the goods
covered thereby and failing to deliver the
proceeds of such sale has been squarely made
to fall under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The fact that the bank does not become the
factual owner of the goods does not make the law
unconstitutional. The language of the above-
mentioned penal provision has been clarified by
P.D. 115. The person who is prejudiced through
the misappropriation or conversion of the goods
need not be the owner, thereof; if such had been
the intention of the authors of the Code, the
phrase "to the prejudice of another" would have
read "to the prejudice of the owner.”
Verily, P.D. 115 is a declaration by the legislative
authority that, as a matter of public policy, the
failure of a person to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of goods covered by a trust receipt or to
return said goods if not sold is a public nuisance
to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
In fine, P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
provision on non-imprisonment for non-payment
of debt.
The trial court's orders were AFFIRMED and the
case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Serona v. CA
[G.R. No. 130423. Nov.18, 2002]
FACTS:
Leonida Quilatan delivered pieecs of jewelry to
Serona to be sold on commission basis. By oral
agreement, shall remit payment or return the
pieces of jewelry if not sold to Quilatan, both
within 30 days from receipt of the items.
Quilatan required Serona to execute an
acknowledgement receipt indicating said
agreement and the total amount due. This was
signed by Serona and a witness.
Unknown to Quilantan, Serona had earlier
entrusted the jewelry to Marichu Labrador for the
latter to sell on commission basis.
Serona was not able to collect payment from
Labrador, which caused her to likewise fail to pay
her obligation to Quilatan. So Quilatan filed an
action for estafa under Art. 315 1(b)
RTC found Serona guilty of Estafa. CA affirmed
said ruling but modified the penalty.
ISSUE:
WON Serona is guilty of estafa
HELD:
No she did not commit estafa through conversion
or misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to a
sub-agent for sale on commission basis. Serona
is acquitted but liable for civil damages for value
of unpaid jewelry. She neither abused the
confidence reposed upon her by Quilatan nor
converted or misappropriated the subject jewelry.
Giving the pieces of jewelry to a sub-agent for
sale on commission basis did not violate her
undertaking with Quilatan.
Moreover, she delivered the jewelry to Labrador
under the same terms upon which it was originally
entrusted toher and that Serona had not derived
any personal benefit from the loss of the jewelry.
Labrador admitted that she received the jewelry
from petitioner and sold the same to a third
person. She further acknowledged that she owed
Serona P441,035.00, thereby negating any
criminal intent on the part of Serona.
There is no showing that she conspired with
Labrador to deprive Quilatan of the jewelry or its
value.
An agent who is not prohibited from appointing a
sub-agent but does so without express authority
is responsible for the acts of the sub-agent. Thus
Serona is still civilly liable.
The acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority do not bind the principal unless he
ratifies them, expressly or impliedly.
An agent who is not prohibited from appointing a
sub-agent but does so without express authority
is responsible for the acts of the sub-agent
CHUA BRUCE V. CA
331 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank,
requested FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant Cashier,
to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside
the vault, which should total to P4 million. They
found out that there was a shortage of P150,000.
After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and
NBI, the reports concluded that Cristeta Chua-
Burce, Cash Custodian, was primary responsible
for the shortage. Unable to explain the shortage,
the services of the accused was terminated.
Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio
Burce, were charged with the crime of estafa. A
civil case was also instituted. The accused prayed
for suspension of criminal case due to a
prejudicial question. It was first granted but
denied by the CA. The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases
continued.
The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of
estafa. CIVIL CASE also found her liable for the
shortage of P150,000. She appealed both rulings
to the CA but the court affirmed the two TC
rulings.
Hence this petition
ISSUE:
WON the elements of estafa were proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No, the crime of estafa was not proven.
The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the
following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration, or any other
circumstances, with the duty return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such
property or denial that he received it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of
another
d) There is demand for such property
The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives
the tranferee both material and juridical
possession of the personal property. Juridical
possession means the transferee has a right over
the thing which he may even set up against the
owner.The possession of the accused of the
money had no juridical possession. Being a cash
custodian, her possession is akin to that of a
bank teller. And possession of a bank teller is
possession of the bank. she was a mere
custodian.
She should have been charged with qualified
theft, but double jeopardy is already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER
– payment to the teller is a payment to the bank,
he is a mere custodian. AGENT – he can assert his
independent, autonomous right to retain
money, even against the owner.
RICARDO CELINO, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Complainant Jose Tan Kapoe testified that
Zosimo and Ricardo Celino together with two (2)
other companions went to his house and informed
him that there was a hidden treasure under his lot;
that they told him that a certain dwarf entering
the body of Zosimo is giving instructions to the
latter as to the digging operations; that he will be
given millions of pesos; that because he and
accused Ricardo Celino as well as their fathers
were close friends, he believed them.
So later on, they dug a hole in his ricemill and
they told him that they discovered a treasure, a jar
full of gold; that both accused Ricardo and
Zosimo did not allow him to see it by covering it
with a sack and white cloth; that both Ricardo and
Zosimo told him to give P10,000.00 and he got
the money from his safety vault, placed it in a
white envelope, 6x3 inches, and gave it to the
accused Zosimo; that both Ricardo and Zosimo
went inside the little room under the stairs of his
house where they brought the jar filled with
treasure and placed the money on the treasure;
that Ricardo and Zosimo stayed in the room for
about 1/2 hour and then they went out of the room
and closed the door; that Zosimo told him that
they are going back upon instructions of the
dwarf and that they will communicate with him
again; that the second time, he was told by the two
(2) brothers, Requerido and Cipriano Celino to
give P5,000.00 which he also placed in a white
envelope; that he gave the money to Zosimo who
together with his father, accused Ricardo, went
inside again the room and they said that they
placed the money on the treasure; that he was
forbidden to enter or touch the treasure because
the dwarf will be angry; that the third time, it was
Requerido Celino who advised him to give
money allegedly upon instructions of the dwarf
and he withdrew money from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and they went through the
same procedure in placing the money in the white
envelope and entering the room; that Zosimo
required him to go to the church of Landayan,
located at San Pedro, Laguna for three (3)
consecutive days; that the Celinos continued to
ask for money to be put in the jar and he got from
said bank (Exh. A-1); that all in all, the money
which he had given to the accused amounted to
P50,230.00 (Exh. A); that when his savings in the
bank was exhausted, he asked them to set a
deadline and he was told May 30, 1979; that he
was hoping by that time, he will get back the
money and the gold; that they did not fulfill their
promise on May 30, 1979 and so he opened the
jar and found that it contained only newspaper,
comics, rocks and soil; that thereafter, he wrote a
letter to Zosimo to return his money through his
driver Batitis (Exh. B) and Zosimo wrote back
that he will return the money (Exh. C),
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court finding the accused Ricardo Celino
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ESTAFA.
ISSUE:
WON the transaction entered by Celino and
Kapoe was on one of joint veture.
HELD:
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming
Ricardo Celinos conviction.
There is no merit to the petitioner's pretense that
the transaction between him and the complainant
was one of "joint venture" and that if he had any
liability at all, it is civil in nature. The evidence
presented in this case conclusively shows that
Ricardo Celino, together with his two sons,
Zosimo (deceased) and Requerido, led the
complainant to believe that there was a hidden
treasure underneath his lot; that a dwarf whose
spirit supposedly entered the body of Zosimo
directed the digging operations; that to obtain
said treasure and upon instructions of the
"dwarf," it was necessary for the complainant to
give the accused money which amounted to
P41,300.00 all in all and to pray in the church for
three (3) consecutive days.
Furthermore, no evidence was adduced by
petitioner in support of his contention that he and
the complainant were partners in a "joint venture"
transaction. The case of U.S. v. Clarin [17 Phil.
85 (1910)] cited by the petitioner is therefore not
applicable. The facts clearly show that petitioner
together with his sons pretended to possess power
to find hidden treasure in order to fleece the
complainant of his hard-earned money. Contrary
to the petitioner's allegation, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law
and jurisprudence laid down by this Court on the
matter. Under the cases of People v. Scott [62 Phil
553 (1935)] and U.S. v. de los Reyes [34 Phil. 693
(1916)] bearing similar facts as the case at bar, the
acts committed by the petitioner constitute a
classic case of swindling under Art. 315 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code.