Statutory Construction made easy by a Freshman

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2012

Rule1. Apply the Law when it is CLEAR. Do not interpret or CONSTRUE.

Rule2 in StatCon is IBC, interpret before you CONSTRUE. You CONSTRUE only
when the written law is not enough to give meaning and EFFECT to the INTENT of the
LAW.

The RULES are simplified in the middle of this REVIEWER. Done by a Freshman, by
ang aging Freshman who shall be a Lawyer soooooon!!!

literal meaning or plain meaning rule

dura lex sed lex
doctrine of necessary implication
ejusdem generis
limitations of ejusdem generis
expressio unios est exclusio alterius
negative- opposite doctrine
application of expressio unius rule
doctrine of casus omissus
doctrine of last antecedent
reddeddo singula singulis
stare decisis
res judicata
obiter dictum

A legislature is a kind of deliberative assembly with the power to pass, amend, and
repeallaws.[1] The law created by a legislature is called legislation or statutory law. In
addition toenacting laws, legislatures usually have exclusive authority to raise or
lower taxes and adopt thebudget and other money bills. Legislatures are known by
many names, the most common being parliament and congress, although these terms
also have more specific meanings.

Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may sometimes be
considered by the judiciary when interpreting the law (see judicial interpretation). The
judiciary may attempt to assess legislative intent where legislation is ambiguous, or
does not appear to directly or adequately address a particular issue, or when there
appears to have been a legislative drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the
inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a statute could be
interpreted in more than one fashion that legislative intent must be inferred from sources
other than the actual text of the statute.
 Sources of legislative intent
Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine the goals and
purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it passed the law:
 the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,
 amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
 the record of hearings on the topic,
 legislative records or journals,
 speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
 legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
 other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the definitions in the statute on
question,
 other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question,
 legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president,
 case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems the
legislature was attempting to address with the bill, or
 constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have passed certain sections of
a statute 'had it known' about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the
statute?").
 legislative intent- the reason for passing the law

Literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal meaning or
plain rule means INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL WORDS words in a statute
should if possible, be given effect.

Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should
not, by CONSTRUCTION, be given a different meaning. When the legislature defines a
word used in a statute, it does not usurp the courts function to interpret the laws but it
merely LEGISLATES what should form part of the law itself.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases
used in statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning which
is supported by the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is
generally spoken shall be generally understood. It is also the same as GENERALI
DICTUM GENERALITIR EST INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is understood
in a general sense.

WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not intent to words.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish,
do not distinguish.
dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA
EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is
written.

Doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute isunderstand by
implication to contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it
grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in the maxim EX
NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of the law.

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the
particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and
the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not
specifically named by the particular words.

The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry
out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must give way in favor of the
legislative intent;

limitations of ejusdem generis

requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a
general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not
merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader
meaning.

expressio unios est exclusio alterius.

the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of
OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly

limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be
extended to other matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions, what is
not list down as an exception is ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT
REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS, the express exception, exemption or
savings excludes others.
application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule is used in CONSTRUCTIONof
statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights,
andimposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly
construed. It is only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for ascertaining the legislative
intent. The rule must also yield to legislative intent.

negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS

IMPLIED is known as negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. This rule is not absolute if it can be shown that the legislature did not
intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative
intent is clearly indicated, the COURT may supply the omission if to do so will carry out
the intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language.

doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAL RELATIO NISI

IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA or relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless
the context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING WORDS restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated.

The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of a statute, by which "Referential

and qualifying phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last
antecedent." The rule is typically bound by "common sense" and is flexible enough to
avoid application that "would involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain intent of the
language, or if the context for other reason requires a deviation from the rule." Evidence
that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the
immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the
antecedents by a comma."

reddendo singula singulis when two descriptions makes it impossible to reconcile,

reconcile it to have a “singular meaning” to settle the issue.

refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to effect that each
word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriate
related and to which it is most applicable.

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By rendering each his own; for

example, when two descriptions of property are given together in one mass, both the
next of kin and the heir cannot take, unless in cases where a construction can be made
reddendo singula singulis, that the next of kin shall take the personal estate and the heir
at law the real estate. 14 Ves. 490. Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab. Conditions, L.
Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts to abide by or adhere
to principles established by decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray duh-see-sis) n. Latin
or "to stand by a decision," the doctrine that a trial court is bound by appellate court
decisions (precedents) on a legal question which is raised in the lower court. Reliance
on such precedents is required of trial courts until such time as an appellate court
changes the rule, for the trial court cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial
judge believes it is "bad law")

Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a
court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that
were litigated or that could have been litigated in that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must
then show that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the
second suit. For example, assume that the plaintiff in the first lawsuit asserted that she
was injured in an auto accident. She sues the driver of the other auto under a theory
of Negligence. A jury returns a verdict that finds that the defendant was not
negligent. The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that
would help her prove that the other driver was negligent. A court would dismiss the
second lawsuit under res judicata because the second lawsuit is based on the
same Cause of Action (negligence) and the same injury claim.

Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the
decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision
upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the
question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination
of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not
binding as precedent.

AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in contravention

of the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law or RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA.

Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes must be done to avoid evil and

injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation that will give
the thing the EFFICACY is to be adopted. Law must receive sensible interpretation to
promote the ends for which they are enacted. They should be given practical
CONSTRUCTION that will give LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE DONE without doing
VIOLENCE to reason.

UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must be interpreted to give it

efficient operation and effect as a whole avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT is so
that a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a useless SURPLUSAGE.
Accordingly, in case of Doubt or obscurity, that construction should make the statute
fully operative and effective. IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT
DO A VAIN THING IN THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.

INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS

INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every statute must be so CONSTRUED and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of Jurisprudence. ALL laws are
presumed to be consistent with each other.

DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA, distinguish times and you will

harmonize laws.

IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware, and taken
into account, PRIOR LAWS on the subject of legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject
is not intended and if such occur, Court must construe, through reconciliation to give
effect to the statute. If it is impossible to reconcile and harmonize, one statute has to
give way to the other. The latest statute shall prevail being the latest expression of the
legislative WILL.

A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The fact that one is
general and the other special creates a presumption that the special act is to be
considered as remaining an exception of the General Act. One as a General Law of the
Land, the other as a LAW for a Particular case. This shall apply all the time regardless
of which law was enacted first.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS

are made by the EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the Executive on
Statutes, for them to implement it, they must understand it and interpret it if the
language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The executive makes RULES or IRRs for this
statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and PROCEDURES. These IRRs or RULES
issued by the executive to execute the Statute are CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS of the
JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS, under her are
the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine Republic. The issuances on how laws
are to be prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION of the Justice
Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES handling
disputes in a QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are based on their
UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by congress, laws that are enforced. These are
CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS and Constructions.

THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN, WHEN THERE

ARENO ACTUAL CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES
IN THE SUPREME COURT, therefore,NO STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE.
IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS, THEN
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO INTERPRET AND
CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY MAKE, MAY ALSO DO CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE
BOUND TO FOLLOW.

WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE RIGHT TO

INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE
GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER POWER. This is so because the
greater includes the lesser as expressed in the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest
et minus.THERE SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A LAW
THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS INTENDED BY THE
LAW.

Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions as maybe

necessary to EFFECTUATE its object and purpose, or to make effective Rights,
powers, privileges or JURISDICTION which it grants, including all such COLLATERAL
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and LOGICALLY inferred from its
TERMS, as expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate legis or from the NECESSITY of
the LAW. Doctrine of Necessary Implication.

WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY. QUANDO

ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM.

WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of Autolimitation—It is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres to principles
of international law as a limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.

Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either because of the
arrival of an expiry date or because an agency has accomplished the purpose for which
it was created. Function is mere FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated facts in support of the conclusion.

RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the statute ; and the
security of men's lives and property, require that they should be adhered to:for
precedents serve to regulate our conduct ; and there is more danger to be apprehended
from uncertainty, than from any exposition; because, when the rule is settled, men know
how to conform to it; but, when all is uncertain, they are left in the dark, and constantly
liable to error; for the same offence which, at one time, was thought entitled to clergy, at
another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the life or death of the citizen will be made to
depend, not upon a fixt rule, but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try
him, than which a more miserable state of things cannot be conceived.
1. Presumption of Correctness
a. “When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the statute
to be valid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is on the
challenger. "Every act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the
Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so as to sustain the enactment in
question, if practicable." "When the constitutionality of an act is challenged, a heavy
burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge. All laws are presumed to
be constitutional and this presumption is one of the strongest known to the law.

b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting

statutes, the CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations thereof.
Although the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes are in pari
materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends the earlier enacted statute.

c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.

d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the
interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative
interpretation of the original act, a formal change-rebutting the presumption of
substantial change.

e. “We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted
the relevant statute."

f. when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that
the CONGRESS, in amending a statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the
law. "Further, we assume that CONGRESS’ amendments to a statute are purposeful,
rather than unnecessary.

g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of

statutory construction that, where both general and specific statutes appear to
address a matter, CONGRESS intends the specific statute to control the subject

h. “When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of
law," it is presumed that CONGRESS intended to override any potential conflicts
with earlier legislation.

i. “The construction of statutes by agencies charged with administration of those

statutes is entitled to great weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law
made by CONGRESS carries great weight and is entitled to deference unless it is
proven the agency erred. The grant of regulatory authority extends only to duties or
powers conferred by law. As such, "regulations, promulgated pursuant to definitive
statutory authority, have the force and effect of law. Moreover, those regulations which
"clearly and explicitly mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any
regulation of the Department must be reasonably grounded in an identifiable and
definitive statutory foundation. "Generally, the court accords substantial deference to an
agency's interpretations of its own regulations. Provided the interpretation "does not
violate the Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.

j. we will overturn COURT’s decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary

or capricious" and thus a "clear abuse of delegated discretion." On the other hand, an
"agency does not possess specialized competence over the interpretation of a statute
merely because it addresses topics within the agency's delegable authority. Pure
statutory construction, a matter within the "core competency of the judiciary," . "This
axiom stems from basic principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the
province and duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the law is. It
necessarily follows that the a priori question whether the statute delegates or withholds
discretion is itself a question of statutory interpretation, one implicating our duty of de
novo review."

k. ”The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's reasoning,
correctly noting that courts give "great deference" to an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations. This deference stems from Code § 2.2-4027, which requires that
reviewing courts "take due account" of the "experience and specialized competence of
the agency" promulgating the regulation. Even so, "deference is not abdication, and it
requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of
the principles of construction courts normally employ. No matter how one
calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulationdoes not
include the power to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference
"to the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting
a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to
adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the
notice and public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process - thereby putting in
jeopardy the "enhanced political accountability of agency policy decisions adopted
through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially
affected members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of
determining the rules that affect them.

l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the language

of the statute or when the interpretation has not been consistently and regularly applied,
the usual deference accorded to an agency's interpretation should be withheld.

m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of

an executive agency, it has no control over that implementation (except, of course,
through further, more precise, legislation).The legislative and executive functions are
not combined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule's meaning. And
though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the legislative
power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to
 fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a
law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of
a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes
power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own
rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future
adjudications, to do what it pleases.

Construed Against the State/ Vagueness

a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be construed strictly
against the state and favorably to the liberty of the citizen. The maxim is founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the power
of punishment is vested in the legislature and not in the judicial department. No man
incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects him to it is clearly within the spirit and letter
of the statute which imposes such penalty. There can be no constructive offenses, and
before a man can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the
statute. If these principals are violated, the fate of the accused is determined by the
arbitrary discretion of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."

b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against the STATE
and in favor of an accused.

c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the STATE in
criminal cases, "we will not apply 'an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute'
that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein.

d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague, the

Supreme Court has considered whether the words used have a well-settled . . . meaning
. . . (citing dictionary to determine "generally understood" meaning for adjective in
ordinance). "A penal statute is void for vagueness if it both fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute and encourages selective prosecution

Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative Defense

1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications, exceptions or

exemptions to their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative
element of the offense which the prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may
determine that the exemption is a statutory defense, which the accused can assert to
defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. In determining whether specific limiting
language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to
the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the
existence or absence of the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation.
When determining whether the limiting language is a negative element or a statutory
defense, this Court has identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the
exception and its role in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the
situation prompting legislative action, the exception is essential to complete the general
prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or justification for what
would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and whether
the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An application of these
factors to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except as provided by law,"
as used in Code § 29.1-553, establishes a statutory defense as opposed to a negative
element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this case, we first must
address the threshold issue of whether the absence of a valid prescription is an
affirmative defense or a negative element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden of
proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to the accused...When construing penal
statutes which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their application, the
limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the
prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a
statutory defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the
prosecution. The ACCUSED BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF
THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his
guilt. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense
or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a whole
and the ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the
underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation.Accordingly, we should
consider the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the other words in the
statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is
essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an
excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an
affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant. (It is undoubtedly the general rule that the state must prove all the essential
facts entering into the description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases
that when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant it is
incumbent on him to establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code § 18.2-250 relates to a
fact that would be solely within the knowledge of the accused. If we accept appellant's
contention that the STATE must prove appellant had no valid prescription, the offense
would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's theory, to obtain a conviction under the
facts of this case, the STATE would be required to prove that no medical professional,
wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had prescribed the drug to
appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of chain drugstores, as well as
independent pharmacies, hospitals, prison infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument,
conceded that such an undertaking would most likely be impossible. CONGRESS
clearly did not intend such a result, nor would they enact such an impotent statute

Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other
rights of the people not therein expressed.

2) “The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the
pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and modes of thought and life of the people as
developed under the common law and as existing at the time of its adoption to the
extent and therein stated…The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers
of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it
is to be made effective. As we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take
any action “not prohibited by express terms or by necessary implications by the
Constitution.
3) “A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by
the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the
constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to
decide the merits of the case. A statute will be construed to avoid a constitutional
question whenever this is possible.
5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS (note it is congress
construing, not the supreme court, that is why it is CALLED “CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSTRUCTION”)is entitled to consideration, and if the construction
is contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional provision, it is entitled to
great weight. In addition, Long acquiescence in such an announced construction so
strengthens itthat it should not be changed unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.

A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its enforcement.

A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or requirement that must be

followed.

A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on the legislature" for
its implementation.

7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE

NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we are guided by the
principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be constitutional. Where a statute
is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no standing to challenge the
statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a
third person in a hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party has standing to
challenge the constitutionality of a statuteonly insofar as it has an adverse impact on
his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, departs from
the express limitations of the Constitution and relies instead on implied constitutional
restrictions, the legislative usurpation must be very clear and palpable to justify the
court’s holding that an enactment is unconstitutional.
9) "This Court’s jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well established.
“The fact that many things of a diverse nature are authorized or required to be done in
the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is
authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate
and natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is sufficient. “[I]f
there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its
sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless it is
plainly so. The analysis of a particular act must necessarily “stand on its own,” and we
must look to both the body and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether
the act violates the Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the
litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional on its face, that is, as applied to a third person in a hypothetical
situation." We have said that classification ordinarily will be upheld "if any state of
facts can be reasonably conceived that would support it." But where the statute
creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or where it affects a
fundamental constitutional right, the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the
"strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject
to de novo review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew,"
"beginning again."

Retroactive Enactment of Laws

1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of the
parties are to be deemed in accordance with the law in effect when the action is begun,
unless the amended statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our analysis is
guided by the fundamental principles of statutory construction that retroactive laws are
not favored, and that a statute is always construed to operate prospectively unless a
contrary legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply only to future cases unless
there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new
provision, which shows that the new law was intended to have a retrospective
effect. Further, every reasonable doubt is resolved against a retroactive operation of a
statute, and words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they
are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them .
Retroactive effect will be given to a statute only when legislative intent that a statute be
so applied is stated in clear, explicit, and unequivocal terms.

Common Law

1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the common law
definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind
in the enactment of a statute. The statute must therefore be read along with the
provisions of the common law, and the latter will be read into the statute unless it
 clearly appears from express language or by necessary implication that the purpose
of the statute was to change the common law.
3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not be held to
change the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly
manifested. Therefore, a statutory change in the common law will be recognized
only in that which is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is necessarily
implied by its language.
4) “A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the
legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by
construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory change in the
common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily
implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was
intended. "When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by
the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms
are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule

Previous Construction of a Statute

1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts, and is then re-enacted by the
legislature, the construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature,
and thenceforth becomes obligatory upon the courts." Hence, when the court finds the
old construction should be modified, it cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by its
old construction because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the courts, and
therefore, it "carries its historical construction" when used by CONGRESS in a statute.
3) We have said that “when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an
existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates,
as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as
well.” (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or
STATUTE that is ambiguous even if it was applied to a private case)

New Law New Remedy

4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute prescribing a
new remedy for an existing right should never be construed to abolish a pre-existing
remedy in the absence of express words or necessary implication. Further, " 'when a
statute gives a new remedy, and contains no negative, express or implied, of the old
remedy, the new one provided by it is cumulative, and the party may elect between the
two.'
Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject
1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not be read in
isolation. Such statutes should be considered in pari materia. Moreover, statutes
dealing with the same subject matter should be construed together to achieve a
harmonious result, resolving conflicts to give effect to legislative intent. An accepted
principle of statutory construction is that, when it is not clear which of two statutes
applies, the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes
provide different procedures on the same subject matter, "the general must give way to
the specific.

"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your questions and in accord with the
rule of statutory construction in pari materia, statutory provisions are not to be
considered as isolated fragments of law. Such provisions are to be considered as a
whole, or as parts of a greater connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single
and complete statutory compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but one act, so that
sections of one act may be considered as though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a
system of related general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a
fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing
system and to be carried into effect conformably to it, and they should be so construed
as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the system and make the scheme
consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is
shown plainly or with irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the
absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend
to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violate a general statute or system of
statutory provisions the entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily
involved in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary, legislature did not intend
to alter or repeal general statute or system).

3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two
statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and construed together and effect
given to all of their provisions. Statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to
harmonize, and force and effect should be given the provisions of each.

4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent. 'In interpreting statutes, "courts should give the fullest possible effect
to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment. Potentially
conflicting statutes should be harmonized to give force and effect to each.

5) City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the
Constitution. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts
must harmonize them and apply them together.

The Meaning of Words

1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to have
their usual and ordinary meaning.

3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be

presumed to have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely
necessary. "We must assume that the legislature did not intend to do a vain and useless
thing. "It is a well-established rule of construction that a statute ought to be interpreted
in such a manner that it may have effect, and not found to be vain and elusive. "A word
or clause contained in a statute may only be rejected as surplusage if it "appears to
have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable of any
sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.

4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase, but will
construe the words and terms at issue in the context of the other language used in the
statute.

5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to

ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, that intention must be
gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest
absurdity. "The Court has stated the related principle that "the plain, obvious, and
rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or
strained construction." Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd
or irrational consequences.

6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought
to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should receive
a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather than one which
will defeat it.

7) [i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clear and definite, effect must be given to it. It is unnecessary to resort to any rules of
statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those
situations, the statute's plain meaning and intent govern.

"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way, refers to
two or more things simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or
lacks clearness and definiteness.”

9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally
sufficient;binding." (noting that if the STATUTE does not provide a statutory definition
we may look to the dictionary definition to determine legislative intent

10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with
a comma followed by the disjunctive word "nor." We have noted that, pursuant to the
rules of grammar,”phrases separated by a comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are
independent. The disjunctive serves to connect the two parts of the sentence but also to
keep them separate and independent.”

12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary,
as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally means
an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly,
obstinately, perversely [.] The word is also employed to characterize a thing done
without ground for believing it is lawful. The term "willful act" imports knowledge and
consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be intended
or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in
an injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and culpable" describes conduct. The word
"gross" means "aggravated or increased negligence" while the word "culpable" means
"deserving of blame or censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when
accompanied by acts of commission or omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing
a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others, under circumstances
reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable that injury will
be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the
probable result of his acts

13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they permitted
to accomplish the same result by judicial interpretation." Rather, when the language of
a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and
may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did
not mean what it actually has stated.

14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation by the Department that is in conflict with the
plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.

15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons or things is
enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general words are to be restricted
in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words. Likewise,
according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when general and specific
words are grouped, the general words are limited by the specific and will be construed
to embrace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific
words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its terms, the
exception negates the idea that any other class is to be excepted.

17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine, is particularly
applicable here and can be summarized as follows: Referential and qualifying words
and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last
antecedent. The last antecedent is 'the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made
an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually
is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it. (explaining
and applying "the grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that
it immediately follows . . . ."); (noting that construction of a statute according to the last
antecedent rule is "quite sensible as a matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with its
enforcementcannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear meaning. Amendments
of statutes can only be made by the legislature and not by the courts or
administrative officers charged with their enforcement
20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume that
the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute,
the Court of Appeals mischaracterized that presumption as “effectively irrebuttable.” We
also understand that “[m]ost words have different shades of meaning and consequently
may be variously construed, not only when they occur in different statutes, but when
used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section.” Thus, the
“natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning … is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is
such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant
the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.”
Ibid. A given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association
with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to provide
an endnote or footnote citation orreference for a source that was cited in the preceding
endnote or footnote. It is similar in meaning to idem (meaning something that has been
mentioned previously; the same), abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal
citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one must look at the reference preceding it.

21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or," are
independent.(finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence, "'but
disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive results in alternatives, which must be
treated separately); (finding that limiting phrase in statute is independent of and does
not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting phrase is separated from the first
two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma and the
disjunctive "or" as implying two separate and independent phrases in a Virginia statute
authorizing payment of dividends by corporation "out of net earnings, or out of its net
assets in excess of its capital"). Accordingly, the phrase, "made by the Defendant to any
law enforcement officer," is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny
written or recorded statement or confessions."

The Terms May/Shall

1) The term "may," as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary meaning intended
by the CONGRESS -permission, importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the word "may," while
ordinarily importing permission, will be construed to be mandatory when it is necessary
to accomplish the manifest purpose of the legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute generally implies that its terms are intended to
be mandatory, rather than permissive or directive.
4) "[T]he use of ‘shall,’ in a statute requiring action by a public official, is directory
andnot mandatory unless the statute manifests a contrary intent."14 "A statute directing
the mode of proceeding by public officers is to be deemed directory, and a precise
compliance is not to be deemed essential to the validity of the proceedings, unless so
declared by statute.
 The Term Aggrieved “Locus Standi”
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to
determine who is a proper party to seek court relief from an adverse decision. In order
for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must affirmatively appear that such person had
some direct interest in the subject matter of the proceeding that he seeks to attack. . .
. The petitioner 'must show that he has an immediate, pecuniary and substantial
interest in the litigation, and not a remote or indirect interest.' . . . Thus, it is not
sufficient that the sole interest of the petitioner is to advance some perceived public
right or to redress someanticipated public injury when the only wrong he has suffered is
in common with other persons similarly situated. The word 'aggrieved' in a statute
contemplates a substantial grievance and means a denial of some personal or property
right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the petitioner
different from that suffered by the public generally.

Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent

1) "In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary element
in the indictment and proof of a particular crime becomes a question of legislative intent
to be construed by the court. Thus, to insert a mens rea element into the offense, and
to require proof thereof, would defeat the statutory purpose, which is to criminalize the
introduction of firearms into a school environment. So we will not add, by implication,
language to the statute that the legislature expressly has chosen not to include.
Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly decided, in refusing the instruction in
question, that this statute is one of strict criminal liability, and that the Commonwealth
was required to prove only that the defendant had possessed, on school property, a
firearm of the type described in the statute.

2) "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is
no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth
Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime
there must first be a "vicious will." Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth
Century early pronounced the same principle, although a few exceptions not relevant
to our present problem came to be recognized.

Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-

meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism.

As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent
on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the
principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that
it required no statutory affirmation.

Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the requirement as to

offenses that were taken over from the common law. The unanimity with which they
have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is
emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite
but elusive mental element.

However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have
devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such
terms as "felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge,"
"fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to
signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.

By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who
were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes....The
Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and
balances in the scales of justice.

The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is
to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he
derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the
freedom heretofore allowed juries.

Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended
to common-law crimes on judicial initiative.

3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea was long a requirement of criminal
responsibility. But the list of exceptions grew, especially in the expanding regulatory
area involving activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare. Id., at 254. The
statutory offense of embezzlement, borrowed from the common law where scienter was
historically required, was in a different category. 13 Id., at 260-261.

"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and
meaning [401 U.S. 601, 608] of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless
otherwise instructed."

The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority

The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our determination of the powers of local
governing bodies. This rule provides that municipal corporations have only those
powers that are expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly
granted powers, and those that are essential and indispensable.
"In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where a power is conferred and
the mode of its execution is specified, no other method may be selected; any other
means would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable. A
necessary corollary is that where a grant of power is silent upon its mode of execution,
a method of exercise clearly contrary to legislative intent, or inappropriate to the ends
sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine of implied powers
should never be applied to create a power that does not exist or to expand an existing
power beyond rational limits. Always, the test in application of the doctrine is
reasonableness, in which concern for what is necessary to promote the public interest is
a key element.
Finally, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority exists only to
the extent specifically granted in the statute. It can never go beyond the authority given .

6) “When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative agency to promulgate

regulations, those regulations must neither exceed the scope of the authority delegated
nor be inconsistent with it. Furthermore, "delegations of legislative power are valid only
if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency,
or board in the exercise of the power. Delegations of legislative power which lack such
policies and standards are unconstitutional and void." For example, language in an
enabling statute which provides merely "that the regulations be designed to protect and
promote the safety and health of employees" is insufficient.

7) "We consistently have held that when the primary purpose of an enactment is to raise
revenue, the enactment will be considered a tax, regardless of the name attached to the
act. The General Assembly is directly prohibited from enacting “any local, special, or
private law . . . [f]or the assessment and collection of taxes. There is, however, an
exception to this specific prohibition. The General Assembly may by special act like RA
7160(Local Government Code)delegating the power of taxation to any province, city,
municipality.

Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of
Executive Departments have the force of law, and that any Executive Department
concerned with the execution of a statute’s interpretation of its governing statutes, as
reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight. Regulations, however, may not
conflict with the authorizing statute. Whether a regulation is inconsistent with its
enabling legislation isproperly a subject of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is the
duty of the courts to harmonize them and not nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with STATUTES. Such ordinances
are inconsistent with state law when they cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a
county or municipal ordinance enlarges on a statute's provisions does not create a
conflict with the statute unless the statute limits the requirements (Separability Clause is
inserted) for all cases to its own terms. Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both
can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.
A Single Body of Law
1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a
statute with "a view toward harmonizing it with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a
particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary
meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the SUPREME Court oftenexamines
other related statutes that contain similar or contrasting language to help determine
legislative intent.

The Exclusion Rule

Ambiguity
1) "Language is ambiguous when it may be understood in more than one way, or
simultaneously refers to two or more things.
2) "When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a manner
that will give effect to the intent of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern and give effect tolegislative
intent, with the reading of a statute as a whole influencing the proper construction of
ambiguous individual provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used in the connection with the construction of
written documents to the effect that an ambiguous provision is construed most strongly
against the person who selected the language." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive covenant, in particular the phrase "residential
purposes," to be ambiguous in several respects....Indeed, even the circuit court's
interpretation that the term " '[r]esidence' means more than mere physical presence and
less than domicile" is ambiguous. It can be argued that a nightly or weekly rental is
more than mere physical presence. Moreover, if the phrase "residential purposes"
carries with it a "duration of use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental of the
property moves from short-term to long-term. Under our case law, a restrictive covenant
of "substantial doubt or ambiguity" must be interpreted "in favor of the free use of
property and against restrictions

Criminal versus Civil Intent of a Statute

The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a
matter of statutory construction." First, one must determine whether the legislature, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other. Second, where the legislature has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, one must address "whether the statutory scheme
was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution

1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution supersedes any
conflicting state law. The preemption of Local laws by STATUTES may occur by
express statutory language or other clear indication that Congress intended to
legislate exclusively in the area. Even if Congress does not intend the enactment
of a STATUTORY scheme completely to preempt Local laws in the area,
 congressional enactments in the same field override Local laws with which they
conflict.

The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which preemption may occur:
(1) Congress may adopt express language setting forth the existence and scope of
preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that "occupies the field" and leaves
no room for states to adopt supplemental laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with the constitution, typically when compliance with
both laws is a "physical impossibility" or the statute stands "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
4) "Settled legal principles provide that the Constitution, not a state court erroneous
interpretation of it, is controlling. (in context of determining whether to apply retroactively
a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions, adopting Blackstonian view that
judges...find the law rather than make the law and that judicial declaration of law is
merely a statement of what the law has always been.

Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the lawmakers on matters of economics, sociology
and public policy. . . . Those considerations belong exclusively in the legislative
domain. Regardless of whether it "may or may not be better public policy". Meaning
COURTS do not interpret provisions for ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY and PUBLIC
POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the "propriety, wisdom, necessity and expediency"
of legislation. We ask only whether the statutory classification erects an irrational,
arbitrary distinction - one that no conceivable state of facts could reasonably sustain.