1. Geluz v CA G.R. No.

L-16439, July 20, 1961

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of
the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff
Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five,
sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate
dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 —
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of
P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la
categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho"
(Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having
rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of
the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note,
10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation
of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not
expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of
the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion,
the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by
the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it
that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his
wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in
favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the
beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio
Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
2. Joaquin v. Navarro G.R. No. L-5426, May 29, 1953

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953

RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.

Leonardo Abola for respondent.

TUASON, J.:

This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary
settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael
Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose
decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court
for review.

The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of
civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this
persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin
de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.

It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner.
The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of
Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela
Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.

The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of
Appeals as follows:

"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion,
and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought
refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San
Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with
refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the
Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to
escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could
not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor,
Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was
shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already
on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air
raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were
forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the
refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.

"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was
about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older
than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were
between 23 and 25."

The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who
miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as
between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the
survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. The
appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:

"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the
death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when
the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is
to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club
in the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed
minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the
appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until
he died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left
her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a
variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling
beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the
exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can
decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when
she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her
son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be
said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to
uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have
survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec.
69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).

"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question
whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence
to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that
battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in
the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that
a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the
same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the
law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the
presumption of survivorship.

"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin
family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad;
then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which
there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."

Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now
section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889,
now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that
on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.

The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when
obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the
two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and
it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when
it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the
strength and ages of the sexes, according to the following rules:

xxx xxx xxx

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who
would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must
prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at
the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.

Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so
are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule
123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but
unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is
assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable,
the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX
Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)

In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the
respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth
Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California
said:

When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that
one died before the other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of
death by one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts
proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would shown, or which would
tend to show, probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller,
8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to
prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by which it
is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when
tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship
cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand
Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the statue of the
presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision
that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or
inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent
and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and
necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and
trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."

Lopez testified:

Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin
Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.

Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15 meters
away from the building but I could see what was going on.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is
the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir,
I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.

Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A.

Possible, but not probable.

Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few
minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over
them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the
fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you
can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A.
Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed
over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I
presumed she died there.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and
Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to
 the Club and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather
than be roasted.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.

Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the entrance,
because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying
to escape, and as far as I can remember they were among those killed.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you
left the place? — A. That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting
the people inside especially those trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — . There were
many people shot because they were trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you
explain that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.

It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem
of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory
presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a
fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his
mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted
that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from
proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed,
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he
must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from
the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife
started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the
Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those
five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True,
people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who
had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her
husband and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the
same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son,
and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the
perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement
that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was
shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro.
The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down
of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to
warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired

The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which
Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light
of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by
her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept
away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside,
and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who
tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams
because the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden.
As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five
seconds between her son's departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule
123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided
be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can
not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York,
269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts
have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship
must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in
civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author,
"according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral
facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such
cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to
experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on
Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the
inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was
the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That
conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater
room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based
purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the
opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which,
weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought
to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon,
"bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun
with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in
consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which
has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our
judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of
Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the
correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules
of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is
another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or
contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is
submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the
issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."

The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be
invoked is a question of law.

The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least
evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.

We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward
on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without
costs.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
3. Standard Oil Co. v Arenas G.R. No. L-5921, July 25, 1911

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.

Chicote and Miranda for appellant.

W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and
Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the
obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New
York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with interest at P1 per month.

On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors for payment
of the P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the
15th of December, 1908, and the costs.

The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Vicente
Sixto Villanueva on April 17, 1909.

On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were
so notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.

On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants
to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the
interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment
should have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.

While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of
Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was
declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was
appointed his guardian by the same court; (3) that, on October 11, following, she was authorized
by the court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several
bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity, among them that concerned in the
present cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York; (4) that she, the
guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance
informed thereof; (5) that when Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he
was already permanently insane, was in that state when summoned and still continued so, for
which reason he neither appeared nor defended himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion,
she petitioned the court to relieve the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the
aforestated judgment rendered against him in the suit before mentioned, and to reopen the trial
for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the said defendant with respect to his capacity at the
time of the execution of the bond in question, which evidence could not be presented in due
season on account of the then existing incapacity of the defendant.

The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of evidence, after
due consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on the
15th of December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly well the nature
and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for
the purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such
findings the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment
rendered in the case be denied and that the said execution be carried out.

After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with reference
to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in
support of the appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error
as follows:

Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the
defendant Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one
herein concerned.

Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine which
supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result
that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond like the
one here in question.

This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower court. It
would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a
veritable mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva
was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was
not, nor could there have been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and
this purely an effect of monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date when
the bond in question was executed.

With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of
medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility, some of them, as
Casper, going so far into a wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence of 60 to
80 distinct states, an enumeration of which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the doubt
in the minds of the majority of the authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of
sane judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some who consider as a
sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even those other chronic
diseases or complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania,
somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers passional states which
more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on
the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such
certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he
who suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is
really insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under
the influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous
contract .The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908,
and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until July
24, 1909.

The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years suffered
from such monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine above cited, that
a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not
necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Specifically, in
reference to this case, the following facts were brought out in the testimony given by the
physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant,
the first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903, and the
latter, only once, in 1908.

Dr. Cuervo:

Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his houses
and if you should direct him to read it, do you believe that he would understand the
contents of the document?

A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing particularly

remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it might be that he
could not do that; it depends upon what the question was.

Dr. Ocampo:

Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those concerning
greatness?

A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness and
wealth.

Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?

A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I have
made no trial.

Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of this

monomania of greatness and wealth?

A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.

Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?

A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.

Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had prepared the
instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers; that he explained to Mr.
Villanueva its contents and when the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he
replied that he was willing and did in fact do so; that the defendant's mental condition appeared
to the witness to be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to indicate the contrary;
and that the defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving
cause fir any suspicion that there was anything abnormal.

Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the Court of
First Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-
Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him some
questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be
adequate surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as many, others had done, and witness
did not notice any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties; that he answered the
questions concerning the property that he held, stated its value, specified the place where it was
situated, his answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated; that he therefore approved
the bond; and that all this took place between July and September, 1908. This witness having
been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date mentioned,
had again been surety in any other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr.
Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond,
replied that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he
endeavored to investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had
given any other previous bond, and the discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a
criminal case, but that, as it had already been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the
one offered by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.

Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that
is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the
opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.

With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a
consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be
expressed in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor
proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is
no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.)
Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for some other consideration, according to the
agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous and remuneratory
contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the beneficiary of
the bond.

It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of the
firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified that he had never had
dealings with Villanueva; from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have been moved to
favor the former by the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos,
with monthly interest .But he added that Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for
them, to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. The witness did not know, however,
whether Arenas gave the money for the signature of the bond or simply in order that the agent
might find sureties. The fact is that the sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.

The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his dealings with
Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the 13th of May, 1909,
that is, two days before Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference "for
the purpose of treating of a matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva, between 5
and 6 of that same day, in the garden and on the benches which are in front of the Delmonico
Hotel, on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not
be affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the
business of giving bonds for a certain consideration or remuneration; but neither can it be
sustained that there was no other cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental
disorder that dominated the intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his believing himself
so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is no
proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned, he
was influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.

Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting that he
was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now under
discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity,
it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a
person was in a state of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of
the performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of
the executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the
performance of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent.
The witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct,
referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another of them to the year 1908, but none to
December 15, 1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony
of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in 1908, to have her
husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein, objection was made by the
director of the institution who advised her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for
old men, as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up
in the insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly
insane enough to be placed among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in this
case, stated: that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go wherever
he wished and do what he liked; that her husband had property of his own and was not deprived
of its management; that he went out every morning without her knowing where he went; that she
did not know whether he had engaged in the business of signing bonds, and that, with reference
to the one now concerned, she had learned of it only by finding to note, before mentioned,
wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on the benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel; that
she had not endeavored legally to deprive him of the management of his own real estate which
had been inherited by him, although he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the
payment of the land tax, all this being done by her, and she also it was who attended to the
subsistence of the family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point
under discussion, she was asked:

Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go out of the
house and was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:

A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the markets, and
buys provisions and other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.

Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being sane
when he was on the street, according to your opinion?

A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange that
this should have occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are many people who
can testify in regard to this particular.

The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to the market,
would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions, and when she was asked
by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far as she knew, he had
never squandered any large sum of money; that he had never been engaged in business; that he
supported himself on what she gave him; and that if he had something to count on for his living, it
was the product of his lands.

Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is very
evident that it can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give
efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

4. Mercado vs Espiritu G.R. No. L-11872, December 1, 1917

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-11872. December 1, 1917. ]

DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOSE ESPIRITU,

administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, Defendant-Appellee.

Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for Appellants.

Vicente Foz for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER; MINORS. — The annulment of a deed of sale of a piece of land was
sought on the ground that two of the four parties thereto were minors, 18 and 19 years old,
respectively, on the date when the instrument was executed, but no direct proof of this alleged
circumstance was adduced by means of certified copies of the baptismal certificates of the two minors,
nor any supplemental proof such as might establish that in fact they were minors on that date. Held:
That the statement made by one of the adult parties of said deed, in reference to certain notes made in
a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said their father kept during his lifetime and until his
death, is not sufficient to prove the plaintiffs’ minority on the date of the execution of the deed.

2. ID.; ID. — The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors who
have already passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age when they pretend
to have already reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is valid, and they cannot be
permitted after wards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or to
seek their annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th partida.) The judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and
absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale
of minors property nor the rules laid down in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) This doctrine is entirely in accord with the
provisions of section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which determines cases of estoppel.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of September
22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the
plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs
of the suit.

By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was
amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of administrator of the estate of the
deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all
surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis
Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48
hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as
described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held
by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita
Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by
their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters
Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at
P3,795; that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share,
that is, one-fourth of said land, to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters
Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes
of rice per annum, which, at P2.50 per cavanes was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis
Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked
that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs’ favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their
respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore
to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their
equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each and
all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter
of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the
deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs’ mother, with the due authorization of her husband
Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to
wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901,
Wenceslao Mercado y Aredo Cruz, the plaintiffs’ father, in his capacity as administrator of the property
of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of
said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his
(Wenceslao’s) children, and this amount being still insufficient he successively borrowed from said Luis
Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17, 1910, the plaintiffs,
alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria de la
Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument,
ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu,
effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold
absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged
to their deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned
purchaser. In his cross complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was
unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused
to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay
said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against
them.

In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and in
special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-
complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed
by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be
absolved from the defendant’s cross-complaint.

After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a
new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and, the proper bill of
exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.

As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17, 1910,
on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the decision of
this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore
incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then
were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of
legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within the legal period, ask for the annulment of the
instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with
the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.

The record shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by composition
with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of
Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares and 69 centares, which facts
appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu’s death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his
four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent’s
estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares was
allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to
Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, had by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz,
Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in
1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.

The plaintiffs’ petition for the annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-
fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint,
and which, they stated amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant
excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered by 21
cavanes of seed.

It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs’ mother conveyed
by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now
in litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of
the loss of the original of said instrument, which was in the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu,
and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public documents of the
Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and
father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial
instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and in those of his minor children
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that
the sale of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis
Espiritu in 1894.

However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao
Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis
Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to
this vendor’s deceased wife, Margarita Espiritu, adjoining the parcel previously sold to the said Luis
Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged
to ,make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children’s needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the
plaintiffs’ father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together
with their sisters Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the
required legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary- the document Exhibit 3, on
May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for
the sum of P2,600 and with her husband’s permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in
perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the land
described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to
that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed, bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the
heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those
of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on
the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further reason
that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent
for the execution of said deed.

As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (the plaintiffs were born
in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost
or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she
testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and
397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and
Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs’
minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C,
by which it appears that in he was only 23 years old, whereby it would also appear that Josefa Mercado
was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17, 1910, when the instrument of purchase and
sale, Exhibit 3, was executed the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.

The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father’s death her brother and sisters
removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis
Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in interest; that
it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year
1910, wherein it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not know why
her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that
her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.

The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs’ father, it was Luis Espiritu who
directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria
Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know
just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.

Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his
sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to
the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and
minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as
compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters’
share was 764 cavanes.

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the
defendant. He testified that the was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that
the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said document was
signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to them and had been
translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish. On cross-
examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to court, he had known
the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had not yet commenced to
attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898, for witness said that he was
then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of age.

Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter,
testified that Espiritu’s land contained an area of only 84 cavanes, and, after its owner’s death, was
under witness’ administration during two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this
land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by
Luis- Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu’s death, her
husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, containing an area of six
cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held the same until 1901, when
he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu.

The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, a son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff
Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the year 1909 or
1910, and used to go back and forth between his father’s house and those of his other relatives. He
denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother and
sisters.

In rebuttal, Antonino Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he mediated
in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown
the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. This
same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis
Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated
in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument
were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was presented to him for
identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the
land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6
cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private
document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the
notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that
she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she
signed it, on which occasion and while said document was being signed said notary was not present, nor
were the witnesses thereto whose names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle’s house,
because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them.
Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her brother Luis Espiritu in company with the
plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.

The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu
employed fraud, deceit, violence or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document
Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and sisters Domingo,
Maria del Consejo, Paz, and Josefa, surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous
sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her
brother, with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of
land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact
that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract
made with him, they declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of land, and
waive thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of
the property.

So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel or
portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors’ mother in favor of the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or
mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an
increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows:
P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors’ deceased mother; P600 collected by the vendors’
father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.

In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her
brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs’ widowed
father mortgaged or pledged the remaining portion or parcel of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law,
Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed
by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting
of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors
receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document
was false and simulated on account of the employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in
the procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed it.

Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates,
Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into account the relationship between the contracting parties, and also the
general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an
increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without proof to
the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3
inasmuch as, since May 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the
parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of
mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now after his death, his testate or intestate estate is in
lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue
of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes and, in consequence of the
contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the
remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.

The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership was
conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion
of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return
of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan
under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor
Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture
to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in
the deed Exhibit 3.

Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, as regards the statements made therein, is of the nature of a
public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter,
even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art.
1218.)

The plaintiffs’ father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita
Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of
seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25, 1894 — an
instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and register
books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the
request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said
notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the
plaintiffs’ legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he had personal
knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding
that his testimony affected his children’s interests and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits
that might be produced by said real property.

The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the
plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is false,
and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs father, there
is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted
as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.

The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consista in that, on the date of
May 17, 1910, when it was executed and they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet
attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the
plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of
their respective baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever
to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document
Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the
plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of the births of the said
Domingo and Josefa.

However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it cannot
be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time they
executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is
perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed,
pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his
brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its
original owner, the plaintiffs’ mother.

The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made
by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have
them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment
that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does
not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors’ property, nor the juridical rules established in
consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and
March 1, 1875.)

With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu
who took out Domingo Mercado’s personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of
23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of
the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in order to show the
propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914, wherein it is
recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both these facts are not proved;
neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the
notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they executed it, they were already of legal age,
and, besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true
ages was introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be concluded
that the plaintiffs, who claim to have been minors when they executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3,
have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the
execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs’ mother, Margarita Espiritu,
in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion the plaintiffs any
damage or prejudice whatever, for the reason that the portion of the land sold to Luis Espiritu was
disposed of by its lawful owner, and, with respect to the area of 6 cavanes that was a part of the same
property and was pledged or mortgaged by the plaintiffs’ father, neither did this transaction occasion
any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2 that
he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to secure the loan of
the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for
certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge
from the statements made by their father himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land
of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which
must have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of
the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of
P400, which sum, added to that of the P2,000 received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600
collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the
sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of
seed, and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered
as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

I concur.

But in order to avoid misunderstanding, I think it well to indicate that the general statement in the
prevailing opinion to the effect that the making of false representations as to his age by an infant
executing a contract will preclude him from disaffirming the contract or setting up the defense of
infancy, must be understood as limited to cases wherein, on account of the minor’s representations as to
his majority. and because of his near approach thereto, the other party had good reason to believe, and
did in fact believe the minor capable of contracting.

The doctrine set forth in the Partidas, relied upon by the supreme court of Spain in the cases cited in the
prevailing opinion, is substantially similar to the doctrine of estoppel as applied in like instances by many
of the courts in the United States.

For purposes of convenient comparison, I here insert some citations of authority, Spanish and American,
recognizing the limitations upon the general doctrine to which I am inviting attention at this time; and in
this connection it is worthy of note that the courts of the United States look with rather less favor than
the supreme court of Spain upon the application of the doctrine, doubtless because the cases wherein it
may properly be applied, are much less likely to occur in a jurisdiction where majority is reached at the
age of 21 than a jurisdiction wherein majority is not ordinarily attained until the infant reaches the age
of 25.

Ley 6, tit. 19, Partida 6.a is, in part, as follows: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

"If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over twenty-five years
of age, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an
action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be
released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the obligation. The
reason for this is that the law helps the deceived and not the deceivers." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

In the glossary to these provisions of the Partidas by Gregorio Lopez, I find the following: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph

"(1) De tal tiempo. Nota bene hoc verbum, nam si appareret ex aspectu eum esse minorem, tunc
adversarius non potest dicere se deceptum; imo tam ipse, quam minor videntur esse in dolo, quo casu
competit minori restitutio, quia facta doli compensatione, perinde est ac si nullus fuisset in dolo, et ideo
datur restitutio; et quia scienti dolus non infertur, l. 1. D. de act. empt. secundum Cyn. Alberic et Salic.
in l. 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. adde Albericum tenentem, quando per aspectum aliter constaret, in
authent. sacramenta puberuqm, col. 3. C. si advers vendit.

"(2) Enganosamente. Adde 1. 2. et 3. C. si minor se major. dixer. Et adverte nam per istam legem
Partitarum quae non distinguit, an adultus, vel pupillus talerrl assertionem faciat, videtur comprobari
dictum Guillielm. de Cun de quo per Paul. de Castr. in 1. qui jurasse. in princ. D de jurejur. quod si
pupillus proximus pubertati juret, cum contrahit, se esse puberem, et postea etiam juret, quod non
veniet contra contractum quod habebit locum dispositio authenticae sacramenta puberum, sicut si esset
pubes: et cum isto dicto transit ibi Paul. de Cast. multum commedans, dicens, se alibi non legisse; si
tamen teneamus illam opinionem, quod etiam pupillus doli capax obligatur ex Juramento, non esset ita
miranda dicta, decissio; vide per Alexand. in dict. 1. qui jurasse, in princ. Item lex ista Partitarum
expresse sentit de adulto, non de pupillo, cum superius dixit, que paresciere de tal tiempo: Doctores
etiam intelligunt de adulto 11. dict. tit. C. si minor. se major dixer. et patet ex 11. illius tituli. Quid
autem dicemus in dubio, cum non constat de dolo minoris? Azon. in summa illius tit. in fin. dicit, quod
praesumitur dolug in minore, qui se majorem dixit; et idem tenet Glossa in dict. 1. 3. et ibi Odofred. in
fin. Cynus tamen, et alli, tenent oppositum, quia dolus non praesumitur, nisi probetur, 1. quotiens, s.,
qui dolo, D. de probat. Et hoc etiam vult ista lex Partitarum, cum dicit, si lo faze enganosamente: et ita
tenent Alberic et Salicet. in dict. 1. 3. ubi etiam Bart. in fin. Si autem minor sui facilitate asserat se
majorem, et ita juret, tunc distingue, ut habetur dict. 1. 3 quia aut juravit verbo tenus, et tunc non
restituitur, nisi per instrumentum seu scripturam probet se minorem; et si juravit corporaliter, nullo
modo restituitur, ut ibi; et per quze instrumenta probentur, cum verbo tenus juravit, vide per Specul.
tit. de restit, in integr. s. quis autem, col. 4. vers. sed cujusmodi erit scriptura, ubi etiam vide per
Speculatorem aliquas notabiles quaestiones in ista materia, in col. 5. videlicet, an praejudicet sibi minor
ex tali juramento in aliis contractibus, et tenet, quod non; et tenet glossa finalis in 1. de aetate, D. de
minor. in fin. gloss. vide ibi per Speculat. ubi etiam de aliis in ista materia." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In the decision of the supreme court of Spain dated the 27th of April, 1860, I find an excellent
illustration of the conditions under which that court applied the doctrine, as appears from the following
resolution therein set forth.

"Sales of real estate made by minors are valid when the latter pretend to be twenty-five years of age
and, due to the circumstances that they are nearly of that age, are married, or have the administration
of their property, or on account of other special circumstances affecting them, the other parties to the
contract believe them to be of legal age." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

With these citations compare the general doctrine in the United States as set forth in 22 Cyc. (p. 610),
supported by numerous citations of authority.

"Estoppel to dissaffirm — (I) In General. — The doctrine of estoppel not being as a general rule
applicable to infants, the court will not readily hold that his acts during infancy have created an estoppel
against him to disaffirm his contracts. Certainly the infant cannot be estopped by the acts or admissions
of other persons.
"(II) False representations as to age. — According to some authorities the fact that an infant at the time
of entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt that he had attained the
age of majority does not give any validity to the contract or estop the infant from disaffirming the same
or setting up the defense of infancy against the enforcement of any rights thereunder; but there is also
authority for the view that such false representations will create an estoppel against the infant, and
under the statutes of some states no contract can be disaffirmed where, on account of the minor’s
representations as to his majority, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of
contracting. Where the infant has made no representations whatever as to his age the mere fact that
the person with whom he dealt believed him to be of age, even though his belief was warranted by the
infant’s appearance and the surrounding, circumstances, and the infant knew of such belief, will not
render the contract valid or estop the infant to disaffirm."
5. Bambalan vs Maramba G.R. No. L-27710, January 30, 1928

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.

Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.

Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is
alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in
question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan
y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental question to be resolved in
this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.

The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated
July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did
so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who
threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not
decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of
being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was
a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention
to sell the land in question.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband
Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva
Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of
Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land within which
was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's
father, of which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the
land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the
requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section
50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is
the registration that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the
document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is
taken into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract
executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the
defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the
acknowledgment of the document.

In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her
son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was
given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which
appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by
Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent
annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit
1.

The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness
Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of
the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the
land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the damages
claimed by the plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

6. Braganza vs Villa Abrille G.R. No. L-12471, April 13, 1959

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959

ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.

Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.

R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of
Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the
sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.

The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to
pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present
hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines", plus 2
% per annum.

Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.

In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have received
P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties
and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the
terms above described.

There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the
minority of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the
minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors
may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of signing Exhibit A,
Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of
Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:

. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were
not yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him
on their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age,
parted with his money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act.
But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed
money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the legal
impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant
case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them
or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the
same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be
permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact,
according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;

. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract

as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort.
Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on
the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part of, and does not grow out of, the
contract, or that the enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as tort does not
constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. In order to hold infant liable,
however, the fraud must be actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere
silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made
the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)

The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief
that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to
disclose his age is not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)

The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed
therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no such
statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation;
whereas in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or
constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the
scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority
which incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of
misrepresentation.

We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally
bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.

It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in
1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it
because more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the
age of majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an
action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has
reached majority age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied,
however, that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be
held that in October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So
that when this defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed
from October 1947.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301
of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors
asking for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an
action for annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse from liability.

Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable
because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the
money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa
Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but
fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been
authoritatively established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00
Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now
return P1,166.67.3Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be
enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their
liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance
of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall
pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and
Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6%
interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Mercado vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.

2It would be observed in this connection, that the new Civil Code does not govern the
contract executed in 1944.

3 P46,666.00 divided by 40.

4She says peso for peso, in view of the terms of Exhibit A. She is, indeed, willing to pay
as much.

5Arts. 1137, 1138, Civil Code. Debtors presumed to be bound jointly — not severally. Un
Pak Leung vs. Negora, 9 Phil., 381; Flaviano vs. Delgado, 11 Phil., 154; Compania
General vs. Obed, 13 Phil., 391.
7. US vs Vaguillar G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472, March 13, 1914

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.

William J. Rohde for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one
for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs
in each case. From this judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court
together.

The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner
charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these crimes is not
denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf,
testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the
commission of the crimes. they also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head
and stomach prior to the killing.

Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the
prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he refused
into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant;
that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not
know of any disagreement between the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning
before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness
further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the
time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he looked at
me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife and
child."

Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture the
appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in the head
and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a madman;
crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was."

Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and stomach
trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very sad at the
time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must have been crazy
because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that
he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all right;"
that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does
without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that when the
appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other night he, the
appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me,
you are beasts."

The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the
appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her
hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other."
The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did
not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was
suffering from any mental derangement or not.

There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such
a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get
into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man,
often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that
he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before
indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy
because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the
word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person
would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because
he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and
strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must
have been crazy because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the
word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.

The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is
not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which would follow
the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be sufficient to cause
the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you doing to me; you are
beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the
time the deeds were committed.

In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an assault
with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which would involved
no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished between passion and
insanity as follows:

But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may
extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal
responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness
are bound to control their tempers and restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if
they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to make them
reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief
is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be no safety for
society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate
acts of violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and unbridled passion is
clearly within legal as well as moral censure and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38
Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with an
explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred,
or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible
for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such
motives as these.' "

The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the subject of
anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following concise statement:

Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere
mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of
mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally
sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence.
Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and
irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind.

In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted of the
crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any question as to the actual
commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused committed them, confined
himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime the defendant was
sick with fever and out of his mind and that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts,
wounding his wife and the other members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the
decision in that case this court stated:

In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a
few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was
in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition,
unless his insanity and absence of will are proven.

Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions,
we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):

But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the
accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact.
(State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this
presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support a
conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged "beyond a
reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof. This presumption
however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal
intent did not exist at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional is a
defense, and like other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of it.
"The positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation
to the prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed
by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)

What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient merely to
allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a denial, and
ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient
proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the presumption of sanity and then
any other proof that may be offered.

In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):

One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of
passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control
 the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of
insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made
affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was
the direct consequences of his insanity.

The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an
enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at
the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been
proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from
are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
8. Martinez vs Martinez G.R. No. 162084. June 28, 2005

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005

APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ, petitioners,
vs.
RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59420 setting aside and reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. 00-96962 affirming, on appeal, the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 164761 (CV) for ejectment.

The Antecedents

The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a
parcel of land identified as Lot 18-B-2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54334,
as well as the house constructed thereon.2 On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will
and Testament3 directing the subdivision of the property into three lots, namely, Lots 18-B-2-A,
18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo,
Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate.

In May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right side of his
body. Natividad died on October 26, 1996.4 Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6, 1997.5

On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife
Lucila.6 He also discovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said
deed of sale.7

Rodolfo filed a complaint8 for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936
against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor
against Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice.9

On motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order10 on March 29, 1999, dismissing the
complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr.
had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.11

On October 4, 1999, Rodolfo filed a Petition with the RTC of Manila for the probate of the last will
of the deceased Daniel Martinez, Sr.12

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he
vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said
spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They
alleged that they were the owners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant
to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, the matter was referred to the barangayfor conciliation
and settlement, but none was reached. They appended the certification to file action executed by
the barangay chairman to the complaint.

In his Answer13 to the complaint filed on October 11, 1999, Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that the
complaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable
settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached. He
also pointed out that the dispute had not been referred to the barangay before the complaint was
filed.

On October 20, 1999, the spouses Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged
that earnest efforts toward a settlement had been made, but that the same proved futile. Rodolfo
filed his opposition thereto, on the ground that there was no motion for the admission of the
amended complaint. The trial court failed to act on the matter.

The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise
had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile.14 No amicable
settlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of
irreconcilable differences. The MTC was, thus, impelled to terminate the conference.15

On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Martinez.
The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff. The defendant,

including any person claiming right under him, is ordered:

1) To vacate the subject premises;

2) To pay plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00 a month starting July 17, 1999, the date of last
demand until he vacates the same;

3) To pay the sum of ₱10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

4) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.16

The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez had substantially complied with Article 151 of
the Family Code of the Philippines17 based on the allegations of the complaint and the appended
certification to file action issued by the barangay captain.

Rodolfo appealed the decision to the RTC. On May 31, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment
affirming the appealed decision. He then filed a petition for review of the decision with the CA,
alleging that:

1. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND WITHOUT
MERIT THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER THAT THERE IS NO ALLEGATION IN THE
COMPLAINT THAT PETITIONER HAS UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY FROM RESPONDENTS – A REQUIREMENT IN [AN] UNLAWFUL DETAINER
SUIT.

2. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT
PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF
RESPONDENTS.
3. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

4. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH DID NOT
RESOLVE THE SIXTH ISSUE, TO WIT, "Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over this
case considering that the allegations in the complaint makes out a case of accion publiciana."

5. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

6. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF CONCILIATION HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

7. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
LAW.

8. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THE
PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 98-91147 AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 99-95281,
INVOLVING THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS AND INVOLVING THE SAME
PROPERTY DID NOT DIVEST THE MTC OF AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE CASE.

9. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH GRANTED THE
RELIEF PRAYED FOR BY THE RESPONDENTS.

10. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC.18

On November 27, 2003, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the spouses Martinez had failed to comply
with Article 151 of the Family code. The CA also held that the defect in their complaint before the
MTC was not cured by the filing of an amended complaint because the latter pleading was not
admitted by the trial court.

Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the spouses Martinez
filed the present petition for review on certiorari, in which they raise the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN

THE COMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE BARANGAY BUT NO
SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO PROVE THAT, INDEED,
EARNEST EFFORTS WERE, IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT PROVIDED
FOR UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE, CONSIDERING THAT ONE OF THE
PARTIES TO A SUIT IN THIS CASE IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY.19

The petitioners alleged that they substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code, since
they alleged the following in their original complaint:
2. In compliance with P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay," this case
passed [through] the Barangay and no settlement was forged between plaintiffs and defendant
as a result of which Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay 97, Zone 8, District I,
Tondo, Manila. xxx" (Underscoring supplied)20

Further, the petitioners averred, they alleged in their position paper that they had exerted earnest
efforts towards a compromise which proved futile. They also point out that the MTC resolved to
terminate the preliminary conference due to irreconcilable difference between the parties.
Besides, even before they filed their original complaint, animosity already existed between them
and the respondent due to the latter’s filing of civil and criminal cases against them; hence, the
objective of an amicable settlement could not have been attained. Moreover, under Article 150 of
the Family Code, petitioner Lucila Martinez had no familial relations with the respondent, being a
mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the respondent; hence, there was no need for the
petitioners21 to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code.

The petition is meritorious.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be
dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil
Code.

The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family
Code, to wit:

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general
rule. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.22

As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in
the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers.23

Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint
against a family member would render such complaint premature.

In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151
of the Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.
First. Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the
MTC. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and
the respondent:

As regards plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case,
Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:

"No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035."

It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or
maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family,"
should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:

"Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters."

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces.
Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 – which
should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule – and Silvestre Gayon must
necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within
the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint
does not bar the same.24

Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family
Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the
respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No.
1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in
the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.25 The Court rules that such
allegation in the complaint, as well as the certification to file action by the barangay chairman, is
sufficient compliance with article 151 of the Family Code. It bears stressing that under Section
412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no complaint involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties and no settlement was reached.26

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, as affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 30, in Civil Case No. 164761(CV) is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, with Associate Justices Juan Q.

Enriquez, Jr. and Arsenio J. Magpale, concurring.

2 Rollo, pp. 69-70.

3 Id. at 71-72.

4 Id. at 68.

5 Id. at 67.

6
Id. at 73-76.

7 Id. at 77-78.

8 Id. at 79-84.

9 Rollo, pp. 93-94.

10 Id. at 85-90.

11 Id. at 91.

12 Id. at 95-98.

13 Rollo, pp. 60-66.

14 Id. at 13.

15 Id.

16 Rollo, p. 40.

17 Formerly Article 222 of the New Civil Code.

18 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

19 Rollo, p. 12.

20 Id. at 13.

21 Petitioner Manolo Martinez died intestate on October 18, 2004 and was survived by
petitioner Lucila Martinez and their children, namely, April, Fritz Daniel and Maria Olivia,
all surnamed Martinez, who were substituted as parties-petitioners.

22 See Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. L-28394, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 104.

23 Magbaleta v. Gonong, G.R. No. L-44903, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 511.

24 Gayon v. Gayon, supra.

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Section 399 of Republic Act No. 7160.

26SEC. 412. Conciliation. – (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in Court. – No

complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by
the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the
parties thereto.