III.

Rule 112- Preliminary Investigation

HERMILO RODIS, SR., petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
1. Writ of preliminary injunction
2. Petitioner Hermilo v. Rodis, Sr., former President of the Philippine Underwriters Finance
Corporation (PHILFINANCE) together with some other persons, was charged before the
Sandiganbayan in separate informations with five (5) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act
3. motion to quash - ground of lack of preliminary investigation, with the alternative prayer
that the "issue and/or enforcement of the warrant of arrests as against him be held in
abeyance while he seeks a reinvestigation by the Tanodbayan pursuant to his right of (sic)
preliminary investigation
4. since lack of preliminary investigation is not among those enumerated thereunder, the
motion to quash on this ground should be denied for lack of merit and instead, petitioner
should be ordered to file his Petition for Reinvestigation and/or Motion for
Reconsideration in accordance with Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Tanodbayan
5. lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground for quashing the information
6. while petitioner's petition for reinvestigation was pending action by the Tanodbayan, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash
for lack of merit: not afforded due preliminary investigation, the proper remedy for him is
to file a Petition for Reinvestigation
7. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondent
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the arraignment, pre-trial and trial
8. It is, however, contended that this alleged failure did not affect the regularity of the
preliminary investigation as the Tanodbayan is justified under Section 3, Rule 112 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
9. The analysis of respondent People, thru the Solicitor General, as to the real nature of the
controversy at bar is correct
10. Under Section 3, sub-section (d) of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, "if
the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution
on the evidence presented by the complainant." It is to be noted that this provision does
not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings the presence of
the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the
rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of
offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics.
11. It is worthwhile repeating that the avowed purposes of a preliminary investigation are "to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect
 him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety
of' a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials 9and while
the "absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case (n)or do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective,
but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing
the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or
remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted. 10 In this case, the Tanodbayan, has the duty to conduct the said
investigation.
12. As we cannot assume that the reinvestigation was indeed conducted as would render the
instant petition moot and academic, and considering the importance of the issue
involved, we deemed it proper to decide the petition on the merits.
ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H.
BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, HELEN B. CANOY and REBECCA B. TAN, respondent
1. Special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction/restraining order
2. Multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain them from
prosecuting him
3. on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of
Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II
4. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged
5. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel
6. Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment
7. In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas
implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged
8. respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with
the conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the amendment
of the previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one
of the accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,2 contending that the
preliminary investigation was not yet completed
9. petitioner filed a Petition for Review4 with the Department of Justice
10. the Department of Justice, through respondent Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III,
issued Resolution No. 6487 dismissing the said petition for review
11. petitioner then flied the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition
12. Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation as to him
was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to
justify his inclusion in the second amended information
13. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does
not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy
14. Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution
15. A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will
readily show that the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence,
the petition at bar must be dismissed
16. There were still several incidents pending resolution such as the validity of the
testimonies and affidavits of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as bases for
preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed
17. Petitioner likwise claims that he was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter-
affidavit
18. It will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the
subpoena issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against
him and dismissed it as a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link
him to the crime
19. the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The fiscal has the
discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties
or witnesses concerned
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they
may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound
to the parties or witnesses concerned.
20. Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary
investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to
be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court."
21. Petitioner further submits that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or
sufficient justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public trial
22. A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.13 The quantum of evidence now
required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well
founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a wen grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.14 We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the
case at bar that there existsprima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the
commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the
facts obtaining therein
23. even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol
at the time they were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against
Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the
 preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never available to him. The
admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial
court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation
24. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find
no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

EDEN D. PAREDES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent

1. habeas corpus: (1) whether the arrest and detention of the petitioner after a preliminary
investigation that was conducted by the Tanodbayan without notice to him, are valid,
and (2) whether the crime charged against him has already prescribed
2. On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, applied for a free patent for Lot No. 3097-A, PLS-67. His application was favorably
acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison
3. Eight (8) years later, on June 27, 1984, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San
Francisco passed Resolution No. 40, requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan
del Sur to assist it in recovering Lot No. 3097 from Attorney Paredes because the land
had been designated and reserved as a school site. The Sangguniang Bayan requested
the provincial fiscal to file a perjury charge against Attorney Paredes, Jr
4. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 512, Teofilo Gelacio, former vice-mayor of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, filed with the Tanodbayan on October 28, 1986, a criminal
complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial
Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the
District Land Office in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.
5. the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case to Fiscal Ernesto Brocoy of Butuan
City (TBP Case No. 86-03368) for preliminary investigation
6. Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the preliminary
investigation of the case on August 29, 1987
7. The summons did not reach Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting for proof of
service of the summons on the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the
preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses
8. Attorney Paredes filed a motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan's resolution. He
assailed the validity of the preliminary investigation that was conducted by Fiscal Brocoy
without notice to him
9. on January 18, 1988, Attorney Paredes was elected governor of Agusan del Sur
10. Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 512, annulling
Governor Paredes' Free Patent No. (X-8) 1253 and his OCT No. P-8379 and restoring the
land "to the mass of public domain"
11. an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan (Crim. Case No.
13800) and a warrant for his arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his provisional liberty, was
issued on August 30, 1989 and served upon him (p. 12, Rollo). He refused to post bail in
"protest against the injustice to him as Governor," (p. 68, Rollo). Consequently, he was
detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco
12. This petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Mrs. Eden Paredes, against the
Sandiganbayan. She alleged that the warrant for her husband's arrest was void because
the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information
against him had already prescribed
13. Solicitor General, as counsel for the Sandiganbayan, agreed that lack of notice to
Governor Paredes of the preliminary investigation was "a fatal defect" invalidating not
only the preliminary investigation, but also the information
14. the petitioner's contention that the ten year prescriptive period of the offense under
Section 11 of R.A. 3019, assuming it was committed on January 21, 1976, expired on
January 21, 1986
15. Although the prescriptive period was increased to fifteen (15) years under Section 4, B.P.
Blg. 195 of March 16, 1982, the Solicitor General opined that the new law may not be
applied retroactively to Paredes
16. Ombudsman argued that the Sandiganbayan was improperly made respondent in this
case because it does not have custody of Governor Paredes; that the lack of preliminary
investigation did not affect the validity of the information nor the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The period of prescription commences to run not on the day the crime
was committed but on the day it was discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents
17. the Court directed the petitioner to implead the Tanodbayan, through the Special
Prosecutor, as well as the Ombudsman, as respondents
18. the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its comment on the petition for habeas corpus.
19. The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the
court which has jurisdiction to do so
20. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over
the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective
21. The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack
of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted.
The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and
order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation
Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the
Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So it is explicitly
provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction
over the case
22. All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be
determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the
law, and the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge
on which he is held will not entitle him to his discharge on habeas corpus
23. finding no merit in the petition, the same is hereby denied
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO YUTILA, AQUILINO YUTILA and
ESPERIDION YUTILA, defendants-appellants
1. An automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch VI, in
Criminal Case No. 38, entitled "The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Bonifacio Yutila,
Aquilino Yutila and Esperidion Yutila, Defendants"
Esperidion Yutila, Bonifacio Yutila, and Aquilino Yutila, 'GUILTY' beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
each is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by
electrocution
2. three defendants were accused of Rape with Homicide in the following:
3. 24th day of April, 1970, in the municipality ty of Gen. MacArthur, Province of Eastern
Samar
4. Fidela Dema-angay Bederio against her win and without her consent
5. Fidela Dema-angay Bederio stabbed wounds on the different vital parts of her body,
which wounds caused the death of said Fidela Dema-angay Bederio
6. with the aggravating circumstances of (1) superior strength; (2) the crime was committed
in an uninhabited place
7. Virginita Bederio while looking for her mother, Fidela Dema-angay Bederio
8. Saw the three accused Bonifacio, Aquilino, and Experidion together with their brother
Gregorio, all named Yutila, stabbing Fidela with a knife and long bolos
9. Virginita informed her father Ciriaco Ciriaco after having viewed the body sent Virginita
first to the barrio captain in Cancuevas
10. The chief of police the next morning investigated the place of the incident and made a
sketch of the same
According to the Plaintiff-Appellee:
11. the deceased Fidela Dema-angay de Bederio went to their farm to gather some food for
her family
12. Ciriaco Bederio, who was home in bed suffering for high fever, asked his eldest daughter,
12 year old Virginita, to go to the farm to help her mother carry the food she may have
gathered
13. Proceeding towards the direction of her voice, Virginita saw her mother lying near the
bank of a creek in a sidewise position and being stab by appellants and their brother
Gregorio, with a knife and boloes
14. showing that the deceased sustained multiple wounds and abrasions on different parts of
her body
15. The reference by the trial court in its decision to the information as originally filed is of no
moment. The original and the amended information are substantially the same
16. The lack of preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the proceedings. It did
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the case. Moreover, the
 three defendants pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned. The denial of the accused of
his right to preliminary investigation cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
17. The physical evidence consisting of the torn clothes of the victim, the presence of semen
in her private parts, the physical injuries sustained by her not only in her private parts but
also in other parts of the body show that Fidela Dema-angay Bederio had been raped
18. It is apparent from the manner that the defendants committed the act charged in the
amended information that there was conspiracy. her statement is part of the res gestae.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, APOLONIO CRUZ and BERNARDA
CRUZ, respondents
1. whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 immediately after the arraignment
of the accused-private respondents on the basis of the resolution of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case despite the disapproval of
such resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor
2. an information was filed with the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Bulacan charging private
respondents Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz with the crime of falsification of public
document
3. did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare or cause to be prepared a
document denominated as "Kasulatan ng Kaloobpala" making it appear therein that the
same was executed and signed by the spouses Cenon Constantino and Sotera de la Cruz
4. Notary Public Santiago L. Lindayag and acknowledged the same to be their own free act
and deed
5. as said spouses were already dead at the time of the alleged execution of said document
6. the private respondents filed with the trial court a petition for reinvestigation 6 premised
on the ground that "after the information was filed, material and relevant evidence was
discovered which, if presented in a reinvestigation
7. respondent Judge issued an order7 granting the petition for reinvestigation
8. the accused presented what it considered new material and relevant evidence which
consists merely of an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared that she was the one
responsible for the preparation of the questioned public document
9. basis of the Rutor resolution The order reads: the Provincial Prosecutor deemed it wise to
endorse to the Court the propriety of resolving the case at bar
10. Sotera dela Cruz at the time of her death was the registered owner of a parcel of land
situated at Barrio Pritil
11. Following her death on February 1, 1989, one of the heirs of the deceased, Feliza
Constantino, sold her share to accused spouses for P200,000.00 pursuant to extrajudicial
settlement with sale
12. a document denominated as "Kasulatan ng Kaloobpala" dated January 10, 1991 to which
both accused affixed their signatures as well as the vendee's parents Sotera dela Cruz
and Constantino Cruz despite their death long before the execution of said document,
was the one presented to the Register of Deeds
13. accused spouses are charged with the offense of Falsification of Public Document
14. Feliza Constantino, one of the two legitimate children of deceased Sotera dela Cruz,
expressly admitted having sold her share of 1,034 square meters to accused spouses for
a valuable consideration pursuant to "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman na
may Bilihan",
15. one of the heirs of deceased Sotera dela Cruz pursuant to "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman"; that accused the spouses are not directly involved in the preparation of said
"Kasulatan ng Kaloobpala"
16. The express admission by the sister of the complainant that she sold her share to accused
spouses for a valuable consideration and that the latter have no hand in the alleged
falsification of public document are material and of the great probative value and the
same should be given persuasive effect and credence in judicious assessment of the case
at bar
17. He further alleged that since the court had arraigned the accused, it should have,
pursuant to the Rules, scheduled the case for pre-trial and trial
18. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor vehemently opposed it on the ground that the
private prosecutor has no personality to intervene in the proceedings
19. Under the Rules, after arraignment of the accused had been made, Pre-trial and Trial will
follow
20. They then prayed that on the order of dismissal be set aside and the case be set for pre-
trial and trial
21. the respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration for having been
filed out
22. this petition which was filed on 25 March 1994 by the private complainant, through the
private prosecutor, with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes
23. The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused,
rests in the sound discretion of the court
24. In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and
directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation
25. Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an
accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for
reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act
on the resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon
proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the
Department of Justice
 26. The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of
the case never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor

Also, under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 5180,17 as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911:

27. [N]o assistant fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information or dismiss a case except
with the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or Chief State
Prosecutor.
28. Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the prosecution should present its "evidence that
makes out a prima faciecase" clearly indicate that he was convinced that there is at the
very least a reasonable ground to believe that the crime of falsification was committed
and the private respondents are probably guilty thereof
29. He closed his eyes to the Provincial Prosecutor's stand the prosecution should present its
evidence "that makes out a prima facie case and let the court decide," which simply
means that the case should not be dismissed on the basis of Rutor's recommendation
30. In submitting it nonetheless to the court and moving for the dismissal of the case, Rutor
showed outright disregard of the aforementioned provisions and ruling. So did the
respondent Judge when he dismissed the case on the basis of that resolution. Their
disregard of the said provisions and ruling is condemnable, for it carries with it a
whimsical and capricious bent that taints the exercise of discretion with grave abuse,
thereby rendering the whole act infirmed and void
31. Since the Provincial Prosecutor, to which the respondent Judge had deferred the matter
of reinvestigation, had finally resolved to stand on the information and to present
evidence to prove the quilt of the private respondents for the crime charged, the
respondent Judge did not have the option to dismiss the case on the basis of the
disapproved resolution of Rutor. His only option was to proceed with the arraignment of
the accused and, thereafter, conduct a pre-trial and trial on the merits should they enter
a plea of not guilty.
32. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the private
respondents. Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which was immediately
followed by the dismissal of the case would forever foreclose, on the ground of double
jeopardy, any reopening of the case.
33. For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to
present its evidence and prove its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge
dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 is a null and void
34. This Court wonders why Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor disregarded the
disapproval by his superior, Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes, of his resolution
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93.
35. Additionally, he vigorously objected to the private prosecutor's motion to reconsider the
dismissal. Something is wrong somewhere
 36. The instant petition is defective in that it was initiated for the People by the private
prosecutor
37. This is an opportune time to remind litigants that in cases of this nature, the Office of the
Solicitor General must be consulted and its assistance solicited. Prosecutors must not
simply give conformity to privately initiated petitions; they should also report the matter
to the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action

EDUARDO P. PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; ABSENCE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION, NOT A GROUND. — The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground
to quash a complaint or information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT AFFECT JURISDICTION
OF COURTS NOR IMPAIR VALIDITY OF INFORMATION. — The absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity
of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to
their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the Information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted . . . (Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 72830, 149
SCRA 1 [1987] and reiterated in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85468, 177 SCRA 354
[1989]).
Facts:
1. Petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner seeks to annul the resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan denying his motion to quash the information for Violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Petitioner predicated his motion to
quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person because the same was filed
without probable cause
2. the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) donated one ambulance (a Mitsubishi L-
300) to the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Petitioner, who is the Congressman of
the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, received the ambulance in behalf of the municipality.
3. Unaware of the donation, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality passed a resolution
(Resolution No. 16, Series of 1988) requesting PCSO for an ambulance
4. The mayor of the municipality, Eleanor P. Lelis, thereafter sought the intercession of
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
5. Justice Garchitorena contacted the PCSO and learned about the ambulance previously
donated by the latter to Tigaon through petitioner
6. Mayor Lelis reiterated the municipality's request for an ambulance making reference to
the certification of the municipal treasurer that no vehicle from the PCSO or from anyone
has been received
7. Finally, on December 26. 1988, he personally returned the ambulance, then already
painted to cover the logo of the PCSO and the other markings thereon
8. With the return of the Mitsubishi L-300 to the PCSO, the Municipality of Tigaon, through
Mayor Lelis, finally received a brand new Besta Kia Ambulance unit complete with all
accessories
9. Anthony D. Jamora, the Regional manager of the Special Projects Department of the
PCSO and Mayor Lelis of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, submitted their respective affidavits
10. petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit denying the imputation of said offense claiming
that the vehicle was not equipped with any medical attachments or facilities so he was
constrained to request PAGCOR for assistance to finance its conversion into a medical
ambulance which is evidenced by his letter dated November 15, 1987 to Mrs. Alice Reyes
11. Thus, he allegedly made personal representations with PAGCOR for the latter to shoulder
the expenses of the installation
12. Ombudsman Investigator Isaac D. Tolentino issued a resolution finding no probable cause
for malversation and recommended that the case be dismissed
13. petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that respondent Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over his person because the information was filed without probable cause
since there is absolutely no proof adduced in the preliminary investigation
14. whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration
15. He alleges that the preliminary investigation was conducted for the charge of
malversation
16. rudimentary rule that the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash
a complaint or information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The proper
procedure in case of lack of preliminary investigation is to hold in abeyance the
proceedings upon such information and the case remanded
17. "The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective,
but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
Information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand
the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted . . ."
18. We are not persuaded. The lack of jurisdiction contemplated in Section 3(b), Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court refers to the lack of any law conferring upon the court the
power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law and to declare the punishment for an
offense in a regular course of judicial proceeding. Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable but
absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In fact, it is frequently waived.
19. Thus, petitioner could not validly raise violation of his right to due process because the
bases for the information filed by the Ombudsman were all reflected in the complaint
and the evidence supporting it. In Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, 7
20. this Court held that preliminary investigation is nothing more than the submission of the
parties' respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate
allegations
21. Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
it is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information
22. The Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualification of the crime. Rather, he is guided
by the evidence presented in the course of a preliminary investigation and on the basis of
which, he may formulate and designate the offense and direct the filing of the
corresponding information
23. In the case at bar, there is no old or new information. Only one information was filed as a
result of the preliminary investigation conducted by the office of the Ombudsman
24. It is well-settled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and
may be waived expressly or by silence. 11 Failure of accused to invoke his right to a
preliminary investigation constituted a waiver of such right and any irregularity that
attended it. 12 The right may be forfeited by inaction and can no longer be invoked for the
first time at the appellate level. 13
25. "If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary Investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence to
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."
26. Clearly, the alleged lack of a valid preliminary investigation came only as an afterthought
to gain a reversal of the denial of the motion to quash
27. Probable cause has been defined in the leading case of Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban 14 as
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted
28. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
29. in passing on a motion to set aside an information on the ground that the accused has
been charged without probable cause, the court should not be guided by the rule that
accused must be shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether
there is sufficient evidence which inclines the mind to believe, without necessarily leaving
room for doubt, that accused is guilty thereof.
30. The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
GELACIO V. SAMULDE, in his official capacity as Municipal Judge, petitioner, vs. RAMON M.
SALVANI, Jr., in his official capacity as Provincial fiscal of Antique, substituted by LEOPOLDO O.
VILLAVERT, respondent.
1. disagreement between an investigating judge and the provincial fiscal on whether it is
mandatory for the former to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused in view of his
finding, after conducting a preliminary investigation, that there exists prima
facie evidence that the accused committed the crime charged
2. Municipal Judge Gelacio Samulde of Patnoñgon, Antique, conducted a preliminary
investigation of Pelayo Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed on October 29, 1985
by Maria Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land
directly adjoining Arangale's land
3. After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the complainant and
her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and his witnesses, Judge Samulde
transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Ramon Salvani with his finding
that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint
4. to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records to his office was
"premature" because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest
5. He pointed out that under Section 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is
satisfied "that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he
refused to issue a warrant of arrest
6. mandamus was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Antique by Provincial Fiscal Salvani
against Judge Samulde
7. Believing that the procedural question involved is important, Fiscal Villavert manifested
to the Court that there is need to continue the case begun by his predecessor
8. "the petitioner had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the
act to be required of respondent and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform
(it),"
9. Unconvinced, Judge Samulde appealed to this Court. The issue posed by this case
necessitates an examination of the history and development of the rule on preliminary
investigation
10. The rule was substantially unchanged under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court except that
municipal judges and city fiscals were also authorized to conduct the preliminary
investigation of offenses committed
11. In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 2, Rule 112, the list grew even longer to
include: (a) provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional state prosecutors; and
(d) other officers authorized by law. *
12. the distinction between a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation was
more clearly defined by using the term "preliminary examination" in Section I of the Rule
 to differentiate the first stage of the preliminary investigation (where only the
testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses were taken), from the second stage
where, after the arrest of the defendant, he was informed of the complaint against him
and given a chance to testify and present his evidence (Sec. 10, Rule 112, 1964 Rules of
Court). The purpose of the preliminary examination was still to determine "whether there
is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for
trial. "
13. However, the rule on preliminary investigation underwent some modifications in the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which is the applicable rule in this case. Under Section 1 of
the present rule, the definition of the purpose of a preliminary investigation, does not
contemplate the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the investigating judge or officer:
14. SECTION 1. Definition. — Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial
15. It is an entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely
discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused,
even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists
and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
16. In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute
between two property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any
danger of the accused absconding before the filing of the information against him by the
fiscal, hence, he found no need to place him under immediate custody.
17. The fiscal's speedy and adequate remedy, if he believes that the accused should be
immediately placed under custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice, is not to file a
mandamus action (which may take two years or more to finally resolve, as happened in this
case), but as sensibly indicated by the petitioner, to immediately file the information so
that the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused

IV. Rule 113- Arrest

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
1. 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of
the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao
City
 2. they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously
3. identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance
4. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38
Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for
a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22
caliber gun
5. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty
6. It appearing that the accuse d was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2)
7. Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
wherein in due course a decision was rendered
8. the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the
items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in
evidence against him
9. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant
10. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in
the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same
11. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore
discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures has not been violated

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETO SALANGGA and LAURETO

LOPEZ, accused LORETO SALANGGA, accused-appellant
1. Loreto Salangga, alias "Dodong," and Laureto Lopez, alias "Retoy," were haled to court as
conspirators in the rape and killing of a fifteen-year old barrio lass named Imelda Talaboc
2. Assisted by counsel de oficio, both accused pleaded not guilty during their arraignment.
After trial, judgment was rendered by said trial court on February 21, 1991 finding
appellant Salangga guilty of attempted rape with homicide. Accused Laureto Lopez was
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilty beyond reasonable doubt
3. Imelda Talaboc was sent by her mother to fetch water from the spring, or "bugac," the
only source of water in the vicinity
4. one Ricky Monterde, a friend and brother in faith of the Talaboc family, who resided only
two hundred meters away from the latter's residence, likewise went to fetch water
5. On his way, he saw appellant Salangga walking about three meters ahead of Imelda
6. Trailing the girl was accused Lopez who was walking behind her at a distance of about
twenty fathoms
7. On the same occasion, Lenie Alingay, a twelve-year old elementary student residing
at Sitio Ogsing, was on her way home from her grandfather's house. She recounted that
she met Imelda at the downhill crossing leading towards the barrio. Lenie explained that
she was about four meters away from Imelda, while the latter was following appellant
and walking about two meters behind him
8. Bernardo Talaboc, father of Imelda, came home from work, he was informed by his wife
that Imelda, whom she sent to the "bugac" earlier, was missing
9. His search for Imelda led Talaboc to the house of Ricky who told him that he had earlier
seen Imelda on her way home with appellant walking ahead of her.
10. Ricky then accompanied Talaboc and his son to the house of thebarangay captain,
Severino Laput, to whom they reported Imelda's disappearance.
11. At around 8:00 o'clock that same night, they found the corpse of Imelda lying in the
bushes about twenty meters away from where the water containers were earlier found
12. Imelda was found with her clothes on but her panty was missing. Her face was disfigured
by physical blows, she had been stabbed by a knife, and her eyes were gouged out. The
searching party brought home the body of the victim
13. Appellant and Lopez were arrested that same night at around 8:00 o'clock, after the
corpse of Imelda had been found
14. They both became the main suspects responsible for the grievous fate of Imelda, as they
were the persons last seen with her before the tragedy. The soldiers of the 46th Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army took them into custody
15. the soldiers recovered from appellant a piece of lady's underwear, later identified by
Talaboc to be that of his daughter, Imelda
16. Appellant scrawled his quivery signature on an unsworn statement,5 handwritten by
some other person, wherein he admitted the crime charged, except that he was not able
to consummate his bestial desire because Imelda fought very hard against him.
17. a strong and painful kick in the stomach was inflicted on appellant by one of his
custodians for refusing to carry a lady's underwear and a pair of blue slippers in his
pocket, which items were later identified by Talaboc as belonging to his daughter
18. Appellant Loreto Salangga has now come before us, through counsel de oficio,
contending that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged on the basis
of insufficient circumstantial evidence
19. , it is not hard to conclude that appellant was arrested in violation of his fundamental
right against unjustified warrantless arrest
20. Also, the soldiers had no personal knowledge of the crime he was being charged with,
nor was he a fugitive from the law
21. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure
of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one
22. In any event, the underwear allegedly taken from the accused is inadmissible in evidence,
being a so-called "fruit of a poisonous tree."
23. It is an a typical and abnormal situation under Filipino customs for a father to be familiar
with the underwear of his daughter. This is highly improbable, and it is plain common
sense that improbabilities must be carefully scrutinized and not readily accepted.
24. The aforesaid testimony of Laput thus suffers from serious flaws attendant to its taking
which accordingly taint its credibility
25. Laput's claim that he revealed the aforesaid facts to Sgt. Gataber 11 is belief by his own
sworn statement
26. the aforesaid allegations on the supposed scratches and bite marks on the body of
appellant can by no means be considered as minor or trivial matters
27. We are not persuaded by the theory that the accused waived their right against the said
unreasonable search and seizure, simply because they did not object thereto. To constitute
waiver, it must appear, firstly, that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.14 Courts understandably indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and do not
deduce acquiescence in the loss of elementary rights.
28. It is consequently evident that since appellant was not assisted by any counsel during his
custodial investigation, his supposed incriminatory statement is inadmissible and cannot
be considered in the adjudication of this case
29. The rule, of course, is that no in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person in his behalf or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his
behalf
30. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be effected voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. Further, waiver must be with the assistance of counsel.19 The
absence of counsel at that stage makes the statement, in contemplation of law,
involuntary, even if it was otherwise voluntary in a non-technical sense
31. This constitutional edict has been proved by historical experience to be the practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive
part of the military and police officers to disregard such basic rights. This is of special
public importance and serves as a shield in the remote provinces and rural areas to the
people who have no access to courts for prompt and immediate relief from violations of
their rights
32. before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime
 33. A meticulous and closer inquiry into the records reveals that there is really but one sole
circumstance upon which the court relied in its decision, that is, that Imelda was seen
trailing behind appellant by a few meters on the path towards her house.
34. We reject the People's hypothesis on the alleged "confession" of appellant to a certain
Pastor Juan Tapic. The records reveal that there was a statement of appellant merely
saying that he and Lopez were suspects in the rape and death of Imelda but never did he
say that they were the ones responsible for such crime
35. We also note that while the prosecution presented a medical certificate24 to prove the
alleged rape, it failed to present the physician to affirm it. In the absence of the doctor's
testimony, the contents thereof are hearsay
36. well-settled are the exceptions thereto, which are when (1) the conclusion is a finding
based entirely on speculations, (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion, and (4) the finding is based on a
misapprehension of the facts.26 The evidentiary bases for the conclusions of the lower
court having been demonstrated to be either incompetent in law or incredible in fact, the
exceptive circumstances have to be given full sway
37. This Court must, however, be guided by a rule of long standing and consistency that if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support
a conviction

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant

1. information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm in his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army
(NPA)
2. Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by
virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units
3. Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00
o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with
the use of firearm against his life, if he refused
4. accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month
5. Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of
fifteen (15) members was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben
Burgos
6. Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked
accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok
7. Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after
which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the
prosecution
8. After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3)
meters apart from his house
9. a pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang
Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo,
Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong
10. To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was
presented
11. , accused told Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member.
12. Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and
his family will be killed
13. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver
which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused
14. as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel
Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the seminar
15. Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally
shouted, the NPA will be victorious
16. Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the contribution from the members
17. Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos,
realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty.
Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription
of his extra-judicial statement
18. Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the allegations of
his extra-judicial statement
19. With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog
and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted the
accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused
defendant-appellant's version
20. From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to
the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there, he was investigated by
soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a civilian attire
21. investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to
the subject firearm
22. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right side of his
body which rendered him unconscious
23. He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his
own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
24. After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped
25. To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman,
Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not
personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being his neighbor and member
of his barrio
26. He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the
authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and were
not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the
government
27. they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them
28. The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of
the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects
29. The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling
under one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant “the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement”
30. If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged
subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule
126, Section 12, which states: A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
31. trial court are erroneous.
32. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859).
33. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife
34. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided
by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection
35. In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
 crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test
of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator
36. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted
37. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right
38. We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights."
39. Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest
40. The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is
inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the
admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him
41. With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents
inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to
sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the
testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
42. We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable
doubt
43. In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that
Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion.
The trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil Home Defense Force.
44. Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4,
1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used
the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the
prosecution never presented any other witness
45. evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt
46. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws
V. Rule 114- Bail

PABLO FELICIANO, petitioner, vs. HON. LADISLAO PASICOLAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, and UNION C. KAYANAN, in his capacity as provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, respondents
1. mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to decide on the merits a motion filed by the
petitioner in Criminal Case
2. Pablo Feliciano, was one of the eighteen persons charged with the crime of kidnapping
with murder in an amended information
3. Upon learning of the filing of said information and that a warrant for his arrest had been
issued, the petitioner, fearing, according to his lawyer, that he might fall into the hands of
irresponsible police officers, and to avoid disgrace and humiliation consequent to an
arrest and incarceration, went into hiding
4. Attorney Filemon Cajator, at the instance of the petitioner's wife, filed in the case a
motion asking that the Court fix at P10,000.00 the amount of the bond for petitioner's
release pending trial
5. After hearing, the respondent Judge, then presiding the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, dismissed petitioner's motion, on the ground that "pending his arrest or
surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail."
6. under the Constitution, "all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong,"
Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words
"all persons" used in said constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean "all
persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any
criminal offense
7. The petition at bar is in effect a petition for admission to bail. And the rule on the subject in
this jurisdiction is well settled. There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked
by petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security
"required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law
8. According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense
and the evidence of his guilt is strong
9. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the
law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and
until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong

10. In the instant case, the petitioner upon learning that an amended information charging
him and seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and
 that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and until now
is at large.
11. Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the
amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the
petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

EVANGELINE L. DINAPOL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 45, Bais City, respondent.

1. In a sworn letter dated 26 August 1992, complainant charges the respondent Judge with
grave abuse of discretion, ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of
the bench in that notwithstanding the fact that the spouses Crozoro Palermo and Jovy
Palermo, accused for murder, had not yet been arrested pursuant to the warrant of
arrest he had issued and were "freely roaming in the municipality of Guihulngan," said
respondent Judge entertained a petition for bail and set the same for hearing despite the
vigorous opposition of the complaining witness
2. Complainant further alleges that the two accused have been "seen conspicuously after
the filing of the petition for bail; bail inside the chambers of this court [RTC] accompanied
by a younger brother of a congressman"; that it was the said congressman who
supposedly "sponsored" the appointment to the Judiciary of the respondent Judge; and
that the accused spouses are "relatives of the said congressman.
3. Information for Murder so no bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of
accused Crozoro Palermo and Jovy Palermo
4. The respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
5. Before the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over their persons, accused filed through
their counsel, the Paras and Associates law office, a motion to grant and fix bail
6. Evangeline Dinapol, the complaining witness and a sister of the victim in the murder case
filed a vigorous opposition to the motion
7. the respondent Judge issued an order (a) denying the motion to grant bail on the ground
that the court "has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused," (b) ordering
the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest and (c) directing the PNP of Guihulngan "to
exert utmost efforts for the arrest of the accused"
8. Atty. Alfonso Briones — filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration on the ground
that "the accused are forthcoming, and are willing to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction
of the Court"
9. Acting thereon, and on the basis of Atty. Briones' confirmation of "the willingness of the
accused to surrender to the custody of the court as stated in said motion,"
10. resetting the hearing of the motion to grant and fix bail subject to the condition that "the
accused shall surrender to the custody of the court." "that failure to present evidence on
said date without justifiable reason will be considered as lack of strength of its evidence"
11. Despite their commitment and Atty. Briones' confirmation on their behalf that they
would voluntarily surrender on 7 May 1992, the accused failed to appear on the set date
 12. Nevertheless, "in the interest of substantial justice and to avoid delay in the
administration of justice," the respondent Judge issued on the said date an order
resetting, once again,
13. the subpoena and warrant server of the Guihulngan Police Station, SPO1 Hindenburg
Cabang, executed a return of service of the 29 May 1992 warrant of arrest.
14. the Prosecution filed on 24 June 1992 a "Motion Entreating Hon. Ismael O. Baldado to
Consider Whether or Not to Continue Presiding Over the Above-Entitled Case"
15. respondent Judge inhibited himself, Judge Bulado also inhibited himself from hearing the
case since prosecution witness Alfredo Bulado is his first cousin or a relative within the
fourth civil degree and decreed the return of the case to the court of origin
16. Judge maintains that he had in fact denied in his 24 April 1992 Order the accused's
motion for bail precisely because his court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the accused.
17. He claims that he ordered the issuance of an alias warrant for their arrest and acted
favorably on the motion to reconsider the said denial (by resetting the hearing of the
petition for bail) only to avoid what appeared to him as a " 'pendulum' of procedure or a
'pingpong' of actions by both parties with the accused manifesting their willingness to
surrender and submit to the custody of the court and the prosecution objecting to the
hearing of the application for bail."
18. he cannot be charged with ignorance of law because although he was "a working student
in college, consistently endeavored to achieve excellence, and his academic efforts
proved fruitful — graduated (sic) Cum Laude in both Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of
Laws at Silliman University
19. Finally, respondent Judge alleges that (a) there is no clear and direct proof to support the
allegation that both accused were in his chambers for; (b) "not a single politician has
made interventions or at least insinuate (sic) to intervene, in any case pending before
him"; and (c) there are parties working "behind the scene of this malicious charge"
against whom he will, in due time, undertake legal recourse
20. letter of Glenn B. Litrada, youngest sister of both Liberty Litrada — the victim in the
murder case — and Evangeline Dinapol — the complainant in instant case — informing
this Court that in view of the latter's having been pressured into signing an affidavit of
desistance
21. Atty. Jose Estacion, Jr. as "the man behind, the prime mover and the active instigator, in
the filing of this case." It appears that the respondent Judge, while still in the private
practice of law, represented Ruth Sison in an administrative case (Adm. Matter No. RTJ-
87-104) filed by her against Estacion who was then the Presiding Judge. The respondent
Judge attached to his Supplementary Comments the alleged true and correct copy of
complainant Evangeline Dinapol's so-called affidavit of desistance
22. respondent Judge manifested that he is submitting the instant case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings

Ruling
Office of the Court Administrator concludes that the respondent Judge has "committed a
jurisdictional lapse in the procedure he adopted in setting the case for hearing the Motion to
(sic) Bail filed by the counsel of the accused on the mere allegation that the accused are
forthcoming and are willing to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court."

Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court that an accused can move for the granting of
bail only if the court has acquired jurisdiction over his person. It then recommends that the
respondent Judge "be sternly admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
violation in the future will be dealt with more severely."

Bail is defined Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court as "the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions" specified in Section 2 thereof. A
person is considered to be in the custody of the law(a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a
warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under
Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when
he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the
proper authorities.

Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were not arrested by virtue of both the original
warrant arrest and the alias warrant of arrest, and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, they had no standing in court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the court have
any business setting the same for hearing

While he subsequently rectified his error by denying the motion in his Order of 24 April 1992, he
nevertheless backtracked by granting the motion for reconsideration and setting anew the
hearing of the motion for bail this time with a warning to the prosecution that its failure to
present evidence on the scheduled date "will be considered as lack of strength of its evidence.

According to Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, a Judge violates his duty as a minister of
justice if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him.
Respondent Judge had likewise betrayed impropriety by his unusual partiality in favor of one of
the parties

Respondent Judge is hereby meted a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely

MARCOS, Petitioner, v. HON. FERNANDO S. RUIZ, RTC Judge, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbilaran City,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
BAILBOND; FORFEITURE. — A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of
the accused is specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due notice to
the bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear in
person as so required. There is no showing that the court had specifically required the bonding
company to produce the body of the petitioner on 8 and 9 April 1985. Moreover, since Criminal
Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892, which involve two (2) checks with a face value of P3,000.00 each,
were merely for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which imposes a penalty of
"imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court," the presence of the accused at the hearing on 8 and 9 April 1985 was not indispensable.
HEARING IN ABSENTIA, PROPER. — Having failed to appear on 8 April 1985 despite due notice,
and considering that on said date the urgent motion for resetting had not yet been received by
the court, respondent Judge could not be faulted for believing that petitioner’s non-appearance
was unjustified. Hence, a hearing in absentia was proper under the aforequoted provision of the
Constitution and Sections 2(c) and 1(c) of Rules 114 and 115, respectively, of the Rules of Court
WHEN NON-APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED CONSIDERED A WAIVER. — With respect to an accused
who is not in custody, his non-appearance constitutes a waiver of his right to be present only for
the trial set for the particular date of which he had notice. Upon the other hand, such non-
appearance by an accused in custody and who later escapes is considered a waiver of the right
on such date and all subsequent trial dates until such custody is regained
1. certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner seeks to set aside, for being null
and void
2. after conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting 2nd Assistant City
Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol two (2) informations against petitioner herein for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
3. when the petitioner, knowing fully well that he did not have sufficient funds deposited
with the Far Fast Bank and Trust Company (Cebu North Proclamation Area Branch),
delivered to Fulgencia Oculam, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry taken by
 petitioner’s wife Anacleta Marcos, two (2) checks drawn against said bank in the amount
of P3,000.00 each
4. The petitioner appeared on that date but asked for a resetting on the ground that his
lawyer had just withdrawn and he had to look for another lawyer
5. It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his obligation with the offended party
who, on 3 November 1984, executed an Affidavit of Desistance which she subscribed and
swore to before Notary Public Paulino G. Clarin. Pertinent portions thereof
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
6. 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case
7. That the complaining witness in this case has turned hostile
8. That without the testimony of said complaining witness, the above-entitled case cannot
be prosecuted successfully
9. motion bears the approval of Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal Miguel Relampagos
10. the court received a telegram from petitioner’s wife. Lita Marcos, advising the court that
the petitioner was indisposed. Without any objection on the part of the prosecution, the
court cancelled the arraignment on that date and re-scheduled the same
11. the petitioner appeared together with his counsel de parte, Atty. Carlos Marcos. He was
arraigned in both cases; he entered a plea of not guilty
12. When the cases were called in the afternoon of 8 April 1985, neither petitioner nor
counsel appeared
13. Directing Paramount Insurance Corp., the bondsman, to show cause, within thirty (30)
days form notice
14. In fact, up to the present, the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss dated November 12,
1984 has not been acted upon by this Honorable Court
15. THAT the non-appearance of the accused in the scheduled trial is not a sufficient ground
for the cancellation of the bailbond because his failure could still be considered as a
waiver of his presence
16. Respondent Judge filed his Comment 14 by mail on 30 May 1985. He maintains that
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the arraignment and was not denied due process
17. petitioner mailed his Joint Reply to the Comments
18. this Court resolved to give due course to the petition, consider the Comments as Answer
and require the parties to file their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with
19. Respondent Judge asserts that the petitioner is estopped from questioning the inaction
on this motion because he voluntarily appeared at his arraignment, entered a plea and
agreed to the scheduling of the case for trial on the merits
20. While the first proposition is incorrect, the second is inaccurate. Estoppel does not
operate in the present case for the motion may still be resolved after the arraignment; by
its nature, it may be filed by the prosecution at any time
21. that the motion to dismiss is for Criminal Case No. 3892 only 17 although the instant
petition makes it appear, and the respondents seem to accede thereto, that the motion
 affects both Criminal Cases Nos. 3890 and 3892. This, of course, would become entirely
irrelevant in the light of the succeeding discussion on the second ground stressed by the
respondent Judge.
22. Prosecution orally withdrew the motion to dismiss
23. Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court provides, in part, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the
court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without any justifiable
cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver
of his right to be present during that trial."
24. "(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due
notice shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified
in the notice. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia:"
25. Having failed to appear on 8 April 1985 despite due notice, and considering that on said
date the urgent motion for resetting had not yet been received by the court, respondent
Judge could not be faulted for believing that petitioner’s non-appearance was unjustified
26. respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the forfeiture of the
bond and required the bonding company to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against it for the amount of the bond
27. A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is
specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the
bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear
in person as so required
28. Under the Rules of Court, the accused has to be present:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) at the arraignment pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 116;

(b) at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in
which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation in absentia is
allowed under the third paragraph of said section; and

(c) when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused
29. Petitioner, however, is not fully justified in claiming that he was denied his right to due
process by the respondent Judge
30. It will, however, be noted that insofar as the second case, Criminal Case No. 3892, is
concerned, the court made no ruling on, the manifestation and offer by petitioner’s
counsel that the reading of the information be waived and a plea of not guilty be entered
31. the motion to reset the hearing was a mere subterfuge to obtain a postponement of and
delay the proceedings
32. SEC. 2. Continuance or postponement of the trial. — The court on the application of
either party or on its own motion, may in its discretion for good cause postpone the trial
of the case for such period of time as the ends of justice and the right of the defendant to
a speedy trial require."
As amended, it now reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC 2. Continuance trial until terminated; postponements. — Trial once commenced

shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated; but for good cause,
it may be postponed for a reasonable period of time."cralaw virtua1aw library
33. ". . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular
date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during
that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and
escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all
subsequent trial dates until custody is regained." (Emphasis supplied)
34. Thus, with respect to an accused who is not in custody, his non-appearance constitutes a
waiver of his right to be present only for the trial set for the particular date of which he
had notice. Upon the other hand, such non-appearance by an accused in custody and
who later escapes is considered a waiver of the right on such date and all subsequent
trial dates until such custody is regained
35. The order of the respondent Judge declaring the two (2) cases submitted for decision is
not only a violation of Section 1(c) of Rule 115 but is also a pronouncement that the
petitioner had waived his constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel, 31 and
present his evidence. This is certainly lamentable for he thus allowed his court to breach
one of its highest, duties — the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights
36. While constitutional rights may be waived, 33 such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. 34 There is nothing on record to
suggest conduct on the part of the petitioner from which it may be reasonably inferred
that he had waived his right to submit his evidence