AiD Godišnjak ENG 2018 25102018 PDF

We and the Others
Yearbook:
Summer School of Interethnic, Intercultural
and Interconfessional Dialogue – AID - 2018
2018, Belgrade
We and the Others
Yearbook: Summer School of Interethnic,
Intercultural and Interconfessional
Dialogue – AID - 2018
Publisher
Forum za etničke odnose
Kraljice Natalije 45
11000 Beograd
Editor in chief
Dušan Janjić
Translation
Agencija TOUCH TWO
Prepress
Atelje, Beograd
www.atelje.rs
Printing
Štamparija PEP, Beograd
Contents
PUBLISHER’S NOTE............................................................................................................... 5
PART I: PAPERS WRITTEN BY LECTURERS................................................................. 7
1. Dušan Janjić
Key Determinants of Globalization and Challenges of Preserving Diversity........ 9
2. Miloš Bešić
Research and Understanding of Attitudes Toward Others......................................21
3. Jasmina Trajkoska
Interethnic Relations in the European Union and European Identity..................29
4. Miroslav Keveždi
Mapping Interculturalism in Serbia.............................................................................39
5. Amela Lukač-Zoranić
Freedom of Religion or Belief and Globalization......................................................49
6. Mirko Blagojević
Religion and Religiosity in Europe, Serbia, and Russia...........................................61
7. Prepared by: Professor Nevena Petrušić
Legislative and Institutional Framework Governing the Interethnic,
Intercultural and Inter-Confessional Relations in the Republic of Serbia...........71
8. Anna Krasteva
Balkan Migations.............................................................................................................85
PART II: PAPERS WRITTEN BY STUDENTS.......................................................107
1. Slobodan Pejanović
Yugoslav Identity: then and now.................................................................................109
2. Verka Jovanović
The Kosovo’s Knot of Reconciliation..........................................................................119
3. Biljana Marković
Essay Topic: The Impacts of Immigration on the Labor Market..........................127
4. Marija Milenković
Interethnic cooperation through tourism: A Kosovo Case Study........................135
5. Marija Đekić
The Economic Impact of Remittances Inflow (Economic Migration)................143
6. Nikola Aleksić
Migration and Human Rights.....................................................................................153
7. Katarina Antić
Modern Migration and Security in the Republic of Serbia...................................163
8. Mehmed Plojović
The Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia.........................173
PART III: APPENDIX..............................................................................................185
1. Aleksandra Ålund,
Carl-Ulrik Schierup
Making or unmaking a movement?
Challenges for civic activism in the global governance of migration..................187
PUBLISHER’S NOTE
SID 2018 Yearbook of the Summer School on Intercultural and Inter-Confessional

Dialogue -We and the Others – SID is a collection of papers written by lecturers and
essays written by students of the Academy on Interethnic, Intercultural and Intercon-
fessional Dialogue - AID.
The Summer School on Intercultural and Inter-Confessional Dialogue, SID was
organized by the Forum for Ethnic Relations and the Faculty of Business Economics
and Entrepreneurship (PEP), within the AID Project - Academy on Interethnic, Inter-
cultural and Interconfessional Dialogue, supported by the Embassy of the Republic of
Bulgaria in Serbia.
Part I
Papers written by lecturers
7
Dr Dušan Janjić
1. KEY DETERMINANTS OF
GLOBALIZATION AND CHALLENGES
OF PRESERVING DIVERSITY
People who are engaged in the subject of modern society in an effort to understand
and explain to themselves and others the reality and logic behind the mechanisms this
society, face many challenges and complex tasks. Many of these tasks are related to the
social history and culture to which a person belongs. The first task than is to understand
where the society to which we belong company stands.
This text aims to raise certain questions, prompt a search for answers that would
help in explaining and understanding the Serbian society as well as other Balkan and
European societies. The aim is to launch a discussion on issues which merge the past and
the future. As Henry Kissinger1, once wrote, the encounter of the past and the future
cannot be understood if there is no knowledge and feeling of both of these elements, the
past, and the future. That is why the future should be built on solid foundations. These
are not populist and other marketing-propaganda imagery of the world that does not
exist in reality, but which leaders use to lure the public. Instead of building “Potemkin
Villages”, it would be advisable to respond to many challenges stemming from the final
years of the Cold War. And in a cold war, certain challenges are simply “frozen issues”
of the 19th and 20th century. This is particularly evidenced by the political agenda of
today’s Serbian leadership.
Facing the legacy should not impede facing up to completely new issues (climate
change, cyber security, context of the world order vision, operations of “non-state ac-
tors”), although it often does. This endeavor is greatly assisted by exploring a “wider
perspective”, which brings a viewpoint of the ‘history of the present’, and by looking for
the roots of new phenomena. It is important to understand that even the most recent
issues did not arise in a type of vacuum.
Higher interconnection between people, their lives and destinies, social and nation-
al histories is characteristic of the modern day life today. This speaks of the need to
1 H. A. Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History, Lon-
don, Allen Lane, 2014, pp. 348-349.
9
10 We and the Others • Yearbook: AID - 2018
understand the complex relationships of contemporary circumstances (independent of

the past), to understand the complex processes of linking geographic locations, but also
issues of vital importance to people, modern societies and nations.
In this paper, the term “globalization” is used in the meaning of the English word
“Globe” (meaning “Earth” or “World globe” in the Serbian language). This concept en-
compasses all the global / planetary social processes and relationships, manifested in all
aspects of world affairs, including the connection going beyond borders of particular
nations (nationalities) and national states, with the main objective to increase economic
growth and wealth. In that sense, “globalization” refers to the world image as a common
space in which interdependence (technological, political, economic and ecological) is
knit at a tremendous speed, eliminating geographical distance, increasing wealth, and
making democratic form of government universal.2
This paper discusses the most recent phase that was conceived in the second half of
the 20th century when a new economic wave called globalization appeared. This phase
culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall, i.e. with the fall of political blocks. The dom-
inance of capitalism over socialism was established; dominance of liberal democracies
and ethno-nationalism over socialist ideals and ideologies.
Globalization is erasing the clear differences between the national and international
that was important to the world view before. The importance of national states is weak-
ening and there is a growing need for regional and international interconnection. This
strengthens the influence of international institutions and corporations. Globalization
is a linkage that goes beyond frameworks of national governments and establishes re-
gionalization or regional integration in the world (such as the European Union - the EU,
ASEAN, and North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA).
This paper raises the question of the following three megatrends, which have a direct
impact on Serbia’s development, particularly ethnic identity, relations between ethnic
communities and states and the position of national minorities in those states:
Megatrend 1–Transition and Identity: The awakening of ethnicity and identity crisis as
a fertile soil for strengthening ethnic nationalism and extremist mobilization, including
the spread of terrorism as a form of ethnic and religious conflict.
Ethnicity and religious identity have become the decisive factors in the formation
of cultural and national identity. Globalization has brought frequent encounters with
other people, cultures and ethnicities, shaking up traditional models of building and
reflecting identities. In addition to accepting globalization and fitting into its values, the
search for answers to the challenge of annihilation of one’s own identity. Ethnic and na-
tionalist mobilization is is seen by many as an effective way to avoid losing own identity.
2 “Globalization can be defined as economic, political, social and cultural processes at the supranational
level, which changes the established global political, economic, social and cultural relations. The es-
sential determinant of these processes is the technological development that brings a spatial-temporal
reduction of the world” (Anita Bušljeta, Globalizam – Ideologija globalizacije? Sociologija ekologije,
Zagreb, Vol. 19, 2010), No. 2).
Part I: Papers written by lecturers 11
This proves that the old model of national (ethnic) identity is facing a crisis, ex-
pressed inthe domain of conflicting psychological stereotypes, due to building of the
new and/or reinforcing old stereotypes; in the domain of conflicting ideological doc-
trines, a fierce ideological battle to win over persons belonging to own nation for one
of the two most influential options: first, building own identity without annihilating
others, and, second, more dominant option, which puts the spotlight on national ter-
ritory issues, requesting its extension to imaginary ethnic boundaries; escalation of
conflicts between political institutions, i.e. confrontation of political organizations
(political parties, government institutions, etc.) over the economic, and in particular,
energy, financial, political, military and police power; escalation of internal territorial
and political conflicts, combined with ethnic elements, which dramatizes the issues of
national minorities.
While the height of nationalist mobilization was reached in the early 1990s, extreme
nationalism remains an important aspect of politics in the Western Balkans. Hate
speech that continues to be disseminated by some media and the absence of any signif-
icant steps towards reconciliation have allowed for the persistence of resentment-based
nationalism in the Western Balkans. Strong ties among political extremism, violence,
terrorism and organized crime have much strengthened during wars in the former Yu-
goslavia countries and across the world, particularly in North Africa, Near East and
Central Asia. For this reason, it is interesting to analyze lessons learned from the col-
lapse of the USSR and especially from the South Caucasus.
Capitalism has triumphed over communism and socialism in almost all corners of
the world, and ironically, many of the most prominent capitalists come from former
communist and socialist countries.
The triumph is the result of fruitful economic activities that are successful in creat-
ing opportunities and possibilities for many people to ensure higher economic security.
However, there are shortfalls; first, this is producing an unsustainable boom - growth
and inescapable decline - crash; second, inequality, including gaps between many coun-
tries worldwide. But it is the only way to create wealth for all nations and people. This is
what gives legitimacy to capitalism.3
The process of transition has only just begun in most former socialist / communist
countries, which has left difficult economic and social situation which is the source and
main feed of political instability, and consequently, the extremism and use of violence, such
as terrorism, or mass scale involvement in the non-formal economy and organized crime.
The period of extreme globalization has brought with it the opening of borders espe-
cially for capital and the international monetary system, which has pushed many societ-
ies and economies to believe that they can join and enjoy the flow of money which they
didn’t have before. That has brought upon many and ever more violent financial crises in
Latin America and East Asia. This has culminated in the global financial crisis in 2008,
marked by the bursting of a thriving financial balloon at the center of globalization - the
3 David Rubenstein, A letter to capitalists from Adam Smith, The Financial Times, January 9, 2012 7:03 pm
United States. It has temporarily slowed down the process of globalization, which is also
evident from a sharp decline in global capital flows and global trade.
This crisis has led to a short-term breakdown of leading financial systems, and stock
market crashes. However, at the end of this cycle investment and productivity also de-
clined. Investments dropped even though investors had money. This has affected the
traditional investment in real estate property, as the firm belief in the growth of real
estate prices went unfulfilled. In fact, it turned out that a deep system decompression is
taking place, that access to capital is impossible and that the state should provide cash.
Investors were left without capital. This has raised the issue of the cost of the global
financial crisis, which had given rise to the feelings of injustice and unfairness of rela-
tions between societies around the world. The question of responsibility of governments
was opened. Governments were accusing banks, and banks were desperately trying to
prove that they too are feeling the consequences of financial crisis.
The financial crisis has become an economic disease that has caused a social crisis.
Political and financial elites were obsessively focused on their own interests and ide-
ologies. They did not pay attention to the revolt of ‘ordinary people’. Their fears were
addressed by certain world leaders such as Donald Trump, Victor Orban or Brexit in
the UK, a number of political parties and movements in the EU, as well as religious and
other movements in northern Africa and the Arab world.
The 2008 global financial crisis revealed the end of a rapid ascent of winners in the »new
world order«, thus severely shaking the European Union and the United States, which until
then had been the driving force behind globalization. Deep changes have occurred. Since
then, the issue of immigration has been burdening and exacerbating the developed West-
ern European countries, almost to the state of panic. In the EU and the US, this issue has
become the prevailing issue in political campaigns, including presidential elections.
The crisis has awakened deep social fears – fear of finding a job, fear of not earning
money for food and other needs.
The Western, especially the European understanding of the nation as a place of birth
and the only culture, is shaken by mass immigration in 2015 and 2016. In the United
States, as an “immigrant nation-state”, there is also a growing fear that new immigrants
will produce high costs for the United States and pose a challenge for the nation’s cul-
ture. There is also a growing fear that immigrants will not be assimilated.
Also, the trust in Euro-American society has dropped, which has led to a transfor-
mation of regimes into dictatorships i.e. too much power is placed in the hands of one
person. Examples of this are Russia’s President Putin, China’s Xi Jinping etc. This raises
the question of the need and ability of the nation and its leadership to protect nation
interests. The priority is not the protection of the global and regional systems. This is a
fertile ground for further strengthening of ethnic – nationalism.4
The rise of today’s ethnic nationalism seems to be a xenophobic attempt to blame
economic difficulties and foreigners for the failing nationalism. Voters in USA, Italy,
4 George Friedman, How 2008 Changed Everything, Geopolitical Futures, Sept. 28, 2016
Hungary and other countries fear that foreigners will influence government elections
and that immigrants will usurp their living standards. All this is making nations less
open to others. This is best confirmed by the slogans and policies of Donald Trump
and in the promise of benefits of Brexit to the UK – “Taking back control” or “America
First”. This is followed by the promise of “I (leader and state) will protect you because
“They” will not be able to open a factory or come to work in your town. This is a policy
of isolationism. It is a policy of neglecting and / or avoiding co-operation and contacts
with other states, economies, cultures etc. It is a policy of closing in own borders, or-
ganizations, cultures, clans, etc. It is often associated with the “non-interfering” and
“avoiding” alliances with other countries as well as all wars, which do not directly con-
cern own state.
Today, nationalism vs. globalism is defined as a political conflict. However, the alter-
native to the current populist nationalism is not globalist elitism but economic realism.
After all, reality always wins.5
Today, it is almost evident that such a policy had led the world in the two world
wars because it created space for the development of aggressive populist movements and
politics. Despite the fact that the space for possible wide armed conflicts has narrowed,
the risks of political, social, ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as the economic and
security instability of certain regions, throughout the world and the Western Balkans
are multiplying. There are particularly important issues related to ethnic relations in
Macedonia, relations between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as between Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Republika Srpska. These are possible conflict hot spots and challenges with
possible wider (regional) consequences.
As in the past, the essence of the crises today is a new crisis of capitalism that is
forced to impose itself with varying models of progress, economic growth and inter-
national relations, for example, the investment and infrastructure building model in
China, which is promising a new silk road that goes beyond state borders and conti-
nents. This path is not based on free trade arrangements or market divisions, but on real
roads, electricity transmission systems, on mixed industrial policies and investments
in infrastructure. This only points to the need for bottom-up policy change and new
reflections on international cooperation within the framework of long-term strategic
interests and values.6
Megatrend 2 – Transformation of the (nation) state in the context of globalization and

strengthening of regional and global integration has revealed the limitations of tradition-
al representative democracy and its inability to respond to the growing complexity of
societies, the volume of information received in real time and the amounts of money
needed to govern the state and to run the elections.
5 Anatole Kaletsky, Project Syndicate 2018 Nationalism Will Go Bankrupt,25 June 2018 @Kaletsky, Social
Europe
6 Ngaire Woods, Overcoming Crisis Of Globalization: Rebuild Politics, Rethink International Coopera-
tion, on 16 July 2018, Social Europe
Until recently, it was strongly believed that neoliberal economy will be replaced by
a post-capitalist economy in which the market, as part of expected both economic and
social reforms, will be designed so as to balance the relationship between individuality
and the community in a more just way. This belief proved to be wrong. Events in 1989
started a process which has been evolving up to these days and which replaced the in-
disputable value of socialism and liberal democracy with new idols: unlimited free mar-
ket economy, the nation, ethno-nationalism. Two types of conflict have been dominant
since then: on the one hand, political conflicts in which almost everywhere (with the
exception of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania) forces linked with the old regimes were
removed from power, and on the other, national (ethnic) conflicts which are particu-
larly characteristic for multiethnic federal states: the USSR, Czechoslovakia and SFRY.
In Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Western Balkans, there are numer-
ous locations in which potential conflicts over the legal, political and economic status
can break out. Already in 1990 thirty minorities, i.e. around 143 million people and
around 35% of the population in this region, were identified as “minorities at risk”. To-
day, 16 of these minorities are ruling majorities in the newly established states, and 93
million people, i.e. 20-25% of the region’s population, are at risk. Considering that many
ethnic conflicts can easily get out of control, these conflicts are a serious challenge to
stability of this part of Europe in which were identified as many as 129 potential loca-
tions for interethnic conflict; among these conflicts, 25 are in the group of conflicts in
which authorities apply serious pressure, including threat or use of threat.
Thanks to German unification one state no longer exists, but thanks to the disinte-
gration of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and former Yugoslavia the number of indepen-
dent states tripled. The model of the nation-state is extremely attractive for most local
minorities, and all new states were established along the ethno-nationalistic principle
although they are ethnically heterogeneous. Hence, the existence of ethnic minorities
poses problems to political elites in the majority of new independent states which want
to evolve as nationally (ethnically) homogeneous. And in cases when the minority lead-
ership (like in case of Serbs in Croatia, or Albanians in Kosovo) is also trying to estab-
lish their own state or to join their kin-state, the existing conflicts intensify, secessionist
movements get stronger and it is not rare that all this ends in wars and mass migration.
In most cases, in Europe, post-communist authorities were forced to invoke democ-
racy in their efforts to suppress endeavors to transform their states into authoritarian or
totalitarian police states which would root out, at their very beginning, movements of
minorities aiming at autonomy and to find a settlement with the minorities. Most often
this was not a result of comprehending internal needs, but rather a kind of “courtship”
to Europe. Namely, in 1991 guarantees regarding minority rights were introduced as
a condition under which the European Community, afterwards the European Union,
would recognize the newly established states (first the Baltic states, and later on also
all the others). Therefore, almost all post-communist regimes resort to legal reforms
regarding protection of minorities. Generally, these reforms have been based upon
international legal provisions of the UN, on the OSCE minority standards and other
forms of regional protection (Community of Independent States, Council of Europe) or

on bilateral agreements of states regarding protection of national minorities. Minority
protection is established in regard to individual rights (Estonia, Croatia, Slovenia etc.)
group rights (Serbia and Montenegro) and personal autonomy (Hungary).
If judged by constitutional and legal provisions, minorities are in a much better po-
sition than is the case in reality. The biggest problem is that the paradigm of an ethni-
cally and nationally homogeneous state does not imply room for compromises with
minorities because the ethno-nationalistic speech on the own nation’s right to national
self-determination is not in correlation with the speech on the freedom of minorities.
However, the nature of existing differences makes it impossible to centralize the
power and instead request federalism and regionalism. Since the position of minorities
has significant impact upon the ability of newly established states to survive, one of the
most important issues is how to adequately balance the autonomy of minorities which
would support maintaining their cultural and ethnic differences, with efforts to also
discourage separatist movements.
A particularly difficult political issue is the status of “new national minorities”, i.e.
members of ethnic communities which in the former USSR and SFRY had the status of
“state-building people”. In order to ensure territory and border stability, successor states
would have to ensure equality of all people, and particularly of members of these mi-
nority groups; the first step in this direction is to guarantee citizenship as well as some
affirmative action measures. However, in reality the treatment of “foreign nationalities”
is extremely bad and unspecified: State policies are directed against “new minorities”,
and ethnic conflicts become more serious.
Globalization increased the significance of alliances, strategic partnership and
“club” membership like in the EU, NATO etc. This is also a challenge for the Western
Balkans as a region with a population exceeding 20 million people and a region in
which relations between states and the entities may be described as being antagonized
in many ways.
The last decade of our history teaches as two lessons: first, ethno-nationalistic move-
ments are not able to establish either stable and efficient states, or modern societies;
and second, the international community guided by the principle of integration did not
intervene in local conflicts, it even relied on protectorates only to leave defeated.
Like in numerous examples throughout the world, here, too, the process of indepen-
dence and democratization proved to be a long one, often painstaking, but inevitable
in the contemporary world. The troubles with learning and beginner mistakes can cer-
tainly be reduced provided the road taken is one of cooperation with own citizens (tak-
ing the example of Kosovo, cooperation of Albanians, Serbs and other communities),
with the neighbors (taking the example of Kosovo, cooperation with Serbia, Montene-
gro, Albania and Macedonia, and taking the example of the other former battlefield –
Bosnia-Herzegovina – with Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) and of course cooperation
with the international community, first of all with its representatives in Kosovo and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The example of Serbia is illustrative for all of these developments: at the beginning of
the 21st century Serbia’s society was facing numerous problems with regard to the func-
tioning of the economy and the security system, as well as in relations with the world.
These problems were particularly intensified due to the recent world crisis.
The time from 1987, as well as from October 2000 until now, is one of the most
turbulent periods in Serbian political history. This is a period of multiple events: end
of communism i.e. socialism; disintegration of Yugoslavia through a series of internal
or civil warswhich had also characteristics of inter-ethnic wars; creation of new states
in the territory of the former common state; EU and UN sanctions and the ten-year
long international isolation introduced by them; war with leading countries in Europe
and the world, i.e. NATO (1999); restoration of the multi-party system and elections
within the undemocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic and the pre-democratic system
which was being built in the post-Milosevic era (form 5 October 2000 up to now); Ser-
bia restored national statehood, but this was not based on political intentions and plans
of Serbia’s leadership, but was rather the end result of defeats and political decisions
made by other political stakeholders and states, including the decision of Montenegro’s
citizens expressed in the referendum to restore their statehood and leave SRY/SCG; in-
troduction of comprehensive and socially painful reforms; particularly bad manage-
ment of the privatization process which acquired features of tycoonization, destroyed
the production sector and stimulated high corruption of politicians, as well as radical
changes of cultural models and the ruling moral and social norms etc.
The present and the future (of Serbia) must be comprehended in the context of glo-
balization. On the one hand, globalization links states and reduces the power of the
individual nation-state, and on the other it imposes the need to strengthen the state as a
support for national identity and the mechanism for protection of local resources.
The problem of Serbia is that the state is inefficient and weak to be able to support
the strengthening of internal social and national integrative connections. Therefore, to-
day’s Serbia may be marked as an “unfinished state” in which are gaining strength such
processes which indicate that the issue of the country’s future has not yet been clarified.
There is a strong tendency to make Serbia a “failed state”, which would not be able to real-
ize either its internal, rational integration, or its external, international integration links.
Such state cannot react to challenges of globalization by joining regional and global in-
tegrations and simultaneously preserve and develop its own characteristics and advan-
tages. On the other hand, this means that the trend of Serbia’s disintegration would con-
tinue. Therefore, it is necessary to perceive the solution to the problem of building Serbia
as a nation-state by considering at least two options which represent different goals and
different conditions within which the process of building of the nation-state will evolve:
The first options the realization of “European future”, which imposes the following
priorities:
• in the period after 2011 and until joining the EU (most likely in 2025–2030), it is
necessary to transform Serbia from the weak i.e. “unfinished state” which it is today,
and bring it to the level of a modern and efficient i.e. so-called “normal state”;
• in the period after joining the EU and until 2050 it will be necessary to submit the
nation-state to gradual deregulation i.e. the transfer of certain state functions to
European bodies.
The second option shall apply if the present model of European integration proves
unsuccessful, which may be the case either because Serbia will not join the EU or be-
cause EU reorganized and left Serbia outside the circle of “closely integrated” countries.
Considering that one of the variants in this second option is highly feasible, the follow-
ing priorities are imposed:
• strengthening of the state and raising its efficiency when facing internal social as
well as global challenges (equal to the first option), and
• building new regional and global supports, i.e. alliances which do not exclude also
the EU.
In reality, this is Serbia’s starting position because at the end of the 20th century
Serbia for the first time in its history found itself on the same side with “historical los-
ers”. Recovery from big losses and turning toward development, internal stability and
strengthening of the international reputation and influence is a hard and long-lasting
task aimed at establishing an optimum balance between ethnic loyalty to the national
community and citizens’ loyalty to the state, which is made more difficult due to the
deep identity crisis of Serbia and the Serbian nation. Together with all this, it is visible
that there is no clear vision and strategy for managing the state in the process of transi-
tion from the socialist to the capitalist society. Serbia’s leadership was not ready to enter
this process and it is also excessively oriented towards the past, leaving the present and
the future at a lower rank. Therefore, there is also no confronting with the consequences
of reforms realized up to now.
Like other independent states in the Western Balkans, Serbia has no chance to en-
sure a sustainable level of development if it relies only on individual efforts and without
mutual cooperation. Therefore, these states must turn toward their common future,
towards the EU and towards their own region, the Western Balkans. This requests con-
fronting and overcoming their nationalistic pasts and “Balkanization”. In this regard,
there are many things which can be learnt from Britain, France and Germany. In the
course of their long history they were waging mutual wars, by far more in numbers and
longer than the peoples in the Western Balkans, and after all the hardships in the past
they still have managed to create a community in which they live good and happy lives,
with a realistic hope that this will also be the case in the foreseeable future.
Applying also West Europe’s experience, the Western Balkans may lean upon two
examples:
• Example No. 1: the Benelux is the result of serious, bloody, inter-religious and
other types of conflicts, and
• Example 2: the European Union is the result of serious and bloody conflicts during
World War II, first of all the German-French conflicts.
As a rule: When united, they are stronger! The Western Balkan BeNeLux (Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro) or the Western Balkans of the six (WB6) i.e.
eight (WB8) could accelerate the development of these states and bring them to the EU
using an easier route. This can by no means be a “common” political or state communi-
ty but rather an area with unimpeded communications, flow of people, goods and ideas.
Albanian–Serbian reconciliation is backbone, the historic turning point of the Bal-
kans. It could be the basis for the creation of a broader framework of inter-Balkan coop-
eration which shall directly involve Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia.
Whether Kosovo will become a recognized independent state can be solved only by
peaceful means, in circumstances in which democratic political elites will emerge on
the basis of strengthened democratic procedures and institutions and in which, at the
national level, action is taken towards establishing nucleuses which would represent for
the region what the Club of Rome represented for the EU.
Megatrend 3. Growing importance of interaction between energy and security, and the
importance of understanding the relationship between energy security and ethnic con-
flicts is a key challenge for Serbia, Western Balkans and Russia.
Finding themselves at a particular crossroads between the Caucuses and Europe,
and bordering the Middle East and North Africa, the Western Balkans are – by virtue
of their geo-strategic position – a crucial element in Europe’s energy security dilemma.
Peace and stability in this region, which has been affected by ethnic conflict at the end
of the last century and which still face several threats, is essential in order to guarantee
the security of oil and gas supplies for the EU.
While the question of energy security has been a policy concern in the past, only
recently has the question of energy become a very publicly debated question; often dis-
puted not only in expert circles and socio-political and economic forums, but as part of
the general public discourse.
Russia’s recovery after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its significant economic
growth and political influence resulting from exploitation of its massive natural resources,
have created considerable political, security and energy concerns in Europe and across the
world. Russia has remarkable experience in playing with its energy power. In the Western
Balkan region, news of a resurgent and returning Russia – this time through energy deals
– was received with great caution and attention. Moreover, this Russian return to Europe
is seen as a cunning and perfidious political tool, part of its hidden agenda to re-establish
its economic and political influence in the region. Reactions to the Russian move in the
Western Balkan region have been even more flustered. It is believed that the Russian pres-
ence in the region is the beginning of “an entirely new phase in the resolution of the crisis,
in which Serbia is again attempting to destabilise the situation by stirring up new violence
and threatening new conflicts. The fear that the Russian energy establishment in South-
east Europe, and chiefly in Serbia, goes well beyond its economic and political feasibility,
and that it will undoubtedly end-up provoking serious security problems, latent conflict(s)
and potential border changes became even greater after the conflict in Georgia.
There are multiple crises in Europe today, both internal and external. The rising
Euroscepticism and political populism in several major EU countries signify the depth
of the crises as well as one of the feasible solutions to them.
The current EU-Russia tensions, though being basically negative for both, can be and
admittedly is being used by the EU leadership to strengthen the Union in the face of a
putative common enemy, and to prevent the European project from further dissolving.
The current Ukrainian crisis has affected Russia dramatically. This impact has to do
not only with economic, political, or humanitarian relations between the two countries.
The 2014 Maidan revolution in Kiev, the Crimean referendum, and the ongoing
war in East Ukraine have deeply divided Russian politically-minded society. Whereas
the majority perceives the Ukraine case as a warning against the revolution in Russia,
the radical minority at the fringes of the Russian political spectrum is inspired by the
Ukrainian uprising and doesn’t mind having something of a kind in Moscow.
Prof. dr Miloš Bešić
2. RESEARCH AND UNDERSTANDING

OF ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHERS
2.1. Attitude toward others in quantitative research
Attitude toward others is a frequent research subject. Various methods, both qual-
itative and quantitative, can be used for this purpose. For example, we can use inter-
views or group interviews and also perform content and critical discourse analysis. This
paper will present key research methods used in quantitative research to measure atti-
tudes towards others. Quantitative research is a type of research that uses the concept
of variables for measuring research subjects. Variables represent attributes of entities
(analytical units), and analytical entities can be individuals or aggregates.
The concept of variables is quite flexible and has two key advantages; firstly, vari-
ables can be very different in character, e.g., they can survey questions or data ob-
tained from secondary sources, as well as classified and coded qualitative data. Sec-
ondly, variables indicate certain attributes of entities in a unified way, and reference
values for all analytical units are used/entered under same criteria. This allows future
analytical procedures involving statistics to describe certain concepts, or to test re-
lations between concepts. Theoretically, variables are the result of operationalization
of certain notions, which are the subject of our interest. In case of questionnaire,
where questions and/or items are later treated as variables, these questions represent
indicators for specific notions. So, for example, if we investigate religiosity, we ask
respondents whether they believe in God/ heaven/ hell, where these three represent
indicators of religiosity.
The language of variables is very much present in researches with different goals,
and is also often used when examining attitudes toward others. The basic idea is to
translate the notions and social relations into a numerical form by using variables, and
then to describe and explain the social phenomena using numbers (this is the basic
principle of quantification). Consequently, quantitative research is always assigned a
task to ‘measure’ certain phenomena. In this way we can evaluate the attitude toward
immigrants, ethnic distance, the degree of discrimination in society, etc. This paper
21
will present several typical examples and heuristic concepts used to measure attitudes
toward others.
2.2. Research of social and ethnic distance
One way to use research to determine attitude toward others is to measure social
distance. Social distance is a matrix according to which individuals express their dis-
tance toward members of certain social groups. The research platform for measuring
social distance was first defined by the American sociologist Bogardus (1925), and
his concept and operational platform is essentially the same today. Methodologically
speaking, the key idea behind measuring social distance is a system of bivariant ques-
tions, where each subsequent question represents a higher degree of ‘closeness’ from
the point of potential relationships between individuals belonging to different social
groups. Items are given systematically through 7 to 9 questions and members of a
social group express ‘closeness’ or ‘distance’ to members of other social groups. The
principle is that respondents accept or reject social ties with members of certain social
groups. This way, all items form a unique (Bogardus) scale, which shows a cumulative
attitude of individual ethnic groups. Originally, the Bogardus scale had seven ques-
tions7. Later, other researchers have modified the Bogardus scale by introducing new
or different items. Scale modification was necessary because each society in culturally
specific i.e. social relations which define ‘closeness’ may be different due to reasons
pertaining to culture. The first scaling of ethnic distance in the territory of former
Yugoslavia was performed by Rot and Havelka (1973)8, and they used a modified Bo-
gardus scale containing the following items:
1. To reside permanently in my Country
2. To live in my neighborhood, street, building
3. To socialize, be friends
4. To have a sister/brother marry one
5. To be married to
6. To be my superior at work
7. To be the head of the state or hold a very high office
Ethnic distance is only one of the forms of social distance, or more precisely, ethnic
distance is a social distance when ethnic communities are referential social groups. In a
multi-ethnic society, ethnic distance is of particular importance because its measuring
can determine the level of social cohesion or potential for conflicts along national lines.
7 (1) Close relation by marriage, (2) club membership, (3) street neighbor, (4) working in the same profe-
ssion, (5) citizenship, (6) only a visitor, (7) deportation; Bogardus measured the distance by Americans
toward four ethnic groups.
8 Rot, N., Havelka, N., (1973): Nacionalna vezanost i vrednosti kod srednjoškolske omladine, Institut za
psihologiju i IDN, Beograd.
Measuring ethnic distance is not new. The model that we implemented in Montenegro
(CEDEM 2007, 2012, 2018) operates by a modified Bogardus scale consisting of nine
items / attitudes9:
1. To permanently reside in my country
2. To live in my neighborhood, in the same building or street
3. To be my work associate
4. To be my superior at work
5. To be a teacher to my kids
6. To socialize
7. To hold high office in my country10
8. To be related – through cousins
9. To be closely related, by marriage or through children
The results of scaling ethnic distance can be expressed in several ways. First, we can
show the degree of distance of a social group (ethnic) toward members of other ethnic
community by all items (attitudes) as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Distance by Serb nationals toward members of the following groups

Croats Bosniaks Albanians Roma
1. To permanently reside in my country 35.9 22.1 44.5 26.3
2. To live in my neighborhood, in the same building or street 41.6 27.4 56.6 45.0
3. To be my work associate 42.7 28.1 52.3 45.9
4. To be my superior at work 54.1 45.6 63.3 63.3
5. To be a teacher to my kids 56.3 49.5 67.3 69.0
6. To socialize 48.4 35.9 62.6 63.8
7. To hold high office in my country 67.7 63.9 74.4 75.6
8. To be related – through cousins 63.4 65.4 79.4 80.0
9. To be closely related, by marriage or through children 68.0 77.3 84.5 85.2
The flexibility of the concept of variable and measuring of ethnic distance using the
Bogardus scale is shown in the fact that it is possible to make simple synthetic lines and
examine the cumulative attitudes of members of all ethnic groups toward other ethnic
groups. (Chart 1)
9 Kuzmanović, B used this scale for the first time in Montenegro (2001): Ethnic distance in Montenegro,
Djukanović, B., Kuzmanović, B., Lazić. M., Bešić, M., Nacija i Država, CID, Podgorica.
10 Atypical item / attitude which showed high sensitivity in Montenegro. It is assumed that this item could
have a great heuristic value in all situations/societies, with manifested divisions (social gaps).
Chart 1. Ethnic distance between Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians
Also, by using all attitudes/items it is possible to scale the total level of distance ex-
hibited by members of one ethnic group toward all other groups. A cumulative score is
produced, allowing us to measure total distance. (Chart 2)
Chart 2. Total level of distance toward members of all ethnic groups
This form allows, for analytical, descriptive or explicative purposes, measuring the
degree of distancing by different criteria in relation to the different groups. For example,
it is possible to examine the difference between the ethnic distancing of Serbs towards
Croats (or vice versa) by making comparison by age, i.e. whether there is a difference
between young and old Serbs with regard to distance toward Croats. Other socio-demo-
graphic features (gender, education, income, etc.) can also be used as criteria.
2.3. Measuring attitudes in the research of attitudes toward others
Measuring attitudes is a research tool once primarily used in social psychology, but
later in sociology and political sciences. Attitudes are dispositions, they are relatively sta-
ble, and individuals form these attitudes in the process of socialization. According to the
hypothesis of persistence (Mannheim, 1952, Inglehart 1981) attitudes are formed early in
life and are fully developed in adolescence, after which they never change or change with
great difficulty. The significance of attitudes is that once adopted, they represent guide-
lines for the behavior of an individual in different social situations. They are, therefore,
behavioral guides as they continually assign daily behavioral patterns. Today, attitudes are
most often investigated using the so-called “Likert scale”. In the research (questionnaire)
respondents express different attitudes by various degrees of agreement/disagreement,
and the assessment is accordingly assigned a place on the scale (numerical). The numbers
on the scale indicate gradation ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. An
example of scaling attitudes towards national minorities is given in Table 3.
Table 3. How much do you agree with each of the following statements
Neither
Strongly Strongly
Agree agree nor Disagree
agree disagree
disagree
Minority groups should adapt to the customs and
1 2 3 4 5
traditions in Serbia
Majority will should always prevail, even over rights of
1 2 3 4 5
minority groups
The majority people in Serbia do not recognize
1 2 3 4 5
adequately the interests of national minorities
National minorities in Serbia abuse the rights they have 1 2 3 4 5
We will start with a few methodological remarks regarding attitude research. First,
initially (XX century) the five-level scale was dominant, and in the last ten years the
four-level scale is increasingly used. This is because the practice of research has shown
that the value of “neither agree nor disagree” has the characteristic of attracting a large
number of responses (because it is in the middle), and such responses usually have very
low information value. Second, we always use the matrix for our research (as shown in
the table), to enable a uniform manner for respondents to provide their (dis)agreement
with different opinions. Third, attitude research rarely takes a single isolated attitude as
reference, but rather several individual attitudes (items) in order to examine a general
attitude toward a certain phenomenon based on all these individual attitudes (items).
Four, measuring attitudes in a battery of items commonly involves the use of positive
and negative attitudes, which assures the validity of the measurement. Five, the practice
of social research has formulated standardized scales for the typical phenomena (such as
nationalism, for example) that have been repeatedly evaluated in research and for which
statistical procedures have established a high degree of validity and reliability. Therefore,
if there are such questions and items in a standardized survey it is to use them, and for-
mulate our own items and attitudes whose reliability is questionable. Finally, despite the
fact that four- and five-level scales are most commonly used, this is not necessary. Often
if an attitude requires a higher level of differentiation and sensitivity, it is possible to add
additional grading in the questionnaire and use seven- or ten-level scales.
The key to researching attitudes is the fact that attitudes are not isolated and repre-
sent certain complex and structured indicators of higher-level attitudes. This is one of the
reasons why matrix questions are used as an instrument to survey attitudes. In research
practice, most often a great number of items (individual attitudes) are used to measure
the overall general attitude and / or opinion on certain issues. In other words, individual
attitudes (items in the instrument) represent indicators of the concept that is the subject
of our measuring. This is evident from the example given in Table 3. These four items are
used to measure the attitudes toward national minorities. For the purpose of accuracy
works, we use these four items to form a cumulative score (reliability of which is verified
by relevant statistical tests) to measure a unique generalized attitude towards minorities.
The table clearly shows that one of the attitudes (third in the table) is defined negatively,
therefore, the higher measurement values for this item, should theoretically correlate with
low values on the other items and vice versa. The cumulative score can be formed using
different statistical procedures, but most commonly the so-called factor (regression) score
(which is standardized so it has arithmetic mean 0 and standard deviation 1. (Table 4)
Table 4. Attitudes toward minorities (distribution)–Standardized (regression)score

Arithmetic mean .0000
Median .0926
Modus -.31
Standard deviation 1.0
Skewness -.287
Kurtosis -.462
Minimum -2.48
Maximum 1.86
This score can be used for various analytical purposes, and a typical way would be
to compare score values with respect to different socio-demographic or other features
of respondents. But there are two crucial aspects of this type of analysis. First, when the
opinion values are compared between certain categories (bivariant), we use different
statistical significance tests (t-test, F-test) to find out whether these differences are sig-
nificant or are the result of standard measurement error. Second, if we want to test the
hypothesis, we need to keep in mind that the differences between subunits can be the
result of collinearity, and therefore, we use specific multivariant statistical procedures
(most commonly different types of regression analysis).
2.4. Instead of conclusion
The basic idea in quantitative research is that social phenomena are measureable.
This idea has a 100-year old history, since the time of introduction of a variable. It is not
easy to measure social phenomena. The process of translating specific attitudes, opin-
ions, assessments etc., into a numeric form requires a number of methodological proce-
dures in order to ensure measuring reliability and validity. However, the practice of so-
cial research has shown that data obtained through quantitative research carries a great
heuristic value. The main advantage of the quantitative approach is precision, which is
one of the key epistemological criteria. So, it is one thing when we claim that there is a
‘high level’ of discrimination present in a society based on general assessment or qual-
itative research, but when we say that 45% of the respondents feel that they are victims
of discrimination, that is much more precise. As pointed out above, there are several
aspects of the special value provided by the quantitative approach. First, quantification
measures the degree of a certain social phenomenon and provides a description of the
phenomenon / problem that is the subject of research. Second, the approach is flexible
because we can identify differences using the same numerical indicators in relation to
different social characteristics and / or other criteria. Third, multivariate statistics can
be used to determine whether the differences between certain categories are significant.
Fourth, multivariate statistics can identify factors or predictors of certain phenomena.
Fifth, using the same procedures we can monitor trends of indicators and come to rel-
evant data and information about the phenomenon that is the subject of our interest.
We must bear in mind that quantitative approaches also have certain weak spots. First,
there are phenomena that we cannot quantify; to put it simply, a phenomena that cannot be
translated into numbers and language of variables. Second, there are phenomena that are
too sensitive, and therefore impossible to qualify using a standardized Questionnaire (vio-
lence is a typical example). Third, quantification assures measurability, but it is difficult to
determine the internal motives of individuals. For example, we can determine that certain
individuals or groups have negative attitudes, but it is not simple to determine why, using
quantitative research. Different individuals may have different reasons (personal, profes-
sional, results of socialization, individual experiences, etc.). Four, quantitative research is not
cost-effective if we collect data ourselves, so relatively large financial resources are required.
Fifth, quantitative research requires a large number of researchers and significant human
and institutional capacities. Six, quantitative research requires special knowledge in the field
of statistics so that no trivial and / or serious errors can be made when generating, analyz-
ing, and / or interpreting data. Therefore, when doing quantitative research, we must be
aware of these limitations related issues. Also, it is crucial to remain focused on the guiding
questionnaire question in our research. Certain research questions require immanent quan-
tification, while other point to the use of other qualitative methods. For example, if we want
to find out a measure of ethnic distance existing in society, this question naturally requires
quantification. But if we want to find out about the motives of individuals to distance them-
selves along ethnic lines, we would have to use interview or some other qualitative method.
Questions may be specific, and therefore the methods may be specific. E.g. we can ask: what
are the discursive practices of politicians that influence public opinion? In this situation we
will probably work some kind of discourse analysis. If, on the other hand, we ask: how do
media shape public opinion, we would probably analyze media content. So, quantification is
not one thing, and often it is not the best solution either. Simply, given the objectives of the
research, we may opt for this approach, as long as it is justified by these objectives goals. To
that end, design and choice of the type of research and method is always guided by research
objectives. Lastly, it is worth noting that modern methodology uses two methodological
designs suitable for the research of a complete phenomenon. First, there is triangulation,
which implies the use of different methods to prove the same thesis. In this way epistemo-
logical pluralism increases the heuristic fertility and validity of research findings. Second,
it is a mixed method approach, which means that we combine qualitative and quantitative
methods with the aim of exploiting the merits of both approaches in order to obtain more
meaningful results that examine the whole phenomenon / problem. A typical example is the
use of questionnaire methods and group interviews that are guided by the same objectives.
2.5. Bibliography
1. Bobo, L. (2001). Racial attitudes and relations at the close of the twentieth centu-
ry. America becoming: Racial trends and their consequences, 1, 264-301.
2. Bogardus, E. S. (1925). Measuring Social Distances. Journal of Applied Sociology,
9, 299-308.
3. Clark, R. D., & Word, L. E. (1974). Where is the apathetic bystander? Situational cha-
racteristics of the emergency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29(3), 279.
4. Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudi-
ce. In Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 41-113). Academic Press.
5. Inglehart, R. (1981). Post-materialism in an environment of insecurity. American
Political Science Review, 75(4), 880-900.
6. Katz, I., & Hass, R. G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict:
Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive structures. Journal of perso-
nality and social psychology, 55(6), 893.
7. Kuzmanović, B. (2001): Etnička distanca u Crnoj Gori. U Djukanović, B., Kuz-
manović, B., Lazić. M., Bešić, M., Nacija i Država, CID, Podgorica.
8. Mannheim, K. (1952). The problem of generation. In: Kecskemeti, P. (ed.). Essays
on the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. Ingle-
hart, R. 1981. Post-materialism in an environment of insecurity. American Poli-
tical Science Review, 75, 880–900.
Jasmina Trajkoska
3. INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
EUROPEAN IDENTITY
Abstract
There are 10 ongoing ethnic conflicts of varying intensity in the European Union
today. These conflicts point to “weaknesses” of the European Union’s policies on the
building of European civil society with ultimate goal to create a European identity.
Using a research conducted with 50 European experts in the field of multicultur-
alism, interethnic coexistence and interethnic conflicts, this paper aims to find an an-
swer to a question concerning European Union’s contribution to the improvement of
inter-ethnic cohabitation in Catalonia and Basque, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia,
North Cyprus and Belgium. Is there a real will to create a European identity? Will the
political, social, economic or cultural elements be the foundation on which to build a
European identity? Which identity has a brighter future, national or European?
Key words: civil society, interethnic conflict, unification, European identity.
3.1. Europe – the birthplace of the nation state
Europe is the birthplace of the nation state and multinational empires. It is unique by
its multitude of peoples that self-consciously identify with different nations. From recogni-
tion of religious minorities within the Ottoman Empire and protection of certain groups,
the Treaty of Westphalia, to modern interventions of the European Union and NATO in
the post-Cold War ethnic conflicts in Europe, European governments have a long history
of attempts to resolve tensions between state sovereignty and national self-determination
by means of different combinations of divisions, military interventions, ethnic divisions
of power and constitutional rights, all with varying degrees of success.
29
The modern European political geography is based on three basic elements: territori-
ality, borders and integration. These are the results of convergence and divergence social
and spatial processes11. The space-time matrices in the pre-capitalist period of were only
single known spaces, based on a common religion and a common civilization. Every-
thing else was perceived as barbarian-inhabited no-land. By contrast, capitalism differs
by the appearance of borders, and territorialisation of space territories is a precondition
for modernity. The former open space has now been reformed as a series of territories.
There are over 5000 nations in the world, organized in approx. 200 states.12 In es-
sence, the recognition of a new nation is not the biggest issue. The question is which
territory will the “new” nation proclaim in its declaration of independence? Whenever
the issue of territory arises between two nations, conflicts are imminent.
Over the past decades, ethnic clashes have become a dominant form of mass political
violence. After 1950, the number of ethnic conflicts is steadily increasing, and even the
EU with its mechanisms was unable to stay immune to such forms of conflict.
Today, the biggest challenges of the European Union are, on the one hand, overcom-
ing the “narcissism of small differences”, related to ethnic tensions within its borders,
and on the other hand, strengthening Europe on the global level and its unity, and over-
coming the dangers related to the aging population migration flows that disturbing the
demographic map within its boundaries.
3.2. “European Identity” in the eyes of the European Union
The European Union is making attempts to grow from the original economic union
to a political union. This creation aims to avoid repeating the negative events that have
marked the twentieth century, which is why the Union strives to achieve a common
“European” sense of belonging in the different nations and ethnicities living in it. The
concept of the European Union as a political community also entails “European iden-
tity” and public policies implemented by the European Commission for building and
strengthening this identity. The validity of this concept is questionable.13This is a con-
sequence of the Europe’s historical baggage - the creation of a nation states on its own
soil, clashes and conflicts between empires and later the states, as well as the complexity
of the concept of identity and the change of the matrix that has ruled over the European
soil for centuries.
U Academia holds that there are two schools of thought that look at identity as a
goal and as a means to understand more clearly inter-ethnic conflicts. The first implies
11 Milan Bufon , 8 November 2006 ,“Between social and spatial convergence and divergence: an explora-
tion into the political geography of European contact areas”, Springer Science + Business Media B.V
12 George W. White, 2000, “Nationalism and territory”, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc. стр.2
13 R. Brubaker and F. Cooper (2000). ‘Beyond “Identity”.’ Theory and Society стр.1-47
identity as a goal in the sense of simulated racial and genetic traits or separate cultural
and basic traits.14The second sees identity as a means to achieving a particular goal. This
concerns grouping in a common identity as an instrument of legalization of institu-
tions, the state or prevailing conditions in the state. According to this school, a common
identity meets specific needs in the context of modernization.15U In creating a com-
mon identity, the role of the individual is almost insignificant - the common identity is
aimed at groups through constructed reality (such as economic or political), outside the
domain of the individual. Institutes that manage the education and its content, man-
age the shared identity.16 A conclusion can be drawn that we are talking about socially
created identity instead of naturally created identity. Identity is significant because it is
beneficial to the person owning it, and different nation states provide different levels of
political, social, and economic benefits to its citizens. It is then evident that identity is
what brings us recognition and acceptance by others. Therefore, identity is not a tradi-
tion or mentality, but a purely political strategy created in not-very-distant history and
utilized very skillfully by political actors.17 Every culture, identity or tradition inevi-
tably possesses elements of different cultures. In interaction between members of the
same society the variability category is more prominent compared to the consistency
category.18 In the field of cultural identity, focus is placed on differences, and from that
we make a link between identity and ethnicity as both a conscious and imaginary con-
struct of differences that are essential for identity policies mobilized in a nation state.19
We further draw that the basic elements of ethnic nationalism are territory, language,
religion, history, and tradition. These same elements, when in service of national poli-
cies, show differences from which the nation state emerges as a modern political form.
For political nationalism, “objective” elements such as territory, language, religion, and
culture are no less important than “subjective” elements that include will, loyalty, patri-
otic connection, and for this reason nationalism is not only a political form, but it shows
people who they are, it provides them with history, social relationships, collective spirit
and creates a sense of destiny that is “more important” than personal existence.20
Geographically observed, identity exists at the local, regional, national, Europe-
an and global level. In addition to political, administrative, and economic elites, very
few people use “Europe/European” as their primary identification.21The most import-
ant collectives for personal identification are entirely geographical, but they are re-
lated to different types of identification, gender, race, ethnic or linguistic groups, so-
cial class, affiliation to a particular organization or political party, etc. The process of
14 Годфрид фон Хердер, “Outlines of a Philosophy of the history of Man”, Лондон, 1800
15 David Sils, “International Encyclopedia of a social Sciences”, XVII тома, Њујорк 1968
16 http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~plam/irnotes07/Gellner1983.pdf
17 Jean – Claude Ruano – Borbalana, “Identitet(i), Pojedinac, grupa, društvo”, Beograd 2009, pp. 5-16
18 Е.Carpintero, “Bolest našeg vremena: fragmentacija kolektivnih identiteta”, Tvrdza br. 1-2/2006, pp. 65-71
19 Златко Крамариќ, Ангелина Бановиќ-Марковска, “Политика, култура, идентиет”, Магор, Скопје 2012
20 Endru Hejvud, “Politichke ideologije”, Zavod za udzbenike I nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 2005
21 https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/development-of-european-identi-
ty-identities_en.pdf , 22.09.2015
“Europeanisation” in the direction of creating a type of identity is conceived through

the realization of a common “European matrices” that deals with the values, rights,
responsibilities, and social-economic benefits enjoyed by citizens of the EU.
The concept of European identity is realized through22:
• Europeanisation refers to national institutions and activities carried out on the
national level within the EU.
• Transnationalism refers to ‘cross-border’ living, which is becoming more
common thanks to modern technology and communications, availability of cheap
air fares to different European destinations, loose border control, Schengen area,
and expansion of the EU toward Central and Eastern Europe.
• Cosmopolitanism, which is based on the concept of respect of other cultures,
and cosmopolitan Europe is based on traditional European values, equality and
tolerance, which is supported by all European institutions, meeting different
national and ethnic structures existing in the EU and their relations. European
continent today encompasses large number of individual characteristics from all
over the world.
Conceptually-distinct dimensions for the expression of European identity23, stem-

ming from the “Framework Program” by the European Commission are as follows:
• Multiple social identities and biographical identity;
• Transnational intimate relationships;
• Collective action;
• Standardization and regulation;
• Intercultural translation;
• Inclusion/Exclusion;
• Structural conditions and opportunity structures;
• The public sphere and state-regulated institutions.
This concept is still at an early stage of development, and ethnic conflicts and nega-
tive nationalism that is spreading among EU member states are great challenges.
22 https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/development-of-european-identi-
ty-identities_en.pdf, 22. 09.2015
23 Ibid.
3.3. Preventive Diplomacy in Inter-Ethnic

Conflicts in the European Union
U In the early 1990s of the 20th century, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the trans-
formation of the federation into independent states, and the change of the international
political system, conflict prevention or “preventive diplomacy” emerged in internation-
al politics”24. Preventive diplomacy is a permanent idea of the United Nations that has
been in constant development since the very beginning over fifty years ago. Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OEBS), and G-8 have published a large body of work in the
field of conflict prevention.
The European Union is a new actor in this area, which in the mid-1990s began fol-
lowing the global trend of international organizations by reforming own structure and
capabilities in the field of conflict prevention and management.
Respecting the right to belonging to a particular “minority” is one of the funda-
mental values of the European Union. This right is explicitly contained in Article 2 of
the Treaty on European Union25, stating that “The Union is founded on the values of
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are
common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tol-
erance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. In addition,
European legislation and programs contribute to combating discrimination, including
the right to belong to a minority community. Article 2126of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union prohibits discrimination on grounds of ethnicity.
The European Commission has no direct powers in relation to the treatment of mi-
norities in the Member States, and it particularly does not interfere in issues related to
the recognition status of minorities, self-determination and autonomy, the use of re-
gional and minority languages. All Member States have individual powers and policies
that regulate their frameworks of minority rights. Member States are obliged to respect
fundamental rights by means of constitutional and institutional guarantees. This is di-
rectly linked to “minority rights” as fundamental human right is the right to self-deter-
mination and the right to religion.
The European Union is naturally and inevitably composed of different peoples and
ethnic groups. Each member has its individual relationship with minorities. Some
24 Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering results, http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/

pdf/SG%20Report%20on%20Preventive%20Diplomacy.pdf 18.08.2015.
25 Treaty on European Union/Article 2, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:-
C:2008:115:0013:0045:en:PDF, 01.09.2015.
26 Повелба за основните права на Европската Унија, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_
en.pdf, 02.09.2015 година.
Member States, such as Greece and France, do not recognize minorities within their
borders. In the last decade, a clear distinction between “two” Europes appeared in
the European Union: the “Western”, with more pronounced individualism and stron-
ger consciousness of Europe, and the “East”, which lags behind in terms of nation
building and developed democratic system , still in the premodern stage.27Some the-
oreticians believe that after the emergence of the European Union, the transferring
of certain rights to supranational organizations of the European state moved the Eu-
ropean states into the era of postnationalism, however rendering them politically,
economically, and socially interdependent, making nationalism much less significant
political value.28
However, nationalism still prevails as the basis for political legitimacy, an axiom that
implies that only national self-government is a legitimate form of government.29
There are ten ongoing disputes of ethnic character within the European Union today.
Nature of nationalistic movements varies: linguistic and cultural nationalism with
the aim of limiting the expansion of autonomous rights such as Welsh, Breton, Galician
and Catalan; a clearly formulated nationalism that proclaims complete independence
such as Flemish, Walloon and Scottish; as well as nationalism involving violence such as
the Basque and Corsican. Whatever the nature of nationalism, there is a clear fact that
there are collectivities in the European Union that are not satisfied with the solution of
their national identity and are fighting for greater independence in public policy forma-
tion in their territories.
Conflicts involving autonomy are low intensity; there are six violent conflicts involv-
ing secession, three of which take place in the European Union - in France (National
Liberation Front on Corsica), and the largest demonstrations in Europe for the Cata-
lan secession with 1.5 million demonstrators in the capital of Catalonia – Barcelona in
2012.30 In 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: “If every ethnic, religious or linguistic
group aims at statehood, there will be no prospect for peace, security, and economic
development.”31 Some authors argue that the political activity of ethnic and minority
languages has a “minor influence”32, and in the Western European countries certain
minorities were not assimilated in social and cultural processes. This is seen as a result
of technological development and the creation of supranational integration structures.
In political theories there is a significant debate on the legitimacy of the level of recog-
nition, affirmation and institutionalization of ethnic, cultural and linguistic rights in
democratic multinational states. Some theorists believe that recognizing these identities
27 Mattei Dogan, “The Decline of Nationalisms within Western Europe”, ComparativePolitics, Vol. 26, No.
3, April 1994, pp. 285, 294.
28 ibid., pp. 281–305
29 Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19, 1993, p. 212.
30 “Conflict Barometer 2012”, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, No. 21
31 “The Self-determination of peoples- community, nation and state in an independent world”, edited by
Wolfgang Danspecgruber, Lynne Kienner Publishers, 2002
32 “Nation Building”, K. Deutsch and W. Foltz (ed), New York, 1996
is a question of democratic justice,33 and others that European integration is the best
way for ethnic groups to achieve their national ambitions34.
The following is an overview of the inter-ethnic conflicts in the European Union
today, which are essential for observing the essence of nationalism in the Union as a
counterbalance to the development of “European identity”.
According to the Conflict Barometer35, where conflicts are defined as “conflicts of
interest pertaining to national values between two sides (organized groups, groups of
states, organizations, states) which are directed towards the realization of their interests
and victory over the other side”.
Conflict in France with Corsicans started in 1975, and involves a demand for se-
cession. Conflict in Latvia, related to the autonomy of the Russian minority, started in
1991. Also in 1991 the conflict in Estonia began, concerning autonomy of the Russian
minority. The conflict concerning the secession of the Basque province in Spain start-
ed in 1959. The conflict concerning secession of Catalonia from Spain started in 1979.
The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and Northern Cyprus involving secession
started in 1963. The conflict in the Republic of Croatia, eastern Slavonia, with Croatian
Serbs began in 1992 and involved the issue of autonomy. The conflict between Flemish
and Walloon in Belgium involves a demand for autonomy by the Flemish. The conflict
in Romania, in the Transylvania region with a Hungarian minority, started in 1989. The
conflict in Slovakia with the Hungarian minority started in 1998.
All of these ongoing conflicts result from extensive and difficult history on the Eu-
ropean continent, intertwined histories, a great loyalty to the concept of nation state
and nationalism in a negative connotation. The term “ethnic minority” is still one of the
fundamental issues in the international context, including its definition. The objectives
aimed by the European Union through the Europeanization and a common European
identity should be based on the preservation of national identity and its upgrading with
the “European identity” in order to be consolidated as a global subject on the interna-
tional scene. All these conflicts with varying intensity are affecting the deep tissue of
the European Union, which is facing even greater, worldwide problems, such as migrant
movements. One of the solutions is to build a common identity and to strengthen a
common foreign and security policy.
33 Amy Gutmann, “Identity in Democracy”, 2003, Prinston

34 Z. Csergo & J. M. Goldgeier, Virtual Nationalism: Foreign Policy 125, 2001
35 http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2003.pdf
3.4. Concluding remarks
The survey was conducted with 50 respondents, 5 from each of the above men-
tioned countries with conflicts of varying degrees, all of them involved in doctoral or
postdoctoral research in this field. The survey aims to reveal the opinions of experts
who are building a picture of a European society in line with key issues on the Euro-
pean civic community.
Expert opinion is essential for the development and future of scientific works,
which will provide grounds for future scientific debates on the subject, and steer the
public opinion toward nationalism or multiculturalism. Expert consultants from the
European Union believe that there is a real possibility for creating a European iden-
tity that is primarily based on culture, which implies building common European
cultural frameworks, where socio-economic conditions are a lesser priority to a Eu-
ropean citizen, followed by politics, and economy as the last pillar of the European
identity. This reveals a direct criticism of the European Union for the strengthening
and establishment of a common political union, which is precisely the biggest chal-
lenge for EU member states today.
With regard to the European Union’s role in improving inter-ethnic coexistence in
countries with interethnic disputes, expert opinions point to a weak positive influence
of the Union. The European Union must build a stronger institutional structure that
will allow Union’s stronger influence in building a multicultural concept. Today, the
European Union faces migration trends that are completely changing the demographic
map, so one of the most important policies should be to unite the political foundations
that will contribute to the overcoming of inter-ethnic conflicts and the creation of a
European identity.
The European experts see themselves as European citizens but national citizenship
is still considered primary.
The overall research suggests the need for building stronger political union between
the member states. It also points out that the use of terms “majority” and “minority” in
the media and scientific fields in our country contributes to one group feeling socially
privileged and entitled, and another socially discriminated. The fact that there are no
mono-ethnic states today leads us to a new matrix of thinking and ultimately to chang-
ing the definitions that encourage conflict. When the ethnic majority feels as being “na-
tion-building”, and other communities who have always lived in the same country as
“others”, damage is done to the core structure of the concept of civic multiculturalism.
New ideas should already be aimed at overcoming the nation-state as the most stable
form for uniting peoples.
Building the European Union on a multicultural concept is necessary for stronger
political and supranational union. The multiculturalism here means mutual inclusion
of citizens of different cultural backgrounds into the core of one society or state. It
also implies elimination of power and dominance of one group over another. This
form of multiculturalism is concerned with the elimination or at least the weaken-
ing of exclusion mechanisms, or the increase of the possibilities for inclusion. Here,
political elites believe in the concept of multiculturalism, unlike some unfortunate
negative examples such as British Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy who stated that
multiculturalism is dead.
A greater political unification of states on the European soil is important for
building a prospective European Union and for overcoming the issues faced by the
Union globally.
3.5. Bibliography
1. Alonso, S., Ruiz-Rufino, R. (2007) Political Representation and Ethnic Conflict in

New Democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 46 (2), pp. 237-267.
2. Bochsler, Daniel. 2010. “The Nationalization of Post-Communist Party Systems.”
Europe-Asia Studies 62 (5):807-27.
3. Brubaker, R. (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Que-
stion in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Brubaker, R., (2006). Ethnicity without Groups. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, and London, England
5. Conflict Barometer Data. (1992-2013) Heidelberg Institute for International
Conflict Research e. V. at the Department of Political Science, University of Hei-
delberg Campus Bergheim. At: www.hiik.de
6. K. Deutsch and W. Foltz , (1996), “Nation Building”, New York
7. Amy Gutmann, (2003),“Identity in Democracy”, Princeton
8. Z. Csergo & J. M. Goldgeier, (2001), Virtual Nationalism: Foreign Policy 125
9. Caramani, Daniele. 2004. The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of Na-
tional Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
10. Chandra, K. (2012)(Ed.) Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics. Oxford Uni-
versity Press. Ohford and New York.
11. Gadjanova, E. (2012) What is an Ethnic Appeal? Policies as Metonymies for Eth-
nicity in the Political Rhetoric of Group Identity Ethnopolitics, 12:3, pp. 307-330.
12. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and
New York.
13. Horowitz D.L. (2000) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 2nd ed. University of California,
Berkeley and Los Angeles.
14. Lijphart, A. 1995. Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic mino-

rities in power-sharing systems. Will Kymlicka the rights of minority cultures
Oxford university press
15. Milan Bufon , 8 November 2006 ,“Between social and spatial convergence and di-
vergence: an exploration into the political geography of European contact areas”,
Springer Science + Business Media B.V
Miroslav Keveždi
4. MAPPING INTERCULTURALISM
IN SERBIA
Abstract
This paper aims to set the ground for mapping interculturalism in Serbia. The au-
thor is focused on definitions and controversies of the concepts of mapping, culture,
multiculturalism and interculturalism. The starting point is the basic understanding
of the philosophy of discourse by Michel Foucault, and the standpoint of Swiss anthro-
pologist Christian Giordano that contact situations and intercultural communication
processes, practically without exception, lead to socially constructed disparities, which
are expressed on the social structure level.
Key words: Interculturalism, communication, mapping, multiculturalism, Serbia
4.1. Introduction
This paper aims to set the ground for mapping interculturalism in Serbia. The work
is focused on definitions and controversies of the concepts of mapping, culture, multi-
culturalism and interculturalism.
To put it simply mapping means creating maps. A map is: “1. a geographic map,
a plan, a drawing showing a geographic area, expressed according to the rules of
cartography. 2. a painting collection of art paintings that make a whole according to
subject, format, genre, and the like. 3. a special cover, wrapping or bag for document,
paper or drawing collection” (Klajn & Šipka, 2008, page 744). Mathematically speak-
ing, mapping is an operation that associates each element of a given set (domain) with
one or more elements of the second set (scope) (Clapham & Nicholson, 2009, p. 500).
In our case, one set is “Serbia” and the other “Interculturalism”. In order to perform
mapping, we need to incorporate the elements of these sets according to a principle,
39
and for this purpose we propose the principle of intercultural communication, i.e.
intercultural misunderstanding.
If we want to define the set “Interculturalism” more closely then we first have to
refer to the term “multiculturalism”36. Branimir Stojković defines multiculturalism in
the following way: “Multiculturalism implies, or ideal, of the harmonious coexistence
among different ethnic and cultural groups within a pluralist society. The main uses of
the term – multiculturalism - refer to an ideology, a discourse, and as a cluster of pol-
icies and practices“ (Ibid.). Milan Mesić takes the opinion that some, especially Euro-
pean researchers and cultural practitioners, who deal with issues of affirmation of cul-
tural diversity, understand multiculturalism simply as recognizing the factual cultural
(ethnic) pluralism and the rights of different social groups (primarily new immigrants)
to retain their cultural specificity: “From that perspective, multiculturalism can only
be positive if, against exclusivity and (forcible) assimilation, advocates coexistence of
minorities and underprivileged groups with dominant societies. On the other hand, the
notion of multiculturalism can be easily be accused of a backward, essentialist support
to closed off cultures and even isolation and segregation of these same groups, as well
as for preserving their inner, often non-liberal relationships that are primarily based on
the oppression of women. Against (such) multiculturalism, the concept and policy of
interculturalism was set up, which leads to open models of culture, encouraging con-
tacts and permeation, and in radical versions, even transculturalism” (Mesić, 2006, 67).
Mesić argues that the concept of interculturalism is not as conceptually and theoretical-
ly developed as the term multiculturalism. In addition, he notes that the notion of inter-
culturalism is most often associated with the areas of education and art, but the scope
is much wider. We find useful him noticing the existence of demographic-descriptive,
ideological-normative and program-political meaning of the two mentioned notions.
Each of these aspects is useful for our second set - Serbia.
In demographic-descriptive terms, Serbia’s population is 7,186,862 (the 2011 cen-
sus). According to nationality, there are 5,988,150 Serbs (83.32%), followed by 253,899
(3,53%) of Hungarians, Roma 147,604 (2.05%), and Bosniaks 145,278 (2.02 %). A possible
question is whether these percentages are sufficient to describe Serbia as a pluralistic,
i.e. multicultural state? How palpable is the harmonious life between different groups?
Do census results really show that cultural pluralism actually exists? With regard to
this last question, there are authors (of liberal provenance) who bring collectivism and
its rights into question (Kukathas, 1992, pp. 124; Keveždi, 2017). They also question
the very existence of cultures as precisely defined, essentialized and time-unlimited
(Winthrop, 2002; Keveždi, 2017). We find this to be important because even in nomi-
nally different groups there is certain practical overlapping (e.g. linguistic or religious)
that sometimes may prompt outsiders to wonder whether these are two or actually one
36 Historicaly observed, definition of the field of multiculturalism first emerged in 1971, in the speech by
Pierre Trudo, the then Premier of Canada, who said:“The term biculturalism is insufficient to describe
our society. The term „multiculturalism“ is therefore much more precise“. (Stojković, 2004, str. 147).
cultural / ethnic group(s) (taking as an example certain Croats in relation to Bunjevci,

Vlachs in relation to Romanians, Bosniaks to in relation to Muslims etc.).37
In the ideological-normative and program-political sense it is necessary to ask
about the character of authority in Serbia. In addition to the territory and population,
authority is one of the main attributes of the state, 38 as the state through its authorities
allows or bans acts and exemptions from acts of certain parts of the population in
its territory (Winthrop, 2002, Keveždi, 2017). Definition of the nation-state requires
mentioning the following important division: “Based on the type of communities
from which nations are born, the characteristics of the state (civil state or nation
state), the ideology, and prevailing rhetoric, nations can be divided into two basic
types. The first is ethnic or the so-called primordial (primoridialism) (in literature
also referred to as Eastern, cultural, romantic, multicultural or historical), which is
basically characterized by the deepest attachment of an individual to his/her ethnic-
ity (race, tribe, heritage), which means that one does not choose his/her affiliation to
it, but is born into it. Here, the nation determines the individual, not the other way
around. The logic behind these concepts implies the state is viewed as an institution
that will formally and legally protect a particular, ancient tradition and culture that
is the foundation of the nation. The nation enwraps ethnic core, customs, languages,
own myths, and defends itself using ethnic rhetoric. In short, state and nation are not
synonymous, and modern states constituted on this principle also include national
minorities as collectives. Belonging to the nation is perceived as destiny, and from
that standpoint comes the central term - the national community. One field of this
approach is the “subjective self-identification”, which is predominantly applied in our
legislation regulating the rights of national minorities. “(Dr Đurić, Prof. dr Tanaskov-
ić, Dragan, & Lađević, 2014, pp. 8-9). The second type of nation is liberal or civil (also
known as the political or Western model). In this approach to the concept of nation,
the key term is a sovereign citizen, and the nation is perceived as a community of
equal citizens united by patriotic attachment to a common set of political practic-
es and values. Nation defined as a political community implies only neutral cultur-
al-ethic notion of the nation, i.e. purely national-territorial concept of the nation.
Therefore, the liberal notion of a nation is determined by citizenship, belonging to a
particular state, made up of citizens equal before the law and equal in the enjoyment
of civil rights. According to the liberal principle, “the concept of national minorities
means communities that are a minority in a given society, but have their own coun-
try (homeland), where their nation is a majority, and under ethnic principle national
minorities are all communities that show distinctive cultural traits. From these two
basic approaches to the interpretation of the concept of a nation emerged liberalism
37 See publication Vlachs or Romanians from Eastern Serbia and the „The issue of Vlachs“ (Dragić, 2002).
38 In general, legally the state is a sovereign and independent entity capable of entering into relations with
other states and enjoying international legal personality. In order to qualify as a state, such an entity
must have: 1. a permanent population (population), 2. a defined territory where it exercises its author-
ity, 3. effective authority (state administration) (Martin, 2003, p. 475).
- as a doctrine of a nation of citizens, and multiculturalism - as a doctrine of the eth-

nic perception of the nation. The policy of state neutrality in ethic-cultural differences
is characteristic for civic nations, and ethnic nations follow the policy of recognizing
ethnic-cultural differences. In civic nations, majority nation domination is invisible,
and in ethnic nations different regimes for the protection of minority rights (col-
lective and group) are established“(Ibid.).39 In the Republic of Serbia, the mixing of
different normative principles is most pronounced in Article 1 of the Constitution:
“Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it, based on
the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human and minority
rights and freedoms, and commitment to European principles and values”.40 On the
one hand, Serbia is defined by the ethnic approach (a state of Serbian people, minority
rights), but also by the other approach (the state of all citizens who live in it, human
rights) (Ibid. 9). The same source cites that “We can argue that the multicultural con-
cept of a nation is dominant in Serbia, regardless of the fact that it derogates the clas-
sical principles of the civic nation. With great respect for this concept, it is important
to observe its shortcomings, which are primarily manifested in the homogenization
of minority ethnic communities and radicalization of political demands for the estab-
lishment of ethnic territorial-political autonomies, which would provide protection of
their cultural or religious affiliation, especially when a minority is present as compact
population in a part of the territory, which implies confrontation with the majority
nation. In such confrontations, pressure can also come from the majority nation as
ethnic nationalism and the opinion that the legal system should be based only on the
Serbian cultural-cultural tradition. Such pressure aims both national minorities and
the civic state, resulting in rigid majority nationalism, which is politically equally as
dangerous as secessionism or ethnic nationalism of national minorities “(Ibid. 9-10).
Given these findings, it seems that Serbia is in need of Interculturalism.
According to Mesić’s assertion that the notion of interculturalism is most commonly
associated with areas of education and art, we see that interculturalism is indeed per-
ceived as a “specific educational approach within multicultural public policies” (Piršl,
Benjak, Diković, Jelača, & Matošević, 2016, pp. 18).41 Education should enable good
quality relationships among people, but “the level of quality of relationship between
people depends on the manner of perceiving and understanding the feelings, thoughts
and attitudes of people who are not part of our culture, who think, shape and organize
concepts and thoughts in a way that is specific to their way of life, i.e. their culture”(Ibid,
39 However, we must note that the civil model cannot be completely ethnically neutral in such a way that
“majority nation domination is invisible”. This is evident in the fact that if when official language is esta-
blished in a civil state, that language is, however, the language of the dominant group (Keveždi, 2018).
40 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia („Official Gazette of RS“ no. 98/2006).
41 Elvi Piršl argues that interculturalism appears as a term in 1975 when “the working group of the Cul-
ture Council of Council of Europe proposed it as an approach to education of migrants that enables
the solution of the problem faced by most immigration countries” (Piršl, Benjak, Diković, Jelača, &
Matošević, 2016, p. 19).
16). In this regard, great attention is paid to the development of the so called intercul-
tural competences, i.e. intercultural sensitivity. Accordingly, more than a dozen works
dedicated to the educational aspect of interculturalism have been published in Croatia
in the early 1990s (Čačić-Kumpes, 1993; Sekulić-Majurec, 1996; Klinar, 1991), while
in Serbia this issue is still emerging (Petrović, 2014)42. The Serbian Quotation Index
(SCIndeks) recognizes only nine scientific papers which include the term ‘intercultur-
alism’, as a part of their title, summary, or keyword (Kristović, 2012, Maksimović &
Petrović, 2012, Đolić, 2012, Jelačić, 2011, Đorđević, 2009, Đorđević, 2008; Đorđević
& Mašović, 1999). The same number of units is also found in the Catalog of Matica
Srpska.43 Most texts dealing with interculturalism come from the civil sector (Jočić,
Milosavljević, Joksimović, Kovačević, & Škorc, 2012, Macura-Milovanović, Gera, &
Kovačević, 2009, Petrović & Jokić, 2016, Aksentijević, 2009). Very few publications
came out of scientific gatherings in the region, as if to prove Mesic’s claim that apart
from education, interculturalism mainly concerns art (Roksandić, 2017).
In order to better present the situation concerning multiculturalism and intercul-
turalism, it is necessary to observe the notion of culture found within the concepts
of interculturalism and multiculturalism. Even half a century ago there were several
hundred definitions in existence, and the process of defining culture is not complete.
(Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, Kloskovska, 2001, pp. 8-23). We will focus on a new one,
and point out the problems that arise from the definition of culture. Jang Jun Kim
(Young Yun Kim) sees culture as “a symbol of collective life experiences of commonly
recognizable large groups, such as national and ethnic / racial groups. It also applies
to other smaller, subcultural social groups with distinct traits (for example, groups
based on gender, sexual orientation, geographical area, or physical disability / ability
“(Kim, 2001, p. 140). What we consider important is the fact that if the concept of
culture is too broad, then it is the basis for treating almost every cultural encounter
as “intercultural” with different degrees of “interculturality” or heterogeneity, against
the experiential background of those involved in interaction (Ibid.) A second aspect
which we consider important is the emphasis Kim and some other authors place on
intercultural communication, which we consider to be the essential form of intercul-
turalism. In this sense, in addition to being “a specific educational approach within
multicultural public policies” interculturalism also represents a specific communica-
tion approach. A specific difference between intercultural communication and genus
proximum communication would be in that the former is conducted against much
more diverse cultural experiential background of communicators. This is logical also
because intercultural education must result in intercultural competencies and these
are only activated in intercultural communication.
42 During the 1990s, there were publications by the Forum for Ethnic Relations on the subject of Interul-
turality, in the context of interethnic conflicts on the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia, edited by
Božidar Jakšić (Jaksic, Interculturality and Tolerance, 1998; Jakšić, Interculturality versus Racism and
Xenophobia, 1998; Jakšić, Boundaries - The Challenge of Interculturality, 1996).
43 There are ten times more publications containing the term „interculturalism“, 104 to be exact.
When it comes to intercultural communication, we find interesting the approach

stemming from the philosophy of Michel Foucault (Foucault, Michel). Namely, “Ac-
cording to Foucault, ‘truth’ is a ‘set of rules ... [and] a system of ordered procedures
for the production, regulation, distribution, and processing of the statements.” (Moon,
1996, p. 70). In other words, interculturalism can be recognized as a candidate for
“truth”, where procedures related to the processing of statements of those belonging to
different cultural backgrounds would be regulated. Interculturalism would be training
in proper, “true” communication. In this sense, the “truth of interculturalism” would
overcome individual cultural “truths”. This approach is interesting because the area of
interculturalism can be observed by the extent to which it overcomes individual cul-
tures. Likewise, it is assumed that where intercultural communication fails, i.e. appears
as a misunderstanding - the border of interculturalism emerges.
Such observations follow Moon’s statemen: “Foucauldian genealogy research seeks
to explore the “discharges” and “appearances” of new discursive formations and map
the lines of discourse through contradictions and logical discontinuities, in particular”
accidents, coincidences, passions, small wrongs, surprises… and power” (ibid.). This is
important for us because it reveals that there is a proper and “true” intercultural com-
munication that runs smoothly and in accordance with procedures on the one hand,
and on the other, the existence of intercultural communication that is characterized by
misfortune, coincidence, passion, malice and power. The former is, if it exists at all, tidy
and, therefore, most often invisible. The other is “untrue”, and is mapping bounderies
of a non-regulated system. That means that the mapping of culturalism in a form of a
collection of instances of Interculturalism may refer to such “unfortunate” cases which
draw up maps of Interculturalism in Serbia.
Swiss anthropologist Christian Giordano gives an interesting view in the same di-
rection, somewhat more specifically, that “in the social consciousness of a society, one
can often observe a play, according to which “superior” and “subordinate” groups are
distinguished by opposing ethnic traits” (Giordano, 2001, p. 6). Superiority and sub-
ordination are considered concepts that are related to Fuko’s question of power. This
would mean that a “disordered” intercultural communication often appears at the bor-
der between power and powerlessness. In other words, an “unfortunate case” is often a
power game by representatives of different social groups.
Giordano criticizes a naive, tacit assumption that cultural contacts i.e. intercul-
tural communication contains interactive processes between equal partners. He finds
the following attitude more realistic: “intercultural relations within the ‘disenchant-
ed’ Western world are made up of stereotypes intended to document their own su-
premacy” (Ibid., 9). Members of a “clan” or an ethnic group always strive to highlight
their own socio-cultural superiority in relation to neighboring rivals, citing countless
symbols and signs: “In this sense, Levi-Stross is completely right when pointing out
that in intercultural relations ethnocentrism makes one of the basic constants of the
collective mind of every society.” We note that the cartographic metaphor within the
theory of mapping interculturalism can be observed, among other things, in certain
post-colonial analyzes of how the maps drawn up during European colonialism cre-
ated distorted geopolitical images of the world that positioned the West in an arti-
ficially superior position: “These colonial maps manipulated the shapes and sizes of
continents and nations and distorted the reality of their relative physical quantities,
so that North America appears to be larger than Africa, and Scandinavia larger than
India “(Munshi & McKie, 2001, p. 10).44 Neo-colonialism and imperialism are there-
fore sometimes seen as highly influential factors in the creation of intercultural maps,
which is indicated in the literature on intercultural communication in the following
way: “The idea is to train the “Western” us to learn about “their” cultural values and
business practices in an effort to remain business-competitive” (Ibid, 13). The quoted
authors criticize the process of stereotyping by creating images of Others, and so to
them, even more sophisticated techniques for configuration of other cultures (such
as the Geert Hofstede theory) actually appear as sophisticated stereotypes. In other
words, such attitudes have called into question our intercultural education, because it
is seen as an instrument of economic and political centers of power. Giordano’s posi-
tion that “contact situations and intercultural communication processes, practically
without exception, lead to socially constructed disparities, which are expressed on the
social structure level” (Ibid 10), points to a (naive) interculturalism as being a part of
the problem, not as a part of solution.
4.2. Bibliography
1. Aksentijević, Z. (Ur.). (2009). Ne prolazi ulicom bez traga : ka interkulturalnosti.

Beograd: Grupa 484.
2. Clapham, C., & Nicholson, J. (2009). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Mathema-
tics, Fourth Edition. Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press.
3. Čačić-Kumpes, J. (1993). Interkulturalizam i obrazovanje djece migrantskog po-
rijekla. Migracijske i etničke teme, 9 (3-4), 211-225.
4. Dragić, D. (2002). Vlasi ili Rumuni iz Istočne Srbije i “Vlaško pitanje”. Beograd:
Helsinški odbor z ljudska prava u Srbiji.
5. Đolić, S. (2012). Uticaji psihologije okruženja na interkulturalni model nastave
engleskog kao stranog jezika. Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini (42-
2), 57-64.
6. Đordano, K. (2001). Ogledi o interkulturalnoj komunikaciji. Beograd: XX vek.
7. Đorđević, D. (2008). Romi za ugled II - doprinos učvršćivanju kulturnog identi-
teta. Teme, 32 (1), 85-111.
8. Đorđević, D. (2009). Prema temeljima romologije. Teme, 33 (2), 531-540.
44 This tendency is still present because every state or entity place themselves in the center of the map.
9. Đorđević, D., & Mašović, D. (1999). Romska prilika: interkulturalizam u obrazo-

vanju. Facta universitatis - series: Philosophy and Sociology, 2 (6/2), 285-292.
10. Inđić, T. (1994). Kultura i obrazovanje. Nastava i vaspitanje, 43 (3), 165-172.
11. Jakšić, B. (Ur.). (1996). Granice - izazov interkulturalnosti. Beograd: Forum za
etničke odnose.
12. Jakšić, B. (Ur.). (1998). Interkulturalnost i tolerancija. Beograd: Republika - Bibli-
oteka XX vek.
13. Jakšić, B. (Ur.). (1998). Interkulturalnost versus rasizam i ksenofobija. Beograd:
Forum za etničke odnose.
14. Jelačić, S. (2011). Specifičnosti i značaj interkulturalnog obrazovanja u savreme-
nim društvima. Norma, 16 (1), 9-19.
15. Jočić, A., Milosavljević, S., Joksimović, A., Kovačević, D., & Škorc, B. (2012). Pri-
ručnik za interkulturalno učenje kroz dramu. Beograd: Bazaart.
16. Keveždi, M. (2017). Problematika kulturnih prava. Interkulturalnost (13), 11-27.
17. Keveždi, M. (2018). Analiza modela obrazovanja na bosanskom jeziku u Sandžaku
– segregativna politika ili interkulturalni pristup? [rukopis]. Novi Pazar: Forum 10.
18. Kim, Y. Y. (2001). Mapping the Domain of Intercultural Communication: An
Overview. Annals of the International Communication Association, 24 (1), 139-156.
19. Klinar, P. (1991). Od etničkog pluralizma k interkulturalizmu. Migracijske i etnič-
ke teme, 7 (1), 29-45.
20. Kloskovska, A. (2001). Sociologija kulture. Beograd: Čigoja.
21. Koković, D. (2002). Procesi integracije, regionalizam i očuvanje kulturnog iden-
titeta. Sociološki pregled, 36 (1-2), 163-171.
22. Kristović, M. (2012). Promišljanje multikulturalizma kao posebnog pristupa kul-
turnoj raznolikosti. Teme, 36 (3), 1065-1086.
23. Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts
and Definitions. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Greenwood Press.
24. Kukathas, C. (1992). Are there any cultural rights? Political theory, 20 (1), 105-139.
25. Macura-Milovanović, S., Gera, I., & Kovačević, M. (2009). Mapiranje politika i
praksi za pripremu nastavnika za inkluzivno obrazovanje u konktestu društvenih
i kulturnih različitosti. Preuzeto sa Nastavnici-refleksivni istrazivači inkluzivne
obrazovne prakse: http://narip.cep.edu.rs/biblioteka/literatura_na_srpskom_je-
ziku/mapiranje_politika_i_praksi_za_pripremu_nastavnika_za_inkluzivno_ob-
razovanje_izvestaj_za_Srbiju_ETF.pdf
26. Maksimović, J., & Petrović, J. (2012). Stavovi studenata humanističkih i društve-
nih nauka prema stranim jezicima. Facta universitatis - series: Philosophy, Socio-
logy, Psychology and History, 11 (1), 21-31.
27. Martin, A. E. (Ed.). (2003). Oxford Dictionary of Law . New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
28. Mesić, M. (2006). Multikulturalizam. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
29. Moon, D. (1996). Concepts of “Culture”: Implications for intercultural Commu-
nication Research. Communication Quarterly, 44 (1), 70-84.
30. Munshi, D., & McKie, D. (2001). Toward a New Cartography of Intercultural
communication: Mapping Bias, Business, and Diversity. Business Communication
Quarterly, 64 (3), 9-22.
31. Petrović, D. (2014). Interkulturalna interakcija i razvoj interkulturalne osetljivosti.
Beograd: Institut za psihologiju - Centar za primenjenu psihologiju.
32. Petrović, D., & Jokić, T. (2016). Interkulturalno obrazovanje u Srbiji. Beograd:
Centar za obrazovne politike.
33. Piršl, E., Benjak, M., Diković, M., Jelača, M., & Matošević, A. (2016). Vodič za
interkulturalno učenje. Zagreb: Ljevak.
34. Roksandić, D. (Ur.). (2017). Hrvatsko-srpski/srpsko-hrvatski interkulturalizam
danas. Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
35. Sekulić-Majurec, A. (1996). Interkulturalizam u obrazovanju kao metodologijski
izazov. Društvena istraživanja, 5 (5-6), 875-894.
36. Stojković, B. (2004). Multikulturalizam, Balkan i planetarna kultura. U A. Sem-
prini, Multikulturalizam (str. 147-159). Beograd: Clio.
37. Winthrop, R. (2002). Defining a right to culture, and some alternatives. Cultural
Dynamics, 14 (2), 161-183.
38. Dr Đurić, V., Prof. Dr.Tanasković, D. Dragan, P. d., & Lađević, P. (2014). Rtnokon-
fesionalni i jezički mozaik Srbije – Specijalna publikacija, 2011. Preuzeto, decem-
bar 15, 2017. sa: Republički zavod za statistiku: http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/Objavlje-
nePublikacije/Popis2011/Etnomozaik.pdf
39. Klajn, I., & Šipka, М. (2008). Veliki rečnik stranih reči i izraza. Novi Sad: Prometej.
Amela Lukač-Zoranić
Internanational University in Novi Pazar
5. FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR
BELIEF AND GLOBALIZATION45
Abstract
In this paper, the author will attempt to present reflections on an extremely complex
subject, summarizing some of the attitudes that support the title and concern the issue
of freedom of religion and belief, and the attitude of religion toward the “other”. The pa-
per also gives relevant data on religious affiliation in RS pointing to the fact that religion
plays an important role in defining national identity. Presenting the theory of cultural
boomerang, the author strives to point out the changes occurring in the Serbian society
after the 1990s and the phenomenon of globalization as an undeniable harbinger of new
cultural patterns, which imposes the necessity to foster multiculturalism. In the end, for
the sake of a better coexistence and preservation of universal human values and rights,
the paper points to the necessity of intercultural education within educational systems,
aimed at acceptance and understanding of differences between people, whether reli-
gious, ethnic, national or racial.
Key words: freedom of religion, globalization, cultural boomerang, multicultural-
ism, interculturalism.
45 The English translation of a Yearbook contains a short version of the text by dr Amela Lukač – Zoranić.
The integral version of the text was presented at the Academy and published in the collection of texts in
Serbian language.
49
Monotheism today is widespread throughout the world and its religious foundations
are manifested through Christianity, Islam and Judaism..
According to the results of the official population census in the Republic of Serbia
in 2011, the population is mostly Christian Orthodox Christian, or 84,6 % of the total
population; 5 % are Catholics, 3 % practice Islam, and the rest are members of the Prot-
estant and Jewish communities, and atheists. 46
It is evident that “religiosity in Serbia, which was explicitly or implicitly denied, is
increasing in the post-socialist period.” Analyzing religiosity in the Republic of Serbia,
Zorica Kuburić and Danijela Gavrilović pointed out that:
The last twenty years are a revitalization period. Measurement and analysis of data
may point to certain trends in the form and type of religiosity occurring in Serbia:
1. Domination of religiosity in the transition period is an important homogenizati-
on and integration factor.
2. Citizens’ attitudes on religion are becoming clearer.
3. The number of adherents is growing in most forms of religiosity.
4. The number of pseudo-adherents is reduced.
5. The number of people practicing personal religiosity, not belonging to any reli-
gious community, remains the same and is relatively low.
6. The number of atheists with a “scientific view of the world” is declining in favor
of those embracing theistic and pantheistic view of the world. 47
The increase in religiosity is not a coincidence. After decades-long ban and unpopu-
larity, religiosity became a manifestation of freedom, of returning to traditional values,
and a collective sense of respect for religious belief.
Focusing on legislation, we note that the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia recognizes
the freedom of religion as an essential element of the constitutionality of the state and the rule
of law based on inalienable human rights, that is, that there is no state or mandatory religion
(as was the practice from which a Latin phrase was coined “Whose realm, his religion”), and
Article 4348 especially concerns freedom of thought, conscience, beliefs and religion.
The Republic of Serbia goes even further in that sense by strictly forbidding any incite-
ment and encouragement of racial, national, religious or other inequality49, pointing to the
importance and the obligation of the state to promote understanding, recognition, and
respect of diversity arising from specific ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity of
its citizens, through measures applied in education, culture and public information50, as
well as the obligation of the state to promote the spirit of tolerance and multicultural dia-
logue and to foster cooperation among all people living on its territory irrespective of their
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, adding that freedom of thought, conscience
46 http://www.srbija.gov.rs/pages/article.php?id=37
47 Zorica Kuburić,Danijela Gavrilović, op.cit., p. 9.
48 Constitution of RS, special session II, 2006., http://www.ius.bg.ac.rs/prof/materijali/martan/Ustav_Srbije.pdf
49 Ibidem, Art. 47.
50 Ibidem, Art. 48.
and religion is a fundamental human right defined by international law.51 These statements
go in favor of the fact that the Republic of Serbia has recognized the importance of interna-
tional declarations concerning human rights and freedoms of religion and beliefs and has
demonstrated the readiness to accept the values stated in international declarations and
weave them into the underlying values of the constitutionality of the state.
5.1. International Declarations and Freedom of Religion or Belief
International declarations and documents dealing with the subject of human rights
and freedom of religion are based on the principle that freedom of religion is actually
a fundamental human right. The first significant document to address this issue is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by Resolution 217 of
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. Namely, hoping to put a spotlight on the
horrors of World War II, world leaders wanted to focus the issue of human rights on
the interests of preventing future conflicts caused by diversity, as well as to ensure safe
way for human rights and implementation, guaranteeing rights to everyone and every-
where. Hernan Santa Cruz from Chile, a member of the subcommittee for drafting the
draft version of the Declaration, noted on that occasion:
I perceived clearly that I was participating in a truly significant historic event in
which a consensus had been reached as to the supreme value of the human person, a
value that did not originate in the decision of a worldly power, but rather in the fact
of existing — which gave rise to the inalienable right to live free from want and op-
pression and to fully develop one’s personality. In the Great Hall ... the atmosphere
was filled with sincere solidarity and fraternity between men and women from all
latitudes, the like of which I have not seen again in any international setting.52
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is defined in article 1853, which, inter
alia, states that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
51 Ibidem, Art. 81.

52 Hernán Santa Cruz of Chile: “I perceived clearly that I was participating in a truly significant historic
event in which a consensus had been reached as to the supreme value of the human person, a value that
did not originate in the decision of a worldly power, but rather in the fact of existing—which gave rise
to the inalienable right to live free from want and oppression and to fully develop one’s personality. In
the Great Hall…there was an atmosphere of genuine solidarity and brotherhood among men and wo-
men from all latitudes, the like of which I have not seen again in any international setting.”http://www.
un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html
53 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, cons-
cience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practi-
ce, worship and observance. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html
as well as the right to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance. The issue of freedom of belief was again on the agenda of the United Na-
tions in 1981. Starting from the UN Charter’s basic principle that dignity and equality
are inherent to all human beings and that all member states have committed themselves
to support and ensure the implementation of human rights and to work to suppress all
forms of discrimination, the UN adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The Decla-
ration seeks to emphasize that any violation or failure to observe human rights and
fundamental freedoms, especially the right to free opinion, consciousness, religion or
belief, can directly or indirectly lead to conflicts and great suffering for humans, which
is why it is necessary to promote understanding, tolerance and respect for religious
affiliation or belief, and that “the Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion is guaranteed to everyone”54, as well as that “no one shall be
subject discrimination”.55 The Declaration insists that “states take effective measures to
prevent and eliminate discrimination based on religion or belief”.56
The normative core of the freedom of religion or belief consists of eight components,
namely:
1. Internal freedom,
2. External freedom,
3. Non-coercion,
4. Rights of parents and guardians,
5. Corporate freedom and legal status,
6. Limits of permissible restrictions on external freedom,
7. Non-derogability.57
Given that certain elements overlap with values protected by other human rights, it
is necessary to develop additional active mechanisms and by-laws that can guarantee
and protect the freedom of religion and belief with a special focus on raising human
awareness about the existence of all forms of diversity.
Attempt to raise awareness on the freedom of religion and belief and the search
for mechanisms to provide support and protect or facilitate religious freedoms, once
again brought together scientists and political leaders to adopt The Oslo Declaration
54 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief Article 1.: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion … http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm
55 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, Article 2.: No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or
person on grounds of religion or other beliefs. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm
56 Ibidem, Article 4.:All States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief . http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm
57 N. Ghanea, T. Lindholm, W.C. Durham Jr., B. G. Tahzib-Lie, Sloboda vjere ili uvjerenja: Priručnik “Re-
ligija i slobode religije ili uvjerenja ponovo u fokusu”, u prijevodu N. Begović i A. Mulović, CNS, Sara-
jevo 2015., str: 20-22.
for Freedom of Religion or Belief. Approximately 150 representatives from political,

academic and religious circles worldwide attended the conference. They adopted the
position on the recognition of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
together with other instruments, and recognized that religions and beliefs teach peace
and good will58, and that religions and beliefs were “abused to provoke intolerance,
discrimination and prejudice”59. The Oslo Conference resulted in the formation of the
Coalition for Freedom of Religion or Belief that has taken on a significant role in the
achievement of international relations and broad perspectives by committing to practi-
cal actions that may have an impact on international initiatives with a view to promot-
ing freedom of religion or belief as part of an original international framework.
Largest monotheistic religions, Christianity, Islam and Judaism, or “people of the
book” propagate justice, love, striving for society / world without conflicts and wars,
for peace and tolerance. All of them base their fundamental teachings on love and re-
spect for one another, as well as love and subordination to one God. Nevertheless, his-
tory testifies that members of different religions have had difficulty in tolerating other,
different beliefs. Such intolerance had produced the worst inter-religious conflicts and
persecutions, and most recently the genocide in Srebrenica during the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Holocaust during World War II.
Conflicts based on belief, religion, and ideology still exist between these commu-
nities, despite actually representing an outright abuse of faith aimed to implement an
ideology and establish political power. Namely, if religion is based on practicing God’s
laws and humility, how is it possible for religious believers to enter into conflicts with
one another? Isn’t it contradictory to religious revelations which state that one should
distinguish between good and evil and strive to do well.
The Old Testament, in the First Book of Moses called Genesis, 4.7, states: “If you do
well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, sin is crouching at the door.
Its desire is for you, but you must rule over it.”60
The Old Testament, Book of Deuteronomy, 10:18, clearly states how to treat a strang-
er, and the stranger does not have to be of Christian faith, i.e. it speaks of tolerance and
empathy: “He executes justice for the orphan and the widows, loves the foreigner, and
gives them food and clothing. So you also must love the foreigner, since you yourselves
were foreigners in the land of Egypt.”61
The New Testament, Mark 12:28: 31, testifies to the importance of love or charity,
stating that there are no greater commandments than these: “One of the teachers of the
law came and heard them debating. Noticing that Jesus had given them a good answer,
he asked him, “Of all the commandments, which is the most important?” “The most
58 The Oslo Declaration on Freedom of Religion or Belief, “Recognize that religions and beliefs teach peace and
good will”.https://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/oslocoalition/docs/oc-declaration.pdf
59 Ibidem, “Recognize that religions and beliefs may be misused to cause intolerance, discrimination and
prejudice, and have all too often been used to deny the rights and freedoms of others”.
60 Holy Scripture or Bible,Institut za hebrejski jezik, Metafizika, Beograd, 2010.
61 Ibidem
important one,” answered Jesus, “is this: ‘Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is
one. Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your
mind and with all your strength. The second is this: “Love your neighbor as yourself.
There is no commandment greater than these.”62
Mark Twain, famous American author, pointed out, “Kindness is the language which
the deaf can hear and the blind can see.” With his testimony he only confirmed the power of
kindness that we all appreciate in humans and which we would like to practice more often.
Šušnjić noted that: “Those who hate in the name of faith are committing a crime
against faith. Therefore, intolerance does not come from theology but from ideology.
Hostility is incompatible with the original messages of these religions”,63 which is con-
firmed by the words from the other Holy Book, Qur’an, Surah al-Baqarah, verse 148:
“For each [religious following] is a direction toward which it faces. So race to [all that is]
good.”64 Or the Surah Ali-Imran, verse 104: “And let there be [arising] from you a nation
inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong.”65
Oliver Oliver Potežica, referring to the fundamental sources of Islam, the Qur’an
and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, claims that members of the monotheis-
tic religions called Ahl al Kitab “people of the book”, “should be treated in their own
faith”,66 but there is no tolerance for pagans Susnjic agreed, adding:
The essence of the Islamic faith is a little understood outside Islam, but we all
feel the consequences of this lack of understanding. A responsible thing to do is to
say straight-out: “Islam has a long tradition of tolerance and considers all “people
of the book” as their brothers and sisters and is very tolerant toward them.67
In Islam, members of one of the religions (officially recognized monotheistic reli-

gions) were allowed to perform their religious rituals and to practice other rights (mar-
ital and family law) but, as Potežica points out, “in return, they paid a special tax (jizja),
as well as a special land tax (kharaj)”68 meaning that there was no forced or violent
conversion to Islam, as evidenced from a number of different sources. In support of
this statement, we will cite the Qur’an, Surah al-Baqarah, verse 256: “There shall be no
compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion”, which unambiguously reveals that a person
has the right to choose whom to worship and how. Of course, the Qur’an also cites clear
consequences depending on the choice.
Accordingly, religions teach and guide toward the good, propagate undisputed toler-
ance that allows us to live with each other irrespective of the differences that separate or
62 Ibidem
63 Đuro Šušnjić, op.cit., p. 202.
64 The Noble Qur’an,translated by mr. Muhamed Mehanović, Lies Stiftung, 2013.
65 Ibidem
66 Oliver Potežica, Odnos Islama prema drugim religijama, http://starisajt.nspm.rs/Debate/2006_CP_po-
teyica1.htm,
67 Đuro Šušnjić, op.cit. p. 205.
68 Oliver Potežica, op.cit.
connect us. A person must not be limited to him/herself because familiarity with another
person, the exchange of experience and knowledge actually makes a person think, feel and
understand. Despite the fact that collective communities are deeply traditional and related
by common history and experience, they must face and accept the necessity of introducing
high, universal values which imply understanding and accepting diversity, not in the sense
that they should endure and tolerate others, but to accept and learn from others.
As human beings we are well aware in understanding that any form of violence and
intolerance is damaging to the human community. Although violence is uncivilized
and primitive manifestation, prof. Šušnjić claims that the number of those who encour-
age and commit violence in modern society is increasing. “Violence means denying
value of a human being. Consumers of violence are spreading. Our time is a time of
intolerance, which is clearly witnessed by the graffiti in our cities, although the city
should, by definition, be a place of tolerance of diversity.”69
If freedom of religion is recognized by legal acts (Edict of Milan) in the 4th century,
how is it that 17 centuries later we are again talking about the necessity of these free-
doms? In the 4th century, in 313, the freedom of belief became a part of reality. Namely,
that year by virtue of the Edict of Milan70∗ religious equality and the end of the perse-
cution of Christians was declared. The Edict allowed Christians to publicly practice
their faith. It is interesting to note that this legislative act enabled freedom of belief for
everyone, and “everyone believes his heart prefers.”71
5.2. National ideologies and religion
If humans have advocated for freedom of religion or belief since ancient times, why
are national ideologies opposed to it?
Public opinion survey conducted by the Pew Research Center72∗ has shown that:
in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, religion and national iden-
tity are closely related. This also applies to former communist states, such as the
Russian Federation and Poland, where most say that being Orthodox is important

70 A legal act adopted on April 30, 313 by the Emperors Constantine and Licinius in Mediolanum, todays Milan.
71 The „Edict of Milan“ (313 A.D.), “When I, Constantine Augustus, as well as I Licinius Augustus d for-
tunately met near Mediolanurn (Milan), and were considering everything that pertained to the public
welfare and security, we thought -, among other things which we saw would be for the good of many,
those regulations pertaining to the reverence of the Divinity oughtcertainly to be made first, so that we
might grant to the Christians and others full authority to observe that religion which each preferred;”,
https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/edict-milan.asp
72 Pew The Pew Research Center is an independent research tank for collecting facts that informs the public
about the issues, attitudes and trends that shape the world. It is engaged in research of public opinion,
demographic research, content analysis and other sociological research. http://www.pewresearch.org
for being a “true Russian” or “only true Poles are Catholics”. This is also the case in
Greece, where church played an important role in the successful struggle for Greece
independence from the Ottoman Empire and where three quarters of the popula-
tion (76%) claim that Orthodoxy is important for someone to be a “true” Greek.73
Religion has become a fundamental aspect of the Serbian national identity, but na-
tional and ethnic identities are seen as one. A person not of the Orthodox faith cannot
be a Serb. Research has shown that 78% of Serbs believe that Orthodoxy is linked to the
national identity.
Having religious foundations at the core of the national identity brings a number
of misunderstandings and contradictions. Although Serbia is a multicultural, secular
state in which different nationalities and religions are equally represented, intolerance
and hostility are inspired by religious affiliation. Nationality and religious affiliation
of indigenous peoples who have always lived in the areas of today’s Serbia is often dis-
puted, as evident from media headlines. Some articles state that Bosnian Muslims are
actually Islamized Orthodox Serbs74, which, of course, is a violation of fundamental
human rights. Such outbursts are remnants of the devastating events from 1980s and
1990s. After the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980), nationalist narratives filled the territory
of the former Yugoslavia with intolerance and hatred towards all who did not share
the same national and religious ideology. Nationalistic narratives became increasingly
fascist. The Oxford Handbook of Fascism, edited by Professor Richard Bosworth, in the
chapter dedicated to Yugoslavia, provides the following reference:
In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
former authoritarian Communists seeking new bases for their power and legitima-
cy came together with dissident nationalist opponents of the Titoist order to produce
regimes that were arguably, to a greater or lesser degree, fascist or semi-fascist.75
The legacy of the nineties is still palpable today, and after so many years we are again
seeking mechanisms that will allow us to live a peaceful coexistence and with respect
for one another.
A result undoubtedly produced by the nineties and still very much felt in the present
is the “Cultural Boomerang”. The Cultural boomerang theory is actually reminiscent of
a violent usurpation of national identities of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia after
the Second World War, when they were replaced by communist ideology. Communist
73 http://demostat.rs/sr/vesti/istrazivanja/religije-i-nacionalna-pripadnost-u-centralnoj-i-istocnoj-evropi/205
74 https://www.srbijadanas.net/o-srbima-muslimanske-veroispovesti/
75 R., Bosworth, Ed. The Oxford Handbook of Fascism,Oxford University Press, 2010. http://www.helsin-
ki.org.rs/npyug_t01.html
„In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in the late 1980s and early 1990s, authoritarian former
Communists seeking new bases for their power and legitimacy came together with dissident nationa-
list opponents of the Titoist order to produce regimes that were arguably, to a greater or lesser degree,
fascist or semi-fascist.“
ideology, which was absolute, denied the existence of God, that is, the Communist Party
was the only religious and national affiliation, and caused alienation from all national,
cultural and religious values in individuals, believing that by suppressing all emotions
of this kind, it will also suppress cultural memory. However, when deepest intimate
feelings are violently torn away, as if throwing a boomerang, it is impossible to know
when and how hard it will hit on its way back. The boomerang returned, like shattered
feelings returning through cultural and religious awakening and national renaissance,
which places special emphasis on the national specificity of the awakened. This opens
the issue of the intensity of the returned feelings and beliefs, as compared to their inten-
sity at the moment of their alienation.
The cultural boomerang brings to the surface hidden national feelings which, under
the passing of time, cultural, economic, political and social changes are stronger and
more pronounced than at the moment of their alienation from the individual or the
social community. High intensity cultural boomerang will result in a conflict or intol-
erance. Conflict can be defined as a real or perceived state of opposing needs, values
and interests or a state of incompatibility between two or more sides and individuals.
Whichever definition we use, we are aware that conflicts bring instability, migration
and displacement of vulnerable peoples, growth of nationalism, religious intolerance,
lack of investments, fear, and no production. With higher levels of nationalism a nation
confides itself within the limits of state borders, where people blindly follow the dogma
and lose the feeling for universal values, as this is considered a “betrayal of homeland
and national consciousness”.76
And while Balkan states are fighting each other in an attempt to preserve the new
and old national identity, ethnic and religious purity, they are failing to notice a new
force that eradicates all boundaries and invades or changes national identities at an in-
credible speed, spreading and changing their reality. That force is globalization.
Manfred Stager, Professor of Global Studies, points out that the term globalization
denotes a set of social initiatives that clearly “transform our present social condition by
changing nationality into globality.”77Steger further explains that globalization actually
changes the form of human contact. He believes that globalization is an uneven pro-
cess, meaning that people living in different parts of the world are differently affected
by this gigantic transformation of social structure and cultural zones. This means that
whatever efforts people of a particular cultural and national space exert to preserve own
characteristics, they are directly affected by the cultural hegemony that comes through
globalization. Diversity has become the dominant feature of the world that nurtures
and turns to supernatural society, ignoring national identity. Globalization largely af-
fects the economy and business, but at the same time imposes Western culture on the
rest of the world, where the Balkan case is no exception, and Serbia is a Balkan state.

77 M., B., Steger,Globalization: A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, New York., 2003, p. 3:11
„Transform our present social condition of weakening nationality into one of globality“.
At the same time, we must be aware that the absolute acceptance of globalization is
impossible without experiencing certain side effects. The more a society and a national
community are aware of the effects of globalization, the more they strive to preserve
local culture, which can produce serious consequences. However, we must also bear in
mind that globalization is not and cannot be followed by multiculturalism - they come
together in the package, hand in hand.
Multiculturalism can be defined as a view that “cultures, races, ethnicities, partic-
ularly those of minority groups, deserve special acknowledgement of their differences
within a dominant political culture”.78Multiculturalism strives to include all cultural
and religious groups that exist in a particular area in a common democratic society that
nurtures and values all the characteristics and differences while contributing to society
as a whole.
Intercultural education can help people to acquire the skills necessary for effective
interaction with those who differ from them; it may show that despite a large number
of differences exist and separate people, there are also great similarities based on com-
mon values. The main goal of intercultural education is to help young people not only
understand the diversity of thoughts, expressions, beliefs and rituals of those who are
different from them, but also focus on their development so that all people can live and
work with one another effectively. Brought up on these values, young people will be en-
couraged to develop knowledge, motivation, and skills to counter and modify systems
that are characterized by discrimination and oppression.
A question is – given the steady increase in religiosity, could religions contribute to
the development and nurturing of such values and societies in which all people can live
freely and enjoy the rights within a system that does not differentiate and is the same
for all. Freedom of religion, dialogue and tolerance should be a way of life that manifests
itself in everyday contact with differences.
We will conclude with the words of a prominent scholar and advocate for tolerance,
prof. Šušnjić, who believes that religions are the key to success, that is, responsibility lies
with them and through them with us, and the freedom of religion or belief will establish
freedom and peace in the world, liberated from fear and destructive weapons that paint
the sky above, instead of stars.
“Universal religions, because of their universal values and norms, could help institu-
tionalize human rights and freedoms across the world.”79
78 “Multiculturalism is defined as “the view that cultures, races, and ethnicities, particularly those of mino-
rity groups, deserve special acknowledgement of their differences within a dominant political culture”.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/multiculturalism
79 Đuro Šušnjić, op.cit, p. 205
5.3. Literature
1. Ben-Canaan, Wu, Li, Dan, The Impact of Globalization and the Internet on Engli-
sh Language Teaching and Learning, Heilongjiang University, School of Western
Studies, Harbin, 2006. http://www.academia.edu/188911/The_Impact_of_Glo-
balization_and_the_Internet_on_English_Language_Teaching_and_Learning
2. Bosworth, R., Ed. The Oxford Handbook of Fascism,Oxford University Press,
2010. http://www.helsinki.org.rs/npyug_t01.html
3. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm
4. Ghanea, N., Lindholm, T,. Durham W.C Jr., Tahzib-Lie, B. G., Sloboda vjere ili
uvjerenja: Priručnik “Religija i slobode religije ili uvjerenja ponovo u fokusu”, u
prijevodu N. Begović i A. Mulović, CNS, Sarajevo 2015.
5. Kuburić, Z., Gavrilović, D., „Vjerovanje i pripadanje u savremenoj Srbiji“, Religija
i tolerancija, Vol. X, No 18, Jul-Decembar, 2012., 7-19.
6. Marx, K., Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 7 & 10 February 1844, Paris http://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.html
7. PlemenitiKur’an, prevod mr. Muhamed Mehanović, Lies Stiftung, 2013.
8. Potežica O., Odnos Islama prema drugim religijama, http://starisajt.nspm.rs/De-
bate/2006_CP_poteyica1.htm,
9. Sveto pismo ili Biblija, Institut za hebrejski jezik, Metafizika, Beograd,2010.
10. Steger, M., B., Globalization: A very short introduction, Oxford University Press,
New York., 2003, http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html
11. Šušnjić, Đ., “Judaizam, Hrišćanstvo i Islam-pluralizam monoteizama”, Religija
i Tolerancija Časopis Centra za empirijska istraživanja religije, Vol. XIII, No 24,
Jul-Decembar 2015., Novi Sad, 201-209.
12. The „Edict of Milan“ (313 A.D.), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/edi-
ct-milan.asp
13. The Oslo Declaration on Freedom of Religion or Belief, https://www.jus.uio.no/
smr/english/about/programmes/oslocoalition/docs/oc-declaration.pdf
14. Ustav RS, II posebna sjednica, 2006., http://www.ius.bg.ac.rs/prof/materijali/
martan/Ustav_Srbije.pdf
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declara-
tion-human-rights/index.html
16. Wagenbichler, H., The Yugoslav Tragedy Why Multicultural Societies, Volume 3,
Number 4, 1993., Issue theme: “What makes a nation?”
17. https://www.britannica.com/
18. https://www.brainyquote.com/
19. http://demostat.rs/
20. http://latin-ictionary.net/
21. http://www.pewresearch.org
22. http://www.srbija.gov.rs/
23. https://www.srbijadanas.net/
Mirko Blagojević
Institute for Social Sciences, Belgrade
6. RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY IN

EUROPE, SERBIA, AND RUSSIA
Abstract
Relying in this paper on empirical scientific evidence, we intend to outline the scope
and degree of religiosity of certain European societies, peoples’ attachment to church
and religion in the Serbian society and finally the current religious situation in Russia.
Such an approach aims to place the contemporary Serbian religious situation beyond
regional and into the European framework, using the case of Russia as a reference, since
modern Russia is the most populous Orthodox country. The approach is sociological,
which ultimately means that the analysis of religious situation in Europe, Serbia and
Russia is used predominantly to prove the social rather than eminent spiritual flows.
Naturally, this cannot be done without at least a rudimentary evolutionary approach
to the contemporary religious situation, since past events surrounding religions and
churches have an impact on their contemporary position and make it easier to explain
the obvious changes that have occurred over time, mostly due to circumstances outside
the religious and sacred, strictly speaking.
Key words: secularized Europe, (non) religious Serbia, de-secularized Russia, religi-
osity, attachment to religion and church, sociology of religion.
6.1. (Non) religious Europe
Discussing the historical context of the complex and fluid relationship between reli-
gion and wider societies across Europe requires highlighting several well-known facts
that are important for the contemporary spiritual and religious situation in European so-
cieties and Europe as a whole: firstly, European history is inextricably tied to Christianity
61
through specific and complex links between religion and state, as well as a sort of under-
standing of religion and the church as public institutions; secondly, it should be empha-
sized that although Christianity in Europe has created common, homogenous values by
means of the universalization of Europe, Christian Europe is not monolithic in terms of
religious denominations, so the existence of three Christian traditions (churches) must
have at least certain significance for the present religious situation of that part of the
world; and finally, the fact that countries of today’s Europe are rapidly changing, espe-
cially in the last twenty years, from the fall of communism in Europe to strong European
integration processes, also embraced by the post-communist countries.
In this text, we are primarily concerned with the religious situation in the so-called
Western Europe. Western Europe should also be observed through separate segments:
historical heritage, the dominance of one or diversity of confessions, the relationship be-
tween religions and churches toward the state – all these vary across Europe and are not
identical. The religious situation in European countries is not unambiguous, so it is wrong
to judge it using the same argument. On the other hand, previous researches suggest that
certain general conclusions can still be made about the process of secularization in these
countries considering the confessional composition of these countries. In one of her books
Grace Davie (Davie, 2005: 25-26), analyzed the profile of religion in contemporary Eu-
rope, based on the results of the 1990 European Values Study, and divided the European
countries to: Catholic (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain); Mixed Countries
(Great Britain, The Netherlands, Northern Ireland, West Germany) and Lutheran coun-
tries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). In this context, she observed two im-
portant indicators of conventional religiosity: the frequency of church attendance and the
degree of religious beliefs: in God, the soul, the afterlife, the resurrection of the dead, etc.
According to the indicators of participation in ritual activities and religious institu-
tional affiliation, Davie concludes that surveyor show an undeniable degree of secular-
ization throughout Western Europe. On the other hand, sociological indicators that are
less tied to the institutional framework, such as the moral acknowledgment of people
as one of the aspects of religious life, show considerable persistence. Such mixed results,
therefore, call for caution when giving a general conclusion on the religious situation in
modern Europe as a clearly secularized environment. If we evaluate the contemporary
religious situation by observing both the established religions as well as through the so
called subjective, institutionally non-mediated religiosity, and if also add to the mix the
nonestablished churches, new religious movements, mysticism and esotericism, various
fundamentalist movements, the rise of Islam, we cannot speak of a deeply secularized
Europe today. Today, the religious profile of Europe is more diverse than before, and
religious and spiritual offerings are more varied and the non-church forms of belief are
increasingly more present. In such circumstances, Christian orthodoxy does not carry
as much individual or social importance. The reputation of church and ecclesiastical
practice of declared worshipers has dropped. Christian Europe is therefore much less
associated with the church. In Europe there are particularly Lutheran countries with
low level of devotion to church: in Denmark, 13% of the population goes to church
once a month or more, in Iceland 9%, in Norway and Sweden 10% (Davie, 2005: 25).
The same survey showed that Catholic countries rank far better on this indicator of
religiousness are, such as Ireland (81% attends church at least one week), Italy (41%),
Portugal and Spain by 33%. And multi-confessional countries, according to this indi-
cator, are leaning more towards Catholicism rather than Lutheranism. However, there
are some exceptions that can be explained by historical reasons: in France, for example,
only 10% of the population are regular church-goers (on Sundays), 23% in Belgium, 13%
in Britain, but in Northern Ireland, which a mixed country, as much as 49%.
However, Christianity in Europe today is not a lifeless, pale image of human conscious-
ness. Christian beliefs are still an integral part of human values and individual identities.
This had urged Grace Davie to promote the phrase “believing without belonging”, pri-
marily in the case of religion in the United Kingdom (Davie, 1994). According to the
quoted 1990 research of European values, the European average church attendance of at
least once a week was 29% but never 40%; the European average for believing in God was
70%; 61% believe in soul; 57% believe in sin, and 33% believe in the resurrection from the
dead. Belief in God is an absolute majority in all of the listed Catholic countries: in Ireland
96%, in Italy 83%, in Spain 81%, in Portugal 80%, and in Belgium 63%. Even in Lutheran
countries, we now have data that far exceeds the church ritual practice: 85% of Icelanders
believe in God, 76% of Finns, 65% of Norwegians, 64% of Danes, 45% of Swedes.
It is a well-known fact that Europe is full of empty churches. What matters to the pro-
cess of secularization is not that religion has completely disappeared from people’s every-
day lives, but that religion, even the conventional religion, has become personalized and
privatized. Personal religiosity does not see as necessary to regularly cross the threshold of
the church; it is possible to be religious in one’s own, subjective way. The talk of post-secu-
larization in recent years, especially in Italian and German intellectual circles, rearranges
religion and church from private to public sphere. A German professor from the Humbolt
University, Klaus Eder, points out that the process of secularization has not definitively
annulled the religious expression in Europe, but has only made it invisible to the public
sphere, and then defines the contemporary process of post-secularism in Europe as a re-
turn of religion from the private to the public sphere (Boseti, Eder, 2008).
6.2. Serbia and structure of religious believers

– evolution and present state
Orthodoxy in Serbia, conventional religiosity of citizens, their attachment to Or-

thodoxy and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), and relations between Church and
the state in the 20th and early decades of the 21st century should be observed from the
perspective of several different general socio-political contexts. In these contexts, the
social position and the social and spiritual influence of the SPC on over their tradi-
tional religious-confessional space was essentially equivocal, even diametrically oppo-
site. In that sense, the general religious situation was not unambiguous and invariable
but diametrically different, and can be basically observed, with implied abstractions,
through two ideally-styled patterns: one stimulating, giving a positive value to the reli-
giosity of the people and the SPC and in which it implied the church’s privileged social
position, reputation and great national and cultural significance, and the other, which
was very disincentive to the religiosity of the people, and which deteriorated the SPC’s
influence in terms of social position, spiritual influence and national significance and
placed it on the margins of social life without the possibility of displaying, then prob-
lematic, public implications.
The first mentioned ideal-type form, affirmative to religion and church, historically
runs until 1918, until the end of the First World War and the creation of the state of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, although it seems that this affirmative period can be pro-
longed until the beginning of the Second World War. So, up until the First World War,
the SPC had a privileged social position. The relationship between the state and the
Church would be easier to understand in the light of the fact that the Serbian constitu-
tion of 1903 stipulated that Orthodoxy is the official state religion, religious education
is a compulsory school subject, public holidays are marked by church rituals, and that
all religious officials are paid by the state same as other civil servants. Under such social
and cultural circumstances it would be safe to say that people have been traditionally
linked to Orthodoxy, and that religion and the Church, in one way or another, exist dai-
ly in the lives and experiences of a large number of people, and that these ties certainly
have a significant influence on people’s consciousness and their practical behavior.
This religious status and the social position of Orthodoxy and the SPC after the
Second World War have changed, which is another ideal-type form of the social sta-
tus of religion in Serbia. These significant religious changes are closely related to the
significant social and political changes initiated during the Second World War and af-
ter. In that sense, there have been radical changes in the social, political and cultur-
al-normative patterns in these newly established socialist societies in central, eastern
and south-eastern Europe compared to the social, political and cultural patterns of the
societies that preceded them. For almost half a century religions and churches have sur-
vived under this new matrix in the geographical, religious and confessional area of the
so-called Other, Socialist Yugoslavia. True, over such a long period of time the relation-
ship between the state and religious communities was not one-dimensional, predictable
and unchanging, but it had certain stages of tense and less tense relations, and stronger
and weaker political pressure on religious organizations. However, one fact was never
questioned: the socialist state has socially marginalized and spiritually demonopolized
religions and churches, often using violence to promote atheism even to the extent that
this phenomenon can be called the hegemony of atheism in the culture of socialist so-
ciety. Such a series of social and political events had a great impact on the SPC and
Orthodox religiosity in Serbia.
Since the 60s of the last century sociological, socio-psychological and public opinion
surveys showed a significantly smaller prevalence of classical religiosity in Orthodox
dominant areas such as the so-called “narrow Serbia and Montenegro” compared to, ex-
ample, predominantly Catholic or mixed areas. Later studies during the 1970s showed
the tendency of further decline in religiosity and an increase in non-religious popula-
tion, particularly in the traditional Orthodox areas (Pantić, 1974). Empirical research
from the 1970s and almost to the end of the 1980s of the last century has shown that
Orthodox religiosity can be distinguished as a special example in relation to religiosity
in other mono-confessional and mixed religions. This is reflected in the continuously
low percentage of religiosity, belief and church practice, and in the prevalence of such a
religious situation in predominantly Orthodox religious areas (Đorđević, 1984).
The end of the 80s and the beginning of the 1990s in Serbia were marked by deep
economic and political crisis of until then generally accepted values. Sociological and
public opinion surveys revealed an obvious change in the religiosity of the population
even in the Orthodox homogeneous areas of Serbia and Montenegro, but also in the
Orthodox population outside Serbia, as well as mixed and predominantly Catholic and
Islamic religious areas (Pantić, 1991; Vratuša Žunjić, 1996, 1996a). These changes im-
plied wider changes, and not just purely elevated levels of religiosity and people’s intense
attachment to traditional confessional organizations. These changes point to the con-
clusion that they re-evaluated the overall social significance of traditional religious sys-
tems in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as well as their significance for the then
increasingly more popular national corpus, directed toward desecularization (deathei-
sation) processes. In the eve of war conflicts and the collapse of the country, confronted
national and confessional groups sought the full engagement and commitment of their
members, allowing only a limited deviation from group unity (Coser, 1956: 151 et seq.)
The beginning of the revitalization of the religious-church complex coincided with
the war period, the onslaught of unbelievable hatred, violence and suffering on a consid-
erable part of the territory of the Socialist Yugoslavia, so the sociologists mostly associat-
ed such revitalization with the mainstream socio-political changes that were manifested
as a result of social, territorial, national and confessional homogenization of the popula-
tion in the ex-Yu republics. The new religious changes in the Serbian Orthodoxy until the
end of the 1990s were empirically recorded in all segments of attachment to Orthodoxy
and SPC - religious identification, indoctrination, and religious rituals. By examining
a large number of indicators of people’s attachment to religion and church during the
1990s, there is a notable tendency of religious changes in Serbia toward desecularization
of Serbian society (Blagojević, 1995, 2005, Radisavljević Ćiparzović, 2006).
Traditional relationship with religion and church, which was least problematic even be-
fore, has been further expanded so that the overwhelming majority of people in the Ortho-
dox homogeneous areas are traditionally associated with religion and church. Somehow,
some of the current religious practices, such as prayer, attending liturgy and fasting prior
to church holidays, have been revitalized. Today, the Orthodox homogeneous Serbian area
can no longer be recognized as an area in which rituals of the actual religious nature have
eroded or that inhabitants are “running away” from religion and church. Practically, over
the two decades of this century, the religious situation surrounding Orthodoxy in Serbia
can be described as a new stabilization of the structure of religious believers.
6.3. Russia: religious changes and desecularization
When the relationship between society, religion and religiosity is observed at suf-
ficiently large intervals, findings can be presented as the motion or swinging of a reli-
gious pendulum in a sinusoidal curve. In the case of Russia, this was performed by Fur-
man and Kaariainen (Фурман, Каариайнен, 2006; Каариайнен, Фурман 2000). Their
starting point for the history of Russian religiosity was the presumed total religiosity
of the Russian medieval society. Formally, this religiosity, being not only Orthodox but
also pagan and sectarian, was absolute, which speaks not so much about the religion
itself as much of the global Russian mediaeval society. Namely, the Russian imperial
state did not acknowledge a non-confessional setting. However, if we exclude the formal
religious criteria applied by Russian imperial statistics, then the state of religiosity in
this period of Russian history was certainly not 100%, although state and social reasons
undoubtedly influenced non-problematic, pro-religious, and pro-Orthodox consensus.
In imperial Russia, the Orthodox Church had a special social role as it was practically
part of the state apparatus, and as such it had certain privileges unlike other denomina-
tions and their churches. Fulfilling a series of public functions, the church was a part of
the government. On the other hand, religious norms had a great practical significance
in regulating many aspects of social life. All this shows that the Church, apart from the
monopoly on spiritual activity, participated in the social and political life of the country
by intertwining the secular interests of the church, the nobility and the state, and pro-
viding a traditional and completely open legitimacy to the secular monarchic authority
embodied in the Russian emperor who was also the patron of all Orthodox people.
6.4. Atheization of the Soviet Union – destabilization

of the structure of worshipers
Although the position of religions and churches over a long period of the Soviet
rule cannot be uniquely determined, a general conclusion can be drawn about the
overall hostile and intolerant social framework that was strongly repressive against
religions and churches, especially towards Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox
Church as the largest religious institution in the Soviet Union as well as in today’s
Russia. Strictly observed, the position of religion and church in the Communist Sovi-
et Union varied – first going through a phase of exceptionally strong ideological-po-
litical and state pressure and persecution of churches and worshipers, resulting in
extreme social marginalization of religion, church and worshipers, to a phase of a
more peaceful and less repressive, but always pronounced negative relationship. The
sophisticated principles of atheization and atheistic education have continually nur-
tured a negative, universal attitude toward religion and church in efforts to preserve
the results achieved by atheism and secularization across the world. Religious people
faced an informal social barrier against any aspirations or careers in the field of state
administration, army, education system or health care. Religion and church were in
a type of a social ghetto, under full control by state and atheistic bureaucracy. How-
ever, the 1970s and 1980s were the years of disappointment of intelligence in official
views of the socialist state, which contributed to an increased interest in the unofficial
and directly opposed ideology held by the church. In general, these are the decades
in which the intelligence had discovered the attractiveness of various religions, not
just the Orthodoxy, but also the Romantic approach to the national past. Taking into
account the official standpoint, the effort to preserve the results of atheism had re-
mained in effect even in the initial period of the Gorbachev’s Perestroika, promoted
in the mid-80s as a “new opinion” in the failed reformist course in rescuing socialism.
The state-church relations did not “improve” until the end of the 1980s, which came
in the time of marking a millennium of the transition of the Russians from paganism
to Orthodox Christianity (988 - 1988). Those years were marked by increased public
interest in relations between the church and the state, religion, and society, particu-
larly relations between religion and culture, morality and politics.
The analysis of changes in the post-revolutionary religious situation in the Soviet
Union suggests two important consequences for the religion and church. The first im-
portant consequence is that a large number of worshipers “broke off” from the Ortho-
doxy, neglected religious rituals which were at that time socially prohibited. The second
cardinal consequence is the internal divide created in the Orthodox Church.
The religious situation in the Soviet Union started to change in the late 1970s and
early 80s. The increase in the number of worshipers among the Russians, both in Russia
and other parts of the Soviet Union, was evident even before Perestroika between the
1970s and the 1980s, although this increase varied in degree and by region. The fact
that during the 1960s and 70s experimental researches of religiosity showed a level of
religious population of hardly ever over 10% (Pantić, 1988: 21-22), then the empirical
data from late 1980s allowed a conclusion that the religiosity of the population doubled,
while the popularity of Marxism-Leninism was severed in half in that same period.
Religious pendulum is swinging back.
6.5. Deatheisation of Russia – restabilization

of the structure of worshipers
Towards the end of 1980s and early 1990s the social scene was changing, primarily by
relieving social and cultural climate from ideological repression, which was beneficial
for the occurrence of political and spiritual pluralism. The apparent religious changes
observed during the 1980s and early 1990s were mostly evident not only by a total in-
crease in powerful religious activities and social activities of religious organizations,
but also by the increased number of religious people in general and more pronounced
religious activities among youth and mid-life generation. There was also an increase in
religiosity and more pronounced religious activity among men in the religious popula-
tion, followed by an increased number of worshipers among the already above-average
religious older population. Religion and religiosity were revitalized in the sense of revi-
talizing religion as such, although public interest and public support extend to a wide
range of concrete religious expressions, be it Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism,
Buddhism, or Hinduism. Along with fertile missionary activities by Western organiza-
tions at the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was flooded cults and sects, both foreign and
domestic. Further development of the emerging religious situation showed that these
tendencies have continued to significantly change the religious views of society. In the
1990’s in Russia, “the conceptual pendulum” evidently shifted from declared atheism
back to declared religiosity. This was referred to as a “second ideological blow”, which
pushed the “spiritual pendulum” back towards religion and church, again after 70 years.
As in the time of the shift of the pendulum towards atheism, when mass atheism was
only gaining social grounds, primarily with young people and the urban population,
the agents of ideological changes of the post-Soviet Russia were again the urban popu-
lation and youth.
The process of religious revival in Russia, as well as in Serbia, was not completely
unambiguous. This was an ambivalent process as was the country in which it was tak-
ing place, in a state of a type of religious bifurcation, to use a geographic term used by
a Russian sociologist (Dubov, 2001). There are experimental data that show that this
process during the 1990s also revealed some internal limits, which did not allow it to
move in the direction of total, or at least unreasonable, return to religion and church, or
to orthodoxy, above all in terms of conventional, religious practice.
6.6. New stabilization of the structure of

worshipers in modern Russia
If the factual church practice in Russia is not judged too harshly, and if we bear in
mind the situation with religious practice in the Soviet Empire, it is difficult to deny the
process of religious revitalization even when religious behavior is concerned. On the oth-
er hand, we cannot deny the fact that conventional religious behavior in Russia, such as
attending church regularly, is at one of the lowest levels in Europe (Furman). (Furman).
Despite the fact that the spiritual and conceptual pendulum did not radically change
its position from the Soviet era, it is evidently moving towards the affirmation of reli-
gious and sacred. It is affirming the social significance of religion, Orthodoxy above all,
with a relatively stable structure and with certain fluctuations in the levels of religiosity,
empirically detected and theoretically justified.
6.7. Bibliograhpy
1. Blagojević, Mirko (1995) Približavanje pravoslavlju, Niš, JUNIR; Gradina.

2. Blagojević, Mirko (2005) Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva, Institut za
filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, IP Filip Višnjić, Beograd.
3. Blagojević, Mirko (2008) „Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society“,
Religion in Eastern Europe, vol. XXVII, Numbber 1., pp. 37-50., (Christians Asso-
ciated for Relations with Eastern Europe /USA/, edited by Paul Mojzes and Wal-
ter Sawatsky).
4. Boseti, Giancarlo; Eder Klaus (2008) „Post-secularism: A return to the Public
Sphere, Eurozine Review, www. Eurozine.com/journals/.
5. Coser, L. A. (1956) The Function of Social Conflict, London, Routledge and Ke-
gen Paul.
6. Davie, Grace (1994) Religion in Britain since 1945. Believing without Belonging.
Oxford: Blackwell.
7. Davie, Grace (2005) Religija u suvremenoj Europi – mutacija sjećanja, Golden
marketing, Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb.
8. Дубов, И. Г. (2001) „Уровень религиозности и влияние религиозных усто-
новок на отношение россиян к политическим лидерам“, Политические ис-
следования, № 2.
9. Đorđević, B. Dragoljub (1984) Begodcrkve, Knjaževac, Nota.
10. Фурман, Д. Е., Каариайнен, К. (2006) Религиозность В России в 90-е годы XX
– начале XXI века, РАН, Институт Европы, Издател ьство ОГНИ ТД, Москва.
11. Каариайнен, К., Фурман, Д. Е. (2000) Старые церкви, новые верующие

(Религия в массовом сазнании постсоветской России), Летний сад, Москва.
12. Pantić, Dragomir (1988) Klasičnaisvetovnareligioznost, Beograd, Centarzapoliti-
kološkaijavnomnenjskaistraživanja.
Prepared by: Professor Nevena Petrušić
7. LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE
INTERETHNIC, INTERCULTURAL AND
INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
7.1. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
7.1.1. United Nations Documents
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights –UDHR (adopted in 1948) sets forth the
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, all human beings are entitled to,
including: the right to life, liberty and security of person, the prohibition of slavery,
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of discrim-
ination, arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, the right to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal, the right for respect for his private and family
life, the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, the right to
marry and to found a family, the right to own property, freedom of religion, expression,
assembly and association, and political rights. According to the Declaration everyone
has right to social security, the right to work, to free choice of employment, the right
to education and the right to participate in the cultural life of the community. Articles
1 and 2 state that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and
“everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities80 (adopted in 1992) has the status of customary internation-
al law. It sets forth the rights to persons belonging to national or ethnic, linguistic and
80 Resolution 47/135, 18. December 1992.
71
religious minorities and urges states to promote and encourage respect for human
these rights. Article 2 provides that persons belonging to minorities have the right to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their
own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of
discrimination, and to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic
and public life.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion-ICERD (1965)81 is the principal UN treaty in the fight against racism and discrim-
ination. The ICERD states, inter alia, that “States Parties condemn all propaganda and
all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group
of persons of one color or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial
hatred and discrimination in any form” (Article 4). In this respect, states shall adopt
immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of,
such discrimination, and shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts
of violence or incitement to such acts, and shall declare illegal and prohibit organiza-
tions, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite
racial discrimination, and shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, na-
tional or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination. The ICERD calls upon states
to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all its
forms and manifestations, and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices.
Article 1 defines the term “racial discrimination” as: “any distinction, exclusion, restric-
tion or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - ICCPR (1966)82 Article
20 paragraph 2 sets forth that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited
by law”. Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that: “All persons are equal before the law
and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status”.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - ICESCR
(1966)83, Article 2, paragraph 2 imposes a duty on all states parties to guarantee that
81 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965, and came into force in 1967 (“Official Gazette of the
SFRY”, 31/67).
82 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966, and came into force on
March 23, 1976, (“Official Gazette of the SFRY” - International Treaties”, 7/71.
83 “Official Gazette of the SFRY” - International Treaties”, 7/71.
the rights enunciated in the ICESCR are exercised without discrimination of any kind
as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”. The States Parties recognize the right of every-
one to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work, fair wages and equal
remuneration for work, social security, the right of everyone to education and to take
part in cultural life.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child - CRC (1989)84 Article 2 establishes that
States Parties must respect and ensure the rights set forth in the CRC to each child with-
in their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his
or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women –
CEDAW (1979)85 establishes that States Parties must eliminate all forms of discrimina-
tion against women in the exercise and enjoyment of all human rights of women in the
civil, political, economic, social and domestic fields.
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – CRPD (2006)86 Article
5 establishes the obligation of Member States to ensure the full exercise of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons subject to their jurisdiction, without
any discrimination on the basis of disability. The CRPD also requires States Parties to
ensure equal protection and equal benefit of the law, and to prohibit all discrimination
on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effective
legal protection against discrimination on all grounds.
As a member of the United Nations, the Republic of Serbia is obliged to comply with
standards and recommendations set forth by the documents adopted by specialized or-
ganizations of the UN System, such as the UNESCO’s: Convention against Discrimination
84 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, was adopted on November 20, 1989. It entered into force
on September 2, 1990. To this date, over 200 states have ratified the CRC, including Yugoslavia (See:
Law on Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, “Official Gazette of the SFRY -
International Treaties”, No. 15/90 and 2/97).
85 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly at the session on 18 December 1979 in New York. The SFRY
ratified it by the Law on Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, (“Official Gazette of the SFRY - International Treaties”, No. 11/81). The SFRY
signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (OP-CEDAW), adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 6, 1999 in New York,
which came into force on December 22, 2000 (Law on the Confirmation of the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of Women, “Official Gazette of the
SFRY - International Treaties”, 13/2002).
86 The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted on December 13, 2006 by
the United Nations General Assembly in New York. It was opened for signature and ratification on
March 30, 2007. The CRPD came into force on May 3, 2008. The Republic of Serbia signed the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol on December 17, 2007, and
confirmed it by the Law on Confirmation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(“Official Gazette of the Republicof Serbia - International Treaties”, 42/09).
in Education (1960), Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
(2003)87, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), and others.
Among other things, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity fore-
sees the following: In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious
interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities
as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all
citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. Thus de-
fined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. In disso-
ciable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange
and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life (Article 2). Article 6
states: While ensuring the free flow of ideas by word and image care should be exercised
that all cultures can express and make themselves known. Freedom of expression, media
pluralism, multilingualism, equal access to art and to scientific and technological knowl-
edge, including in digital form, and the possibility for all cultures to have access to the
means of expression and dissemination are the guarantees of cultural diversity.
7.1.2. Council of Europe Documents
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, bet-
ter known as the European Convention on Human Rights - ECHR (1950), and its proto-
cols, including Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (2000)88
guarantees a number of civil and political rights (Articles 2-13) and provides for the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the EHCR without discrimination
on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status (Article 14). Protection against discrimination was reinforced by the Protocol no.
12 to the European Convention on Human Rights (adopted in 2000, and entered into
force in 2005), by establishing a general prohibition on discrimination of the enjoyment
of any right, including those protected under national law.
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), which was
adopted as a convention in 1992, and came into force in 199889, aims to protect and
promote traditional regional and minority languages in Europe, and thus contribute
the conservation and promotion of tradition and cultural diversity in Europe. The
87 It was adopted at the 32nd Session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization in Paris in 2003 (Law on the Confirmation of the Convention of the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia - Interna-
tional Treaties”, No. 1/10) .
88 Law on Ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties”, No. 9/03, 5/05 and 7/05 –
correction, and “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia - International Treaties”, no. 12/10 and 10/15).
89 Law on Ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, (“Official Gazette of
Serbia and Montenegro - International Treaties”, No. 18/05).
ECRML lays down a series of concrete measures designed to facilitate and encourage
the use of regional or minority languages in several areas of public life: education,
courts, administration, media, culture, economic and social life, and cross-border
co-operation. With regard to the prohibition of discrimination based on language
(Article 7), it sets forth that “The Parties undertake to eliminate, if they have not yet
done so, any unjustified distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference relating to the
use of a regional or minority language and intended to discourage or endanger the
maintenance or development of it. The adoption of special measures in favor of re-
gional or minority languages aimed at promoting equality between the users of these
languages and the rest of the population or which take due account of their specific
conditions is not considered to be an act of discrimination against the users of more
widely-used languages”.
The Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities of the Coun-
cil of Europe (1995)90 is the first multilateral treaty to deal exclusively with the rights
of national minorities. It refers to the rights of persons belonging to national mi-
norities in different spheres of public life, in particular: culture, education, official
use of language and script, information in national minority languages, and other
rights, such as the right to participate in public affairs, the right to maintain maintain
free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with persons in other States, in particular
those with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, etc.
The Framework Convention lays out general objectives and principles that Member
States should implement through national legislation and appropriate governmental
policies, and a catalogue of rights that they should incorporate in national legislation
and legal orders, in order to create appropriate conditions enabling them to enabled to
maintain and develop their distinct identities. As for protection against discrimina-
tion, Article 4 requires that: “The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belong-
ing to national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection
of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on belonging to a national mi-
nority shall be prohibited”.
7.1.3. The EU legal documents
Though not-binding from the formal point of view, EU legal documents are rele-
vant for human and minority rights and protection against racial and other discrimina-
tion, since the Republic of Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement91
(SAA) with the EU in 2008, and in 2009 applied for EU membership. As a consequence,
90 Law on the Confirmation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (“Of-
ficial Gazette of the FRY - International Treaties”, No. 6/98).
91 The Law on the Confirmation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European
Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part
(“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, no. 83/08)
respect for human and minority rights and fight against discrimination are among ba-
sic obligation undertaken by the Republic of Serbia, with respect to political conditions
for accession to the European Union, defined by the Conclusions from the Copenhagen
European Council in 1993, relating to standards in the field of rule of law, human rights
and respect for and protection of minorities.
In EU law, the general prohibition of discrimination is set out in Article 13 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty). With the Amsterdam
Treaty Article 13, the European Union was provided with a legal basis for the first
time to take action to combat discrimination on grounds of gender, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, including the power
to enact own legal documents to prevent and eliminate discrimination based on the
above grounds. The Treaty of Lisbon (signed on December 13, 2007), under Article
2, paragraph 3 sets forth, inter alia, that the EU shall combat social exclusion and
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between wom-
en and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.
When the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union - CFR (2000) became legally binding. The CFR establishes that
everyone is equal before the law (Article 20); prohibits discrimination based on the
ground of any membership, including membership of a national minority (Article 21)
and sets forth that the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity
(Article 22). The CFR explicitly prohibits any discrimination based on any ground
such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property,
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation, while emphasizing the importance of the
principle of gender equality.
In the sphere of protection against racial discrimination, directives are an important
part of the secondary sources of EU law. The most important among them are Council
Directive 2000/43/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Racial Equality Directive) and Council Directive
2000/78/EC, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation (Employment Equality Directive).
The Race Equality Directive prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin in the fields of employment, education, social pro-
tection, including social security and health care and access to goods services which
are available to the public. Under the Race Equality Directive all Member States must
have, or create, a special body for the promotion of equal treatment on grounds of
race and ethnic origin.
The Employment Equality Directive implements the principle of equal treatment in
employment and training, irrespective of religion, sexual orientation and age. The Di-
rective allows for differences of treatment if it allows the preservation of the specific
features of religious institutions or when it refers to the setting of special conditions on
access to employment for young people or older workers in the labor market.
7.2. Bilateral agreements
Serbia is a successor to bilateral agreements on protection of minorities entered into

by and between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or State Union of Serbia and Monte-
negro and Hungary, Romania, Macedonia and Croatia, as follows: Agreement between
Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Hungary on Protection of Rights of Hun-
garian National Minority Living in Serbia and Montenegro and of Serbian National Mi-
nority Living in the Republic of Hungary 92; Agreement between Federal Government of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Romania on Cooperation in
the Area of Protection of National Minorities93; Agreement between Serbia and Mon-
tenegro and the Republic of Macedonia on Protection of Rights of Serbian and Monte-
negrin National Minority in the Republic of Macedonia and of Macedonian National
Minority in Serbia and Montenegro94, and Agreement between Serbia and Montenegro
and the Republic of Croatia on Protection of Rights of Serbian and Montenegrin Mi-
nority in the Republic of Croatia and of Croatian minority Serbia and Montenegro95.
7.3. National sources of law
7.3.1. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia
The Constitution of the RS (2006)96 contains the norms which constitute intercultur-
ality, by ensuring dignity and free development of individuals (Article 23), inviolabili-
ty of physical and mental integrity (Article 25), right to freedom and security (Article
27), right to legal person (Article 37), freedom of thought and expression (Article 46),
freedom of expressing national affiliation, including the right not to declare national
affiliation (Article 47), etc.
The Constitution also promotes understanding, recognition and respect of diver-
sity arising from specific ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity of its citizens
through measures applied in education, culture and public information (Article 48).
Under Article 49, any inciting of racial, ethnic, religious or other inequality or hatred
shall be prohibited and punishable. The Constitutional Court may ban only such as-
sociations the activity of which is aimed at violent overthrow of constitutional order,
92 “Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro – International Treaties”, No. 14/2004

96 “Officaial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 98/06
violation of guaranteed human or minority rights, or inciting of racial, national and

religious hatred (Article 55, paragraph 3). The Constitution prohibits activities of politi-
cal parties aiming at forced overthrow of constitutional system, violation of guaranteed
human or minority rights, inciting racial, national or religious hatred (Article 5). The
Constitution strictly prohibits any forced assimilation of persons belonging to national
minorities, including “undertaking measures, which would cause artificial changes in
ethnic structure of population in areas where members of national minorities live tra-
ditionally and in large numbers” (Article 78). Persons belonging to national minorities
are guaranteed special individual or collective rights in addition to the rights guaran-
teed to all citizens by the Constitution. They may elect their national councils in order
to exercise the right to self-governance in the field of culture, education, information
and official use of their language and script, in accordance with the law (Article 75,
paragraph 3). The Constitution envisages a number of individual and collective rights
providing for cultural autonomy of persons belonging to national minorities, including
the right to: expression, preservation, fostering, developing and public expression of
national, ethnic, cultural, religious specificity; use of their symbols in public places; use
of their language and script; have proceedings also conducted in their languages before
state bodies, organizations with delegated public powers, bodies of autonomous prov-
inces and local self-government units, in areas where they make a significant majority
of population; education in their languages in public institutions and institutions of au-
tonomous provinces; founding private educational institutions; use of their name and
family name in their language; traditional local names, names of streets, settlements
and topographic names also written in their languages, in areas where they make a
significant majority of population; complete, timely and objective information in their
language, including the right to expression, receiving, sending and exchange of infor-
mation and ideas; establishing their own mass media (Article 79, paragraph 1).
Under Article 76, persons belonging to national minorities are guaranteed equality be-
fore the law and equal legal protection. Any discrimination on the grounds of affiliation to
a national minority is prohibited. The Republic of Serbia may introduce specific regulations
and provisional measures in economic, social, cultural and political life for the purpose of
achieving full equality among persons belonging to national minority and citizens who
belong to the majority, which shall not be considered discrimination if they are aimed at
eliminating extremely unfavorable living conditions which particularly affect them.
Article 77 of the Constitution provides for persons belonging to national minorities
the right to participate in administering public affairs and assume public positions, un-
der the same conditions as other citizens. When taking up employment in state bodies,
public services, bodies of autonomous province and local self-government units, the
ethnic structure of population and appropriate representation of members of national
minorities must be taken into consideration.
According to Article 11 if the Constitution, churches and religious communities are
separated from the state and no religion may be established as a state or mandatory re-
ligion. Also, according to Article 44, paragraph 2, churches and religious communities
are equal and free to organize independently their internal structure, religious matters
and to perform religious rites in public.
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by Article 43 of the Constitution, stipulating that
everyone has the freedom to manifest their religion or religious beliefs in worship, ob-
servance, practice and teaching, individually or in community with others, and to man-
ifest religious beliefs in private or public, and no person has the obligation to declare his
religious beliefs, which is expressly stated by Article 43, paragraph 2. The Constitution
also states that freedom of manifesting religion or beliefs may be restricted by law only
if necessary in a democratic society to protect lives and health of people, morals of dem-
ocratic society, freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Constitution, public safety and
order, or to prevent inciting of religious, national or racial hatred.
Tolerance is another value set forth in the Constitution. In the field of education,
culture and information, under Article 81, Serbia shall give impetus to the spirit of tol-
erance and intercultural dialogue and undertake efficient measures for enhancement of
mutual respect, understanding and cooperation among all people living on its territory,
regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity.
The Constitution guarantees, and as such, directly implements human and minority
rights guaranteed by the generally accepted rules of international law, ratified interna-
tional treaties and laws (Article 18, paragraph 2). Provisions on human and minority
rights are interpreted to the benefit of promoting values of a democratic society, pursu-
ant to valid international standards in human and minority rights, as well as the prac-
tice of international institutions which supervise their implementation.
The Constitution prohibits all direct or indirect discrimination based on any
grounds, particularly on race, sex, national origin, social origin, birth, religion, political
or other opinion, property status, culture, language, age, mental or physical disability
shall be prohibited (Article 21).
7.3.2. Law on Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities
The Law on Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities97 contains
a definition of a “national minority”, which, in the spirit of the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe, involves subjective
and objective criteria on the basis of which persons belonging to national minorities
have the freedom to choose the ethnic (national) group. Accordingly, a national minori-
ty is a group of citizens of the Republic of Serbia sufficiently representative, although
in a minority position on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, belonging to group of
the population with a lasting and firm connection with the Republic of Serbia and pos-
sessing some distinctive features, such as language, national or ethnic belonging, origin
97 “Official Gazette of FRY“, No. 11/02, and “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 72/09 – state law, and 97/13 –
Constitutional Court
or religion, upon which it differs from the majority of the population, and its members
should show their concern over preservation of their common identity, including cul-
ture, tradition, language or religion (Article 2, paragraph 1)98. Article 5, paragraph 1,
explicitly establishes that no one will suffer any damage as a result of his/her affiliation
or expression of national belonging, or of his/her not doing so, whereas paragraph 2 of
this Article prohibits any registration of persons belonging to national minorities that
obliges them to express their national belonging against their will.
The law establishes the cultural autonomy of national minorities, which includes a
range of special measures for the protection of their rights in the areas of importance for
the preservation of their common identity, including education, culture, information
and official use of languages (Articles 9-17). In addition, the law introduced the the con-
cept of minority self-government through the institution of national council of national
minority (Article 19) – bodies established for the purpose of exercising their right to
self-governance in the fields of the use of language and alphabet, education, media and
culture. An important provision of the law allows for taking measures of affirmative
action with the aim of securing full and effective equality (Article 4).
7.3.3. Law on National Councils of National Minorities
The Law on National Councils of National Minorities – NCNM Law 99 governs the
competences of NCNMs in the areas of culture, education, information, official use of
language and script, electoral procedures for NCNMs and their funding, as well as oth-
er issues of importance for NCNMs (Article 1). The NCNM Law was amended in 2018
to ensure that human and minority rights are enhanced and its provisions harmonized
with the Decision of the Constitutional Court declaring some of the provisions un-
constitutional. The amendment was carried out to comply with the recommendations
provided to Serbia, as the signatory of international treaties dealing with protection of
minority rights, by relevant international bodies responsible for monitoring their im-
plementation, in particular by the Advisory Committee for evaluating the implementa-
tion of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, suggesting
that the NCNM Law should be amended to reduce excessive politicization of NCNMs
and provide for the division of powers in the management of NCNMs. The intention of
amending the NCNM Law was also to harmonize its provisions with the systemic laws
in the spheres of education, culture and information, and to remedy the weaknesses
identified in the course of its implementation. Some provisions were amended to reg-
ulate in detail some issues, such as deletion of NCNMs from the Register, publicity of
the NCNM’s work, keeping special electoral registers of national minorities, delivery of
98 All groups of citizens who consider or define themselves as peoples, national or ethnic communities,
national or ethnic groups, nations or nationalities, and who fulfill the conditions from Article 2, para-
graph 1 of the Law, will be treated as national minorities.
99 “Official Gazette of RS“, Nos 72/09, 20/14 – CC and 55/14 and 47/2018.
the decision on enrollment, deletion and changes in the Register to the provincial ad-
ministrative body responsible for the protection of national minorities, cooperation of
NCNMs with provincial authorities, and financing the activities of NCNMs.
7.3.4. Law on Churches and Religious Communities
The Law on Churches and Religious Communities100 provides for Freedom of religion,
including: freedom to have or not to have, to hold or to change religion or religious convic-
tion, that is freedom of belief, freedom to profess faith in God; freedom to manifest belief
or religious conviction either individually or in community with others, in public or in pri-
vate, by participating in religious services and performing religious ceremonies, through
religious teachings and instructions, cherishing and developing religious tradition; free-
dom to develop and improve religious education and culture (Article 1, paragraph 2).
The law prohibits all forms of discrimination based on religion (Article 2), and de-
fines traditional Churches and religious communities, confessional communities and
other religious organizations as holders of religious freedom (Article 4). Article 10 de-
fines traditional Churches and religious communities by name. Article 18, paragraph 2
explicitly states that traditional Churches and religious communities do not need to file
an application for the entry into the Register. The law envisages that the state may, in
mutual interest, financially support Churches and religious communities.
7.3.5. Laws in the field of education
The Law on Fundamentals of Education System101 - The main objectives of education

and upbringing specified in Article 8 include, inter alia, development of competencies
for understanding and respect of the rights of the child, human rights, civil freedoms
and capabilities for life in a democratically regulated and just society; development of
and respect for the racial, national, cultural, linguistic, religious, gender, sexual and
age equality, tolerance and respect for diversity, development of personal and national
identity; development of awareness and sense of belonging to the Republic of Serbia,
respecting and fostering of the Serbian language and their languages, the Serbian tra-
dition and culture, the tradition and culture of national minorities and ethnic commu-
nities, developing multiculturalism and respecting and preserving national and world
heritage. Article 5 states that for pupils and students belonging to national minorities
the teaching is conducted in their languages and scripts, and may also be conducted
bilingually: in languages and scripts of national minorities and in Serbian language, in
accordance with a special law.
100 “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 36/06.

101 “Official Gazette of RS“, Nos. 88/2017 and 27/2018 – state laws.
The Law on Primary Education102 prescribes that the teaching is conducted in Serbi-
an language. For pupils belonging to national minorities, the teaching is conducted in
the minority language or bilingually, if at lease 15 pupils enroll into the first grade. For
school pupils wishing to attend religious education classes, the curriculum is made by
the minister, upon agreed proposal of traditional churches and religious communities,
and upon obtained opinion from the authority in charge of relations with churches and
religious communities. The commission for religious education monitors the organiza-
tion and implementation of religious education classes (Article 33). Similar provisions
are envisaged by the Law on Secondary Education. 103
7.3.6. Law on Official Use of Languages and Scripts
The Law on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts104 provides for the general issue of
official use of languages and scripts within the Republic of Serbia, its part III containing the
provisions exclusively related to official use of languages of national minorities. At the very
beginning, in Article 1, the Law sets forth that in the areas inhabited by persons belonging
to national minorities, their languages and scripts shall be officially used concurrently with
Serbian language. Under the Law, the official use of languages and scripts is defined as the
use of languages and scripts in the activities of government authorities, authorities of auton-
omous provinces, cities and municipalities, institutions, companies and other organizations
when exercising public authority, public authorities and companies and other organizations
performing activities provided by the Law itself. Part III of the Law provides for the following:
conducting first-instance administrative, criminal, civil or other proceedings or procedures
in the minority language (Articles 12 - 14); use of minority language in the proceedings con-
ducted in the areas where minority languages are not in official use (Articles 16 - 17); issuing
public documents in the languages of national minorities (Article 18); choice and use of per-
sonal name and names of children and entry of such names into all public documents, official
records and personal data collections (Article 18 а); display of topographical indications as
well as signs in the languages of national minorities (Articles 19 - 20).
7.3.7. Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination
The Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination105 regulates the general prohibition of

discrimination, the forms and cases of discrimination, as well as the methods of pro-
tection against discrimination, and establishes the Commissioner for the Protection of
102 “Official Gazette of RS“, Nos. 55/13 and 101/17 and 27/2018 – state law)
103 “Official Gazette of RS“, Nos. 55/2013 i 101/2017.
104 “Official Gazette of RS“, Nos. 45/91, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 101/05 – state law, 30/10. 7/2018 and 48/2018
–coorec.
105 “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 22/09.
Equality. Direct and indirect forms of discrimination are also prohibited, as well as vio-
lation of the principle of equal rights and obligations, calling to account, associating for
the purpose of exercising discrimination, hate speech and disturbing and humiliating
treatment, and severe forms of discrimination (Article 13).
7.3.8. Other regulations
The Law on Public Information and Media (2014) - With a view to enabling national
minorities to exercise their right to information in their own languages and the right to
foster their own cultures and identities, the Republic of Serbia, Autonomous Province and
local self-government unit provide part of funds, through co-financing, or other condi-
tions for the operation of the media that publishes information in the languages of nation-
al minorities, through the authority responsible for public information affairs (Article 13).
The Law on Public Service Broadcasting (2014) establishes the obligation of the public
the public service broadcasters to fulfill the minority needs for programming that fa-
cilitates preserving and expressing the cultural identity of national minorities, showing
consideration for the need of national minorities to have access to certain programming
in their own language and script.
The Law on the Election of Deputies106 envisages that political parties of ethnic mi-
norities and coalitions of political parties of ethnic minorities shall participate in dis-
tribution of mandates even if they won less than 5% of votes out of the total number of
voters who have voted (Article 81, paragraph 2).
Provincial Assembly Decision on the Election of Deputies of the Assembly of the Au-
tonomous Province of Vojvodina107 stipulates that political parties of national minorities
and coalitions of political parties of national minorities participate in the distribution
of mandates, even if they have gained less than 5% of votes out of the total number of
voters who have cast their votes (Article 74, paragraph 4).
The Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia108 incriminates certain criminal offenses
against freedoms and rights, including the right to equality. Special attention is devoted
to the following criminal offences: violation of equality (Article 128), violation of the
right to use the language or script (Article 129), violation of the right to expression of
national or ethnic affiliation (Article 130), violation of the freedom of religion and per-
forming religious services (Article 131), injury to reputation due to racial, religious, eth-
nic or other affiliation (Article 174), instigating national, racial and religious hatred and
intolerance (Article 317), racial and other discrimination (Article 387), as well as other
hate crimes. Under Article 54a, if a criminal offence is committed from hate based on
106 “Sl. glasnik RS”, br. 35/00, 57/03 – CC decision, 72/03 – state law, 75/03 – corr. Of state law, 18/04,
101/05 – state law, 85/2005 – state law, 28/11 – CC decision, 36/11 i 104/09 – state law.
107 “Official Gazette of AP Vojvodina”, no. 23/14.
108 “Official Gazette of RS”, no. 85/05, 88/05 - corr., 107/05 - corr, 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 104/13, 108/14 i
94/16.
race or religion, national or ethnic affiliation, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity
of another, the court shall consider such circumstance as aggravating except when it is
not stipulated as a feature of the criminal offence.
7.4. Institutional framework
Republic authorities: Committee on Human and Minority Rights and Gender

Equality of the National Assembly; Culture and Information Committee of the Nation-
al Assembly; Office for Human and Minority Rights; Coordination Body for Gender
Equality; Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Unit; Council for the Improvement of
Roma Status and Implementation of the Decade of Roma Inclusion; Council for Nation-
al Minorities of the Republic of Serbia; Youth Council; Committee on the Rights of the
Child; Council for Monitoring the Implementation of the Recommendations of the UN
Human Rights Mechanisms; Council for Monitoring the Implementation of the Action
Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for Prevention and Protection against Dis-
crimination for the period 2014-2018
Provincial authorities: Provincial Secretariat for Education, Regulations, Admin-
istration and National Minorities - National Communities; Provincial Secretariat for
Economy, Employment and Gender Equality; Roma Inclusion Office
Local authorities: Councils for Interethnic Relations
Independent bodies: Protector of Citizens of the Republic of Serbia; Commissioner
for the Protection of Equality; Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and
Personal Data Protection; Press Council; Agency for Electronic Media
Anna Krasteva109
8. BALKAN MIGATIONS
There is hardly another region of the world where the current situation of migra-
tions is still considerably influenced by the past history as in the Balkans. Migra-
tions are a fundamental part of the history of the Balkans, accompanied by turbu-
lent times...(Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004: 519).
This quote is notable in two aspects: on the one hand, it describes the typical migra-
tion outlook of continuity and longue duree, while on the other, it presents it as a unique
specifically to the Balkan region. The theory of migration systems and several non-eco-
nomic theories have strongly conceptualised the influence of a state’s past and interstate
relations on contemporary migrations flows. It is quite curious as to why what is long-
known in theory as a typical causality is seen as unique. The answers lie in the construc-
tions of the Balkans as radical otherness, though their argumentation goes beyond the
purpose of the present study. The highlight of the present study is on the understanding
of the alloy between continuity and discontinuity in the explanation of migrations; the
former expressed in the trends, the latter – in breakthroughs, ruptures, changes.
8.1. The long (re)discovery of labour migration
The migration champion of Europe – the Balkans suddenly gained this reputation in
the beginning of the 90ties. The above period is characterized by rather contradictory
trends in the Eastern and Western sub regions. I am going to analyze this unique dy-
namic and the diversity by a periodization of the major stages in the development of the
migration situation and a typology of the main flows and the key trends.
I’ll distinguish four periods after the fall of Berlin wall.
109 Director of CERMES (Centre for european refugees, migration and ethnic studies), professor of political
sciences at the New Bulgarian University, Sofia and doctor honoris causa of University Lille 3, France.
85
8.2. Periodiodization (1990 – 2015+)
8.2.1. First period from 1989 to Dayton. Two opposite migration models
This period covers a highly dynamic historic situation: the wars in former Yugosla-
via, the beginning of the democratic transition in Bulgaria and Romania. It is charac-
terised by 4 trends.
The first is the sad primacy of the Balkans, which become the migration champion of
Europe, creating the largest flows of forced migrations in post-war Europe (Laszko, von
Koppenfels and Bartel 2002, Krasteva et al 2007), a serious furnace of security risks. Ten
million of the 80-million population entered the migration flows (Edwards-Baldwin 2005).
The second is the imbalance between the different forms of migration. While in Eu-
rope and the world work migrations are dominant, in the West Balkans of the early
90s the pendulum is pointing in the polar opposite direction – the refugees, internally
displaced persons, ethnic migrations and traffick have taken central stage. This is the
period when the Eastern Balkans are still producing refugees.
The third is the brisk separation of the Balkans in two opposing models - the literal
“flight” of the Western and Eastern Balkans towards two opposing migration poles.
While the migration profiles of the Western and Eastern Balkans were opposing even
before this period, these differences intensify in the early 90s and form two polar clus-
ters. The Eastern Balkans are undergoing a transition from politization to economiza-
tion of migration; the Wеstern – just the opposite, from economization to politization.
The forth trend is predominantly related to somewhat good news. After the commu-
nist closeness the Eastern Balkans110 also become an overproducer of migration, but one
that is predominantly work and education. This forth trend is not so much traumatic,
but prospective.
110 The case of Albania is a mix of elemets of migration models of Western and Eastern Balkans; it will be
analyzed in ‘migration profiles’.
8.2.2. Second period from the Dayton Agreement of 1995 to the mid-first decade of
the XXI century. Post-conflict migrations. Europeanization and migration.
This period starts with an end and ends with a beginning. It starts with the end of
the wars in former Yugoslavia, marked by the Dayton Agreement, and ends with the
European debut of the first Balkan members of the EU – Slovenia (2004); Romania
(2007) and Bulgaria (2007).
It is characterised by two trends:
• Transition from forced to post-conflict migration flows in the Western Balkans
• First steps towards Europeanization of the migration profile of the Eastern Balkans.
The policy of voluntary return of the forcefully displaced gain absolute priority.
If the migration panorama in former Yugoslavia should heal the wounds of conflicts,
the refugee flow in Romania and Bulgaria gains a European outlook: it does not originate
from neighbouring countries, but from the far-away ones – the classic sources of global
refugee flows. Afganistan, Irak, Somalia – those are the main sources of those looking for
asulym in Bulgaria and Romania. Those are the main producers of refugees also on a Eu-
ropean and global scale – every forth refugee in the world is Afgan. Rather paraxodically,
the Europeanization of the migration profile of the Eastern Balkans starts precisely with
the refugee flows. Several distinctions need to be made. In all else, the migration profile of
Bulgaria and Romania remains Balkan, not European: the emigration strongly dominates
against immigration; immigration itself holds low values – both in absolute numbers, as
well as in percentage of the population; both countries are still a strong source of human
trafficking to the difference of Western countries, who are the final destination.
The second distinction is in regard to the profile of refugees in the Eastern and West-
ern Balkans, which differs significantly. In the countries of former Yugoslavia it is char-
acterized with internally displaced persons and refugees from neighbouring countries.
In other words, it has a post-conflict outlook that is entirely defined by the recently end-
ed wars in the region. For the Western Balkans the source of refugee flows is internal,
for the Eastern – external.
Another specificity of the period is that immigration starts receiving political and
economic visibility. This is a period of gradual rehabilitation of the labor migration. It is
no longer one form amongst a multitude of others, but one that holds a central place in
the migration landscape as well as migration politics.
8.2.3. The third period from mid-first decade of 20th century (2004) till the start
of the economic crisis (2008-9). Labor migration – the main game in town
The European integration is already a reality or a foreseeable horizon. The biggest

achievement of this period is the transformation of work and occupation as the main
source of both emigration and immigration. It is only in this period that the Balkans
begin approaching migration ‘normalcy’111. Forced and ethnic112 migrations are in the
past, the citizens take on to look for jobs, for more decent pay, for better education, for
new professional perspectives. South Eastern Europe has gone a long way into rehabil-
itating labor migration.
The second visible result is overcoming the opposing migration profiles of the West-
ern and Eastern Balkans. The economization of migration starts gradually to erase the
differences characterising the early 90s period and we observe a larger convergence of
the types of migration flows and trends.
The third change, which has already started in the previous periods, is the trans-
formation of migration into a powerful symbolic capital and resource. To the lack of
reforms, poor governance, new inequalities, the citizens respond in three ways – mi-
gration, migration, migration. Migration becomes the radical critique of the inefficient
elites. If in the first period the elites in the Western Balkans use forced migrations
against its citizens, from then on until now the citizens in both Westerna and Eastern
Balkans are re-appropriating migration as a resource to escape local elites and to realise
professional, educational, family or existential projects.
EU integration has direct effect on the migration flows and has its qualitative and
quantitative dimensions. The first is related to the access granted to the citizens of the
new member states to a new migration category – ‘the free movement of people’. The sec-
ond is related to the increase of emigration. This phenomenon represents such a tangle
of myths, media speculations, realities, and political discourses, that in order to untan-
gle we would need a separate article. Here I will mention two equally significant facts.
The first is the increase of flows from the new member-statess: from 0.3 million in
2001, the number of Romanians reached 1.7 million in 2008, the respective figures for
Bulgarians are 0.1 and 0.3 million. The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 had a different
impact on migration flows: in 2001 there were twice as many citizens of EU-10 in the EU
than Romanians and Bulgarians; in 2008, the situation reversed both in absolute and
relative terms (Vassileva 2009: 6). Balkan citizens are more eager to consume the right of
free movement. A great public visibility gains the topic of Balkan communities in the EU:
Romanians are the largest immigrant group in two of the largest immigrant countries in
Europe – Spain and Italy113, Albanians in Greece, Serbians - in Austria (Vasileva 2009).
The mobility of the new member states has such an impressive political visibility – in
the sending as much as in the receiving countries - that the images and political mes-
sages begin to strongly dominate against the realities. The mobility of the new member
states is not an exception but a confirmation of the right to high mobility that the “old
ones” enjoyed: 75% of the foreigners in the EU-27 live in Germany, Spain, UK, France
and Italy; at the same time, citizens of these countries are among the most numerous
EU foreigners living in another member state (Vassileva 2009: 1).
111 “Migration today is for work” (International Labor Organization 2010 a).
112 The Roma migration remains the big exception.
113 As well as Hungary.
8.2.4. The forth period begins with the economic crisis and continues
till today. It is characterized with the interference of two
crises – the economic crisis and the refugee crisis.
Two distinct types of crisis mark the current migration period: the first is the
economic crisis of 2008-9 and its influence on the migration dynamic; the second
is the crisis of Syrian refugees after 2012, which continues even today with growing
strength.
The economic crisis impacts deeply migration flows (Papademetriou and Terrazas
2009) - this statement is accepted consensually, but scholars diverge in the interpre-
tation of the impact. The emergence of a new migration order summarizes the first
interpretation. It is substantiated by two arguments: the scope and range of the eco-
nomic crises are unprecedented; its impact on immigration is direct and crucial and
leads to the emergence of a “new migration order”. The second interpretation stresses
that the crisis is global, but the strategies for dealing with it are national. In addition,
the more all-embracing the crisis becomes, the more the cooperation decreases and
the national protective mechanisms flourish (Koser 2009: 2) The third interpretation
introduces a radical criticism. It un-economizes the crisis and stresses that the eco-
nomic crisis should not cover up another, much bigger and much deeper crisis – that
of the increasing social inequalities (Hoerder 2009). This vision shifts the accent from
unemployment to inequalities, from the economic to the social. The crisis as opportu-
nity is the central point of the fourth interpretation (Barbulescu 2009). A publication
of the International Labor Organization with the telling title of Don’t waste the crisis:
critical perspective for a new economic model calls for debate so that the end of the
crisis is not just return to business as usual, but the grounds for a new economic and
social order (Pons-Vognon 2010)
Crisis and return. It was expected that the crisis would give rise to large flows of
returnees to the Balkan states due to the unemployment in the Western countries. Re-
turns, of course, there are, and increasingly so, yet far from the expected numbers. The
reason for the short-sightedness of these predictions is the reductionist economic un-
derstanding of migration, reducing it to a mere response to the necessities of the labour
market. Yet migration is a far more complex phenomenon. Amongst the elements in
relation to the given example we can find: the unemployment benefits in many receiving
countries are far higher than the salaries in the home states; many migrants are already
well integrated and would suffer a shock in coming back; the children go to school and
the return would sever their educational integration.
Crisis and migrational balance. If there is an area in which the crisis is vividly and
unanimously manifested, it is in relation to the migration balance between emigration
and immigration. For countries such as Bulgaria the imbalance was starting to decrease
with numbers of immigrants approaching numbers of emigrants. Yet the crisis opened
the scissors again between the out-flows and the in-flows. For two reasons. The crisis
reduces the already not very strong appeal of Balkan states as a destination and thus
reduces the number of the willing to immigrate in the region. The crisis reduces even
further the opportunities for work and decent remuneration and the migration remains
the main option for escape route.
The refugee crises114 after 2013 is born from two opposing reasons: the war in Syria
and the large refugee flow on the one hand, and the membership of Bulgaria in the EU,
which makes the country one of the first European stops after Turkey.
8.3. Applications for asylum in Bulgaria for the period 2010 - 2015
Year Number ofapplications

2010 1025
2011 890
2012 1387
2013 7144
2014 11081
30.06.2015 7348
Source: State Agency for Refugees, Bulgaria
Other reasons explain the perception of the refugee flow as a shock: 1/the sudden
increase – almost 7 times in 2013 and then 50% more in the following 2014. Just in the
first six months of the current 2015 the number of refugees (7 348) is already more than
it was in 2013 - 7 144; 2/the utter unpreparedness of the Bulgarian authorities and insti-
tutions to deal with the refugee flow.
***
It is difficult to decide the figure that would be able to synthesize the migration dy-
namic in the Balkans in the last quarter of a century. The circle represents the continuity
between the refugee crisis, which marks the beginning of the circle and the new refugee
crisis, which stands at the end of the analysed period. Both refugee crises are born in
wars and conflicts though the source is different – internal for the Western Balkans two
decades ago, external to the Balkans today. The arrow introduces the more optimistic
image of the Balkan migration – the transition from forced and ethnic migrations to
economic ones and the possibilities for free movement of people.
114 The size and the impact of the reefugee crisis in numerous Balkan countries can’t be covered by the
present article.
8.4. Typology of Balkan Migrations
The great diversity of migration flows on the Balkans I would divide into three cat-
egories. The first two engroup the two poles of the labor and non-labor migrations. I
put in a separate third category the return, as it touches on both first categories – in the
post-conflict Western Balkans the return follows mostly forced migration or displace-
ment, while in the Eastern Balkans – it is most often a natural end or another step in the
labor and educational migration.
I Non-labor
1. Forced
2. Ethnic
3. Trafficking
4. Refugees
5. Retirement
II Labor
1. Emigration
2. Circular migration, including the free movement of people
3. Immigration
III Return
1. From forced migration or displacement
2. From voluntary migration
8.5. Typology of Balkan Migrations
Each typology is a risky endeavour in that it aims to capture in cryslallised forms

the dynamic, flexible and fluid form of migration. The current typology zooms in on
the migration flows in the last quarter of a century. Exactly for this reason it looks
‘reversed’ in comparison to the global picture. If in the same period in the world and
the EU labor migrations prevail and even certain asylum demands are considered
as veiled form of work migration, in the 90s in the Balkans we see an increase in the
forms of non-laboor migration.
We see that the category of non-labor migration is vastly heterogenous. The pole of
voluntarism and life in comfort englobes some of the most positive forms of migration
– migration of free time and retirement migration. The most characteristic groups are
the Germans and Austrians in Croatia (Bosic, 2007), and British in Bulgaria (Krasteva,
2008). The opposite and negative pole is overpopulated – around it are concentrated the
forced and the ethnic migrations, the refugees, as well as human trafficking.
Out of the four types of migration which Martin Edwards-Baldwin (2005) uses to
characterize the Balkan migrations in the first half of the 90ties, three are non-labor:
forced, ethnic, and trafficking. The largest group of forced migrations are the 2.6mln
from the 4.3mln population of Bosna and Herzegovina, who were internally displaced
or refugees (1992-1995) – this is the largest population loss of the decade (Bonifazi and
Mamolo 2004: 523). 300 – 350 000 Serbians leave Croatia in the direction of Serbia and
Bosna and Hertzegovina (1991-1995). In 1999, 770 000 Kosovars are forced to flee their
homes; their return later in the same year leads to exodus of 230 000 Serbs and Roma to
Serbia and Montenegro (Edwards-Baldwin 2005).
If forced migrations put a traumatic mark on the Western Balkans, the Eastern Bal-
kans produce ethnic migrations: Bulgaria expels 360 000 members of the Turkish mi-
nority115 (Krasteva 2007, 2008), numerous members of the minorities in Romania leave
the country in the first years after the transition: 105 000 Germans, 37 000116 Hungari-
ans, 3 000 jews (Edwards-Baldwin 2005). The utter complexity of the ethnic and forced
migrations of the Balkans in the 90s is summarized by Miriana Morokvasic:
What Hannah Arendt calls “the belt of mixed populations” in Central and East-
ern Europe” un-mixes as the ‘ethnic surplus’ is expelled or leaves ‘voluntarily’ to
join the majority in a new state or territorial unit (Morokvasic 2003:2)
The exodus and forced displacements give non-work migrations on the Balkans its
outlook in the early 90s; later that decade the focus shifts to another equally negative
form – trafficking. The Eastern European trafficking (Krasteva et al 2007b, Laczko
2002) can be summarised in the following specificities:
• The first is a sad record – CEE, as well as former soviet countries establish
themselves as the regions with fastest growth in this type of crime.
• The second is a direct consequence of the first – Eastern European trafficking is
gaining central place in this highly competitive market in Western Europe, taking
over positions from trafficked victims from Latin America, Asia and Africa.
• The third is a diversification of the typology of the countries in relation to
trafficking:
115 In the summer of 1989 г.

116 60 000 according to Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004.
- Most Balkan countries are a source of traffickking with Romania and Albania,
closely followed by Bulgaria holding the leading places for trafficking victims
per capita;
- All countries take part in the transit of trafficking;
- A more particular tendency is the establishment of some countries as a
destination. In this category fall Bosna and Hertzegovina and Kosovo – quite
paradoxically for a region strong in export of trafficking.
Non-labor migrations are articulated in numerous forms, yet their combined num-
bers are significantly smaller than those of labor migrations. Those are excellent news
for a region which has just recently transitioned from conflict-related to peaceful forms
of migration.
The circular migration has a solid tradition in the Balkans - gourbet is a cross-border
concept (Христов 2012). The emigration and the circular migration are also amongst
the most solid sources of work migration in the Balkans: till the 90s this role was taken
by Yugoslavia and Turkey. After the democratic transition all countries take part in the
outward flows with Albania as the biggest exporter (Bonifazi and Mamolo 2004). The
top five destinations for migrations from the SEE117 are Germany, Italy, Greece, Switzer-
land and Austria (Gallup 2009).
The return as a natural stage of the migration process is one of the biggest democrat-
ic achievements of the post-communist migrations. It has two main variations: from
voluntary and from forced migration. In the first variation the return is a predictable
horizon for migrations such as the educational; it is a normal continuation of the labor
migration; it is a natural and repeated stage of mobility.
The return from forced migration with regard to the analysed period of the Bal-
kans has two variations: return after the democratic transition of political migrants of
the communist period in the Eastern Balkans; return after forced displacement in the
post-conflicts period in the Western Balkans. The first variation covers specific individ-
ual cases, relatively limited in number; the second has a considerable empirical refer-
ent – both as potential as well as real returnees. This second group is of great political
importance, as assuring normal conditions for return is the centre of the policy for the
post-conflict reconstruction.
117 Gallup’s study is on the WB.

8.5. Types of return
The paradox of the return is that opposite types of migration give rise to similar phe-
nomena of return. Forced migrations during the conflicts in Yugoslavia, on the one hand,
and the voluntary work and educational migrations, on the other, form three figures of
return – permanent, termporary, transnational (Кръстева 2014, Mesic and Bagic 2010):
• Permanent. They have closed the circle of forced displacement or migration by
coming home. This large group has four variations:
- “To die at home.” The first variation is nostalgic – many elderly prefer at the
dawn of their life to be closer to their ancestors, relatives and homeland (Mesic
and Bagic 2010).
- The planned end of temporary migration. Migration theory defines this second
variation as a successful migration project that is finalised through new
integration at home – the war has finished, the education has finished, money
has been gathered for new accommodation/car.
- The unplanned end of unsuccessful migration. The lack of integration in the new
place makes the return necessary or inevitable.
• Temporary. This group includes returnees from forced or voluntary migration
– migration has made them more mobile and they are ready to take on new
migration provided they find sufficiently interesting opportunities.
• Transnational. This is one of the relatively new migrant figures – those who ‘settle
in mobility’and permanently remain in two places. An example are two doctors
– one has a prosperous dental office in France, the other – in Germany, yet they
open a common one in Bulgaria as well and each one divides his time between the
two countries (Кръстева 2014).
8.6. Immigration or the timid attractiveness of the

post-communist and post-conflict region
The newer and more unexpected the phenomenon, the bigger the public interest
it attracts. The number of immigrants to Albania is insignificant; the net balance is
strongly negative: -6.5 (IOM 2007), but this is what comes first in IOM’s immigration
profile of the country (ibid).
Three groups of labor migration may be distinguished in SEE:
• Small, middle, and sometimes bigger business people and entrepreneurs and self-
employed immigrants;
• Immigrants employed by other immigrants, by local business people – or very
rarely – by the administration;
• Highly-skilled experts, consultants, and investors.
Immigrants’ origin varies in the different countries, but on the whole, we can say
that the first group consists mainly of tradesmen and business people from the Near
and Middle East Arab countries such as Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Chi-
na, etc. Representatives of the same countries are found in the second group, but it com-
prises of more nationalities – Moldavians in Romania, Russians in Bulgaria, citizens of
former Yugoslavia countries in Slovenia. In periods of economic advance, immigrant
workforce fills certain shortages: in construction – Ukrainians in Romania, Vietnam-
ese in Bulgaria; in the textile industry – Chinese in Romania (Lazaroiu 2007: 158).
The third group originates from the EU, the USA and other developed countries: ev-
ery one in four immigrants in Romania is from the EU – 24% from Italy and 18% from
Spain (Dobre and Ariton 2008); the same (26%) is the relative percentage of EU citizens
in Croatia. The highly qualified professionals from the developed countries work with
the foreign investors, at the representations of international organizations, and as con-
sultants for local institutions.
Trade and hospitality are the main economic niches where many of the immigrants
are concentrated.
The quantitative expression of immigration is quite modest so far: 0.6% of the pop-
ulation in Romania (IOM Romania 2010), and 1.4% in Bulgaria (IOM Bulgaria 2010).
This group’s political and symbolic significance is much higher. The former is related
to the specifics of immigration in the new EU member states and the need for adapted
public policies. An interesting paradox seen in countries with new immigration, such
as Romania and Bulgaria, is that its profile is more positive than that of countries who
have had decades of migration history: the ratio between the first two groups is in favor
of the first – many immigrants have their own business and create employment oppor-
tunities for their families and other workers.
The symbolic dimension of immigration is of great importance as well. For countries
abandoned by a multitude of emigrants seeking work and opportunities abroad, immi-
grants, who invest similar energy, labor, and existential meaning, are the bearers of a
strong message of attractiveness and new opportunities.
Types of migration and migration periods

Forced Ethnic Trafficking Refugees Retirement Emigration Immigration Return
Stage WB EB WB EB WB EB WB EB WB EB WB EB WB EB WB EB
I + + + + + + + + +
II + + + + + + + + + + + +
III + + + + + + + + + + + +
IV + + + + + + + + + + + +
The table illustrates the diverse types of migration are not evenly spread neither in
time, nor between the two regions. The forced migrations are concentrated in space, as
well as in time and they are characteristic only in the conflict Western Balkans in the
first half of the 90s. In the same period we find the ethnic migrations of Turks from Bul-
garia, Germans and Hungarians from Romania. Bulgaria signs the Geneva Convention
in 1993 and would start accepting refugees only after. The retirement migration and the
leisure migration have the long history in Croatia, benefitting from its mild climate and
beautiful coast. This is a new phenomenon in Bulgaria and Romania and one which is
dependent on the crisis, as well the underdeveloped politics of receiving this positive
migration – after the emerged interest of the British in the small Bulgarian villages and
the ascending tendency in the early 10s, came the disappointment from underdevel-
oped and unrealiable real-estate market and the withdrawal in the last few years. The
return – from both forced and from voluntary migration – begins not simultaneously
with, but after the peak of emigration flows.
The migration panorama outlines two tendencies:
• Reduction in the diversification of the forms of migration. By the end of the
analysed period they are less than they were at the beginning.
• Normalization of the migration flows and the transition from conflict to regular
forms.
8.7. National migration models
Every country has its unique migration profile and model, and the volume contrib-
utes to their understanding. My task is to spread the diversity along some analytical
axes and offer a synthesized typology. Among the various migration experiences in the
different countries, I’ll outline four types:
• Post-conflict. Elements of which we find in most countries of former Yugoslavia,
but is most represented in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
• ‘All inclusive – this image I use to name the migration profile which includes all
types of migration. A typical example is Albania;
• New emigration “champion”. The country that attracts the attention of the European
public because of its considerable and intensive migration is by all means Romania.
• Immigrational. The country in the region that first began experiencing the
transition from emigration to labour migration is Slovenia;
The brief analyses that follow do not aim to deal with the unrealistic task of pre-
senting in depth and detail the respective countries, but single out the elements in their
migration profile that make them representative of the given model.
8.7.1. The post-conflict model – Bosnia and Herzegovina
It is not by coincidence that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the country where the policy
on migration is overinstitutionalized: all fourteen governments had ministries respon-
sible for refugees and return118. It is not by accident that the responsible institution in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is called Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees. The suffering
of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who paid the highest migration price in the
conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia, calls for institutional – both national and in-
ternational – counterbalancing.
The other logical and expected fact is that in the decade after the Dayton Agreement,
the return from exile comes into the centre of migration policy. Fifty percent of the
refugees and temporarily displaced persons (Marinkovic 2007) returned in that period;
after that the return continued but at a much lower rate. Many refugees prefer to stay in
the states where the ethnic group they belong to is a majority (Mirocvasic 2003).
The return is not always a smooth process: some refugees are returned from coun-
tries that no longer offer their hospitality, while the home countries are not able to pro-
vide housing or other solutions which would make the return possible. Sixty percent
of the returnees from Germany are made to settle in towns or villages different from
118 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010)

their own that leads to changing their status of refugees to that of displaced people
(Marinkovic 2007: 65).
Nowadays we can outline two tendencies: the first one is the terminal fading of re-
turns119. The other is the introduction of higher criteria by which the international com-
munity evaluates its impact. The term sustainable return (Mesic and Bagic 2010) that
links it more explicitly to the right to jobs, homes, and healthcare is being used.
Both tendencies illustrate the coming of the end of a migration model, marked by forced
migration, and the transition to a normal model of migration. Citizens of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina are among the most mobile in Europe; they form the largest immigration group
in Slovenia, the third largest in Austria and the fifth largest in Sweden. Emigrants reach the
impressive number of 1 350 000 (ibid) coming from a population of just 3.8 million.
I will conclude with a somewhat curious tendency. Over the past few years there has
been an abrupt fall in the attractiveness of the traditionally most prestigious destination
– the USA (from 15 000 emigrants in 2000 to 3 789 in 2006); while the attractiveness
of Slovenia has risen: the migration towards a neighbouring Balkan country grew more
than 6 times (from 2016 emigrants in 2000 to 12 477 in 2007). This fact could be seen as
the symbolic reconciliation with the region and also as a positive rating of the opportu-
nities for professional realization that it provides.
8.7.2. ‘All inclusive’: Albania
“Country on the move”(Carletto et al 2006 ), “laboratory for the study of migration

and development” (King 2005), ‘new migration order” (Van Hear 1998), ‘significant
and unique case” (Vulnerati 2007) – numerous are the metaphors and definitions with
which scholars try to capture the uniqueness of the country, which after long decades
of pathological closeness is now unstoppably headed towards migration. “Migration is
one of the most important social and economic phenomena affecting Albania. Since
1990, almost a quarter of the Albanian population has left the country along with a
large urban-rural migration” (IOM 2007: 23). The characterizations of researchers and
international organizations such as IOM introduce the first two aspects of the Albanian
model: huge numbers - every one in four Albanians is a migrant; as well as the deep so-
cio-economic impact. The very structure of Albanian population is being changed. On
the one hand, Albania has positive demographics - one of the highest in Europe. On the
other, emigration is age and gender selective, which leads to two negative consequences:
reduction of the relative quota of employable young people; and the accelerated ageing
of the Albanian population120. Demographic imbalance is a serious issue. Equally se-
rious is the socio-economic imbalance: the level of remittances is three times higher
119 Similar tendencies exist in relation to the return of Serbs to Croatia (Mesic and Bagic 2010).
120 The relative portion of the population under the age of 15 is reduced from 33% to 29.3% for the period
1989-2001, while that over 65 has risen from 5.31% to 7.5% (Vulnerati 2007)
than the direct foreign investment and nearly twice as much as the help that comes
from international sources (IOM 2007). The centre of development is moving form the
country to its Diaspora: “Diaspora becomes increasingly important for the growth and
the socio-economic development of the country” (Vulnerati 2007: 76).
Another dimension of the Albanian model is found in the variety of the forms of
migration. This is a small country producing large trafficking. The pair “irregular mi-
gration – forced return” is clearly manifested: several hundred thousand Albanians
have been returned from the European countries121. Typical of the Albanian experience
are some “exotic” forms of migration such as the 5000 Albanians who sought asylum
at the embassies of western countries in Tirana (June-July 1990), the ships overloaded
with would-be emigrants traveling to Italy, the wave of migrants after the crisis with the
financial pyramids (Vulnerati 2007: 76).
Some Western perceptions describe the Balkan migrations as “Balkanized”: exotic,
tending to be irregular, multiple – both in terms of forms and numbers. Albanian mi-
grations are often perceived as their closest illustration.
8.7.3. New emigration “champion”: Romania
“Visible, but not numerous” – this is how the French researcher of Romanian origin
Dana Diminescu summarized Romanian migration in the EU just six years ago (Dimi-
nescu 2004). Time has accelerated the first characteristic and made the second invalid:
Romanian immigrants in the EU are around 2.5 - 2.7 million. Just in Italy the number
is quarter of a million in 2008 - 796 000, twice as much than in the previous year. The
situation in Spain is completely symmetrical: 797 000 (OECD 2010).
To a great extent, Romanian emigration offers a synthesis of the specifics of the
outward flows in SEE. It is best explained by the neoclassical economic theory which
has two conceptual centers: the differences in salaries and the geographical differences
in the supply and demand of the workforce (Borjas 1989). Romania is characterized
by both oversupply of labor and low income: “the first year of economic restructuring
brought also a diminishing of the real earning. Considering the value of 1990 as a refer-
ence point (100%) in 2000 the real earning barely reached 59% of this value. Although
the real earnings increased constantly in 2006 they still represented only 97.4% of the
1990 value” (Dobre and Ariton 2008: 188). Two external, European, factors made mi-
gration flows easier and more numerous: the opening of the Schengen Area for visa-free
travel in 2001 and EU membership in 2007. The case of Romania illustrates two of the
advantages of emigration for the sending countries: reduction of the pressure on the
local labor market and remittances. Romania never reached the unemployment levels
of neighboring Eastern European countries; unemployment fell from 10.04% in 1997 to
4.1% in 2007 before the crisis (Dobre and Ariton 2008: 185). Romanian President Traian
121 (IOM 2007) 42 254 до 2006 г.

Băsescu122 recently summarized in an attractive way the two advantages by appealing

to emigrants not to return because the country needed their remittances123, and also
because it could not offer them any jobs.
Romania illustrates the appetite that the population of SEE has for emigration, stim-
ulated by European integration and the free movement of labor. Economic theories of
migration argue that labor mobility will continue to attract many citizens of the new or
future member states until considerable differences in the earnings and quality of life
continue to exist.
8.7.4. The immigration model: Slovenia
The transition form emigration to immigration increases the countries’ self-confi-

dence and the discourses on immigration often precede its stable and sizeable qualitative
expression. One of the countries, where reality is quite close to the discourse, is Slovenia.
The other one is Croatia, which also has a positive net migration balance (0.5 according to
IOM data, 2010). The net balance of Slovenia is 2.2. The percentage of foreign population
is about to reach European levels: 8.1%. The percentage of immigrant is labor is even high-
er: 10%. The citizens of other EU member states are not many – 0.2% of the population
(Vasileva 2009: 3), but relatively more numerous than that in Bulgaria and Romania.124
Two aspects are of material importance for the theme of our conference: the clearly
regional profile of the immigrants and the regional policy of Slovenia. According to
data provided by Eurostat, of the top five foreign nationalities, four are from former
Yugoslavia: 47.3% of all immigrants are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20.1% - from
Serbia, 10.9% - from Macedonia,and 10.2% - from Croatia (Vasileva 2009: 5). Nine-
ty-five percent of the work permits are for nationals of the former Yugoslav republics,
the majority are issued to people from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The regional migration
policy of the country has to dimensions: bilateral and multilateral. Slovenia has entered
into agreements with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for the employment of their
nationals and after the crisis will most probably continue establishing similar agree-
ments. The more ambitious goal is to provoke a debate about the creation of a zone for
free movement of the workforce in the Western Balkans in the period before the EU
accession of the rest of the countries (ibid).
The Slovenian example presents an interest on two levels: regionalization and eu-
ropeanization. The country is characterized by intensive regional migration, which is
being supported by the active policy of the country in the Western Balkans. Slovenia is a
122 Trud newspaper, 10.08.10

123 Romania is the biggest net recipient of remittances in the EU. In terms of GDP it occupies top position
together with Bulgaria. At the same time the 42% reduction of Romanian remittances in 2009 conside-
rably exceeds the average in Europe – 18% (Comini and Faes-Cannito 2010).
124 According to Eurostat data, EU citizens in Bulgaria and Romania are invisible for the statistics – 0.0%
of the population (Vasileva 2009: 3).
leader in the implementation of the Mediterranean model of transition from emigration

to immigration. This is precisely the motorway that would shade the Balkan specifics
and would gradually lead to the acquisition of a European migration profile.
***
There are, of course, no pure models, and there are no countries that belong to a
single model. Labor immigration exists in all of the countries, together with high levels
of labor emigration. Croatia can be characterized as a mixed type between Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Slovenia, as well as – in different ratios – Macedonia and Serbia. Mol-
dova is similar to Albania, Bulgaria comes close to the migration profile of Romania,
but operates on a smaller scale. Time will show how the migration models of Montene-
gro and Kosovo will crystallize.
8.8. Trends: from extraordinary to ordinary flows
If we assume the impossible task of summarizing by a single word the complex, con-
tradictory, and diverse Balkan migrations at the beginning of the 21st century, it would
be normalization. This movement takes a variety of expressions; I’ll delineate four main
trends (Krasteva 2010):
• From forced migrations to returns. Conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia produced
huge numbers of IDPs and refugees. Fifteen years later, return still remains an
‘unfinished business’ (Bobic 2010). Many IDPs and refugees will never return to
their native places, because these places are not the same, and interethnic structures
have changed. Return, has, however, become a viable alternative to displacement.
• From ethnic to economic logic. Second only to forced migrations, ethnic migrations
have been an important type of human mobility in the end 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s. A decade later the same populations return to the same
destinations, but the logic is no longer ethnic but economic. One third of a million
Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin, who, on the eve of change, were made by the
communist authorities to leave for Turkey, are a case in point. A few years later
on, the economic difficulties push many representatives of the biggest minority
group in Bulgaria to find jobs either in Turkey, or in Germany, as network theory
rightly anticipates.
• From mass emigration to temporary or circular migration. Women gathering
strawberries in Spain returning home for the winter; men working in construction
abroad with their families remaining at home; highly qualified professionals
moving from one job to another, irrespective of the country – temporary and
circular migration take a diversity of forms. Nowadays it affects all professions
– from seasonal workers to experts. Return becomes a usual element of labor

mobility plans. More than half (60%) of those who plan to migrate, intend to do
so just for just a few years (Gallup 2009).
• From emigration to immigration. Bosnians, Serbs, and Macedonians in Slovenia;
Austrians, Germans, and Dutch in Croatia; Chinese almost everywhere; Russians,
Ukrainians, and British in Bulgaria; Moldovan in Romania - immigration in SEE is
a fact. The pull factors vary from the soft climate and beauty of the Adriatic coast,
to the relatively low cost of real estate in Bulgaria and Romania, to the economic
niches in the relatively new market economies. Emigration still largely prevails
over immigration, but EU integration may reverse the picture, as it has already
done so in Slovenia. The Mediterranean model that transformed Spain, Italy and
Greece from emigration to immigration countries only two-three decades ago
could be realized in several Balkan countries (Krasteva 2010: 10 – 11).
• From diversification to convergence of the Balkan migration models. In the early
90s we can observe two opposing trends and migration profiles in the West and
East Balkans. The West Balkans strongly politicise migration, which becomes
a function of conflicts, wars and ethnic cleansing. This dramatic turn happens
in Yugoslavia after a long period of openness towards work immigration and
return. The Eastern Balkans on the other hand are on the opposite pole - they
economize migration as it has escaped the communist political logic of radical
restrictiveness. More than a decade is necessary to reverse this trend, to transition
to convergence of both forms and trends of migration. The end of diversification
from the early 90s, when the dividing line of migration profiles passes through
conflicts and marks temporary convergence of national migration profiles in the
mid-present decade, before beginning to outline the new distinctions, related to
the Europeanization of migration.
8.9. Conclusion: from migration used by the elites

against the citizens to migration used by citizens
againt the elites and for themselves
The analysis of twenty five years of Balkan migrations could be sum up in five
conclusions.
Looking for a job and not seeking asylum. Labor migration, jobs and better quality of life
as top reasons for human mobility present a huge achievement that occurred over the past
two and a half decades – both for the ones who left the closed societies of Albania, Bulgaria,
and Romania, and for the post-conflict and post-war countries of former Yugoslavia.
The second conclusion refers to the possibility to discuss the Eastern and the West-
ern Balkans as a single analytical entity. Twenty years ago the two parts of the region
were developing in opposite directions: transition form closed to open, and from polit-
ical to economic migrations in Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania; and just the opposite
transition in former Yugoslavia. The last decades brought together the migration devel-
opment of the two parts of the region.
None of crisis - the economic crisis and the refugee crisis - is coped with efficiently, both
show the lack of strategic thinking, good governance and capacity to manage migration.
Citizens have appropriated migration. If at the beginning of 1990s forced and ethnic
migration have been used by the elites in WB against the citizens, the latter both in WB
and EB have transformed migration into a radical critic against inefficient and corrupt-
ed elites and into a powerful social capital for realization of professional, educational,
family, existential projects.
The “roads” are more attractive than the “roots”, millions of emigrants have divested
the region of significance and illustrate its deterritorialization. The immigration could
not still compensate for the emigration, but the attractiveness of the Balkans as a pos-
sible migration destination is growing. The day when pull factors reach the strength of
push factors the citizens of the region will celebrate the end of ‘balkanization’ and will
welcome a new image of an attractive and hospitable region. This day is not tomorrow,
but it is in the foreseeable future. The reterritorialization is strengthening and its agen-
cy diversifying: the returnees who choose the roots for a new beginning; the circular
migrants who earn abroad and spend at home; the immigrants - they all invest labor,
capital, and existential value in the Balkans.
8.10. Bibliograhpy
1. Кръстева А. (2014) От миграция към мобилност: политики и пътища.

София: Издателство на НБУ.
2. Христов П. (2012). Гурбет и идентичност (по материали от Западна
България, Източна Сърбия и Западна Македония). Социологически
проблеми, 1-2, 186-202.
3. Baldwin-Edwards M. (2005) Balkan migrations and the European Union: patterns
and trends.- Romanian Journal of European Studies, N 4, 31 – 44.
4. Barbulescu R. (2009) The economic crisis and its effects for intra-european move-
ment: mobility patterns and sate responses. The case of Romanians in Spain. Paper
at the Annual Conference 2009 of the Centre on migration, policy and society,
University of Oxford “New times? Economic crisis, geopolitical transformation
and the emergent migration order”
5. Bobic M. (2010) Serbian unfinished business. Refugees and IDPS.- In: Krasteva
A., A.Kasabova, D. Karabonova (eds) (2010) Migrations from and to Southeastern
Europe. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 211 – 224.
6. Bonifazi C. and M. Mamolo (2004) Past and current trends of Balkan migrations.-
Espaces, populations, societies, N 3, 519 – 531.
7. Borjas G. J. (1989) Economic theory and international migration.- International
Migration Review, N 3, 457 – 485.
8. Bozic S. (2007) Croatia.- In: Migration flows in Southeast Europe, a compendium
of national perspectives. Belgrade: Group 484, 11 – 42.
9. Carletto G., Davis B, Stampini M. and Zezza A. (2006) A country on the move:
international migrations in post-communist Albania.- International Migration
Review 40 (4), 767 – 85.
10. Comini D. and F. Faes-Cannito (2009) Remittances from the EU down for the first
time in 2009, flows to non-EU countries more resilient.- Eurstat, 2010, N 40.
11. Diminescu D. (2004) Visibles, mais peu nombreux. Les circulations migratoires
roumaines. Paris : MSH.
12. Dobre S. and V. Ariton (2008) Romania. Migration and development: creating re-
gional labor markets and labor market circulation as response to regional market
demands. Paper for Group 484.
13. GALLUP (2009) The impact of migration.- Balkan Monitor. Insights and percep-
tions: voices of the Balkans. June 2009, 1-9.
14. King R. (2005) Albania as a labotary for the study of migration and develop-
ment.- Journal of South Europe and the Balkans, 7(2), 13 – 56.
15. Krasteva A. (2007) Post-communist discovery of immigration: the case of Bulga-
ria.- In: Berggren E. et al (eds) Irregular migration, informal labor and communi-
ty: a challenge for Europe. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 104 – 117.
16. Krasteva A. (2007a) Bulgaria.- In: Migration flows in Southeast Europe, a com-
pendium of national perspectives. Belgrade: Group 484, 163 – 193.
17. Krasteva A. et al (2007 b) Human traffickingking: the Bulgarian case. Paper for
HERA international project.
18. Krasteva A. (2008) L’immigration en Bulgarie : culture d’entreprise et questions
d’intégration.- Hommes et migrations, N 1275, 112 – 126.
19. Krasteva A., A.Kasabova, D. Karabonova (eds) (2010) Migrations from and to
Southeastern Europe. Ravenna: Longo Editore.
20. Krasteva A.(2010) Introduction.-In: Krasteva A., A.Kasabova, D. Karabonova
(eds) Migrations from and to Southeastern Europe. Ravenna: Longo Editore,
2010, 9 – 14.
21. Lazariou S. (2007) Romania.- In: Migration flows in Southeast Europe, a com-
pendium of national perspectives. Belgrade: Group 484, 109 – 161.
22. Laczko F., A. von Koppenfels and J. Barthel. (2002) Traffickingking in women
from Central and Eastern Europe: a review of statistical data.- In: Laczko F., I.
Stacher and Koppenfels A. von (eds) New challenges for migration policy in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. The Hague: IOM: TMC Asser press, 153 – 174.
23. Marinkovic D. (2007) Bosnia and Herzegovina.- In: Migration flows in Southeast
Europe, a compendium of national perspectives. Belgrade: Group 484, 43 – 75.
24. Mesic M. and D. Bagic (2010) Serb returnees in Croatia – the question of return
sustainability.- International migration, vol. 48 (2), 133 – 160.
25. Morokvasic M. (2003). Transntional mobility and gender& a vew from post-war
Europe. In M. Morokvasic, U. Erel, & K. Shinozaki (Eds.), Crossing borders and
shifting boundaries: gender on the move. Opladen: Leske+Burich.
26. OECD (2010) International migration outlook. www.oecd.org/els/migration/imo
27. Papademetriou D. and A. Terrazas (2009) Immigrants and the current economic
crisis: research evidence, policy challenges and implications. http://www.migratio-
npolicy.org/pubs/lmi_recessionJan09.pdf
28. Pons-Vignon N. (2010) Don’t waste the crisis: critical perspective for a new eco-
nomic model. Geneva :ILO. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgre-
ports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/genericdocument/wcms_141464.pdf
29. Van Hear N. (1998) New Diasporas. London: UCL Press.
30. Vasileva K. (2009) Population and social conditions.- Eurostat, N 94, 1-7.
31. Vulnetari J. (2007) Albanian migration and development: state of the art review.
IMISCO working paper. September 2007.
Part II
Papers written by students
107
Student: Slobodan Pejanović
Mentor: dr Dragan Popadić
1. YUGOSLAV IDENTITY:
THEN AND NOW
Introduction
Burdened by negative events of the recent past, primarily wars and conflicts, and of-
ten presented as bad, backward and outdated,the issue of Yugoslav identity todayseems
to have been consigned to oblivion. Yugoslav identity was created and molded more
than a hundred years before the common state was created, and it was imbued with
progressive ideasadvocatinga community of equal peoples and stood opposite the idea
of divided
and closed off Balkan nations and states.Today, just as at the time of birth of
the Yugoslav idea, we are witnessing the same ideas that insist on things that seemed
antiquated across a wider region and Europe. Various critics of the existence of Yugo-
slav identity often emphasize that the existence of “an ethnic Yugoslav” is based on false
grounds, that this identity is an artificial creation, just like the Yugoslavia created by
the Treaty of Versailles (Versailles state), and as such cannot be treated as a genuine and
lasting phenomenon, despite many facts contradicting these claims. In the present so-
cial and political climate the word Yugoslav carries many controversies and prejudices,
as well as a dilemma as to how to interpret this issue in the foggy future ahead.
Yugoslav identity must be observed as a phenomenon that has been developing for
more than two centuries, during which period it changed its meaning many times over
under different social, economic, social and historical circumstances. If we search for the
initial source of Yugoslav identity, we must look back far into the past to the Enlight-
enment movement.125The Yugoslav identity, which was directly linked to the romantic
concept of the nation, has been actively developing since the end of the 18thcentury in line
with the then European practice of emerging wider national ideas under the influence of
125 One of the first representatives of common Slavic identity are writers Vinko Pribojević (16th century)
and Mavro Orbin (1563‒1610),who argued the existence of south Slavic ethnic-linguistic kinship in
their works „On the Origin and Glory of the Slavs (De Origine Successibusque Slavorum)“,and „Kingdom
of the Slavs (Il Regnodegli Slavi)“.
109
the French Revolution, and the later German – Italian unification.126 Observing the de-
velopment of the Yugoslav idea from that perspective, it could be said that the Yugoslavs
existed much earlier before the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was officially
established, and that they were the product of a wider European phenomenon based on
the national integration and modernization processes that sprouted in various degrees
and territories inhabited by the South Slavs. Under such circumstances, the main promot-
ers of the idea of Yugoslavdom and those who “felt Yugoslavs” before Yugoslavia existed
were primarily members of the religious, civic, intellectual and political elite, who saw the
South Slav peoples as one nation divided by tribal borders. However, in that period, there
were different forms and visions as to who actually belonged to the Yugoslav corpus and
in which way the unification should be carried out, ranging from cultural demands for
the equality of South Slavic languages, autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
to a union of Slav peoples in the form of creating Yugoslav or Balkan Confederation, as
well as much wider pan-Slavic ideas and programs.Although different in many respects,
all these agendas were based on one thing, and that is an inextricable connection and
ethnic propinquity of the South Slav peoples, mostly evident in the similarity of languages
and the feeling of a shared common past. Of course, the main point of divergence among
them was and is the confessional schism. Another characteristic of this period was that
Yugoslav identity developed parallel to the awakening of the Serbian, Croatian and Slove-
nian national identities with which it was inextricably linked, but was generally met with
opposition due to its universal nature, which many did not favor. These identities, as well
as many others that existed and exist in the Balkans, developed in parallel but unsteadily
– in the direction of Yugoslav communion at one moment, and toward separation along
national lines at the other. As mentioned earlier, the Yugoslav identity in this period was
built from above, and with the help of civil society institutions such as theaters, maga-
zines, singing and literary associations, it was spread among common people trying to
take roots. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the process of building Yugoslav identity
appeared in underdeveloped social environments and that in the period of late19th century
and early twentieth century a wide scale movement did not yet exist.
1.1. Illyrian Movement
The starting point of the development of the modern Yugoslav idea is found in the
Illyrian Movement, which emerged in the first half of the 19th century in territory of
the then Austrian Empire. Members of this movement saw language as the main idea
126 French model for forming national identity was based on the achievements of the French Revolution,
according to which each citizen of France is French, while the German model was based on nation-
al-romanticism of the 19th century, according to which Germany is the country of Germans.
Part II: Papers written by students 111
behind building a common identity of the South Slav nations and the main criterion for
defining borders, origin and affiliation of a nation. Threat of the great Germanization,
and even more the Hungarianization of the Slav peoples in these areas, prompted the
leaders of the Illyrian Movement, primarily LjudevitGaj (1809-1872) to closely coop-
erate with VukKaradžić (1787-1864), toward creating a common literary language and
achieving a complete linguistic unity among the South Slavic nations. The language was
named after the movement itself - the Illyrian language, and as such it fitted perfectly
into the one language - one nation concept. The ideological role model for the Illyrian
movement was a Slovak politician, poet and writer Jan Kolar (1793-1852), the ideologue
of the Slovak and Czech national revival and one of the main representatives of the
pan-Slavism of that period. Kolar advocated the thesis that all Slavpeoples are actual-
ly one people with four dialects: Russian, Czech, Polish and Illyrian, which will later
serve as the basis for the concept of one nation with three names.These ideas were not
well received among representatives of the Austrian and Hungarian authorities, who
viewed the unification of the Slavic people with skepticism and regarded it as a threat
to the then state order. This is best reflected in the fact that the movement was officially
banned in 1843, but the movement’s ideas left a strong mark on contemporaries and
intelligentsia. With their understanding that a nation’s identity is not made solely of a
single language, but also of related languages of one group, the Illyrians have managed
to connect numerous diversities in the Balkans into one whole. Unlike today, when one
of the consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia is the emergence of many new
languages on the territory of the former state, language politics of that time had played
a key role in the process of bringing together and building common identity.
1.2. Integral Yugoslavdom
In the second half of the 19thcentury, despite all the negative influences and pres-
sures, the idea of a common Yugoslav identity took deeper root than ever before. A
number of members of intelligentsia, writers, and scientists, spoke in one voice about
the Yugoslavs as members of one nation divided into various tribes. This terminology,
which was created during the Illyrian Movement era, remained in use in the twentieth
century and was the key aspectthat later helped the formation of theYugoslav identity.
One important event that strengthened the positions of the Yugoslav-oriented intelli-
gentsia, citizens and common people was the overturn of the Obrenović royal dynasty
in 1903.127Although at first glance this can be observed as a power struggle between
to dynasties in Serbia, this change has had a huge impact on the strengthening of the
127 This refers to May Coup which occurred in the night between May 28 and 29 (old calendar),when King
Alexandar and Queen Draga Obrenovic were murdered.
Yugoslav movement. In addition to the change of the ruling family, this also marked a
new approach in the Serbia’s national policy, which from that moment moved more vig-
orously toward the process of liberation and unification. The new dynasty’s more active
role in the propagation of Yugoslavism /Yugoslavdom was evident in the ceremonies
that were held in honor of the crowning of King Peter Karadjordjević (1844-1921) in
September 1904. The crowning ceremony included a series of manifestations with a dis-
tinctly Yugoslav character, such asthe First Yugoslav Art Exhibition, the First Congress
of the Yugoslav Youth, and the Yugoslav Artistic Evening, which were part of the central
event.128These and other events, such as the founding of the Yugoslav Art Colony led
by Ivan Meštrović (1883-1962), NadeždaPetrović (1873-1915) and RihardJakopić (1869-
1943), propagated unambiguouslythe unity of the South Slavic peoples. Similar to the
previous period, the main promoters of the Yugoslav identity were members of the edu-
cated upper social class, but from this period on the idea of the existence of South Slavic
nation received more active support from the Serbian royal court, and with the use of
propaganda the idea was brought closer to the simple folk. Aparticularly important role
in building a common identity was attributed to the students and youth organizations
that organized joint festivities with Yugoslav character, which testifies to the youth be-
ing especially attracted to the notion of the Yugoslav identity.
After the end of the First World War and collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Em-
pire, for the first time in history favorable conditions were reached to place almost all
southern Slavs in one common state. After the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918 the state provided generous assistanceto the
work on creating unique Yugoslav identity. The dedication of the state and the King Al-
exander to thiswork is evident in the official motto of the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia:
“One nation, one king, one state!”In 1929 King Alexander introduced dictatorship and
changed the name of the state to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the identity of the
new Yugoslav nation of that time can be best explained through the concept of integral
Yugoslavdom.Proponents of integral Yugoslavdombelieved that the unification of the
state, and, above all, of the population, could be enforced by a decree. In their view,
that was the fastest way to create a Yugoslav man, and such attitudes were shared by
theroyal court, Slovenian Democratic Party, members of the Radical and Democratic
parties close to the court, the army, but alsorepresentatives of great powers, primarily-
France.129This idea favored the existence of a single Yugoslav identity and was actively
implemented in the period from the introduction of the 6 January Dictatorship until
the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, after which it fell on shaky ground and
finally collapsed at the dawn of the Second World War. The identity built around the
integral Yugoslavdomdid not recognize any ethnic character of the South Slavic peoples
and was regarded as the last stage in the construction of single Yugoslav nation. One of
128 Дубравка Стојановић, Југославија пре Југославије. Југословенство у свакодневном животу
Београђана 1890‒1914. Годишњак за друштвену историју 3.2013. 33.
129 Ljubomir Petrović, U Potrazi za izmišljenom stvarnošću, Jugoslovenski identitet u časopisu „Jugosloven“
1931‒1932, Istorija 20. veka, Beograd 1/2007, 38.
the consequences of such a policy was the strengthening of nationalism among the peo-
ple of Yugoslavia who opposed such politics, but also the appearance of a new, Yugoslav
nationalism.130In the creation of this new nationalism, great attention was paid to youth
education as youth was seen as the main harbinger of Yugoslav identity. This included
giving preference to the so-called national-oriented school subjects - history, geogra-
phy and language, and only school associations with a pronounced Yugoslav character
were allowed.131One of the most influential associations that was supposedlyaimed at
strengthening Yugoslav identity in youth was the Yugoslav Sokol Alliance. This associa-
tion emphasized as the primary goal of “creating a physically healthy, wholesome, moral
and intellectually developed youth, imbuded with the national spirit, inspired by the spirit
of Slovenian solidarity and great and general ideals of mankind, and youth that will pre-
serve the achievements of present-day generations-unification and independence.”132The
Sokol movement was established much earlier, before the unification of the Kingdom
of SHS, and can be seen as a part of the authentic (original) Yugoslavdom, as evidenced
by the fact that youth waseducated under the motto “All Sokols are Yugoslavs”.133 At the
height of its popularity in 1930’s, the association membership counted 384,000 Yugo-
slavs, and one of the legacies of this movement, later utilized in Socialist Yugoslavia later
utilized for strengthening brotherhood and unity, was the celebration of theYouth Day,
modeled after All-Sokol Slet (All-Sokol gathering), as well as establishing the hymn Hey
Slavs as the official national anthem. However, efforts of the promoters of the integral
Yugoslavdom to create a new identity will prove completely unsuccessful, as manifested
in violent inter-ethnic conflicts during the Second World War on the territory of the
former kingdom.
1.3. Yugoslavdom and SFRY
The idea of building

Yugoslav spirit with the help of integral Yugoslavdom was
abandoned with the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Instead,
a state based on federal principle was established, which recognized six nations, and
many nationalities. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia became the only political
force in the country and the main bearer of the principle of Yugoslav identity, now in a
modified form.The Yugoslav identity in this period was firmly associated with the idea
of socialism, and the main formula for behind this idea was “brotherhood and unity”,
with constant emphasis on the individuality of nations and nationalities, which almost
130 The emergence of the Yugoslav nationalism led to the creation of extremist groups which used violence
means to “imbue” integral Yugoslavdom, such as movementsOrjuna, Jugoslovenskaakcija (Yugoslav Action).
131 Ljubodrag Dimic, Integralno jugoslovenstvo i kultura 1929‒1931, Zagreb, 2001, 340.
132 http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1364087&print=yes
133 ibid.
completely erased the idea of existence

of a single and common Yugoslav identity. From
being a bearer of Yugoslavdom, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia became one of the
main factors in its gradual disintegration. This realistic or minimalYugoslavdom fully
recognized the ethnic specificities of the population, but, in principle, left the integra-
tion and building of Yugoslavs for a suitable moment in the future. The idea of Yugoslav
ethnicity was foreign to the new socialist regime, and it was not before the 1953 census
that people were given a possibility to declare themselves as Yugoslavs, but only as Yu-
goslav – undecided, intended for those without a strict national identity, above all Mus-
lims. Only in the following census of 1971, the Yugoslavs appeared as a separate group,
confirming their identity in relation to other nations and nationalities. The events of the
“happening of the people” (“Dogadjanjenaroda”), the confederal constitutional reforms,
as well as granting Muslims a separate national identity, contributed to keeping the
number of Yugoslavs on this list to a minimum.134Despite the fact that these and many
other factors were aimed against the creation of a unique Yugoslav identity, the number
of citizens who declared as Yugoslavs in 1981 increased to 1,291,469 or 5.8%. Perhaps,
at first glance, this figure does not seem high, but it should be emphasized that at that
moment more citizens declared themselves as Yugoslavs than Montenegrins (579,023),
Hungarians (426,866), and more close to the number of those who declare themselves
as Macedonians (1,339,729).135Who were the main pillars of this new / old nation, which
recorded growth in this period? Yugoslavs were mostly composed of urban population,
and three quarters of total population lived in cities.136 Yugoslavs of this period were
also predominantly educated people, but not necessarily highly educated people, and at
times they formed the backbone of the Yugoslav identity. The accelerated moderniza-
tion of the Yugoslav society also affected a part of the citizens, spontaneously making
them assume a new primary identity directly linked to Yugoslavia and away from all
the earlier defined ethnic groups. Urban areas were the most fertile ground for the de-
velopment of Yugoslav national identity, primarily due to its mixed cultural and ethnic
character, and in such environments the main feature of Yugoslav identity was the state
and language, which was somewhat similar to the previous period. One of the reasons
for the increase in the number of people who declared themselves as Yugoslavs was the
increase in the number of mixed marriages after the Second World War. These were the
formative years of these generations and they became aware of the existence of a new
identity that in some way surpassed the old, narrower ethnic identities, which by their
very nature were utterly exclusive. By contrast, the identity of Yugoslavs reappeared as
something modern and civilized, and as such, it became increasingly appealing com-
pared the ethnic-national identities that existed.
Political and economic crises are always closely related to the global trends affecting
them. This was evident in Yugoslavia in the 1980’s after Tito’s death, when the entire
134 Number of citizens declared as Yugoslavs in the 1971 census was 273,077 or 1,3%.
135 https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popis_stanovni%C5%A1tva_1981._u_SFRJ
136 https://pescanik.net/ko-su-bili-jugosloveni/
Yugoslav society faced a deep crisis that affected all parts of the Yugoslav system, which
brought into question the survival of Yugoslavia as a state and thus the existence of
Yugoslav identity. One of the most tragic consequences of this was the re-emergence of
aggressive nationalism among the peoples of Yugoslavia, which in combination with
re-traditionalization and the introduction of “democracy” signaled new conflicts. Nev-
ertheless, despite the prevailing warmongering atmosphere in the SFRY in early 1990’s,
the Yugoslavs did not disappear, which is best evident in the census held this year. Al-
though their number decreasedcompared to the 1981 census, the number of citizens
who felt as Yugoslavs, despite all the negative circumstances, was around 710,000.137The
evident decline in the number of citizens who declared themselves as Yugoslavs was
evident everywhere except in Serbia and Montenegro, where it actually showed growth,
amounting to 45.6% of the total number of Yugoslavs, while in Montenegro that num-
ber has increased from 2.6% to 3.7%.138In Bosnia and Herzegovina lived 33.8% Yugo-
slavs out of the total number of people declared as such, but compared to the 1981 cen-
sus, that was less than 108.000, while in Croatia the decline went from 31.4% 14.9%,
and in Slovenia it dropped from 2.6% to 1.7%. Observing the political atmosphere of
that era, when nationalist parties were in power in all the former republics, and pushed
in the forefront the thesis of threatened national interests within Yugoslavia, it should
not come as surprising to see a decrease in the number of people who felt as Yugoslavs.
Armed conflicts that came shortly after have destroyed the last kernel of communion
that held the Yugoslav idea, the state, and the Yugoslavs together.
1.4. Yugoslavs today
The postwarsituation on the territory of the former SFRY has shown that Yugoslav
identity, like the identity of the Jewish people, survived the destruction and disappear-
ance of their own state, and that Yugoslavs still exist as a nation without homeland. For-
mer members of the “seventh nation of the SFRY” have now become immigrants of sort,
or rather stateless persons who refuse to declare themselves as members of the “liberat-
ed” peoples. Based on the results of the 2001 Population Census, there were about 80,000
Yugoslavs in Serbia, most of whom were in the Vojvodina area or in the territory of Bel-
grade, which confirms the thesis that Yugoslav identity was best developed and longest
kept in multiethnic and urban environments. Still, in the last census in Serbia in 2011,
the number of citizens who declared as Yugoslavsdropped to 23,303.139However, a num-
ber of Yugoslavs can now be found all over the world, so according to the 2010 census in
137 https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popis_stanovni%C5%A1tva_1991._u_SFRJ
138 https://pescanik.net/ko-su-bili-jugosloveni/
139 http://www.jugosloveni.info/
the United States, there are 325,907 citizens who declared ethnically as Yugoslavs, and
a fair number of Yugoslavs can be found in Canada (65,305) and Australia (33,000).140
When it comes to the former republics, the number of Yugoslavs is at the level of statisti-
cal error and ranges from 176 people in Croatia 141 to 1,154 in Montenegro142. According
to unofficial data there are 900,000 Yugoslavs in the world today, which in itself inspires
many questions, one of them being – can Yugoslav identity survive in the future?
The successor states of Yugoslavia today, each for their own reasons, lead a sort of
anti-Yugoslav politics and in various ways try to distance themselves from the previ-
ous period, denying the many positive achievements of Yugoslavia. In this way they are
denying the right of their own citizens who feel as Yugoslavs to protect the existence of
that identity and realize the rights they might get if they acquired the status of a national
minority. On June 19, 2013 a Yugoslav club was founded in the Republic of Serbia, whose
goals are as follows: protection and promotion of Yugoslav culture, Serbo-Croatian lan-
guage and both scripts, Yugoslav literature, arts, music, traditions and customs, linking
the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the field culture, economy, sport and other
fields, opening borders and reconciling peoples from the territory of former Yugoslavia.
Also, the Club statute stipulates that the association will be especially engaged in a speedy
establishment of the Yugoslav National Council.143 The unwillingness of the Republic of
Serbia, as well as of the other states of the former SFRY, to at least legally approve the
establishment of the Yugoslav National Council testifies to the systemic negation of an
identity, especially given that this right was granted to communities with fewer members.
It must be noted that this attitude is not opposed by the European Union, which shows
complete indifference for the existence of Yugoslav ethnic identity. EU should follow its
own guidelines and positions on the rights and protection of minorities and protect and
support the existence of a nation whose members still exist today.
The concept of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav identity has passed a long road stretching
over several centuries, during which it changed according to circumstances. If we ob-
serve it in an uninterrupted timeline, we see that it had ups and downs, but also that
it kept returning to the historical scene, sometimes with more power and sometimes
with less. Although the state of Yugoslavia disappeared in the tragic events of the nine-
ties, it left behind only a small number of citizens who have kept their Yugoslav ethnic
identity, regardless of the surrounding events.This is an indication and a confirmation
that the existence of Yugoslav identity does not necessarily require the existence of a
Yugoslav state as such, which fully corresponds with the very beginning of the devel-
opment of the Yugoslav idea and identity among the South Slavic intelligentsia in the
19th century.The existence of Yugoslavs without Yugoslavia, in the past as well as today,
testifies to a particular resilience of this identity under the most complex circumstances
in the Balkans. Their existence, despite pressures, proves that Yugoslav identity did not
140 http://www.jugosloveni.info/6/Tree-Column-Page.html
141 2011 census.
142 2011 census.
143 http://www.jugosloveni.info/statut_novi_ju.pdf
necessarily disappear forever and that with a certain initiative it could always recur and
could not only be preserved but reinvigorated, provided necessary conditions exist. A
fact speaking in favor of this claim is that Yugoslavdom today is not closely related to
any political party or ideology as it once was, but rather represents a widespread cultur-
al matrix spread far beyond the space once occupied by the former SFRY, and that such
decentralization of ideas is a certain guarantee that it will survive this historical endin
an altered form. If that happens, it will give an answer to a question of whether Yugoslav
identity is an anachronous phenomenon or something far ahead of its time, still waiting
for favorable historical circumstances. A conclusion can be made that today we need
to re-examine more deeply the need to grant this group official minority status, which
would supply a new form to the whole idea and perhaps create a wider support. Addi-
tionally, this would remove a great injustice to those who feel as Yugoslavs, which would
be beneficial for all, except those who advocate for ethnic isolation. Unfortunately, we
are witnessing that such policies are gaining support today.
1.5. Bibliography
1. Grupa autora (2017), Jugoslavija u istorijiskoj perspektivi, Beograd.

2. Grupa autora (2003), Sarajevske sveske, Sarajevo.
3. Dimic Ljubodrag (2001), Integralno jugoslovenstvo i kultura 1929‒1931, Zagreb.
4. Mićunović Natalija (1997), Kulturni identitet na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, Filozo-
fija i društvo XII, Beograd.
5. Petranović Branko(1988), Istorija Jugoslavije 1918‒1988, 1, Beograd.
6. Petrović Ljubomir (2007), U potrazi za izmišljenom stvarnošću, Jugoslovenski
identitet u časopisu „Jugosloven“ 1931‒1932, Istorija 20. veka, Beograd.
7. Стојановић Дубравка (2013), Југославија пре Југославије. Југословенство
у свакодневном животу Београђана 1890‒1914, Годишњак за друштвену
историју 3, Београд.
Student: Verka Jovanović
Mentor: Dr Dragan Popadić
2. THE KOSOVO’S KNOT OF

RECONCILIATION
Introduction
In the aftermath of Kosovo’s conflict, the focus of the international community and
governments in Pristina and Belgrade was more on resolving political issues, building
institutions, and achieving superficial stability, rather than on reconciliation. As a result,
there has been a lack of a serious and systematic reconciliation efforts, and inter-com-
munity dialogue is at an unsatisfactory level. The poor state of human rights respect of
non-majority communities in Kosovo largely reflects the imbalanced power relations
between different communities. The non-majority communities encounter persistent
issues with justice and security, socio-economic rights, language and education, return
and reintegration rights, etc. The non-fulfillment of rights of communities is further
deepening animosities. As exemplified by the events preceding the 1999 conflict, the
fulfillment of rights, inclusion and representation of non-majority communities is
crucial to achieve a balanced power-sharing coexistence and conflict prevention, and
non-fulfillment may have grave consequences to peace and security overall. Kosovo
should learn from its history of unaddressed grievances of communities, which even-
tually lead to escalations of violence, and should, therefore, work to prevent similar
developments in the future, through systematic and sustainable reconciliation initia-
tives and improvement of judicial system and law enforcement for adequate human and
community rights protection.
119
2.1. Defining reconciliation
Reconciliation is most often viewed as the establishment of new bilateral relation-

ships after conflict, accomplished by movements on both sides, and built on principles
of peace, justice, mutual trust and respect.144 Political reconciliation is often manifested
as the establishment of bilateral relationships, but reconciliation among members of a
society is manifested through established multilateral relationships among individuals.
Non-lethal coexistence and the presence of negative peace are the first stop in the defi-
nitional continuum of reconciliation.145 Negative peace, defined as the absence of violence,
is manifested by post-conflict relationships without meaningful social interactions and
often with the presence of high levels of animosity; in other words, the “non-lethal coexis-
tence”146. Nevertheless, reconciliation is defined as positive and sustainable peace between
people147, and non-lethal coexistence is no more than just a small step toward achieving
that. Positive peace, on the other hand, is manifested by the type of coexistence which
encompasses “mutually beneficial cooperation on an equal basis and mutual learning to
heal past violence and prevent future violence.”148 Negative peace is fragile and may at
any point turn into violence, while positive peace is sustainable, based on trust and co-
operation, and absent of hate, fear, and loathing, which makes it harder for conflict to
erupt. Non-lethal coexistence is the first step in achieving reconciliation, but peaceful and
harmonious coexistence is the main goal of reconciliation processes, just as it is the most
important indicator that reconciliation exists in a society.
Reconciliation is often viewed differently by different people, depending on their ex-
periences and nature of their personalities. There is a view of reconciliation as future-ori-
ented, forward-looking, and a view of reconciliation oriented toward the “rightening”
of past wrongs as a precondition for dealing with mutual future. While, for someone,
justice must be pursued in order to achieve reconciliation, for others, truth about past
atrocities may be the only important requirement to make peace with themselves and
reconcile with others. Consequently, reconciliation, as a process, must be pursued in a
way that responds to the needs, beliefs, and desires of a specific community, group, or
society, and the strategy to achieve it must be crafted specifically for that context, with
active participation of all relevant groups. By adopting an inclusive consultative process,
a systematic strategy for reconciliation may be built, whereby a society may develop its
own definition of reconciliation and the actions that should be pursued to achieve the
144 Erin, Daly, and Jeremy Sarkin, eds. Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground. p. 180-
182. UPEN Press, 2011. Accessed February 02, 2017.
145 Ibid. p. 183.
146 Ibid. p. 183.
147 Ibid. p. 184.
148 Galtung, Johan, and Dietrich Fischer. Johan Galtung Pioneer of Peace Research. p. 12. Springer Briefs on
Pioneers in Science and Practice, 2013.
best results in that respective context. One thing is for sure, no matter in what way rec-
onciliation is being pursued, it should always aim for achieving more than just negative
peace where communities coexist segregated and discriminate against each other, but
positive peace, where communities coexist interactively and respect each other’s rights.
2.2. Reconciliation in Kosovo
Coexistence between Serbian and Albanian communities has been troublesome since
the Kosovo conflict ended. A research149 on ethnic distance between Kosovo Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians showed low levels of readiness for entering into the relations of differ-
ent level of closeness with the members of different social groups.150In another research,
youngsters were asked how “wholeheartedly” they would welcome each other as neigh-
bors. Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs stated to have been very reluctant to accept
each other in such a hypothetical situation. Moreover, the questions of safety and discrim-
ination were answered quite differently byAlbanians, rather than Serbs. In the post-con-
flict area of Kosovo, 90% of Kosovo Albanians felt safe in their area of residence. The
situation was completely different for young Kosovo Serbs, with as many as 60% declaring
to feel rather unsafe in their neighborhoods. Moreover, as many as 78% of young Kosovo
Serbs declared to have felt discriminated against, compared to 33% of Kosovo Albanians
who have felt so. Serbs cited Ethnicity and Religion as the main reasons for receiving dis-
criminatory treatment.151 All these information help us get an idea about how coexistence
looks like in post-conflict Kosovo. Additionally, the OSCE reports that inter-community
dialogue and reconciliation have been almost at a stalemate. Although they commend the
“improved climate”152 between the Kosovo communities, following the Brussels agree-
ments, and the processes of initiation of institutional integration of Serbian communi-
ties in the Kosovo system, the persistence of divisions between communities along ethnic
lines is evident. The main reason for this is the conflict itself. However, additional reasons
for barely moving forward regarding reconciliation are the following:
1. There was no significant, effective, nor efficient reconciliation efforts by the aut-
horities since the conflict ended;
2. The ongoing dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo in Brussels, led on a high and
political level, also failed to address reconciliation among people;
3. Ineffective and inefficient law enforcement system.
149 Perspectives of a Multiethnic Society in Kosovo. Publication. Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR). 257-61.
150 Ibid. 272.
151 Kosovo Youth Study: Forward Looking, Grounded in Tradition. Survey 2012. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. IDRA. p. 6.
152 Community Rights Assessment Report. Mission in Kosovo, Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE). Fourth Edition ed. OSCE, 2015. p 6. Accessed May 3, 2017.
Effective reconciliation initiatives in Kosovo have been happening simultaneously

with, but separately from the „high-level“ dialogue in Brussels, were mostly small-scale,
lacking capacity to involve larger groups of people on different levels, and, above all,
lacking sustainability. I would not like to undermine initiatives led by various local and
international non-governmental organizations, but to emphasize that local and inter-
national authorities that have effective power in Kosovo bear most responsibility for
notcreating a system for sustainable reconciliation process.
As an example for a government-led, failed, initiative, there was an Inter-Ministerial
Working Group on Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation (IMWG), chaired by the
Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, which has been working since 2012 on develop-
ing a National Strategy on Transitional Justice. This government’s institutional frame-
work, installed to deal with the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, has been fail-
ing to establish proper representation of communities, and has overall failed to perform
the assigned duties. The IMWG has failed to meet regularly and had no more than one
Serb among its participants.153 A group of NGOs evaluated the work of this Working
Group, concluding that the main issues were related to leadership and management, po-
litical ownership, representation and participation of non-majority communities, and
the lack of engagement of the general public. This Working Group did not contribute to
building trust between the government and non-majority communities, Serbs in par-
ticular.154 On February 13th, 2017, Kosovo’s President, Hashim Thaci, announced the
formulation of a truth and reconciliation commission in Kosovo. Despite the fact that
similar initiatives had failed to contribute to intercommunal reconciliation, the poten-
tial of an initiative like this one should not be undermined. Instead, bad practices from
the pasts hould be taken into account. In addition, respect for human and community
rights as essential part of reconciliation process shoul dnot be undermined, either, un-
less the policy makers want to deal with another failure.
If we put these failed and half-implemented initiatives, up to this moment, instead
of reconciliation, largely ignoring and neglecting the need for it, integration has been
agreed on in Brussels, and agreements have, consequently, been implemented in Koso-
vo. Integration may take many forms, including the one of „institutional integration“,
where communities of different ethnicities live segregated, with low levels of social
interaction, but function within the same major institutions.155Similarly, although, as
agreed in Brussels, it has been progressing institutionally, integration between Koso-
vo communities has been keeping the shape of intercommunal segregation, as a con-
sequence of non-existence of systematic reconciliation efforts by relevant authorities,
154 “War Justice Strategy for Kosovo Undermined by Divisions.” Balkan Insight. April 11, 2017. Accessed
May 03, 2017. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/war-justice-strategy-for-kosovo-undermined-
by-divisions-04-10-2017.
155 Kriesberg, Louis. Changing Forms of Coexistence in Reconciliation, justice, and coexistence: theory &
practice. Edited by Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. pp. 49.
including Brussels that, despite trying to be presented as a „facilitator“, cannot really

hide from the public that it has a much bigger role.
And while the institutional integration has been progressing, the institutions hav-
en’t. This is at the same time the result and the cause of the fact that institution builders
forgot that there was a conflict between communities that are now supposed to work
under the same roof, and policy makers neglected that these peoples speak different
languages, with little possibility of understanding each other on a linguistic, as well
as personal level. Systematic reconciliation efforts were supposed to create a basis for
interpersonal understanding, forgiveness if not forgettance, and a basis for de-subjec-
tivization of trut has a precondition for understanding „the other“.
The lack of systematic reconciliation efforts and, consquently, the lack of political
will, brought about improper implementation of essentially good legislation and ju-
dicial system.The ill implementation is particularly present when it comes to non-ma-
jority communties. Kosovo’s judicial and legislative system foresees its society to be
multiethnic, multilingual, multiconfessional, whereas in practice the system disables
the enjoyment of rights of different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. For instance,
Kosovo Constitution affirms protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms,156
human dignity,157 equality before the law158, and states the direct applicability of the
most important international human rights agreements159. Freshly formed institutions
in theoryembraced the differences, forbade discrimination of minorities, and accepted
back refugees. In practice, this went differently. The constitutional obligations, as well
as obligations provided in other domestic laws and international provisions, are poorly
implemented in Kosovo’s communities, with the largest consequences on non-majori-
ty communities. Kosovo Serbian communitymembers were pushed toward integration
into institutions which failed to respect and fulfill their rights.
For instance, in the reporting period of 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, there were 479
recorded incidents in Kosovo “which had the potential to negatively affect the secu-
rity perceptions of communities in a numerical minority at the municipal level”160.
These incidents included “theft, verbal assault, severe damage and illegal occupation of
property (including cultural heritage sites and cemeteries), incidents inciting hate and
156 Constitution of Kosovo. Article 21. Accessed May 3, 2017. http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/reposi-

tory/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf.
157 Ibid. Article 23.
158 Ibid. Article 24.
159 The international agreements directly applicable in Kosovo, according to the Article 22 of the Consti-
tution, are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights and its Protocols; Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Convention on the Rights of the Child;
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
aggressive nationalism161 and actual physical assaults or intimidation”162. More than a

half of these incidents directly affected Serbian community members and the Serbian
Orthodox Church. Moreover, Kosovo courts have consistently failed to address com-
plaints of non-Albanian communities, primarily Serbs, about ethnically motivated vio-
lence or hate crimes, thus infringing their right to access justice.
Concerning linguistic rights, there is a problematic non-compliance of institutional
structures with their language obligations, in terms of a lack of public documents ade-
quately translated in both official languages, as well as the lack of proper interpretation
during service provision. Poor quality or non-provision of translation services was report-
ed in 61 per cent of the cases that involved non-Albanians. Although the Serbian language
and the Albanian language should be equally respected under Kosovo legislation, this is
not the case even in judicial proceedings. Namely, “in 105 criminal cases involving only a
Kosovo Serb defendant monitored by the OSCE in 2014, not a single case was heard in the
Serbian language”.163 The Office of the Language Commissioner emphasized the contin-
uous lack of progress on the proper implementation of the Law on the Use of Languages,
due to the lack of capacity, and weak awareness of legal obligations.164
Moreover, the two separate educational systems, one operated by the Kosovo Ministry
of Education, Science and Technology (MEST), and the other one operated by the Minis-
try of Education of the Republic of Serbia, do not provide communities with an opportu-
nity to learn each other’s languages. Communities choose either system depending main-
ly on their location,ethnicity, language and/or religion. Education and language issues
further hinder socio-economic rights and concerns were expressed regarding unequal
employment opportunities for members of different communities in Kosovo, and the full
implementation of The Law on Civil Service. Moreover, there are concerns regarding the
recognition of diplomas issued by the Belgrade-operated University in Mitrovica North
by the Kosovo authorities, which further hinders access to employment for members of
the Serbian community.165 Additionally, there is widespread ethnic bias in media report-
ing, which is further aggravated by the lack of dual language media outlets.166
More than 220.000 people, the majority of whom are ethnic Serbs, remain displaced
in Serbia, Kosovo, and neighboring areas to date. The rate of voluntary returns fell
significantly after the March 2004 violence, and continue at a slow pace. Until 2015,
about 26,666 persons167 have voluntarily returned to Kosovo from the region and third
161 Incidents including graffiti with hateful and nationalistic messages, verbal assaults, or burning of Serbi-
an flags in public places were recorded by the OSCE.
in Europe (OSCE). Fourth Edition ed. OSCE, 2015. Accessed May 3, 2017. p 12.
164 Ibid. p. 15-17.
165 Ibid. p. 20-27.
166 Ibid. p. 8.
167 “Accountability Framework Serbia and Montenegro.” Danish Refugee Council, March 2015, 1. Accessed
December 12, 2017. https://drc.dk/media/2449694/af-serbia-mne-feb-2016-eng-with-aip.pdf.
countries, out of whom only about 10.000 were Serbs.168 The reasons for such low num-
bers of the returned are multiple, and range from all previously discussed issues, i.e.
material and physical insecurity, to economic instability, to problematized notions of
language and education, and property rights of the returnees.
All these examples prove that the inter-ethnic coexistence in Kosovo has merely
been just that – a non-lethal (but not completely nonviolent) coexistence of the two
communities living next to each other, largely functioning under the same institu-
tions, with minimum social interaction and a high level of ethnic discrimination,
primarily against Serbs, Roma, Gorani, and other non-majority groups. Kosovo
government may have installed inclusive and non-discriminatory legislation with
a broad range of mechanisms for the protection of community rights, but it has
been falling behind in the practical enforcement of this legislation at the expense
of non-majority community rights andoverall reconciliation between communities.
The existence of the community-protective legislation is a significant aspect of a
power-sharing coexistence, which should go beyond a merely non-lethal coexistence
and includerespect for human rights, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other cultural
distinctions, andhigh levels of integration between communities.169 In Kosovo, the
incomplete enforcement of community rights legislation aimed at power-sharing has
been risking the resurgence of a policy of preeminence of a single dominant group
over others. The inadequate protection of human rights is one of the main obstacles
to inter-ethnic communication and dialogue, which also makes it one of the main
obstacles to reconciliation.
2.3. Conclusion
Reconciliation is a highly contextual process, and steps to achieve it may not be

applied universally without exceptions or modifications to specific situations, con-
flicts, cultures. On the other hand, there are certain similarities in efforts made at
reconciliation, and the most common practice applied in many post-conflict societ-
ies is the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). However,
neither general, nor specific strategies aimed at reconciliation, including truth and
reconciliation commissions, specialcourts, initiatives for pursuing dialogue, etc., will
not improve post-conflict relationships in a society unless persistent problems of a
wider social context are being simultaneously or previously addressed. In a peaceful
and sustainable society, the needs of non-majority communities must be adequately
168 Zejneli, Amra. “Oko 200.000 izbeglihsaKosova se jošnijevratilo.” Radio SlobodnaEvropa. June 20, 2011.
Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/24240855.html.
169 Kriesberg, Louis. Reconciliation, justice, and coexistence: theory & practice. Edited by Mohammed
Abu-Nimer. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 51.
addressed. Parties are much more likely to turn towards violent resolution of their
conflicts if they are poor, unemployed, disadvantaged, and if the government is desta-
bilizing, corrupt, inefficient or biased.170
In tackling the objectives for the improvement of Kosovo’s future,human rights
must be respected and communities must be adequately protected. Moreover, there is a
need to address past grievances of all communities in order to form a basis for sustain-
able, long-term solutions and agreements, and to prevent new conflicts from emerging.
Kosovo society needs to learn constructively from the history of negative past events.
Reconciliation is a multi-fold process that requires not only unilateral actions of en-
hancing the rights protection of a particular group per se, but also mutual involvement
and constructive engagement of various groups, at different levels. Addressing the needs
of and grievances of all is a precondition for an inclusive and sustainable reconciliation
strategy to be developed.
170 Erin, Daly, and Jeremy Sarkin, eds. Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground. p. 188.
UPEN Press, 2011. Accessed February 02, 2017.
Student: Biljana Marković
Mentor: Vladimir Petronijević
3. ESSAY TOPIC:
THE IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION
ON THE LABOR MARKET
Introduction
Migration is a phenomenon that occurs from ancient times. With the development
of society when people began to leave their homelands in search of a better life, migra-
tion has become an area of deeper research for social scientists.
To put it simply, human migration can be defined as movements of people from one
area to another or from one country to another is the movement by people from one
place to another. Migration may be voluntary or forced.
This paper, among other things, discusses the impact of migration on the labor mar-
ket. In the Republic of Serbia there are more workers than jobs, while in some other
countries around the world it is the other way around – demand for workers exceeds
supply. This is why Serbian workers are leaving the country to seek new employment
opportunities in countries that offer such opportunities, i.e. those with labor shortages.
This leads to increasing migration of population from countries with shortage of work
to countries with shortage of workers. Therefore, it would be very interesting to exam-
ine the positive and negative effects of migration on the labor markets in both countries
of origin and host countries. Using secondary data, this paper suggests that apart from
significant benefits migration embraces certain negative effects on both the origin and
destination countries.
127
3.1. Migration
From a demographic perspective, migration denotes the change of place of residence

of the population within. There are two basic kinds of migration - external and internal.
Internal migration denotes the change of place of residence of the population within a
country. External migration occurs when a registered citizen moves to a foreign coun-
try.171 The migration rate is the difference between the number of people coming into an
area and the number of people leaving an area.
Migration by the duration-of-residence can be:
• Permanent migration
• Seasonal migration
• Daily or weekly migration
Labor immigrants generally gravitate towards fast growing regions.

Estimating the effects of migration on the labor market is quite challenging due to
a lack of adequate data. Data is not available because of the method used for collecting
and recording data on the labor market. Namely, most data is based on the nationality
criterion, instead of the country of birth of immigrants. Europe was in the past and still
is the primary destination for migrants. General population surveys in EU member
states show that most of them are experiencing a natural population decrease, which
occurs where death rate is greater than birth rate. Besides, the share of population aged
65 and over in these countries is greater than the share of younger population. For this
reason, the issue of migration is becoming increasingly important.172
3.1.1. Effects of migration on the labor market
When immigrant and native-born workers are perfect substitutes, they compete for
jobs in the same labor market and the impact of migration on native-born workers
will be negative. It is assumed that immigrant workers will increase the labor supply in
host country and, consequently, cause a reduction in wage rates of native-born workers.
However, when immigrant workers are not perfect substitutes for native-born workers,
assuming that among them there are workers with high and lower levels of education,
the migration and increase in the labor supply on the one side will also increase the
employment rate on the other. This means that if the number of lower-skilled workers
171 Bobić Mirjana, Anđelković Vesković Milica, Kanazir Kokotović Vlasta, Studija o spoljnim i unutrašnjim
migracijama građana Srbije sa posebnim osvrtom na mlade, Švajcarska agencija za razvoj i saradnju
(SDC), Beograd, 2015, str.13.
172 Penava Marija, Uticaj migracija na evropsko tržište rada, Faculty of Economy Zagreb, Croatia, 2011,
UDK/UDC: 331.556.4(4), p. 335‒362.
is expanded, the size of business will increase, and consequently the demand for jobs
requiring higher education will increase. Consequently, the impact of migration on job
creation is positive.
We have so far focused on host countries, but what happens to the countries of origin.
In case the workers in question were employed in their home country before moving to a
foreign country, migration will have negative impact on their home country. However, if
they were unemployed before moving to a foreign country for work, then the impact on their
home country is positive because total GDP will remain unchanged while GDP per capita
will increase. Another benefit is from remittances sent by workers who live and work abroad
to their home country. However, if the workers in question are highly-qualified, then the
effect of migration will be negative due to the cost of educating highly-qualified labor force.
3.1.2. Most notable examples of migration
A study by Card (1990) analyzed the effect of the Mariel boat lift on the Miami la-
bor market. In 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban immigrants migrated to the United
States, with many of them settling in the Miami metropolitan area. This concentrat-
ed immigration influx increased the supply of workers to the Miami labor market by
roughly 7% in a very short time period. Relative increase in workers was around 20%.
There is no evidence of an impact of this large influx on wages or unemployment rates.
A similar analysis was done using the 1962 independence of Algeria from France as
an exogenous shock to the French population. Upon independence, nearly all French na-
tionals residing in Algeria returned to France, a migratory flow that amounted to over
900,000 immigrants (roughly 1.6% of the total French labor force in 1962). The estimates
suggest that the flow of repatriates had modest decrease in the wages by 0.8%, increase
in the unemployment rate by 0.3%, and decrease in the average salaries by, at most 1.3%.
The last example analyses the effect of the massive repatriation of 600,000 Portu-
guese from African colonies after the Carnation Revolution in 1974, increasing the pop-
ulation of Portugal by approximately 7%. Carrington and deLima who examined this
example found that the impact of this massive repatriation had only a modest effect on
the Portuguese labor market.173
3.1.3. Push and Pull Model
According to the classic push and pull model, individual perception of the labor
market related conditions is especially important, such as employment opportuni-
ties, level of income, and speed of progress. However, today the perception of other
173 Penava Marija, Uticaj migracija na Evropsko tržište rada, Faculty of Economy Zagreb, Croatia, 2011,
UDK/UDC: 331.556.4(4), p. 335‒362.
conditions is becoming more and more important, such as the feeling of safety, per-
spectives related to the future, , the level of democratic development, and alike. This
is why the individual’s knowledge of the potential destination country is important.
The positive factors related to good conditions in the country of potential or real des-
tination are pull factors, and those related to poor conditions in the country of origin
are push factors.
Personal or individual perception of the emigrant includes parameters such as the
possibility to obtain citizenship in the destination country and cost of moving there,
but also the psychological cost of leaving the country of origin and coping in the new
environment. According to Lee (Lee, 1966), individual factors are also important for
making the decision on migrating and the decision decision to migrate is never com-
pletely rational underlined. Namely, the choice of factors related to the area that are
evaluated and especially their evaluation depends on the individual, their personal-
ity, value system, stage of life, a number of personal circumstances and high level of
knowledge.174
3.2. Serbia
Government of Serbia adopted the National Sustainable Development Strategy in

May 2008. Several chapters of the strategy address the issue of migration. The strategy
emphasizes the need to prevent labor emigration from Serbia. Laying the foundations
for preventing brain-drain of people with higher levels of education is the objective
envisaged in the strategy. The Government has taken certain steps to address the issue
of unemployment by adopting the 2016 National Employment Action Plan. One of the
measures envisaged by the action plan is to develop a mobility program concept for the
unemployed seeking work.
Serbia is traditionally a country of emigration. Besides Germany, Austria, Switzer-
land and Sweden, popular new destinations are Italy and Great Britain. Serbian citizens
are attracted by these countries because they offer opportunities for professional de-
velopment and learning.175 Emigration from Serbia appears to have reduced compared
to rates in 1990. Students participate in the emigrant contingent with a share of 3.9%.
Among the students there is somewhat more female persons.
Men prevailed among the persons working abroad and women among family mem-
bers. Among the students there was somewhat more female persons.
174 Rašević Mirjana, Migration and Development in Serbia, International Organization for Migration,
Belgrade, 2016, p. 11.
Chart 3.3 The participation of external migrants and resident population of Serbia in
large age groups, 2011 Census
The above chart shows that in the registered emigrant contingent the highest share
were persons of ages 20-39.
On the other hand, the education structure of the emigrant contingent is the following:176
• 6% ‒ persons with no primary school
• 27.5% ‒ persons with completed primary school
• 38.8% ‒ persons with completed secondary school
• 15.7% ‒ emigrants with higher education
The results of the Census show that, in the registered emigration contingent, more
numerous are those who departed abroad from non-urban settlements (57.8%) than
from persons who left from urban ones. Employment of Serbian citizens abroad is reg-
ulated by the Law on Employment and Unemployment Insurance.
In 2013, an agreement was signed between the Government of Serbia and France
that promotes the mobility of students and young professionals. It is stipulated that the
annual exchange volume may not exceed 500 persons.
Between the last two population censuses, according to the results of the 2011 Cen-
sus, 67.6 thousand persons moved into Serbia from abroad, out of which nearly one-
third was from Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by immigrants from Montenegro,
Croatia and Germany.
When talking about current immigration flows, the biggest influx of foreigners in
2014 was from China, Russian Federation, Romania, Macedonia and Libya.
According to the National Employment Service records, 0.1% of the unemployed in
Serbia were foreign nationals on 31 December 2014. Among them, most were with no
education or with the lowest level of education.
According to this Law on Employment of Foreigners in Serbia of 2014, a foreigner
employed in Serbia has equal rights and obligations in terms of employment, as the
citizens of Serbia. Employment of foreigners is possible provided they have approval for
temporary stay or permanent residence and work permit.
3.2.1. Migration and its effects on the labor market
Worsening economic situation, unemployment and low standards of living are the
main factors that motivate citizens to leave Serbia and pursue job opportunities abroad.
The biggest number of highly trained emigrants from Serbia go to Germany, mostly
health care workers. In 2013, the National Employment Service of the Republic of Serbia
and the German Federal Employment Agency of the City of Nuremberg concluded an
Agreement on mediation in temporary employment of the health care workers from the
Republic of Serbia in FR Germany. Other reasons for departure of Serbian health care
workers to Germany are working conditions and modern equipment of German clinics
and opportunities for training.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated
that developing countries invest in tertiary education around USD 20,000.00 per student.
The high majority of emigrants with higher education (15.8%) are in the USA.
Next on the list, by the share of Serbian citizens with higher education working/stay-
ing abroad, is Germany (10.4%), followed by Canada (7.1%), Switzerland and the UK
(with 5.2% each). The highest number of registered emigrants with a PhD degree are
also in the USA.
The motives for emigration of highly educated persons to the above countries can be
divided into four groups:177
• degree of democratization
• living standards
• social environment
• the position of science in the society
3.2.2. Remittances
Migrants’ remittances can have both positive and negative effects. Positive effects:
remittances received by families of migrants improve their standard of life, and there-
fore purchasing power, provide more opportunities for education, and increase the like-
lihood of investing is small business.
Potential negative effects of remittances: households that receive remittances tend
to rely on remittances and become inactive in terms of making their own efforts for
improving the standard of living, and are less likely to participate in the labor market
in general.
In the period 2007-2015, the size of remittance inflows in Serbia was USD 34,937
million, ranking Serbia second on the list of remittance recipients in Europe and Cen-
tral Asia.
3.2.3. Migration and labor market
The Government of Serbia adopted the 2017 National Action Plan for Employment in
September 2016. One of the key measures envisaged by the plan is the development of a
mobility program concept for the unemployed in seeking work, including seasonal jobs.
The state may use active labor market policies to address geographical immobility in
two principal ways:178
1. Either to create incentives for workers to move to depressed areas, or
2. To encourage workers to move to job-rich areas.
These mobility-supporting active labor market measures include transport and re-
location subsidies and housing support. Most programs that are part of such measures
fall under four broad categories: labor market training, job search support, subsidized
employment and direct job creation. Some countries tend to apply programs based
on the carrot-and-stick approach. In Sweden, for example, an unemployed person is
required to extend the geographic job search area after 100 days of unemployment in
order to continue receiving unemployment benefits.
Examples successful programs – good practice examples:
• Coordination and cooperation of employment services – The European Job Mobility
Portal (EURES) is the main web platform promoting labor mobility in Europe
(Iceland, Norway and Switzerland),
• Coordination of vocational training and accreditation systems – Internet based
textile education laboratory in Turkey,
• Encouraging relocation of youth to employment-rich areas – Moving Swedish
youth to Norway,
• Transportation and relocation support – Reducing costs of relocation in Sweden
through tax breaks,
• Housing support – Mobility schemes in the UK (The LAWN agency and the
Housing Organizations Mobility and Exchange Services encourage movement
from large urban areas to depopulated regions),
• Education policies ‒ New South Wales Rural Resident Medical Officer Cadetship
Program (the Cadetship Program offers bonded scholarships providing financial
support for medicine students and contract to complete 2 of their first 3
postgraduate years in the NSW rural hospital network).
178 Marjanović Dragana, Labor Migration and its Effects on the Demography and Labor Market in Serbia,
research conducted within the “Mainstreaming Migration into National Development Strategies“, Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Belgrade, 2015, p. 46.
3.3. Conclusion
Human migration is the defining issue of the 21st, especially for Serbia. Large num-
bers of Serbian citizens immigrate to Europe and America in search of a better life.
Most of them have completed secondary school. As far as the education profiles are con-
cerned, Germany is hosting the largest number of medical professionals from Serbia.
Even though this has caused the huge losses for Serbia, to the extent that our workers
abroad maintain ties to their country of origin, Serbia benefits because of remittances,
and therefore immigration should not be viewed as pure loss.
In order to reduce external migration the state has adopted certain measures to
promote internal migration with a pure goal to encourage citizens to move within the
borders of Serbia, rather than go abroad. Sweden is a good example of how to handle
internal migration by applying the carrot-and-stick approach, to make citizens aware
that the loss of employment in one city does not mean that good opportunity will not
pop up in another city within the same state.
3.4. Literature
1. Beslać Milan, Ekonomski aspekti integrativnih politika međunarodnih migracija,

Visoka škola za ekonomiju i preduzetništvo, Beograd, 2018.
2. Bobić Mirjana, Anđelković Vesković Milica, Kanazir Kokotović Vlasta, „Studija
o spoljnim i unutrašnjim migracijama građana Srbije sa posebnim osvrtom na
mlade“, Švajcarska agencija za razvoj i saradnju (SDC), Beograd, 2015.
3. Marjanović Dragana, „Migracija radne snage i njen uticaj na demografsku sliku
i tržište rada u Srbiji,“ Istraživanje sprovedeno u okviru projekta „Uključivanje
migracija u nacionalne razvojne strategije“, 2015., Švajcarska agencija za razvoj i
saradnju (SDC), Beograd, 2015
4. Penava Marija, „Uticaj migracija na eEvropsko tržište rada“, 2011, Ekonomssmki
fakultet Zagreb, Hrvatska, 2011, UDK/UDC: 331.556.4(4)
5. Rašević Mirjana, Migracije i razvoj u Srbiji, 2016,, Međunarodna organizacija za
migracije, Beograd, 2016.
Student: Marija Milenković
Mentor: Dr Dragan Popadić
4. INTERETHNIC COOPERATION
THROUGH TOURISM:
A KOSOVO CASE STUDY
Introduction
The notion of “ethnic group”179 is widely used in the social sciences. It it is a category
of people who identify with each other based on similarities such as common culture,
tradition, customs, language, origin, history, religion and other characteristics180. An
“ethnic group” has been defined by Eric Hobsbawm (as described by Vrcan, 1999) as
“any group that is, on the whole, distinct from other groups in the same territory, which
has a collective name and characteristics that will help to distinguish the group from
other groups by virtue of real or presumed characteristics that are common to all its
members ... “181. Anthony Smith, 1998, (pp. 29-30) identifies six attributes of an ethnic
group: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical mem-
ories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture. Moreover the ethnic
group needs an association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for signif-
icant sectors of the population182.
Social scientists emphasize the need to differentiate the adjectives “national” and
“ethnic”, and this paper will, inter alia, provide clarification of terminology. In everyday
and social science context, the adjectives “ethnic” and “national” have different, often
unclear meaning. In this paper, an “ethnic group” will refer to a population whose members
have a common heritage, a subjective belief in their common origin, the feeling of belonging
and sense of personal relatedness, while a “nation” will be used as a broader concept which
is associated to a particular state. Since the ethnically homogenous states may no longer
179 The term “ethnic” is derived from the Greek word “ethnos”, meaning nation or people.
180 Korunić, Petar, Nation and National Identity, Usp. Zgodovinski časopis 57, Ljubljana, 2003, p. 1.
181 Vrcan, Srđan, „Znakovita zbrka oko etničkog“,u: J. Čačić-Kumpes (ur.),Kultura, etničnost, identitet. Na-
klada Jesenski i Turk, Zagreb,1999, str. 15‒39.
182 Smit, Antoni, Nacionalni identitet, XX Century, Belgrade, 1998, p. 29‒30.
135
apply in contemporary societies, a nation may also be multi-ethnic. The rights of per-
sons belonging to all ethnic groups are guaranteed by laws within a particular state. The
Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities183 of the Republic of
Serbia184 sets forth the right of each ethnic group to preserve and develop the unique
characteristics making them distinct from other ethnic groups. In Kosovo, the Law on
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members185 en-
sures the full and effective equality for all persons belonging to different social groups.
4.1. Ethnic group and nation are often used synonymously
Ethnic distance refers to the degree of closeness or distance between different ethnic
groups. Ethnic distance also indicates the degree of social interaction and tolerance
of members of one ethnic group towards members of other groups.186 According to a
recent survey, respondents in Serbia show the most social distance towards Albanians,
more so than towards any other ethnic group.187 Around 40% of respondents were re-
luctant to accept the fact that ethnic Albanians are citizens of Serbia, almost half don’t
want Albanian people to be their neighbors, over half would don’t want to have ethnic
Albanian bosses, while 70% of respondents per cent wouldn’t marry them.188
High levels of ethnic distance between Serbs and Albanians has its roots not only
in a different language and culture, but also in the long history of political and mili-
tary conflict. Serbian-Albanian relations during the 20th century went through differ-
ent stages and were marked by conflicts, mass political protests and other movements.
Deteriorating relations culminated with the 1999 war and massive armed conflicts be-
tween the two ethnic groups. After the war, Kosovo experienced the change in ethnic
composition as a result of violence. The percentage of Serbs in the total population ac-
cording to some sources decreased from 11% in 1991 to only 5% in 2007.189 Supported
by the world’s most powerful countries, Kosovo pronounced independence in 2008,
and began the institution-building and legal framework development process. Ethnic
Serbs who have immensely shrunk numerically are mostly concentrated in the north
183 All groups of citizens termed or determined as nations, national or ethnic communities, national or
ethnic groups, nationalities and nationalities are deemed national minorities for the purpose of this law.
184 The Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (“Official Gazette of FRY”, No.
11/02, “Official Gazette of SMN”, No. 1/03 - Constitutional Charter and “Official Gazette of the Repub-
lic of Serbia” No. 72/09 – state law and 97/13-US)
185 The Law No. 03/L-047 on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members.
186 Popadić, Dragan, Put iz bratstva i jedinstva – etnička distanca građana Srbije, p. 107.
187 Public Opinion Survey report, Public Perceptions of Discrimination in Serbia, Commissioner for the
Protection of Equality and UNDP, Belgrade, 2013, p. 31.
188 Popadić, Dragan, Put iz bratstva i jedinstva – etnička distanca građana Srbije, p. 108.
189 Demografija Kosova i Metohije, Wikipedia, available at: https://bit.ly/2JTBewT.
of Kosovo (the municipalities of North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan),
and in the enclaves south of the Ibar River. This post-conflict society is characterized
by the interethnic intolerance of mistrust, placing Kosovo in a precarious state, when it
comes to relations between Serbs and Albanians.
Establishing trust and communication between the sides in conflict is not an easy
task. Research shows that social distance and prejudices can be reduced by setting su-
perordinate goals. Superordinate goals are the goals which are compelling and highly
appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be attained
by the groups separately (Delamater & Myers, 2011, p. 339).190Unification around super-
ordinate goals is an effective method used to resolve intergroup conflict and improve
relations in the post-conflict period. Formation of superordinate goals increases inter-
action among members of groups, but increased interaction does not necessarily lead to
reduction of hostility. However, if the interaction is personalized and not only oriented
towards the completion of tasks, a superordinate goal may positively affect the mitiga-
tion of stereotypes and hostility among the conflicting groups. Interaction aimed at
achieving superordinate goals will be more efficient when members who communicate
with each other are of the same status within their groups, and if it is institutionally
supported. Superordinate goals also increase cooperation between the groups. If the
conflict seen as a win-lose situation is turned into a common problem-solving process
with a potencial for win-win solution for both sides, the superordinate goal will will
positively affect the reduction of conflict among the groups. Formation of superordinate
goals may create a shared superordinate identity of in-group and out-group members,
which reduces the difference between “Us” and “Them”.
Gathering around a common goal and establishing and/or enhancing cooperation
among different groups is certainly a great challenge, due to differences across ethnic
groups. Nevertheless, it may have numerous benefits. Establishing cooperation between
ethnic groups through various economic, cultural and other projects, helps reducing
the status differences between them and their isolation from society. Tourism can be
instrumental in stimulating effective interethnic cooperation. Development of tourism
and a change in the tourism industry can bring together people belonging to different
ethnic groups. Tour operators, guides, tourism organizations, media outlets covering
tourism, have a significant role in promoting positive interactions and tolerance to-
wards diversity.
Tourism industry can become a generator of interethnic cooperation by activating the
overall cultural and historical heritage of different communities with the aim to increase
their attractiveness.191 Cooperation between ethnic groups can be promoted through joint
projects, creation and promotion of tourist programs which include similar or different
tourist products and activities. Tourists want to experience different elements of authentic
190 Delamater&Myers, Social Psychology, Wadsworth Cengage Learning USA, 2011, p. 339.
191 Posebni oblici turizma Dunavskog regiona Srbije, Institut za ekonomiku poljoprivrede Beograd, 2014, p.
142, available at: https://bit.ly/2vK1N5E.
local culture and different forms of cultural expression produced by various communi-
ties. Cooperation contributes to economic and social prosperity of minority communities
that share the same living space, and helps strengthen ties between them.
This paper presents an example of successful cooperation in the field of tourism,
between the two largest ethnic groups in Kosovo.
4.2. Tourism development as a superordinate

goal: A Kosovo Case study
Kosovo is home to abundant natural and other resources which represent an im-
portant development opportunity for tourism. The variety of mountains, rivers, lakes,
historical sites and rich cultural heritage make this region attractive for tourists having
different preferences.
Viewed from the tourism point of view, Kosovo is divided into five touristic regions:
central region of Priština, tourist region of Prokletije, tourist region of Sharr, tourist re-
gion of Kosovo-Pomoravlje and tourist region of Mitrovica.192 All the regions of Kosovo
have touristic value for development of specific forms of tourism (active tourism, rural
tourism, etc), but they differ depending on the level of development resources. For the
purpose of tourism and sustainable development, ethnic diversity of Kosovo’s popula-
tion should be taken into account, with a variety of different cultural patterns, traditions
and customs. As mentioned above, benefits achieved through interethnic cooperation
in tourism are seen, above all, in the social and economic development of ethnic groups,
enriching the content of tourist stay, increasing attractiveness of the region, preserving
ethnic and cultural identity and authenticity, and in raising awareness of diverse values.
4.2.1. Active tourism development
Thanks to the perfect natural conditions in Kosovo, active tourism193 has been de-
veloping over the past five years. The center of active tourism south of the Ibar River is
located in the region of Peć, in the Rugova Valley, inhabited by ethnic Albanians. In the
northern part of Kosovo, and the municipalities with a majority Serb population, the
region of Ibarski Kolašin (Zubin Potok municipality) has been recognized as an attrac-
tive destination for the development of active tourism.
192 Sector profile of tourism, Ministry of trade and industry, Prishtina, March 2014, str. 7, available at:
https://bit.ly/2I2JYko.
193 Active tourism is a new form of tourism that combines recreation and education, and requires physical
and mental engagement of tourists in order to improve their psycho-physical health.
A wide range of tourism products and outdoor locations, which attract adventurers
from all over Europe and beyond, were developed with international donor support
from several donors operating in Kosovo. Among them there are many attractive out-
door activities such as hiking, mountain biking, rock climbing, zip-line tours, para-
gliding, rafting, kayaking, etc. Some outdoor activities are promoted as part of unique
tourist packages. A unique tourism product developed in the municipalities of in Peć
and Zubin Potok - Via Ferrata, incited several organizations to launch projects aimed
at active tourism development.
4.2.2. About Via Ferratas
Via Ferrata is the Italian expression for the “steel road”: a secured steel-climbing
path fixed to the rock which offers an adrenaline-infused adventure and safe climbing.
Via Ferratas were initially built for military purpose in First World War. Later, Via Fer-
ratas began to be seen as a useful way to attract tourists.
There is one Via Ferrata in the municipality of Zubin Potok - Via Ferrata Berim, and
there are two Via Ferratas in Peć – Ari and Mat.
Via Ferrata Berim was built in 2015 as a part of the initiative Outdoor In - Tourism
Development in the municipality of Zubin Potok. The initiative was launched in 2013
by the Institute for Territorial Economic Development (InTER) in partnership with the
municipality of Zubin Potok,and donor support from the European Union Office in
Kosovo. The initiative aimed to contribute to local socio-economic development and
environmental protection in Zubin Potok. Responding to local needs, the project also
sought to increase the opportunity for young people to engage in outdoor activity and
to stimulate interethnic communication among Kosovo’s young people who are lovers
of active sports. With donor support from the Embassy of Finland Kosovo, the EU Of-
fice in Kosovo, the Canada Fund and the UNDP194, PPSE195/Swisscontact, InTER imple-
mented several projects within this initiative in Zubin Potok, where different tourism
products were developed. One of the most successful projects was the construction of
Via Ferrata Berim. It is located on the Mokra Gora Mountain (1733m), 25 km from the
Zubin Potok municipality. The construction of Via Ferrate Berim created conditions
for job creation in tourism industry in the north of Kosovo.
Via Ferrata Ari was built in 2012 in the municipality of Peć, in the Rugova Canyon.
Via Ferrata Mat was completed in 2016 and it is built next to the Via Ferrata Ari. These
two tourism attractions were built with the initiative of the NGO Marimangat and the
Municipality of Peć, with the aim to contribute to local economic development and
tourism supply of this municipality. Several donors have recognized the importance of
194 United Nations Development Programme

195 Promoting Private Sector Employment Kosovo project, supported by the Swiss Economic Cooperation
Office, and implemented by Swisscontact.
building the Via Ferrate in Peć, such as: PSE/Swisscontact, Trentinoconil Kosovo, and
Peć Municipality. The third Via Ferrata is under construction and will be bigger and
more challenging than the other three.
4.2.3. Interethnic cooperation through joint projects
„There are no politics up here—the mountains bring people together” – the unknown author
In order to contribute to interethnic cooperation and the promotion of this type of

climbing, InTER established a partnership with NGO Marimangat. Thus, tourists who
come to Kosovo with a desire to experience a climbing adventure have the opportunity
to visit all Via Ferratas in Kosovo in a unique tourist package.
The fact that tourism can become the strong link between different ethnic groups
is indicated by the fact that the number of tourists who visit Kosovo to experience this
type of climbing is increasing every year. In 2016, when the climbing season began at
Via Ferrata Berim, about 200 tourists visited this tourist attraction, compared to 2017,
when the number of tourists to nearly 500. Via Ferrate Mat and Ari have also continued
to grow in popularity. In 2017, the number of tourists was about 1,000, while in 2016 this
number reached 800. The number of people from south Kosovo who visit attractive sites
in the north and vice versa, is also growing.
Since 2015, InTER and NGO Marimangat have been implementing joint projects
in the field of active tourism. The Summer Climbing Camp BERIM 2016 was orga-
nized in July 2016, as part of the project “Let’s Climb Together”, implemented by
InTER and NGO Marimangat, and financially supported by the UNDP. The summer
climbing camp gathered 20 participants (ages 14-26) from all parts of Kosovo, who
began their climbing experience with the artificial wall in the sports hall in Zubin
Potok, and then moved to climb Via Ferrati Berim, while the others climbed to the
top of Berim.
In late 2016, InTER and NGO Marimangat organized a joint training for Via Ferrata
Guides and Rescue Services, with donor support from the Canada Fund for Local Ini-
tiatives. The aim of the training delivered by experienced trainers in rock climbing was
to enhance young peoples’ employability through a specialized training for Via Ferrata
guides and mountain rescuers. The training was held in two locations - Peć and Zubin
Potok. Besides, a rescue drill on Via Ferrara Berim was organized within the project,
thus increasing safety of users of this tourist product.
With the aim to promote the Ibarski Kolasin region (Zubin Potok municipality)
and north of Kosovo as an attractive destination for active tourism, InTER organized a
FAM Trip for 25 travel agencies, journalists and bloggers from the region who had an
opportunity to get acquainted with tourism products in this region. The FAM Trip was
organized in May 2017 with donor support from the PPSE Swisscontact. The aim of
this FAM Trip was to increase the knowledge for the existing tourism products in the
western part of Kosovo: Peć, Rugova Canyon, Visoki Dečani Monastery. Many visitors
have tried out the Via Ferratas Mat and Ari, or the zip line. They often write stories and
articles about Kosovo tourism attractions for most the respected regional media. Koso-
vo tourist products and destination are also promoted on radio and TV.
4.3. Conclusion
One of the main characteristics of ethnic groups is a collective identity shared by

a group of people with some characteristics in common, such as: language, religion,
culture, customs, country of origin, history. Differences in ethnic identity can lead to
ethnic distance and isolation of ethnic groups from each other in a multi-ethnic society.
At the same time, there are various mechanisms that can contribute to reducing eth-
nic distance, establishing cooperation and positive interaction between different ethnic
groups. Particularly effective among them is the cooperation aimed at achieving super-
ordinate goals through communication. Joint projects in the field of tourism are very
good example of such communication around superordinate goals, as it has been shown
in this paper.
Kosovo has very rich in natural resources and most diverse cultural and historical
heritage of different ethnic groups. In recent years, Kosovo has become an attractive
destination, especially for active tourism enthusiasts. Gathering persons belonging to
different ethnic groups around joint projects in the field of tourism (tour operators and
other provider of tourism related services and organizations, media that provide in-
formation about Kosovo tourist attractions) contributes not only to interethnic coop-
eration but also affects social and economic development and location attractiveness.
Therefore, the benefits achieved through cooperative relations between ethnic groups
go beyond the reduction of ethnic distance, and have much wider impact, making tour-
ism a good choice for all who are willing to accept diversity and contribute to prosperity
in the society.
Student: Master’s degree Marija Đekić
Mentor: Prof. Milan Beslać
5. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

OF REMITTANCES INFLOW
(ECONOMIC MIGRATION)
Introduction
This paper analyzes development implications of migration for Serbia, and eco-
nomic and social impact of remittances sent by the Serbian Diaspora. There are sev-
eral reasons why this topic is important. Firstly, migration can have both positive and
negative aspects, but it undoubtedly has positive impact on economic development of
the sending country as well as the receiving country. Secondly, the Serbian Diaspora is
numerous, world-wide because Serbia is a country with a long tradition of emigration.
It is however impossible to track the exact numbers of Serbian citizens living abroad,
either temporarily or permanently, because there are no official sources of reliable data,
but it is roughly estimated that the size of this population is several million. Thirdly, the
total pool of remittance income which is already big is experiencing continuous upward
trend. However, the true size of remittance inflows is unknown, because money often
flows in through unrecorded informal channels, which makes accurate estimation dif-
ficult if not impossible. It should be noted that the annual volume of remittances sent to
Serbia has been higher than the average inflow of FDIs in the past ten years.
The diaspora also plays an important role in the transitional economies, especially
those gravely affected by the political and economic crises, wars and destruction. In this
respect, there is increasing awareness among the countries that their own diasporas can
potentially can contribute to better political and economic relations with other coun-
tries, poverty reduction and economic growth.
143
5.1. Economic migration and diaspora phenomenon
While the characteristics of migration driven by economic reasons are similar, the
causes of migration are often different. Migrants exhibit very different characteristics,
including: level of education, the amount of money they have when moving to another
destination, ethnic origin, place of origin, age, gender, etc. Economic migration may be
permanent or temporary, legal or illegal, planned or unplanned, organized or unorga-
nized.196 In principle, there are three major types of migration. The first type is tempo-
rary migration which refers to well off individuals or groups who migrate in search of
higher profits, less expensive labor and resources. The second type of migration refers
to middle-class migrants who move to other countries for substantially higher wage and
and improved standard of living. The third type of migration refers to highly skilled
emigrants and poorest migrants. The second type of migration is particularly relevant
to the subject being explored in this paper.
Serbia is a country with a long tradition of emigration with a large number of its
citizens living all over the world. The intensity of emigration in general depends on
historical, economic, demographic, political, social, ethnic and psychological factors.197
According to the OECD data, Serbia was on the 31st place in the world among the 50
countries with the largest emigration. According to the World Bank, Serbia ranked as
one of the top emigration countries with an estimated 2.3 million emigrants abroad in
2008, or approximately 22% of its total population.198 According to more-recent esti-
mate of the World Bank, Serbia was had 1,292,900 emigrants abroad in 2013, or approx-
imately 18% of its total population. The top ten destination countries for the Serbian
Diaspora include Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Croatia, the United States, Turkey,
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Australia.199 According to the IOM forecasts, net mi-
gration rate of Serbia for the period 2015-2020. is 1.1 (per 1000 population).200
The quest for a definition of diaspora seems to be a very difficult task because it raises
tangible issues of time, place of birth and citizenship, as well as subtle questions of iden-
tity and belonging. The available definitions do not specify when does a migrant cease
to be one and become part of the diaspora. Given the increase in migration it is difficult
to limit today the notion of diaspora to those who are settled “forever” in a country
196 Grečić, V. (1998). Jugoslovenske spoljne migracije. Belgrade: Federal Ministry of Labor, Health and So-
cial Policy, p. 17.
197 Grečić, V. (2016). How Can the Serbian Diaspora Contribute Much More to the Development at Home
Country? Glasnik srpskog geografskog društva, Vol. 96, No. 2, 65-82.
198 World Bank. (2008). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008. The International Bank for Reconstru-
ction and Development. Washington, p. 3-4.
199 World Bank. (2016). Migration and Remittances Factbbook 2016: 3rd Edition. Washington: World Bank.
doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0319-2, p. 221.
200 International Organization for Migration. (n.d.). Available at: https://www.iom.int/countries/serbia,
20. April 2018.
other from where they were born and temporary migrant workers are also considered
their countries’ diaspora. Place of birth does not itself define belonging to a diaspora
because second and third-generation migrants born to immigrant parents abroad can
have a stronger feeling of belonging to the diasporas than first generations. We do not
qualify diasporas according to the citizenship because it can be obtained in different
ways. Being part of a diaspora implies a sense of identification with a country of origin
and the host country. In this respect, the most important dimension of a diaspora is the
readiness to contribute to the development of home country.201
The Serbian diaspora includes citizens of the Republic of Serbia living abroad and
persons of Serbian ethnicity who emigrated from the Republic of Serbia, and their
descendants (fourth-generation). The massive emigration of Serbs had begun over a
century ago before the outbreak of World War One, and continued between the two
great wars (mainly to overseas countries), and after the World War Two (mainly to
West European countries). During the wars that raged in the former Yugoslavia, a large
number of citizens, minority communities and religious groups fled their homes in for-
mer Yugoslav republics as a result of the war and political instability. Migration waves
from Serbia had diverse causes but currently prevailing purposes for migration are of
economic origin, with a brain drain that refers to the migration of young and highly
educated people who move to western countries.
5.2. The importance and effects of remittances
Remittances are transfers of money by foreign workers to their relatives and other
individuals in the home country. Remittances contribute to beneficiaries’ wellbeing,
and have economic and social implications at a macro level, and have ability to reduce
poverty and promote social peace in the society. Remittances are a source of foreign
currency for developing countries and have effect on per capita GDP. Apart from hav-
ing a positive effect on the wellbeing of beneficiaries, it is the responsibility of the home
country important to create conditions for directing remittances towards improving
the economic development of to create conditions to use them as a tool for its economic
development. Remittances already have indirect effects on development, if seen as an
important source of funding for education, health care, housing construction, purchase
of real estate, and alike. In terms of the potential benefit, remittances are:202
1. Stable source of foreign currency for financing the deficit in trade;
2. Source of savings and investment for development;
201 Pavlov, T., Kozma, R., & Velev, B. (2012). Dijaspora kao resurs lokalnog razvoja. Belgrade: USAID Ser-
bia, p. 5.
202 Vasiljević, B. (2009). Uticaj doznaka na ekonomski i socijalni razvoj u Srbiji. Godišnjak Fakulteta poli-
tičkih nauka: Politička teorija, politička sociologija, politički sistem, (p. 201-213).
3. Source of investment for education and development of human capital;

4. Source of improvement for the living standard of recipients;
5. Tool that can help reduce the level of income inequality;
6. Poverty reduction tool
The way in which remittances are used can produce wide multiplier effects in the
economy and for development directly and indirectly. When remittances are used for
investment they may directly contribute to production growth. When they are used for
expenditure on housing and consumption, through the multiplier effect of consump-
tion and demand for domestic goods and services, remittances indirectly contribute to
production growth.203 Over the past thirty years, remittances have become increasingly
important external finance for developing countries, because it is estimated that their
amount in most countries exceeds export earnings, foreign direct investment, develop-
ment aid, and other forms of private and official capital inflows. It is generally believed
that by reducing money transfer costs and by increasing the volume of labor emigra-
tion, remittance inflows will further increase. These estimates are based on trends of
labor shortages in developed countries and, consequently, more pronounced migration
to more developed countries.
There are several factors that may influence flow of remittances. Factors may in-
clude the number of workers abroad, wage rates, levels and types of economic activi-
ty in sending and host countries, exchange rate, relative interest rate between sending
and host countries, political risk, facility for transferring funds, marital status, level of
education of the migrant, years since migrated and household income level.204 Remit-
tances are defined as the sum of three components: workers’ remittances, employees’
compensation and migrants’ transfers. Remittances sometimes do not differ from sim-
ilar transactions. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) interpretation,
compensations of employees are booked as gross earnings of workers residing abroad
for less than 12 months, while only the monetary transfers sent home from workers
residing abroad on a permanent basis are booked as remittances.205 Apart from that,
economic emigrants, or part of the diaspora who migrated abroad in recent years and
decades, dominantly contribute to the remittance inflows.
Although the size of remittance inflows is undoubtedly large, remittances are often
underestimated for several reasons. Firstly, data recorded in the balance of payments
are based only on remittances that are recorded and transmitted by banks, but any anal-
ysis of remittance inflows should also take into account transfers made through private,
unrecorded channels, such as consumer goods. Secondly, analyses of remittances are
based on data relating to formal banking channels, while transfers through informal
203 Amidžić, S., Kurteš, S., & Rajčević, P. (2016). Kretanje doznaka i uticaj na ekonomiju zemlje. Financing,
Vol. 7, Issue 2, 22-29.
204 Russell, S. S. (1992). Migrant remittances and development. International Migration/Migrations Inter-
nationales/Migraciones Internacionales, Vol. 30, Issue 3-4, 267-287.
205 Nikolić, M. (2006). Makroekonomski efekti pomoći i doznaka. Belgrade: National Bank of Serbia, p. 14.
channels, such as hand-carries of cash by friends or family members are not taken into
account. In host countries, central banks collect remittance data from commercial
banks, while data of non-bank providers of remittance services such as money transfer
agencies are not observed. Reliable data on the number of workers abroad is crucial
element when calculating the remittance figures. Despite the fact that many developing
countries do not have recent data on the stock of workers abroad and host countries, and
that IMF does consider unrecorded remittance data from informal channels, the im-
pact of remittances on economic growth and poverty reduction is extremely important.
According to the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, released by the World
Bank, international sent $601.3 billion to their families in home countries in 2015. Only
ten years earlier, in 2006, the size of outward remittance inflows was USD 330.3 billion,
and since then, this trend has been rising steadily. According to the same report, Serbia
ranked on the list of top ten remittance recipients in 2015, with an estimated USD 3.6
billion in remittances, after Ukraine which received USD 6.2 billion in remittances.206
Table 2. Migrant remittance inflows to Serbia, 2007-2015 (in million USD)207

Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL
Migrant remittance 3,765 3,544 4,648 4,118 3,960 3,549 4,025 3,696 3,632 34,937
inflows, in million USD
The National Bank of Serbia performs makes estimates of annual remittance inflows
to Serbia. As mentioned above, the figures underestimate a larger volume of remittance
inflows to Serbia as significant amounts enter through informal mechanisms and are
thus unrecorded data. According to the IOM Study of Migrant-Sending Households
in Serbia Receiving Remittances from Switzerland, conducted on a sample of 600 mi-
grants in 2006, the vast majority (74%) of remittances sent from Switzerland to the
surveyed areas of Serbia are sent through informal channels. In the case of informal
transfers, money is most commonly hand-carried by migrants (87%), sent with bus
drivers (19%) and by registered post (5%).208 The importance of informal channels for
sending remittances is confirmed by the research conducted by the Statistical Office of
the Republic of Serbia on a sample of 250 households. Findings show that only 43.6% of
remittance transfers are made through recorded formal channels, 39.6% are hand-car-
ried by migrants, and 1.9% of remittances are sent by bus drivers travelling back and
forth between the sending and receiving country.209
206 World Bank. (2016). Migration and Remittances Factbbook 2016: 3rd Edition. Washington: World Bank.
doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0319-2, p. 28.
207 Ibid.
208 Government of the Republic of Serbia. (2015). Мigracioni profil Republike Srbije za 2014. godinu. Bel-
grade: Government of the Republic of Serbia, p. 75.
209 Rašević, M. (2016). Migracije i razvoj u Srbiji. Belgrade: Međunarodna organizacija za migracije IOM,
p. 46.
Remittances can be a significant source of income and finance for start-up business-
es, development and growth of small and medium-sized businesses. According to the
World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted on a sample of 160 small and medium-sized
enterprises, 17.5% of interviewed enterprises used remittances as a source of funding for
start-up or further expansion of business. Remittances were also used to finance 30% of
costs associated with starting a business.210
5.3. A comparative analysis of remittances

versus foreign direct investments
The inflow of foreign currency to Serbia due to remittances has grown in the past
ten years to 8-10% of Serbia’s gross domestic product (GDP).211 In recent decades, remit-
tances have become more stable source of external financing than either foreign direct
investment or private capital inflows. Remittances are one of the most important items
in statistics of balance of payments of Serbia and other Balkan countries, which before
the crisis had recorded foreign trade deficits. Remittances, foreign direct investments
and external borrowing cover Serbia’s trade deficit and current account deficit. The table
below shows the importance of remittances vis-à-vis FDI.
Tabela 3. Remittances compared with FDI inflows to Serbia, 2007 - 2017 (in million EUR)212
Year 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013. 2014. 2015. 2016. 2017.
Remittances 2,542 2,188 3,095 2,880 2,580 2,460 2,701 2,442 2,671 2,510 2,758
FDI 3,219 2,711 2,100 1,278 3,544 1,009 1,548 1,500 2,114 2,127 2,545
Remittances compared with FDI inflows in the period 2007-2017, suggest that
through the entire period, remittances were larger than FDI inflows, with the exception
of 2007, 2008 and 2011. Therefore, personal transfers are very important because it con-
tributes to Serbia’s balance of payment adjustment.
210 Pissarides, F., Sanfey, P., & Tashchilova, S. (2006). Financing transition through remittances in south-ea-
stern Europe: The case of Serbia. EBRD.
211 Šojić, M. (2016). Strane direktne investicije i koncesije na nacionalne resurse u Republici Srbiji. Strane
direktne investicije i privredni rast u Srbiji (str. 249-265). Beograd: Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu.
212 Narodna banka Srbije. (n.d.). Platni bilans Srbije 2007.-2017. Dostupno na: http://nbs.rs/internet/cirili-
ca/80/platni_bilans.html, 20.aprila 2018.
Chart 1. Remittances and FDI inflows in the period 2007 – 2017 (in million EUR)213
5.4. Conclusion
Serbia is a country with a decades-long history of emigration of its citizens who tra-
ditionally move to developed countries. The number of Serbian citizens who currently
live and work abroad can only be estimated and precise data is not available. The chal-
lenge of measuring the size of Serbian emigration and in particular of Serbian Diaspora
has several causes: firstly, there is no clear definition of “diaspora”, even though it has
several determinant factors; secondly, there are no official sources of reliable data on the
number of emigrants from Serbia. Nevertheless, Serbia is among the countries with a
very numerous diaspora.
The economic and other effects of intense emigration of Serbian population have
both good and bad aspects. Recent demographic trends in Serbia indicate an alarm-
ing population decline. The scale of population decline in Serbia has reached alarm-
ing proportions. The migration balance and other aspects of migration leave no
room for optimistic forecasts. However, numerous Serbian Diaspora has many pos-
itive aspects, among them perhaps the most important one is the inflow of money
from remittances.
Foreign remittances generate multiple effects and therefore they may be approached
and analyzed in different ways. It is suggested on the basis of various data on the stock
of emigrants and remittance flows, available from the National Bank of Serbia and rele-
vant international institutions, that Serbia has become one of the largest remittance-re-
cipient countries in the world. Even though remittances received through formal chan-
nels clearly affect the deficit in trade and are one of the most important items of the
balance of payments of Serbia, official remittance figures are underestimated. The main
213 Ibid.
reason as to why the true magnitude of remittances is underestimated is because large

share is believed to flow through informal channels which are difficult to accurately
measure. This conclusion is drawn on the basis of research results of numerous studies
conducted at the national and international level.
Economic and social aspects of the effects of remittances can be examined both at
the micro and macro-levels. The efficiency and effectiveness of remittances depend on
the way in which remittances are used. They contribute to beneficiaries’ wellbeing and
have ability to reduce poverty and deficit in trade, increase consumption, help SME
development, and alike. Serbian citizens in the diaspora use remittances to buy or con-
struct houses/apartments in Serbia, many of which sit empty and unused. Efforts should
be made to improve the policies and relationships with the diaspora, in order to channel
remittances used for this purpose towards more productive investments. Therefore,
Serbia must find ways to promote relations with its diaspora and adopt mechanisms for
more productive use of remittances.
5.5. Literature
1. Amidžić, S., Kurteš, S., & Rajčević, P. (2016). Kretanje doznaka i uticaj na ekono-
miju zemlje. Financing, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 22-29.
2. Grečić, V. (1998). Jugoslovenske spoljne migracije. Beograd: Savezno ministarstvo
za rad, zdravstvo i socijalnu politiku.
3. Grečić, V. (2016). How Can the Serbian Diaspora Contribute Much More to the
Development at Home Country? Glasnik srpskog geografskog društva, Vol. 96, No.
2, 65-82.
4. International Organization for Migration. (n.d.). Dostupno na: https://www.iom.
int/countries/serbia, 20.aprila 2018.
5. Narodna banka Srbije. (n.d.). Platni bilans Srbije 2007.-2017. Dostupno na: http://
nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/80/platni_bilans.html, 20.aprila 2018.
6. Nikolić, M. (2006). Makroekonomski efekti pomoći i doznaka. Beograd: Narodna
banka Srbije.
7. Pavlov, T., Kozma, R., & Velev, B. (2012). Dijaspora kao resurs lokalnog razvoja.
Beograd: USAID Srbija.
8. Pissarides, F., Sanfey, P., & Tashchilova, S. (2006). Financing transition through
remittances in south-eastern Europe: The case of Serbia. EBRD.
9. Rašević, M. (2016). Migracije i razvoj u Srbiji. Beograd: Međunarodna organiza-
cija za migracije IOM.
10. Russell, S. S. (1992). Migrant remittances and development. International Migra-
tion/Migrations Internationales/Migraciones Internacionales, Vol. 30, Issue 3-4,
267-287.
11. Šojić, M. (2016). Strane direktne investicije i koncesije na nacionalne resurse u

Republici Srbiji. Strane direktne investicije i privredni rast u Srbiji (str. 249-265).
Beograd: Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu .
12. Vasiljević, B. (2009). Uticaj doznaka na ekonomski i socijalni razvoj u Srbiji. Go-
dišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka: Politička teorija, politička sociologija, politički
sistem, (str. 201-213).
13. Vlada Republike Srbije. (2015). Мigracioni profil Republike Srbije za 2014. godinu.
Beograd: Vlada Republike Srbije
14. World Bank. (2008). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008. The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington.
15. World Bank. (2016). Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016: 3rd Edition. Was-
hington: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0319-2.
Student: Nikola Aleksić
Mentor: Profesor Nevena Petrušić
6. MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Introduction
At the beginning of 2015, when the refugee-migrant crisis along the Western Balkan
route intensified, the authorities in Serbia had to address the upcoming humanitarian,
security, legal and other challenges associated with refugees. Given the different nation-
ality, religion, citizenship, political and other affiliation of people who found themselves
in the Republic of Serbia as migrants and refugees, it was necessary to take all appro-
priate measures to ensure that, regardless of their status, refugees and migrants are able
to to enjoy at least a minimum of universally accepted human rights. This is especially
important given the fact that in 2015, as many as 577,995 persons expressed intention to
seek asylum in Serbia,214 and that, although with a drastically lower number of asylum
seekers, there is evidence that migrants and refugees continue to arrive to Serbia as the
country of transit or destination. Therefore, this question should be tackled by lawyers,
sociologists, demographers, cultural scientists and other experts from different fields.
Much attention should be paid to the legal standing of individual as subject of inter-
national law, which was particularly underlined after the World War II, and therefore
movements of migration, both involuntary and voluntary, should be analyzed in more
modern manner the context observed in the modern context, differently from migra-
tion in the past centuries, taking into account agreed standards of human rights. 215
The refugee/migrant crisis, which has intensified on the Western Balkan Route
since the beginning of 2015, has several characteristics. Firstly, it is a massive wave of
214 In the period 1 January – 31 December 2015, 577,995 persons expressed intention to seek asylum and
were registered as asylum-seekers in the Republic of Serbia. In 2014, there were 16,490 registered asy-
lum-seekers, indicating that the number of asylum seekers in 2015 was over 35 times biger than in 2014.
Petrović Lena (ed.), Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2015, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights,
215 More information about the legal standing of individual as subject of international law: Meron The-
odor, The Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2006, p.
314‒318.
153
migration and large numbers of people crossing state borders, who originate from Mid-
dle East, Central Asia and African countries. Secondly, they are people of different reli-
gions, nationalities, political affiliations, etc.
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of relevant international standards
and highlight the key challenges in creating the conditions for long-term support and
integration of refugees and migrants, including especially vulnerable groups.
6.1. Definition of terms
Considering that that the Western Balkan migration crisis, which escalated dramat-
ically in the spring of 2015, fall into the category “mixed migration”, consisting of com-
plex population movements including migrants and refugees, the key terms should be
defined. The focus will be on the Republic of Serbia and its constitutional legal order.216
The citizen of the Republic of Serbia holds citizenship of the Republic of Serbia.217
Apatrid is a stateless person who is not a citizen of any country218. Apatrides can be
de jure statelessness and de facto statelessness219. A foreigner is any person who is not a
citizen of the Republic of Serbia, irrespective of whether he/she is a foreign national or a
stateless person – apatrid. An asylum seeker is a foreigner who has filed an application
for asylum in the Republic of Serbia220. Also, with regard to the initiation of the asylum
procedure, there is a serious inconsistency, or different interpretation of the initiation
of the procedure.
According to the General Administrative Procedure Law, which is applied subsid-
iarily in the asylum procedure, the administrative procedure is initiated ex officio and
at the request of a party. A decision on the asylum application in the administrative
procedure shall be rendered, at the latest, within two months after the date of the
asylum application. Under the Asylum Law, the asylum procedure shall be initiated
by submitting an asylum application to an authorized officer of the Asylum Office on
a prescribed form, within 15 days from the day of registration. Therefore, applying for
216 We should emphasize that generally accepted rules of international law and ratified international trea-
ties are an integral part of the legal system in the Republic of Serbia (see Article 16, paragraph 2 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia).
217 See Article 1 of the Law on Citzenship of the Republic of Serbia.
218 Read more at: Čok Vida, Spone međunarodnog i uporednog prava, primeri iz oblasti ljudskih prava, PE
Official Gazette, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Center for Advancement of Legal Studies, Bel-
grade, 2010, p. 93‒204.
219 The thesis that refugees are de facto apatrids was advocated by professor Vojin Dimitrijević. See: Dimi-
trijević Vojin, Paunović Milan, Đerić Vladimir, Ljudska prava ‒ udžbenik, Belgrade Center for Human
Rights, Belgrade, 1997, p. 196.
220 See: Article 2, para. 1, point 4 of the Asylum Law and Article 2, para. 1, point 4 of the Asylum and
Temporary Protection Law.
asylum absolutely depends on whether the Asylum Office will enable the prompt im-
plementation of this procedural action, wherefore the procedure is de facto initiated
ex officio. In the event the asylum procedure is initiated ex officio, under the General
Administrative Procedure Law, the procedure shall be deemed initiated as soon as the
authority conducts any action related to the procedure221.
A Migrant falls within a broader category than other categories of people on the
move. This is important to say because, in sociological terms, refugees can be subsumed
under the category of migrants. However, from the legal point of view, there are crucial
distinctions between the two, and it is incorrect to use the terms refugee and migrant
interchangeably222. A migrant is a person who moves from one place to another, espe-
cially to another country223.
An irregular migrant is a person who entered and/or resides in the Republic of Ser-
bia illegally. Irregular migrants are guaranteed the same fundamental rights as other
people. A special issue is the status and rights of irregular migrants224.
According to Article 1A (2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
term refugee shall apply to any person who:
…owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Regarding legal concepts, we should define some of important rights related to refu-
gees and migrants. Above all, it is the right to asylum. The right to asylum can be viewed
from two aspects. One aspect is the right of every sovereign state to decide to grant or
deny asylum to persons located within its boundaries. The second aspect is the right of
an individual to seek and enjoy asylum in the state of refuge225.
221 Petrović Lena (ur.), Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2014, Belgrade Center for Human Rights,
Belgrade, 2015, p. 30, 31.
222 News outlets often make this mistake.
223 Krivokapić Boris, Enciklopedijski rečnik međunarodnog prava i međunarodnih odnosa, PE Official Ga-
zette, Belgrade, 2010, definition of a migrant, p. 581.
224 Weatherhead Katharine T., “Irregular status“ at: Guild Elspeth, Grant Stefanie, Groenendijk C. A.
(eds.), Human Rights of Migrants in the 21st Century, Routledge, 2018, p. 35‒40.
225 More about the right to asylum at: Dimitrijević Vojin, Utočište na teritoriji strane države, teritorijalni
azil, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade 2015 (doctoral thesis, published in 1969); Dimi-
trijević Vojin, Paunović Milan, Đerić Vladimir, Ljudska prava ‒ udžbenik, Belgrade Center for Hu-
man Rights, Belgrade, 1997, p. 263‒265; Dimitrijević Vojin, Popović Dragoljub, Papić Tatjana, Petrović
Vesna, Međunarodno pravo ljudskih prava, secondedition, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Bel-
grade, 2007, p. 181‒184; Paunović Milan, Krivokapić Boris, Krstić Ivana, Međunarodna ljudska prava,
Faculry of Law, Belgrade University, Belgrade, 2017, p. 165‒168.
The right to asylum has been recognized in a number of international legal instru-
ments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)226. At the regional
level (eg. the American227 and African228 continent), the right to seek asylum can be found
within the human right treaties which have special provisions governing this right.
The right to refuge shall be understood to mean the right to residence and protection
granted to a refugee in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, with respect to whom the
competent authority has determined that his/her fear of persecution in the country of
his/her origin or the country of his/her habitual residence is well-founded.229
Subsidiary protection shall be understood to mean a form of protection granted by the
Republic of Serbia to a foreigner who would be, if returned to the country of his/her origin
or habitual residence, subjected to serious harm, and who is unable or unwilling to avail
himself/herself of the protection of that country, in accordance with Article 25 of this Law.230
6.2. Sources of law
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 231 is the primary source of law. All
laws and other general acts enacted in the Republic of Serbia must be in compliance
with the Constitution. Article 16, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia,232, 233 provides for primacy of international law over domestic law. Bearing in
mind that the asylum system in Serbia is still under development, this is of particular
importance to the refugee law matters. In this regard, it is also necessary to ensure the
application of international legal norms and standards. The Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees234 and its Protocol is a milestone in the protection of refugees.
226 Article 14: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution“.
227 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/II.66, Doc.10, Rev.1, at 190–193 (OAS Cartagena Declaration).
228 Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10011 UNTS 14691, done
Sept. 10, 1969, entered into force June 20, 1974 (OAU Convention).
229 Article 2, para. 1, point 7, of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection.
230 Article 2, para. 1, point 8, of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection.
231 “Official Gazette of RS“, no. 98/2006.
232 Article 16, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia: “Generally accepted rules of inter-
national law and ratified international treaties shall be an integral part of the legal system in the Republic
of Serbia and applied directly. Ratified international treaties must be in accordance with the Constitution“.
233 More about the primacy of international law over domestic law at: Dimitrijević Vojin, and associates,
Osnovi međunarodnog javnog prava, Third Edition, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade 2012,
p. 66‒68, and at: Đorđević Stevan, “Odnos unutrašnjeg i međunarodnog prava“, Uvod u međunarodno
pravo, PE Official Gazette, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, Belgrade 2007, p. 109‒144; and at:
Tomušat Kristijan, Ljudska prava između idealizma i realizma, Belgrade Center for Human Rights,
Belgrade 2006 (translation: Vojin Dimitrijević, Ana Jerosimići Marko Milanović), p. 135‒145.
234 The Convention on the Status of Refugees was drawn up in Geneva on 28 July 1951 and entered into
force on 22 April 1954. (“Official Gazette of SFRY - International Treaties”, no. 7/60).
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Proto-
cols,235 as well as the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, are no
less important.
Under Article 57 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia: “any foreign national
with reasonable fear of prosecution based on his race, gender, language, religion, na-
tional origin or association with some other group, political opinions, shall have the
right to asylum in the Republic of Serbia”. The same article stipulates that the procedure
for granting asylum shall be regulated by the law – the Law on Asylum.
The Asylum Law is the most important act regulating the asylum procedure in the
Republic of Serbia. It was enacted in 2007 and entered into force on 1 January 2008.
However, a new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection was adopted in March
2018. It came into force in early April 2018, and was set to apply from the beginning
of June 2018. Article 104 of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection states that
it shall come into effect on the eighth day from the date of its publication in the “Of-
ficial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, and its implementation shall commence after
60 days from the coming into effect. According to Article 102, paragraph 1: “as of the
date of coming into effect of this Law, the Asylum Law (“Official Gazette of the Re-
public of Serbia,” No, 109/07) shall cease to have effect”. It is therefore unclear which
law shall apply in the period between the coming into effect of the Law on Asylum
and Temporary Protection and the beginning of its implementation, given that the
Asylum Law shall cease to have effect as of the date of coming into effect of the Law on
Asylum and Temporary Protection (Article 102, paragraph 1 of the Law on Asylum
and Temporary Protection).
There is a number of regulations (bylaws) in Serbia’s legal system that apply to
asylum seekers and persons who have been granted protection status236. However,
there are still some gaps – for example, the Serbian government did not enact a bylaw
regulating the appearance of the travel document, which was an obligation under the
Asylum Law237.
235 “Official Gazette of SMN – International Treaties“, nos. 9/03, 5/05 i 7/05 ‒ corr. and “Official Gazette of
RS– International Treaties“, no 12/10).
236 Professional Guidance on the Inclusion of Refugee/Asylum Seeking Pupils in the Education System,
Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, 5 May 2017, No. 601-00-00042 /
201718; Decree on Criteria for Establishing Priority Accommodation of Persons Recognized the Right
to Refuge or Granted Subsidiary Protection and the Conditions for the Use of Temporary Housing, “Of-
ficial Gazette of RS”, no. 63/15; Decree on the Integration of Foreigners Granted Asylum in the Social,
Cultural and Economic Life of the Republic of Serbia, “Official Gazette of RS “, no. 101/16, and others.
237 You can read more about the right to travel documents for refugees at: Hathaway James C., The Rights
of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge - New York - Melbourne
- Madrid - Cape Town - Singapore - São Paulo 2005, p. 840-874.
6.3. Situation in the Republic of Serbia
The asylum system in Serbia can be analyzed based on statistics on asylum grants
(right to refuge and subsidiary protection), from January 1, 2008. The number of for-
eigners who expressed the intention to seek asylum in the period January 1, 2008 - De-
cember 31, 2017 is particularly interesting. This number was ranging from a few tens to
a several hundred thousands of asylum seekers238. Since the beginning of implementa-
tion of the Law on Asylum in 2008, the Asylum Office granted asylum to 44 persons,
and subsidiary protection to 60 persons239.
One of the issues of the asylum system in Serbia is automatic application of the safe
third country concept by the administrative bodies in the asylum procedure, which has
been broadly applied in the asylum procedure. Namely, a list of safe countries of origin
and safe third countries was established by Government Decree in 2009 and has not
been revised since240.
By applying the automatic third country concept, the asylum authorities avoid mak-
ing decision on the merits of the asylum seeker application. I.e. they do not examine
the reasons for leaving the country of origin and automatically reject the asylum seeker
application241.
Serbia has been perceived only as a transit country. The majority of refugees and
migrants do not see Serbia as a desirable destination country and do not intend to stay
in Serbia longer than necessary in order to safely continue their travel to the countries
of Western Europe (especially to Germany or Nordic countries).
Since a big number of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants are staying in Serbia
for longer periods of time, the authorities of the Republic of Serbia need to take respon-
sibility for the provision of long-term support and their integration into Serbian society.
“Untimely development of the system of integration and inclusion of asylum seekers,
refugees and migrants into the labor market can only negatively affect the long-term
opportunities for economic and social integration, leaving people under international
protection in a position of isolation and existential minimum“.242
Serbia is also facing challenges in addressing the problem of illegal migrants. On the one
side, special measures should be taken to provide adequate accommodation and care for
238 2008 ‒ 77, 2009 ‒ 275, 2010 ‒ 522, 2011 ‒ 3.132, 2012 ‒ 2.723, 2013 ‒ 5.066, 2014 ‒ 16.490, 2015 ‒
577.995, 2016 ‒ 12.821, 2017 ‒ 6.199. See: Tošković Sonja (ed.), Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia
2017, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Belgrade, 2018, p. 20.
239 Tošković Sonja (ur.), Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia 2017, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights,
241 For more information about the safe third country concept applied in Serbia – see the reports of the
Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia (2014‒2017).
242 Tošković Sonja, Kilibarda Pavle (ur.), Srbija od zemlje tranzita do zemlje destinacije, izazovi i praksa odab-
ranih država u procesu integracije izbeglica, Belgrade Center for Human Rights, Belgrade, 2016, p. 27.
refuges and asylum seekers, and enable them to exercise the rights arising from their status,
and on the other, to provide for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of migrants.243
One of challenges is the provision of international protection of persons in need who are
seeking international protection in Serbia. Devastating statistics on the number of persons
granted asylum and subsidiary protection over a ten-year period (from January 1, 2008
to December 31, 2017), also indicate the unwillingness of Serbian authorities to address
this issue. By failing to ensure full integration of persons granted international protection,
Serbia breaches the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which states that efforts
should be made to facilitate the naturalization of refugees (Article 34 of the Convention).
The issue of full integration of refugees into Serbian society also means that they will
remain permanently in Serbia and acquire citizenship of the Republic of Serbia, in accor-
dance with Article 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.244 Growing
numbers of refugees who belong to the same ethnic community and their full integration
into Serbian society would open the issue of new minorities in Serbia.245 Considering the
rise of nationalist movements across the region in early 1990s and ethnic and religious
conflicts during the breakup of the SFRY, resulting in armed conflicts, it can reasonably
be concluded that one of the factors that impede full integration of refugees into Serbian
society in larger numbers is the fear of creating new national minorities in Serbia.
6.4. Conclusion
There is a need for a clear perspective on the protection of refugees and migrants in
Serbia in the coming years, given that the migration trends suggest that their movement
to the Western-European countries is slowing down. This means that a number of refu-
gees and migrants will stay longer or permanently in the Republic of Serbia. Efforts should
be made to determine their status, rights and obligations. Otherwise they will remain in
legal limbo, or the practice of being issued certificates of having expressed the intention to
see asylum to people who do not want to seek protection in Serbia will continue, or even
worse, will be invisible and excluded from the system. Refugees and migrants should be
243 See more information about the legal framework at: Tošković Sonja, Ljudska prava migranata i izbeglica
u Republici Srbiji, uz poseban osvrt na pravo na rad i pravo na obrazovanje, Belgrade Center for Human
Rights, Belgrade, 2017, p. 17‒32.
244 Article 34 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: “The Contracting States shall as far as possi-
ble facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to ex-
pedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings”.
245 See more information about the term “minorities” at: Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, re-
ligious and linguistic minorities, by Francesco Capotorti. Yugoslav Committee of Lawyers, Belgrade, 2001.
(translated by Jelena Manić), p. 35‒63; See more about the UN standards on minority rights at: Thornberry
Patrick, Estebanez Marija Amor Martin (eds.), Minority rights in Europe, A review of the work and standards
of the Council of Europe, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2004., p. 12‒27.
allowed to stay legally in compliance with the recommendations of the New York Dec-
laration246. Recognizing the needs and problems of mixed movements of migrants and
refugees, the UN General Assembly called upon all actors involved in the refuge-migrant
route to ensure respect for basic human rights of refugees and migrants and actively en-
gage in solving the burning problems. In order to meet the challenges posed by large
movements of refugees, close coordination is required among international organizations
and agencies (UNHCR, IOM and others), government authorities (MoI, ministries re-
sponsible for education, labor, health, etc.), civil society (CSOs that provide free legal assis-
tance to refugees and migrants, such as the Belgrade Center for Human Rights) and local
population which plays a key role in integration of refugees, preservation of peace and
creation of social cohesion with people coming from different parts of the world. It should
be borne in mind that many refugees and migrants in Serbia are victims of forced migra-
tion, massive violations of human rights and wars going on in their countries of origin.
More efforts should be made to improve the treatment of refugees to make Serbia a
safer place for refugees, and transform it into a destination country from transit coun-
try. Accordingly, the asylum procedure should be made more effective to enable ref-
ugees (persons granted international protection) proper integration into the Serbian
society.247The gap between those expressing intention to seek asylum/asylum seekers
and those given some form of international protection indicates that Serbian authorities
are not prepared to fulfill undertaken international obligations in respect of refugees.
Also, there is a lack of readiness to integrate refugees and migrants into Serbian society,
resulting from fear of creating new minorities, which should be entitled to the same
rights as persons belonging to national minorities.
6.5. Literature
Udžbenici, monografije, izveštaji

1. Čok Vida, Spone međunarodnog i uporednog prava, primeri iz oblasti ljudskih
prava, JP Službeni glasnik, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Centar za una-
pređivanje pravnih studija, Beograd, 2010.
2. Dimitrijević Vojin, Utočište na teritoriji strane države, teritorijalni azil, Beograd-
ski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2015.
3. Dimitrijević Vojin, Paunović Milan, Đerić Vladimir, Ljudska prava ‒ udžbenik,
Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 1997.
246 GA UN, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1, 19 September 2016.
247 It is necessary to respect the attitudes of international judicial and other bodies engaged in monitoring
and protection of human rights. See more about this at: Kilibarda Pavle, “Developments in International
Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Practice Relevant to the Serbian Asylum System: A Legal Review“, Pravnizapi-
si, Belgrade, no. 2/2017, p. 352‒358.
4. Dimitrijević Vojin, Popović Dragoljub, Papić Tatjana, Petrović Vesna, Međuna-

rodno pravo ljudskih prava, drugo izdanje, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava,
Beograd, 2007.
5. Dimitrijević Vojin, Račić Obrad, Đerić Vladimir, Papić Tatjana, Petrović Vesna,
Obradović Saša, Osnovi međunarodnog javnog prava, treće izdanje, Beogradski
centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2012.
6. Guild Elspeth, Grant Stefanie, Groenendijk C. A. (eds.),Human Rights of Mi-
grants in the 21st Century, Routledge, 2018.
7. Hathaway James C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge ‒ New York ‒ Melbourne ‒ Madrid ‒ Cape Town ‒
Singapore ‒ São Paulo, 2005.
8. Đorđević Stevan, Uvod u međunarodno pravo, JP Službeni glasnik, Pravni fakultet
Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2007.
9. Kapotorti Frančesko, Studija o pravima pripadnika etničkih, verskih i jezičkih ma-
njina, Jugoslovnski komitet pravnika za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2001.
10. Kilibarda Pavle, „Developments in International Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Pra-
ctice Relevant to the Serbian Asylum System: A Legal Review“, 2/2017 Pravni zapi-
si, Beograd, 2017.
11. Krivokapić Boris, Enciklopedijski rečnik međunarodnog prava i međunarodnih od-
nosa, JP Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2010.
12. Meron Theodor, The Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publi-
shers, Leiden – Boston, 2006.
13. Paunović Milan, Krivokapić Boris, Krstić Ivana, Međunarodna ljudska prava,
Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2017.
14. Petrović Lena (ur.), Pravo na azil u Republici Srbiji 2014, Beogradski centar za
ljudska prava, Beograd, 2015.
15. Report of the fact-finding mission by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary General on migration and refugees, to Bulgaria, 13-17
November 2017,SG/Inf(2018)1819 April 2018.
16. Thornberry Patrick, Estebanez Marija Amor Martin (eds.), Minority rights in Eu-
rope, A review of the work and standards of the Council of Europe, Council of
Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2004.
17. Tomušat Kristijan, Ljudska prava između idealizma i realizma, Beogradski centar
za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2006.
18. Tošković Sonja, Ljudska prava migranata i izbeglica u Republici Srbiji, uz poseban
osvrt na pravo na rad i pravo na obrazovanje, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava,
Beograd, 2017.
19. Tošković Sonja (ur.), Pravo na azil u Republici Srbiji 2017, Beogradski centar za
ljudska prava, Beograd, 2018.
20. Tošković Sonja, Kilibarda Pavle (ur.), Srbija od zemlje tranzita do zemlje destina-
cije, izazovi i praksa odabranih država u procesu integracije izbeglica, Beogradski
centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2016.
21. Vučković Šahović Nevena, Petrušić Nevena, Prava deteta, drugo izdanje, Pravni
fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu, Niš, 2016.
22. UNHCR, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia As a Country of Asylum,
August 2015.
International legal documents
1. Konvencija o pravima deteta, Sl. list SFRJ ‒ Međunarodni ugovori, br. 15/90 i Sl.
list SRJ ‒ Međunarodni ugovori, br. 4/96 i 2/97
2. Konvencija o statusu izbeglica, Službeni list FNRJ– Međunarodni ugovori, br. 7/60
3. Njujorška deklaracija, GA UNA/RES/71/1, 19. septembar 2016. godine
4. Protokol uz Konvenciju o statusu izbeglica, Službeni list SFRJ – Međunarodni
ugovori i dr.sporazumi, br. 15/67
5. Univerzalna deklaracija o ljudskim pravima, GA UN 217 (III), 10. decembar
1948. godine
National laws
1. Zakon o azilu, Službeni glasnik RS, br.109/2007

2. Zakon o azilu i privremenoj zaštiti, Sl. glasnik RS, br. 24/2018
3. Zakon o državljanstvu Republike Srbije, Sl. glasnik RS, br. 135/2004, 90/2007 i
24/2018
4. Zakon o strancima, Sl. glasnik RS, br. 97/2008
5. Ustav Republike Srbije, Sl. glasnik RS, br. 98/2006
Student: Katarina Antić
Mentor: Vladimir Petronijević
7. Modern Migration and Security

in the Republic of Serbia
Introduction
Over the last several years the Republic of Serbia has been a common stop along the
“Balkan” route for migrants from the Middle East and Africa moving toward Western
and Northern Europe. Serbia is only a short stop and most of them do not stay any lon-
ger than necessary to continue their journey. Their number (a few tens and even hun-
dreds of thousands) and period of detention presents a serious challenge for the state
and its institutions in terms of maintaining public order and peace, prevention of dis-
order, crime prevention, stronger public health care measures, and disease prevention.
Europe is currently experiencing migrant and refugee crisis which jeopardizes the
national security of the affected states, both destination and transit states. Migrant
crisis is a threat to human safety and international security. Each year between four
and ten million migrants enter a different country, while the number of illegal border
crossings varies between 30% and 50%.248 Migration brings increased threats of crime,
terrorism, diseases etc.
Also, migrant crisis has created certain other problems and risks, such as lack of hu-
man, material, technical and financial resources, normative frameworks related to the
work of state bodies and public services on migrant routes.249Most states are not ready
to respond to such problems, whether transit or destination countries.
The term migrant originates from the Latin word migrario, migrare meaning to
move, to wander, to relocate.250 Migration is movement of individuals or groups across
international borders or within a country. This movement of population implies any
248 UN, Keytrends in international migration, Expert Group Meeting on The Post 2015 Era: Implication for
the Global Research Agenda on Population Development, NewYork, 10 April 2015.
249 Simeunović, D. “Migrantska kriza kao bezbednosni izazov za zemlje zapadnog Balkana stanje u 2017. i
perspektiva“, Kultura Polisa, br. 14 (posebno izdanje), Novi Sad, 2017, str. 32‒35.
250 Beslać, M., Ekonomski aspekti integrativnih politika međunarodnih migracija, Visoka škola za poslovnu
ekonomiju i preduzetništvo, Beograd, 2018.
163
type of movement of people, regardless of the length of travel, composition and causes,
including migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants and persons
moving for other purposes, including family reunification.251
7.1. Causes of migration
Migration has always been a part of the human existence. Large waves of migration
from the Middle East started in 2011 and culminated in 2014 and 2015, when a large
number of migrants decided to seek sanctuary, security and better life in one of the Eu-
ropean countries. Not all of the European countries are equally affected and threatened
by the migrant crisis. Some, like the Republic of Serbia, are just transit countries where
migrants do not stay long, and some, such as Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark,
migrants see as their final destination. In terms of the causes of the current migrant
crisis, war in the Middle East is certainly a dominant factor, but there other reasons
as well, including demographic explosion or large population growth in Africa, social
engineering, or artificial migration.252War in the Middle East is the leading migration
factor today. Another relevant migration factor is a wide demographic explosion in Af-
rica, Asia and Latin America. Population growth brings unfulfilled social expectations
in terms of employment or living standards, which causing migration of people who set
out to find better life in another country, mostly in Europe. Another cause of migration
affecting Europe today that would be worth mentioning here is artificial migration,
instigated with the aim of achieving external or internal political effects and score sig-
nificant political, military, economic, or territorial points, or simply tocause damage to
the enemy state.253
7.2. Security risks of the migrant crisis
When discussing modern migrant crisis in the Republic of Serbia or more precisely
the global migrant crisis in the last couple of years, it is very important to mention new
security risks. Despite Serbia being only a transit country and not a destination country
for the permanent settlement of migrants, the transit through Serbia involves many
251 International Organization for Migration, Key Migration Terms, IOM, available at:http://www.iom.int/
key-migration-terms, accessed on 17 April2018.
252 Simeunović, D., „Migrantska kriza kao bezbednosni izazov za zemlje zapadnog Balkana stanje u 2017.
i perspektiva“,Kultura Polisa, br. 14 (posebno izdanje), Novi Sad, 2017, str. 32‒35.
253 Ibid., str. 35.
security issues, which could pose a threat to the national security, safety of citizens,
including migrants.
To be able to discuss migrant crisis security risks, it is very important to identify
them first.
The first group of security risks is the increase in the number of violations related to
illegal border crossing, movement in the border zone, and unauthorized residence on
the territory of the Republic of Serbia. These violations require increased engagement
by the police, courts and prosecutors’ offices. Following the conclusion of the EUI –
Turkey refugee agreement in 2016, the “Balkan refugee route” was officially closed (this
route is part of the migration flows through Greece, Bulgaria or Macedonia, Serbia and
Hungary to Western Europe), after which the inflow of refugees to our country was
drastically reduced. Due to accelerated works on putting up physical barriers by the
Republic of Hungary at the border with Serbia, the movement, and in particular the
smuggling of migrants, was redirected to alternative routes (via Croatia, Romania) to
Western Europe.
The migrant/refugee crisis is largely contributing to the increase in human traffick-
ing, which is another group of security risks. Human trafficking is a global phenom-
enon that largely affects countries undergoing economic and political transition and
post-conflict realities. This is not an isolated phenomenon that affects a limited number
of people, but rather a phenomenon with deep social and economic implications, and
globalization, new technologies, migration crisis and chaos created at borders are all
conducive to human trafficking.254 These are fertile grounds for traffickers to transport
victims across borders and even make it easier to lure victims with promises of better
living conditions and better jobs abroad. As a result of mass migration and its intense
flow, this type of crime is very much on upswing worldwide. Human trafficking, media-
tion in illegal adoption of children, forced marriages, trafficking in human organs, sex-
ual and labor exploitation, coercion to commit a crime or take part in armed conflicts
are sources of enormous profits.255
The following are transport risks. In recent years we are witnessing a growing num-
ber of people involved in illegal transport of migrants. They pack 30 to 40 people in
8-passenger vehicles or refrigerator trucks. Such acts are a risk not only to persons being
transported but also to other traffic participants. Mediation in illegal transport across
state borders and illegal transport to foreign countries is becoming one of the most prof-
itable forms of “criminal-business operations” by transnational organized crime.256An
act of smuggling is a criminal act where there is “organized assistance to illegal immi-
grants to cross the border for the purpose of gaining economic benefits. Smuggling is
254 Bjelajac, Ž., Dragojlović, J., „Migrantska kriza kao izvor ugrožavanja regionalne i globalne bezbedno-
sti“, Kultura Polisa, Novi Sad, 2017, str. 161‒171.
255 Simeunović, D., „Migrantska kriza kao bezbednosni izazov za zemlje zapadnog Balkana stanje u 2017.
i perspektiva“,Kultura Polisa, br. 14 (posebno izdanje), Novi Sad, 2017,, str. 37
256 Mijalković, S., Petrović, I., „Bezbednosni rizici savremenih migracija“, NBP Žurnal za kriminalistiku i
pravo, Beograd, 2016, str. 3.
carried out in order to obtain direct or indirect financial or any other material benefit,
as a result of illegal entry of a person into the territory of the state of which the person
is not a national or a permanent resident”.257
Next group of risks are health risks, and we shall invoke the images from Belgrade
Bus and Railway stations and their immediate vicinity. There were two illegal collection
centers in that area tolerated by state bodies. Their accommodation and living condi-
tions in these places stayed were characterized by the lack of running water, sanitation
facilities and basic hygiene. Therefore, it was justifiable to ask whether migrants were
potential carriers of contagious diseases, especially considering that all this was taking
place twenty meters away from the main traffic hub in the Republic of Serbia, with thou-
sands of passengers circulating daily.
Next on the list is economic risk. In economic terms, Serbia is a poor country, so
food, accommodation, health care, and very often transport and heating during win-
ter months for a large number of migrants passing through or stopping in Serbia is
a burden on the state budget. Accommodation capacities in Serbia are not sufficient,
which is another risk factor. According to one study, “overcrowded accommodation
capacities are a problem; asylum seekers have started going to woods to sleep, or
breaking into weekend cottages, gardens and crops…” Many weekend cottages were
found with doors and windows missing, wood flooring taken out, traces of fire, graf-
fiti on walls.258
Special risk groups are “sleepers”, or members of radical Islamic groups who travel
with migrants and who may be “activated” at any point for the purpose of committing
terrorist acts in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The arrival of migrants from
countries torn by civil war and countries harboring different terrorist groups has
increased the risk of terrorism in “transit” countries as well as “destination” coun-
tries.259This requires cooperation and coordination between countries affected by the
migrant crisis, especially in terms of more detailed and better control of state borders
and people crossing borders, and mandatory registration of migrants. It is necessary
to abolish the current practice of certain countries acting solely in their own interests
and to respond to the migrant crisis in an organized, synchronized and cooperative
manner, and realistically consider all possible security challenges, risks and threats,
especially terrorism as the most destructive and growing global security problem.260
The fact remains that the presence of large number of migrants is the environment
conducive to criminal acts of people smuggling and related crimes, so it should not
come as a surprise that certain authors point out that this refugee wave is “voluntarily
257 Međunarodna organizacija za migracije, Osnovi upravljanja migracijama u Republici Srbiji, Beograd,
2012, str.57.
258 Jelić, S., Vasić, М., „Мigracije stanovništva lokalne zajednice i neke njene determinante – primer opštine
Lajkovac“ u Zbornik radova Мigranti na raskršću ili bespuću zemlje Srbije, Beograd, 2016, str. 153
259 Pašić., D., „Uticaj migrantske krize na terorizam u Evropi“, PRAVO ‒ Teorija i praksa, Novi Sad, broj
7‒9/ 2017, str.46.
260 Ibid., str. 47
forced, and organized“.261As stated in sources, “it was noted that during certain periods
refugees were coming to our territory in equal daily quotas, in organized groups, with
a clear plan of further travel”.262
Finally, a special group of risks concerns possible gatherings and demonstrations by
migrants to express dissatisfaction with their prolonged transfer to Western Europe,
which may turn from peaceful to violent.
In addition to the mentioned security risks caused by migration which pose a threat to
the state of Serbia and its citizens, I want to point out certain problems that migrants face
while traveling. Namely, their personal and collective security has been compromised from
the very beginning of the journey. They are exposed to numerous forms of crime, such as
corruption, various frauds and property crime, committed by local residents of transit and
destination countries, as well as to various types of injuries during transport, endangering
their health and life.263They also face various problems related to freedom of movement
– being fenced off with barbed wire at border crossings by authorities of the neighboring
states, problems with education, health care, food shortages, accommodation, etc.
7.3. Normative and institutional framework for managing

migrant crisis in the Republic of Serbia
As part of its EU-accession process, the Republic of Serbia has accepted the concept
of European security and safety values. To that end itinitiated the harmonization of its
normative acts in this field with positive EU regulations. Considering that migration
management is a method for ensuring security, relevant national regulation had to be
harmonized with the European.
Legal framework for managing migrant crisis in Serbia entails the following documents:
• Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette of RS, no. 97/2008),
• Law on Protection of the State Border (Official Gazette of RS, no. 97/2008 and
20/2015, et al.),
• Law on Migration Management (Official Gazette of RS, no. 107/2012),
• Law on Employment of Foreigners (Official Gazette of RS, no. 128/2014)
• Law on Asylum (Official Gazette of RS, no. 109/2007),
• Law on Refugees (Official Gazette of RS, no. 18/92;Official Gazette of RS, no. 30/2010),
• Strategy for Combating Illegal Immigration in the Republic of Serbia for the
period 2009‒2014 (Official Gazette of RS, no. 25/2009),
261 Dragišić, Z., „Мigracije kao bezbednosni problem“, Srpska politička misao, Beograd, broj 4/2015,str. 377.
262 Ibid.
263 Mijalković, S., Petrović, I., „Bezbednosni rizici savremenih migracija“,NBP Žurnal za kriminalistiku i
pravo, Beograd, 2016,str. 12.
• Strategy for Migration Management (Official Gazette of RS, no. 59/2009),

• Strategy for Reintegrationof Returnees under the Readmission Agreement(Official
Gazette of RS, no. 15/2009),
• Strategy for Integrated border management (Official Gazette of RS, no. 11/2006),
• National Strategy for Combating Organised Crime (Official Gazette of RS, no. 23/2009),
• Strategy to combat trafficking in human beings in the Republic of Serbia Srbiji
(Official Gazette of RS, no. 111/06).
A number of state bodies and institutions are in charge of application of the afore-
mentioned regulations:
• Ministry of Interior is responsible for:
- security of the state border and control of border crossing, movement and stay
within the border zone;
- stay of foreigners;
- international assistance and other forms of international cooperation in the fi
eld of internal aff airs, including readmission;
- illegal migration;
- asylum;
• Commissariat forRefugees is responsible for:
- carrying out the expert and other tasks related to providing care, return and
integration of persons who were granted the status of refugees;
- establishing the status of a refugee and keeping records of refugees and
internally displaced persons;
- providing care to refugees;
- harmonising the assistance efforts by other entities and organisations in the
country and abroad;
- provision of accommodation and distribution of refugees across the area of
local self-government units;
• Ministry of Foreign Aff airs is responsible for:
- protection of rights and interests of the Republic of Serbia, its citizens and legal
entities abroad;
- keeping electronic records of the issued visas in the form of a database, as well
as the records of denied requests for visa issuance; and
- issuance of travel documents free of charge to Serbian citizens – victims of
human trafficking, who have been rescued abroad.
• The Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government, which includes
the Office for Human and Minority Rights, is responsible for:
- protection and promotion of human and minority rights, including rights
of endangered migrant groups, refugees, displaced persons, returnees by
readmission agreements and asylum seekers,
- providing assistance to endangered migrant groups, particularly to returnees
by readmission agreement.
• Ministry of Health is responsible for health care of foreigners.

• Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy is responsiblefor:
- the social welfare system,
- exercise of rights and integration of refugees and displacedpersons, returnees
under the readmission agreements,Roma population and other socially
vulnerable groups.
• The Council for Integration of Returnees under the Readmission Agreements is
responsible for:
- considering and proposing the measures and activities for theimplementation
of admittance, provision of care and integrationof returnees;
- providing support in establishing and implementation ofmeasures at the local
self-government level aimed at offerringassistance to returnees, in line with the
possibilities andneeds of the local community; and
- proposing the establishment of a framework for a dialoguebetween countries
concerning the issues of protection andexercise of the rights of migrants and
problems associatedwith the illegal migration,
• The Council for Combating Human Traffickingis responsiblefor:
- coordination of national and regional activities in combatinghuman trafficking;
- considering the reports of relevant bodies of the internationalcommunity on
human trafficking;
- taking stands and proposing measures for implementationof recommendations
by international bodies in combatinghuman trafficking.
• The Coordination Body for Managing and Monitoring Migrationis in charge of
steering the work of competent ministries and special organizations in defining goals
and priorities of the migration policy and monitoring and managing migration.264
7.4. Conclusion
Migration is a natural phenomenon. Every living creature seeks better living condi-
tions, prompted by the innate instinct for self-preservation. As such, they are not unique
to humans and apply to migratory plant and animal species as well. It is clear that human
migration has always existed and it will continue to exist in the future.265 It is impossible
to stop the movement of people who are crossing thousands of miles and putting them-
selves in grave danger in order to escape suffering from various forms of poverty, extreme
violence, wars… Not even walls, fences or strict border control can stop that.
264 International Organization for Migration, Review of the legalandinstitutionalframework in the Repbulic
of Serbiapertaining to migrationmanagement, Belgrade 2011, pp. 5‒8.
265 Mijalković, S., Petrović, I., „Bezbednosni rizici savremenih migracija“,NBP Žurnal za kriminalistiku i
pravo, Beograd, 2016,,str. 14.
According to Professor Dragan Simutenovic, “migration, especially irregular migra-

tion, has enormous security repercussions”. Between 4 and 5 million migrants enter a
country each year, while the number of illegal crossings varies between 30% and 50%.
Migration inevitably brings an increased risk to the safety of the population from con-
tagious diseases, crime and terrorism. He specifically identifies the following security
risks: smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, inadequate inte-
gration of immigrants into the receiving states, migrant offenders, and increased risk of
internal conflicts between migrants.266
Modern migration is a security threat for the Republic of Serbia, but so far Serbia
has been successful in meeting the challenges, especially in the area of crime prevention
and maintaining public order and peace, as well as maintaining stability of the state and
government. It should be noted that migrants are in great distress; their lives and health
are at risk because they are not able to exercise their basic rights in terms of freedom of
movement, nutrition, health care, education and personal safety.
A precondition for successful migration management is to define a clear and coher-
ent migration management strategy, to create legal and institutional framework for the
consistent implementation of migration policies, and to implement effective coordina-
tion between all relevant bodies and institutions.267
Priority activities entail adoption of appropriate legal framework and implementa-
tion of relevant strategies. Specifically in Serbia, these priority activities are:
• Adoption of the Law on Migration Management,
• Implementation of the 2009 Migration Management Strategy and Action Plan for
the Implementation of the 2011 Strategy,
• continuity in the work of the Coordination Body for Migration Monitoring and
Management, for which the Refugee Commission performs expert, operational
and administrative-technical tasks,
• implementation of the 2009 Returnees Reintegration Strategy and relevant Action
Plan, and
• Implementation of the 2007 Law on Asylum.268
Most of all, migration management requires the existence of a regulated system with
clear migration policy and organized and planned migration management, and in par-
ticular the management of entry and stay of migrants.
266 Simeunović, D.,„Migrantska kriza kao bezbednosni izazov za zemlje zapadnog Balkana stanje u 2017. i
perspektiva“,Kultura Polisa, br. 14 (posebno izdanje), Novi Sad, 2017,, str. 37.
267 International Organization for Migration, Fundamentals of migrationmanagement in the republic of Ser-
bia,Belgrade, 2012, p. 9.
268 Ibid., p.10
7.5. Bibliography
1. Beslać, M., Ekonomski aspeki integrativnih politika međunarodnih migracija, Vi-

soka škola za poslovnu ekonomiju i preduzetništvo, Beograd, 2018.
2. Bjelajac, Ž.,Dragojlović, J., „Migrantska kriza kao izvor ugrožavanja regionalne i
globalne bezbednosti“, Kultura Polisa, Novi Sad, 2017.
3. Dragišić, Z.,„Migracije kao bezbednosni problem“, Srpska politička misao, Beo-
grad, 2015.
4. Đorđević, B., „Etika migracije“, Godišnjak FPN, Beograd, 2018.
5. Đorić, M., Impact of migration crisis on the development of islamic extremism and
terrorism, Institute forPolitical Studies, Belgrade, 2017.
6. International Organization for Migration, Key Migration Terms, IOM, Preuzeto-
sa: http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms.
7. Jelić, S., Vasić, M., „Migracije stanovništva lokalne zajednice i neke njene deter-
minatne ‒ primer opštine Lajkovac“ u: Zbornik radova Migranti na raskršću ili
bespuću zemlje Srbije, Beograd, 2016.
8. Međunarodna organizacija za migracije, Osnovi upravljanja migracijama u Repu-
blici Srbiji, Beograd, 2012.
9. Međunarodna organizacija za migracije, Pregled pravnog i institucionalnog okvira
u Republici Srbiji u oblasti upravljanja migracijama, Beograd, 2011
10. Mijalković, S., Petrović I., „Bezbednosni rizici savremenih migracija“, NBP Žur-
nal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2016.
11. Pašić, D., „Uticaj migrantske krize na terorizam u Evropi“, PRAVO ‒ Teorija i
praksa, Novi Sad, 2017.
12. Rašević, M.,Migracije i razvoj u Srbiji, Međunarodna organizacija za migracije,
Beograd, 2016.
13. Simeunović, D., „Migracije kao uzrok političke anomalije u Evropi“, Bezbednost,
nauka, policija, Beograd, 2015.
14. Simeunović, D., „Migrantska kriza kao bezbednosni izazov za zemlje zapadnog
Balkana stanje u 2017. i perspektiva“,Kultura Polisa, 14 (posebno izdanje), Novi
Sad, 2017.
15. UN, Keytrends in international migration, Expert Group Meeting on The Post
2015 Era: Implication for the Global Research Agenda on Population Develop-
ment, NewYork, 10 April 2015.
Student: Mehmed Plojović
Mentor: prof. dr Nevena Petrušić
8. The Protection of National Minorities

in the Republic of Serbia
Introduction
Contemporary world is caracterized by multiethnic, multinational and multicon-

fessional societies. The roots of ethnic/national minority protection can be traced back
to the time when first efforts were made to protect religious minorities, by adopting in-
dividual instruments at the state level, internal norms, international treaties and peace
treaties between the states themselves. Distinct national and ethnic features compose
particularities that differentiate persons belonging to national minorities from the rest
part of a state’s population. Legal protection of minorities provided on the basis of
non-discrimination and equality ensures that persons belonging to national minorities
are treated on an equal footing with those belonging to the majority population. This
is achieved by granting special rights, institutions and other privilegies to minorities
to ensure the preservation of their particularities. The Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia guarantees minority rights to persons belonging to minorities that define them-
selves as having a certain national identity and national being they want to preserve,
while excluding from the notion of minority those groups whose members do not con-
sider these features to be important, and rather follow the path of integration and as-
similation with the majority population.
8.1. The notion of minority
The term “minority” cannot be easily defined. Definition of “minority” depends on

specific circumstances that different parts of the world face. The term “minority” is
most commonly used for a group that is less numerous than the dominant group, and
173
therefore has less power and influence in community. Every person can be part of a
group which, because of its distinctive characteristics forms a minority compared to the
dominant group. This can result from different way of life (eg artists), specifoic lifestyle,
different sexual orientation or medical condition (AIDS, disabled), or different level
of education. Each of these groups might be considered minority, but the character of
group is shaped smaller cohesion factor and collectivity and less pronounced differenc-
es, in terms of race, religion, ethnicity, cultural or political identity.
8.1.1. Types of minorities
A certain group of people posesses features that distinguish them from the major-
ity population. These particularity can be: race, ethnicity, language, culture, tradition,
beliefs. A minority has distinctive physical or cultural characteristics that can be used
to separate it from the dominating majority, and therefore different terms are used to
describe various types of minorities.
• The phrase “racial minorities” was used after World War Two in a number of
international treaties and legal instruments adopted under the auspices of the
United Nations. It is used less nowadays because it is considered vague, ambiguous
and controversial in the accademic community, and because it was used as a
synonym for ethnic and national minorities rather than for racial traits. In the
scientific literature, ethnic groups are often treated differently as and races are
most often unspokenly treated differently in that the racial groups are not defined
based on social and cultural characteristics, but rather based on phenotypic
differences269.
• Language minorities are considered to be groups whose members do not speak the
same language as the majority population in their community. Apart from language,
there might be other distinguishing characteristics that set language minorities apart
from each other, such as: place of origin, religion, customs, racial and other features.
The term “language minority” has been abandoned and replaced by one of the most
commonly used terms - a national or ethnic minority, because it is difficult to make
distinction between groups on purely linguistic grounds.
• Religious minorities are groups that have a faith which is different from that held by
the majority. The concept of “religious minority” is considered to be inappropriate
for secular states where church and state are separate and religion is a matter of
personal choice of every individual. Religious minorities exist independently only
in countries that have an official state religion, like in some Arab countries and
until recently in Norway, where the Lutheran State Church was declared as the
official religion of Norway.
269 Putinja F., Stref-Fenar Ž. (1997). Teorije o etnicitetu. Belgrade: The 20th Century Library; Said, E. (2002).
Orjentalizam. Belgrade: The 20th Century Library.
• Ethnic minorities as are groups that are distinguished by ethnic characteristics

from the dominant group – often the majority population of the country in
which they live. It also refers to minorities that have no state of their own, and is
generally used in international documents, often under different terms that are
interchangeable. The term ethnic minority is used eather alone or in combinaton
with the term national minority, as it is too broad and does not reflect the fact
that every national minority posesses all characteristics of ethnic minority, while
ethnic minority is not always identified as a national minority. Ethnic minority
may be defined as a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
state, in a non-dominant political position and is surviving as ethnic category.270
The definition of ethnic groups has changed throughout history, from attempts to
establish objective definition to extremely subjective definitions. Eric Hobsbawm,
(according to Vrcan, 1999)271 considers as “ethnic” any group which, as a whole,
distinguishes itself permanently from other groups living or operating on a given
territory by a common name, with supposed characteristics that distinguish it
from others and, of course, real or supposed common characteristics of all its
members...“. Anthony Smith (1998)272 identifies six attributes of ethnic: a collective
proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or
more differentiating elements of common culture, association with a specific
homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. The
terms ethnic and national identity are often used synonymously. Thus, national or
ethnic identity has become an inevitable element and one of the basic demographic
characteristics of participants in quantitative surveys, and sometimes a key
correlate to socio-psychological, sociological and political phenomena.273
• The term national minority is most often used that tends to become widespread and
generally accepted term used to describe a minority. Basically the term national
minority includes the minorities that are part of the nation on the territory of
another country where this part is smaller than the rest of the population. The
origin and significance of nations has been influenced by a number of important
items: language, the 20th century population explosion, expansion of reading
audiences, high social mobility, specific social character,274 religious affiliation,
national music as one of the main features of culture…..National minorities differ
from ethnic minorities in being part of the nation that has own nation state.
National identity is a sense of belonging that is shaped within a particular social
270 Minority Righits Group (1990). World Directory of Minorities. London: Longman.
271 Vrcan, S.(1999)„Znakovita zbrka oko etničkog”. U:Kultura, etničnost, identitet. Zagreb: Naklada Jesens-
ki i Turk, p. 15‒39.
272 Smit, A. (1998).Nacionalni identitet. Belgrade: The 20th Century Library.
273 Milošević-Đorđević, J. (2003). Jedan pokušaj teorijskih razmatranja nacionalnog identiteta. Psihologija,
36 (2), 125‒140.
274 Golubović, Z. i sar. (1995). Društveni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba. Bel-
grade: Institute of Phylosophy and Social Theory.
group. An individual accepts culture, forms of behavior and values, and feels like
member of a group. Apart from referring to the subjective feeling one shares with
a group, national identity depends to a large extent upon the attitude of others
towards us, and how others see our national identification. According to the most
commonly quoted definition offered by Francesco Capotorti, Special Rapporteur
of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, a minority is: A group numerically inferior to the
rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members -
being nationals of the state - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a
sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion
or language“.275
8.2. Protection of national minorities
8.2.1. International legal framework
Drawing on negative past experiences with the use and abuse of collective minority
rights protection, a different approach was taken regarding the subject of protection,
and rights and obligations of persons belonging to minorities. The United Nations aban-
doned the concept that involved special regulation for protection of collective rights as
a group. A new concept of having specific rights for individual members was adopted,
which lasted until 1992, when the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was adopted.
The United Nations Charter adopted in 1945276 protects and promotes respect for hu-
man rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion. It contains no specific provisions relating to the question of protec-
tion of minorities. This charter focuses on universal rights and fundamental freedoms to
which all human beings are entitled, without any discrimination on the grounds of race,
sex, language or religion, thus protecting the status of persons belonging to minorites too.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948277 reaffirmes the same
principles of the United Nations Charter and even goes beyond wih some of its provisions
275 Dimitrijević, V. i sar. (2007). Međunarodno pravo ljudskih prava. Belgrade: Center for Human Rights.
276 The Charter of the United Nations is an international treaty and the constituting instrument of the
United Nations. The charter was signed at the San Francisco Conference on 26 June 1945 by
the representatives of the 50 countries. It came into force on October 24, 1945.
277 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A /
RES / 217, December 10, 1948 at the Palais de Shaillot in Paris), sets out, for the first time, fundamental
human rights to be universally protected.
which proclame the principle of non-discrimination, stating that everyone is entitled

to all the rights and freedoms, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin or other status. According to the Universal
Declaration, all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966278 is con-
sidered to be the foundational text in the contemporary international system for the
protection of minorities and one of the major sources of human rights for international
documents on minority rights. The provisions of the covenant provide that “In those
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language. in a country where there are ethnic, religious or linguistic minori-
ties, persons belonging to these minorities can not be deprived of the right to have,
together with other members of their group, their own cultural life, confess their own
religion and perform religious duties or to use their own language. “
The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities of 1992279 sets forth a wide range of the rights of persons be-
longing to minorities and obligations of states to protect the existence and the national
or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective
territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. Persons
belonging to minorities may exercise their rights individually as well as in community
with other members of their group. The declaration envisages the obligation of states
to take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging to minorities may
exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without
any discrimination and in full equality before the law. States Parties to the Declara-
tion are obliged to take legal and other measures necessary to ensure that members of
minorities enjoy all rights and freedoms without any discrimination and full equality
before the law. Although the declaration does not create legal obligation on the states, it
is the first international document devoted specifically to the protection of minorities.
In order to become legally binding, the declaration needs to be translated in the text
of an international convention or converted into rules of customary international law.
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the most
comprehensive treaties and the first legally binding international instrument devoted
to the protection of national minorities in general. Considering it one of the methods
by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realization of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
278 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly with resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966, and in force from 23 March 1976 in
accordance with Article 49 of the covenant.
279 The UN General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the declaration at its 47th meeting held on Decem-
ber 18, 1992 (resolution 47/135).
of Europe adopted the framework convention in 1994, which entered into force on 1
February 1998. The framework convention was ratified ba the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia ratified in 1998280.
The European Charter on Regional Minority Languages stresses the value of intercul-
turalism and multilingualism and considers that the protection and encouragement of
regional or minority languages should not be to the detriment of the official languages
and the need to learn them. The protection and promotion of regional or minority lan-
guages in the different countries and regions of Europe represent an important con-
tribution to the building of Europe based on the principles of democracy and cultural
diversity within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity281.
8.2.2. Minority rights in the national legal framework
Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Slo-
venians, Macedonians, Croats, Montenegrins, Muslims / Bosniaks who used to be the
Yugoslav Constitutive nations became new national minorities in Serbia. Although the
rights of minorities in Serbia were guaranteed by the 1990 Constitution, general so-
cial atmosphere was extremely unfavorable to national minorities, due to the wars in
the territory of former country, culminating in ethnic intolerance. At the same time,
the ethnification of politics and populism used and misused by the government as an
instrument of mobilization and conflicts with neighbors, created general feeling of in-
security, as well as high distance, animosities and distrust among ethnic communities
in the country. After the change in 2000, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
was re-admitted to membership of the United Nations and other international orga-
nizations (Council of Europe, OSCE, European Commission), thus assuming obliga-
tions to ensure standards of the protection of human rights and the rights of national
minorities provided for in international legal instruments. Main documents signed by
the FRY are Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Eu-
ropean Chapter on Regional and Minority Languages, which define a minimum of the
protection of minority groups. In contemporary Serbia status of the minorities is pri-
mary defined by Constitution (2006)282, and by special laws: Law on Protection of the
280 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (“Official Gazette of the FRY
- International Treaties”, No. 6/98). At the invitation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, FR Yugoslavia joined the Framework Convention on 11 May 2001, and, on the basis of Article
29 paragraph 2 of the convention, entered into force for FR Yugoslavia on 1 September 2001.
281 The Charter was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1992 and entered into force on March 1, 1998.
The Charter has so far been ratified by 25 member states of the Council of Europe, and signed by a
further eight member states. Serbia ratified the Charter on February 15, 2006. Minority languages rec-
ognized in Serbia: Albanian, Croatian, Vlach, Bosniak, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romanian, Ruthenian,
Roma, Slovak and Ukrainian.
Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (2002)283 – which continued to be in effect

in Serbia when Montenegro seceded from the FRY, Law on Official Use of Language
and Script, Law on Educational System and Upbringing284 and Law on Local Self-Gov-
ernance (2002) 285.
Table 1. Ethnic composition of the Republic of Serbia, according to 2011 Census.

Ethnicity Number % Growth index 2002–2011.
Serb 5,988,093 83.32% -3.62%
Hungarian 253,899 3.53% -13.43%
Roma 147,604 2.05% +36.43%
Bosniak 145,278 2.02% +6.75%
Croat 57,900 0.81% -17.99%
Slovak 52,750 0.73% -10.63%
Montenegrin 38,527 0.54% -44.2%
Vlach 35,330 0.49% -11.79%
Romanian 29,332 0.41% -15.17%
Yugoslav 23,303 0.32% -71.13%
Macedonian 22.755 0.32% -11.96%
Muslim 22,301 0.31% +14.35%
Bulgarian 18,543 0.26% -9.53%
Bunjevac 16,706 0.23% -16.52%
Ruthenia 14,246 0.20% -10.43%
Gorani 7.767 0.11% +69.58%
Albanian1 5,809 0.08% /
Ukrainian 4.903 0.07% -8.42%
German 4,064 0.06% +4.18%
Slovenian 4,033 0.06% /
Other* 17,558 0.24% +26.12%
Regional belonging* 30,771 0.43% +167.92%
Undeclared 160,346 2.23% +48.84%
Unknown* 81,740 1.14% +8.29%
Total 7,186,862 100% -4.15%
In accordance with Article 33 of the Law on the Census of Population, Households

and Dwellings, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia published preliminary re-
sults of the census of population, households and dwellings in 2011286. According to the
2011 census, Serbs are the largest ethnic group in the country and constitute 83.3% of
population. Besides, there are 20 ethnic communities with over 2,000 members (Table
1). There is an increasing number of people who have declared for regional ethnicity, as
283 “Official Gazette of FRY“, no. 11/2002.
284 “Official Gazette of RS“, nos. 88/2017 and 27/2018 ‒ state laws).
286 “Official Gazette of RS“, no. 104/09 and 24/11.
well as those who do not want to declare their ethnic affiliation. In addition, there has
been an increase in the number of Gorani and Roma. The results show a large decline in
the number of Yugoslavs and Montenegrins.
8.2.3. National minority rights guaranteed by the Constitution
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia governs the rights of national minorities.
Unlike in the Constitution of 1990 where the Republic of Serbia had been defined as the
’democratic state of all its citizens’, here the concept of the civic state has been changed
and Serbia defined as the ’state of Serbian people and all its citizens’, and besides this, it
is insisted that Serbian language and Cyrillic letter are used, while state symbols reflect
strictly Serbian national tradition. Section one of the Constitution lays out constitu-
tional principles. Article 14 states that the Republic of Serbia shall protect the rights of
national minorities and shall guarantee special protection to national minorities for the
purpose of exercising full equality and preserving their identity. Section two of the Con-
stitution provides for the human and minority rights and freedoms. Article287 provides
for restrictions on the human and minority rights. Article 21 prohibits discrimination
and Article 22 provides for the protection of human and minority rights and freedoms.
8.2.4. Law on Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities
The Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities is the basic
law that regulates the status of national minorities. It was introduced on the federal
level during the existence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but it continued to be
in effect in Serbia after the referendum in spring 2006, when Montenegro seceded from
Yugoslavia. This law will continue to be in effect until the parliament of the Republic
of Serbia adopts the new law on national minorities. This law has taken over the stan-
dards that were achieved in this area through the documents of the Council of Europe
– the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and European
Charter on Regional or Minority Languages. General provisions define the subject of
the law, stating in Article 1 that the law governs the manner of exercising individual
and collective rights of national minorities set forth in the Constitution of the Federal
287 Human and minority rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be restricted by the law if the Consti-
tution permits such restriction and for the purpose allowed by the Constitution, to the extent necessary
to meet the constitutional purpose of restriction in a democratic society and without encroaching upon
the substance of the relevant guaranteed right. Attained level of human and minority rights may not be
lowered. When restricting human and minority rights, all state bodies, particularly the courts, shall be
obliged to consider the substance of the restricted right, pertinence of restriction, nature and extent of
restriction, relation of restriction and its purpose and possibility to achieve the purpose of the restric-
tion with less restrictive means.
Republic of Yugoslavia and guaranteed by international treaties. This law further regu-
lates protection of national minorities and establishes establishes regulations288. Article
2289 defines a national minority.
8.2.5. Law on National Councils of National Minorities
The Law on National Councils of National Minorities, NCNM290 (2009) includes:

general provisions, issues regarding the status of NCNMs, competencies of NCNM,
relations with state bodies and bodies of the autonomous province and local self-gov-
ernment units, international and regional cooperation, election of NCNMs, funding of
activities of NCNMs, monitoring and penal provisions.
8.2.6. Law on Official Use of Language and Script
The Law on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts stipulates that within the terri-
tory of a local self-government unit that is traditionally inhabited by persons belonging
to a national minority, language and script of such persons may have equal official use,
provided that a minority forms at least 15% of the population. This right refers especial-
ly to the use of minority language and script in: administrative and judicial proceed-
ings, communication between an authority exercising public authorities, maintenance
288 “Official Gazette of FRY“, no. 11/02 , 57/02 ‒ state regulation, “Official Gazette of RS“, no. 72/09 ‒ state
law, 97/13 – Constitutional Court:
(1) This Law shall govern the manner of exercising individual and collective rights of national minori-
ties set forth in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and guaranteed by international
treaties.
(2) This Law shall further regulate protection of national minorities from any form of discrimination in
exercising their rights and freedoms, and instruments shall be established to ensure and protect parti-
cular rights of national minorities in respect of self-government, education, language, information and
culture, and institutions shall be established to facilitate participation of minorities in government and
public administration.
(3) The Republic and Province regulations may specify, in accordance with the Constitution and law,
issues regulated by this Law.
289 (1) A national minority for the purpose of this Law shall be any group of citizens of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia numerically sufficiently representative and, although representing a minority in the
territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, belonging to a group of residents having a long term and
firm bond with the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and possessing characteristics such
as language, culture, national or ethnic affiliation, origin or confession, differentiating them from the
majority of the population and whose members are distinguished by care to collectively nurture their
common identity, including their culture, tradition, language or religion.
(2) All groups of citizens termed or determined as nations, national or ethnic communities, national or
ethnic groups, nationalities and nationalities, and which meet the conditions specified under para. 1 of
this Article shall be deemed national minorities for the purpose of this Law.
290 “Official Gazette of RS“, no. 72/2009
of prescribed records by municipal bodies and organizations, keeping official records

and collections of personal data in the languages of national minorities, use of language
in the work of representative bodies, inscription of names of settlements and other geo-
graphical names, names of streets and squares. It is foreseen under Article 9 of the
Identity Card Law (2006) that the identity card form is printed in the national minority
language and script291.
8.2.7. Law on the Foundations of the Education System
The Law on Fundamentals of Education System (2004) stipulates that main objec-
tive of education is development of awareness and sense of belonging to the Republic
of Serbia and respecting the Serbian tradition and culture, the tradition and culture of
national minorities and ethnic communities. Therefore, students belonging to national
minorities can be educated in their languages and script, and may also be conducted bi-
lingually. When the curriculum is implemented in Serbian language, classes for students
who belong to national minorities are organized in languages of national minorities with
elements of national culture. This law also determines the minimum number of students
required if the teaching is to be performed in the language of a national minority.
8.2.8. Law on Local Self-Government (2002/6/7)
The Law on Local Self-Government (2002/6/7) regulates the issues of importance

for minorities. The Law introduces new approach to the rights of national minorities.
Article 18 of the Law stipulates that municipalities shall ensure protection and exercis-
ing of the rights of national minorities. Article 63 of the Law on Local-Self Government
(2006) stipulates that nationally mixed municipalities where one national community
accounts for more than 5% of the total population or all national communities collec-
tively account for more than 10% of the municipality’s population should foresee the
establishment of a council for interethnic relations. The council is expected to monitor
the implementation of the Law on Local Self-Government and deal with the issues of
realization, protection and improvement of equality in local communities, through the
mechanism of overseeing the work of local government. Its main task is to serve as an
effective mechanism for developing good interethnic relations in the municipality.
291 Article 9: ”The form of an identity card is printed in Serbian language, Cyrillic letters and in English
language. The form of an identity care is printed in language of ethnic minorities in compliance with the
law. The form of an identity card contains the data on name and surname in original form as they were
recorded in the Register of births. The data on surname and name of the members of ethnic minorities
are entered also according to the spelling rules of Serbian writing. The remaining data are recorded in
both Serbian language, Cyrillic letters and in language of national minorities in line with the law“.
8.3. Conclusion
The term “minority” is defined as a group of people which is numerically smaller

than the dominant group in the community. Racial minorities, linguistic minorities, re-
ligious minorities, ethnic minority and national minorities are names that have evolved
over time. Ethnic minority and national minority seem to be most acceptable, although
they have their own shortcomings.
The history of minority protection has been quite complex. In antient history, toll-
erant attitudes toward persons from a different ethnic background depended on the
ruler. In the Middle Ages, the mediaval period sometimes referred to as a dark ages,
especially in Europe, characterized by a series of both religious and territorial wars, the
protection of religious minorities did not exist.
The first international treaty to protect religious minorities refers to the protection of
Ottoman Christians, concluded between France and Turkey in 1535. The Treaty of Ver-
sailles, a peace settlement signed at the end of the World War I. It introduced the system
referred to as a minority agreement, signed by the allied and associated powers and by
defeated countries in the war, the newly established countries and those that expanded
their territory. The United Nations Charter adopted in 1945 protects and promotes re-
spect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion, and does not envisage special protection of minorities
and their collective rights as a group. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 1966 is considered to be the foundational text in the contemporary interna-
tional system for the protection of minorities and one of the major sources of human
rights for international documents on minority rights. The Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992 sets
forth a wide range of the rights of persons belonging to minorities and obligations of
states to protect the existence and identity of minorities within their respective territo-
ries and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.
In the Republic of Serbia, twenty ethnic groups have been identified as national mi-
norities. Respect for differences on the basis of language, religion or customs, ethnic di-
versity and a will for preservation of separate identity of national minorities are the values
of the Republic of Serbia. The rights of national minorities and their status in the Republic
of Serbia are regulated by the Constitution and other laws concerning minorities. Also, it
is possible for citizens not to declare their ethnicity or to express regional identity.
8.4. Literature
1. Golubović, Z. and partners (1995). Društveni karakter i društvene promene u sve-

tlu nacionalnih sukoba. Belgrade: Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory.
2. Dimitrijević, V. and partners (2007). Međunarodno pravo ljudskih prava. Belgra-
de: Belgrade Center for Human Rights.
3. Minority Rights Group (1990). World Direktory of Minorities. London: Longman.
4. Milošević-Đorđević, J. (2003). Jedan pokušaj teorijskih razmatranja nacionalnog
identiteta. Psihologija, 36 (2), 125‒140.
5. Putinja F., Stref-Fenar Ž. (1997). Teorije o etnicitetu. Belgrade: The 20th Century
Library.
6. Said, E. (2002). Orijentalizam. Belgrade: The 20th Century Library.
7. Smit, A. (1998). Nacionalni identitet. Belgrade: The 20th Century Library.
8. Sollors, W. (1996). Theories of Ethnicity. New York: New York University Press.
9. “Official Gazette of FRY“, No. 11/2002.
10. “Official Gazette of FRY“, Nos. 11/02 , 57/02 ‒ state regulations.
11. “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 72/09 ‒ state regulation, 97/13 ‒ Constitutional Court.
12. “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 88/2017 i 27/2018 ‒ state laws.
13. “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 9/2002.
15. “Official Gazette of RS“, No. 104/09 i 24/11.
17. Vrcan, S.(1999).”Znakovita zbrka oko etničkog“. Kultura, etničnost, identitet. Za-
greb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 15‒39.
Part III
Appendix
185
Aleksandra Ålund
Carl-Ulrik Schierup
Linköping University, Linkoping, Sweden
1. MAKING OR UNMAKING A MOVEMENT?

CHALLENGES FOR CIVIC
ACTIVISM IN THE GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION292
Abstract
This article discusses dilemmas of global civic activism from a neo-Gramscian per-
spective as both subordinated and a potential challenge to hegemonic neoliberal order.
With the investigational focus on the People’s Global Action on Migration, Develop-
ment and Human Rights (PGA) event, the space for civic activism relating to the inter-
governmental Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and its associat-
ed Civil Society Days and Common Space is analysed. The article asks how the future of
PGA activism may be influenced by its formalized representation within the GFMD. It
posits that the PGA has landed at a crossroad between becoming a global activist coun-
terhegemonic movement to a dominant neoliberal migration policy and being captured
in a tokenist subordinated inclusion within a truncated ‘invited space’ for interchange.
This ambiguous position jeopardizes its impact on global migration governance, dis-
cussed with reference to theories of transversal politics and issues of counterhegemonic
alliance-building.
Keywords: Civic activism; global governance; international migration; neoliberal-
ism; social movements
292 © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Li-
cense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
187
Introduction
At the centre of this paper are emergent civil society movements concerned with mi-
grant’s rights, and the political economy of neoliberal globalization. They question the
precarisation of work and citizenship as well as dominant refugee and asylum politics.
Such issues have since long been the object of critical research on civic activism and
social movements.
Towards the end of the 1980s, Hall (1987) initiated a discussion of the relevance
of Gramscian thought for understanding and acting politically in a profoundly trans-
formed present. We live today, he observed, ‘in an era when the old political identities
are collapsing’, raising questions on new political forms and a new cultural order. A new
order emerges with a ‘multiplicity of dispersed wills’, ‘heterogeneous aims’, a ‘plurali-
sation of modern cultural identities’, and multiple centres of power (Hall, 1987, p. 20).
The problem faced, Hall argued, is related to the capability of addressing this diversity
of identities and social forces, unifying them within a common project across their
differences. That means understanding – from an overall Gramscian perspective – civil
society as an arena for mobilization, with contemporary social movements as a new
political subject, subordinated to while also challenging neoliberal hegemony making.
Contemporary civil society organizations (CSOs) and movements demonstrate new
forms of political participation, putting into question the growing democratic deficit of
formal politics as well as ‘partnerships’ between state, market, and civil society (Ålund,
Schierup, & Neergaard, 2017). Inclusion through ‘integrative’ co-optation may mediate
change but may, at the same time, defuse counterhegemonic discourses and activism of
contending movements through appropriative consensus-making (Coy & Hedeen, 2007
[2005]), carrying ‘uncertain futures for democratic possibilities’ (Walton & Udayagiri,
2003, p. 309). From this vantage point, this paper aims to contribute to the critical theo-
retical discussion of what we, with Purcell (2009a, p. 291), call counterhegemonic move-
ments – that is, ‘movements that can both undermine the dominance of neoliberalism
and construct concrete alternatives to it’ (Walton & Udayagiri, 2003).
Grounded in a neo-Gramscian approach (Gill, 2003), we see our present historical
moment as tendentially ‘non-hegemonic’ (Cox, 1983; Deak, 2005). This signifies more
specifically an ostensibly hegemonic neoliberal ‘end of history’ in crisis challenged by
cycles of contending movements (Funke, 2014). Yet, a morbid ‘arrest of time’ (Brown,
2005, p. 7) in the hiatus of which the new to be born can only be glimpsed through a
looking glass darkly. Following Purcell (2009b, pp. 143–144), we discuss how unstable
articulations of neoliberal hegemony mired in contradictions and legitimacy problems
are challenged by counterhegemonic projects carried forth by movements of civil soci-
ety; ‘[c]ounter-projects’ that are not only ‘possible’, but indeed ‘inevitable’. This posits so-
cial movement issues and prospects, Purcell (2009a, pp. 295–296) contends, in the orbit
of the original Gramscian argument on hegemony by stating that ‘the social field is too
Part III: Appendix 189
fragmented for one class (or, more generally, one group) to rule on its own’. It must ‘wid-
en itself … propagating itself throughout society … broadening its political identity’ to
incorporate, appropriate and subordinate a wider array of ideopolitical perspectives and
interests (Purcell, 2009a). From this overall position, we interrogate which challenges, in
terms of identity, direction, and position, are faced by global, network-based movements
from two analytical perspectives; the internal dynamics in the formation and articula-
tion of movements, and challenges faced by movements connected with a subordinated
position within formalized spaces of governance. The first perspective is concerned with
the constitution of networks of equivalence as developed by Purcell (2009a, p. 291) as an
‘articulation of differentiated but equivalent popular struggles’. That is, broad coalitions
of movements and groups that expose the political field as ‘irreducibly plural’, merging
sameness and difference in terms of identity and agenda. The other main perspective
concerns the limits of what has been theorized in terms of invited spaces (Gaventa, 2006)
for civil society participation within intergovernmental fora.
We illustrate cardinal points through empirical reference to the case of the global
network designated the People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human
Rights (here forth the PGA).1 The PGA is a forum for a multitude of civil society activists;
organizations, networks, and movements, including migrant and migrant advocacy orga-
nizations and individuals, researchers, trade unions, and faith organizations. It is mobi-
lized as a campaign event during world governmental summits within the Global Forum
on Migration and Development (GFMD), as well as periodically occurring UN summits
concerned with migration and development. The PGA has sought to introduce an agenda
onto the GFMD that represents the concerns of migrants, and to raise critical perspectives
on human rights, labour rights, sustainable development, and the need to contest precari-
ous livelihoods and the excessive exploitation of millions of the world’s migrants.
The GFMD was initiated following the UN High Level Dialogue (UNHLD) on Mi-
gration and Development in 2006. It is the most inclusive state-led forum between gov-
ernments, concerned with developing common policies for international migration.
Although non-binding, and situated outside the UN system, it presents the most ambi-
tious intergovernmental deliberations on a global governance framework on migration.
Since 2007, the GFMD has figured as an arena for dialogue between sending, receiving,
and transiting states on standards for global migration governance. Yet, the GFMD pro-
cess has remained embedded in the UN framework, homecoming to regularly occur-
ring UNHLD follow-ups, the latest of which took place in New York in 2013.
The forum is meant to be informed by the exchange of ideas with international orga-
nizations, civil society, and business. Since its inception, the so-called Civil Society Days
(CSD) have been organized as a side event to the GFMD meetings. Further, since the
emergence of PGA (in 2006), as a collaborative network of CSOs on the issues of migra-
tion and development, the quest for human/labour rights has become a central demand
to voice within the formalized fora of the GFMD/UNHLD process. However, the PGA
has come to face problems concerning deliberations within fora for global governance
of migration. While the PGA has created a space for repeated appearances preceding and
subsequently represented within GFMD/CSD, the movement has landed at a crossroad

between representing an activist counterhegemonic movement and a position marked
by a subordinated inclusion within the GFMD/UNHLD process. On this background,
we reflect upon the trajectories of contestative movement activism in relation to con-
temporary governance.
While others have ventured in some detail into the constitution of a contestative
global civil society movement for migrant rights (Piper, 2015; Rother, 2009), our pur-
pose is to illustrate points in our theoretical discourse through commenting on impass-
es encountered by the PGA at crucial crossroads in the later part of its trajectory. The
question we posit is whether the ‘PGA’ hasbecome the insignia of a social movement in
unmaking rather than in the making?
1.1. Progress and prospects for the making

of a ‘new’ global movement
A growing body of research has called attention to the issue of the ‘new’ in con-
temporary social movements, depicting differences between what is perceived as ‘old’,
‘new’, and ‘new-new’ social movements. New social movement theorists (Melucci, 1989;
Offe, 1985; Touraine, 1987) claim these movements differ from the ‘old’ – in particular
from the labour movement – mainly in terms of more composite social bases (mixed)
and forms of organization (localized, informal, and temporal). Feixa, Pereira, and Juris
(2009) argue that globalization has resulted in ‘new-new’ globalized social movements
(NNSM). While organized around informal networks, NNSM link locally rooted strug-
gles to national and global events. Thus, they are ‘like the neoliberal system these move-
ments oppose’, situated in a globally networked space (Feixa, Pereira, & Juris, 2009,
pp. 421–422). NNMS, they continue, ‘highlight the transformations and social conflicts
associated with the consolidation of informational capitalism’, merging generations,
genders, ethnicities, and territories, within unstable networks.
As originally imagined and devised, the highly composite global network and yearly
event, the PGA, demonstrate the importance and veracity of critical interventions on
issues connected with the emergence of a neoliberal migration policy regime (Schierup,
Ålund, & Likić-Brborić, 2015). The PGA was first constituted as a global civil society
network event which was critically counterpoised to the UNHLD on International Mi-
gration and Development in 2006. As noted above, the UNHLD resulted in the insti-
tutionalization of the intergovernmental forum, the GFMD, as a yearly event. Since
then, the PGA has recurrently taken place, parallel to, and critically counterpoising,
yearly GFMD intergovernmental meetings. This began in Brussels 2007, and was followed
by Manila 2008, Athens 2009, Mexico City 2010, Geneva 2011, Port Louis 2012, New
York City 2013 (in conjunction with a second UNHLD), Stockholm 2014, Istanbul 2015,
Dhaka 2016, and Berlin 2017. In its original form, the PGA brought together a multi-
tude of critical networks, organizations, and movements from across six continents,
while tilting towards a marked ‘southern’ political and organizational perspective. It
amalgamated perspectives of ‘new’ diaspora movements and migrant advocacy organi-
zations with those of a multiplicity of organizations of labour, representing ‘old’ as well
as ‘new’ moral-political and organizational union orientations. The PGA as a whole ap-
peared indeed in the stature of a ‘new-new’ type of global network and event. Concern-
ing an original counterhegemonic orientation, this invites comparison with the World
Social Forum on Migrations (WSFM) – founded in São Paulo as a key feature of the
World Social Forum (WSF) – indicating that ‘another world is possible’.
The contestative character of the PGA, as an event born out of the alter-globalization
movement, was clearly expressed in its first world summits, organized as counterpoints
to GFMD intergovernmental meetings, including the PGA in Mexico City, 2010. ‘We
are human beings with rights to mobility, freedom of speech, decent work and social
protection – not a commodity’, is a pledge cited from the PGA’s statement targeted at the
Mexican GFMD governmental forum. It echoes Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) radical critique
in the Great Transformation, denouncing the unchecked commodification of labour,
embodied in the migration of precarious workers from the south.
The ‘International Working Group’ (IWG), responsible for organizing the 2010 PGA
in Mexico City, had ambitious goals in terms of building a movement that would shape
a continuous policy deliberation in favour of labour, social, civic, and human rights for
migrants and rebalance asymmetric power relations in the governance of migration and
development in favour of ‘southern’ interests. The IWG included migrant umbrella feder-
ations, organizations, and networks situated in Asia, the Americas, Africa, and Europe
(representing numerous community-based migrant organizations and migrant advo-
cacy groups), as well as the Global Unions Federation (representing affiliated unions
distributed over a wide array of trades) and a Mexican-based critical think tank (PGA,
2010). The Mexican PGA venue gathered more than 800 delegates from across the 6
continents, representing migrant/diaspora organizations, migrant advocacy organiza-
tions, faith-based solidarity organizations, trade unions, and academics. The venue gave
witness to what Motta (2011, p. 179), in her discussion of academic versus social move-
ment epistemology, described as ‘developing utopias as part of the process of creating al-
ternative logics of being and doing’ trusting that ‘movements … can develop theoretical
knowledge via a systematisation based on their political experiences’.
Regarding the importance of Mexico 2010, it should be added that the PGA ob-
tained for the first time the opportunity to delegate representatives to CSD and a
newly instituted ‘Common Space’ (CS) for governmental/civil society interchange,
thereby acquiring a formally acknowledged place relating to the GFMD. Yet, from
our participation in a range of plenums and workshops, we could also observe a range
of actual or potential rifts between the motley collection of widely different net-
works and organizations, represented in or relating to the PGA/CSD/CS. They count-
ed potential dissentions between labour unions and other CSOs, between different
regionally situated organizations and networks, and organizations with differential

positionality relating to regional, national, or local governance frameworks. This calls
for an analysis of the potential challenges and pitfalls contingent on the contempo-
rary plurality and fragmented character of social movements, and of perspectives for
their formation as political subjects.
It is problematic that, as discussed by Rother (2013), there is an innate controversy
between civil society actors that rely on ‘outside–inside’ as opposed to ‘outside’ strategies
and tactics in relation to hegemonic discourses and institutions of governance in pro-
moting their aims. Nevertheless, an ‘outside–inside’ strategy dominates the direction
of the PGA. Endeavouring to promote a rights-based migration regime, it has built on
global grassroots mobilization, but with the rationale of instituting a civil society agen-
da within major intergovernmental fora; a war of position for neoliberal times (Gramsci,
1971). A rival civil society tactic, reminiscent of a contemporary war of movement, has
aimed to criticize and counter this dominant strategy. It puts its stakes on global alli-
ance-making from the bottom-up, with insistent claims from the ‘outside’ matched by
a distanced scepticism rejecting a disciplining of civil society within intergovernmental
fora.2 This unsettled enigma has followed the global movement for migrant rights from
its beginnings until today.
1.2. Networks of equivalence – social

movement as a political subject
Departing from a Gramscian understanding of CSO and its relation to policy, Pur-
cell (2009a) discusses the ways that fragmented struggles within global movements of
the present can be brought together without ending in a uniform whole or becoming
subordinated to other struggles. Like Hall (1987), he sees the work of Gramsci as the
starting point to reach beyond a reductionist approach to political movements and, at
the same time, still develop a collective and coordinated struggle with the potential to
transform existing power relations.
With this in mind, Purcell develops the notion of ‘networks of equivalence’, per-
ceived as broad coalitions that bring ‘together many different struggles, movements
and groups’ (2009a, p. 279). In this process of coming together, there is a complex
relation between sameness and difference (Purcell, 2009a, p. 279). With reference
to Gramsci (1971) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Purcell elaborates on the notions
of articulation and equivalence. This is devised to ‘capture how groups join togeth-
er into a counterhegemonic formation’, constructing a shared common sense and a
collective articulation of a new political will ‘without dissolving differences into a
homogenous unity’ (Purcell, 2009a, p. 303), a coalitional movement amalgamating
multiple subject positions.
1.3. Transversal dialogues?
This issue of a movement becoming a political subject in its own right begs for widen-
ing the space for different voices to be heard. It invites, in effect, a recapturing of a rich
legacy in feminist debates.
Criticism of ethnocentricity in the mainstream feminist discourse was initiated by
black feminists in the United States and Britain in the early 1980s. The essential aspects of
this critique concerned the problems of either the ‘invisibility’of black and ethnic wom-
en in the writings of white feminists, or their ‘visibility’ as victims. But, it was particular-
ly the critique of the ‘victim’ perspective that opened up for new understandings of the
relationship between colonial and post-colonial imaginaries, images and the struggles
for the Self among oppressed peoples.
The recognition of black, ethnic, and migrant women in the texts and politics of
mainstream feminism has since the 1990s been a prominent theme within international
feminist studies. The perception of diversity as a threat has gradually been replaced by
claims for the development of a politics of recognition for different voices in joint ‘trans-
versal’ dialogues (Yuval-Davis, 1999). In order to find new modes of articulation be-
tween the universal and particular concepts such as ‘differentiated universalism’ (Lister,
1996) and ‘transversal dialogue’ (Yuval-Davis, 1999), express the need to bring forth the
recognition of socio-cultural particularity into universalism, without overshadowing
socially constructed inequalities appearing as divergences (Lister, 1996).
Particularly, Yuval-Davis (1999) discusses the notion of transversal dialogue within
the context of ‘transversal politics’, aiming to bridge diversity across, for example, eth-
nic and political boundaries. She criticizes what she sees as an overstated confidence in
universalism in discourses of feminist sisterhood, but also a limitless relativism of ‘dif-
ference’ caring with it cleavages and fragmentation. Yuval-Davis argues that differenc-
es, related to social, economic, and political power, should be acknowledged without
replacing the notion of equality. Relating to the epistemology of stand point femi-
nism, she explains the need to recognize that just one position (gender for example) is
‘unfinished’. She sees, at the same time, the need for the recognition of an interconnec-
tion of other positions in terms of social, economic, political, or cultural inequality.
To this end, the notion of transversal dialogue, Yuval-Davis alleges, could be important
in advancing democratic deficits within contemporary social movements in order to
avoid either ‘over universalism’ or ‘over relativism’. Thus conceived, ‘transversal politics’
stands out as an alternative to an assimilationist, ostensibly ‘universalistic’ politics on
the traditional left, but at the same time also to a fragmenting identity politics obsessed
with ‘difference’.
Let us now relate transversal dialogues to the issue of the global movement for mi-
grant rights. In this connection, there is a diacritical watershed between labour unions,
on the one side, and other organizations and movements of civil society such as migrant
organizations and an array of NGOs, on the other. They have different management
styles and approaches to tackling inequality. While the latter tend to congregate around
demands propagating ‘human rights’, often packed in a moralistic discourse, the legit-
imacy and mandate of the former do not depend on a human rights discourse. Rather,
trade unions obtain their organizing mandate from workers who need collective rep-
resentation to face employers and the state (Schierup, Munck, Likic-Brboric, & Neer-
gaard, 2015, 12). They are often very formal organizations, which tend not to engage
with the informal economy or people whose livelihoods are most precarious. NGO pro-
grammes, on their part, are often ‘concerned with manifestations of extreme poverty
and are accustomed to working in the informal sector but they have little sense of the
significance of labour rights as such’ (Piper & Grugel, 2015). While trade unions may
be slow to act, although have long term and overtly political horizons, NGOs are often
project-based, dependent on a constant struggle for government or corporate funding,
and tend towards settling with a ‘watchdog role’.
On this background, a dialogue traversing differences and potential controversies is
necessary (Piper & Grugel, 2015) in order to accomplish a counterhegemonic formation
capable of sustaining demands for a restructured global governance of migration. Such
a dialogue indeed was vivid on the occasion of the 2010 PGA and that year’s CS days in
the GFMD. But, later events would demonstrate that a window of opportunity limited
to vague promises of ‘respect for human rights’ does not provide an adequate discursive
and institutional space for productive transversal dialogue and powerful and sustain-
able alliances traversing these divides within a wider civil society.
1.4. The limits of invited spaces
Any movement of civil society, operating within the framework of dominant institu-
tions – be they local, national, or transnational – face risks connected with co-optation.
It has indeed been inferred that the current public attention paid to civil society and
new social movements are related to the preceding decades’ neoliberal reorientation – a
process in which CSOs have become key players involved with the expansion of market
principles. Kaldor (2003), for one, discussing the dilemmas of global civil society in the
context of wars and complex emergencies, links imaginaries and agency of contempo-
rary social movements to the transformation of civil society from an ‘activist’ into a
neoliberal model. Here, civil society functions as a substitute for the state, which has
pulled back from public service delivery, with the consequence of social movements
turning into a market of NGOs/ INGOs. Becoming institutionalized, they service func-
tions of a retiring state, including human rights consultation, combating poverty, con-
flict resolution, education, and training in democracy and citizenship. In contemporary
development studies, CSO/ICSOs have increasingly been seen and engaged as central
agents for the promotion of democracy in the governance of developmental processes.

But, as contended by Veltmeyer (2009, p. 90), in the course of their engagement in ‘par-
ticipatory development’, they have been induced to adopt tactics of subtle deliberation
rather than ‘confrontationalist politics of direct action’. In this process, they have often
become transformed from contentious movements into institutionalized and pragmat-
ically orientated NGOs. It is a development which is inherently connected with the dy-
namics and limitations of invited spaces for civil society participation in contemporary
forms of governance.
The concept of ‘invited spaces’ originates from the work of Brock, Gaventa, and
Cornwall (2001). It was further developed in different contexts by, for example, Corn-
wall (2002), Gaventa (2006), and Miraftab (2004, 2009). Invited spaces are, as argued by
Gaventa (2006, pp. 26–27), related to participatory governance, formalized at different
levels from local government, to national policy and even in global policy forums. Aim-
ing at the creation of more open arenas for citizen participation, citizens ‘are invited
to participate by various kinds of authorities and organisations, be they government,
supranational agencies or non-governmental organisations’. These spaces are ‘either
institutionalised ongoing, or more transient, through one-off forms of consultation’
(Gaventa, 2006, pp. 26–27).
Referring to Cornwall (2002), Miraftab (2004) applies the notion of invited spaces
in her analyses of local governance in Cape Town, South Africa. She defines invited
spaces ‘as the ones occupied by those grassroots and their allied non-governmental or-
ganizations that are legitimized by donors and government interventions’ (Miraftab,
2004, p. 1). She furthers that ‘invented’ spaces are in contrast those also occupied by the
grassroots and claimed by their collective action, but directly confronting the authori-
ties and the status quo. Either through inventing new spaces, re-appropriating old ones
or by moving between these spaces, grassroots movements employ counterhegemonic
practices in order to ‘expose and upset the normalized relations of dominance’ (Miraft-
ab, 2004). Or spoken through a Gramscian terminology, they launch a war of position
(Miraftab, 2009, p. 34).
Counterhegemonic movements can be strengthened in the processes of state de-
centralization and the related emergence of new forms of local governance. This global
trend, on one side, can provide openings for grassroots movements and other forms
of social justice struggles to be recognized through local formal channels for citizen
participation and claims within formalized spaces of invited dialogues. Thus, Miraftab
(2009, p. 34) maintains that ‘[t]hrough persistent counter-hegemonic practices, these
movements expose and upset the normalized relations of dominance’. But, a hege-
monic move from above that institutionalizes participatory development and supports
partnerships between states and NGOs can also result in the institutionalization and
de-politization of grassroots movements.
1.5. Pacification through appropriation?
Pacification through appropriation appears indeed to be relevant for the develop-

ment of the PGA. It resounds in comments from William Gois – the leader of Migrant
Forum in Asia and an important organizer of PGA events during years – related to the
PGA’s position and impact, expressing worries relating to an eventual appropriation
of PGA language officially for governments and multilateral organizations. Might it
mean recognition or pacification, he pondered in his concluding statement at the sev-
enth global summit of the PGA, organised in New York, October 2013, as a parallel
civil society event to the UNHLD on Migration and Development, realized through
commitment by local CSOs.
The New York HLD (NY HLD) had been preceded by the formation of the Global
Coalition of Migration (GCM)3 as a standing representative body of regional and inter-
national networks of migrant associations, migrant rights organizations and advocates,
trade unions, faith groups and academia, covering most major regions of the globe. It
was constituted on the basis of the mobilization that had taken place since 2006 within
fora such as the WSFM and the PGA. It had coordinated one year’s scrupulous work
laid down in elaborating a five-year action plan to be presented to the governments and
international organizations on the occasion of the HLD. Yet, the actual results of the
HLD were less than pleasing for many.
While Gois’ statement at the New York PGA reflected ambiguity, an open letter to
the UN Secretary, Ban Kimoon, by the powerful Global Unions (member of the GCM)
expressed, in a highly critical idiom, a frustration with the GFMD process in general,
and the HLD in particular. Here, the governments and the UN’s ‘invited space’ for de-
liberations with civil society stands out as at best symbolic, but in reality is monitored
and disciplined by a screening process through which:
[a]t every juncture in the process, civil society members have faced significant
roadblocks. For over a year, hundreds of representatives from national, regional
and international organisations met in over 20 preparatory events around the
world and in a UN civil society hearing to develop our inputs to the HLD. Despite
this great effort to achieve shared analyses, it appears those views will be ignored.
(Global Unions, 2013)
The 2013 HLD expressed a modus operandi of hegemonic governance. The letter
brings this out further, through which the organizations that represent workers were
effectively excluded from having any voice in the scant civil society hearings that ac-
tually took place. ‘A major labour recruiter granted an award by the World Economic
Forum for operating an “ethical labour supply company” was given an opportunity to
address member states, as was a for-profit development firm’, argues Flecker (2014) in
a similar critique of the 2013 HLD, ‘but not the civil society rapporteur who had been
pre-selected earlier in the year, nor representatives from any organizations that repre-
sent workers’.
It was conceivably, by inference, a way of marginalizing the labour unions in their
capacity of the most critical, politicized, and potentially powerful partner in the global
movement for migrant rights, which had for years been developing within fora like the
WSFM and the PGA, while, at the same time extending the space for more compla-
cent and readily co-opted actors. The consequences have been dismal in sapping the
engagement of international unions in the GFMD process, as well as in amputating
a necessary and productive transversal dialogue between organized labour and other
civil society solidarity organizations. It appeared to harbinger the beginning of the end
of the PGA as a viable ‘invented space’ running in tandem with its co-optation and
neutralization as a dynamic politicized forum.
In particular, the GFMD and UN’s systems increased gravitation towards the prop-
agation of policies mainstreaming temporary and circular migration as universal win-
win-win formula (for emigration countries, receiving countries, and migrants them-
selves)4 has become a stumbling block for trade union engagement. In conjunction with
an apparent incapability of an organized civil society to place radical alternatives onto
the agenda, this has continued to estrange a variety of trade union activists, envisaging
damaging effects of temporary schemes for labour and to social cohesion. Former PGA
activist, Flecker (2011, p. 53), for one, concludes the following in an analysis (on behalf of
the Canadian Labour congress) of Canada’s temporary worker schemes, commonly held
out in intergovernmental meetings as an ideal model to follow by others:
Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker Program is far from being a model ini-
tiative. Given the experiences of the Canadian labour movement, it is abundant-
ly clear that the program’s design permits the exploitation of migrant workers. It
operates to serve employers’ interests with little meaningful regard for compliance,
monitoring, or enforcement of national or subnational labour standards.
1.6. Screening, embedding and NGOizing civil society
While Mexico 2010 could be seen as a high-point concerning the potentiality of the
PGA as an outside–inside civil society player related to the global governance of migra-
tion, the occasion of the UNHLD can be seen as a critical marker of its decline. This
concerns both its potential as a node for transversal dialogue within a variegated civil
society, and its impact within the ‘invited space’ of the GFMD.
After the NY HLD, a further confirmation of an uncritical win-win-win formula
of temporary migration as the standard baseline for deliberation, could be observed
in subsequent GFMDs in Stockholm 2014 and Istanbul 2015, with Sweden and Turkey
as respective host countries. It stood forth as a settled preference, which did not help
to further promote the engagement of trade unions in a transversal dialogue within

civil society, nor, through inference, to strengthen the clout of the PGA’s ‘outside–in-
side’ strategy vis-à-vis the GFMD. The marginalization of trade union perspectives in the
forum was, at the same time, exacerbated through a changing balance of power and
influence between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International
Organization for Migration in favour of the latter. It has implied a predilection towards
a neoliberal perspective on the management of migration in general (Flecker, 2014; Li-
kic-Brboric & Schierup, 2015).
In tandem with the increasing fading out of the PGA’s outside–inside strategy, post-
NY HLD, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) – a since long es-
tablished humanitarian INGO within the field of migration – came to undertake the task
of embedding and NGOizing global civil society agency within the GFMD process. It
was a mission instrumentalized on the occasion of the Stockholm CSD/GFMD through
founding the Migration and Development Civil Society Network (MADE), predomi-
nantly funded by European governments and largely loyal to preferences inscribed in
the mainstream EU migration governance framework. The ICMC was also accorded a
gate-keeping role in channelling GFMD-related funding earmarked for financing par-
ticipation of civil society delegates in the CSD and thereby, indirectly, also in the PGA
summits adjacent to the GFMD/CSD.
In the case of the Stockholm GFMD, 2014, the type of screening process criticized by
the Global Unions in New York could be observed in action on the (Swedish) national
level. Here, the ICMC’s local Swedish sister organization, Caritas Sweden, was, on be-
half of the ICMC and in close collaboration with the Swedish government, put in charge
of the preparatory selection of delegates for the CSD and CS of that year’s GFMD. From
our discussions with the migration policy responsible in the Swedish Trade Union Con-
federation (LO) during the Spring of 2014, we could record frustration and anger, sim-
ilar to what was expressed in the Global Unions’ letter to the UN General Secretary in
2013. It was provoked by feelings of belittlement, without the space for expressing views,
which diverged from those of the Swedish government and the dominant GFMD line. It
appeared decisive for a remarkable absence of interest, from the unions, in the CSD and
in a PGA, which had – void of independent funding sources – at this stage, become high-
ly dependent on the ICMC which was now in command of screening and financing civil
society delegates to the GFMD. Through this, the ICMC was also indirectly responsible
for the participation of the very same individuals in the PGA, in advance of the GFMD.
A similar critique from the unions, as in New York, 2013, and Stockholm 2014, was made
in a briefing paper by Global Unions (2015) on the GFMD process in Istanbul 2015. The
paper expressed concerns about the slow progress made by the GFMD in terms of ac-
countability, transparency, and inclusivity, and about a growing impact of the business
community in migration policy, with unions and civil society in general relegated to a
peripheral space. It opted for an ILO-led tripartite model of consultations in partner-
ship with migrant workers’ associations. On the background of a frail impetus and a
flagging coherence of civil society, in particular concerning the partnership between
unions and other civil society actors, the PGA meeting in Istanbul was to become a
turning point, marked by self-critical reflection. At this meeting, preceding the Istan-
bul GFMD, the aforementioned William Gois expressed clearly what it meant in terms
of nostalgia ‘for the spirit that once existed’ in pondering:5 ‘We thought that we have a
synchronised focus on Human Rights. We started losing that spirit and have to go back
to the roots … we have to find it again’. Comments from the floor further clarified what
is at stake with the PGA: ‘It is being institutionalised … Rather than to speak about
what is the real agenda we are spending too much time on who is chairing discussions
in the CSD/CS … While becoming a chair you cannot criticise’.
1.7. Enigmas of civic activism: straddling policy,

political, and democratic spaces
This ‘losing of the spirit’ and becoming institutionalized within invited spaces relat-
ed to neoliberal governance is, evidently not particular for the PGA, but generally prob-
lematic, widely discussed among civil society activists as well as in the social sciences.
Gaventa (2006, p. 23), for one, argues in discussing new spaces emerging around the
world and aiming to promote opportunities for citizen engagement in policy processes,
that creating new institutional arrangements will not lead to profound policy change.
Rather he claims, this will depend on the nature of the power relations, in which new,
potentially more democratic, spaces are embedded. He raises a number of critical ques-
tions related to issues of the democratic within invited spaces:
Does this new terrain represent a real shift in power? Does it really open up
spaces where participation and citizen voice can have an influence? Will increased
engagement within them risk simply re-legitimating the status quo, or will it con-
tribute to transforming patterns of exclusion and social injustice and to challeng-
ing power relationships? (Gaventa, 2006, p. 23)
This kind of understanding can be applied to the position of the PGA and the CSD/
CS within spaces for invited deliberation (the UN, GFMD, etc.). The rhetoric of partic-
ipation and the use of the same language on human rights (within the PGA, the UN,
and the GFMD), as William Gois referred to in the PGA meeting in New York (parallel
to the UNHLD) 2013, corresponds to Gaventa’s (2006, p. 23) reflections on the limits of
new arrangements, which call for ‘co-governance’ and ‘participatory governance’. Can
they actually, he asks, ‘challenge our traditional categories of the rulers and the ruled,
the policymakers and the public’?
What is at stake could be captured by what Miraftab (2004, 2009) discusses in terms
of ‘symbolic inclusion’. It relates to multifaceted forms of power and dominance within
a rhetoric of so-called partnership and shared ownership. As Gaventa explains, when

used by large, powerful actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund to ‘invite engagement on a “level playing field” [this] obscures inequalities of re-
sources and power’, it blurs ‘traditional “us” and “them” distinctions between economic
power holders and those who might negatively be affected by their corporate practic-
es’ (Gaventa, 2006, p. 23). The argument points at the distinction between power with
(cooperation, collective action, alliance-building) and power over (domination), which
neutralizes power to act, that is activism. But power with – that is building ‘links between
situated knowledge and mobilisation and broader international advocacy work’ is es-
sential for the making of a political space – a point of departure for collective action, ‘in
order to challenge global economic power’ (Gaventa, 2006, pp. 25–26).
But, what is then political space? The political can start with being situated within
new terrains of invited space for citizens’ dialogues that correspond to the meaning
of space as a dynamic social field of struggles; ‘a social product’, humanly construct-
ed and including control, domination and power relations (Gaventa, 2006, p. 26).6 If
we apply this perspective to the PGA as a global migrant network, it is important to
emphasize the distinction between policy space and political space. While the former
refers to meeting places for deliberation between citizens and policymakers (such as
the GFMD’s ‘CS’), the latter relates to institutional channels, political discourses and
practices through which precarious people and contending organizations working with
them can pursue social justice, human rights and poverty reduction (cf. Gaventa, 2006,
p. 26). Although these questions are inherent within regular documents formulated at
PGA meetings, which address the UN and the GFMD, the primary expectations of
PGA members are focused on realizing genuine democratic dialogue and influencing
the global governance regime politically. It implicates, in consequence, what Gaventa
refers to as democratic space; a space ‘in which citizens can engage to claim citizenship
and affect governance processes’ (Gaventa, 2006, p. 26, with reference to Cornwall &
Coehlo, 2006). It would lend substance to the idea of ‘invited dialogue’ within, for ex-
ample, the CS as a meeting place for deliberation between civil society, states, and in-
ternational organizations within the GFMD framework. Such an ‘invited space’ ought,
with reference to the expectations of PGA delegates, to be ‘democratic spaces’ related to,
as formulated in general terms by Gaventa (2006, p. 26), ‘opportunities, moments and
channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and
relationships that affect their lives and interests’.
However, as evident from deliberations at the PGA meeting in Istanbul 2015, the actu-
ally existing policy space in the GFMD process hardly functions as a democratic space from
the perspective of civil society. The institutionalization of civil society is not necessarily
counterproductive in itself, but can bring with it a tamed and de-politicized NGOization
if controlled by the self-same dominant political and economic interests; the politics and
policies, which have originally been the object of contestation. It is an enigma observed,
in the global north as well as the south, as imminent in the staging of invited spac-
es.7 This, in turn, implicates the necessity of a continuous revival and renewal of civil
society alliances in order to develop a counterhegemonic network of equivalence that

amalgamates multiple subject positions within a powerful coalitional movement: that
is, to constantly strengthen a composite movement from within. This is a still unsettled
issue. It has been the object of critical/selfcritical debate in Istanbul 2015, and has con-
tinued in PGA venues in both Dhaka 2016 and in Berlin 2017, with a conceivably more
potent and less disciplinary financial/organizational backing that those in for example
Stockholm and Istanbul.
The discussions at the Berlin PGA meeting in 2017 contended that the PGA, and the
wider institutionalized and permanent civil society fora which have originally emanated
from it (e.g. GCM and MADE), need to reconnect to activist, radical and fundamental
beliefs, and responsibilities (PGA, Panel 3 on ‘Institutional Obstacles’). Envisaging its up-
coming venue in Morocco in 2018, the PGA’s still essential mission was stressed, region-
ally as well a globally. The need for a critical perspective on civil society actors captured
by government interests was emphasized, as well as the need for strengthening autonomy
through the revitalization of regional and global alliances. In this perspective, partici-
pants pointed to the importance of strengthening partnerships with labour unions. Oth-
ers emphasized the strengthening of bonds with fora outside the narrow purview of the
GFMD, such as the WSFM; an invented space, which sprung from the WSF, with similar
visions as those originally grounding the PGA, but wider autonomy. After all, in spite of a
discouraging experience, at times, for many activists, the original radically critical values
and positions of the PGA as an invented space remain a fundamental platform.
1.8. Contestation or appropriation?

Vagaries of an inside–outside strategy
As we have laid out in the preceding discussion, there are obvious problems connect-
ed with contemporary movement strategies bound into an ambiguous position as both
participating in ‘dialogue’ within ‘invited spaces’ and with counterhegemonic ambi-
tions to transform existing power relations. We have illustrated this with the case of
the PGA as a global movement in the making, positioning itself as counterpoised to
the intergovernmental forum of the GFMD. Recording self-reflections of movement
activists in the PGA in the course of the 2013 UNHLD, and later in Stockholm 2014,
Istanbul 2015, and Berlin 2017, we have depicted this mission as connected to risks of a de-
politicizing co-optation. Without subscribing outright to the idea of a universal ‘stage
model’ (Coy & Hedeen, 2007 [2005]), we do see, in conclusion, co-optation as a complex
amalgamating process, beyond single acts or particular events, as expressed on differ-
ent levels and as potentially incremental, typically proceeding through consecutive and
tendentially cumulative steps.
The start of the PGA as nodal point for a contending movement was, seen in this
perspective, marked by the inception of a collective global engagement. It was focused
on what had been identified as a widely shared issue of dispossession and social justice
with activists representing the global south at the forefront. It was premised on the iden-
tification of a multitude of civil society actors with joint demands for change to be ad-
vanced through an ‘inside–outside’ contestative strategy, sustained by a globally extend-
ed ‘network of equivalence’. It called, from the perspective of migrant organizations
and migrant advocacy NGOs/INGO’s, for the rapport with powerful, but every so often
ambivalent, allies among global unions. This was based on struggles over the precari-
ty of contemporary labour relations; nationally, regionally, and globally. We have illus-
trated vagaries connected with managing this puzzle through the course of events at the
UNHLD in New York 2013. Therefore, we could witness, on site, an already ambivalent
positionality of the labour unions, becoming exacerbated by their progressive marginal-
ization in the context of a covert process of inclusionary, but selective and subordinat-
ing, hegemony management by governments, business interests, powerful international
organizations, and the chosen gate-keeping humanitarian INGOs.
A powerful marker of co-optation was, at this stage, the parallel, almost universal
appropriation by governments of the discourse of ‘human rights’, hitherto flown as the
frontal parole of civil society; yet henceforth (as captured by disorientated self-reflection
of movements activists) as a floating, and tendentially ‘empty’, non-obliging signifier. In
essence, a moral ‘last utopia’ (Moyn, 2010) in the age of neoliberal globalization where
the twentieth century’s totalizing ideopolitical conceptions of ‘social justice’ have been
declared dead by default. Yet, as contended by Moyn (2010, p. 227), if human rights shall
relate to ‘core values that demand protection they cannot be all things to all people …
the last utopia cannot be a moral one’. A moral discourse of ‘human rights’, but without
a distinct prominence of labour rights and labour protection, and social rights in general,
is of limited interest to trade unions in particular. The Stockholm GFMD was marked by
a further step towards co-optation of civil society via a transition from the appropria-
tion of movement language to a condition of in-depth ‘institutional appropriation’ (Coy
& Hedeen, 2007 [2005]). It was a process also signified by the tendential assimilation of
movement leaders and movement programmes, bound up through financial control by
a powerful humanitarian INGO as the gatekeeper (the ICMC). We have, in tandem with
a global policy shift, depicted this process of increasingly deep-seated appropriation of
a movement in the making – thereby tendentially ‘unmaking it’– as intertwined with a
process of consensual hegemony making. It is, more specifically, spun around an ap-
propriative and dispossessing so-called win–win–win formula of ‘managed migration’,
prioritizing the local and global interests of employers and migrant receiving countries.
Let us, in this vein, conclude by quoting Brubaker’s8 comment that ‘in relationships
marked by power imbalances, cooperation and co-optation are nearly indistinguishable’.
The implications appear clear, and the concept of ‘space’ is of discriminating importance.
While the PGA and similar civic networks and movements of civil society are strug-
gling to gain influence within formal ‘invited spaces’, they need to continuously critically
recreate and consolidate their own ‘invented spaces’, in order to be able to develop a
sustainable capacity as counterhegemonic political subjects. This implicates, among oth-
ers, as addressed by movement activists in Berlin, a revived process of transversal dialogue
bringing the unions solidly back into a strengthened, more autonomous and sustainable
‘network of equivalence’.
1.9. References
1. Ålund, A., Schierup, C.-U., & Neergaard, A. (2017). Reimagineering the nation.
Essays on twenty first century Sweden. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
2. Brock, K., Gaventa, J., & Cornwall, A. (2001). Power, knowledge and political spaces
in the framing of poverty policy. Brighton: IDS.
3. Brown, W. (2005). Edgework: Critical essays on knowledge and politics. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
4. Brubaker, D. (2003, April 3–7). Personal comments during discussion at ‘Resto-
rative Justice and Conflict Transformation: Friends or Foes’ presentation by Mic-
helle Armster and Lorraine Stutzman-Amstutz at NCPCR-PeaceWeb Conferen-
ce, April 6, 2003, Atlanta, Georgia.
5. Cornwall, A. (2002). Locating citizen participation. IDS Bulletin, 33(2), 49–58.
6. Cornwall, A., & Coehlo, V. (Ed.). (2006). Spaces for change? The politics of citizen
participation in new democratic arenas. London: Zed Books.
7. Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: An essay in
method. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12(1), 162–175.
8. Coy, P. G., & Hedeen, T. (2007 [2005]). A stage model of social movement coopta-
tion: Community mediation in the United States. Retrieved from https://eds-a-
ebscohost-com.e.bibl.liu.se/eds/detail/detail?vid=2&sid= 259e066a-bcdd-49a5-
9712-be8bdde4819f@sessionmgr4006&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmUmc2Nvc
GU9c2l0ZQ==#AN=17567536&db=edb
9. Deak, A. (2005). The condition of hegemony and the possibility of resistance.
Undercurrent, 2(3), 46–56.
10. Feixa, C., Pereira, I., & Juris, J. (2009). Global citizenship and the ‘new, new’ social
movements. Iberian connections. Young, 17(4), 421–442.
11. Flecker, K. (2011). Model program – or mistake? Canada’s temporary foreign wor-
ker program (TFWP). Toronto: Canadian Labour Congress.
12. Flecker, K. (2014). Not wanted on the voyage. Migrant workers’ needs and rights
continue to be ignored. The Monitor. Retrieved from https://www.policyalterna-
tives.ca/publications/monitor/not-wanted-voyage
13. Fudge, J., & Strauss, K. (Eds.) (2013). Temporary work, agencies, and unfree labor. In-
security in the new world of work. New York, NY: Routledge.
14. Funke, P. N. (2014). Building rhizomatic social movements? Movement-building

relays during the current epoch of contention. Studies in Social Justice, 8(1), 27–44.
15. Gaventa, J. (2006). Finding the spaces for change: A power analysis. IDS Bulletin,
37(6), 23–33.
16. Gill, S. (2003). Power and resistance in the new world order. London: Palgrave.
17. Global Unions. (2013). Open letter to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-mo-
on concerning trade union and civil society inclusion at the High-level Dialogue
on Migration and Development New York, October 3– 4, 2013. Public Services In-
ternational. Retrieved from http://world-psi.org/en/support-our-action-sign-letter
18. Global Unions. (2015). Global unions briefing paper: 2015 Global Forum on Mi-
gration and Development. Brussels: Author.
19. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. (H.
Quinton & G. N. Smith, Eds.), New York, NY: International.
20. Hall, S. (1987, June). Gramsci and us. Marxism Today, pp. 16–21.
21. Kaldor, M. (2003). Global civil society. An answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press.
22. Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and socialist strategy. London: Verso.
23. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. London: Verso.
24. Léon-Rosales, R., & Ålund, A. (2017). Renaissance from the margins – Urban yo-
uth activism in Sweden”. In A. Ålund, C.-U. Schierup, & A. Neergaard (Eds.), Re-
imaginiering the nation. Essays on Swedish society (pp. 351–374). Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang.
25. Likic-Brboric, B., Schierup, C.-U. (2015). Labour rights as human rights? Trajecto-
ries in the global governance of migration. In C.-U. Schierup (Ed.), Migration, pre-
carity and global governance (pp. 223–244). Challenges for labour. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
26. Lister, R. (1996, July 16–18). Citizenship: Towards a feminist synthesis. The Confe-
rence: Women and Citizenship, University of Greenwich, London.
27. Melucci, A. (1989). Nomads of the present social movements and individual needs
in contemporary society. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
28. Miraftab, F. (2004). Invited and invented spaces of participation: Neoliberal citi-
zenship and feminists’ expanded notion of politics. Wagadu, 1(Spring 2004), 1–7.
29. Miraftab, F. (2009). Insurgent planning: Situating radical planning in the global
south. Planning Theory, 32(8), 32–50.
30. Motta, S. C. (2011). Notes towards prefigurative epistemologies. In S. C. Motta, &
A. G. Nilsen (Eds.), Social movements in the global south. Dispossession, develop-
ment and resistence (pp. 178–199). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
31. Moyn, S. (2010). The last utopia: Human rights in history. London: Belknap.
32. Neocosmos, M. (2011). Transition, human rights and violence: Rethinking a libe-
ral political relationship in the African neo-colony. Interface: A Journal for and
About Social Movements, 3(2), 359–399.
33. Offe, C. (1985). New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional
politics. Social Research, 52 (4), 817–868.
34. People’s Global Action. (2010). 2010 Peoples Global Action on migration develop-
ment. MFA, Migrant Forum in Asia. Retrieved from http://mfasia.org/2010-peo-
ples-global-action-on-migration-development/
35. Piper, N. (2015). Democratising migration from the bottom up: The rise of the
global migrant rights movement. Globalizations, 12(5), 788–802.
36. Piper, N., Grugel, J. (2015). Global migration governance, social movements and
the difficulties of promoting migrant rights. In C.-U. Schierup (Ed.), Migration,
precarity and global governance. Challenges for labour (preliminary title) (pp. 261–
279). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37. Polanyi, K. (2001 [1944]). The great transformation: The political and economic
origins of our time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
38. Purcell, M. (2009a). Hegemony and difference in political movements: Articula-
ting networks of equivalence. New Political Science, 31(3), 291–317.
39. Purcell, M. (2009b). Resisting neoliberalization: Communicative planning or co-
unter-hegemonic movements? Planning Theory, 8(2), 140–165.
40. Rother, S. (2009). ‘Inside-Outside’ or ‘outsiders by choice’? Civil society strategies
towards the 2nd Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in Ma-
nila. Asien, 111(April), 95–107.
41. Rother, S. (2013). A tale of two tactics: Civil society and competing visions of global
migration governance from below. In M. Geiger & A. Pécoud (Eds.), Disciplining
the transnational mobility of people (pp. 41–62). Houndmills: Macmillan.
42. Schierup, C.-U., Ålund, A., & Likić-Brborić, B. (2015). Migration, precarization and
the democratic deficit in global governance. International Migration, 53(3), 50–63.
43. Schierup, C.-U., Munck, R., Likic-Brboric, B., Neergaard, A. (2015). Introduction:
Migration, precarity and global governance: Challenges and opportunities for la-
bour. In C.-U. Schierup (Ed.), Migration, precarity and global governance. Challen-
ges and opportunities for labour (pp. 1–24). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44. Touraine, A. (1987). Social movements: Participation and protest. Scandinavian Po-
litical Studies, 10(3), 207–222.
45. Triandafyllidou, A. (Ed.). (2013). Circular migration between Europe and its ne-
ighbourhood. Choice or necessity? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
46. Veltmeyer, H. (2009). Democratic governance and participatory development:
The role of development NGOs. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and Inter-
national Relations, 6(Summer/Fall), 89–109.
47. Walton, J., & Udayagiri, M. (2003). Global transformation and local counter mo-
vements: The prospects for democracy under neoliberalism. International Jour-
nal of Comparative Sociology, 44, 309–343.
48. Wikström, F., & Lundström, T. (2002). Den ideella sektorn: Organisationerna i det
civila samhället. Stockholm: Sober Förlag/European Civil Society Press.
49. Yuval-Davis, N. (1999). What is ‘transversal politics’. Soundings, 12, 94–98.
1.10. Notes
1. Information on the history and politics of the PGA is available at, among others:
http://peoplesglobalaction.org/about/history/.
2. Represented by, e.g. the International Assembly of Migrants and Refugees (Rot-
her, 2013).
3. Founded in connection with the PGA meeting connected with the GFMD in
Geneva, 2011.
4. See Triandafyllidou (2013) and Fudge and Strauss (2013) for critical analyses of
schemes of circular and temporary migration (2013).
5. Referring, in particular, to the PGA summit in Manila, 2008.
6. Referring to Lefebvre (1991) and Cornwall (2002).
7. For example, Wikström and Lundström (2002), Kaldor (2003), Veltmeyer (2009),
Neocosmos (2011), Léon-Rosales and Ålund (2017).
8. Brubaker (2003), quoted in Coy and Hedeen (2007 [2005]).

AiD Godišnjak ENG 2018 25102018 PDF

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

AiD Godišnjak ENG 2018 25102018 PDF

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

We and the Others

SID 2018 Yearbook of the Summer School on Intercultural and Inter-Confessional

understand the complex relationships of contemporary circumstances (independent of

Megatrend 2 – Transformation of the (nation) state in the context of globalization and

forms of regional protection (Community of Independent States, Council of Europe) or

2. RESEARCH AND UNDERSTANDING

2.1. Attitude toward others in quantitative research

2.2. Research of social and ethnic distance

Table 1. Distance by Serb nationals toward members of the following groups

Chart 1. Ethnic distance between Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians

Chart 2. Total level of distance toward members of all ethnic groups

2.3. Measuring attitudes in the research of attitudes toward others

Table 4. Attitudes toward minorities (distribution)–Standardized (regression)score

2.4. Instead of conclusion

3.1. Europe – the birthplace of the nation state

3.2. “European Identity” in the eyes of the European Union

“Europeanisation” in the direction of creating a type of identity is conceived through

Conceptually-distinct dimensions for the expression of European identity23, stem-

3.3. Preventive Diplomacy in Inter-Ethnic

24 Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering results, http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/

33 Amy Gutmann, “Identity in Democracy”, 2003, Prinston

3.4. Concluding remarks

1. Alonso, S., Ruiz-Rufino, R. (2007) Political Representation and Ethnic Conflict in

14. Lijphart, A. 1995. Self-determination versus pre-determination of ethnic mino-

cultural / ethnic group(s) (taking as an example certain Croats in relation to Bunjevci,

- as a doctrine of a nation of citizens, and multiculturalism - as a doctrine of the eth-

When it comes to intercultural communication, we find interesting the approach

1. Aksentijević, Z. (Ur.). (2009). Ne prolazi ulicom bez traga : ka interkulturalnosti.

9. Đorđević, D., & Mašović, D. (1999). Romska prilika: interkulturalizam u obrazo-

5.1. International Declarations and Freedom of Religion or Belief

51 Ibidem, Art. 81.

for Freedom of Religion or Belief. Approximately 150 representatives from political,

In Islam, members of one of the religions (officially recognized monotheistic reli-

5.2. National ideologies and religion

69 Đuro Šušnjić, op.cit. p. 203.

76 Đuro Šušnjić, op.cit. p. 204.

6. RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY IN

6.1. (Non) religious Europe

6.2. Serbia and structure of religious believers

Orthodoxy in Serbia, conventional religiosity of citizens, their attachment to Or-

6.3. Russia: religious changes and desecularization

6.4. Atheization of the Soviet Union – destabilization

6.5. Deatheisation of Russia – restabilization

6.6. New stabilization of the structure of

1. Blagojević, Mirko (1995) Približavanje pravoslavlju, Niš, JUNIR; Gradina.

11. Каариайнен, К., Фурман, Д. Е. (2000) Старые церкви, новые верующие

7. LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL

7.1. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

7.1.1. United Nations Documents

80 Resolution 47/135, 18. December 1992.

7.1.2. Council of Europe Documents

7.1.3. The EU legal documents

7.2. Bilateral agreements

Serbia is a successor to bilateral agreements on protection of minorities entered into

7.3. National sources of law

7.3.1. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia

92 “Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro – International Treaties”, No. 14/2004

violation of guaranteed human or minority rights, or inciting of racial, national and

7.3.2. Law on Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities

7.3.3. Law on National Councils of National Minorities

7.3.4. Law on Churches and Religious Communities

7.3.5. Laws in the field of education

The Law on Fundamentals of Education System101 - The main objectives of education

7.3.6. Law on Official Use of Languages and Scripts