INTERPLEADER
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against
PASRICHA VS. DON LUIS DISON REALTY INC. property leased.135 This remedy is for the lessee to protect
What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was
petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they
did not know to whom payment should be made. However,
this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were
the case, they were not without any remedy. They should
have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules
of Court on interpleader.
Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at
the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of
payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.57
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced
the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for
consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not
imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that they made a
written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for
their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a
valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid
tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of
consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that
tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in
order that the effects of payment may be produced.59
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court
provides:X....X....X......
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should
be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the
right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a
person against double liability but to protect him against
double vexation in respect of one liability.61
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies,
petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.
===========================================
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA
CORPORATION
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the
interpleader case to compel Lui Enterprises and the
Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims.
Thus, "[d]eclaring the other claimant in default would
ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit."134 The
RegionalTrial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui
Enterprises in default.
those who have conflicting claims over the rent due for the
him or her from "double vexation in respect of one
liability."136 He or she may file the interpleader case to
extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or
her from the adverse claimants’dispute, and compel the
parties with conflicting claims to litigate among themselves.
In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to
extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the
interpleader case "was not defeated"137 when the Makati
trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default.
At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may
be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer
within the required period may, on motion, be declared in
default. The consequence of the default is that the court may
"render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant] from any
claim in respect to the subject matter."138 The Rules would
not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be
declared in default if it would "ironically defeat the very
purpose of the suit."139
The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises
in default when it failed to answer the complaint within the
required period. Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside
order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel
failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove the
excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err
in refusing to set aside the order of default.
III
The nullification of deed in dation in payment case did not
bar the filing of the interpleader case. Litis pendentia is not
present in this case.
Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of
dation in payment with the Regional Trial Court of Davao. It
sought to nullify the deed of dation in payment through
which the Philippine Bank of Communications acquired title
over the leased property. Lui Enterprises argued that this
pending nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of
Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the
interpleader case was filed subsequently to the nullification
case, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground of litis pendentia:
The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(1)Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions;
(2)Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and
(3)The identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
144
All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent one
requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no
identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is
not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial
court.
There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the deed of
dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank
of Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the
interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and
extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was
necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui
Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of
the interpleader case.
===========================================
DECLARATORY RELIEF
REYES vs.ORTIZ
Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory
relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court
provides:X.....X.....X.....
The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The
first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been
defined as a special civil action by any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or
whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive
order or regulation to determine any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to
quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a
sale with a right to repurchase.43
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the
subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief
namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a
statute, executive order or regulation, or any government
regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,44 declared that the
subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory relief
are exclusive, viz:
This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or
ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the
principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The foregoing holding was reiterated in Natalia Realty, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,45 wherein this Court stressed that court
orders or decisions cannot be made the subject matter of a
declaratory relief
Then again in a recent ruling of this Court, it was
emphasized:
A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court
decision as its subject matter
In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their
motions to suspend proceedings. This recourse by petitioners,
unfortunately, cannot be countenanced since a court order is
not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63.
The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have
utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings
in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for
reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for
certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have
filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65
with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by
the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to
the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of
Appeals in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle
of the hierarchy of courts.48
Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated
as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications and
raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no
allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is
entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except
when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances
warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
To make matters worse, petitioner Matienzo obviously
availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute for a
petition for certiorari, a remedy which she sadly lost by
inaction. From this, it can be inferred that petitioner
Matienzo’s recourse is a belated attempt designed to salvage
her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her motion to
suspend proceedings.
=========================================== It is well to note that private respondents also lack the
REPUBLIC vs. ROQUE
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief:
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance;
second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction;
third , there must have been no breach of the documents in
question;
fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse;
fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court
observes that while the first,35 second,36 and
third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth,
fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists
in this case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is
meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed
with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it
has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion,
and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory
relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how
they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain
some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
assailed provisions of RA 9372.
As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have
become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.
required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge
against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of
RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal
interest in the case.42 While it has been previously held that
transcendental public importance dispenses with the
requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual
danger of suffering direct and personal injury,43 it must be
stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation.44
To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of
locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by
the general public.46
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief,
neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe
for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition,
remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.1âwphi1 It is
well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.47 This private respondents failed to
demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it
irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of
adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth
requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as well as the
irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’
petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed
===========================================
AQUINO, vs.

MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN
We deny the petition.
Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find
merit in petitioner’s contention that the special writ of
certiorari, and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for
assailing EO 10
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the
state where another relief is immediately available; and
supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of
wrongs.4
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became
unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and implementation.
The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any
possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for
carrying outthe directives in the challenged EO 10.
Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief
is the proper remedy given such a situation.
===========================================
MALANA vs. TAPPA
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and
the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties
thereunder.21
The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and
the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person
may file a petition for declaratory
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for
declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation
of an instrument (2) an action to quiet title and (3) an action
to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase
. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory
relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal
rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to
carry the judgment into effect.22
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions
identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with
those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet
title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought
under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a
person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x
x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option.23
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word
"shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title
to or possession of real property where the assessed value
does not exceed P20,000.00
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject
property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is
only P410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving
title to and possession of the said property is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that
there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory
relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.25
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior
to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words,
a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action.26
In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title
was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents
refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint
was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of
ownership over the subject property before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had
already been deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.
An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession,
filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An
accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one’s
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
271avvphi1
Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an
accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would
depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the
subject property herein is valued only atP410.00, then the
MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover
the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.
===========================================
REVIEW OF COMELEC OR COA JUDGMENT
QUERUBIN VS. COMELEC
Rule 64 is not applicable in assailing the COMELEC en
banc's Decision granting Smartmatic JV's protest

petitioners claim that under Rule 64, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
Court, "[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections x x x may be brought by the
aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65."50 They postulate that the June 29, 2015 Decision
of the COMELEC en banc declaring Smartmatic JV as the
eligible bidder with the lowest calculated responsive bid is a
"judgment" within the contemplation of the rule, and is,
therefore, a proper subject of a Rule 64 petition.
 sought redress via a petition for the issuance of the


The argument fails to persuade.



a. Rule 64 does not cover rulings of the COMELEC in the
exercise of its administrative powers
 whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Though the provision appears unambiguous and unequivocal,
the Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision,
order, or ruling" of constitutional commissions, the
COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that
it only relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise
of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.51 In the case of the
COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the
decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to
be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
elective offices.52



Consequently, Rule 64, should likewise be read in the same
sense—that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings,
and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari is the proper remedy.
We ruled in Elpidio M. Salva, et al. vs. Hon. Roberto L.
Makalintal, et al. (340 SCRA 506 (2000) that Rule 64 of the
Rules applies only to judgments or final orders of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
The rule does not apply to interlocutory orders of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions or
to its administrative orders. Rule 64, a procedural device for
the review of final orders, resolutions or decision of the
COMELEC, does not foreclose recourse to this Court under
Rule 65 from administrative orders of said Commission
issued in the exercise of its administrative function.
As applied herein, recall that the instant petition revolves
around the issue on whether or not Smartmatic JV is eligible
to participate in the bidding process for the COMELEC's
procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers. The
case does not stem from an election controversy involving
the election, qualification, or the returns of an elective office.
Rather, it pertains to the propriety of ihe polling
commission's conduct of the procurement process, and its
initial finding that Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate
therein.


The subject matter of Smartmatic JV's protest, therefore,
does not qualify as one necessitating the COMELEC's
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that
could properly be the subject of a Rule 64 petition, but is, in
fact, administrative in nature. Petitioners should then have
extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the
COMELEC en banc's June 29, 2015 Decision granting the
protest. As a caveat, however, the writ will only lie upon
showing that the COMELEC acted capriciously or
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Decision, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 

It goes without saying that petitioners' action, having been
lodged through an improper petition, is susceptible to
outright dismissal. 

b. Jurisdiction of the RTC over rulings of the head of the
procuring entity relating to procurement protests



Guilty of reiteration, the COMELEC en banc was not
resolving an election controversy when it resolved the
protest, but was merely performing its function to procure the
necessary election paraphernalia for the conduct of the 2016
National and Local Elections.
Section 58. Resort to Regular Courts; Certiorari. - Court
action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated
in this Article shall have been completed. Cases that are filed
in violation of the process specified in this Article shall be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The regional trial
court shall have jurisdiction over final decision of the head of
the procuring entity. Court actions shall be governed by Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 65, of the Rules of Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision,


This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on
the Supreme court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary
restraining orders and injunctions relating to Infrastructure
Projects of Government. (emphasis added)
Thus, under Sec. 58, the proper remedy to question the ruling
of the head of the procuring entity is through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The term "procuring entity" is defined under the RA 9184 as
"any branch, department, office, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations,
government financial institutions, and local government units
procuring Goods, Consulting Services and Infrastructure
Projects."64 This statutory definition makes no distinction as
to whether or not the procuring entity is a constitutional
commission under Article IX of the Constitution. It is broad
enough to include the COMELEC within the contemplation
of the term. Hence, under the law, grievances relating to the
COMELEC rulings in protests over the conduct of its project
procurement should then be addressed to the RTC.



Additionally, even if the Court treats the protest proceeding
as part of the procuring agency's adjudicatory function, the
Court notes that Sec. 58 of RA 9184 would nevertheless
apply, and the RTC would still have jurisdiction, pursuant to
the proviso "unless otherwise provided by law" as appearing
in Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. In this case,
the pertinent law provides that insofar as rulings of the
COMELEC in procurement protests are concerned, said
rulings can be challenged through a Rule 65 certiorari with
the RTC.
 states that –
MITRA VS. COMELEC
The COMELEC’s submission in this regard – that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of
questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the
present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari – is wholly erroneous. This submission appears
to have confused the standards of the Court’s power of
review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the import of
Mitra’s petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for
certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule
we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard
of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the Rule 45
question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,
i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The basis for the Court’s review of COMELEC rulings under
the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that
"[U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." For
this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule
(Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the
COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a
petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause –
"except as hereinafter provided."6
In Ocate v. Commission on Elections,9 we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine
whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 Thus,
any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to
the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the
Constitution itself,10 in defining judicial power, pointedly
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power
and duty of this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations,
and differentiates this authority from the power of review by
appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the
COMELEC’s position that patently confuses the mode of
review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules
of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same
Rules provides.
=========================================== perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
SALIGUMBA VS. COA
The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons:
1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money
matters and not to administrative cases involving the
discipline of its personnel.
2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review
decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, We
can not do so on factual issues; Our power to review is
limited to legal issues.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
=========================================== the errors ascribed by petitioner are not proper subjects of a
CERTIORARI
TAN vs.. ANTAZO
The pivotal issue in this case is the correctness of a special
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals as a
remedy against the Decision and Resolution of the Regional
Trial Court.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is a pleading limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the
following requirements are alleged in and established by the
petition: (1) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.4
Only the first requisite is here present. Petitioner correctly
impleaded the trial court judge in her certiorari petition.
Regarding to the second requisite, it is well-settled that a
petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction
over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. The
term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of
passion or hostility.5
Petitioner herself disproved the absence of the required
statements. She questioned the trial court’s appreciation of
her arguments and defenses; the sufficiency of evidence to
prove encroachment; and the existence of a clear title to the
alleged encroached properties in Errors (I), (II), and (III).
Errors (IV), (V), and (VI) pertain to legal questions such as
whether there was violation of forum-shopping; whether the
award of attorney’s fees is proper; and the validity of the
counterclaims. A petition for the writ of certiorari does not
deal with errors of judgment. Nor does it include a mistake in
the appreciation of the contending parties' respective
evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.7 Verily,
petition for certiorari.
Anent the third requisite, a writ of certiorari will not issue
where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved
party. The party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals is proscribed from assailing the decision or final
order of said court via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because
such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law.8 Furthermore,
certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal.9
In this case, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court was clearly available to petitioner. She however
chose to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
===========================================
CAWAD vs. ABAD,
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioners is not the appropriate remedy to assail the
validity of respondents' circulars.
Thus, on the one hand, certiorari as a special civil action is
available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.11
On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1) it is
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
12 Based on the foregoing, this Court has consistently
reiterated that petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be
invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers,
or persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, and not against their exercise of legislative or
quasi-legislative functions.13
Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon
the rights of the parties.14 Quasi judicial functions apply to
the actions and discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, in
their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.15 Ministerial
functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in
the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and
without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.16
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that
gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought
before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.17 In this case, respondents did not act in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their
issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and
implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not
called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to
exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The
issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM,
CSC and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in
the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative
functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation,
promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power.
Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of
non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches
of the government.18
Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie
against herein respondents' issuances. It is beyond the
province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative
issuances illegal because petitions for certiorari seek solely to
correct defects in jurisdiction, and not to correct just any
error committed by a court, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board,
or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.19
It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition
since generally, the purpose of the same is to keep a lower
court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain
the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords
relief against usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court,
or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction, the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law.20
===========================================
PROHIBITION
BELMONTE VS. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN
We rule in favor of public respondent.
The petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is
inappropriate.
For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.10 A cursory reading of
the records of the case readily reveals the absence of the
second and third requisites.
First, the Court does not find that public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the subject Decision.
the Court observes that in arriving at the assailed Decision,
public respondent carefully weighed the rights and interests
of the parties vis-à-vis the evidence they presented to
substantiate the same. It ruled that Sandra submitted
substantial evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support her
allegations that petitioners demanded and received favours
from her as consideration for the processing of the macro-
etching examination of the subject vehicle. Thus, that public
respondent’s ruling was unfavourable to petitioners’ interests
does not necessarily mean that it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion, especially so when such ruling was aptly
corroborated by evidence submitted by the parties.
Second, petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly
had some other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy
and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or
resolution of the lower court or agency.12 As public
respondent pointed out, the remedy of a motion for
reconsideration was still available to petitioners
In fact, as borne by the records, petitioners actually availed
of the same when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration
with public respondent on July 18, 2011.
Moreover, the mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision
imposing the penalty of dismissal from service is
immediately executory, alone, does not justify the issuance of
an injunctive writ to stay the implementation thereof.
The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was,
in fact, settled in Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it was
held that such are immediately executory pending appeal and
may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance
of an injunctive writ.
xxxx
Thus, petitioner Villaseñor’s filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation
of the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal, considering that "a
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course" under Section
7.
In view of the foregoing, therefore, the Court cannot give
credence to petitioners’ assertion that given the immediate
effectivity of the assailed Decision, a Writ of Prohibition and
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction must be issued to stay the implementation thereof.
As clearly held by the Court, they have no vested right which
stands to be violated by the execution of the subject decision.
At this point, it must be observed that the instant petition is
likewise dismissible for its violation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. As previously mentioned, petitioners,
without awaiting public respondent’s action on their Motion
for Reconsideration, immediately filed the instant petition
before this Court, instead of the appellate court, as required
by said doctrine.
True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however,
does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary
writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of
his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or
important reason which would allow a direct resort to this
Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal
to this Court only on pure questions of law.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands
that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also
within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special
action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest
and with serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an
imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.16
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a
judgment be rendered directing the defendant to desist from
continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
illegal. Its proper function is to prevent the doing of an act
which is about to be done. When, however, under the
circumstances, the act sought to be restrained can no longer
be committed, resort to such recourse is rendered futile for
prohibition is not intended to provide a remedy for acts
already accomplished.18
===========================================
MANDAMUS
DE LIMA VS REYES
The determination by the Department of Justice of the
existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice
in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still
be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be
taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by
the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before
us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer
performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the
findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of
probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an
essentially executive function to determine whether the crime
alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether
there was 'probable cause to believe that the respondents
_were guilty thereof.60
A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against
"the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions."61 The Department of Justice is not a
court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial
functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions
of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function.
An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done."62 In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed."63 Considering that "full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the executive branch in the
determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation,"64 the functions of the prosecutors and the
Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.
However, even when an administrative agency does not
perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the
Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.65 In Auto
Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn:66
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable
cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to
establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over
the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without
authority.67
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying
the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
===========================================
QUO WARRANTO
DIVINAGRACIA, v s . C O N S O L I D AT E D
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored
and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law. Such
remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of
Appeals – the resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a
public office, position or franchise may be brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public
office, position or franchise."61 Even while the action is
maintained in the name of the Republic62, the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such
action upon complaint, and upon good reason to believe that
any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be
established by proof.63
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ
by which the Government can call upon any person to show
by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise.64 It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right
to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy
such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto,
the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon
complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a
franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury."65 A
forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct
proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a
franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is
primarily a concern of Government.66 Quo warranto is
specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a
government corporation has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise.67
Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the
cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs, and not
the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a remedy.
The argument is artificial. The authority of the franchisee to
engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislative
mandate. To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in
effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its
exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such
mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional
authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly
administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.
What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts
conclude that private respondents have violated the terms of
their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo
warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel any
existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength
from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not
already been made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC
such as CPCs and provisional authorities are junior to the
legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing
authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the
franchising authority of the State through Congress. The
issuance of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative
franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that
the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather
than creates its own laws. And similar to the inability of the
executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by
Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper
delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative
franchise by withholding or canceling the licenses of the
franchisee.
And the role of the courts, through quo
warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The
courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status
of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations
under law.
===========================================
DE CASTRO, vs.. CARLOS, term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on diverse
Nature of the AGMO Position
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is
permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of
merit.
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the
right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office
and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the
claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the
privilege has been forfeited."21 Where the action is filed by a
private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent
has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.22
In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show
that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the
lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is
immaterial.41
All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright
dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for
failure to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to
the position of AGMO of the MMDA.
EXPROPRIATION
B A R A N G AY S I N D A L A N , S A N F E R N A N D O ,
PAMPANGA, 

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS,
The petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the
nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking
of, private property for a public use without the owner’s
consent, conditioned upon payment of just
compensation."10 It is acknowledged as "an inherent
political right, founded on a common necessity and interest
of appropriating the property of individual members of the
community to the great necessities of the whole
community."111ªvvphi1.nét
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained
by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no
person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property
without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the
situations. The limited meaning attached to "public use" is
"use by the public" or "public employment," that "a duty
must devolve on the person or corporation holding property
appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public
with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the
part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or
quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the
property after it is condemned."12 The more generally
accepted view sees "public use" as "public advantage,
convenience, or benefit, and that anything which tends to
enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and
promote the productive power of any considerable number of
the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the
growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the
employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community."13 In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as
"whatever is beneficially employed for the community."14
It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise
of expropriation cannot depend on the "numerical count of
those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the
community to be benefited."15 The number of people is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use,
provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited
to particular individuals.16 Thus, the first essential
requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the
expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public
use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated
that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation
declaring "that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation."17
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an
inherent power of sovereignty similar to police power and
taxation. As a basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay
is clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and
other facilities for public use and welfare
Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue.
The legal question in this petition, however, is whether the
taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the
taking of private property must be for a public purpose. A
corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by
law from one person and given to another in the guise of
public purpose.
the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of
respondents’ lot is confined solely to the Davsan II
Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common.
27Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the
subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his
commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in
conjunction with his development permit and license to sell
from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also
be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way. In
this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners
are able to go to the barrio road by passing through the lot of
a certain Torres family. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is
that the expropriation of respondents’ lot is for the actual
benefit of the Davsan II Subdivision owner, with incidental
benefit to the subdivision homeowners.
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit
of a private individual is clearly proscribed by the
Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or
purpose.
. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and
Secondly, a compelling reason for the rejection of the
expropriation is expressed in Section 29, PD 957, which
provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The owner or
developer of a subdivision without access to any existing
public road or street must secure a right of way to a public
road or street and such right of way must be developed and
maintained according to the requirement of the government
authorities concerned.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all
subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II
Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them.
However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an
access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive
respondents of their property instead of compelling the
subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the
law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is
patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be
justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.
Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose.
In this proposed condemnation, government funds would be
employed for the benefit of a private individual without any
legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute
malversation.
Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioner’s proper
remedy is to require the Davsan II Subdivision owner to file
a complaint for establishment of the easement of right-of-
way under Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code.
Respondents must be granted the opportunity to show that
their lot is not a servient estate. Plainly, petitioner’s resort to
expropriation is an improper cause of action.
One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be
exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking
an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can
only be justified by a higher good—which is public use—and
can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without
these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be
unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also
constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an
individual’s basic right to property as well.
For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting
the rights of the property owner and must perform a more
thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose
behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in
resolving complaints for condemnation, such that when a
serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of
property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
property owner and against the State.
the October 26, 2001 Resolution of the CA, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO
 predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is offensive
vs.
 to our laws.42
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
The Court’s Ruling
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the
taking of private property, consequent to the Governments
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of
the required factual justification.39(Emphasis supplied.)
Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept
underpinning it, is no longer compelling, considering the
ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the Court
resolved Fery not under the cover of any of the Philippine
Constitutions, each decreeing that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. The twin
elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by
themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent
domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple
title.1avvphi1 The fee does not vest until payment of just
compensation.40
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the
landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat
the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in
expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property
against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due
process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must
show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public
purpose to take private property, the purpose to be
specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired
an expansive meaning to include any use that is of
"usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]."41 If the genuine public
necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—
allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private
land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point
for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The
same legal situation should hold if the government devotes
the property to another public use very much different from
the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their
productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to
the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing
which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If
not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The
government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process,
dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in
keeping with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation
proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee
simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We
suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and inTudtud and
more recently in Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be
differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was
absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase
and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play.
There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept"
if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its
continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary
corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek
its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least,
of the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land
is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner.
But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield
ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance
that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be
too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent
domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit
another with influence and power in the political process,
including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is
not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery.
Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases,
there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is
poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to
Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added
dimension to abandon Fery.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand
the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in
question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token,
justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian
return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation
for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal
interest to be computed from default, which in this case
should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.43 They must likewise pay MCIAA
the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining
their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in
managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as
private owners, were benefited thereby.
=========================================== landless.
BELUSO vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY
We find the petition to be impressed with merit.
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property to particular uses to promote
public welfare, is essentially lodged in the
legislature. 21 While such power may be validly delegated to
local government units (LGUs), other public entities and
public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated
entities is not absolute. 22 In fact, the scope of delegated
legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating
authority and such entities may exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to its control and restraints imposed
through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. 23 Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no
inherent power of eminent domain. 24 Thus, strictly
speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU
is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must conform
to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes
only of a share in eminent domain. 25 The national
legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter
cannot go against the principal’s will or modify the same. 26
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily
involves a derogation of a fundamental right. 27 It greatly
affects a landowner’s right to private property which is a
constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation
and enhancement of personal dignity and is intimately
connected with the rights to life and liberty. 28Thus, whether
such power is exercised directly by the State or by its
authorized agents, the exercise of such power must undergo
painstaking scrutiny. 29
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of
local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to
determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the
power of eminent domain expressly provides: XXX
It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before
an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted. 30
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local
government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body. 31 R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the
purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment
of the municipal council will not suffice. 32
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to
expropriate private property; and the reason for this is settled:
x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the
previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.]
7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. x x x 33
As respondent’s expropriation in this case was based merely
on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While
the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting
local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an
LGU’s exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in
contravention of the very law giving it such power. 34
REPUBLIC vs. C.C.UNSON COMPANY
The petition is without merit.
Determination of just compensation
 consider these standards; the exact wording of the said
is a judicial function
In Republic v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation,
38 the Court defined just compensation "as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to intensify the meaning
of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. Such ‘just’-ness of
the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and
actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned
property. Trial courts are required to be more circumspect in
its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner,
considering that eminent domain cases involve the
expenditure of public funds."39
This Court, however, is not a trier of facts; and petitions
brought under Rule 45 may only raise questions of law.
1âwphi1This rule applies in expropriation cases as well.
In Republic v. Spouses Bautista,43 the Court explained the
reason therefor:
This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be
raised in a petition brought under Rule 45, as such petition
may only raise questions of law. This rule applies in
expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on this
Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues presented
leads the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to
deviate from the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts.
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court sitting as an expropriation court may, after hearing,
accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment in
accordance therewith. This is what the trial court did in this
case. The CA affirmed the trial court’s pronouncement in
toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CA’s identical
findings of fact concerning the issue of just compensation
should be accorded the greatest respect, and are binding on
the Court absent proof that they committed error in
establishing the facts and in drawing conclusions from them.
There being no showing that the trial court and the CA
committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their
findings.
The only legal question raised by the petitioner relates to the
commissioners’ and the trial court’s alleged failure to take
into consideration, in arriving at the amount of just
compensation, Section 5 of RA 8974 enumerating the
standards for assessing the value of expropriated land taken
for national government infrastructure projects. What escapes
petitioner, however, is that the courts are not bound to
provision is that "in order to facilitate the determination of
just compensation, the courts may consider" them. The use of
the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion. In the absence of a finding
of abuse, the exercise of such discretion may not be
interfered with. For this case, the Court finds no such abuse
of discretion.44
As a general rule, just compensation, to which the owner of
the property to be expropriated is entitled, is equivalent to the
market value. The general rule, however, is modified where
only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a
case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the
portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the
property."47
Section 6 of Rule 67 speaks of consequential damages. It
specifically provides:
Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering
upon the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall
take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform
their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in
court with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may
be introduced by either party before the commissioners who
are authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them,
and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the
contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend, view and
examine the property sought to be expropriated and its
surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the
property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken,
the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person
taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed,
or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property
so taken.
Also in Republic v. BPI,48 the Court categorically stated that
if as a result of the expropriation made by the petitioner, the
remaining portion of the property of the owner suffers from
impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages
were to be awarded.
.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
D E PA R T M E N T O F P U B L I C W O R K S A N D
HIGHWAYS,Petitioners, vs. ARLENE R. SORIANO
I concur in the result.
Republic Act No. 8974, Section 4 provides in part:
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. -
Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the
right-of-way, site or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate
implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation
proceedings before the proper court under the following
guidelines:
a. Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to
the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately
pay the owner of the. property the amount equivalent to the
sum of (I) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as determined under Section
7 hereof;
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the
court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an
order to take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, the state through the agency causing the taking
complies with the requirements for the issuance of a writ of
possession only when it pays the owner.
Of course, the owner may contest the proffered value by the
agency1 or the power of the agency to exercise eminent
domain, the necessity of the taking, or the public character of
the use for which the property is being condemned. In such
cases, the value required by Section 4(a) will be deposited
with the trial court with jurisdiction over the case.
This case does not present these issues, and I am of the view
that the pronouncements should be limited only to cases
where there are no objections to the taking of the property.
Legal interest, whether in the form of monetary interest (for
forbearance) or compensatory interest (for damages) also
does not apply in this case. In Sun Life of Canada
(Philippines), Inc. v. Sandra Tan Kit,2 the two (2) kinds of
interest rates were distinguished.3 Monetary interest rate is
determined by parties that enter into a contract of loan, or
any other contract involving the use or forbearance of money.
Thus, monetary interest represents the cost of letting another
person use or borrow money. On the other hand,
compensatory interest rates are determined by courts as a
penalty or indemnity for damages in monetary judgments.
There is no showing that the owner was denied payment of
the amount deposited by the Department of Public Works and
Highways in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974.
Furthermore, there is no complaint by the landowner of any
delay in payment.1âwphi1 The property was subject to a writ
of possession dated March 27, 2011.
Should there be any delay, I am of the view that the value of
the property should be at the time of the taking, but the actual
price paid should be computed using the formula for present
value as of the time of payment.4
In other words, we compute for replacement value. Monetary
interest or compensatory interest will not be relevant.
Finally, I agree that documentary stamp taxes are not
necessarily for the account of the seller. This is especially so
in expropriation cases where the sale is coerced and the
owner is unwilling. I, however, doubt whether the "Citizen's
Charter" of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
published in its website, should have the effect of a
regulation. At best, it is evidence that can lead to a finding of
estoppel if all the elements of that equitable defense are
alleged and proven by the proper party.
===========================================
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
ROSALES vs. SUBA
Clearly, as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a
judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only exemption is
when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a
bank or a banking institution. Since the mortgagee in this
case is not one of those mentioned, no right of redemption
exists in favor of petitioners. They merely have an equity of
redemption, which, to reiterate, is simply their right, as
mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership
of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale. However, instead of
exercising this equity of redemption, petitioners chose to
delay the proceedings by filing several manifestations with
the trial court. Thus, they only have themselves to blame for
the consequent loss of their property.
===========================================
JUDICIAL PARTITION
ORIBELLO, v. COURT OF APPEALS
The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the
plaintiff to show that she was entitled to the partition


It is our studied conclusion that the RTC correctly ruled
against the right of respondent Remedios Oribello to demand
the partition of the real property belonging to the late Tomas
Oribello on the ground that she had not substantiated her
right to the partition by preponderance of evidence.
 defendant's obligation to render an accounting and to exact


Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the
remedy of judicial partition. The proceeding under Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between persons
who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property,
seek to secure a division or partition thereof among
themselves, giving to each one of them the part
corresponding to him.18 The object of partition is to enable
those who own property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or
tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to
vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment
in the lands or tenements.19
As Justice Regalado discussed in De Mesa v. Court of
Appeals:21
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or
accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or
not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper,
that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end in a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because
a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally
prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that
partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties
may, if they are able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the
court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties." In either case, whether the action is dismissed or
partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one
and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
 Oribello, the widow of Tomas Oribello. The RTC, being the


The second stage commences when the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event,
partition shall be effected for the parties by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This
second phase may also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the
parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of
the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, also
final and appealable.

In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part
of the judgment which will not necessitate any further
proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings, such as
the appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition
and the rendition and approval of the accounting, may be had
without prejudice to the execution of that part of the
judgment which needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has
been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce the
payment of the money value of the plaintiffs' shares in the
personal property and attorney's fees due defendants, as well
as the costs of the suit and damages. In this case, the CA has
declared that Remedios Oribello, being the adopted daughter
of the late Toribio Oribello, was entitled to the judicial
partition she hereby demanded by virtue of the decree of
adoption of the CFI. Hence, it has remanded the case to the
RTC for the second stage of the partition proceedings.





This case is an action for judicial partition. As stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Biñan v.
Garcia, December 22, 1989, a judicial partition has two
phases. The first phase is an inquiry as to whether there exists
co-ownership of properties by several persons. The second
phase is on the actual partition and accounting, if applicable.



This Court finds that no-co-ownership exists between
plaintiff and defendant. Hence, we cannot proceed to the
second phase.The foregoing findings by the RTC, that
the Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted Remedios
Oribello under the CFI's decree of adoption was not the same
person as the Tomas Oribello whose property was the subject
of her demand for judicial partition, were supported by the
records. In finding so, the RTC did not interfere with the
jurisdiction of the CFI as a court of equal rank and category,
and did not negate the adoption decree, but simply
determined whether or not the claim of Remedios Oribello to
the partition of the property of Tomas Oribello was
competently substantiated by preponderance of evidence.
What the RTC thereby settled was only whether Remedios
Oribello was a co-owner of the property with Berlinda
trial court with jurisdiction over the action for partition,
undeniably possessed the fullest authority to hear and settle
the conflicting claims of the parties.

===========================================
FEUD
PANGANIBAN, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION
The Ruling of the Court
We find no merit in the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly
applied Rosales[11] and University Physicians Services, Inc.
[12] in sustaining the dismissal of the action for declaratory
relief to give way to the ejectment suit.
At any rate, while the said case before the Court of First
Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific performance
with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between
the parties is whether or not the lessee should be allowed to
continue occupying the land as lessee.
The situation is not novel to Us.
It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a
lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the
lessor should be decided under Rule 70 (formerly 72) of the
Rules of Court.
There is no merit to the contention that the lessees supposed
right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in
the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, supra,
this Court held that if the plaintiff has any right to the
extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and
legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer
case because it may be used as a defense to the action. In
other words, the matter raised in the Court of First instance
of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in
consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of
suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer case was
filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the
application of the foregoing rule.
It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for
dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending
action. They provide that there is pending action, not a
pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit
was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present
action. (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, supra.)
The requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed
within the time for filing the answer is not absolute. Even
after an answer has been filed, a defendant can still file a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of
jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action,
and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would
constitute a ground for dismissal.[19] Litis pendentia is also
one of the grounds that authorize a court to dismiss a
case motu proprio.[20]
Petitioner questions the preference given by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to the unlawful detainer
case filed by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that
based on priority in time, the action for declaratory relief, the
case filed earlier, should not have been abated in favor of the
ejectment suit, a case filed much later.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action
refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of actions and
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
[22] We have set the relevant factors that a court must
consider when it has to determine which case should be
dismissed given the pendency of two actions. These are:
(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the
first action filed to be retained;
(2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed
merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its filing
and lay the basis for its dismissal; and
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating
the issues between the parties.[23]
The mere fact that the action for declaratory relief was filed
earlier than the case for unlawful detainer does not
necessarily mean that the first case will be given preference.
An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from
whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the
latters right to hold possession under a contract, express or
implied.[25] Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the
SLDA as to when the SLDA would expire is the key issue
that would determine petitioners right to possess the gasoline
service station. When the primary issue to be resolved is
physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the
ejectment suit, and not in any other case such as an action for
declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits.
.
Petitioner erroneously believes that the unlawful detainer
case should have been dismissed because private respondent
was already guilty of laches when it filed the ejectment suit
269 days from July 31, 1995, the date private respondent
claims the SLDA expired. A complaint for unlawful detainer
should be filed within one year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession occurs.[28] When
the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration
of its term, it is upon the expiration of the term of the lease
that the lessee is already considered to be unlawfully
withholding the property.[29] The expiration of the term of
the lease immediately gives rise to a cause of action for
unlawful detainer.[30] In such a case, a demand to vacate is
no longer necessary.[31] Private respondent therefore had
one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the case for
unlawful detainer. Laches definitely had not yet set in when
private respondent filed the unlawful detainer case 269 days
after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not
sleep on its right when it filed the unlawful detainer case well
within the prescriptive period for filing the action.
Petitioner implores us to reconsider the application
of Rosales[32] and University Physicians Services, Inc.
[33] to this case because this will, in the words of petitioner,
open a floodgate of abuses.[34] Petitioner claims that this can
happen where an earlier case filed by the lessee is already
submitted for resolution and the lessor belatedly files an
ejectment suit to create a cause to dismiss the earlier case
based on litis pendentia.
Petitioners contention is unfounded.
The action for declaratory relief was not yet submitted for
resolution when private respondent filed the action for
unlawful detainer. There is also no proof that private
respondent filed the ejectment suit in anticipation of the early
resolution of the action for declaratory relief. Private
respondent was not out to frustrate the impending resolution
of the action for declaratory relief when it filed the ejectment
suit. In fact, the unlawful detainer case was already decided
upon by the Metropolitan Trial Court even before the
Regional Trial Court dismissed the action for declaratory
relief. It appears that it is petitioner who wants to avoid the
adverse ruling in the unlawful detainer case by insisting that
the action for declaratory relief be given preference even
after the ejectment suit was already decided. The abuse
feared by petitioner does not apply in this case and yet,
petitioner urges us to reevaluate the applicability of a
doctrine based on a feared hypothetical abuse. This, we
cannot do. We can only rule upon actual controversies, not on
scenarios that a party merely conjures to suit her interest.
LABASTIDA and C O N S TA N C I A
LABASTIDA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
First. Although entitled For Recovery of Possession,
Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, it is
evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by private
respondents that the case was actually for unlawful detainer.
Rule 70, 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them,
for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs. The complaint must be verified.
The provisions of this rule shall not apply to cases covered
by the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that they were
the registered owners of the lot subject of the case and thus
entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were their
lessees, paying rent on a month-to-month basis; and that
despite repeated demands to vacate the land made by private
respondents, petitioners refused to leave the premises. This
amounts to an allegation that petitioners were unlawfully
withholding possession of the land. A lease on a month-to-
month basis is deemed to expire at the end of the month upon
notice to vacate addressed by the lessor to the lessee.[7] The
refusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives rise to an
action for unlawful detainer.
Private respondents action is not for recovery of
possession. It is not for a determination which party has a
better right of possession. Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals correctly found the action to be for ejectment.
Second. As the action below was for unlawful detainer, the
question is whether it was brought within one year after the
unlawful withholding of possession[8] so as to sustain
petitioners contention that the action should have been filed
before the Municipal Trial Court rather than in the Regional
Trial Court.
The Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction if the
deprivation of possession had been committed through other
means than those enumerated in Rule 70, or if the period of
dispossession under Rule 70 has lasted for more than a year.
Clearly, the case was filed within one year from February
20, 1983, the date of the last demand to vacate addressed to
petitioners.
Private respondents do not deny this. What they assert,
however, is that the one-year period should be reckoned from
the time oral demand was made by them on petitioners in
1979.This is error. As we have already stated, where there are
several demands made, the period of unlawful withholding
starts to run from the date of the last demand on the theory
that if the lessor brings no action shortly after the demand, it
may be because he has agreed to the renewal of the lease.
Third. The Court of Appeals held petitioners estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground
that in the beginning they denied having received the notice
to vacate sent to them dated February 20, 1983 and it was
only in their answer later filed that they said that if ever there
was any demand it was on February 20, 1983 for the purpose
of arguing that the case should have been filed in the MTC.
The Court of Appeals said:
. . . Now, considering that defendants effectively denied in
both their motion to dismiss and answer having received the
notice to vacate dated February 20, 1983, they are now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court on the
particular ground that the complaint was filed less than one
(1) year from the last letter of demand.[12]
But if private respondents are to be bound by any
representation that no demand had ever been served on them,
then, as provided by Rule 70, 2, all the more no action can be
brought against them. Thus, Rule 70, 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Landlord to proceed against tenant only after
demand. - No landlord, or his legal representative or assign,
shall bring such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent
due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the
tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such
conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in
the case of building, after demand therefor, made upon him
personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice
on the premises if no persons be found thereon.
Pursuant to this provision, no action could be brought against
petitioners for alleged violation of the terms and conditions
of their lease agreement unless a notice to vacate is given to
the lessee. On the other hand, if as the appellate court held,
the action for unlawful detainer is based on the expiration of
the lease, no notice is required. Any notice given only serves
to negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend
the period of the lease. Such a notice is needed only when the
action is due to the lessees failure to pay rent or to comply
with the conditions of the lease.[13]
===========================================
CO TIAMCO, petitioner, vs. POMPEYO DIAZ
We believe, and so hold, that the order of dismissal is
erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a wrong
construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is unwarranted
under the circumstances of the case; and (3) the complaint
filed is sufficient in itself.
1. We will begin by reviewing the construction placed by the
respondent court on a provision of our Rules of Court. The
position taken by the respondent court is that, in all actions
for unlawful detainer by a landlord against a tenant, a
demand, as required by Rule 72, section 2, is jurisdictional.
Such provision of the Rules is as follows:
Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. — No
landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring
such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to
comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant
shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such
conditions for a period of fifteen days, or five days in the
case of building, after demand therefore, made upon him
personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon
the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice
on the premises if no persons be found thereon. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is apparent from this provision that a demand is a pre-
requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action
is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the
conditions of his lease," and where the action is to terminate
the lease because of the expiration of its term.
A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the
necessity of any notice1 to the tenant who thenceforth
becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully
"after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," as
provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words upon the
expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the
property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the
premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately
be brought against him even before the expiration of the five
days provided in Rule 72, section 2.
Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit
renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the
acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the
thing leased for fifteen days, as provided in article 1566 of
the Civil Code; and the lessor's acquiescence may be inferred
from his failure to serve a notice to quit. (10
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But tacit renewal in such case,
being a new contract (10 Manresa Codigo Civil, p. 619), is a
matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his
answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by
way of anticipation of such defense (Canfield vs. Tobias, 21
Cal., 349).
=========================================== the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
ZACARIAS, vs. ANACAY sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the
action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the
case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts
as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy,
and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy
is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry,
the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.14
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in
petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry but
not for unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if
it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by toleranceof the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination ofthe latter’s right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.16
The complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful
detainer as it does not describe possession by the respondents
being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which
became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of
suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she
actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her
discovery of their entry into the subject premises is incorrect.
As she had averred, she discovered respondents’occupation
in May 2007. Such possession could not have been legal
from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent,
much less was it based on any contract, express or implied.
We stress that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.18
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
present right from the start of the possession which is later
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer
would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v.
Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance
of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with
plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may
require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior
court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the
date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
"tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one
of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court -
provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry
is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases
to bespeedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his
right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible
entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a
number of years, then the result may well be that no action of
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea
of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily
throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable.
Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and
underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which
determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is
required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of
this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full
agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the
alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by
them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not
contain any averment of fact that would substantiate
petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any
color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on
how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the
key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is
fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in
this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to
allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation
of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered
that the defendants have enterep the subject property and
occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and
CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built
their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's
consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in
reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed
for by the petitioner. stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to
NUÑEZ, Petitioner, vs. SLTEAS PHOENIX
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved,19 there can be no gainsaying the fact that
ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts20 by express provision of
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1,
Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.21 In addition
to being conferred by law,22 however, a court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint23 and the character of the relief sought,
24 irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims asserted therein.25 In much
the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the
exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,
26 jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.27
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the
following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition
of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must
allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they
must assert that they were deprived of possession either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the
action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the
owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the
physical possession of the property.28 As it is not essential
that the complaint should expressly employ the language of
the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the
requirement where the facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions.29 The one-
year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry
is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land,
except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year
period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
30
Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted
the MeTC’s jurisdiction,31 our perusal of the record shows
that respondent’s 9 January 2004 amended complaint was
able to make out a cause of action for forcible entry against
petitioner. As the registered owner of the subject parcel,
respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and
thru its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of
the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all
attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes
and other expenses; that an ocular inspection conducted in
October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants
have succeeded in occupying the property by means of
vacate had been unheeded by said interlopers.32 Considering
that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations
in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the plaintiff,33 we find that the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission
in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and
unguarded, respondent’s claim of prior possession is clearly
negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof
since 1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an
indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth
of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the
principle that possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.34 Because possession
can also be acquired by juridical acts to which the law gives
the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments, inscription
of possessory information titles and the like, it has been held
that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every
square inch of the property at all times to be considered in
possession.351avvphi1
=========================================== have only their notarized but unregisteredKasulatan sa
GINA ENDAYA, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO V. VILLAOS


The Petition must be granted.



In resolving the Petition for Review, the CA lost sight of the
legal principle that in resolving the issue of possession in an
ejectment case, the registered owner of the property is
preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of
sale. In Co v. Militar,21 this Court held that -
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the
parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the
property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered
deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan
Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title
in the name of petitioner.
 and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal




It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible
and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has
been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under
existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon
the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.
 regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be


As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the
possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of
his ownership


The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve
more credence because they are valid contracts that legally
transferred ownership of the property to Melu-Jean.
However, it should be noted that the CA merely affirmed the
power of the trial court to provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership, which consequently includes the power to
determine the validity of the deeds of sale. As previously
stated, such determination is not conclusive, and the issue of
ownership and the validity of the deeds of sale would
ultimately be resolved in the case for annulment of the deeds
of sale.



In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered
owners' superior right to possess the property. the Court held
that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate
of title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the
unregistered deeds of sale of the respondents.


In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the
holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot 83. Respondents
Bilihan to support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if
respondents' proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the
same cannot prevail over petitioner's Torrens title.
In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, the Court suspended the
enforcement of a writ of demolition rendered in an ejectment
case until after a case for annulment of title involving the
property to be demolished was decided. The Court
ratiocinated:
x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer,
as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of
the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in
issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and
just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience
possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to
restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed
with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more
substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It
is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of
public policy the right to physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession
found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru
force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
LIM, petitioners, vs. UNI-TAN MARKETING
CORPORATION,
The Lim spouses allege that while the RTC correctly directed
respondent and/or the Branch Sheriff of the Metropolitan
Trial Court to return their personalties that had not been sold
on execution, it should have likewise ordered respondent to
return to them the items that had already been sold on
execution. Since they had been prejudiced by
the ejectment suit, they assert that the RTC should have
awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorneys fees.
We are not convinced. As pointed out by the RTC in its
Order[12] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
neither the plaintiff nor the sheriff may be faulted for the
items sold on execution, because the Lim spouses had failed
to file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTC
judgment.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides
the manner in which immediate execution in
an ejectment case is conducted:
Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay
same. -- If judgment is rendered against defendant, execution
shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial
Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
x x x.
Indeed, immediate execution in an ejectment judgment in
favor of the plaintiff is normal. The defendant may stay it
only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and
making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property
during the pendency of the appeal.[13]
The immediate execution of a judgment favorable to the
plaintiff is mandated, and the courts duty to order it is
practically ministerial.[14] Hence, petitioners cannot ascribe
any error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of
the RTC. The execution sale was conducted in accordance
with the rules and was well within the bounds of law.
Furthermore, there is no basis for petitioners claim for
damages, because respondent was in the lawful exercise of
its right at the time of the execution sale. Although the
judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court in favor of
respondent was eventually reversed by the RTC, the
execution sale was undeniably lawful at the time it was
conducted. Even if the executed judgment is later on reversed
on appeal, and there are provisions for restitution, damages
that cannot be fully compensated may oftentimes arise.
[15] That is why the Rules provide defendants with a remedy
to stay execution. The problem is that petitioners failed or
neglected to avail themselves of it.
Those who exercise their rights properly do no legal injury. If
damages result from their exercise of their legal rights, it
is damnum absque injuria -- a loss without injury, for which
the law gives no remedy.[16]
The law always presumes good faith; thus, any person who
seeks damages because of the tortuous acts of another has the
burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill
motive. Certainly, petitioners have not discharged this
burden, and a recovery for damages under the circumstances
is unwarranted.
In sum, petitioners themselves were the ones who caused the
damage which they claim to have suffered, because they had
failed to follow the strict legal requirements for perfecting an
appeal. If they had filed the requisite supersedeas bond, the
execution of the judgment would have been stayed. Hence,
their loss or misfortune can be attributed to no less than their
own inaction or failure to follow the law.
===========================================
CONTEMPT
Burgos vs Macapagal-Arroyo
The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and
contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity
from suit. The CA ruled that the President’s immunity from
suit is a settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.23
===========================================
LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION

vs.

DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense,
contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of
its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language
in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted
and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of
the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.21 The phrase
contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts.22
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,
23 and need not be specifically granted by statute.24 It lies at
the core of the administration of a judicial system.
25 Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the
power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence,
respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach and insults of pollution.26 The
power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice.27 The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability
of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of
the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.28
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt,
which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as
to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and
constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful
disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.29
The punishment for the first is generally summary and
immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because
the act is committed in facie curiae.30 The inherent power of
courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence
of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of
a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is
essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the
administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such
summary conviction and punishment accord with due process
of law.31There is authority for the view, however, that an act,
to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary
proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate
presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to
interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself.
32 Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of
the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be
punished summarily as a direct contempt,33 although it is
advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to
appear and show cause why he should not be punished when
the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior
and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor
or by testimony under oath of other persons.34
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less
summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment
of the contumacious act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all
the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written
charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such
charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.35
Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the
punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the
action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that
dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result
from the issuance of process, service of complaint and
answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to
arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all
that goes with a conventional court trial.36
A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt
court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal
presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court
contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is
drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must
attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with
contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts
to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment
of in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process.
37
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts
without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to
punish a contempt
committed directly under its eye or within its view.38 But
there must be adequate facts to support a summary order for
contempt in the presence of the court.39 The exercise of the
summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one
and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive
conclusions.40 The reason for the extraordinary power to
punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that the
necessities of the administration of justice require such
summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of
vindicating the majesty of the law, in its active manifestation,
against obstruction and outrage.41
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal,
but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions,
and independently of any action.42 They are of two classes,
the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal
contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting
judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil
case for the benefit of the opposing party therein.43 It is at
times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil
or criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of
whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of
the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the
contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant
purpose.44 The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal
when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when
the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.45Where
the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order
of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the order
runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is to
vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect
the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal.
46 Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of
the courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and
enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to
orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.47
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section
3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property
in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of
a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent
the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into
court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings. (3a)
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment
or disrespect.48 There is no question that in contempt the
intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.49 Thus, the good
faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be
considered.50 Where the act complained of is ambiguous or
does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is
one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his
rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in
some instances, held to be determinative of its character.51 A
person should not be condemned for contempt where he
contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith
institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous
may be his conclusion as to his rights.52 To constitute
contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an
illegitimate or improper purpose.53
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to
embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place
in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose.
On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or
contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a
violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
II.

Utterances in Sea Transport Update,

Not Contemptuous
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the
respondents’ publication of the Sea Transport Update
constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of
court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.
The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication
unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of the
scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein
that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the
petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents
thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme
Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at
least 3 to 6 months,"54 was insufficient, without more, to
sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase
contained in the Sea Transport Update stating: "The Motion
for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied
based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update
reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only,
normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary to the
petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered as
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless
innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself
to be influenced by the petitioners"57 or that "the point that
respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the
decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme
Court was influenced!’",58 we find the phrases as not critical
of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914
were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the
resolutions. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was
to inform DMAP’s members of the developments in the case,
and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to
MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals
instructed.1avvphi1
We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer,
or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the
courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in
respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect
critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted
in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges.
The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore,
whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good
faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea
Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or
slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of
indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to
remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
the administration of justice must falter or fail.61 As judges
we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or
vindictiveness.62
=========================================== depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act.
MONTENEGRO vs MONTENEGRO
The core issue to be determined is whether, based on the
facts found by the trial court, the latter erred in holding the
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying
the orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for
purposes of examination as a judgment obligor at in the
hearings scheduled on 22 March 2002, 10 April 2002, and 23
October 2002.
We rule in the negative.
The totality of petitioner’s acts clearly indicated a deliberate,
and unjustified refusal to be examined as a judgment obligor
at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing by the
trial court. His Such acts tended to degrade the authority and
respect for court processes and impaired the judiciary’s duty
to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner tried to impose
his will on the trial court.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure
to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the
court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.6 It is
defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition
to its authority, justice and dignity."7 The power to punish
contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the
courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of
justice.8
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely,
direct contempt and indirect contempt.
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court also provides that "a party or other person
may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before
the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two
preceding sections, and upon failure to obey such order or
subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to
subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in
other cases." This provision relates specifically to Section
3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by
the court by issuing an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified
petition, complying with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings.10 In the present case, the trial court initiated the
proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two
orders11 directing the petitioner to show cause why he
should not be punished for indirect contempt.
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal
Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority
and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an
act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect."12 On the other
hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to
be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order was made.13 If the purpose
is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to
compensate, then it is civil.14
In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioner’s
refusal to attend a hearing for his examination as judgment
obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must be
pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to
provide the judgment obligee a remedy in case where the
judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its
obligation under the judgment. Petitioner’s refusal to be
examined, without justifiable reason, constituted indirect
contempt which is civil in nature.
Petitioner’s deliberate willfulness and even malice in
disobeying the orders of the trial court are clearly shown in
the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
In the present case, the nature of the contemptuous acts
committed are civil in nature. Section 7 of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court provides for indefinite incarceration in civil
contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with the
order of the court. This may be resorted to where the
attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance
with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of
the court which has then no other recourse but to use its
coercive power.16 It has been held that "when a person or
party is legally and validly required by a court to appear
before it for a certain purpose, when that requirement is
disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use force to
bring such person or party before it."17
The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt
proceedings, in proper cases, is that it is remedial,
preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is
imposed for the benefit of a complainant or a party to a suit
who has been injured. Its object is to compel performance of
the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor
refuses to obey although able to do so.18 In effect, it is
within the power of the person adjudged guilty of contempt
to set himself free.
In the present case, however, the act which the trial court
ordered the petitioner to do has already been performed,
albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable
length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no
longer be imposed despite the fact that its non-
implementation was due to petitioner’s absence in the
Philippines.
We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from
which the present controversy arose. Six years have elapsed
from the time the compromise agreement for the support of
the children of petitioner and respondent was executed. We
take judicial notice of the amount of expenses which a travel
outside the country, particularly to Canada, entails, much
more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to
establish himself in the said country as an immigrant.
Petitioner’s claim for insolvency is negated by his frequent
travels to Canada. We thus exhort the parties, specifically the
petitioner, to resort to all reasonable means to fully satisfy
the judgment for support based on the compromise
agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor
children.
INOTURAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
City, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,
For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring
him to comment on the accusations in the complaint
thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may
even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The
office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders
of his superiors. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court
is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly
and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays
not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise
been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if
not contempt of the judicial system.
We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez
v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta5 and emphasized that obedience to
our lawful orders and directives should not be merely
selective obedience, but must be full:
[A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on
an administrative complaint against officials and employees
of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request
from the Court. Nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.
Respondents in administrative complaints should comment
on all accusations or allegations against them in the
administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve
the integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the Court should not
and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring
comment on such administrative complaints.
===========================================
SANTIAGO vs ANUNCIACION, JR.,
It is well-settled that a contempt charge partakes the nature of
a penal proceeding. Being so, it is subject to the rules on
criminal procedure and the rules on the intervention of the
offended party in criminal actions. The rule is that: SEC. 16.
Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. —
Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the
criminal action, and subject to the provision of Section 5
hereof, he may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense. Aside from the above exceptions, the intervention of
the offended party is subject to the direction and control of
the fiscal, and for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil
liability of the accused, and as we have held, "not of
demanding punishment of the accused." Thus: Consequently,
where from the nature of the offense, or where the law
defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide
for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
prosecution of the offense.

In the case at bar, there is no justification for the prosecution
of the case by a private prosecutor. In this instance, the kind
of contempt (indirect) for which the petitioner is sought to be
held liable provides for no indemnity because the alleged
"obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the
respondent court in particular, which involves no private
party. Thus, the appearance of Atty. Eleazar Ferry, on behalf
of Mrs. Carolina Orozco, was unwarranted.



It is true that in [Converse Rubber Corp. v. Jacinto Rubber &
Plastic Co., Inc., Nos. L-27425 & 30505, April 28, 1980, 97
SCRA 158] we sought to distinguish between the civil and
criminal features of an accusation for contempt; our effort,
however, was not to halve contempt into a civil and penal
proceeding, because contempt is inherently criminal in
character. (In the Converse case, contempt was said to be
"criminal" "when the purpose is to vindicate the authority of
the court and protect its outraged dignity." It is "civil" "when
there is failure to do something ordered by a court to be done
for the benefit of a party.") But whether the first or the
second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which
acquittal, for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The
distinction is for the purpose only of determining the
character of punishment to be administered. We held
thus: . . . the Supreme Court of the United States, through
Chief Justice Taft, said: "In the Gompers case this court
points out that, it is not the fact of punishment, but rather its
character and purpose that makes the difference between the
two kinds of contempts. For civil contempts, the punishment
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, and a
pardon cannot stop it. For criminal contempts, the sentence is
punitive in the public interest to vindicate the authority of the
court and to deter other like derelictions."cralaw virtua1aw
library
 time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by


But the fact, say, that the punishment, in the words of Slade
Perkins, is "remedial and for the benefit of the
complainant," (which makes contempt one of the "civil"
kind), does not convert the criminal contempt proceeding
into a civil case, in which an appeal lies in the event of a
denial. Thus: . . . It is not the sole reason for dismissing this
appeal. In the leading case of In re Mison, Jr. v. Subido, it
was stressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente, that the
contempt proceeding far from being a civil action is "of a
criminal nature and of summary character in which the court
exercises but limited jurisdiction." It was then explicitly held:
"Hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie
from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a
charge of contempt of court." Such a doctrine is traceable to
an opinion by Justice Street in Lee Yick Hon v. Collector of
Customs. A later decision is that of Pajao v. Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Leyte. Justice Alex Reyes, speaking for the
Court, pointed out that with contempt proceedings being "in
their nature penal," its denial "after trial amounts to a virtual
acquittal from which an appeal would not lie. (II Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed. 125)." There is this
qualification in a ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Amoren
v. Pineda: "Likewise, the ruling that an acquittal from a
contempt charge is not appealable, like an acquittal in a
criminal case (Pajao v. Board of Canvassers, 88 Phil. 588)
does not apply to the case before us, since there has been no
adjudication on the merits of the charge, but a ruling upon a
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional ground."
===========================================
CRUZ VS. GINGOYON
A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court[34] without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail
of the remedies ofcertiorari or prohibition.[35]
Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may
avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond
fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, we find that the respondent court properly
denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that
he already filed a petition for certiorari. Petitioner thus
cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the
the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the
remedy prayed for.Clearly, the respondent court did not
commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying
petitioners Ex-Parte Motion.
All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and
affirm the Order adjudging petitioner guilty of direct
contempt.
===========================================
BACULI, vs. BELEN,
Administrative complaint cannot

substitute for lost judicial remedies
The OCA correctly found that these administrative cases
cannot be resorted to as substitutes for the remedies not
availed of in the contempt proceedings. The complaints, in
the main, challenge several Orders issued by Judge Belen in
the respective contempt proceedings, and the four contempt
Decisions issued on December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007.
But as correctly observed by the OCA, issuances in the
exercise of judicial prerogatives may only be questioned
through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not
by way of an administrative inquiry, absent fraud, ill
intentions, or corrupt motive.24 The institution of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for
correcting the action of a judge alleged to have gone beyond
the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy
exists.25
Rule 71, Secs. 2 and 11 of the Rules of Court lay down the
proper remedies from a judgment in direct and indirect
contempt proceedings, respectively. For direct contempt, the
Rules states:
Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.––The person adjudged in direct
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may
avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond
fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
should the petition be decided against him.
In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules states:
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––
The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal
cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not
be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in
contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided
against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or
final order.
The remedies provided for in the above-mentioned Rules are
clear enough. The complainant could have filed an appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the Decisions in the
indirect contempt cases. For the direct contempt citations, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was available to him. He
failed to avail himself of both remedies. He chose instead to
question the proceedings and the judgments in the form of
motions and manifestations, and administrative complaints.
Due to the failure of the complainant here to avail himself of
these remedies, Judge Belen correctly ruled that the assailed
judgments have become final and executory. They cannot
anymore be reviewed by this Court.
Time and again, We have stressed that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions brought against a judge in
relation to the performance of his or her official functions are
neither complementary nor suppletory to the appropriate
judicial remedies. They are also not a substitute to such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to
these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions.26
Even assuming that the Orders are infirm, they have already
become final and executory, which even this Court cannot
review or disturb. Public policy demands that even at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments or orders rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction should become final at some
definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be
permitted to litigate the same issues over again.27 Quieta non
movere.
Complainant failed to prove bad faith, evil motive
or corrupt intention on the part of Judge Belen
Complainant Baculi tags all the contempt proceedings
against him as sham, and were taken, so he claims, as a direct
result of a prior incident between him and Judge Belen where
he issued a Resolution recommending that Judge Belen be
charged for libel. He has belabored this point in his
complaint and supplemental complaints, pointing out that the
judge has deep-seated hatred for him and is bent on
repeatedly citing him in contempt.
Aside from his bare allegations, the complainant, however,
has not presented any credible evidence to support his
allegations against Judge Belen. The fact that Judge Belen
had initiated contempt proceedings against him, and in fact
convicted him in such contempt proceedings, does not by
itself amount to ill motives on the part of Judge Belen. The
initiation of the contempt proceedings stemmed from the acts
of the complainant himself. His unsupported claim that the
prior libel case he filed against Judge Belen created
animosity between them is not sufficient to prove his claim
of evil motives on the part of Judge Belen.
As the proponent of these allegations, the complainant should
have adduced the necessary evidence to prove the claim of
bad faith. This he failed to do. In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, the following presumptions stand: (1) that
official duty has been regularly performed;28 and (2) that a
judge, acting as such, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.29
Judge Belen cannot be administratively liable on the

final and executory decision, in the absence of evil
or corrupt motives or gross ignorance of the law
A judge cannot be held administratively liable at every turn
for every erroneous decision. The error must be gross and
deliberate, a product of a perverted judicial mind, or a result
of gross ignorance of the law. This is as it should be, for no
one tasked to determine the facts in light of the evidence
adduced or interpret and apply the law, following prescribed
rules, can be infallible.30 All that is expected from a judge is
to "follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial
hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom
and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the
conclusions he finds established, adjudicate the case
accordingly."
As We have already stated, the complainant has failed to
adduce evidence in support of his claim of evil or corrupt
motives on the part of the judge. That, and the fact that the
subject Decisions are already final and executory, lead Us to
conclude that no administrative liability can arise on the part
of Judge Belen, if the contempt proceedings that he
conducted followed the required procedure under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.
Judge Belen followed the proper procedure
 But in indirect contempt proceedings inititated motu proprio
in citing complainant in contempt of court
The OCA Report found that Judge Belen failed to follow the
mandatory procedure under Rule 71, because the contempt
proceedings were heard and decided under the same docket
or case number. We cannot sustain this finding of the OCA.
Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating
indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court;
or (2) by a verified petition.
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be
followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect
contempt. First, there must be an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the
opportunity to comment on the charge against him. Third,
there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the
charge and consider respondent’s answer. Finally, only if
found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.
(Citations omitted.)
As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings, that is, through a verified petition, the rule is
already settled in Regalado v. Go:
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge,
the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has
complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as
outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second
paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be
filed.34
The Rules itself is explicit on this point:
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
35 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in
contempt of court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been
complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition,
and to hear and decide it separately from the main case,
unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the
contempt proceedings and the main action.
by the court, the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not
necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio
initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to
speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the
respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to
due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the
form of an Order requiring the respondent to explain why he
or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
In the case at bar, the Orders issued by Judge Belen are in the
nature of a show-cause order.1âwphi1 The Orders clearly
directed Baculi, as respondent, to explain within 10 days
from receipt of the Order why he should not be cited in
contempt. These Orders are formal charges sufficient to
initiate the respective indirect contempt proceedings.
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause
order, the duty of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and
decide the case separately from the main case does not arise,
much less to exercise the discretion to order the consolidation
of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be
docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case
precisely because it is the show-cause order that initiated the
proceedings.
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are
initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is
the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are
conducted respecting the right to due process of the party
being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect
contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to
the contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The
court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the
respondent’s answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent
be punished accordingly.37
Complainant was afforded the opportunity

to present his defense, but he failed to do so
In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the
right to defend himself or herself and have a day in court––a
basic requirement of due process. This is especially so in
indirect contempt proceedings, as the court cannot decide
them summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court.
It cannot be said that Judge Belen did not afford Baculi the
opportunity to be heard on the contempt proceedings. Even
as the respective hearings on the two indirect contempt cases
set in February 2007 did not push through due to the
numerous motions filed by Baculi, Judge Belen still waited
for the former to answer the charges against him. No answer
ever came, however––only numerous manifestations and
motions for postponement.
In all, Judge Belen cannot plausibly be blamed for the fact
that the June 7, 2007 Decisions were issued without any
answer from Baculi. The fault belongs to Baculi himself,
who insisted on resolving the indirect contempt proceedings
in the form of an administrative complaint against the judge.
Baculi was afforded ample time and opportunity to present
his case in court, but he squandered the opportunity.
=========================================== however, cannot be inferred from this particular error, per se.
GUERRERO vs.VILLAMOR
The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing
an unjust judgment, deserve consideration, since the direct
contempt order of the respondent judge, under the attending
circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous.
The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading
was not submitted to respondent, but filed in another court
presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles
away from where respondent holds court in Leyte. As this
Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: 18
Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a
particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or
proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not
tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law
and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment does not
immediately arise from the bare fact of a judge issuing a
decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be erroneous.
From the record before us we agree with the finding of the
investigating Justice that respondent, in issuing his erroneous
contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse
to do an injustice. To be sure, complainants have not
presented evidence or offered logical arguments tending to
show that bad faith accompanied the issuance of the
contempt order. It ought to be remembered that bad faith is
not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of
proving it. In this regard, complainants have not discharged
that burden of proof sufficiently.
Should a circumstance tend to becloud the bona fides of
respondent's actuation, it could only refer to the strained
relationship existing between him and complainants brought
about by the cumulative effect of the reverses Carlos
encountered in respondent's sala, on one hand, and the filing
by complainant Carlos, through Atty. Guerrero, of the
damage suit against respondent, on the other. 23
The fact that respondent did not accord complainants a
hearing nor informed them beforehand of the charges relative
to the contempt incident cannot, without more, be indicative
of bad faith or malice. For, respondent labored under the
impression, mistaken as it turned out to be, that complainants
committed an act constituting direct contempt summarily
punishable. 24 Assuming, as respondent did assume, that
complainants did indeed commit an act punishable by direct
contempt, then a formal hearing would hardly be necessary.
Needless to underscore, the utilization by respondent of the
long-terminated criminal cases as the vehicle for his
contempt order formed a part of his error. Bad faith,
.
In all, the assailed act of the respondent judge appears to be a
case of error of judgment not subject to disciplinary action.:
While the quoted portion of the foregoing ruling speaks only
of exemption from criminal or civil liability, there is no
reason not to include from its reach administrative liability as
well. After all, this Court had occasion to rule that:
[A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere
errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 26
Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account
criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous
decision rendered by them in good faith. 27
In sum, there is no legal basis nor convincing evidence, to
support the proposition that the respondent judge, in issuing
his controversial contempt order, acted in bad faith or with
ill-will or malice as to justify holding him liable for an error
in judgment.
LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO
LISTANA
On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of
petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was
valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in
pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its
members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any
person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the
manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which deals with the commencement of
indirect contempt proceedings, provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
xxxxxxxxx
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the
Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure explains this requirement:
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the
proper procedure for commencing contempt
proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a
special civil action under the former Rules, the
heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for
any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or
lawful fees therefor and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required
in the second paragraph of this amended section.
xxxxxxxxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings
initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified
petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor
and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second
paragraph of this section.[22]
Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged
with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified
petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the
court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in
charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-
judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless
otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt
committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies
exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory
effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to
authority granted to them by law to punish for
contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the
contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over
such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for
all the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to
quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the
former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts
and did not comprehend contempt committed against
administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless
said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec.
580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to
contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce
documents when required to do so by the official or body
exercising such powers.For such violation, said person shall
be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court,
upon application of the official or body with the Regional
Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.[23](emphasis in
the original)
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite
persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper
Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These
matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial
Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was
filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the
PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with
indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an
unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the respondent with
the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:
[24] First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was
not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated
by the PARAD motu proprio;rather, it was by a motion filed
by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB
have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond
the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all
the proceedings that stemmed from respondents Motion for
Contempt, specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated
August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A.
Lorayes, are null and void.
=========================================== ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A
ROBOSA VS NLRC
ISSUES:
The parties submissions raise the following issues:
(1) whether the NLRC has contempt powers;
(2) whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable;
and
(3) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents.
On the first issue, we stress that under Article 218[22] of the
Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any
offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and
impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The
penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment
or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the
contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The
Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the
Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner
prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[23]
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor
arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings
before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when
there is no law granting them contempt powers.[24] As is
clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor
arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction
to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect
contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly
brought the indirect contempt charges against the
respondents before the NLRC.
The second issue pertains to the nature of contempt
proceedings, especially with respect to the remedy available
to the party adjudged to have committed indirect contempt or
has been absolved of indirect contempt charges. In this
regard, Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states that
the judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in a
criminal case. This is not the point at issue, however, in this
petition. It is rather the question of whether the dismissal of a
contempt charge, as in the present case, is appealable. The
CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges
against the respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal
case and is not subject to appeal.
The CA ruling is grounded on prevailing jurisprudence.
In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto,[25] the Court declared:
A distinction is made between a civil and [a] criminal
contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something
criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the
authority or dignity of the court.[26]
Is the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the
respondents beyond review by this Court? On this important
question, we note that the petitioners, in assailing the CA
main decision, claim that the appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion in not ruling on the dismissal by the
NLRC of the contempt charges.[31] They also charge the
NLRC of having gravely abused its discretion and having
committed reversible errors in:
(1) setting aside its earlier resolutions and orders, including
the writ of preliminary injunction it issued, with its dismissal
of the petition to cite the respondents in contempt of court;
(2) overturning this Courts resolutions upholding the TRO
and the writ of preliminary injunction;
(3) failing to impose administrative fines upon the
respondents for violation of the TRO and the writ of
preliminary injunction; and
(4) failing to order the reinstatement of the dismissed
petitioners and the payment of their accrued wages and other
benefits.
In view of the grave abuse of discretion allegation in this
case, we deem it necessary to look into the NLRCs dismissal
of the contempt charges against the respondents. As the
charges were rooted into the respondents alleged non-
compliance with the NLRC directives contained in the
TRO[32] and the writ of preliminary injunction,[33] we first
inquire into what really happened to these directives.
Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the contempt charges against the respondents? An
act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as
committed in grave abuse of discretion when it was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.[35]

We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC

ruling. It rightly avoided delving into issues which would
clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues
involving the merits of the case which are by law within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.[38] To
be sure, whether payroll reinstatement of some of the
petitioners is proper; whether the resignation of some of them
was compelled by dire economic necessity; whether the
petitioners are entitled to their money claims; and whether
quitclaims are contrary to law or public policy are issues that
should be heard by the labor arbiter in the first instance. The
NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the merits
of the case shall have been adjudicated by the labor arbiter.

The NLRC correctly dismissed the contempt charges against

the respondents. The CA likewise committed no grave abuse
of discretion in not disturbing the NLRC resolution.

In light of the above discussion, we find no need to dwell

into the other issues the parties raised.