28 TEOFISTO GUINGONA VS NEPTALI GONZALES

Subject: GR. No. 106971 – 214 SCRA 789 – Political Law – HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD
senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in
the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) / Total No.
of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8
senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of
the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI
of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and
reduced the representation of one political party- either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1
seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party
which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may
coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.
29 FRANKLIN M. DRILON, ET AL. V. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ET AL 594 SCRA 743 (2009)

Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be lodged before the respective
Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court.
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments
(CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to
ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal
Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days.
Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at
least twenty (20) members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the CA.
Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter claiming that ―the Senate contingent
in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties
PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the political party PRP and other
Independents cannot be represented in the CA.
The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA ―has neither the
power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election
of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them.‖ Villar further explained that instructions
have been given to ―transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal‘s letters to the Senate Secretary for their
immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.‖
Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA‘s action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate
President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA.

The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper.

HELD:
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member
of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No.
183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of.
Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that
she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.
Senator Madrigal‘s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court.
Senator Villar‘s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.
29-a DAZA V. SINGSON
G.R. NO. 86344 | 1989-12-21

Subject: Art VI, Sec 18. (proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments)

Facts:
After the May 1987 congressional elections, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats
in the Commission on Appointments (CA) among the several political parties represented in that chamber, in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza, from the Liberal Party (LP), was
among those chosen to sit in the CA.

Due to a subsequent reorganization in the membership of the political parties (24 members of the LP joined the LDP
giving it a memebership of 159 and reducing LP to only 17 members), the House revised its membership in the CA by
removing the seat of Daza (LP) and giving it to Luis Singson (LDP).

Daza claims that he cannot be removed from the CA because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine
announced in Cunanan v. Tan and that that LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution
because it is not a duly registered political party. Singson claims that the issue is political in nature and beyond the
province of the courts.

Held:

Political question
1. The issue presented is not a political question because what is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the
act of the House of Representatives in removing Daza from the Commission on Appointments.

2. Moreover, the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon the judiciary under Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.

Commission on Appointments- proportional representation

3. Art VI, Sec. 18 provides that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of 12 Senators and 12
members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein,"

4. Consequently, each House of Congres may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of
the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.

5. The House of Representatives has authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that
such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
29-b COSETENG V. MITRA
G.R. NO. 86649 | 1990-07-12

Subject: Art VI, Sec 18. (proportional representation in the Commission on Appointment)

Facts:
During the May 1987 congressional elections, petitioner Nikki Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the
banner of KAIBA. Coseteng alleges that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments (CA) as a
representative of the Minority.

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker
Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request
backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on,
added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political
realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as
petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and
the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated
and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other
congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of
the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that
petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Held:
Commission on Appointments – proportional representation
1. The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House.

a. Out of the 202 seats in the House, 160 belong to LDP members. This represents 79% (rounded to 80%) of the
House membership, which is equivalent to 9.6 (or 10) out of the 12 seats in the CA.
b. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (Lorna Verano-Yap) and the KBL (Roque Ablan)

2. The other political parties in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA, are bound by the majority's choices. Even if
KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1%
of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the CA.

3. To be able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should should have been
able to elect-
a. For the House seats -- at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. (atleast 8.4% of the House membership)
b. For the senate seats --at least 2 senators in the Senate
29- c SARMIENTO VS. MISON
G.R. NO. 79974 | 1987-12-17

Subject:
COA Confirmation for Presidential Appointments, Statutory Construction (Constitutional Provisions)

Facts:
Petitioners seek to enjoin Mison from performing his functions as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and
Carague from disbursing funds for the former’s salaries because Mison was allegedly appointed without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (COA). Thus, petitioners argue that Mison’s appointment was
unconstitutional.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. The first group clearly requires the confirmation of the COA. However, it is unclear whether or not the other
groups also require such confirmation.

Held:
Presidential Appointments
1. Under the 1987 Constitution, heads of Bureaus are appointed validly by the President without need of the
confirmation by the COA. Hence, the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs does not need
COA confirmation to be valid.

2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for four groups of whom the President shall appoint, namely:

(1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution,
(2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, and
(4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The 1987 Constitution requires the confirmation of the COA only for the first group of appointments while the other
groups do not require the same.

3. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of the
power to appoint should be strictly construed against them. For these limitations or qualifications to be recognized,
they must be clearly stated. Only the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII clearly requires confirmation from the
COA.

Construction of Constitutional Provisions

4. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed
in the constitutional provisions themselves."

5. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or
the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide

6. By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
7. The court also referred to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to
determine the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
29-d PACETE V COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS G.R. NO. L-25895. JULY 23, 1971

Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August
31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.

He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was made during
the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965.

On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial
Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment
had been by-passed.

Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the
confirmation of the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory
information which he had received.

Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to notify the then Secretary of Justice
accordingly, following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such
letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . . ." Respondent Secretary of Justice
through the Judicial Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as
he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise named respondent
as he had, as a consequence, withheld petitioner's salaries.

Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth
regular session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965;

Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed; and

Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of confirmation prayed for by petitioner.

The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law,
his confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in
the absence of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That
would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is
bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It
can find no shelter in the constitutional prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was contended that his confirmation became final and
irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules
of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be
reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the
members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the
Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion."

1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the motion for reconsideration of
Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's appointment and
that, accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. His opinion continued: "Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a
majority of the members present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment —
and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation — and to require a resubmission of the appointment for confirmation."

2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight.
It is bad enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.

3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and executive
orders are not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission
on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right
of an individual to a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the express language of
the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under the circumstances, what
cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the fundamental law ordains.

As due process is impressed with both substantive and procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not
unduly limited.