Role Behavior: A Neurosociological Perspective

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Role behavior: A neurosociological perspective

Aleksandr Shkurko
Social Science Information 2012 51: 338
DOI: 10.1177/0539018412441751
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Role behavior: A 51(3) 338–363
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DOI: 10.1177/0539018412441751
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Aleksandr Shkurko
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and State Government, Nizhny Novgorod
Abstract
Recent advances in social neuroscience show that many social phenomena can be traced
back to neural processes. Major limitations and contributions of social neuroscience
for a better understanding of social phenomena are considered. Social neuroscience
is currently guided primarily by psychological notions and theories, thus making it
inappropriate for solving sociological problems. Brain research for sociology can be
increasingly useful within a branch we call neurosociology. Incorporation of data from
cognitive and neuroscience may clarify the low-level structure of social phenomena
and contribute to our understanding of social mechanisms. The notion of social status/
role is taken as a possible subject of neurosociological research. A number of low-level
brain structures and processes are shown to be relevant for the sociological notion of
status/role. Examples include findings concerning the possible role of mirror neurons
and oxytocin in social cognition and behavior. The idea of modularity is considered as
a source of particular neurosociological hypothesis. It is also argued that the study of
the neural system may contribute to a better understanding of social categorization,
stratification and other macrosociological questions.
Keywords
neurosociology, role, social neuroscience, social structure, sociobiology, status
Résumé
Les avancées récentes en neuroscience sociale montrent que l’on peut chercher
l’origine de plusieurs phénomènes sociaux dans des processus neurologiques.
L’article s’intéresse aux principaux apports de la neuroscience pour une meilleure
compréhension des phénomènes sociaux. La neuroscience sociale est à l’heure actuelle
principalement guidée par des notions psychologiques et des théories qui la rendent
Corresponding author:
Aleksandr V Shkurko, Department of Philosophy and Political Science, Russian Presidential Academy of
National Economy and State Government, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.
Email: khanovey@rambler.ru

Shkurko 339
inapte à la résolution de problèmes sociologiques. Le recours de plus en plus fréquent

aux recherches sur le cerveau est cependant possible dans un domaine que nous appelons
neurosociologie. L’utilisation des données des sciences cognitives et neurologiques
peut éclairer la structure des phénomènes sociaux et permettre de mieux comprendre
l’action des mécanismes sociaux. La notion de statut/rôle est envisagée ici comme sujet
de recherche neurosociologique. L’auteur montre qu’un certain nombre de structures
et de processus du cerveau sont pertinents pour cette notion. Le rôle des neurones
miroir et de l’oxytocine dans la cognition et le comportement social est donné en
exemple. L'idée de modularité est examinée en tant que source possible des hypothèses
neurosociologiques. L’auteur défend aussi la thèse que le système neuronal puisse
contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des catégories sociales, de la stratification
sociale et d’autres questions macrosociologiques.
Mots-clés
neuroscience sociale, neurosociologie, rôle, sociobiologie, statut, structure sociale
Recent advances in neuroscience have prompted only a weak response in the social
sciences, which could be due to its highly ambitious claims. A number of fast-growing
fields such as social neuroscience and neuroeconomics are getting to the heart of
psychology, economics and, inter alia, sociology. These fields deal with problems common
in social sciences, such as stereotypes and prejudices, interpreting and reconstructing
the Other’s position and intentions, as well as values and reward-orienting behavior.
However, social scientists do not seem very interested in brain research, despite the fact
that, for example, authors submitting manuscripts to the journal SCAN (Social Cognitive
and Affective Neuroscience) are instructed to present their studies ‘in language that makes
their implications for the social sciences clear’.
Of course, this issue can be seen as another chapter in the long-standing debates
around the relations between social and natural sciences. In the general discussion around
the subjects and methods of social sciences, the introduction of social neuroscience does
not change the situation drastically. Attempts to bridge the gap between social and natural
sciences are undertaken repeatedly and form a paradigm of naturalism – one of the four
sociological paradigms in a well-known classification by Alexander (1982). The most
contemporary and relevant version of naturalism for our discussion is that which attempts
to link social and cultural studies with cognitive science. Works by Sperber (2011), and
Kaufmann & Clément (2007) are good examples.
Cognitive science and neuroscience are now closely related and interdependent. At
the same time, there is an important difference between them. While the first deals with
logical models of mind, which are essentially compatible with the core sociological
notion of actor, the latter studies the brain, a more ‘natural’ object than any in the social
sciences. While it seems theoretically and conceptually possible to discuss the relation
between an abstract decision-maker in rational-choice theory and the social system, the
link between the social system and the brain is less obvious. Yet it is the brain that makes
decisions in real life, while the cognitive actor is a model. To be sure, the brain is
presented as a model within neuroscience as well, but there is still the difference between

340 Social Science Information 51(3)
models of mind and models of the brain. Given the pace of advance in brain research, we
find it timely to update the debates surrounding the link between social and natural
sciences. Our aim is not to contribute to the general methodological and philosophical
discussion but rather to see how we can pragmatically use particular findings of current
research in neuroscience to gain a better understanding of social issues and to make
suggestions about what findings would be desirable. We focus on neuroscience rather
than cognitive science in order to avoid additional superficiality while clearly
understanding its ‘mediating’ role in the linkages we are discussing.
Among social scientists, interest in contemporary neuroscience has been shown by
social psychologists (see e.g. Dovidio, Pearson & Orr, 2008) and economists (e.g.
Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2005). Attempts to integrate neuroscience with social
psychology and economics gave rise to two important new fields of research: social
neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Yet both remain peripheral to these older scientific
disciplines. An interest in neuroscience has been demonstrated in other social sciences as
well, especially in political science (McDermott, 2009; Tingley, 2006). Some sociologists
too have recognized its importance. As S Turner has put it, ‘social theory ought to be
physically and computationally realistic and cognitively realistic…’ (Turner, 2007: 369).
The present article is in line with this modest claim.
Here we use the term ‘sociology’ in a broad sense, designating fields describing
collective forms of social life at both micro- and macrolevels. This active role of
sociology could be performed within a field of research we call neurosociology. This
term has been used by some authors (TenHouten, 1997) and was recently promoted in
DD Franks’s fascinating book Neurosociology (Franks, 2010). However, the subtitle of
this book – The nexus between neuroscience and social psychology – was rather
confusing. Although this important book covers a range of topics, from emotions to free
will, it focuses on including neuroscience in an agenda of symbolic-interaction theory,
one of the theories closest to social psychology. We argue instead that the study of the
brain can and should be a part of any sociological approach. By this insistence on
‘sociological’ neuroscience, we mean not only the possibility of extending the link we
discuss from microsociology (social interaction, individual behavior) to macrosociology
(institutions, social structure, social changes), an issue now successfully investigated
within analytical sociology (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998), but also to the conceptual
language as well. Both sociology and social psychology often deal with the same or very
closely related problems and work on one level of analysis. Take, for example, a problem
of stereotypes and prejudices, so intensively studied within social psychology and social
neuroscience. If we were to look at definitions of stereotypes as consensual social
knowledge about the groups to which an individual belongs (Mitchell et al., 2008: 594),
we would see that in sociology this set of phenomena would be named ‘role expectations’.
So, what within social psychology is studied as stereotypes would within sociology be
part of a more general aspect of social behavior, with different theoretical interpretations
and connections. Our argument is that it is possible to use not only a sociological scope
of analysis, but conceptual and theoretical devices as well.
First, we embark on a brief overview of social neuroscience, including its key
problems and findings. We then consider its current limitations and possible contributions
to sociology. A special neurosociological kind of social research is illustrated with an

Shkurko 341
example of role behavior, a notion that can be reasonably included in various social
theories.
Social neuroscience and sociology: Limitations and

contributions
Social neuroscience is a branch of neuroscience that seeks to find neural correlates of
social cognition, emotions, decision-making and behavior (see Adolphs, 2009, and
Lieberman, 2007, for reviews). Using lesion studies and subtle techniques such as
functional neuroimaging, it attempts to reveal the deepest processes underlying our
social life and to determine the origin of social abnormalities such as autism. Social
neuroscience is a very young but fast-growing field of research that is now well
institutionalized. Its findings are presented in a number of conferences and scholarly
journals such as Social Affective and Cognitive Neuroscience or Social Neuroscience. It
is closely related to the field of neuroeconomics, which can be defined as the neurobiology
of decision-making; and it converts the economic theory of expected utility into the
study of relevant brain processes. We use the term ‘social neuroscience’ to designate both
these fields.
Surely, there are good psychological and intellectual reasons for sociologists to avoid
talking about brains, bodies and the like, including different educational backgrounds
and competences necessary for dealing with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) data, or strong anti-reductionist traditions. However, there are quite rational
reasons for this as well. Brain scientists are engaged in a very different field, and their
research is typically driven by very different cognitive interests. Neuroscience, including
social neuroscience, does not try to solve sociological problems. And it should not. To
make use of neuroscience is a sociological task, and it is a sociologist who should think
how class relations or societal evolution are driven by and/or are implemented in brain
processes.
In effect, all the social phenomena we can talk about are implemented in motor
reactions of the body, be it changing where you live, making voting decisions or shifting
from an industrial to postindustrial society. If this is the case, someone has to explain
how global societal structures and changes rule the cerebellum. It is doubtful that
neuroscientists will be – or should be – such a ‘someone’. They have their own agenda.
To see how sociology should actively use brain research to solve sociological problems,
let’s start with the limitations of current social neuroscience. To avoid general talk about
the mind–body problem and the nature of different ‘emergences’, we focus on the more
pragmatic approach to sociological interpretations of neuroscience data. The most
important problems entailed in social neuroscience are as follows.
The search for neural correlates as a goal. Working within a dualistic framework,
social neuroscience seeks to associate psychological and social phenomena such as trust,
rewards, social categories or biases with neural processes and systems. This is usually
done without attempts to build causal chains. Information about brain localization of
subjective states is, in itself, sociologically useless. Even if we know that action selection
is strongly associated with the basal ganglia, it does not help us understand why a course
of action was chosen or why some agents in the population face such a situation.

The scope of analysis. It is frequently noted that, focusing on brain processes, social
neuroscience loses perspective and cannot see the wood for the trees. Indeed, most
sociologically interesting phenomena such as social structure or institutions step onto the
stage only when we see many individuals repeatedly performing complementary actions.
Different time scales. This point is closely related to the previous one. Social
neuroscience typically deals with processes lasting from milliseconds to seconds. This
does not allow us to see patterns of activities with a duration of days, years and centuries.
The statistical nature of neuroscience conclusions. Most of what we know about brain
processes is gained through statistical data analysis. This means no strong causal chain is
established between social functions and brain processes. In addition, we know that
neural resources can be reallocated when some brain areas are damaged. We must also
add the use of small and often-uncontrollable samples in many studies, which thus
restricts their ability for generalization. Yet for social neuroscience, the representativeness
of samples is a more important issue than in other fields of brain research because social
cognition and behavior are more sensitive to group and cultural differences.
Circular explanations and definitions. To reveal the deepest nature of mental states,
neuroscientists use fMRI scanners and other tools to look for neural correlates of
stereotypes, fear or risk evaluations. But in order to say that some neural activity is a sign
of, say, prejudice, we must first be able to identify something as a prejudice at the
behavioral level. Our understanding of brain processes is thus dependent on psychological
notions. Needless to say, these notions themselves function as theoretical biases toward
confirming our initial conceptions. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why neuroscience is
of limited interest for sociology. Current research in social neuroscience is usually guided
by psychological notions, theories and problems, not by sociological ones.
Lack of interest in personal differences, development and change. This is a direct
consequence of the search for neural correlates. Many laboratory experiments in
neuroscience do not try to find out how brain processes change when important shifts in
circumstances or social relations take place.
Encapsulation in the skull. Neuroscience is, by definition, interested in brain
processes. However, there’s a rapidly growing framework in cognitive science and other
fields that argues for externalization of the processes typically associated with an actor’s
inner world, namely: perception, cognition and action. This framework encompasses a
number of approaches, such as distributed cognition, situated cognition, ecological
psychology, embodied embedded cognition and others (Chandrasekharan & Osbeck,
2010; Osbeck, Malone & Nersessian, 2007). They conclude that, in order to understand
human activity, we must include the body (not only the brain!), environment, artifacts,
and even social and cultural entities in the very process of cognition. This means that the
brain alone does not enable us to understand an individual’s inner life.
Brain data are not detailed enough yet to satisfy the needs of sociology. We can find
brain processes associated with different activities but they are still very crude compared
to sociological or anthropological problems, which deal with very subtle differences.
However, this is the least important obstacle, taking into account the pace of advance in
neuroimaging and other techniques.
Of course, many of the above-mentioned issues have already been recognized and
articulated both outside and within social neuroscience (see e.g. Adolphs, 2010; Dovidio,

Shkurko 343
Pearson & Orr, 2008; Huettel, 2010). At the same time, brain research has made at least
four general contributions to sociology and other social sciences.
Clarification of the structure of action. The very idea of neuroscience is that every
mental state and personal behavior has its neural correlates. The implicit idea of sociology
is that every social phenomenon somehow corresponds to an actor’s mind and behavior.
Taking these ideas together, let us suppose that every social phenomenon can be traced
to specific neural processes. This modest conclusion (in the sense that we say nothing
about causal chains and reductionism) is based upon philosophical monism and is
sufficient to justify using neurophysiological data in clarifying sociological questions.
Knowledge of low-level operations underlying social cognition and behavior can
contribute to our understanding of social mechanisms. A social mechanism is considered
as a putative device linking observable events (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). If two or
more events can be tied to such a general device, this can be considered an explanation.
In principle, these ‘events’ need not be facts of a special social theory. If it is possible to
invent a device linking facts of different scientific disciplines, we can consider it to be an
explanation as well. Such a device can even contain ontological disruptions, say
unresolved mind–body problems, and still be explanatory. We can make our understanding
of a causal mechanism linking social or other events as deep as possible according to our
practical needs and possibilities. A case involving oxytocin illustrates this contribution of
neuroscience (see below). A detailed knowledge of mechanisms underlying social
behavior is an end in itself, but, at the same time, it contributes to an understanding of
more traditional sociological issues.
Neuroscience can inform sociology about the spectrum of possible variations in
human biology related to social organization and behavior. Since many features of
societies depend on limitations and capabilities of the human body and the human mind,
we can use neuroscience and other natural sciences to define which societies are possible
and which are plausible. For example, humans, like all the other species with a nervous
system, demonstrate reward-orienting behavior. This means that a society in which most
behaviors go unrewarded is impossible.
Neuroscience provides sociology with new and more objective measures of social
phenomena. Many objects of interest, such as values, attitudes or efforts, can be identified
and measured in a much more reliable and universal way than has been done until now.
To see how neuroscience can contribute to a better understanding of sociological
problems in the field we call neurosociology, we next take an example of status/role as
one of the most important objects of sociological interest.
Decomposition of role behavior

The notions of statuses and roles are widely presented across social theories. Let us focus
on definitions commonly found in sociology textbooks: status as a position in social
structure, associated with specific expectations, and role as a corresponding mode of
behavior. It is important to note that social structures function as a kind of categorization
process, i.e. a cognitive activity (Bourdieu, 1989; Jenkins, 2000). Even if we consider
social structure as an objective supraindividual entity, we must remember that it is only
through human activity that it can be manifested (Harré, 2002). If so, even the most

abstractly defined social structure must somehow operate as a cause of human role
behavior. Network analysis may well reveal the formal features of social structure
(Freeman, 2008), but to explain how taking a position within it corresponds with an
individual’s behavior demands additional knowledge. Such an explanation is possible
either via individuals’ perception and knowledge of their positions and roles, or via their
responding to environmental constraints and opportunities. In any event, a causal
mechanism is needed and it certainly includes brain processes.
Although there are important differences in the way notions of social structures,
statuses and roles are interpreted, taking social positions is usually associated with the
following.
Specific activities. It is something often ignored, especially in relational sociology,
that different positions in social structure usually imply different tasks and activities.
When we speak of a mother’s or an employer’s position, we do not simply mean this is
a special position defined by its relation to the positions of children or employees; we
also mean their typical activities. A typical mother cooks meals, buys toys, sings a
lullaby, asks about their children’s homework, and so on. Perceiving activities like these
is included in the system of status recognition and evaluation by others. Every role is a
pattern of behavioral activities, not just a node in the network.
Focus of attention and relevancy criteria. Each active position makes an individual
focus on a highly specified subject-matter, strongly narrowing his current interest and
information search according to the needs of role performance. For an individual who is
taking the mother position, information on infant disease or school reform is much more
relevant than information on traffic regulation, which is important for the same individual
when she takes the position of a car-driver. A social position imposes relevancy structure
upon the perceiving of social being and the world around.
Specific perceptions, evaluations, judgments and preferences in choice situations.
Sociologists are especially interested in how different positions correlate with perception
and evaluation of social objects, be they neighbors or political parties. When relations
between employers and employees are being discussed, sociologists attempt to trace
them in cultural, ethnic, gender and other differences. Multiple social differences must
be correlated somehow; this is the key idea of sociology. Different positions value
different things and prefer different choices in similar situations.
Mobilization of effort. Social positions may differ in the amount of personal time and
effort invested in role behavior. Individuals occupying high positions may be expected to
work hard compared to those in lower positions (the opposite can take place as well).
Roles composing the role-set of a status, or different statuses, may require more or less
effort because of their relative significance.
When we speak of statuses and roles, we can also mean different stages of role
functioning. These dynamic aspects of roles include:
– role construction and internalization;

– role activation (when a role is being activated due to its relevance in a particular
situation);
– role implementation or performance;

Shkurko 345
– role termination and role switching (when we finish our role behavior or switch
to another role);
– role interference or composition (when we are in a situation inducing simultane-
ous activation of different roles);
– role conflict resolution.
We must also add processes relating to the roles of others: social categorization, status
identification (what is the status of a counter-agent?) and role evaluation.
Clarifying the low-level structure of role behavior using

social neuroscience
Thinking about statuses and roles, we can pose a number of theoretical and research
questions, for example: Why are there stable roles in societies? Why do they differ in
number, properties and distribution? Why are some statuses and roles more significant
than others? Which statuses and roles are these? How does an individual make the
decision as to which role to perform here and now? How and why does social position
affect individuals’ reasoning and values? And so on.
We suggest that a detailed knowledge of low-level processes underlying role behavior
can shed light on sociological questions like these. To give a low-level interpretation of
roles, statuses and social structure is a task for neurosociology. However, as this field of
research is only a project, we could start with some findings of social neuroscience. Because
this field is driven primarily by psychological and neurophysiological interests, we are
forced to use terms borrowed from cognitive science and psychology in this list of role-
related brain functions. However, it is possible to make use of its findings both to clarify
the very nature of roles and to answer particular questions of the kind we mentioned above.
Table 1 lists a number of foci of attention in brain research relevant to our purposes
(though not necessarily composing roles as such). Examples of research mentioned cover
role-behavior components only partially, leaving numerous ‘sociological’ lacunae. Note
that we mentioned only neural structures, not physiological, cognitive or psychological
mechanisms (these can serve as associated functions, however). Note also that we do not
consider this list to be an objective structure of role behavior, a kind of mapping of social
function onto the brain. After all, we are dealing with a field where knowledge is changing
so rapidly that this list may very soon be outdated. This, however, does not invalidate our
main argument. The relation between social and natural sciences is not that the former
are simply consumers and the latter producers. There is no sense in waiting until
‘everything is clear’ in neuroscience to use its knowledge as building-blocks of
explanation. Almost any social theory can propose to look for ‘neural correlates’ of
something and to produce a new list of brain functions. Unfortunately, for now such a
‘sociological’ list of brain functions and structures would be empty. We thus summarize
superficially relevant areas of current research as a preliminary step. A quantitative
meta-analysis is needed to propose a more accurate description of currently available
brain data. Nevertheless, we can make some useful suggestions even now.
(1) Although fragmentary, listed research focuses on issues most of which are quite
relevant and interesting for social science. Almost all the components of role behavior

Table 1. Role-related areas of research in social neuroscience
346
Components Relevant areas of research Associated functions Examples of research or

(brain structures or processes) review articles
Specific tasks and activities Structured event complexes Representations of knowledge about Wood, 2003
(scripts, schemas). Associated event sequences and goals concerning
with networks in PFCa thematic activities
LIP area (lateral intraparietal Representation of possible and Glimcher, Dorris & Bayer,
area) in posterior parietal potentially accessible actions 2005
cortex
Focus of attention and relevancy Amygdala Relevance of stimuli for needs and Sander,Grafman & Zalia, 2003
criterion goals
Significations and evaluations of social Shared circuits Direct recognition of Other’s mental Gallesse et al., 1996; Keysers
objects, status-related emotions, states and intentions via simulation & Gazzola, 2006
preferences and biases (habitus)
PFC, Superior temporal sulcus Theory of Mind construction, Adolphs, 2009; Coricelli &
and right temporoparietal intentions attribution Nagel, 2009; Decety & Lamm,
junction 2007; Keysers & Gazzola,
2006; Mason & Macrae, 2008
PFC Attitudes and stereotypes Knutson et al., 2006; Wood,
2003
Hippocampus and dorsolateral Biased perception and evaluation McClure, Li et al., 2004
PFC
Ventromedial PFC Expectations of evaluations Moor et al., 2010
Ventromedial PFC and ventral Evaluation of options (subjective value Kable & Glimcher, 2009

striatum of goods and actions, respectively)
Striatal dopamine Dominance Martinez et al., 2010
Late positive potential Stereotype threat, expectation of Derks, Inzlicht & Kang, 2008
negative evaluations
Gray matter volume in the Subjective social status Gianaros et al., 2007
perigenual area of the anterior
cingulate cortex
Social Science Information 51(3)
(Continued)
Table 1. (Continued)

Shkurko

Superior anterior temporal Processing abstract social concepts Zahn et al., 2007
cortex
Mobilization of effort P300 potential Amount of effort Murata, 2005; Polich, 2007
Dopaminergic system Reward processing Alves et al., 2011; McClure,
Laibson et al., 2004; McClure,
York & Montague, 2004
Role construction and internalization Basal ganglia Category-learning processes Ashby & Spiering, 2004;
Seger, 2008
Medial PFC Common basis for social and personal Volz , Kessler & von Cramon,
identity 2009
Dopamine and ventral striatum Reward-mediated learning Ashby & Spiering, 2004;
Brown & Ridderinkhof, 2009;
Kable & Glimcher, 2009;
McClure, York & Montague,
2004
Serotonin Processing reward cues Brown & Ridderinkhof, 2009
Oxytocin Social memory, attachment and social Campbell, 2010; Norman et
bonding al., 2010
Role activation PFC Integration of reward system and McClure, York & Montague,
action selection 2004

Basal ganglia Goal-setting, action selection on the Oztürk, 2009; Seger, 2008
basis of relevant categories
Medial PFC and striatum Behavioral changes in the presence of Izuma, Saito & Sadato, 2010
others, seeking reputational rewards
Role implementation Cerebellum How-component of action selection Oztürk, 2009
Caudolateral OFC,b Performance monitoring and cognitive Adolphs, 2009; Coricelli &
dorsolateral PFC, posterior control of behavior Nagel, 2009; Huettel, 2010
347
and anterior PFC

Table 1. (Continued)
348

Dopaminergic system Cognitive control of behavior Cools, 2008
Right dorsolateral PFC Implementation of norms-regulated Knoch et al., 2006
behaviors, willingness to follow social
norms
Role termination or role switching Basal ganglia Rule switching and task switching Ashby & Spiering, 2004
PFC Relational social-state representation Fujii et al., 2009
and responses to status changes
Role interference or composition P200 and N200 components Status interference (e.g. simultaneous Dickter & Bartholow, 2007
of ERPc gender and racial cues processing)
Role conflict resolution Subthalamic nucleus Conflict decisions Fumagalli et al., 2011
Social categorization and status Ventrolateral PFC Identification of status cues Marsh et al., 2009
identification
Frontal cortex Semantic retrieval of social categorical Mitchell et al., 2008
knowledge
Occipital/parietal cortex Response to Other’s high status Zink et al., 2008
Left and right cingulated gyrus Identification of politician’s high status Knutson et al., 2006
ERPc over frontal scalp Race recognition He et al., 2009
P200 and P300 ERP (temporo- Spontaneous and intentional goal Van der Cruyssen et al., 2009
parietal junction and medial ascribing, i.e. expectations concerning
PFC, respectively) Other’s intention

Amygdala Fast processing of social stimuli Adolphs, 2009
Role behavior evaluation MFN (medial-frontal Other’s performance monitoring, non- Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006
negativity) ERP self reward processing
Medial OFC and ventromedial Positive evaluations of Other imitating Kühn et al., 2010
PFC perceiver’s own behavior
aPFC = prefrontal cortex; bOFC = orbitofrontal cortex; cERP = event-related potentials.
Social Science Information 51(3)
Shkurko 349
studied by sociologists are in some way or other reflected in neuroscience. This means
that every brain structure or process mentioned is a possible candidate for inclusion in
the explanatory mechanism of social research concerning role behavior.
(2) Current research delineates role-related processes in a very fragmentary and
inconsistent manner. This means that nobody is trying to convert status/roles or other
sociological notions into neural processes. And nobody has to do it in fact. We must
clearly realize that initial role-behavior decomposition, as well as integration and
interpretation of research findings, are purely sociological tasks. It would be interesting
to speculate on how social scientists could make use of fMRI scanners and other
experimental equipment of neuroscience if they were rich and bold enough, but the most
realistic scenario for including brain studies in empirical research in social sciences is
that of a meta-analysis guided by the theories and hypotheses of sociology, political
science or culture studies.
(3) On the other hand, we can see how many brain regions and structures are involved
in processing roles. Such an analytical approach is common and useful in cognitive
science but seldom in sociological work. The decomposition of role-related phenomena
into the set of the deepest functions and operations is necessary in order to see if they are
merely parts of a complex, well-structured and orchestrated system, or if they can,
instead, be processed quite independently of each other. Looking at this multitude of
brain functions, can we say they work together to compose status/role/habitus as a unit
of analysis? Or, instead, are there many separate processes whose independent effects we
assign to a status? The current state of affairs in neuroscience gives us no answer, partially
because of the circular definitions we mentioned above. However, it seems that role-
related brain systems are not localized somewhere in the brain as a unity.
(4) Evidence that there are different processes and structures performing seemingly
similar or close components of roles can make us change our understanding of their inner
structure. For example, this seems plausible in the case of social perception or biases.
The converse is also the case. If seemingly different role-related phenomena engage the
same neural systems, this can be the sign of a common mechanism at work. An important
example is the role of dopamine in reward-processing, learning, control of behavior and
taking high positions in the social structure. A much more detailed examination of data
is needed to come to final conclusions, though.
The question remains: Is such information really relevant and useful for sociology?
Why should we be interested in these low-level processes? First of all, in attempting to
reveal the detailed mechanism of social behavior, the linking of high-level phenomena
such as class conflicts or institutional functioning, to low-level processes is a task in its
own right. But we can use it to deepen our understanding of these high-level phenomena
as well. To see why this can be done, let’s take a closer look at some of the above-
mentioned role components.
Shared circuits, mentalizing and role expectations

Predicting human behavior is crucial for social interaction and social organization.
Seizing intentions and the sense of Other’s actions is often associated with the ability to

construct mental representation of Other’s mind, i.e. theory of mind. The idea that social
understanding can be reduced to a single mechanism of mentalizing is now challenged.
There are numerous findings concerning theory of mind construction and related
effects. We focus on only one intriguing discovery made by contemporary neuroscience,
namely mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are neural cells in the brain of humans and other
primates that are activated both when performing and when observing an action or
emotional reactions (Gallese et al., 1996). Thus, according to this theory, when we watch
the Other smile or pick up a glass, we simulate his reactions with our own, without
building any cognitive pictures of Other’s mind. This is supposed to be a kind of direct
perception and interpretation of Other’s inner states. Mirror neurons were later considered
as a part of the brain mechanism called shared circuits (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). Some
populations of neurons are more broadly tuned to a class of situations, whereas others
respond very selectively to specific actions, sensations and emotions. Shared circuits are
thus considered as a means of effortlessly sharing the experience of others, making social
interaction more effective.
The question of how shared circuits are connected with theories of mind is discussed
elsewhere (see Adolphs, 2009; Decety, 2010; Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). Even the very
nature of mirror neurons is under discussion. An interesting analysis by Csibra (2007)
shows that mirror neurons can better be described as top-down emulation of action, and
not as bottom-up imitation. Taking into account the hierarchical nature of action (main
goals are divided into subgoals, tasks and low-level operations), the idea that mirror
neurons can directly respond to the most subtle kinematics of the Other, initiating
simulation and thus understanding intentions, is not supported by empirical data. Instead,
the author proposes the model wherein the actor makes hypotheses about Other’s
intentions, and triggers a simulation process to verify them and anticipate future actions.
However, it is important to note that, denying ‘direct-matching’ interpretation of mirror
neurons, Csibra does not argue that the mirror-neurons system is governed by a
mentalizing process. The author emphasizes that ‘extracting the content of an intention
(the goal) does not necessarily imply representing it as the content of a mental state’
(Csibra, 2007: 447).
Whether mirror neurons provide us with direct perception of Other’s actions and
emotions or not, it is doubtful they can embrace all the phenomena involved in
understanding an Other (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). We can make a rational reconstruction
of Other’s goals and expectations without ever seeing him/her. Simulation of Other’s
movements is useless for understanding his/her deepest motives and ultimate goals.
Shared circuits must be crucial for socialization but they are surely not the answer to why
we ascribe intentions every time we do. It seems that shared circuits and mentalizing are
not parts of a single mechanism of understanding other people. Moreover, although
theory of mind construction is repeatedly associated with several brain structures (see
Table 1), it is not at all clear whether or not they compose a separate and specific system
(Stone & Gerrans, 2006).
But what about roles? Their relation to social cognition is twofold. First, sociologists
claim that perception and evaluation of other people are part of the habitus associated
with a social position. Consequently, different positions must manifest themselves in
different predictions of Other’s behavior and in different theories of mind. Second, we

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are able to make predictions about the behavior of other people by simple identification
of their status (Asian man, poor student, etc.). These role expectations are very stable and
are applicable to many different people. Thus, they are neither a kind of mentalizing nor
direct perception. They are a third way to understand and predict behavior. Its
distinctiveness and independence from mentalizing is partially supported by evidence
from developmental psychology. In a recent study by Clément, Bernard & Kaufmann
(2011), children engaged in a false-belief task demonstrated a clear difference between
predictions of the behavior of others based on mentalizing and predictions based on
understanding social norms. Since normative components of role expectations are quite
obvious, the existence of a specialized mechanism for processing role information seems
possible.
The very idea that there can be at least three different cognitive mechanisms for
grasping Other’s intentions is an important sociological hypothesis because it leads us to
the following questions: How are shared circuits tied and how do they interfere with role
expectations and mentalizing when we come to ascribe intentions? How do different
social positions interfere with a shared circuit system in face-to-face interactions? And
do they interfere at all? It seems clear that, if shared circuits are really direct, then they
must function in the social situation completely independently of any possible group
identities and expectations. We can also pose more specific questions, for example: How
do public understanding and evaluation of politicians change with the introduction of
information and communication technologies, allowing visual perception of their
behavior. A much more detailed and accurate explanation can be arrived at if we know
about shared circuits and other special neural mechanisms.
Taking into account what has been said above, we could advance some specific
neurosociological hypotheses. For example, if it is really possible to distinguish between
different neural systems underlying some sort of behavior, we would suppose that:
1 If perception via shared circuits matches role expectations, then reaction time for
responding behavior should be less than in contradictory cases.
2 The final outcome of comprehension and evaluation tasks in face-to-face
interaction is determined by the relative strength of different neural systems,
associated, possibly, with shared circuits, role expectations and mentalizing. This,
in turn, can be determined by other variables such as time available to the actor.
3 If a situation induces conflicting role expectations, e.g. because of mixed social
categorization, then shared circuits can become more significant for understanding
the behavior of others.
Oxytocin and social bonding

Another example is oxytocin (OT), a hot topic in social neuroscience. Oxytocin is a
neuropeptide traditionally associated with parturition (Mitchell & Schmid, 2001), which
has recently been associated with important prosocial effects as well. These include
social memory, attachment and trust behavior (Campbell, 2010; Norman et al., 2010). Its
social effects are so obvious that oxytocin is being used to induce unconditional trust in
psychological experiments (Boone, Declerck & Kiyonari, 2010). Although causal chains

in the secretion of oxytocin as well as of another similar neuropeptide, vasopressin, are

not understood yet, it is clear that oxytocin level is at least partially determined by purely
physiological and genetic factors.
Should we include oxytocin in explaining, say, maternal behavior? We know that in
most cultures mother is a social status associated with caregiving and strong emotional
attachment toward a child. If there is indeed an evolutionary pressure toward the selection
of OT-related genes and systems, how should we consider these role expectations? Are
they sedimentations of intrinsic behavioral triggers of human behavior? The functionalist
explanation that role expectations for maternal behavior become fixed because of their
functional contribution to social integrity is definitely not the case. Neither functions nor
dysfunctions can operate fast enough to select genetic variants. The interpretativist view
that maternal behavior is one of a range of child-bearing strategies is not the case either.
This is because oxytocin regulation in parturition and lactation operates independently of
any contextual or institutional social effects. It is part of an evolutionary mechanism that
can be traced down to reptiles (Bell, 2001). If this is the case, we should think of social
norms and role expectations as realized via additional and quite separate neural
mechanisms interacting with the OT-secretion system. This, again, leads us to very
specific predictions and hypotheses. If there really are different neural systems influencing
maternal behavior, then the outcome should be considered as a function dependent on
their relative strength and interaction. As this strength is an absolute, not a relative, value,
we can expect, for example, that, when different systems are contradictory, are equally
strong and the magnitudes are high, this will induce greater stress compared to situations
in which they are contradictory, equally strong and their magnitudes are low.
Another example of the social effects of oxytocin is its role in behavioral changes
induced by a popular club drug, Ecstasy (Dumont et al., 2009; Johansen & Crebs, 2009).
To see how findings of neuroscience could be included in an explanatory mechanism
connecting social events, suppose that a social theory has to explain such observable
events as the ‘emergence of clubbing culture’ and ‘growth of Ecstasy consumption’. It is
quite possible to give such an explanation by referring to availability of leisure time,
entrepreneurs’ motivations for illegal-drug distribution or youth subculture (see Hunt,
Moloney & Evans, 2010, as an example of this type of research). But if we knew that
Ecstasy increases oxytocin concentration, which reduces amygdala activity, which
reduces fear, which stimulates social attachment and trust (Dumont et al., 2009), we
would add to the knowledge of our mechanism by saying that oxytocin helps people
meet needs of social bonding, thus inducing them to visit clubs. Whatever we thought
about methodological and ontological issues, whatever we thought about what is ‘social’
in this case, we would know more.
A more interesting situation arises if introducing causal chains revealed by
neuroscience not simply deepens our understanding of a social mechanism but forces us
to change it. Social research might explain drug consumption in clubs by referring to role
expectations and social norms of the sort: ‘If you are in, just have a good time’ or ‘If you
are in the club and do not use Ecstasy, then maybe something is wrong with you’. We can
even see Ecstasy consumption as a part of clubbing culture. At the same time, a detailed
consideration of drug effects themselves could probably lead us to a more interesting
explanation. Ecstasy administrates oxytocin release. This, in turn, reduces fear and

Shkurko 353
distrust toward others thus increasing probability of behavior directed to establishing and
maintaining social relations. Oxytocin-related effects of Ecstasy consumption are time-
dependent, they peak at 1–2 hours after drug intake (Dumont et al., 2009). For this period
of time, the only social objects a typical clubber meets are other clubbers. The increased
bonding-seeking behavior thus tends to foster the formation of social relations primarily
among clubbers. The club becomes a place strongly associated with positive social
relations. To establish such relations outside the club is, ceteris paribus (i.e. for the same
period of time and for the same number of persons available for social bonding), less
probable. The bonding-related effects of oxytocin in this case would contribute to group
identity and the very formation of clubbing culture. This conclusion is something very
different from the initial explanation.
This example is speculation. Yet it shows the possible logic of the neurosociological
explanation. It produces a testable hypothesis. For example, we could compare clubbing
cultures and clubbers’ social relations in clubs with or without intensive Ecstasy
consumption; or clubs with Ecstasy and those with cocaine. This kind of causal chain
would hardly be produced by social science or neuropharmacology.
Role behavior and modularity

The questions discussed here relate to very old debates about the nature versus nurture
dilemma. What is new in current science is that we can answer the questions not in a
general form but in a very detailed, specific and elaborate manner. Even more importantly,
we can see how the interaction between factors typically attributed to the ‘biological’ and
the ‘social’ can be analyzed in an ontologically homogeneous manner. When the nature/
nurture question arises, it is often concluded that there are two (or more) different groups
of factors affecting the human mind and behavior both of which contribute to our
understanding of social phenomena but quite independently of each other. There are
biological and social factors of social life. This conclusion often takes the ‘we are not
reductionists’ form among those scholars who accept the importance of ’biological’
arguments in social science (e.g. Franks, 2010; Hibbing & Smith, 2007; Kaufmann &
Clément, 2007). However, this ‘modest’ conclusion can lead to an inappropriate dualistic
position, thus raising an inconvenient question: How can ontologically distinct
phenomena interact? Understanding this problem, Kaufmann & Clément (2007) attempt
to invent an ‘intermediary’ language and introduce the term ‘social forms’ to reflect
ecological relations between agents and environment. This useful contribution does not,
however, help us to solve the interaction questions we mentioned above. When we
discussed the interaction of role expectations with shared circuits or the oxytocin system,
we tried to show their commonality as well as their distinctiveness. If we agree that
social positions must be somehow realized at the neural level, then we can reasonably
discuss their interaction with other factors at the same neural level. In no way are we
going to say that status/role is a kind of neural system. Simply, even if it is defined as a
relational entity in an abstract theoretical consideration, an explanatory mechanism
linking such events as ‘taking a social position’ and ‘performing a particular action’ must
include neural processes as parts of the mechanism. Alternatively, we could take special
neural events as units of analysis while trying to reveal the causal chain linking neural

representations across agents and environments in a way similar to the ‘epidemiological’

approach proposed by Dan Sperber (2011).
The idea of the interaction of ontologically homogeneous elements of a causal
mechanism of social behavior can be easily connected with a vivid discussion within
contemporary cognitive and neuroscience, namely: modularity. Modularity implies that
different neural systems exist in the mind and in the brain. They differ in functions and
they differ in the neural pathways they use (e.g. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Kurzban &
Aktipis, 2007; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). They are considered to evolve in response
to various environmental challenges and tasks. These different systems can be
interconnected and they can be in competition with each other. Different systems can
perform different functions or they can perform one function in different ways. Although
modularity is typically associated with functional specialization, cases in which modules
perform behaviorally and cognitively similar or closely related outcomes are of especial
interest for us. A short list of supporting findings from neuroscience includes:
– separate neural systems for processing immediate and delayed rewards

(McClure, Laibson et al., 2004);
– different processes underlying categorization (Ashby & Spiering, 2004; Smith
& Grossman, 2008);
– different mechanisms involved in attitudes (Wood, 2003);
– autonomous systems for goal setting and goal implementation (Öztürk, 2009);
– interacting but quite independent processes in decision-making (Fellows, 2004).
What is important is that these systems are more or less autonomous: none can be seen
as a governor. In addition, behavioral or cognitive outcome is the result of the interplay
between different systems. Modularity of mind challenges the very notion of self: If the
mind is composed of modules, then who is the actor? We say actor when we need to point
to the source of a particular behavioral or cognitive outcome. But what exactly is the
source of action if different systems interact to produce the outcome? Different modules
can be triggered by different cues: for example, the mirror-neuron systems can be
triggered by the observed kinematics of Other’s body, while role expectations are
activated by status identification. Isn’t it reasonable to suppose that the resultant outcome,
say ascribed intention, is a function of the relative strength of different cognitive/neural
systems and the triggering cues (the notion of strength needs clarification in this context
but it seems appropriate). Suppose then that the mirror-neurons’ cue happens to be
stronger than the status ascribed. Can’t we say that the outcome is caused by the
kinematics of Other’s body? At least in this case, environment is a much better predictor
of an individual’s actions and cognitions – some psychologists call it ‘the strong situation’
(Cooper & Withey, 2009) – while the mediating system is the mirror-neurons system and
not social position.
Social scientists believe that social and cultural phenomena can arise from the
interaction of individual agents. There is no logical jump in suggesting that they arise
from the interaction of even smaller units like modules. The fact that we have become
accustomed to see ourselves as holistic entities is not the question. Our consciousness
may be just one more module among others (Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007). Modularity is a

Shkurko 355
hypothesis. However, it is a useful hypothesis since it puts different factors of behavior

on the same level. The current discussion about modularity within cognitive science is
not about the idea itself but rather about the exact list of functions and interconnections
between modules. For example, when questioning the idea of a specialized ‘theory of
mind’ module, Stone & Gerrans (2006) do not so much reject the modular view as such
but rather replace one set of modules with a different one.
The relation of modularity to role behavior is twofold. First, we can ask if there are
special modules for processing social roles; second, we can wonder if there are different
systems for processing different statuses/roles. Although the latter question does not
necessarily imply the modular approach (see below), the former one definitely does. The
existence of specialized ‘social’ modules has been argued by some scholars. Kurzban &
Atkipis (2007) propose the existence of a social cognitive interface, a module responsible
for manipulation of others through effective self-presentation. Conein (2007) discusses
two means engaged in the existence of social groups, namely skills for maintenance of
group cohesion and monitoring of relations (albeit abstaining from calling them modules
directly). The study by Clément, Bernard & Kaufmann (2011) assumes a module for
processing social norms. Important work by Lawrence Hirschfeld on ‘folk sociology’
points to another candidate for a specialized social module designed for producing
hypotheses about social affiliations and the group structure of social environments
(Hirschfeld, 2001). This idea is of special interest for us as it hypothesizes the existence
of a social-cognition system completely independent from socialization. For sociologists,
it is taken for granted that socialization is a one-way process translating existing social
structures into newcomers’ minds. The fact that children can independently produce
hypotheses about boundaries and relations of social groups while using information from
the socialization process to verify them means that status/role information is not a single
unit of transferred social knowledge but rather a composite cognitive inference.
These findings point to the possibility that status/role is an epiphenomenon of several
mechanisms dealing with different aspects of social categorization and role-related
behavior. Whether the components of role behavior listed in Table 1 are served by
specialized modules or not is a matter for empirical research. The modular hypothesis
would receive support in the event systems responsible for various components of
statuses/roles, say encoding role-related activities and ascribing emotions and cognitions,
were shown to be processed not simply by distinct, but by independent neural mechanisms.
Again, whether this hypothesis is confirmed or not, this would be a kind of research we
could call neurosociological.
A few role-related sociological questions for

neurosociology
It can be said that the above-mentioned examples are more relevant for social psychology
than for sociology. This is true. However, it is quite possible to make interesting
hypotheses concerning even purely sociological, macroscopic problems. We conclude
with a brief examination of some possible neurosociological lines of research concerning
social structure and role-related activities in a more traditional way.

1 What is the difference between statuses?

Every sociology textbook tells us that numerous statuses exist in society: kinship,
professional, economic, gender, ethnic, political, and so on. We usually introduce them in
sociological research to see how they correlate with differences in behaviors and
evaluations. But how and why should we differentiate between statuses? And what
determines their differences and significance? We could use social neuroscience to find out
how different statuses are processed in our neural system. Do different systems process
different statuses? We could use information about differences in status processing to
compare statuses themselves. Imagine that status X is processed in a similar manner to
status Y, while processing status Z involves different neural systems. We might then
conclude that the nature of X and Y is similar, or even they are one and the same thing.
Though, it is sometimes noted that evidence of different systems is more persuasive than
evidence of similar systems (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). If statuses use different neural
systems, this can help us understand why they differ in behavioral or cognitive effects. It is
reasonable to suppose that we must process gender statuses in a different way from
professional ones. Social neuroscience is now trying to understand the neural basis of
status processing. Till now, however, it has concentrated primarily on race and gender (see,
e.g., Dickter & Bartholow., 2007; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Marsh et al., 2009; Wright et al.,
2008). This is partially because the discussion about the so-called ‘primary’ social categories
within social and evolutionary psychology concentrates on age, sex and race (e.g. Kinzler,
Shutts & Correll, 2010; Kurzban, Tooby & Cosmides., 2001). However, ‘primary’ does not
mean ‘most important’. Sociology may well contribute to the discussion by focusing
attention on the social categorizations actually organizing social life in contemporary
societies. Rapid changes in the status priorities underlying the social structure of a given
society, or political manipulations of categorizations are processes sociologists are well
aware of but which are almost completely ignored by social neuroscientists.
Sociologically, status categories are homogeneous: roles associated with gender are
logically and structurally similar to roles associated with race, occupation or income.
They may differ in their significance, stability, contents, etc., but logically they are similar.
This is reflected in the very notion of status/role. They all function as mechanisms of
social differentiation and ordering principles. However, this view could be challenged if
we knew that some statuses were processed by distinct cognitive/neural devices. In a well-
known study by Kurzban, Tooby & Cosmides (2001), there is evidence that what we
know as race categorization is a manifestation of a more general mechanism of coalition
detection (see also Hirschfeld, 2001), and, more interestingly, that this mechanism is
essentially different and independent from the gender-encoding system. The idea that
some kinds of statuses are manifestations of a general form of social categorization
(coalitions or even more general such as ingroup/outgroup distinction) while other statuses
have their own essence is of huge importance for sociology and other social sciences.
2 Are all social structures hierarchical?

This is another theoretically important question. The evolution of societies leads to
higher levels of differentiation. Are all these differentiations organized hierarchically?

Shkurko 357
Or, in other words, do we perceive all significant social differences as differences in

domination and power? Sociologists often advance such hypotheses without trying to
test them empirically or to make them empirically testable. For example, Bourdieu
articulates this idea very clearly, arguing that the structure of social space is inevitably
hierarchized since it is structured by unequal capital distribution (1984a, 1984b). But is
this really so? It seems possible to test this hypothesis with social neuroscience. Hierarchy
of dominance is a focus of attention in all psychological and biological sciences. The
processing of high and low statuses entails clear physiological and neural marks
(Gianaros et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2009; Martinez et al., 2010; Zink et al., 2008). Why
not use these signs to learn if they are really present in people’s brains when processing
status information? If we get evidence that this dominance-related neural system is
constantly being activated in status processing (i.e. is strongly associated with social
categorization), then indeed we will be able to conclude that the structure of dominance
organizes all other social structures. To be honest, however, we must admit that such
neural marks of domination can only be applied to representations of social structure.
They are not directly applicable to situations where social stratification is extracted
according to principles that ignore the agent’s social knowledge. These findings may
nevertheless explain parts of the stratification mechanism that establishes and maintains
social hierarchy and inequality.
3 Why do various groups value different things?

The underlying reason is the intriguing evidence of the existence of common ‘neural currency’
in the human brain for various rewards. It is widely recognized throughout social and
behavioral sciences that human behavior is reward driven. Research in social neuroscience
and neuroeconomics shows that there is a common and very universal neural mechanism
underlying reward processing independently of the nature of the stimuli. Different values, be
they food, money, social attachment or something else, activate the dopaminergic system and
brain areas such as the ventral striatum in a very similar manner (Brosch et al., 2011; McClure,
York & Montague, 2004). If this is true, what does it mean for sociology? It seems we all seek
one and the same thing – in the sense of an inner state of reward and satisfaction. But we
know that people value different things. Why is this the case? Some neuroscientists suppose
this is a matter of individual or cultural differences in value priorities (Brosch et al., 2011).
For sociology, this seems to be an inappropriate explanation since the differences correlate
with group and institutional constitution. Why do scientists seek recognition; businessmen,
money; politicians, power; and housewives a cozy home?
There are good sociological reasons for such a mechanism. Social differentiation
produces new institutions. Institutions differ in their functions and media: money, power,
reputation. Yet they all need one common resource: agents’ motivation. It would not be
surprising if the evolution of society managed to connect these different rewards with the
same motivational devices. The existence of a common neural currency is thus
sociologically plausible. But a more subtle question can be clarified with reference to
social neuroscience. Even if stimuli such as food, money or reputation engage one and
the same reward system, there is an objective cognitive and/or physiological difference
between them. To be rewarded by food when hungry and to be rewarded by subtle flattery

are not the same since they engage different cognitive skills and neural pathways. These
pathways connecting stimulus with a putative common reward system (be it short term
or long term if indeed such a distinction exists) may differ in their ability to produce the
reward effect. These differences then should be included in the explanation of motivation
within various social contexts.
4 What variations of social structures and role

behaviors are possible?
It is clear that our biological organization imposes limitations upon social relations and
society design. But what exactly are these limitations? This question is of special interest
since technological advances and institutional conditions make it both possible and
probable to change this biological organization. Neurosociology can clarify the question.
The first step is to define the space of all possible variations of social structures. There is a
direct way to revise sociological attempts to construe such a space. Perhaps the most
prominent of these are Parsons’s pattern variables (1937, 1960). Now almost forgotten, this
was an impressive attempt to classify both role expectations (and behaviors) and societies.
Although pattern variables were invented in a purely deductive way, we could use
neuroscience to place the notion on solid grounds, and to translate them from intuitive
nominal scales to objective interval ones. If it were possible to measure affectivity/neutrality
at a neural level, we could find out what values of pattern variables were possible in
principle, and what values were more probable under given circumstances. Neuroscience
of emotion, for example, insists that there is no such thing as emotional neutrality. We’re
constantly in an emotional state, primarily that of enthusiasm or discouragement (Damasio,
1995). How, then, should we treat affective neutrality as role expectation if no one can
satisfy it? Further, can’t we say that a mother’s role is more affective by nature than a son’s
role, because of the oxytocin secretion system? Doesn’t this lead us to a conclusion of
intrinsic asymmetry in mother–son relations? Among pattern variables, the most important
is universalism/particularity. Taking into account what has been said previously, is
universalism possible in human societies at all? Is it provided through reflexive control
exclusively, or are there conditions under which it can be realized at the group-identity
level? This would be a promising line of research for neurosociology.
The question of ‘possible societies’ has an inverse form. Just as the set of all logically
possible societies is constrained by our cognitive and neural architecture, there must be
social constraints for cognitive systems. The question then is: Which cognitive systems
and mechanisms must exist in order to make social organization possible? A small
provocation: What kind of brain is needed to live in a progressive society without
violence and injustice?
Conclusion
The intellectual development of social and natural sciences makes it necessary to
constantly update the long-standing debates about their conceptual, methodological and
theoretical interconnections. One of the most recent occasions to do this is the emergence

Shkurko 359
of social neuroscience. We argue that the connection between sociology and social
neuroscience is not simply a point of philosophical debate of little interest for the majority
of researchers. We maintain that sociology can pragmatically use neuroscience to pose
and answer particular sociological questions, deepen its understanding of social
mechanisms, and revise notions and theories of social science. That’s why we speak of
neurosociology. Social neuroscience is a branch of neuroscience that studies social
perception and behavior. Neurosociology is a branch of sociology that studies the brain.
We took as an example of such neurosociological investigation the notion of status/role.
Taking into account relevant neuroscience findings, we can advance several hypotheses.
Controversial and challengeable as they may be, they are appropriate enough for
discussions in sociology as well as in cognitive and neuroscience. One of the most
intriguing hypotheses we discussed is the possibility that status/role/habitus is not a unity
or a social phenomenon sui generis, but rather a set of more or less independent processes
we very arbitrarily put together in sociological explanation. This, however, needs further
research.
I am most grateful to an anonymous reviewer for his/her very useful comments and
suggestion.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or
not-for-profit sectors.
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Author biography
Aleksandr Shkurko, Kandidat nauk (PhD) in Sociology, has since 2008 been a docent in the Volgo-
Vyatsky Public Administration Academy (VVAGS) (now the Russian Presidential Academy of
National Economy and State Government, Nizhny Novgorod branch). He has published on the
sociology of science, including Sociology of Science and Scientific Knowledge: Current state and
perspectives (Nizhny Novgorod: VVAGS, 2008). His current research focuses on the integration
of sociology, cognitive science and neuroscience, currently concentrating on quantitative meta-
analysis of social neuroscience studies as a way to reveal low-level mechanisms underlying
representations of social structure.

Role Behavior: A Neurosociological Perspective

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Role behavior: A neurosociological perspective

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Theory and methods/Théorie et méthodes

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neurosociological perspective Reprints and permission:

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inapte à la résolution de problèmes sociologiques. Le recours de plus en plus fréquent

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Social neuroscience and sociology: Limitations and

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Decomposition of role behavior

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– role construction and internalization;

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Clarifying the low-level structure of role behavior using

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Components Relevant areas of research Associated functions Examples of research or

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Components Relevant areas of research Associated functions Examples of research or

(brain structures or processes) review articles

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and anterior PFC

Components Relevant areas of research Associated functions Examples of research or

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Shared circuits, mentalizing and role expectations

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Oxytocin and social bonding

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in the secretion of oxytocin as well as of another similar neuropeptide, vasopressin, are

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Role behavior and modularity

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representations across agents and environments in a way similar to the ‘epidemiological’

– separate neural systems for processing immediate and delayed rewards

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hypothesis. However, it is a useful hypothesis since it puts different factors of behavior

A few role-related sociological questions for

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1 What is the difference between statuses?

2 Are all social structures hierarchical?

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Or, in other words, do we perceive all significant social differences as differences in

3 Why do various groups value different things?

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4 What variations of social structures and role

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Fukushima H, Hiraki K (2006) Perceiving an opponent’s loss: Gender-related differences in the

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Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at St Petersburg State University on January 12, 2014

Downloaded from ssi.sagepub.com at St Petersburg State University on January 12, 2014

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– separate neural systems for processing immediate and delayed rewards