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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,


NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-


ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,


WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-
in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,


WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA
CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO
ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH
DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE
ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,
RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ,
respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,


WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN


MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA,
EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD
SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS,
NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN
VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA
A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE
ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION
LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO
LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO
LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C.
DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,


vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND
ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE


INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,


vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,


DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,


vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,


vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF


JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,


vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,


MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION
OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and
seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches
of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one
such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject
of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence
to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are
to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily,
salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW


RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION


OF IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
Impeachment. – Impeachment THE SAME OFFICIAL
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed Section 16. – Impeachment
by any Member of the House of Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
Representatives or by any citizen In cases where a Member of the
upon a resolution of endorsement House files a verified complaint
by any Member thereof or by a of impeachment or a citizen files
verified complaint or resolution of a verified complaint that is
impeachment filed by at least one- endorsed by a Member of the
third (1/3) of all the Members of House through a resolution of
the House. endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case
may be, is sufficient in substance,
or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of
the said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified


complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against


Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST Proceedings. – Within a period
IMPEACHMENT of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No deemed initiated as provided in
impeachment proceedings shall be Section 16 hereof, no
initiated against the same official impeachment proceedings, as
more than once within the period such, can be initiated against the
of one (1) year. same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by


Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging
that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their
petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to
conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that
he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez
v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that
the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the
legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul
M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate
and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors
and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the
Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections
16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III
of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition
for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing
Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the
issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an
official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the
unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of
the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging
that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays
in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the
resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of
the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was
put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it
was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28,
2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this
Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C.
De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin
the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under
the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M.
Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as
the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R.
No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated
Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,


Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3,
2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of


Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold
and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the


Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and


perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the


nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for
the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred
upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for
a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme
law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United
States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral


component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It


obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of
the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are
mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience


during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role
of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the


provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame


Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in
Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a


provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of


the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential


application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try"
impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of
Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system
of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole
power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case
of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a
duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise
of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support
of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in
point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-
elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not
have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury.
Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court
had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of
the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the
personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit;
and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial
of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court
to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners
additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive


determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not
being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise
the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene,
alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.
and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He
alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he
asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public


moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected
to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice
to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only
then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and
enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature.
Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to
this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The
dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief
Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of
Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness
on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government."
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,
this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political
questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even
in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review
and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that
the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature
holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all,
reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x
And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense
at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with
it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of
the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of
the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our
main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in
their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The
1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to
that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was
our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished
what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish
for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite
which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern.
The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on
which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt
the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held
from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were
not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the
Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the
motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already
in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored
the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded
to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been
ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.
The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question
and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme
Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members
of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference


between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case.
This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There
are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as
a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is
bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further
clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power
is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?


MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused
its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not
a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,


amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this
Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and
non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political
questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review
is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a


governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission
on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional


question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground
upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this
Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of
the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome
of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling
for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim
to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c)
a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault
on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of
this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already
been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows
then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining
the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at


least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not
filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the


abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for
said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely
endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should
have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who
signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the
scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions
would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but
the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of
the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute
the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec.
1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it
has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office,
the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
[his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in
the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-
Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all
of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the
Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought,
leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no
less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly
and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral


Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What
we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them,
is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of
his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which
it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power
of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal
or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of
judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor
Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded
as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences.
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently,
failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there
were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-
existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of
the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the
branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence,
chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in
People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect
and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure


for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
(1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as
amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI
(3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to


commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments
of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts


consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading
to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco
and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of
the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated
but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened
earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its
records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings
starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment
by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that
the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It
is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So,
on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules
of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but
the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee
or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143
(Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting
the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of
the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas,
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."


Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning
of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people,
both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it
and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment


proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing
Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices
who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this
Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles
that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present
only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records
of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear
and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee,
or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S.
Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in
the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules
of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power
if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle
of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition
of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view
the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules
of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to
that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence
of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk
may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for
a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted.
It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by
the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this
enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches
of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the
view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157
(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing
that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that
"the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more.
It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different
from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes
the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic
flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to
be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought
bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position
or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against
the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and
chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state
of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any
kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference
was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of
all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to
bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is
that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations
or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is
the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by
the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of
the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by
this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted
to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found
answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment


Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.


Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

Footnotes
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."
2
Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
(Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but
no copy of the same was submitted before this Court.
3
Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established "to
help ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution and public policy and required by the impartial administration of justice" by
creating a special fund to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the
Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and
facilities."
4
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."
5
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N.
Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was later
amended to include Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
6
Supra note 4 at 123-124.
7
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A."
8
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9999
9
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.
10
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.
11
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B."
12
Supra note 2.
13
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the following
signatories to the second impeachment complaint and the accompanying
Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2.
Felix Fuentebella, NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma,
IV, NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim
Bernardo-Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern
Samar, (Chairman, House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos,
Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District,
Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis
Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th
District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas,
2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon
City 15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of Benguet 16. Alfredo Marañon, Jr.,
NPC, 2nd District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st
District, Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Makati City
19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Georgilu Yumul-Hermida,
Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21. Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District,
Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran Joaquin,
NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi 25.
Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd
District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28.
Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio, Independent-
LDP, 2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District,
Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B.
Biazon, LDP, Lone District of Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas,
1st District, Agusan del Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto
Paras, Lakas, 1st District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis, Independent, 2nd District,
Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party List-Partido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G.
Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District,
Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy,
Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42. Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District,
Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr.,
NPC, Lone District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of
Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47. Generoso DC.
Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of
Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace H. Durano, NPC,
5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q. Cojuangco,
NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District,
Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde,
Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57.
Alipio Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen,
Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd
District, Palawan 60. Joseph Santiago, NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene
Antonino-Custodio, NPC, 1st District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta
C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District, Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan
del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party List-Sanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District,
North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla, LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico,
LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri, Lakas,
3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur
71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th
District, Pangasinan 73. Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74.
Ronaldo B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O. Montilla,
NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga, NPC, 2nd District,
Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy
Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District, Davao City.
14
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two separate impeachment
complaints before the House of Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
15
299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued that as a
taxpayer and a citizen, he had the legal personality to file a petition demanding that the
PCGG make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's
task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that
the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of
transcendental importance to the public. The Supreme Court, citing Tañada v. Tuvera,
136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and
Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had standing. The Court,
however, went on to elaborate that in any event, the question on the standing of petitioner
Chavez was rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.
16
384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation, wherein the petition sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to
disclose all facts on its then on-going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development
Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner
Chavez had the standing to bring a taxpayer's suit because the petition sought to compel
PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
17
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
18
Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the
petitions, this Court also received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia,
Jr., and Senate President Franklin Drilon.
19
Supra note 2 at 10.
20
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice Regalado
E. Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former
Minister of Justice and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and
Raul C. Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.
21
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.
22
Id. at 292.
23
63 Phil 139 (1936).
24
Id. at 157-159.
25
Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051
(1957); Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).
26
Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.
27
5 US 137 (1803).
28
Id. at 180.
29
In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute allowing for
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125
(1907), this Court invalidated a statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground
that a government grant stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee would
be in lieu of other taxes was a contractual obligation which could not be impaired by
subsequent legislation. In Concepcion v. Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of
the Administrative Code, as amended, which provided that judges of the first instance
with the same salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was
declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of appointment vested in the
Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far
as it declares open to lease lands containing petroleum which have been validly located
and held, was declared invalid for being a depravation of property without due process of
law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorized the
Governor-General to fix the price of rice by proclamation and to make the sale of rice in
violation of such a proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
30
Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time 62-53 (2003).
31
Supra note 23.
32
Id. at 156-157.
33
Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The
Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).
34
Ibid.
35
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).
36
31 SCRA 413 (1970)
37
Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v.
Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
38
194 SCRA 317 (1991).
39
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.
40
152 SCRA 284 (1987).
41
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and I Tañada and Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines 21 ( Fourth Ed. ).
42
82 Phil 771 (1949).
43
Id. at 775.
44
Supra note 38.
45
Id. at 330-331.
46
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220
and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.
47
Supra note 2.
48
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
49
Supra note 21.
50
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
51
Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment
Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.
52
227 SCRA 100 (1993).
53
Id. at 112.
54
US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.
55
1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
56
Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy,
1984, pp. 112-113.
57
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
58
141 SCRA 263 (1986).
59
Supra note 25.
60
298 SCRA 756 (1998).
61
272 SCRA 18 (1997).
62
201 SCRA 792 (1991).
63
187 SCRA 377 (1990).
64
180 SCRA 496 (1989).
65
Supra note 25.
66
Supra note 23.
67
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-331.
68
Id. at 158-159.
69
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993);
House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
151 SCRA 703 (1987); Baker v. Carr, supra note 57.
70
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).
71
Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).
72
Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371,
378 (1988).
73
Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
74
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 (2000).
75
246 SCRA 540 (1995).
76
Id. at 562-564.
77
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora, 342 SCRA
449, 562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337
SCRA 733 (2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
78
Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.
79
Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v.
Morato, supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad v.
Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 (1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note
77; Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA
479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
80
BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252
(1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77;
TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya
v. PCGG, supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC,
supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note
79; Philconsa v. Gimenez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v.
Feliciano, supra note 79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
81
Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79;
Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
82
Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70
at 140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207
SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v.
COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
83
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note
79.
84
Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461
(1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz,
4245.
85
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.
86
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
87
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No.
135306, January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658;
Los Angeles County Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.
88
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974),
citing Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules
Service, pages 454-455; Johnson, et al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711,
715; Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925).
89
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, supra note 87,
dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio
Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of
Doña Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B,
23-257, 23-258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing Section 12,
Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88;
Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 17.
90
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
91
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
(1949); vide Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997);
Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386
(1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA
290 (1992); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197
SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson, supra
note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.
92
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 (1999) citing
Gibson vs. Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA
266, 271 (1989).
93
Supra note 79.
94
Id. at 403.
95
Supra note 81.
96
Id. at 681.
97
SECTION 3. x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Case Digest

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


G.R. NO. 160261
NOV. 10, 2003
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on
13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted
to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four
months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed
with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating
power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is
"the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of
our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between
the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows
sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

En Banc

G.R. No. L-33964, G.R. No. L-33965, G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO
LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI, ALCALA, petitioners,

vs.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary,


respondent.

ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C.J:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was
holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the
general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after
the other, at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight
(8) persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the aforementioned
candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have
been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.

On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:

“WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that


lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction,
design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being
guided and directed by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of
actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly
seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant
our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of
government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of
individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are
based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

“WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are
seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and
broadened their memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new
adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have
succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to
erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing
government and to influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass
media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted
authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the
peaceful members of our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting
public safety and the security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the
dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in
the death and serious injury of scores of persons;

“WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to
maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State;

“NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of


the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as
well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof,
or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.”

Presently, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the
following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon
the authority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:

1. TEODOSIO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the


petitioners in Case No. L-33964 filed on August 24, 1971 who, on August 22, 1971, between 8
a.m. and 6 p.m., were “invited” by agents of the Philippine Constabulary which is under the
command of respondent Brig Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia to go and did go to the headquarters of
the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafter,
detained;

2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 filed, also, on August 24,
1971 who was picked up in his residence, at No. 5 Road 3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, by
members of the Metrocom and then detained;

3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 or on August 28, 1971 the same
was amended to include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein,
although, apart from stating that these additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the
original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition alleges nothing whatsoever as
regards the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are said to be
illegally deprived of their liberty;
4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 filed on August 25, 1971 who was
similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by the
Constabulary;

5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 on August 27, 1971 upon
the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8
p.m., been apprehended by Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon
City, and then detained at the Camp Crame stockade, Quezon City;

6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed on August 30, 1971 to intervene as one of the
petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been arrested by members
of the Constabulary on August 22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don
Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where he is detained and restrained of liberty;

7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in said
three (3) cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise,
apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first
to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon
City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;

8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the same
three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on
August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles
City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon
City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;

9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college student of St.
Louis University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara in his capacity as
Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association filed on September 3,
1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that said Gerardo Tomas had, on
August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his way to
school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises therein at Camp
Holmes, and, thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on
August 25, 1971, to the Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is
detained;

10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 filed on September 7, 1971 a
19-year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio City who, while allegedly on his way home, at
Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by three (3) men who
brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;

11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on
whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the
Philippines (CONDA) filed the petition in Case No. L-34039 on September 14, 1971 against
Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was
arrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by agents of the Constabulary, and
taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon, her husband was
brought, also, by PC agents and both are detained;

12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 on October 26,
1971 against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of
the Central Intelligence Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation
from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen.
Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred petitioner to
Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin
Castillo and another CIS agent, whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being
interrogated by the two (2), petitioner was detained illegally; and

13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34839 filed on November 10, 1971 who was
apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1971, in Quezon
City, and then detained at Camp Crame, in the same City.

Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to answer
the petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 which was, mutatis
mutandis, reproduced substantially or by reference in the other cases, except L-34265 alleges,
inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and detained “on reasonable belief” that they
had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;” that “their continued detention is
justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;” that there is “a state of insurrection or
rebellion” in this country, and that “public safety and the security of the State required the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,” as “declared by the President of the
Philippines in Proclamation No. 889;” that in making said declaration, the “President of the
Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the coordinated efforts of the various
intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the Chief Executive could not at the
moment give a full account and disclosure without risking revelation of highly classified state
secrets vital to its safety and security”; that the determination thus made by the President is “final
and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons” and “partake(s) of the nature of
political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry,” pursuant to Barcelon v.
Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners “are under
detention pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on the reasonable belief” that they
“have committed, and are still committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in
armed struggle, insurgency and other subversive activities for the overthrow of the
Government”; that petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings for habeas corpus, “the question
of their guilt or innocence”; that the “Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken into custody on
the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that
petitioners come within the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended”; that the “continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona
fide precautionary and preventive measure demanded by the necessities of public safety, public
welfare and public interest”; that the President of the Philippines has “undertaken concrete and
abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as
of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and
unhampered”; and that “opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace officers in the
implementation of the proclamation have been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by
various safeguard. contained in directives issued by proper authority.”

These safeguards are set forth in:

1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971,
directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught in flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made
without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense; that such authority
shall not be granted unless, “on the basis of records and other evidences,” it appears
satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6 (b), of the Rules of Court, that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation; that, if such person will
be charged with a crime subject to an afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the
authorization for his arrest shall not be issued unless supported by signed intelligence reports
citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt act; that no unnecessary or unreasonable
force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested persons shall not be subject to greater
restraint than is necessary for their detention;

2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27 and 30, 1971, to all
units of his command, stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than
those specified in the proclamation; that the same does not involve martial law; that
precautionary measures should be taken to forestall violence that may be precipitated by
improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the proclamation
will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and “officers occupying position in the
provinces down to provincial commanders”; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests;
that arrested persons shall not be harmed and shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and
that members of the detainee’s immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;

3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971, directing


the Chief of the Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to
prevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ;
and

4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative
Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with the
implementation of Proclamation No. 889.

Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang
had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, “after it had been found that the evidence
against them was insufficient.”

In L-34265, the “Answer and Return” filed by respondents therein traversed some allegations of
fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the
petitioner therein, had been and is detained “on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that
he has committed overt acts in furtherance of rebellion or insurrection against the government”
and, accordingly, “comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended,” the validity of which
is not contested by him.

On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No.
889, so as to read as follows:

“WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that


lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction,
design and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being
guided and directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking
advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of
[actually] staging, undertaking, [and] waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection
and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly
constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order
with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception
of God and religion, whose notion of individual lights and family relations, and whose political,
social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;

“WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are
seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and
broadened their memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new
adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass
media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have
succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to
erode and weaken the political, social, economic and moral foundations of our existing
government and influence many peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass
media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted
authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the
peaceful members of our society;

“WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and insurrection, have created a
state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest
manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on
August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;

“WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to
maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State;

“NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of


the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do
hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as
well as all others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion[,] and [all] other [crimes and offenses] over acts committed by them in furtherance [or
on the occasion] thereof [,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.]” 1

On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly heard
and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted from
September 3 to September 9, 1971.

Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by
Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippines, namely:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Batanes

2. Ilocos Norte

3. Ilocos Sur

4. Abra

5. La Union

6. Pangasinan

7. Batangas

8. Catanduanes

9. Masbate

10. Romblon

11. Marinduque

12. Or. Mindoro

13. Occ. Mindoro

14. Palawan

15. Negros Occ.

16. Negros Or.

17. Cebu
18. Bohol

19. Capiz

20. Aklan

21. Antique

22. Iloilo

23. Leyte

24. Leyte del Sur

25. Northern Samar

26. Eastern Samar

27. Western Samar

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Guimaras

2. Biliran

3. Siquijor

C. CITIES:

1. Laoag

2. Dagupan

3. San Carlos (Pang.)

4. Batangas

5. Lipa

6. Puerto Princesa

7. San Carlos (Negros Occ.)

8. Cadiz
9. Silay

10. Bacolod

11. Bago

12. Canlaon

13. La Carlota

14. Bais

15. Dumaguete

16. Iloilo

17. Roxas

18. Tagbilaran

19. Lapu-Lapu

20. Cebu

21. Mandaue

22. Danao

23. Toledo

24. Tacloban

25. Ormoc

26. Calbayog

On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the privilege of
the writ in the following provinces and cities:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Surigao del Norte

2. Surigao del Sur

3. Davao del Norte


4. Davao del Sur

5. Davao Oriental

6. Bukidnon

7. Agusan del Norte

8. Agusan del Sur

9. Misamis Or.

10. Misamis Occ.

11. Camiguin

12. Zamboanga del Norte

13. Zamboanga del Sur

14. Sulu

B. CITIES:

1. Surigao

2. Davao

3. Butuan

4. Cagayan de Oro

5. Gingoog

6. Ozamiz

7. Oroquieta

8. Tangub

9. Dapitan

10. Dipolog

11. Zamboanga
12. Basilan

13. Pagadian

On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation No 889-
D, in the following places:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Cagayan

2. Cavite

3. Mountain Province

4. Kalinga-Apayao

5. Camarines Norte

6. Albay

7. Sorsogon

B. CITIES:

1. Cavite City

2. Tagaytay

3. Trece Martires

4. Legaspi

As a consequence, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the following
eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Bataan

2. Benguet

3. Bulacan

4. Camarines Sur
5. Ifugao

6. Isabela

7. Laguna

8. Lanao del Norte

9. Lanao del Sur

10. North Cotabato

11. Nueva Ecija

12. Nueva Vizcaya

13. Pampanga

14. Quezon

15. Rizal

16. South Cotabato

17. Tarlac

18. Zambales

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Aurora

2. Quirino

C. CITIES:

1. Angeles

2. Baguio

3. Cabanatuan

4. Caloocan

5. Cotabato
6. General Santos

7. Iligan

8. Iriga

9. Lucena

10. Manila

11. Marawi

12. Naga

13. Olongapo

14. Palayan

15. Pasay

16. Quezon

17. San Jose

18. San Pablo

The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the view
taken in Barcelon v. Baker 2 and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castañeda, 3 pursuant to which,
“the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege or
the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his ‘decision is final and conclusive’
upon the courts and upon all other persons.” Indeed, had said question been decided in the
affirmative the main issue in all of these cases, except L-34339, would have been settled, and,
since the other issues were relatively of minor importance, said cases could have been readily
disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however,
reached, although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had
authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to do so, the
Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be
undertaken, none of them having previously expressed their views thereon. Accordingly, on
October 5, 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33955, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution
stating in part that

“. . . a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order
to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations
Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons
detained or to be detained for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines,
which area has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen
cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency
of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec.
10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the Court are not
agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises, even as all of
them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED
that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M.

“xxx xxx xxx”

On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly with
cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to file
memoranda, in amplification of their respective oral arguments, which memoranda were
submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971.

Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October 8, 1971,
their willingness to impart to the Court classified information relevant to these cases, subject to
appropriate security measures, the Court met at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and,
in the presence of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator
Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as well as of the
Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen.
Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay Nañadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other
ranking officers of said Armed Forces, on said classified information, most of which was
contained in reports and other documents already attached to the records. During the
proceedings, the members of the Court, and, occasionally, counsel for the petitioners,
propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both parties were then
granted a period of time within which to submit their respective observations, which were filed
on November 3, 1971, and complemented by some documents attached to the records on
November 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted on November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified
information.

In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the parties
therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.

On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations motions stating that on
November 13, 1971 the following petitioners were:

(a) released from custody:

(1) Teodosio Lansang G.R. No. L-33964

(2) Bayani Alcala ” ” L-33964

(3) Rogelio Arienda” ” L-33965


(4) Nemesio Prudente” ” L-33982

(5) Gerardo Tomas” ” L-34004

(6) Reynaldo Rimando” ” L-34013

(7) Filomeno M. de Castro” ” L-34039

(8) Barcelisa de Castro” ” L-34039

(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. ” ” L-34265

(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a
violation of Republic Act No. 17110 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal’s Office of
Quezon City.

(1) Angelo de los Reyes G.R. No. L-22982 * (2) Teresito Sison” ” L-33982 *

accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a violation
of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal:

(1) Rodolfo del Rosario G.R. No. L-33969 * *

(2) Luzvimindo David ” ” L-33973

(3) Victor Felipe” ” L-33982 *

and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying that
the petitions in G.R. Nos.

L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to
the resolution of the remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of said
court which was appended to said manifestations-motions of the respondents as Annex 2
thereof shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-34339, is one of the defendants in said case.

Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973,


in his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of the petitions
in all of these cases, particularly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, upon the ground that he is still detained and that the main issue is one of public
interest, involving as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes, one of the
petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for
whose respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and L-34004 have been filed, maintained that
the issue in these cases is not moot, not even for the detainees who have been released, for, as
long as the privilege of the writ remains suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and
detained again without just cause or valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed on November 29,
1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release of the above-named petitioners rendered their
respective petitions moot and academic.

Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this connection, it should
be noted that, as originally formulated, Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that
it did not comply with the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section
1, Article III of our Constitution, reading:

“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same
may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.”

and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that:

“The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and,
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.”

Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in case of “imminent danger” of invasion, insurrection or rebellion which is one of the
grounds stated in said paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not
mentioned in paragraph ( 14), section 1 of its Bill of Rights petitioners maintained that
Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual “invasion, insurrection or rebellion
or imminent danger thereof,” and that, consequently, said proclamation was invalid. This
contention was predicated upon the fact that, although the first “whereas” in Proclamation No.
889 statedthat “lawless elements” had “entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and
banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging
an armed insurrection and rebellion,” the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not of an
uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the
intent to rise in arms.

Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic by
Proclamation No. 889A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original proclamation,
or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first
“whereas” of the original proclamation by postulating the said lawless elements “have entered
into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose
of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion
in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted
government, and supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely
new one . . . .” Moreover, the third “whereas” in the original proclamation was, likewise,
amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, “by their acts of rebellion and
insurrection,” have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the
security of the State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy
and of the intent to rise in arms to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts
that the lawless elements “are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion” to
accomplish their purpose.

It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original proclamation and
particularly, the circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver
that there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of
said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having, in effect, stressed the actuality of the
intent to rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The pleadings, the
oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have consistently and abundantly
emphasized to justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the acts of
violence and subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above
referred to, and the conditions obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation.
In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the original proclamation and that
the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.

II

Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to the
above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid
exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be “invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion” or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the
Constitution “imminent danger thereof,” and (b) “public safety” must require the suspension of
the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and
there is actually a state of rebellion and that 4 “public safety requires that immediate and
effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and
preserve the authority of the State.”

Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon the
authority of Barcelon v. Baker 5 and Montenegro v. Castañeda. 6 Upon the other hand,
petitioners press the negative view and urge a re-examination of the position taken in said two
(2) cases, as well as a reversal thereof.

The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it
relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott 7 involving the U.S. President’s power to call out the militia,
which he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces may be exercised to suppress or
prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege
had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the
Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President
of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides,
and from whom all government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case
was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and, hence, cannot have more weight than the same.
Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it could go into the question: “Did the
Governor-General” acting under the authority vested in him by the Congress of the United
States, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions “act in
conformance with such authority?” In other words, it did determine whether or not the Chief
Executive had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held
that petitioner therein had “failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which the
judiciary accords to acts of the Executive . . . .” In short, the Court considered the question
whether or not there really was a rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.

Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point under
consideration. Although some cases 8 purport to deny the judicial power to “review” the
findings made in the proclamations assailed in said cases, the tenor of the opinions therein given,
considered as a whole, strongly suggests the court’s conviction that the conditions essential for
the validity of said proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite
view taken in other cases 9 had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said
conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that “(e)very case
must depend on its own circumstances.” 10 One of the important, if not dominant, factors, in
connection therewith, was intimated in Sterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court
of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:

“. . . . When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private
rights secured by that

Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding
directed against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the Federal
judicial power extends (Art. 3, sec 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority
appropriate to its exercise. . . .” 12

In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that “a majority of the Court” had “tentatively
arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual
bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A . . . and thus determine
the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution . . . .” Upon further
deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The
authority conferred by the

Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and
conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception
thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance,
by providing that “(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . . .” It is
only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege “in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion” or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, “imminent danger
thereof” “when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.” 13 For from being
full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined
and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but,
also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the
aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the
limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions
imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and
compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the
framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in
futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is
essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects
the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom
includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to
freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the
practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical
to the commonweal, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammeled enjoyment and exercise of such right which, under certain conditions, may be a
civic duty of the highest order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful
operation and wholesome growth and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and
exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework
of the social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law.
Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and
violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the
government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a
circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or
protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires
it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere dissent no matter how emphatic or
intemperate it may be for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot
hesitate, much less refuse when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly
established or cannot reasonably be denied to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon,
without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and
depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution
and jeopardizing the very Rule of Laws the Court is called upon to epitomize.

As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be
“invasion, insurrection or rebellion” or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the
Constitution “imminent danger thereof”; and (b) public safety must require the aforementioned
suspension. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions
are present.
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the Communist
activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then
aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned
notably; but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and
havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of
the Philippines and its subsequent liberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of
the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an
army called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan (HMB) after liberation which clashed several times with the armed forces of the
Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October
22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld
in Montenegro v. Castañeda. 15 Days before the promulgation d said Proclamation, or on
October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in
Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their
respective sentences. 16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were
concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion
Act, was approved, upon the ground stated in the very preamble of said statute that

“. . . the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only
by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

“. . . the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes
a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; 17 and.

“. . . in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but
international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities,
there is urgent need for special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom
and security of the country . . . .”

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4,1971, by the Senate
Ad Hoc Committee of Seven copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners
herein

“The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass
organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines)
among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the
peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has
exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its
radical brand of nationalism.” 18
Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of
which composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction reorganized the
Communist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People’s Army. This
faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the “Protracted People’s War” or “War of National
Liberation.” Its “Programme for a People’s Democratic Revolution” states, inter alia:

“The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for
a people’s democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for
the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is
genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous . . .

“xxx xxx xxx

“The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The Communist
Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national
situations are favorable of asking the road of armed revolution . . . ” 19

In the year 1969, the NPA had according to the records of the Department of National
Defense conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents
numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In
1970, its record of violent incidents was about the same, but the NPA casualties more than
doubled.

At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the
traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the
attainment of their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although
they may disagree on the means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there
is a New People’s Army, other, of course, than the armed forces of the Republic and antagonistic
thereto. Such New People’s Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially
considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such
announcement is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may
be likened to a declaration of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of
belligerency, even before the actual commencement of hostilities.

We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

In fact, the thrust of petitioners’ argument is that the New People’s Army proper is too small,
compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or
insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellion,
which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the
magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code
defining the crime of rebellion, 20 which may be limited in its scope to “any part” of the
Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the writ “wherever” in case of rebellion “the
necessity for such suspension shall exist.” In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a
proclamation suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case of
In re Boyle 21 involved a valid proclamation suspending the privilege in a smaller area a
country of the state of Idaho.

The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of
the suspension of the privilege namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Before
delving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the
precise nature of the Court’s function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as
amended.

Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.

What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the
Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not
he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to
supplant 22 the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the
contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over
ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which
cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial
authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as
regards findings of fact made in said decisions.

Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary
basis for the contested administrative finding; no quantitative examination of the supporting
evidence is undertaken. The administrative finding can be interfered with only if there is no
evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious
and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some American courts. It has,
likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions,
have applied the “substantial evidence” rule, which has been construed to mean “more than a
mere scintilla” or “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” 23 even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations
involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of
evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act
of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence in the sense in which the term is used
in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test
of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v.

New York, 24 the view that:

“. . . If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio . . . With the wisdom of the
policy adopted, with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are
both incompetent and unauthorized to deal . . .”

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General

“. . . that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension the writ, but that in suspending the writ,
the President did not act arbitrarily.”

No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-equality
of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand
that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis
mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the
proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a)
that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d)
that the President’s alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified;
and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public
safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that counsel for
several petitioners herein have admitted it.

With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the time of
the suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that courts of
justice no longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there
being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners’ reference to the normal
operation of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested act of the Executive
stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to in some American cases to
justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of the Executive. Said cases involved,
however, the conviction by military courts of members of the civilian population charged with
common crimes. It was manifestly, illegal for military courts to assume jurisdiction over
civilians so charged, when civil courts were functioning normally.

Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not
necessarily bear out petitioners’ view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to the
suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of its logical effects is to compel those connected
with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of them could not be located by
the authorities, after August 21, 1971.

The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the theory that,
according to Professor Egbal Ahmad of Cornell University, “guerrilla use of terror . . . is
sociological and psychologically selective,” and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is
bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people’s sympathy and to deprive the dissidents
of much needed mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used in some
demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of its inhabitants. It
would have been highly imprudent, therefore, for the Executive to discard the possibility of a
resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale, under the July-August Plan.

We will now address our attention to petitioners’ theory to the effect that the New People’s
Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to public safety of
such magnitude as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
flaw in petitioners’ stand becomes apparent when we consider that it assumes that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines have no other task than to fight the New Peoples Army, and that the
latter is the only threat and a minor one to our security. Such assumption is manifestly
erroneous.

The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had information
and reports – subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the above-mentioned Report of the
Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven 25 to the effect that the Communist Party of the
Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin’s idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also,
adopted Ho Chi Minh’s terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local
officials; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and
3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater
Manila Area in 1970; that the Constitutional Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971;
that, soon after the Plaza Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San
Juan boundary, was bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City
Hall, the COMELEC Building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO substation at Cubao,
Quezon City; and that the respective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman
Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office premises,
along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor’s Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.
Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that as per said information and reports the
reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao’s concept of
protracted people’s war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the
political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to
such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive
program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the
organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and
farmer and professional groups- that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control
nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in
making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are,
accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among
which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM),
the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng
Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang
Pilipino (MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational
chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater Manila
Areas sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the
Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two
hundred fifty-eight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in
violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these
actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations; that the
violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trained group of armed
agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded
those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the
death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.

Subsequent events as reported have also proven that petitioners’ counsel have underestimated
the threat to public safety posed by the New People’s Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August
21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of
which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two (2) others were wounded, whereas the insurgents
suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA, trained by
defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command post of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying
two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central
Luzon a total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the
Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan,
Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader
of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio
of San Pedro, Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two
(2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces
have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM
group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in settlement in
Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse
Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza was reportedly killed on
September 22, 1971, in an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2)
NPA cadres in Mindanao.
It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to
intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available
materials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a “clay-more” mine, a
powerful explosive device used by the U. S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered
from the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received intelligence
information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations,
kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurrence
would signal the beginning of said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in
Mindanao, particularly in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces
sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces discharge other
functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the
country, particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna,
Quezon and Bicol Region, required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide
area.

Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except those related to events
that happened after August 21, 1971 when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is
not prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion
when he then concluded that public safety and national security required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent
demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines,
with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing of
water mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations a possibility which,
no matter how remote, he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to
anticipate and arrest.

He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the situation was
critical as, indeed, it was and demanded immediate action. This he took believing in good faith
that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had
substantial grounds to entertain such belief.

Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the privilege in the
entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing so in some provinces or cities
thereof. At the time of the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain,
however, about the places to be excluded from the operation of the proclamation. He needed
some time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the suspension to he gradually
lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and
twenty-six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971, in other fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen
(13) cities; and, still later, on October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4)
cities, or a total of forty-eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forty-three (43) cities,
within a period of forty-five (45) days from August 21, 1971.

Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have declared a
general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to
persons detained “for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith.” Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which
withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses
committed “on the occasion” of the insurrection or rebellion, or “incident thereto, or in
connection therewith.” In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the
President had acted in good faith.

In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under
the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces;
(b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure,
however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrarily in issuing
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.

III

The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said
Proclamation, as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as
to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended?

In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Gerardo
Tomas, petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013, were, on
November 13, 1971, released “permanently” meaning, perhaps, without any intention to
prosecute them upon the ground that, although there was reasonable ground to believe that they
had committed an offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient to
warrant their prosecution; that

Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L-33965,
Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for
whose benefit the petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265,
were, on said date, “temporarily released”; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in L-
33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as Luzvimindo
David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are still under detention
and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at
large having been accused, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison,
intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been
charged together with over fifteen (15) other persons, who are, also, at large with another
violation of said Act, in a criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City.

With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang petitioners in L-33965 who were released as
early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio
Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr., Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando,
Gerardo Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were released on November 13, 1971, and are no longer
deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby, become moot and academic, as
far as their prayer for release is concerned, and should, accordingly, be dismissed, despite the
opposition thereto of counsel for Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as
long as the privilege of the writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and
detained again, without just cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective
petitions is not moot. In any event, the common constitutional and legal issues raised in these
cases have, in fact, been decided in this joint decision.

Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Angelo de
los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973,
Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who are still
detained? The suspension of the privilege of the writ was decreed Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, for persons detained “for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts
committed by them in furtherance thereof.”

The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe,
Angelo de los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal Case No. Q-1623
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and that the
similar charge against petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison in a criminal
complaint, originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with said
court. Do the offenses so charged constitute one of the crimes or overt acts mentioned in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended?

In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:

“That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter up to and including
August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and elsewhere in the Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt
acts became officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a
subversive association as defined by Republic Act No. 1700, which is an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
communist totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;

“That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist
Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there knowingly, wilfully, feloniously and by overt acts committed subversive acts all
intended to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:

1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the government, engaging in war against the forces
of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public lands or property from the lawful purpose for which they have been
appropriated;

2. By engaging in subversion thru expansion and recruitment activities not only of the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the united front organizations of the Communist
Party of the Philippines as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Movement for a Democratic
Philippines (MDP), Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students’ Alliance for National
Democracy (STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural Association of the University
of the Philippines (SCAUP) KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (PMP) and
many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies, demonstrations and strikes some of them violent
in nature, intended to create social discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the people’s
confidence in the government; thru consistent propaganda by publications, writing, posters,
leaflets or similar means; speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other similar means; and thru
the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all intended to promote the Communist pattern of
subversion;

3. Thru urban guerrilla warfare characterized by assassinations, bombings, sabotage, kidnapping


and arson, intended to advertise the movement, build up its morale and prestige, discredit and
demoralize the authorities to use harsh and repressive measures, demoralize the people and
weaken their confidence in the government and to weaken the will of the government to resist.

“That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense:

a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the public authorities;

b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief Executive;

c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;

d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;

e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen (15) years old.”

Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, except
that the second paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the complaint filed with
the CFI, although substantially the same. 26

In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and subversion,
of in the language of the proclamation “other overt acts committed . . . in furtherance” of said
rebellion, both of which are covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It
is clear, therefore, that the crimes for which the detained petitioners are held and deprived of
their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
suspended.

Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles enunciated.

After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners
Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and
Teresito Sison are detained for and actually accused of an offense for which the privilege of the
writ has been suspended by said proclamation, our next step would have been the following: The
Court, or a commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on whether as stated in
respondents’ “Answer and Return” said petitioners had been apprehended and detained “on
reasonable belief” that they had “participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion.”

It so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 or two (2) days before the proceedings
relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed by the filing 27 of
a summary of the matters then taken up the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed
against said petitioners. What is more, the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the
charges contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question, therefore, is: Shall
We now order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein, despite the formal and
substantial validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact they are
actually charged with offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned
criminal complaints against them and the preliminary examinations and/or investigations being
conducted therein?

The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion, and,
so hold, that, instead of this Court or its commissioner taking the evidence adverted to above, it
is best to let said preliminary examination and/or investigation be completed, so that petitioners’
release could be ordered by the court of first instance, should it find that there is no probable
cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a probable cause be
established against them. Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as
a preliminary examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed
to establish that the Executive had not acted arbitrarily in causing the petitioners to be
apprehended and detained upon the ground that they had participated in the commission of the
crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for this reason that the Court has opted to
allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the determination of the existence of
probable cause, although ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the existence of
substantial evidence of petitioners’ connection with the crime of rebellion. Besides, the latter
alternative would require the reception of evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the
proceedings now taking place in the court of first instance. What is more, since the evidence
involved in both proceedings would be substantially the same and the presentation of such
evidence cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the other.

Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason, in Nava v.
Gatmaitan, 28 the effect that “. . . if and when formal complaint presented, the court steps in
and the exclusive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial
concern . . . ” that the filing of the above-mentioned complaints against the six (6) detained
petitioners he has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to continue holding them
pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if he did not so intend, and to place them
fully under the authority of courts of justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be
deprived of his liberty without lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone
of them, and that, accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite the
humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view has been espoused, the other Members
of the Court are unable to accept it because:

(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid and We so
hold it to be and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a complaint or
information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his
release may not be ordered by Us;

(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the
validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to construe
the filing of said formal charges with the court of first instance as an expression of the
President’s belief that there are sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners so charged and that
they should not be released, therefore, unless and until said court after conducting the
corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation shall find that the prosecution has
not established the existence of a probable cause. Otherwise, the Executivewould have released
said accused, as were the other petitioners herein;

From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation of the act of the President in having said formal
charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice
Fernando. His view particularly the theory that the detainees should be released immediately,
without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination and/or
investigation would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal charges as long as
it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that
courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective
protection.

Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the
constitutional right to bail is affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon such question, the same not having been
sufficiently discussed by the parties herein. Besides, there is no point in settling said question
with respect to petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is it necessary to express our
view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without bail might still be
decreed by the court of first instance, should it hold that there is no probable cause against them.
At any rate, should an actual issue on the right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in
appropriate proceedings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;

2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-
34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicente Ilao,
Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de
Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;

3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in
conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary
Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison and to issue the
corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise,
order their release; and

4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the
aforementioned preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper
orders or resolutions in connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these
proceedings the proper relief.

5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

READ CASE DIGEST HERE.

Separate Opinions

CASTRO and BARREDO, JJ., concurring:

While concurring fully in the opinion of the Court, we nevertheless write separately to answer,
from our own perspective, a point which Mr. Justice Fernando makes in his dissent. His view, as
we understand it, is that while an individual may be detained beyond the maximum detention
period fixed by law when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, such individual
is nevertheless entitled to be released from the very moment a formal complaint is filed in court
against him. The theory seems to be that from the time the charge is filed, the court acquires,
because the executive officials abdicate, jurisdiction.

This view is based on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason in Nava vs. Gatmaitan. 1
Justice Tuason, in part, said:

“All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under executive control.
It is here where the Constitution tells the courts to keep their hands off unless the cause of the
detention be for an offense other than rebellion or insurrection, which is another matter.

“By the same token, if and when a formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the
executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern . . .”

But the issue to which the Supreme Court Justices in Nava individually addressed themselves is
radically disparate from that raised in these cases. There the question was whether after the
detainees had been formally charged in court and an order for their arrest had been issued, they
were entitled to bail. It was on that question that the Court was split 5 to 4, and it was the opinion
of Justice Tuason, one of the five, that after the detainees had been accused in court, the question
of release on bail was a matter that the court should decide.
Upon the other hand, the question here presented is whether the detainees should be released
forthwith upon the filing of charges against them in court and cannot thereafter be re-arrested
except only by court order. This is a totally different question. It is our submission that they are
not entitled to be released. The dissent is, we believe, based on the fallacy that when a formal
charge is filed against a person he is thereby surrendered to the court and the arresting officer is
thereby divested of custody over him. Except in a metaphorical sense, the detainee is not
delivered or surrendered at all to the judicial authorities. What the phrase “delivered to the court”
simply means is that from the time a person is indicted in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction
over the subject-matter. 2 The detainee remains in the custody of the detaining officer, under the
same authority invoked for the detention, until the court decides whether there is probable cause
to order his arrest.

Under ordinary circumstances, when a person is arrested without a warrant and is charged in
court, he is not released.

He is held until the judicial authority orders either his release or his confinement. It is no
argument to say that under Article III, section 1 (3) of the Constitution only a court can order the
arrest of an individual. Arrests without warrant are familiar occurrences, and they have been
upheld as constitutional. 3

What is more, the privilege of the writ was suspended precisely to authorize the detention of
persons believed to be plotting against the security of the State until the courts can act on their
respective cases. To require their peremptory release upon the mere filing of charges against
them, without giving the proper court opportunity and time to decide the question of probable
cause, would obviously be to defeat the very basic purpose of the suspension. We think our role
as judges in the cases at bar is clear. After finding that the Presidential decree was validly issued,
we should give it effect. To uphold its validity and then try to dilute its efficacy in the name of
personal liberty is, we believe, actually to doubt the constitutionality of the exercise of the
Presidential prerogative.

Not only that. If the rule were that the detainees must be released upon the mere filing of charges
against them in court, it is unlikely that the executive officials would have filed the charges
because of their awareness of the continuing danger which in the first place impelled the arrest of
the detainees, and the end result would be to inflict on the latter a much longer period of
deprivation of personal liberty than is warranted.

Whatever our personal views may be of the power to suspend, the fact remains that the power is
there, writ large and indubitable in the Constitution. It is far too easy to write anthologies on the
side of civil liberties or on the side of governmental order, depending on one’s inclination or
commitment. But that is not our function. Constitutional issues, it has been said, do not take the
form of right versus wrong, but of right versus right. And the Court’s function, as we see it, is,
fundamentally to moderate the clash of values, and not to inflate them into constitutional
dimensions.
Where it is possible, we should avoid passing on a constitutional question. But where there is no
escape from the duty of abstention, our further duty is to decide the question of constitutional
validity on a less heroic plane.

And that is what we have tried to do in pointing out that the ordinary rules of criminal procedure
provide an adequate answer to Mr. Justice Fernando’s problem. That solution is for the arresting
officer to hold the person detained until the court can act, with the only difference that where the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is available, the arresting officer must release the detainee
upon the expiration of the maximum detention time allowed by law, if he has not delivered the
detainee to the court within that period.

To insist on the procedural aspect of a constitutional problem as a manner of solving it is, after
all, no less to be libertarian. Insistence on it is, to us, and in point of fact, one of the cornerstones
of liberalism.

READ CASE DIGEST HERE.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

The decision of the Court penned by the Chief Justice easily ranks with his many landmark
opinions in Constitutional Law and is in the tradition of the great judicial pronouncements from
this Tribunal. Skillful in its analysis, impressive as to its learning, comprehensive in its scope,
and compelling in its logic, it exerts considerable persuasive force. There is much in it therefore
to which concurrence is easily yielded. I find it difficult however to accept the conclusion that
the six petitioners still under detention should not be set free. It is for me a source of deep regret
that having gone quite far in manifesting the utmost sympathy for and conformity with the
claims of civil liberties, it did not go farther. Candor induces the admission though that the
situation realistically viewed may not justify going all the way. Nonetheless the deeply-rooted
conviction as to the undoubted primacy of constitutional rights, even under circumstances the
least propitious, precludes me from joining my brethren in that portion of the decision reached.
Nor should I let this opportunity pass without acknowledging the fairness, even the generosity, in
the appraisal of my position in the opinion of the Chief Justice.

1. The function of judicial review fitly characterized as both delicate and awesome is never
more so than when the judiciary is called upon to pass on the validity of an act of the President
arising from the exercise of a power granted admittedly to cope with an emergency or crisis
situation. More specifically, with reference to the petitions before us, the question that calls for
prior consideration is whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
tainted by constitutional infirmity. What the President did attested to an executive determination
of the existence of the conditions that warranted such a move. For one of the mandatory
provisions of the Bill of Rights 1 is that no such suspension is allowable, except in cases of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion, when the public safety requires, and, even then, only in such
places and for such period of time as may be necessary. 2 There is the further provision that the
constitutional official so empowered to take such a step is the President. 3 The exceptional
character of the situation is thus underscored. The presumption would seem to be that if such a
step were taken, there must have been a conviction on the part of the Executive that he could not.
in the fulfillment of the responsibility entrusted to him, avoid doing so. That decision is his to
make; it is not for the judiciary. It is therefore encased in the armor of what must have been a
careful study on his part, in the light of relevant information which as Commander-in-Chief he is
furnished, ordinarily beyond the ken of the courts. When it is considered further that the
Constitution does admit that the sphere of individual freedom contracts and the scope of
governmental authority expands during times of emergency, it becomes manifest why an even
greater degree of caution and circumspection must be exercised by the judiciary when, on this
matter, it is called upon to discharge the function of judicial review.

2. Not that the judiciary has any choice on the matter. That view would indict itself for
unorthodoxy if it maintains that the existence of rebellion suffices to call for the disregard of the
applicable constitutional guarantees. Its implication would be that the Constitution ceases to be
operative in times of danger to national safety and security. Well has the American Supreme
Court in the leading case of Ex-parte Milligan 4 stated: “The Constitution is a law for rulers and
for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men at all times and under all circumstances.” This ringing affirmation should at the very least
give pause to those troubled by the continuing respect that must be accorded civil liberties under
crisis conditions. The fact that the Constitution provides for only one situation where a provision
of the Bill of Rights may be suspended, emphasizes the holding in the above-cited Milligan case
that the framers of the Constitution “limited the suspension to one great right and left the rest to
remain forever inviolable.”

While perhaps at times likely to give rise to difficulties in the disposition cases during a troubled
era where a suspension has been decreed, such a view is to be taken into careful consideration.

3. For it is a truism that the Constitution is paramount, and the Supreme Court has no choice but
to apply its provisions in the determination of actual cases and controversies before it. Nor is this
all. The protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one the
highest duties and privileges of the judiciary. 5 The exercise thereof according to Justice Laurel
requires that it gives effect to the supreme law to the extent in clear cases of setting aside
legislative and executive action. 6 The supreme mandates of the Constitution are not to be
loosely brushed aside. 7

Otherwise, the Bill of Rights might be emasculated into mere expressions of sentiment. 8
Speaking of this Court, Justice

Abad Santos once pertinently observed: “This court owes its own existence to that great
instrument and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction,
this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution.” 9

Justice Tuason would thus apply the constitutional rights with undeviating rigidity: “To the plea
that the security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the
answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for courts to tamper with the
fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible,
yielding to no pressure of convenience, expediency, or the so-called ‘judicial statesmanship.’
The Legislature itself can not infringe them, and no court conscious of its responsibilities and
limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government and a
menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while
the Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect
and maintain undiluted individual rights.” 10

It is in that context, to my mind, that the petitions before us should be appraised, for in terms of
physical, as distinguished from intellectual, liberty, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
occupies a place second to none. As was stressed in Gumabon v. Director of Prisons: 11
“Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ ‘as the most important human rights provision’ in
the fundamental law.” Care is to be taken then lest in the inquiry that must be undertaken to
determine whether the constitutional requisites justifying a suspension are present, the effects
thereof as to the other civil liberties are not fully taken into account. It affords no justification to
say that such a move was prompted by the best motives and loftiest of intentions. Much less can
there be acceptance of the view, as contended by one of the counsel for respondents, that
between the safety of the overwhelming majority of Filipinos and the claims of the petitioners to
liberty, the former must prevail. That is to indulge in the vice of oversimplification. Our
fundamental postulate is that the state exists to assure individual rights, to protect which
governments are instituted deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

“The cardinal article of faith of our civilization,” according to Frankfurter, “is the inviolable
character of the individual.” 12

4. With all the admitted difficulty then that the function of judicial review presents in passing
upon the executive determination of suspending the privilege of the writ, there is still no way of
evading such a responsibility, except on the pain of judicial abdication. It may not admit of doubt
that on this matter this Court, unlike the President, cannot lay claim to the experience and the
requisite knowledge that would instill confidence in its decisions. That is no warrant for an
unquestioning and uncritical acceptance of what was done. It cannot simply fold its hands and
evince an attitude of unconcern. It has to decide the case. This it does by applying the law to the
facts as found, as it would in ordinary cases. If petitioners then can make out a case of an
unlawful deprivation of liberty, they are entitled to the writ prayed for. If the suspension of the
privilege be the justification, they could, as they did, challenge its validity. To repeat, this Court,
even if denied the fullness of information and the conceded grasp of the Executive still must
adjudicate the matter as best it can. It has to act not by virtue of its competence but by the force
of its commission a function authenticated by history. 13 That would be to live up to its solemn
trust, to paraphrase Cardozo, of preserving the great ideals of liberty and equally against the
erosion of possible encroachments, whether minute or extensive. 14 Even if there be no
showing then of constitutional infirmity, at least one other branch of the government, that to
which such an awesome duty has been conferred, has had the opportunity of reflecting on the
matter with detachment, with objectivity, and with full awareness of the commands of the
Constitution as well as the realities of the situation.
5. Nor is the power of the judiciary to so inquire, negated as contended by respondents, by
reliance on the doctrine of political questions. The term has been made applicable to
controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in
a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or
executive determination to which deference must be paid. 15 It has likewise been employed
loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or
any branch thereof. 16 If to be delimited with accuracy, “political questions should refer to such
as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard
to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the Presidency or Congress. It is thus
beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. 17 Unless, clearly falling within the
above formulation, the decision reached by the political branches whether in the form of a
congressional act or an executive order could be tested in court. Where private rights are
affected, the judiciary has no choice but to look into its validity. It is not to be lost sight of that
such a power comes into play if there is an appropriate proceeding that may be filed only after
either coordinate branch has acted. Even when the Presidency or Congress possesses plenary
power, its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof, if shown, may give rise to a justiciable
controversy. 18 For the constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted. There are
limits to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished. Necessarily then, the courts in the
proper exercise of judicial review could inquire into the question of whether or not either of the
two coordinate branches has adhered to what is laid down by the Constitution. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. So it is in the matter before us so clearly explained in the
opinion of the Chief Justice.

6. The doctrine announced in Montenegro v. Castañeda 19 that such a question is political has
thus been laid to rest. It is about time too. It owed its existence to the compulsion exerted by
Barcelon v. Baker, a 1905 decision. 20 This Court was partly misled by an undue reliance in the
latter case on what it considered to be authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious
American jurists as Marshall, Story, and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This
is most evident in the case of Chief Justice Marshall, whose epochal Marbury v. Madison 21
was cited. Why that was so is difficult to understand. For it speaks to the contrary. It was by
virtue of this decision that the function of judicial review owes its origin notwithstanding the
absence of any explicit provision in the American Constitution empowering the courts to do so.
Thus: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be
opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so
that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution;
or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts
are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.” 22

Nor is the excerpt from Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, in Martin v.
Mott, 23 as made clear in the opinion of the Chief Justice, an authority directly in point. There,
a militiaman had been convicted of failing to respond to a call, made under the Act of 1795, to
serve during the War of 1812. His property was taken to satisfy the judgment. He brought an
action of replevin. The American Constitution empowers its Congress “to provide for calling
forth the Militia” in certain cases, and Congress did provide that in those cases the President
should have authority to make the call. All that Justice Story did in construing the statute in the
light of the language and purpose of her Constitution was to recognize the authority of the
American President to decide whether the exigency has arisen. In stating that such power was
exclusive and thus had a conclusive effect, he relied on the language employed, impressed with
such a character. The constitutional provision on the suspension of the privilege of the writ is, as
shown, anything but that. 24 Chief Justice Taney, in Luther v. Borden, 25 likewise had to deal
with a situation involving the calling out of the militia. As a matter of fact, an eminent
commentator speaking of the two above decisions had this apt observation: “The common
element in these opinions would seem to be a genuine judicial reluctance to speak in a situation
where the voice of the Court, even if heard, could not have any effect. More than this, both Story
and Taney seem to share the suspicion, unusual in them, that under a popular form of
government there are certain questions that the political branches must be trusted to answer with
finality.” 26 What was said next is even more pertinent. Thus: “It would be dangerous and
misleading to push the principles of these cases too far, especially the doctrine of ‘political
questions’ as implied in Luther v. Borden. Given the opportunity to afford a grievously injured
citizen relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power, especially when
the question at issue falls in the penumbra between the ‘political’ and the ‘justiciable’, the Court
will act as if it had never heard of this doctrine and its underlying assumption that there are some
powers against which the judiciary simply cannot be expected to act as the last line of
defense.” 27 It would thus seem evident that support for the hitherto prevailing Montenegro
ruling was rather frail. Happily, with our decision, it is no longer capable of the mischief to
which it does lend itself of an undue diminution of judicial power to the prejudice of
constitutional rights.

7. With such presidential determination of the existence of the conditions required by the
Constitution to justify a suspension of the privilege of the writ no longer conclusive on the other
branches, this Court may thus legitimately inquire into its validity. The question before us, it
bears repeating, is whether or not Proclamation No. 889, as it now stands, not as it was originally
issued, is valid. The starting point must be a recognition that the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ belongs to the Executive, subject to limitations. So the Constitution provides, and it is
to be respected. The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by this Tribunal is necessarily
limited then to the ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension, in the light of the credible
information furnished the President, was arbitrary. Such a test met with the approval of the chief
counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose W. Diokno. T. paraphrase Frankfurter, the question before
the judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken. One who is not the
Executive but equally knowledgeable may entertain a different view, but the decision rests with
the occupant of the office. As would be immediately apparent even from a cursory perusal of the
data furnished the President, so impressively summarized in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the
imputation of arbitrariness would be difficult to sustain. Moreover, the steps taken by him to
limit the area where the suspension operates as well as his instructions attested to a firm resolve
on his part to keep strictly within the bounds of his authority. Under the circumstances, the
decision reached by the Court that no finding of unconstitutionality is warranted commends itself
for approval. The most that can be said is that there was a manifestation of presidential power
well-nigh touching the extreme border of his conceded competence, beyond which a forbidden
domain lies. The requisite showing of either improvidence or abuse has not been made.

8. Why the dissent then. My basic premise is that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
partakes of an executive action which if valid binds all who are within its operation. The function
of enacting a legal norm general in character appertains to either Congress or the President. Its
specific application to particular individuals, like petitioners here, is however a task incumbent
on the judiciary. What is more, as had just been explained, its validity may be tested in courts.
Even if valid, any one may seek judicial determination as to whether he is embraced within its
terms. After our declaration of the validity of the Proclamation No. 889 as amended, the next
question is its applicability to petitioners. I am the first to recognize the meticulous care with
which the Chief Justice, after reaching the conclusion that petitioners are covered by the
suspension, saw to it that their constitutional rights are duly safeguarded in whatever proceedings
they would have thereafter to face. There is thus an assurance that as far as human foresight can
anticipate matters, the possibility e abuse is minimized.

The matter, for me, could be viewed independently whether or not petitioners, by the conduct
imputed to them, could be detained further by virtue of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. For admittedly, a supervening fact, the Executive’s determination to have them charged
according to the ordinary procedural rules, did present itself. There was thus introduced an
element decisive in its consequences. They are entitled to treatment no different from that
accorded any other individual facing possible criminal charges. The opinion of the Chief Justice
is correct in pointing out that such an approach follows the dictum of Justice Tuason, speaking
for himself in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 where a majority of five, lacking just one vote to enable
this Court to reach a binding decision, did arrive at the conclusion that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ does not suspend the right to bail. Thus: “By the same token, if and when
formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention
ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern. Thereupon the corresponding court
assumes its role and the judicial process takes its course to the exclusion of the executive or the
legislative departments. Henceforward, the accused is entitled to demand all the constitutional
safeguards and privileges essential to due process.” 29 Parenthetically, it may be observed that
the above view reflects the stand taken by Justice Recto, fortified by Justice Laurel, drawing
heavily on continental juristic thought, both of whom, having retired from the bench and
thereafter having been elected to the Senate, were invited to appear as amici curiae in the Nava
case.

It would follow to my way of thinking then that the petitioners still detained ought not to be
further deprived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense they
may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. That is to
comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonable search and seizure. 30
Moreover, to keep them in confinement after the ordinary processes of the law are to be availed
of, as thereafter decreed by the Executive itself is to ignore the safeguard in the Bill of Rights
that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 31
That would explain why with full recognition of the sense of realism that infuses the opinion of
the Court, I cannot, from the above standpoint, reach the same conclusion they did.
These six petitioners, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe, Luzvimindo David, Gary Olivar,
Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison, have, for me, become immune from the operation of the
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and are thus entitled to their
liberty. I am reinforced in my conviction by the well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that if there are two possible modes of interpretation, that one which raises the least
constitutional doubt should be preferred. Certainly, to my way of thinking, the choice is obvious.
That interpretation which would throw the full mantle of protection afforded by the Constitution
to those unfortunate enough to be caught in the meshes of criminal law is more in keeping with
the high estate accorded constitutional rights.

There is another consideration that strengthens my conviction on the matter. The language of the
Constitution would seem to imply at the most that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
renders it unavailable for the time being. Still there are authorities sustaining the view that
preventive detention subject to the test of good faith is allowable. 32 Such a doctrine is no
doubt partly traceable to Anglo-American legal history where as pointed out by Maine:
“Substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of
procedure.” 33 The writ of habeas corpus then is more than just an efficacious device or the
most speedy means of obtaining one’s liberty. It has become a most valuable substantive right. It
would thus serve the cause of constitutional rights better if the Tuason dictum as to the judicial
process supplanting executive rule the moment charges are filed be accorded acceptance.
Thereby the number of individuals who would have to submit to further detention, that may well
turn out to be unjustified, would be reduced. What is more, greater fidelity is manifested to the
principle that liberty is the rule and restraint the exception.

I am not of course insensible to the observation in the opinion of the Court that this concept
could be an obstacle to the early resumption of the ordinary judicial process as the Executive
might be minded to postpone resort to it, considering that there would necessarily be an end to
the detention at that early stage of individuals who continue to pose risk to the safety of the
government. It does occur to me, however, that the presumption should be that the high
executive dignitaries can be trusted to act in accordance with the dictates of good faith and the
command of the Constitution. At least, such seems to be the case now. The opinion of the Court
is quite explicit as to the measures taken to minimize the possibility of abuse from officials in the
lower category, who in their zeal or even from less worthy motives might make a mockery of the
other constitutional rights. That is as it should be. It should continue to be so even if there be
acceptance of the doctrine enunciated by Justice Tuason. There is, for me at least, no undue
cause for pessimism.

There is to my mind another reinforcement to this approach to the question before us, perhaps
one based more on policy rather than strictly legal considerations. The petitioners who have not
been released are youth leaders, who for motives best known to them, perhaps excess of idealism
impatience with existing conditions, even overweening ambition, clamor for change, apparently
oblivious at times that it could be accomplished through means of which the law does not
disapprove. It would be premature at this stage say whether or not their activities have incurred
for the a penal sanction, which certainly would be appropriate their conduct is beyond the pale.
Even they should recognize that the existing order has the right to defend itself against those who
would destroy it. Nonetheless as a constitutional democracy can justifiably pride itself on its
allegiance to way or persuasion rather than coercion, the most meticulous observance of the free
way of life seems to me, even at this stage, not without its beneficent influence op their future
course of conduct. This is not by any means to intimate that my brethren view matters
differently. Far from it. Any difference if at all in the positions taken is a question of emphasis.
Rightly, the opinion of the Chief Justice stresses the importance of the rule of law. It is to be
hoped that with a proper understanding of what has been decided by the Court today, there
would be a diminution of the wholesale condemnation of the present system of government by
some sectors of the youth and perhaps even lead to much-needed refinement in the volume and
quality of their utterances. It could even conceivably, not only for them but for others of a less
radical cast of mind, but equally suffering from disenchantment and disillusion, induce a
reassessment and reappraisal of their position, even if from all appearances their commitment
and dedication are plain for all to see. More than that, such a response will go a long way
towards a keener appreciation of the merits of a constitutional democracy. For thereby, it
demonstrates that it lives up to its ideas; it strives to act in accordance with what it professes. Its
appeal for all sectors of society becomes strengthened and vitalized. Nor do I close my eyes to
the risk that such an attitude towards those who constitute a source of danger entails. That for me
is not conclusive. With nations, as with ordinary mortals, that is unavoidable. Repose, in the
often-quoted aphorism of Holmes, is not the destiny of man.

9. One last observation. It would appear to me that if there is really a resolve to maintain
inviolate constitutional rights for all, more especially so for those inclined and disposed to differ
and to be vocal, perhaps even intemperate, in their criticism, that serious thought should be given
to the desirability of removing from the President his power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus well as the power to declare martial law. Nor would government he lacking in
authority to cope with the crisis of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or lawless violence, as the
President as commander-in-chief can summon the aid of the armed forces to meet the danger
posed to public safety. If the privilege of the writ cannot be suspended and martial law beyond
the power of the President to declare, there is a greater likelihood as far as the rights of the
individual are concerned, of the Constitution remaining at all times supreme, as it ought to be,
whether it be in peace or in war or under other crisis conditions. As long, however, as such a
presidential prerogative exists, it would not be proper for the courts not to accord recognition to
its exercise, if there be observance of the limitations imposed by the Constitution. At the most,
they can only through construction nullify what would amount to an unconstitutional application.
How desirable it would be then, to my way of thinking, if the Constitution would strip the
President of such power. That would be constitutionalism triumphant. In terms of Lincoln’s
memorable dilemma, the government would be neither too strong for the liberties of the people
nor too weak to maintain its existence. This is a matter though appropriately addressed to the
Constitutional Convention.

On the purely legal aspect, however, let me reiterate that my acceptance of the Tuason dictum in
the Nava case did result in my inability to concur fully with the opinion of the Chief Justice,
which, as pointed out at the outset, is possessed of a high degree of merit.

Judgment rendered declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No.
889, as amended, and that the same is not unconstitutional; petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-
34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265 dismissed; Court of First Instance of Rizal directed to act
with utmost dispatch in conducting preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against other petitioners, and to issue warrants of
arrest if probable cause is found to exist against them, or otherwise, to order their release; and
parties may, by motion, seek proper relief in these proceedings if there should be undue delay
either in the completion of the preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of
proper orders or resolutions in connection therewith.

READ CASE DIGEST HERE.

Footnotes

1. Words in bracket ([]) are those appearing in the original Proclamation No. 889, but which
were eliminated in the amended Proclamation No. 889-A; words emphasized have been
amended by Proclamation No. 889-A.

2. 5 Phil. 87.

3. 91 Phil. 882, 887.

* Should be L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973.

** Should be L-33964.

4. As stated in the proclamation involved in Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882.

5. 5 Phil. 87.

6. 91 Phil. 882.

7. 6 L. ed. 537.

8. In re Boyle, 57 Pac 706; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 US 78; Ex Parte Field, 5 Blatchf. 63, cited in
USCA Const. Part. 1, p. 463; Luther v. Borden, 7 How 1, 12 L ed. 581; In re Kalanianaole, 10
Hawaii 29, cited in California Law Review, May, 1942, fn. 40, pp. 382-383; Ex parte
MacDonald, 143 Pac 947.

9. In re Burrus, 136 US 500; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 US 375; Patten v. Miller, 8 S.E. (2d)
757; Miller v. Rivers, 31 F. Supp. 540; Hearon v. Calus, 183 S.E. 13; In re Green, 16 Pac (2d)
582; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 52 Pac (2d) 1054; Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp 512; U.S. v.
Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261.

10. Mitchell v. Harmony, 14 L. ed. 75, 84. See also, U.S. v. Russell, 20 L. ed. 474, 475.
11. 287 U.S. 375, 385.

12. Northern P.R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585; Merchants’ Nat. Bank v. Richmond, 256
U.S. 635; First Nat. Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380.

13. Which were, seemingly, taken from the seventh paragraph of Section 3, and Section 21 of
the Jones Law (Act of Congress of the U.S. of August 29, 1916). The only provision thereon in
the U.S. Constitution is found in Section 9(2) of Art. 1 thereof on the Legislative Power which
provides that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases
of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”

14. People v. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 375; People v. Evangelista, et al., 57 Phil. 354; People v.
Capadocia, 57 Phil 364; People v. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451; People v. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455.

15. 91 Phil. 882. See also, Nava v. Gatmaitan, Hernandez v. Montesa, and Angeles v. Abaya, 90
Phil. 172.

16. People v. Nava, L-4907, June 29, 1963; In re Jesus Lava v. Gonzales, L-23048, July 31,
1964; People vs. Nava, L-5796, August 29, 1966; People v. Lava, L-4974, May 16, 1969.

17. Emphasis ours.

18. See page 22 thereof.

19. mphasis supplied.

20. “ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection. How committed. The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.”

21. 57 Pac. 706.

22. Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law, 2nd ed., 190-191.

23. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197.

24. 291 U.S. 502.

25. Although not by some conclusions therein made.

26. Said paragraph reads:


“That all the above named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist
Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there knowingly, wilfully, feloniously and by overt acts committed subversive acts all
intended to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the government of
any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversive or other illegal means, for
the purpose of placing such governmental political subdivision under the control and domination
any alien power, as follows:

“xxx xxx xxx”

27. On November 15, 1971.

28. 90 Phil. 172, 204. Italics ours. Justice Tuason was speaking for himself only, not for the
Court, which was divided.

CASTRO and BARREDO, JJ., concurring:

1. 90 Phil. 172, 204 (1951).

2. Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948).

3. E.g., People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 231 (1936).

READ CASE DIGEST HERE.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. Art. III, Constitution.

2. According to the Constitution: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity
for such suspension shall exist.” Art. III, Sec. 1, par. (14).

3. On this point, the Constitution reads: “In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.” Art. VII,
Sec. 10, par. (2). What is immediately noticeable is that the existence of an imminent danger of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion was included in the justification for the suspension.

4. 4 Wall. 123 (1866).

5. Alvarez v. Court, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).

6. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94-95 (1937).


7. Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco Employees Union, 68 Phil. 541 (1939).

8. Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936).

9. Schneckburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 251-252 (1936).

10. 90 Phil. 172, at p. 206 (1951).

11. L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420, 423.

12. American Communications Asso. v. Douds. 339 US 382, 421 (1951).

13. Cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943).

14. Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, 92-93 (1921).

15. Cf. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946); Lopez v. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA
756; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774.

16. Cf. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1937); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

17. Cf. Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

18. Cf. Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429 (1938); Rodriguez v. Quirino, L-19800, October 28,
1963, 9 SCRA 284.

19. 91 Phil. 882 (1952).

20. 5 Phil. 87.

21. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

22. Ibid., pp. 177-178.

23. 12 Wheaton 19 (1827).

24. Cf. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 Harvard Law
Review, 1253, 1270-1271 (1942).

25. Howard 1 (1849).

26. Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief, pp. 16-17 (1951).

27. Ibid., p. 17.

28. 90 Phil. 172 (1951).


29. Ibid., p. 204.

30. According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the Constitution: “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.”

31. Article III, section 1, paragraph 15, Constitution.

32. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2 (1866); Moyer v. Pea-body, 212 US 78 (1908); Ex parte
Simmerman, 132 F2 442 (1942). That was likewise acknowledged in the opinion of Justice
Tuason in the Nava case.

33. Cf. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, p. 63 (1941). Holmes and Maitland entertained
a similar view.

Teodosio Lansang et al vs Brig-Gen Garcia

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SPONSORED ADS

Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case

Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of
8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang
et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al
questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet
the constitutional requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in
this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the
same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive
evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified
information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of
the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the
SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Constitutional Safeguards to Insure Independence of the Judiciary

Post under Judicial Department

The following are the constitutional safeguards to maintain judicial


independence:

1) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and cannot be abolished by mere


legislation.

2) The members of the Supreme Court cannot be removed except by


impeachment.

3) The Supreme Court cannot be deprived of its minimum jurisdiction


prescribed in Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.

4) The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law


without its advice and concurrence.

5) Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council
and are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

6) The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all lower courts and
their personnel.

7) The Supreme Court has exclusive power to discipline Judges of lower courts.

8) The Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be


undermined by a law reorganizing the Judiciary.

9) Members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency performing


quasi-Judicial or administrative functions.

10) The salaries of Members of the Judiciary cannot be decreased during their
continuance in office.

11) The Judiciary has fiscal autonomy.

12) The Supreme Court has exclusive power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure.
13) Only the Supreme Court can temporarily assign judges to other stations.

14) It is the Supreme Court who appoints all officials and employees of the
Judiciary. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed. (pp. 229-31.) Political Law
Bar Question 2000

The Independence Of The Election Commission

The Election Commission is a constitutional body. It is established by the Constitution and given
a specific mandate by the Constitution.

Article 113(1) provides that:

"There shall be an Election Commission, to be constituted in accordance with Article 114,


which, subject to the provisions of federal law, shall conduct elections to the House of
Representatives and the Legislative Assemblies of the States and prepare and revise electoral
rolls for such elections."

Further to this, Article 113(2)(i) provides that

“..the Election Commission shall, from time to time, as they deem necessary, review the division
of the Federation and the States into constituencies and recommend such changes therein as they
may think necessary in order to comply with the provisions contained in the Thirteenth Schedule;
and the reviews of constituencies for the purpose of elections to the Legislative Assemblies shall
be undertaken at the same time as the reviews of constituencies for the purpose of elections to
the House of Representatives.”

From these provisions it is manifest that the Election Commission is charged with the heavy
responsibility of ensuring free and fair elections through the preparation of the Electoral Rolls
and the delineation of constituencies.

That a key aspect of the Election Commission is its neutrality is, as such, self-evident. It is not
answerable to the Executive nor to the Legislature. Its powers are not conferred by the Executive
nor the Legislature. Its powers are conferred by the Constitution itself, there being no higher
legal authority.

It is also self-evident that the effectiveness of the Election Commission is measured by the
confidence of the Rakyat in the Election Commission. For the democratic process to succeed, it
is vital that Malaysians believe that General Elections are free and fair. Public confidence is
crucial. For this reason, the task of appointing the members of the Election Commission falls to
the DYMM Yang Dipertuan Agong and the Conference of Rulers and NOT the Executive.
Article 114(1) provides:

"The Election Commission shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after consultation
with the Conference of Rulers, and shall consist of a chairman, a deputy chairman and five other
members."

It is significant that the Constitution does not require the Agong to act on, with or after
considering the advice of the Executive. The only condition imposed by the Constitution is in
Article 114(2) which provides that:

"In appointing members of the Election Commission the Yang di- Pertuan Agong shall have
regard to the importance of securing an Election Commission which enjoys public confidence."

In further safeguarding the neutrality of the Election Commission, a Commissioner cannot be an


undischarged bankrupt, cannot engage in any paid office or employment outside his/her duties of
as a Commissioner, cannot be a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative
Assembly of a State (A114(3)).

Further, under Article 114(4A), the Chairman of the Commission shall be disqualified from
holding such office if after three months of his/her appointment to such office or at any time
thereafter he is or becomes a member of any board of directors or board of management, or an
officer of employee, or engages in the affairs or business, of any organization or body, whether
corporate or otherwise, or of any commercial, industrial or other undertaking, whether or not he
receives any remuneration, reward, profit or benefit from it.

These provisions are clearly aimed at ensuring impartiality towards the discharge of function by
the Election Commission. These safeguards are complemented by a protection of the
remuneration of Commissioners through a provision for the same by Federal Law and the
charging of such payment upon the Consolidated Fund (A114(5)). Such remuneration cannot be
altered to disadvantage after appointment (A114(6)).

The foregoing clearly puts paid to any suggestion that the law pertaining to the Election
Commission was/is designed in a manner that made it subordinate to the Executive or the
Legislature.

The only involvement of the Legislature is where terms of office other than remuneration, are
concerned. These can be provided for by Federal Law (A114(5A)). Additionally, the rules that
the Election Commission puts in place to discharge its function are subject to Federal Law
(A113(5)). This involvement is limited and does not, and in any event cannot, justify the
undermining of the independence and function of the Election Commission.

The Election Commission is intended to be as independent as the Judiciary and the other
Constitutional bodies including the office of the Auditor General and the Attorney General. The
constitutional scheme of safeguards is similar.

Any act on the part of the Executive to interfere with the independence of the Election
Commission is an unconstitutional, and I would say an illegal, act.

Accountability of Public Officers


THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.

Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies,
shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.

Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.

Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years
or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees
for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur.

Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which
shall not be decreased during their term of office.

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law.

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel.

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any
firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
the public in the manner provided by law.

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

- See more at: http://www.ncda.gov.ph/integrity-development-action-plan/related-idap-


laws/accountability-of-public-officers/#sthash.SfS0YIjA.dpuf
The Judicial Branch

Contents:
 Introduction
 The Supreme Court
 The Chief Justice
Introduction
Judicial power rests with the Supreme Court and the lower courts, as established by law (Art. VIII,
sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution). Its duty is to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable (Art. VIII Sec. 1 (2)).
The judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. Its appropriation may not be reduced by the Legislature below
the appropriated amount the previous year (Art. VIII, sec. 2).
Rules and procedures
The Rules of Court of the Philippines, as amended and the rules and regulations issued by the
Supreme Court, define the rules and procedures of the judiciary. These rules and regulations are
in the form of administrative matters, administrative orders, circulars, memorandum circulars,
memorandum orders, and OCA circulars. The Supreme Court disseminates these rules and
regulations to all courts, publishes important ones in newspapers of general circulation, prints
them in book or pamphlet form, and uploads them to the Supreme Court website and the
Supreme Court E-Library website.
On June 21, 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility for the
legal profession. The draft was prepared by the Committee on Responsibility, Discipline and
Disbarment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Appointments to the judiciary
By virtue of Article VIII, Section 8, appointments to the judiciary are made by the President of the
Philippines based on a list submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council which is under the
supervision of the Supreme Court. Its principal function is to screen prospective appointees to
any judicial post. It is composed of the chief justice as ex-officio chairman, the Secretary of
Justice and representatives of Congress as ex-officio members, and a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court and a representative of
the private sector as members.
Philippine Judicial Academy
The Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) is the “training school for justices, judge, court
personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts.” It was originally created by the Supreme
Court on March 16, 1996 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 35-96, and was institutionalized
on February 26, 1998 by virtue of Republic Act No. 8557. No appointee to the bench may
commence the discharge his adjudicative function without completing the prescribed court
training in the academy. Its organizational structure and administrative setup are provided for by
the Supreme Court in its en banc resolution (Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-sc-PHILJA).
Philippine Mediation Center
The Philippine Mediation Center was organized pursuant to the en banc Supreme Court Resolution
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, dated October 16, 2001, and in line with the objectives of the
Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) to decongest court dockets, among others, the court
prescribed guidelines in institutionalizing and implementing the mediation program in the
Philippines. The same resolution designated the Philippine Judicial Academy as the component
unit of the Supreme Court for Court-Annexed Mediation and other Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and established the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC).
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office was organized to implement the rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (B.M. No. 850
– “Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)). It holds office in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines main office.
Katarungang Pambarangay
Presidential Decree No. 1508, or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, took effect on December 11,
1978, and established a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level. This decree
and the Local Government Code provided rules and procedures, Title I, Chapter 7, Sections 339-
422. This system of amicable settlement of dispute aims to promote the speedy administration of
justice by easing the congestion of court dockets. The court does not take cognizance of cases
filed if they are not filed first with the Katarungang Pambarangay.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system
Republic Act No. 9285 institutionalized the use of an alternative dispute resolution system, which
serves to promote the speedy and impartial administration of justice and unclog the court
dockets. This act shall be without prejudice to the adoption of the Supreme Court of any ADR
system such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration or any combination thereof. ↵
The Supreme Court
History of the Supreme Court
Royal audencia
The royal audencia was established on May 5, 1583, composed of a president, four oidores (justices)
and a fiscal. The audencia exercised both administrative and judicial functions. Its functions
and structure were modified in 1815 when a chief justice replaced its president and the number
of justices was increased. It came to be known as the Audencia Territorial de Manila with two
branches, civil and criminal. A royal decree issued on July 24, 1861 converted it to a purely
judicial body with its decisions appealable to the Court of Spain in Madrid. A territorial audencia
in Cebu, and audencia for criminal cases in Vigan were organized on February 26, 1898.
Philippine Revolution and First Republic
In the three phases of the revolution: 1896-1897; 1898; 1899-1901, the exigencies of war prevented
the thorough organization of the administration of justice. Katipunan councils, then the
provisional governments of Tejeros, Biak-na-Bato, and the Revolutionary Republic proclaimed
in Kawit, essentially had General Emilio Aguinaldo exercising decree-making powers instituting
ad hoc courts and reviewing any appeals concerning their decisions.
In 1899, when the Malolos Constitution was ratified, it provided for a Supreme Court of Justice.
President Aguinaldo proposed the appointment of Apolinario Mabini as Chief Justice, but the
appointment and the convening of the Supreme Court of Justice never materialized because of
the Philippine-American War.
American military rule
During the Philippine-American War, General Wesley Merrit suspended the audencias when a
military government was established after Manila fell to American forces in August,
1898. Major General Elwell S. Otis re-established the Audencia on May 29, 1899 by virtue of
General Order No. 20, which provided for six Filipino members of the audencia.
Establishment of the Supreme Court
With the establishment of civil government, Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission abolished
the audencia and established the present Supreme Court on June 11, 1901, with Cayetano
Arellano as the first chief justice together with associate justices—the majority of whom were
Americans.
Commonwealth: Filipinization of the Supreme Court
With the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, the membership was increased to 11 with two
divisions of five members each. The Supreme Court was Filipinized upon the inauguration of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines on November 15, 1935. The composition of the court was
reduced by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 3. It provided for a Supreme Court, headed by a
chief justice with six associate justices.
World War II and the Third Republic
During World War II, the National Assembly passed legislation granting emergency powers to
President Manuel L. Quezon; Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos was made concurrent Secretary of
Justice and acting President of the Philippines in unoccupied areas. After his capture and
execution at the hands of the Japanese, the Commonwealth government-in-exile had no system
of courts.
Meanwhile, the Japanese organized the Philippine Executive Commission in occupied areas on
January 8, 1942, which gave way to the Second Republic in October 14, 1943. By the end of
World War II, the regular function of the courts had been restored, beginning with the
appointment of a new Supreme Court on June 6, 1945. On September 17, 1945, the laws of the
Second Republic were declared null and void; a Supreme Court decision on Co Kim Cham v.
Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh and Arsenio P. Dizon recognized this.
Martial law
The Supreme Court was retained during the martial law years under rules similar to the 1935
Constitution, but with the exception few key factors, e.g.:
1. The 1973 Constitution further increased the membership of the Supreme Court to 15,
with two divisions;
2. The process by which a chief justice and associate justices are appointed was changed
under to grant the president (Ferdinand Marcos during this time) the sole authority to
appoint members of the Supreme Court. There were five chief justices that were
appointed under this provision.
Present-day Supreme Court
Pursuant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is composed of a chief
Justice and 14 associate justices who serve until the age of 70. The court may sit en banc or in
one of its three divisions composed of five members each. The chief justice and associate justices
are appointed by the President of the Philippines, chosen from a shortlist submitted by the
Judicial and Bar Council. The president must fill up a vacancy within 90 days of occurrence.
Article VIII, Section 4 (2) of the constitution explicitly provides for the cases that must be heard en
banc, and Section 4 (3) for cases that may be heard by divisions.
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 transferred the administrative supervision of all courts and
their personnel from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court. This was affirmed
by Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. To effectively discharge this constitutional
mandate, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) was created under Presidential Decree
No. 828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842 (and its functions further strengthened by a
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated October 24, 1996). Its principal function is the
supervision and administration of the lower courts throughout the Philippines and all their
personnel. It reports and recommends to the Supreme Court all actions that affect the lower court
management. The OCA is headed by the court administrator, three deputy court administrators,
and three assistant court administrators.
According to the 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5, the Supreme Court exercises the
following powers:
1. Exercise jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm, on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower courts in:
o All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
o All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto;
o All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
o All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher;
o All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved;
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignments shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts; the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar; and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law (Sec. 5 , id.).
The Supreme Court has adopted and promulgated the Rules of Court for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings and practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission in the practice of law. Amendments are promulgated through the Committee on
Revision of Rules. The Court also issues administrative rules and regulations in the form of
court issuances posted on the Supreme Court E-Library website. ↵
The Chief Justice
The incumbent
Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno
Tenure as Chief Justice: August 24, 2012 – present
Appointed by: Benigno S. Aquino III
Age at Appointment: 52
Read her biography from on website of the Supreme Court
Full roster of chief justices
The position of chief justice was created in 1901 by virtue of the establishment of the Philippine
Supreme Court. At the time, the chief justice was appointed by the President of the United
States: the court was composed mainly of American citizens with a Filipino chief justice.
The incumbent Chief Justice, Ma.
Lourdes P.A. Sereno, appointed by President Benigno S. Aquino III, took her oath of office on
August 25, 2012. She is the first woman to hold the position.
There were six chief justices appointed by the President of the United States. In 1935, upon the
inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the power to appoint the chief justice was
transferred to the President of the Philippines. According to the 1935 Constitution, the President
of the Philippines shall make appointments with concurrence of the National Assembly. There
have been six Chief Justices who were appointed under the 1935 Constitution. The only chief
justice that was not appointed by a president was Chief Justice Jose Yulo, who was in office
during the Japanese occupation, from 1942 until the liberation of the Philippines in 1945. During
this time, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed by the Philippine Executive
Committee headed by Jorge B. Vargas.
The 1943 Constitution provided for the members of the Supreme Court and the chief justice to be
appointed by the president with the concurrence of his cabinet. Upon the declaration of martial
law and the subsequent establishment of the 1973 Constitution, the process of selection of the
Chief Justice of the Philippines was changed. The power of Congress to veto an appointment by
the president to the office of the chief justice was removed. According to the 1973 Constitution,
“The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the
President.” There were five chief justices that were appointed under this provision.
After the revolution of 1986, a new constitution was enacted and a new process of selecting a chief
magistrate was created. Former chief justice and 1986 Constitutional Commission delegate
Roberto V. Concepcion introduced the concept of the Judicial and Bar Council. The aim of the
Council is to de-politicize the judiciary by lessening the appointing power of the president. To
read more about the appointment of chief justices, members of the judiciary, and the Office of
the Ombudsman, please click here.
To date, there have been nine chief justices appointed under the conditions of the 1986 Constitution.
Chief justices listed according to appointing President of the Philippines
Of the 15 Presidents of the Philippines, only eight have been able to appoint an individual to the
highest judicial post in the land. The following is the list of presidents who appointed chief
Jjstices and their appointees.
1. Manuel L. Quezon
o Jose Abad Santos
2. Sergio Osmeña
o Manuel V. Moran
3. Elpidio Quirino
o Ricardo M. Paras
4. Carlos P. Garcia
o Cesar Bengzon
5. Ferdinand E. Marcos
o Roberto V. Concepcion
o Querube Makalintal
o Fred Ruiz Castro
o Enrique M. Fernando
o Felix V. Makasiar
o Ramon C. Aquino
6. Corazon C. Aquino
o Claudio Teehankee
o Pedro L. Yap
o Marcelo B. Fernan
o Andres R. Narvasa
7. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
o Hilario G. Davide
8. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
o Artemio Panganiban
o Reynato Puno
o Renato C. Corona
9. Benigno S. Aquino III
o Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
Notable chief justices
Of the list of chief justices, there are a few individuals that stand out for having gone above and
beyond their duty and tenure as chief justice.
1. Cayetano Arellano: Cayetano Arellano was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
He was appointed in 1901 when the Supreme Court was created through Act No. 136,
along with three American justices and one Filipino justice.
2. Ramon Avanceña: Appointed in 1925 by U.S. President Calvin Coolidge, he is known
for ushering in an all-Filipino Supreme Court in 1935. Upon the establishment of the
Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, American justices were no longer allowed to sit in
the Philippine Supreme Court—thus, new justices were appointed, all of whom were of
Filipino citizenship.
3. Jose Abad Santos: As a wartime chief justice, Abad Santos took on two different roles;
he was the chief justice and concurrently the Secretary of Justice. When President
Quezon left the Philippines to evade capture by the Japanese, Abad Santos chose to stay
in the country as a caretaker of the government. On May 2, 1942, the Japanese military
caught Abad Santos in Cebu and invited him to become one of the members of their
puppet government. Abad Santos refused to collaborate. He died at the hands of the
Japanese on May 2, 1942. His last words to his son were, “Do not cry, Pepito, show to
these people that you are brave. It is an honor to die for one’s country. Not everybody has
that chance.”
4. Manuel V. Moran: Appointed in 1945 by President Sergio Osmeña, Manuel V. Moran
would serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for six years. Upon his retirement in
1951, Moran was appointed as Philippine Ambassador to Spain and concurrently to the
Holy See. During President Quirino’s administration, Moran was once again offered a
position in the Supreme Court in 1953, at the twilight of Quirino’s presidency. Moran,
however, refused the midnight appointment.
5. Roberto V. Concepcion: He went into early retirement for refusing to grant absolute
power to Ferdinand Marcos, the president who appointed him. In the resolution of
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, Concepcion argued against the validity of the 1973
Constitution and its questionable aspects. Accordingly, he dissented, along with Justices
Teehankee, Zaldivar, and Fernando, from implementing the 1973 Constitution. Due to
the court’s decision, Concepcion would enter early retirement, 50 days before his
originally scheduled retirement date.
6. Claudio Teehankee: Claudio Teehankee was known for his firm anti-martial law stance
during his tenure in the Supreme Court. Teehankee resisted multiple attempts by the
Marcos administration to garner absolute power by issuing questionable decrees. In 1973,
he was part of the bloc that dissented from the implementation of the 1973 Constitution.
In 1980, he dissented from the proposed judicial reorganization act of President Marcos.
In 1986, after the EDSA Revolution, he administered the Oath of Office of President
Corazon C. Aquino in Club Filipino. He was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court in 1986 by President Corazon C. Aquino
7. Hilario G. Davide: Appointed by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in 1998, Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide was known as the presiding judge of the first impeachment
proceedings in Asia. During the impeachment of President Estrada, he conducted
proceedings with impartiality. Following EDSA II uprising, which deposed President
Estrada, Davide swore in Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the 14th President of the
Philippines.
8. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno: Appointed by President Benigno S. Aquino III in 2012,
Chief Justice Sereno is the first woman appointed to the position.
Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals is the second highest tribunal in the country, which was established on
February 1, 1936 by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 3. The current form of the Court of
Appeals was constituted through Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Executive Order No.
33, s. 1986, Republic Act No. 7902, and Republic Act No. 8246.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional
Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commission.
The Court of Appeals shall also have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence
and perform acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or proceedings.
The Court of Appeals is composed of one presiding justice and 68 associate justices, all of which are
appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The
associate justices shall have precedence according to the dates (or order, in case of similar
appointment dates) of their respective appointments. The qualifications for the justices of the
Supreme Court also apply to members of the Court of Appeals.
The current presiding justice of the Court of Appeals is Andres Reyes Jr., who is set to retire on May
11, 2020.
Court of Tax Appeals
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which is of the same level as the Court of Appeals, was created by
virtue of Republic Act No. 1125, which was signed into law on June 16, 1954. Its present-day
form was constituted through RA 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282 and Republic Act
No. 9503.
The CTA exercises jurisdiction in the following:
1. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or
other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the
National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which
case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him
automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which
are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs
Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of non-agricultural
product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code,
and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may
appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
2. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where
the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than P1 million or where there is no specified amount claimed
shall be tried by the regular courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
1. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respective
territorial jurisdiction.
2. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over
tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving
final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: Provided, however, that collection cases where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than P1 million shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and
Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
1. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally
decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
2. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their
respective jurisdiction.
The CTA is composed of one presiding justice and 8 associate justices, all of which are appointed by
the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The associate justices
shall have precedence according to the dates (or order, in case of similar appointment dates) of
their respective appointments. The qualifications for the justices of the Court of Appeals also
apply to members of the CTA.
The current presiding justice of the CTA is Roman del Rosario, who is set to retire on October 6,
2025.
Sandiganbayan
To attain the highest norms of official conduct among officials and employees in the government,
the creation of a special graft court to be known as the Sandiganbayan was provided for in
Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution. This court was formally established through
Presidential Decree No. 1606, which was signed into law on December 10, 1978.
Through Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers), Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, the
Sandiganbayan was carried over to the post-EDSA Revolution republic. The current form of the
Sandiganbayan was constituted through PD 1606, s. 1978, as amended by Republic Act No.
7975 and Republic Act No. 8245.
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
1. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
1. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
2. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
3. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
4. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
5. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
6. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
7. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of constitutional commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the constitution; and
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, s. 1986.
In addition, the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan also has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs
and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including
quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive
Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
The Sandiganbayan comprises of one presiding justice and 14 associate justices, all of which are
appointed by the President from a shortlist submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The
associate justices shall have precedence according to the dates (or order, in case of similar
appointment dates) of their respective appointments.
The qualifications to become a member of the Sandiganbayan are as follows:
1. a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. at least 40 years of age
3. has been a judge of a court for at least ten years, or been engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a prerequisite for at
least ten years.
The current presiding justice of the Sandiganbayan is Amparo Cabotaje-Tang, who is set to retire on
November 8, 2024.

1935 Judicial Department


Article VIII
Judicial Department

Summary: Article VIII provides for the Judicial Department, its composition, powers and functions. The
Supreme Court is the only court created by the Constitution, all other courts are of statutory creation. A
Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices compose the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
are likewise provided herein. The powers of the Supreme Court includes, among others, the promulgation of
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts as well as the admission to the practice of
law.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in:

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question.

(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.

(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.

SECTION 3. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise the Supreme Court shall have such original and
appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.

SECTION 4. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and ten Associate Justices and may sit
eitheren banc or in two divisions unless otherwise provided by law.

SECTION 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

SECTION 6. No person may be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless he has been five years a
citizen of the Philippines, is at least forty years of age, and has for ten years or more been a judge of a court
of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

SECTION 7. No judge appointed for a particular district shall be designated or transferred to another district
without the approval of the Supreme Court. The Congress shall by law determine the residence of judges of
inferior courts.

SECTION 8. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of inferior courts, but no person may
be appointed judge of any such courts unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and has been admitted to the
practice of law in the Philippines.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.

SECTION 10. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc1 , and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Court.

SECTION 11. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached
in consultation before the case is assigned to a Justice for a writing of the opinion of the Court. Any Justice
dissenting from a decision shall state the reasons for his dissent.

SECTION 12. No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.

ARTICLE X
THE JUDICIARY

Section 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as may be established by law. The Batasang Pambansa shall have the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section five thereof.

Section 2.

1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in two divisions.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc, and no treaty, executive agreement, or
law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.
All other cases, which under its rules are required to be heard en banc, shall be decided
with the concurrence of at least eight Members.
3. Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least five Members,
but if such required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided,
that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc
or in a division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

Section 3.

1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, at least forty years of age, and has for ten years or more been a
judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
2. The Batasang Pambansa shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of inferior courts, but
no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed
by the President.

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
2. Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, executive
agreement, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of inferior courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not last longer than six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
6. Appoint its officials and employees in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

Section 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges
of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal.

Section 8. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc
or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the
writing of opinion of the Court. Any Member dissenting from a decision shall state the reasons
for his dissent. The same requirement shall be observed by all inferior collegiate courts.

Section 9. Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based. The Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of minute
resolutions.

Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. Until the Batasang Pambansa shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice
shall receive an annual salary of seventy-five thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, sixty
thousand pesos.

Section 11.

1. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case or
matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen
months for the Supreme Court, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for
all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.
2. With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the
applicable maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding
decision or resolution, because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or
resolution appealed from shall be deemed affirmed except in those cases where a
qualified majority is required and in appeals from judgments of conviction in criminal
cases, and in original special civil actions and proceedings for habeas corpus, the petition
in such cases shall be deemed dismissed, and a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Magistrate of the court shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case.

Section 12. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session
of the Batasang Pambansa, submit to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Batasang
Pambansa an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.

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