2019 Eleazar Civpro Fourth Syllabus Digests Doctrines

CIVIL PROCEDURE. FOURTH SYLLABUS.
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
CASE ASSIGNMENT FOURTH SYLLABUS CIVIL PROCEDURES
# CASE NAME NAME

1 Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
2 Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96027-28, March 8, 2005 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
3 Lasala v. NFA, G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
4 San Juan Jr. v. Judge Cruz, G.R. No. 167321, July 31, 2006 Bautista, Rey Matthew
5 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011 Capellan, Ace Lemuel
6 Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, June 20, 2012 Cruz, Joan mae
7 Mejillano v. Lucillo, 590 SCRA 1 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.
8 De Grano v. Lacaba, 589 SCRA 148 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
9 Maslag v. Monzon, G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013 Dulatas, Ruth Angela H.
10 Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 Dulay, Robert Ross
11 Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, July 18, 2012 Esquilona, Veniflor
12 Province of Antique v. Judge Calabocal, G.R. No. 201946, June 8, 2016 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.
13 General Milling Corp. v. Ramos, 654 SCRA 256 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
14 Katon v. Palanca, Jr., G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004 Gañas, Evangeline
15 Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of Iba, GR 162217, July 22, 2015 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.
16 Tan v. People, April 12, 2002 Julian, Jenelyn D.
17 People v. Caruncho, January 23, 1994 Lagasca, James Ellis
18 City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo Lazaro, Ivan Rei
19 Abellanosa v. COA, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012 Manalili, Mart
20 Condon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012 Manliclic, Marianne P.
21 Maglalang v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013 Mercado, Ralph Louie
22 Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
23 St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, September 16, 1998 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.
24 Uy v. Public Estates Authority, 589 SCRA 1 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
25 Rom v. Roxas& Co. Inc., 656 SCRA 691 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.
26 Fildams Pharma Inc. v. CA, 426 SCRA 460 Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC. III
27 Orosa v. Roa, 495 SCRA 22 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
28 National Water v. A.L. Ang Network Inc., GR 186450, April 14, 2010 Saligan, Constantine
29 Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, GR 180572, June 18, 2012 Santiago, Melody R.
30 Land Bank v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 18, 2017 Sibal, Tricia
31 Redeña v. CA, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica
32 Mesina v. Meer, July 2, 2002 Songco, Ken Felix C
33 Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat Inc., October 2, 2009 Sy, Exequiel
34 Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 6, 2008 Viran, Archimedes John
35 de Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp. Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
36 Pinausukan Seafood House v. FEBTC, GR 159926, January 20, 2014 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
37 Llamas v. Court of Appeals, September 29, 2009 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
38 Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo, 657 SCRA 20 Bautista, Rey Matthew
39 Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, June 20, 2012 Capellan, Ace Lemuel
40 Barco v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 162 Cruz, Joan mae
41 Villanueva v. Nite, July 25, 2006 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.
42 Mejia-Espinoza v. Cariño, G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
43 Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017 Dulatas, Ruth Angela H.
44 Urban Bank v. Pena, 659 SCRA 418 Dulay, Robert Ross
45 Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005 Esquilona, Veniflor
46 Enriquez v. CA, G.R. No. 137391, December 14, 2001 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.
47 Villeza v. German Management, GR 182937, August 8, 2010 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
48 Anama v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. N. 192048, December 13, 2017 Gañas, Evangeline
49 Infante v. Aran Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.
50 Davis v. Davis, G.R. No. 233489, March 7, 2018 Julian, Jenelyn D.
51 Rubio v. Alabata Lagasca, James Ellis
52 Cometa v. Court of Appeals, February 6, 2001 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
53 Guiang v. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004 Manalili, Mart
54 De los Reyes v. Ramnani, June 18, 2010 Manliclic, Marianne P.
55 Solidum v. Court of Appeals, June 22, 2006 Mercado, Ralph Louie
56 Rural Bank v. Manila Mission, GR 130223, August 19, 2009 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
57 Spouses de Mesa v. Spouses Acera, January 16, 2012 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.
THURSDAY 4:30PM TO 9:30PM CLASS DIGEST POOL. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST FIRST. 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE. FOURTH SYLLABUS. POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
58 Golden Sun Finance Corp. v. Albano, 654 SCRA 375 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
59 Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corp., October 9, 2009 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.
60 Teves v. Integrated Credit, GR 216714, April 4, 2018 Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC. III
61 Yap v. Dy Sr., 654 SCRA 593 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
62 Co v. People, July 13, 2009 Saligan, Constantine
63 Selga v. Brar, September 21, 2011 Santiago, Melody R.
64 City of Cebu v. Dedamo, G.R. No. 172852, January 30, 2013 Sibal, Tricia
65 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica
66 Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 Songco, Ken Felix C
67 Dela Cruz-Marisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018 Sy, Exequiel
68 Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018 Viran, Archimedes John
69 Heirs of JBL Reyes v. CA, 338 SCRA 282 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
70 Suntay v. Keyser Mercantile, Inc., G.R. No. 208462, December 10, 2014 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
CASE DIGESTS PROPER
RULE 37, RULES OF COURT
1 Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House,
Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages in RTC
alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the private respondent through its representative, Roberto
V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner. Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner,
that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign the same despite demands of respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel Coronel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an urgent
motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed
to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to
declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed
to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal
therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy
the judgment in favor of private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private
respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed
of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private
respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what happened
to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such
appropriate action possible under the circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But
that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said
counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for
review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner
that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT LEGARDA SHOULD BE BOUND BY HER COUNSEL’S NEGLIGENCE?
HELD: YES, the original decision is reinstated wherein Legarda lost the case. As long as a party was given an opportunity
to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. If indeed Legarda is
innocent, then all the more is Cathay innocent. Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong
to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Coronel who
somewhat abandoned her case. The decision became final due to failure to appeal the decision.
2 Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96027-28, March 8, 2005 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
3 Lasala v. NFA, G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
FACTS: Lasala, through his PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard services to the NFA. Sometime in 1994,
Lasala’s employees who were deployed to the NFA filed with the NLRC a complaint for underpayment of wages and
nonpayment of other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the employees and held Lasala and the NFA solidarily liable
for the employees’ adjudged monetary award. Consequently, the sheriff garnished the NFA’s bank deposits with the
Development Bank of the Philippines. Believing that it had no liability to Lasala’s employees, the NFA filed with the RTC of
Quezon City, a complaint for sum of money with damages and an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Lasala.
In response, Lasala filed an answer with counterclaim and opposition to the prayer for preliminary attachment for
payment of damages. The trial court dismissed the NFA’s complaint for failure of the lawyer to present the NFA’s evidence-
in-chief due to his repeated hearing absences. The NFA then replaced their counsel, Atty. Mendoza, employing Atty.
Cahucom as its new counsel. Although the NFA’s complaint was dismissed, Lasala’s counterclaim remained, and he
presented evidence to support it. Thus, the trial court granted Lasala’s counterclaim. Despite the huge award to Lasala,
the NFA failed to appeal its case to the CA. Atty. Cahucom did not inform the NFA’s management about the trial court’s
adverse ruling. When asked to explain, he reasoned out that he only discovered the decision after the lapse of the period
for appeal. Having lost its chance to appeal, the NFA filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment grounded
on excusable negligence. The trial court did not accept the NFA’s reasoning.
In the meantime, then NFA Administrator Arthur C. Yap had assumed his position. One of his first instructions was the
legal audit of all NFA cases. In doing this, the NFA management found out that the two lawyers assigned to the case against
Lasala, grossly mishandled it; hence, causing a huge and unjust liability to the NFA. Thus, on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the NFA, now through the OGCC, filed with the CA a petition and an amended petition for
annulment of judgment of the trial court on their prior judgement of granting Lasala’s counterclaim. The CA granted the
NFA’s petition and annulled the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES: WON LACK OF JURISDICTION AND EXTRINSIC FRAUD CAN BE THE PROPER BASIS FOR GRANTING A PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT?
HELD: YES. The Rules provide that only two grounds may be availed of in a petition for annulment. These are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
EXTRINSIC FRAUD: Extrinsic fraud in a petition for annulment refers to “any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false
promise of a compromise, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.”
In Bayog v. Natino, the SC held that the unconscionable failure of a lawyer to inform his client of his receipt of the trial
court’s order and the motion for execution, and to take the appropriate action against either or both to protect his client’s
rights amounted to connivance with the prevailing party, which constituted extrinsic fraud.
The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely solely on its legal officers to vigilantly
protect its interests. The NFA’s lawyers were not only its counsel, they were its employees tasked to advance the agency’s
legal interests. Further, the NFA’s lawyers acted negligently several times in handling the case that it appears deliberate
on their part. First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA’s complaint against Lasala by negligently and repeatedly
failing to attend the hearing for the presentation of the NFA’s evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its chance to
recover from Lasala the employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect employer. Moreover, Atty. Cahucom
further prejudiced the NFA when he likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Thus, the actions of
Attys. Mendoza and Cahucom, under the unique circumstances of this case, amount to extrinsic fraud that warrants the
grant of NFA’s petition for relief from judgment.
LACK OF JURISDICTION: The lack of jurisdiction envisioned under Rule 47 is the total absence of jurisdiction over the
person of a party or over the subject matter. In the instant case, Lasala’s nonpayment of docket fee for his permissive
counterclaim prevented the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over it. Thus, with regard to this counterclaim,
annulment of the trial court’s judgment is proper.
4 San Juan Jr. v. Judge Cruz, G.R. No. 167321, July 31, 2006 Bautista, Rey Matthew
FACTS: Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon
Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm of
Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who
claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative. On August 14, 2002, the probate court issued an
Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or
administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative as required
by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On November 22, 2002, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or
executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased. On December
2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. The motion for reconsideration was denied. On June 11,
2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second motion for reconsideration of San Juan.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
RULES OF COURT IS RECKONED FROM NOTICE OF DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN THOUGH A SECOND AND THIRD MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT
PROHIBITED MOTIONS) OF THE SAME INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND WERE LATER DENIED?
HELD: NO. In this case, the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the motion of petitioner to consider
insufficient or inadequate respondent's compliance with its November 22, 2002 Order is interlocutory. The order does not
finally dispose of the case, and does not end the task of the court of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done. Such order
may not be questioned except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered
in the case.
It bears stressing however that while the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003
Order of the trial court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first motion is not pro forma, such second
motion for reconsideration can nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of
grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected on the ground
that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law or by the Rules of Court.
The court agreed with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA on November 22,
2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order
of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March
18, 2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed his petition for
certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004. The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on
June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned
from the trial court's denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.
5 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011 Capellan, Ace Lemuel
6 Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, June 20, 2012 Cruz, Joan mae
FACTS: This is a petition for annulment of judgment. Petitioner seeks to enforce the commitment of private respondent
to sell his property in accordance with the terms and conditions of their purported agreement dated July 7, 2004. By
implication, petitioner does not question the ownership of private respondent over the property nor does she claim, by
any color of title, right to possess the property or to its recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement of a supposed
contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal action. Petitioner should have filed the case either in Muntinlupa City, where
she resides, or in Manila, where private respondent maintains his residence. Other than filing the complaint in any of these
places, petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her case. Unfortunately for petitioner, private
respondent forthwith raised improper venue as an affirmative defense and his stand was sustained by trial court, thus,
resulting to the dismissal of the case. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WON RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DISMISSED ANTONIO’S COMPLAINT
HELD: NO. the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antonino’s complaint. The RTC was correct in
classifying Antonino’s cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue. It is important
to note that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not only an
abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as aground to annul
a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.
7 Mejillano v. Lucillo, 590 SCRA 1 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.
FACTS: Faustino Loteriña has six children, three from his first marriage with Ciriaca, and another three from his second
marriage with Francisca. Upon his death in 1931, he left two parcels of land in Albay. On May 1959, the children of Ciriaca,
namely Tranquilino and Antonia, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Cession. The agreement states that Lot No.
9007 will be divided equally between them. On March 1978, Tranquilino executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9007
in favor of Lorente. He modified the agreement soon after to include Lot No. 9014 in an Amended Deed of Absolute Sale.
The children of Francisca, namely Felix and Hospicio, claimed that Lot No. 9014 is their inheritance from their father.
Hence, Lorente could not have validly brought it from Tranquilino. Lorente filed an action for recovery of possession with
the RTC of Legaspi City. The RTC dismissed the complaint and declared that Felix and Hospicio are co-heirs of Lot No. 9014
hence they are entitled to possession of the property.
On August 1995, Hospicio sold to Enrique Lucillo, respondent, their one-half share of Lot No. 9014 by Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale while Felix sold the other one-half by way of Deed of Absolute Sale. When Lucillo was about to enter
the property, he discovered that Mejillano, petitioner, was occupying the lot. Lucillo wrote petitioner a letter requesting
Mejilliano to vacate the property, but he refused. He claims that he is the owner of both Lot No. 9007 and 9014 by virtue
of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale by Jesus Lorente.
Lucillo filed an action for recovery of possession of real property against petitioner with the MTC of Daraga, Albay. The
MTC favored Lucillo and ordering Mejillano to relinquish possession of the properties. Petitioner seasonably appealed the
foregoing decision to the RTC, but failed to file an appeal memorandum. Respondent judge Consulta dismissed Mejillano’s
appeal.
Petitioner through new counsel filed an MOR attaching the appeal memorandum alleging that his failure to file the
required memorandum on time was due to ignorance, the death of his former counsel, and the mistaken notion that what
was needed in the appeal was merely a notice of appeal and nothing more. The RTC of Legaspi denied petitioner. Mejillano
went to the Court of Appeals and was also denied including the MOR.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE
RTC DISMISSING PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO FILE ON TIME HIS MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL?
HELD: NO, the appellate court did not commit a reversible error in affirming the order of the RTC dismissing petitioner’s
appeal for failure to file on time his memorandum on appeal. Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is clear. It is
obligatory on the part of the petitioner to file his memorandum on appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the notice
to file the same; otherwise, his appeal will be dismissed.
In appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellant’s brief is mandatory since only errors specifically assigned and
properly argued in the appeal memorandum will be considered in the decision on the merits. In this case, the fundamental
cause of the dismissal of petitioner's appeal was his failure to file the appeal memorandum on time.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The petition was denied.
8 De Grano v. Lacaba, 589 SCRA 148 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
FACTS: On May 30, 2000, Gregorio Lacaba filed a complaint in the MTC for forcible entry against petitioner, Joven De
Grano over 2 parcel of land located in Batangas. Respondent claimed that the petitioner thru force, intimidation, strategy
and threats the petitioner destroyed the fences built by him on the said land. He further claimed that he was the owner
of the said land for more than 30 years in which he presented 2 tax declarations and original receipt of the same. The
petitioner averred that the real owners of the said land was the Malabanan family. On August 11, 2000 the MTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action. Upon appeal, on November 13, 2000 the RTC affirmed the MTC decision which
prompted the respondet to file a motion for reconsideration but was thereafter denied on March 28, 2001 and was
received a copy of the denial on April 28, 2001.
In the RTC judgement denying the motion for reconsideration, it was stated that they were denying the “petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration” as a result thru petitioners manifestation contended that they were not the one who file that
said motion. On October 23, 2001, the RTC modified its judgement changing the petitioner to “respondent motion for
reconsideration”. The respondent then file a motion for extension to file a petition for review claiming that it was on
October 23, 2001 was the date of denying their motion but was assailed by the petitioner contending that the petition
was filed out of time by not attaching the March 28, 2001 order of the RTC. The CA dismissed the issue of timeliness of
the filing of the respondent’s motion for reconsideration before the RTC and likewise ignored the issue of the belated
filing of the petition for review with the CA ruling that the petitioner was barred by estoppel.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF RESPONDENT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME?
HELD: YES, the SC ruled that Respondent might have been confused with the rule that, when a judgment is amended, the
date of the amendment should be considered the date of the decision in the computation of the period for perfecting the
appeal. For all intents and purposes, the lower court rendered a new judgment from which the time to appeal must be
reckoned. However, this rule presupposes that the amendment consists of a material alteration of such substance and
proportion that would, in effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment. But when the amendment merely consists of the
correction of a clerical error, no new judgment arises. In such case, the period for filing the appeal should still be counted
from the receipt of the original judgment.
In this case, there was no material alteration of the judgment. The amendment merely consisted of changing the word
defendant with plaintiff in the dispositive portion, and it is obvious that it was plaintiff (herein respondent) who filed the
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the prescriptive period for filing the petition for review with the CA should be counted
from the date respondent received a copy of the first judgment denying his motion for reconsideration, which was on
April 18, 2001. Respondent had until May 3, 2001 to file a petition for review, but he filed a motion for extension to file
the petition only on November 27, 2001, or almost seven months later. In one case, the Court declared that a delay of
almost seven months is far from reasonable.
9 Maslag v. Monzon, G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013 Dulatas, Ruth Angela H.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of
title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s property. Respondents
appealed to the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet.
Judge Cabato issued its October 22, 2003 Order, declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action.
It further held that that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. On May 4,
2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a Resolution reversing the MTC Decision. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the
RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted.
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They asserted that the proper
mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents’ contention that the proper
remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal. Hence this Petition wherein petitioner prays
that the CA be ordered to take cognizance of her appeal.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER’S ORDINARY APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY?
HELD: NO. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under the present state of the law, in cases involving
title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed
value of the subject property.
Since the assessed value of the disputed property is only P12,400, MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated
from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is “not within the
courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.” Neither would the active participation
of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction
the RTC should have exercised. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question that
already involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was
improper to begin with.
Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
10 Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 Dulay, Robert Ross
FACTS: Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary and
restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties. He amended the
complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and
his surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him.
The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two groups. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff. All the defendants appealed. The RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Only the second group,
which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the land was
foreshore land and that the petitioner’s title was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTCs
decision became final and executory as to them. The CA dismissed the second groups appeal, and later denied their motion
for reconsideration. The respondents appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, but the
Court rejected their recourse and issued an entry of judgment. In the meantime, the MTCC amended its decision to correct
typographical errors in the description of the properties involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the
corrections.
The MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s motion, which writ was duly served upon all the defendants.
The respondents filed a motion to quash against the writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution
of both the first and the amended decision, anchoring their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot
covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State. The MTCC denied the respondents motion to
quash, observing that the cancellation of the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not happen,
and was not the supervening event that could stay the execution. The MTCC also denied their motion for reconsideration.
More than a year after the writ of execution was served upon the defendants, the respondents, led by respondent Elisa
M. Tortogo filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer that a TRO and a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued.
The RTC granted the respondents prayer for a TRO. The petitioner sought a clarificatory order, moving that the TRO be
vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor be
made indefinite. The RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC LAWFULLY ISSUED THE TRO AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY
INJUNCTION DESPITE THE ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTOR NATURE OF THE DECISION OF THE MTCC?
HELD: NO, the RTC did not lawfully issue the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The respondents
elevated to the Supreme Court the CA decision dated December 6, 1999 and resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition
for certiorari. The Court dismissed the petition on July 19, 2000, and the dismissal became final and executory because
the respondents did not timely file a motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the writ of
execution on April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriff’s return of service, the writ of execution was duly served upon all the
defendants.
Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally
applied against the respondents. Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully respected, their
commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully
and finally adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the judgment, the
fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat
the correlative right of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through execution and
satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the law. To frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory
schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation.
It is true that notwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a
party adversely affected by a final and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment
based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the
enforcement of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile
transpire; or when a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief. Neither of such remaining
equitable remedies is available anymore to the respondents, however, for the time for such remedies is now past. Indeed,
it is now high time for the respondents to bow to the judgment, and to accept their fate under it.
11 Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, July 18, 2012 Esquilona, Veniflor
FACTS: Based on the petition filed by respondents before the RTC, sometime between the years 1978 and 1979, Mayor
Bago, then Mayor of the Municipality of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, agreed to lend the administration of Liwagao Island
to Mayor Lim, then Mayor of the Municipality of Caluya, Antique. The agreement was made orally and without executing
any formal documents to this effect. The condition attached to the agreement was that the island would be returned upon
termination of either party's terms in office.
The terms of both mayors ended in 1987. Mayor Lim allegedly returned Liwagao Island to the Municipality of Bulalacao.
However, the Municipality of Caluya continued to exercise administration over the island.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed a resolution confirming its jurisdictional rights and dominion
over Liwagao Island. However, according to respondents, the Municipality of Caluya and the Province of Antique continued
to claim and exercise authority over Liwagao Island. Respondents claim that despite the fact that it is the Province of
Oriental Mindoro and the Municipality of Bulalacao that provide government services to the island, petitioners "continued
collecting real property taxes" from Liwagao's inhabitants.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No. 1454-2012 entitled Resolution Calling for the
Conduct of a Joint Session between the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Oriental Mindoro and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Antique for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Claim over the Island of Liwagao.
Upon receiving a copy of Resolution No. 1454-2012, the Vice Governor of Antique wrote the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Oriental Mindoro of her willingness to conduct a joint session to settle the boundary dispute. However, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Antique issued Resolution No. 142-2012 informing Oriental Mindoro that it was not amenable to any form
of settlement over the jurisdiction of Liwagao Island and asserted that the same rightfully belongs to their province.
Thus, respondents filed their petition before the RTC of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR RECOVERY OF PROPERTY AND
DECLARATION OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL JURISDICTION/DOMINION OVER LIWAGAO ISLAND?
HELD: YES. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
dispute. However, the RTC's ruling that the case does not involve a boundary dispute is incorrect. The allegations in the
complaint filed before the RTC point to a boundary dispute, as defined under the Local Government Code. Specifically,
Rule III, Article 15.
THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. Respondents' resort to filing a case before the RTC was warranted under the
circumstances of this case. It must be emphasized that respondents followed the procedure laid down in the Local
Government Code. SECTION 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. - Boundary disputes
between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end: (c) Boundary
disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the
Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision
of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional
Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area
prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
They took all the necessary steps to settle the dispute within the procedure set out in the law, and by all indication, was
prepared to see the matter thru in order to lay the issue to rest.
However, petitioners failed to perform their concomitant responsibility under the same law, leaving respondents with no
other recourse but to bring the matter to court. Petitioners cannot demand that respondents now follow the procedure
when they themselves have made it impossible for any party to follow the same. The Province of Antique's Resolution No.
142-2012 dated 25 May 2012, stating that the Province of Antique was not amenable to any form of settlement, effectively
blocked any way to continue following the steps in the IRR.
As such, respondents' petition before the RTC must be upheld. Otherwise, they will be left without any recourse or legal
remedy to assert their claim over Liwagao Island. Such uncertainty is unacceptable, as the fate of the island's residents
rests in the immediate resolution of the dispute.
12 Province of Antique v. Judge Calabocal, G.R. No. 201946, June 8, 2016 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.
13 General Milling Corp. v. Ramos, 654 SCRA 256 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
FACTS: General Milling Corp. entered into a Growers Contract with Sps. Librado and Remedios Ramos for the supply of
broiler chickens to the spouses. The Growers Contract was accompanied by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage owned by the
spouse. Sps. Ramos however were not able to settle their account with GMC. Upon notification to the former, GMC
instituted for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. Sps. Ramos filed for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale and contended that it was null and void, since there was no compliance with the requirements of posting and
publication of notices. The trial court held that the action of GMC in moving for the foreclosure of the spouses' properties
was premature, because the latter's obligation under their contract was not yet due.
The CA sustained the decision of the trial court but anchored its ruling on a different ground. Contrary to the findings of
the trial court, the CA ruled that the requirements of posting and publication of notices under Act No. 3135 were complied
with. The CA, however, still found that GMC's action against Spouses Ramos was premature, as they were not in default
when the action was filed on May 7, 1997.
GMC asserts that since the issue on the existence of the demand letter was not raised in the trial court, the CA, by
considering such issue, violated the basic requirements of fair play, justice, and due process.
In their Comment, respondents-spouses aver that the CA has ample authority to rule on matters not assigned as errors on
appeal if these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.
ISSUE: WHETHER [THE CA] MAY CONSIDER ISSUES NOT ALLEGED AND DISCUSSED IN THE LOWER COURT AND LIKEWISE
NOT RAISED BY THE PARTIES ON APPEAL, THEREFORE HAD DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT?
HELD: YES. In Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, We explained that an appellate court has a broad
discretionary power in waiving the lack of assignment of errors in the following instances:
(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d)
Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having
some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(d) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is
dependent.
Paragraph (c) above applies to the instant case, for there would be a just and complete resolution of the appeal if there
is a ruling on whether the Spouses Ramos were actually in default of their obligation to GMC.

14 Katon v. Palanca, Jr., G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004 Gañas, Evangeline
FACTS: Petitioner Katon filed a request for the re-classification of Sombrero Island in Palawan from forest to agricultural
land, and thereafter for him to apply for homestead patent. Since the subject land was no longer needed for forest
purposes, it was certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. However, Palawan
authorities then favorably endorsed the request of Respondent Palanca, et. al., which resulted in the issuance of
homestead patent.
In 1999, Petitioner filed an action which seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in
favor of Palanca et al., as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. Respondents aver that they are all
bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and
that they have been faithfully paying taxes for twenty years. Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity
to sue because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and
that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and
unexplained period of time.
Palanca, et al. filed their Answer and Motion to Dismiss. The trial court dismissed Katon’s Complaint as well as his
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Katon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and charged the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied motion was his first and only motion for
reconsideration. It was dismissed motu proprio pursuant to the appellate court’s residual prerogative. The CA ruled that
prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. Katon questioned the dismissal and assailed that the CA
erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio
dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power
that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal.
It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT IT IS CORRECT FOR THE CA TO INVOKE ITS ALLEGED RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE UNDER SEC. 1,
RULE 9 IN RESOLVING THE PETITION ON AN ISSUE NOT RAISED IN THE PETITION?
HELD: YES. Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9,
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when: (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record.
In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. xxx On the other hand, residual
jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, xxx The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available
at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on
appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still
retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of
petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such
order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of
the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to
dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under
authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
15 Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of Iba, GR 162217, July 22, 2015 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.
16 Tan v. People, April 12, 2002 Julian, Jenelyn D.
FACTS: Petitioner Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy and was sentenced to suffer a prision correctional. Thereafter
petitioner applied for probation however order was withheld due to filing of motion for modification of the penalty by the
prosecution. Prosecution pointed out that penalty for bigamy should be prision mayor, hence was not eligible for
probation. Thus RTC reconsidered its order and rendered an amended decision. Petitioner filed notice of appeal before
the CA but was dismissed. CA explained that the jurisdiction over the case was vested exclusively in the SC and that an
appeal should have been brought up by way of a petition for review on certiorari and not by merely filing a notice of
appeal before the trial court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE BEING A PURE QUESTION OF LAW?
HELD: NO, the CA, under Rule 42 and 44 of Rules of Civil procedure, is authorized to determine errors of fact, of law, or
both. These rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases and they do not thereby divest the Supreme
Court of its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions. Further, in a criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to
appeal in the manner prescribed by law and its suppression would be a violation of due process, itself a right guaranteed
by the Constitution under sec. 3(a), Rule 122. And that any attempt by the court to thereafter alter, amend or modify the
same, except in respect to correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, assailed amendatory judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and its decision of 12 December 1996 is
REINSTATED.
17 People v. Caruncho, January 23, 1994 Lagasca, James Ellis

-People v. Caruncho, January 23, 1994 does not exist. A decision of the same name exists with a different year that is 1984.
-Wala akong book ni Herrera. Wala sa case yung exposition tungkol sa kinalaman niya sa Rule 56 o sa Internal Rules.
Even if the light felony involving Caruncho, Et. Al. is not covered by P.D. No. 1508, Judge Espiritu did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in the light of contemporary practice where there is plea bargaining between the prosecution and the
defense; and it is not uncommon for estafa, libel, physical injuries and even homicide cases to be dismissed because the
complainant has lost interest or alleged that the complaint was filed as a result of a misunderstanding.
FACTS: In the afternoon of June 16, 1981, which was an election day, Salvador F. Reyes who was a radio reporter for Radio
Veritas, addressed certain questions relating the voting procedure to Mayor Emiliano R. Caruncho, Jr. of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The mayor instead of answering the questions, questioned Reyes for questioning him. A video was later televised
nationally showing Mayor Caruncho and some of his companions manhandling Salvador F. Reyes. An outcry against
Caruncho, et al took place. Reyes sought the assistance of the law so that on July 2, 1981, the City Fiscal of Quezon City
filed an Information in the Municipal Court of Pasig, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35961 and which reads as follows:
The undersigned City Fiscal of Quezon City pursuant to the authority under Ministry Order No. 109, dated June
22, 1981, accuses Emiliano Caruncho, Jr., Alfonso Cordova, Cesar Corpuz, Jacinto Gonzales and John Doe whose
true name and real Identity has not as yet been ascertained, of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.
The accused entered pleas of not guilty on July 16, 1981, and on July 23, 1981, they moved to dismiss on the ground that
Reyes had executed an affidavit of desistance. In his affidavit Reyes said that the accused had no intention to physically
injure, insult, dishonor or discredit him because the incident was "the result of our failure to understand each other."
The motion was opposed by the City Fiscal. He said he had evidence other than the testimony of Reyes and such evidence
was sufficient to convict. Judge Espiritu dismissed the case on the ground that the said affidavit of desistance is in complete
consonance with the objective and intention of PD 1508 (ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM OF AMICABLY SETTLING DISPUTES AT
THE BARANGAY LEVEL) as supplemented by its pertinent letters of instructions and implementations. It leaves therefore,
no alternative for the Court except to uphold said affidavit of desistance and to make a finding for all the accused.
The Solicitor General in representation of the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, the
prayer is for the annulment of the order of dismissal and to order a trial on the merits that the order of dismissal is void
for it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DID JUDGE ESPIRITU COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CASE
AGAINST CARUNCHO, ET AL. ON THE BASIS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE?
HELD: NO. Even if the light felony involving Caruncho, Et. Al. is not covered by P.D. No. 1508, Judge Espiritu did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion in the light of contemporary practice where there is plea bargaining between the prosecution
and the defense. Additionally it is not uncommon for estafa, libel, physical injuries and even homicide cases to be
dismissed because the complainant has lost interest or alleged that the complaint was filed as a result of a
misunderstanding.
It should be mentioned that Salvador F. Reyes transferred his residence from Fairview Park in Quezon City to Barangay
Caniogan in Pasig where Caruncho also lives. On March 22, 1982, THE TWO EXECUTED A VERIFIED AMICABLE
SETTLEMENT BEFORE BARANGAY CAPTAIN RUPERTO CONCEPCION. The present case falls within the spirit and purposes
of P.D. 1508, particularly to promote the speedy administration of justice without judicial recourse and, thus, help relieve
the courts of docket congestion.
Justice Abad Santos, who presided over the case, agreed with Justice de Casto and Justice Guerrero's opinions which voted
to dismiss the petition. Justice Guerrero opined that while it is conceded that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute
criminal offenses and that the fiscal has the full control in public prosecution, P.D. No. 1508 itself stays the prosecuting
arm of the government in cases of light offenses and allows the parties to settle their differences in the larger and greater
interest of public peace and order.
The objection that the settlement in the instant case is not effective because the parties reside in different barangays has
been successfully overcome by the certification of the barangay captain that the complainant Reyes and respondent
Caruncho NOW reside in the same street and within the same barangay in Pasig at MRR Road, Barangay No. 6, Pasig,
Metro Manila since July 1981.
The principle of estoppel should be raised against such certification in order to thwart the utilitarian value of the decree.
The parties themselves desire peace. The State is duty-bound to preserve and maintain peace. The Judiciary should do no
less.
RA 9282
18 City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo Lazaro, Ivan Rei
FACTS: The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for
the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly due
from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said
assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code.
Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents
were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as
one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's
sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in
relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and
guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further
averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been
declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.
ISSUES: W/N THE CTA HAS THE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FROM THE RTC?
HELD: The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that
of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.
It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these
cases. Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent
powers of a court of justice. Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as
are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions
of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in
behalf of the litigants.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of
petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers
granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
19 Abellanosa v. COA, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012 Manalili, Mart
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul Commission on
Audit (COA) Decision which affirmed the disallowance of the Incentive Allowance involved herein amounting to
P401,284.39.
On 31 July 1975, P.D. 757 was enacted, creating the (NHA) and defining its powers and functions, among others. Section
10 thereof provides: “xxx the regular, professional and technical personnel of the Authority shall be exempt from the rules
and regulations of the Wage and Position Classification Office and from the examination and/or eligibility requirement of
the Civil Service Commission.”
However, P.D. 1597 was enacted which repealed all laws, decrees, executive orders and other issuances or parts thereof,
that exempt agencies from the coverage of the National Compensation and Position Classification System.
On 23 June 1982, the Board of Directors of the NHA issued Resolution No. 464, granting additional incentive benefits to
its project personnel which provides: Incentive Allowance equivalent to 20% of basic pay, Air Fare (once a quarter), Flight
Insurance (Not more than P10.00 premium per flight), and Staff Housing.
On July 1, 1989, R.A. 6758 was enacted, rationalizing the salaries of government employees. It enumerated the allowable
allowances. Consequently, the Officer-in-Charge, COA-NHA, issued a Memorandum dated 5 December 1990, informing
the NHA management that the payment of the incentive allowance should be discontinued.
Based on Resolution No. 464, petitioners were paid the incentives. However, as they were not paid the maximum of 20%
of their basic pay as authorized under NHA Resolution No. 464, petitioners filed their claims for payment of P1,003,210.96.
On 16 July 2004, Atty. Agustin issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2004-07-115. He noted therein that the
payments had no legal authority, because the power granted to the boards of GOCCs and government financial institutions
(GFIs) to fix, determine and authorize the grant of compensation—had already been repealed by P.D. 1597 dated 11 June
1978;
On appeal, the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA affirmed the disallowance under ASB Decision No.
2007-025, stressing that the power of the boards of the GOCCs and GFIs to grant compensation and incentives had already
been repealed by Section 3 of P.D. 1597. Thus, the ASB ruled that NHA Resolution No. 464 was defective for having no
legal basis.
Dissatisfied with the ASB’s Decision, petitioners filed an appeal with the COA proper. The COA affirmed the disallowance
and denying the appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ISSUANCE OF RESOLUTION NO. 464 BY THE NHA WAS WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS?
HELD: YES. At the time of its issuance in 1982, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 had already expressly repealed all decrees, executive
orders, and issuances that authorized the grant of allowances to groups of officials or employees despite the inconsistency
of those allowances with the position classification or rates indicated in the National Compensation and Position
Classification Plan.
Thereafter, or in 1989, R.A. 6758 further reinforced this policy by expressly decreeing that all allowances not specifically
mentioned therein, or as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates
prescribed. Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents as of 1 July 1989, which were not
integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized.
In this case, the incentive allowances granted under Resolution No. 464 are clearly not among those enumerated under
R.A. 6758. Neither has there been any allegation that the allowances were specifically determined by the DBM to be an
exception to the standardized salary rates. Hence, such allowances can no longer be granted after the effectivity of R.A.
6758.
Petitioners claim that the grant of incentive allowances is incidental to and necessary for the enforcement of the NHA’s
powers and duties. However, this contention cannot prevail in the light of express provisions of law that rationalized
government salary rates in pursuit of similarly noteworthy objectives.
Petitioners also argue that the alleged reopening of the settled, audited accounts of petitioners with respect to the
incentive allowance paid was contrary to existing audit rules; and that the subsequent disallowance was an act tainted
with injustice, fraud, and bad faith. While we commend petitioners' professed dedication to their duties despite being
sent to allegedly hazardous areas in order to implement the housing programs of the NHA, the law must stand.
In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit, this Court stated that public officers' erroneous application and
enforcement of the law do not estop the government from making a subsequent correction of those errors. Where there
is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices
certain parties on account of an error committed by public officials in granting the benefit. Practice, without more - no
matter how long continued - cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
20 Condon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012 Manliclic, Marianne P.
FACTS: Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents, she became a naturalized
Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225(Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003). The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration
of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. In the 2007 elections, petitioner
ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Private respondents filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner's eligibility.
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner's disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign... citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by R.A. No. 9225. Trial court held that the petitioner's
failure to comply with R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. The personal declaration of
renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was
dismissed Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMELEC EN BANC MAY ORDER THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A TRIAL COURT
IN AN ELECTION CASE?
HELD: YES. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment. The Court does not
subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ of execution
and that such function belongs only to the court of origin. There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order
discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the
trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, the Court stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases
when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial
courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
21 Maglalang v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013 Mercado, Ralph Louie
FACTS: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December 2008, he committed an error
counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose between the two, they were invited to the casino’s
Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009,
he was issued a memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension
was imposed.
He filed MR seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents relative to
the case. Both were denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing
to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension.
He further explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only
a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari
for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA WAS CORRECT IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE
IT ON THE GROUND OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?
HELD: NO, CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
is bereft of any legal standing.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Exceptions:
(1) When there is a violation of due process;
(2) When the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
(4) When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(5) When there is irreparable injury;
(6) When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the president bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter;
(7) When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) When it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
(10) When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(11) When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would
greatly prejudice the complainant;
(12) Where no administrative review is provided by law;
(13) Where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and
(14) Where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for
administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and
penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal and a
special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of
discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment
despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies
of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
22 Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
23 St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, September 16, 1998 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.
FACTS: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St. Martin Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds worth
Php 38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was
illegal, respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an
employer-employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St. Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that indeed, there was no employer-employee relationship
between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal in such a situation. The respondent appealed to the
secretary of NLRC who set aside the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court – alleging that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR CERTIORARI WAS PROPERLY FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT?
HELD: NO. Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then
appealable to the Office of the President. However, the new rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding appellate
review for decisions rendered by the NLRC. However in this case, the Supreme Court reviewed such decisions from the
NLRC by virtue of their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of the legislative body who
enacted the new rules.
It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the
checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. The
petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to the
Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded or
forwarded the case to the Court of Appeals.
24 Uy v. Public Estates Authority, 589 SCRA 1 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
25 Rom v. Roxas& Co. Inc., 656 SCRA 691 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.
26 Fildams Pharma Inc. v. CA, 426 SCRA 460 Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC. III
FACTS: Petitioner Filadams Pharma, Inc. was a corporation engaged in the business of selling medicines to wholesalers.
Private respondent Antonio Feria was its sales representative from November 3, 1993 until his dismissal on March 9, 1994.
. In an audit conducted sometime between March 10 to 26, 1994, respondent Feria was found accountable for P41,733.01
representing unsold but unreturned stocks and samples, unremitted collections and unliquidated cash advances.
Filadams alleged that these shortages and accountabilities were admitted by respondent through his wife and counsel in
a conference held at its office but despite demands, respondent failed to settle. Respondent denied the charge. He averred
that, although he was an agent of the corporation, he was not the trustee of its products. The cash advances were spent,
for promoting the products of the company and it was only the unexpended amount that was supposed to be returned
by way of liquidation.
The cash rebates were properly given to the customers concerned, as requested by them. In a spot check conducted in
his area in January and February of 1994, the stock coverages in his possession were segregated and returned to the
company but he was not given the returned goods slip. He also returned various items or medicines on March 14, 1994
amounting to P19,615.49 but what was reflected in the inventory report was only P8,185.30. He maintained that he
neither misappropriated nor converted the subject sums of money for his personal use or benefit.
If ever, his obligation was purely civil in nature and the company in fact accepted his partial payment of P3,000 through
his wife in a conference held at petitioner’s office. Filadams asserted that respondent occupied a position of trust and
confidence. He was not given a new cash advance but merely a replenishment of the used revolving fund. The cash rebates
were never received by the customer as confirmed by the customer himself. Respondent signed the physical inventory
report so he could not claim that he made returns that were not recorded.
Paying back the amount of P3,000 to the company was an acknowledgment of his stock shortages and proof of his breach
of trust and confidence resulting in the company's damage and prejudice. The Assistant prosecutor dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and was also dismissed by the DOJ
in lieu of their appeal under 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or
Reinvestigations. Filadams then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
in which they denied the petition under (1) the proper remedy for the petitioner was a petition for review under Rule 45
and not a petition for certiorari inasmuch as certiorari was available only if there was no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and (2) assuming that a petition for certiorari was proper, the DOJ decision
was not marked by grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPEAL NOT CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY?
HELD: Certiorari was the proper remedy. In this case, the petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but his appeal
was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since there was no more appeal or other remedy
available in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
27 Orosa v. Roa, 495 SCRA 22 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
APPEALS FROM OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES
28 National Water v. A.L. Ang Network Inc., GR 186450, April 14, 2010 Saligan, Constantine
FACTS: Respondent's Certificate of Public Convenience application was opposed by petitioner. Bacolod City Water
District (BACIWA) opposed the said application citing that it is the only government agency authorized to operate a
water service system in the city of Bacolod.
Petitioner granted the application. BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered contending that its right to due
process was violated when it was not allowed to present evidence. Petitioner granted such motion. Respondent filed a
petitioner for certiorari against petitioner and BACIWA in the RTC of Bacolod.
The RTC dismissed such case for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. The CA annulled
the decision of the RTC, it held that the latter has jurisdiction
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION ON PETITION ON CERTIORARI ON QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES?
HELD: NO. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial
agencies. Batas Pambansa 129 impliedly repealed Article 89 of PD 1067. The latter expressedly granted jurisdiction to
the RTC. The rule that appellate court relied on is no longer controlling
The list of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive.
APPEAL IN CORPORATE REHABILITATION CASES
29 Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, GR 180572, June 18, 2012 Santiago, Melody R.
APPEAL FROM SAC CASES
30 Land Bank v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 18, 2017 Sibal, Tricia
31 Redeña v. CA, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica
32 Mesina v. Meer, July 2, 2002 Songco, Ken Felix C
FACTS: Respondent Humberto Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land Sometime in June 1993, he applied for a loan
to construct a house. However, he discovered that his certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one was issued in
the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin. The latter acquired said property by virtue of a deed of sale dated June
1985 purportedly executed by respondent in their favor.
Respondent sought its cancellation. On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of the title. While
the case was pending, It appeared that the subject property has been conveyed to the petitioners, even prior to the
annotation of lis pendens. The Absolute Deed of Sale evidencing the conveyance was notarized on the same day, including
the payment of taxes thereto.
Meer impleaded petitioners as additional party defendants. Defendant-spouses Bunquin never appeared during the
hearings, leading the court to declare them in default. Petitioners, however, participated actively in defense of their
position.
The trial court ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Banquin was fraudulent. However, petitioners were adjudged
buyers in good faith and thus were entitled to the possession of the subject property. Respondent Meer filed a Motion
for Reconsideration against the said Decision but the trial court denied the same. Respondent thereafter filed an Appeal
with the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court reversed the ruling of the MeTC and ruled that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. As aforesaid, the Court
of Appeals denied the petition reasoning that:
"As aptly pointed out by the respondent, the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses should have been filed before
the court of origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 38. Besides, it is extremely doubtful that
the remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 may be availed of from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction”
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITION FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 38 IS A REMEDY AVAILABLE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS?
HELD: NO. Rule 38 is not a remedy available in CA. The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing
uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts and designation of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts
of record. While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court", it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and regional trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court
and may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions
or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allow the remedy
of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
33 Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat Inc., October 2, 2009 Sy, Exequiel
FACTS: Petitioner Samonte is the President and General Manager of S.B. Commercial Traders, Inc. (SB Traders, for brevity),
a corporation engaged in the business of retailing motor oils and lubricants. It (sic) purchases Mobil products on credit
basis from one of Mobil Oil Philippines' authorized dealers in Bulacan, herein private respondent S.F. Naguiat, Inc., with
an express agreement to pay within a period of 60 days from date of delivery. The private respondent filed a complaint
for collection of sum of money against SB Traders. The petitioner and SB Traders must be held solidarily liable for the
subject amount. The petitioner filed an answer claiming that he was not acting in his personal capacity.
Despite due notice, the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference. Hence, trial
ensued where the public respondent allowed the ex parte presentation of the private respondent's evidence. The public
respondent rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent, ordering defendants S.B. Commercial Traders, Inc. and
Romeo G. Samonte to pay, jointly and severally, unto plaintiff S.F. Naguiat, Incorporated. A writ of execution was ordered.
The petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground that the public respondent made serious and
prejudicial mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented.
The public respondent issued the first assailed order denying the petitioner's petition for relief from judgment for lack of
merit. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order but the same was denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
reiterating the grounds stated in his petition for relief from judgment filed with the RTC. Respondent filed its Comment.
The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda.
The CA added that notwithstanding such defect, the RTC proceeded with hearing the petition perhaps as an act of grace
giving petitioner one last chance to protect his interest and present evidence in support of his arguments, but petitioner
opted to dispense with the presentation of evidence in support of the said petition. The CA then said that once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party shall not be deprived of the fruits of victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 28, 2004
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED AN IRREVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING HEREIN PETITIONER'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND SUBSEQUENTLY THEREAFTER, IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THERETO FOR LACK OF MERIT?
HELD: NO. Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to any person against
whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for
is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to
his own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the
right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
procedure by counsel.
34 Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 6, 2008 Viran, Archimedes John
FACTS: June 1930, the RTC issued a decree no. 381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses
Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private
respondents), covering a parcel of land, situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title in the name of spouses Carag.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the DENR a letter-petition requesting the DENR
to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
the issuance of Decree No. 381928. After investigation, they found out that a portion of the lot was only released as
alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of
nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property,
which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified
as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22
February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. The private respondent filed a motion
to dismiss and alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the
complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so.
Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to
be annulled.
ISSUE: WON THE PETITION HAS MERIT?
HELD: Although petitioner complied with the rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the petition has no merit. Petitioner clearly
alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the
trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained
was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable. With respect to petitioner’s failure to allege that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available.
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, the Court ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void
and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in
any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.
Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.
However, lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and
is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. At the time of the filing on the action, the
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement
that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
35 de Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp. Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
FACTS: Petitioner spouses de Pedro filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
respondents Romasan Development Corporation and Manuel Ko. The complaint stated that the spouses De Pedro were
the registered owners of a parcel of land; that the respondents started putting up a barbed-wire fence on the perimeter
of the adjacent property. The respondents allege that they were owners of the land as evidenced by a TCT. The trial court
issued an order to have a relocation survey of the property in order to verify its location. Based on the report, the
respondents filed a Manifestation/Motion to Dismiss, averring that there was no legal or factual basis for the complaint
as shown by the findings of the survey team; hence, the petitioners had no cause of action against them. Trial court
granted the motion to dismiss.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, contending it was premature for the court to dismiss the
complaint without affording them the right to adduce their evidence on their claim for damages. Petition was denied. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA held that the petitioners had every opportunity to question and object
to the composition of the survey team before the trial court; since they failed to do so, they cannot now be allowed to do
the same on appeal. According to the CA, it could not take judicial notice of the alleged cases filed against the chairman
of the survey team since this was not one of the matters which the courts could take judicial notice of, whether mandatory
or directory.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION IS A DIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK?
HELD: The SC in denying the petition held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. The resolution of the
issue is, thus, not dependent on the report of the survey team filed in the trial court. The action of the petitioners against
the respondents, based on the material allegations of the complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject
property and damages.
However, such action is not a direct, but a collateral attack of the TCT. Neither did the respondents directly attack the OCT
in their answer to the complaint. Although the respondents averred in said answer, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that the subject property is covered by a TCT issued in the name of the respondent corporation, and as such the
said respondent is entitled to the possession thereof to the exclusion of the petitioners, such allegation does not constitute
a direct attack on the, but is likewise a collateral attack thereon. Thus, the court a quo had no jurisdiction to resolve the
decisive issue raised by the parties in the trial court.
36 Pinausukan Seafood House v. FEBTC, GR 159926, January 20, 2014 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G
37 Llamas v. Court of Appeals, September 29, 2009 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged before RTC of Makati with the crime of “other forms of swindling” in the Information.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two months. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC and denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Since the SC subsequently denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the judgement of conviction become final
and executory. Petitioner Carmelita Llamas was arrested while Francisco Llamas moved for the lifting or recall of the
warrant of arrest raising for the first time the issue that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There
being no action for the said motion, petitioners instituted, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the
appellate courts’ decisions.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL AND THE APPELLATE COURTS’ DECISION MUST BE ANNULLED?
RULING: NO. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the
enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal
cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.—The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46
and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil
cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases.
38 Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo, 657 SCRA 20 Bautista, Rey Matthew
FACTS: On June 30, 1982, Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land situated along Real St., Manuyo, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, to Eulogia Manila.The contract of lease expired on July 1, 1992 but the lessee continued in possession of the
property despite a formal demand letter dated August 8, 1992, to vacate the same and pay the rental arrearages. On July
14, 1993, the MeTC rendered its decision, To vacate the subject parcels of land. Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 (Civil Case No. 93-3733) which reversed the MeTC. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration on December 23, 1994. In its Order dated March 24, 1995, the RTC denied the motion for having been
filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period considering that respondents received a copy of the decision on December 7,
1994. On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision in the CA. By Decision dated
February 27, 2004, the CA granted the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING THAT THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF NEW
TRIAL, APPEAL, AND PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES WERE LOST THROUGH THE FAULT OF
THE RESPONDENTS?
HELD: YES. A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed
of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. It is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action
is never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies. The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners assail the CA
in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment suit and
not even prayed for by the respondents in their answer. They contend that whatever maybe questionable in the decision
is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal or in certain cases, as ground for a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 and not as ground for its annulment. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioners.
39 Antonio v. Register of Deeds of Makati City, June 20, 2012 Capellan, Ace Lemuel
40 Barco v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 162 Cruz, Joan mae
FACTS: Private respondent Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) married Francisco Maravilla and by Feb. 1977, spouses had opted
to live separately. Thereafter, they obtained an annulment of marriage. Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June
Salvacion (June). June’s birth certificate states that the father is Francisco Maravilla, June bearing Francisco’s last name.
Nadina signed thebirth cert. after it was accomplished. Despite such notation, Nadina subsequently claimed that June’s
father was Armando Gustilo (Gustilo) all along, who is a former Congressman with whom she maintained a relationship.
Nadina alleged that at the time of June’s birth, Gustilo was still married to Consuelo Caraycong who eventually died in a
vessel accident in 1981. Nadina and Gustilo got married in the US. This marriage allegedly took place 2 years prior to
Nadina’s marriage to Francisco. Nadina obtained a judicial declaration of annulment of marriage with Francisco. Nadina
filed a Petition for correction of entries in the certificate of birth of her daughter June in RTC Makati. Nadina alleged that
she had been living separately from her lawful spouse Francisco since Feb. 1977 and that Gustilo was the real father of
June.
She claimed that she did not have any sexual intercourse with Francisco the first 120 days of the 300 days preceding the
birth of June. She prayed that the Civil Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth cert. of June insofar as the full
name of June be corrected to June Salvacion Gustilo and that the name of June’s father be corrected to Armando Gustilo.
Francisco signed the petition signifying his conformity thereto. Gustilo filed a Constancia wherein he acknowledged June
as his daughter with Nadina and that he poses no objection with Nadina’s petition.
RTC, in accordance with Rule 108, issued an order setting the case for hearing and directing that a copy of the order be
published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. Nadina then filed an amended petition, impleading Gustilo and Francisco
as respondents. RTC amended the order to add the parties. Office of the SolGen filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction over the subj. matter. They cited jurisprudence holding that the Petition seeks
changes that are substantial and controversial in character which directly affect the filiation and legitimacy of petitioner's
daughter. MTD was denied by RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT HAVE BEEN
SATISFIED?
HELD: NO. Sec 2 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, namely extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. There are two aspects of jurisdiction which are vital for
disposition of this case, jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter and jurisdiction over the parties. Barco
claims that RTC failed to satisfy both. SC held that there is only an error of jurisdiction.
41 Villanueva v. Nite, July 25, 2006 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.
FACTS: Nite, respondent, took out a loan of Php 409,000.00 from Villanueva, petitioner. To secure the loan, respondent
issued an Asian Bank Corporation (ABC) check to petitioner in the amount of Php 325,000.00 dated on February 1994. The
date was later changed to June 1994 with the consent of Villanueva. The check was dishonored due to material alteration
when the petitioner deposited the check. On August 1994, Nite, through Abojada, remitted Php 235,000.00 to Villanueva
as partial payment of the loan. The balance of Php 174,000.00 was due on or before December 8, 1994.
On August 1994, petitioner filed an action for a sum of money and damages against ABC for the full amount of the
dishonored check. The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Villanueva. When Nite went to ABC on June 1997 to withdraw
money, she was unable to do so because the trial court had ordered to pay ABC to pay Villanueva the value of respondent's
ABC check. On August 1997, ABC remitted to the sheriff a manager's check amounting to Php 325,000.00 drawn on
respondent's account. Nite filed a petition in the CA to annul and set aside the trial court's decision. The CA granted the
petition due to extrinsic fraud.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGEMENT PROMULGATED BY RTC WHICH WAS ALREADY SATISFIED MAYBE ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE?
HELD: YES, the judgement promulgated by the RTC which was already satisfied maybe annulled and set aside. Annulment
of judgement is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgement sought to be annulled is promulgated. It
can be filed by one who was not a party to the case in which the assailed judgement was rendered as provided in Section
1 of Rule 47.
Nite may avail the remedy of annulment of judgement under Rule 47. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and
petition for relief were not available to her for the simple reason that she was not made a party to the suit against ABC.
Thus, she was neither able to participate in the original proceedings nor resort to the other remedies because the case
was filed when she was abroad. Annulment of judgement may be based only on extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
The appellate court finds extrinsic fraud in this case. The petition was denied.
42 Mejia-Espinoza v. Cariño, G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017 Domalanta, Marc Denver L
FACTS: Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza filed a separate ejectment case against one Alberto and Nena Carino, the
respondent, in the Municipal Trial court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan wherein the said court rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioner requiring both Carino to pay rent at the time of default. As a result both Carino’s filed an appeal to RTC
wherein the said court affirmed the ejectment of Alberto Carino but dismissed the ejectment case against Nena Carino
which prompted the petitioner to file a petition for review in CA wherein the said court reversed the decision of the RTC
and affirmed the decision of MTC ejecting Nena Carino.
Soon thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for the writ of execution in the MTC for the decision rendered by the said court
that was later on granted. Few months after the granting of the motion the respondent file for a complaint for "Annulment
of Court's Processes with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or
Prohibition, and Damage” for the granting of the motion for the writ of execution of judgement of the MTC in the RTC
under Rule 47 of the Rule of Court, she contended that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration of
the order granting petitioners motion because she was not furnished of the copy of of the order but the petitioner
contended otherwise.
The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the respondent and ruled that it was not the proper remedy to be filed
respondent but it should be the remedy granted under Rule 38. Upon appeal to the CA, the said court reversed the decision
of the RTC ruling that it respondent had filed the correct remedy. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the
said court but it was denied. Hence, the case.
ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE REMEDY GRANTED UNDER RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT?
HELD: NO, the SC ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy
that may be availed of only under certain exceptional circumstances. Under the Rules, there are three requirements that
must be satisfied before a Rule 47 petition can prosper.
First, the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that a Rule 47 petition is a
remedy of last resort-it is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies under Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45. Second,
an action for annulment of judgment may be based only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Third, the
action must be filed within the temporal window allowed by the Rules. If based on extrinsic fraud, it must be filed within
four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by
laches or estoppel. There is also a formal requisite that the petition be verified, and must allege with particularity the facts
and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be.
Furthermore the SC ruled that the first thing the lower courts should have considered is the subject of the complaint.
Nena is challenging the MTC's order granting the issuance of the writ of execution, the writ of execution itself. Clearly,
these are not the judgments or final orders contemplated by Rule 47. A final order or resolution is one which is issued by
a court which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing
else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.
Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it apply to an action to annul
a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of
the court in the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment
against the losing party.
43 Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017 Dulatas, Ruth Angela H.
44 Urban Bank v. Pena, 659 SCRA 418 Dulay, Robert Ross
45 Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005 Esquilona, Veniflor
BEFORE WHAT COURT DO YOU REVIVE A JUDGMENT IN AN UD/FE CASE?
46 Enriquez v. CA, G.R. No. 137391, December 14, 2001 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.
FACTS: The Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City rendered a decision in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1355, favoring private respondents and ordering petitioners to vacate, restore the premises to private
respondents, and pay the accrued rentals, P5,000 attorney's fees and cost of suit. The decision likewise dismissed
petitioners' counterclaim.
Respondents failed to enforce the judgment by motion within the five-year period from its entry. They then filed an action
to revive the judgment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the then Rules of Court.
Petitioners answered that respondents were not the owners of the land subject of the unlawful detainer case and that
the supervening death of some of the parties brought changes in their relationship that would render enforcement of the
judgment unjust and inequitable.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari. Meanwhile, the
Metropolitan Trial Court set the main case for presentation of evidence. Petitioners moved for abeyance pending
resolution of their petition. The Metropolitan Trial Court denied the motion and considered the case submitted for
decision. The RTC eventually dismissed the action for certiorari. The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered its decision
directing the enforcement of the judgment in (Civil Case No. 1355. It declared that the issue of ownership is immaterial in
an ejectment suit; that Civil Case No. 2957 was not an ejectment case but an action to enforce the final and executory
judgment in the previous ejectment case; and that an ejectment case survives the death of the party. The judgment therein
can be enforced not only against members of the defendant's family but also against relatives or privies who derive their
possession from the defendant.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Muntinlupa City which affirmed the MTC. Thereafter, petitioners elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals where they reiterated their arguments in the lower courts.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: DID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE TO PROVE THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE JUDGMENT?
HELD: The core issue is on the requisites for an action to revive judgment.
Sec. 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an action to revive judgment only requires proof of a final judgment which
has not prescribed and has remained unexecuted after the lapse of five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years from
its finality. Nowhere does the rule require proof that the judgment is still enforceable by and against the original parties
who have died. While the action is still subject to defenses and counterclaims which arose after the judgment became
effective, proof of the death of some of the parties is not required because the judgment call still be enforced by the
executor, administrator or successor-in-interest of the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor.
Petitioners further alleged that respondents are not the owners of the subject premises, hence the action must fail. An
action to revive judgment is not meant to retry the case all over again. Its cause of action is the judgment itself and not
the merits of the original action. The non-ownership by private respondents refer to the merits of the first civil case which
has long been decided with finality and thus become conclusive between the parties.
47 Villeza v. German Management, GR 182937, August 8, 2010 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G
FACTS: The Decision of this Court favoring the petitioner became final and executory on October 5, 1989. On May 27,
1991, the petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC. On February 27, 1992, he filed a
Motion to Defer Resolution thereon because “he was permanently assigned in Iloilo and it would take quite some time
before he could come back.” On February 2 8, 1992, the MeTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of his
motion to issue writ of execution until his return.
Three years later, as there was no further movement, the said court issued an order dated January 9, 1995 denying
petitioner’s pending Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution for lack of interest. More than three (3) years had passed
before petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 29, 1998 alleging that he had retired from his job in Iloilo
City and was still interested in the issuance of the writ. As the sheriff was implementing the writ, an Opposition with
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution was filed by German Management and Services, Inc. On June 3, 1999, an order was
handed down granting the motion to quash the writ of execution issued. Pertinently, the said Order reads:
Considering the provision of Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, after the lapse of five years
from the date of entry, judgment may no longer be enforced by way of motion but by independent action.
On October 3, 2000, Villeza filed with the MeTC a Complaint for Revival of Judgment of the Decision of the Supreme
Court dated September 14, 1989. Respondent German Management moved to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that it
had been more than 10 years from the time the right of action accrued, that is, from October 5, 1989, the date of the
finality of the Court's decision to October 3, 2000, the date of the filing of the complaint for its revival. It further argued
that, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, the complaint is now
barred by the statute of limitations.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER STILL HAS THE RIGHT FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT?
HELD: NO. The rules are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed
as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to
have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action
which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment
becomes final. When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of judgment on October 3, 2000, it had already been
eleven (11) years from the finality of the judgment he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in.
The Court has pronounced in a plethora of cases that it is revolting to the conscience to allow someone to further avert
the satisfaction of an obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality; that although strict compliance with
the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will
not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or
bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would
result.
These cases, though, remain exceptions to the general rule. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgment by action is precisely to prevent the winning parties from sleeping on their rights. This Court cannot
just set aside the statute of limitations into oblivion every time someone cries for equity and justice. Indeed, “if eternal
vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on one's right for more than a 10th of a century and expect it to be
preserved in pristine purity.”
48 Anama v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. N. 192048, December 13, 2017 Gañas, Evangeline
WHAT EVENTS WOULD INTERRUPT THE RUNNING OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR ITS EXECUTION?
49 Infante v. Aran Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.
50 Davis v. Davis, G.R. No. 233489, March 7, 2018 Julian, Jenelyn D.
FACTS: Petitioners, as vendees and the herein respondents Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis as vendors entered in a
Contract to Sell over a parcel of land for a consideration of ₱500,000, with ₱200,000 down payment and remaining balance
is payable in 12 equal monthly installments. Respondents agreed to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the
purchase price. However respondents failed and refused to execute the Deed of absolute sale even after full payment
thereof. This prompted petitioner to file complaint for specific performance and damages. Trial court rendered decision
in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Accordingly, petitioner moved for the execution of
RTC decision but was not executed because said property was sold to other persons.
Hence petitioner moved for the cancellation of the TCT and for the Register of Deeds to issue a new certificate of title in
their favor but was denied on the groud that the new registered owners of the subject property were not parties to the
case. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file an action for annulment of title and document against the new registered
owners. RTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, petitioner filed urgent ex-parte manifestation and
motion to direct the respondents to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. On the other hand, respondents
opposed the arguing that the said Decision cannot be enforced by a mere motion or by an action for revival of judgment
since 10 years had already lapsed from the time it became final. However, petitioner contended that the period within
which to move for the execution of the the Decision was deemed suspended with the filing of an action for annulment of
title.
RTC denied the motion of the petitioners explaining that the consequent filing of annulment of title involving the subject
does not toll the running of the period. Hence there is a need for its revival unless barred by the statutes of limitations.
On certiorari, it was denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE FILING OF ANOTHER CASE INVOLVING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE
PERIOD TO FILE A MOTION FOR EXECUTION?
HELD: YES. Sec 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5) years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances
where it allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have
one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
incurred for his benefit or advantage.
Considering that the delay was not due to the fault of the petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sold the
subject property to another to avoid the outcome of the case filed against them, and which delay incurred to their
benefit/advantage, it is only logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an action for annulment of title and
document was being litigated upon shall be deemed to have interrupted or tolled the running of the five-year period for
enforcement of a judgment by mere motion.
Therefore, in computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time during which execution is stayed should be
excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor. It bears stressing that the purpose of the
law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.
Moreover, the statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so for causes
beyond their control.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED.
51 Rubio v. Alabata Lagasca, James Ellis
FACTS: Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata and
respondent Lourdes Alabata were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and sale,
reconveyance and damages before the RTC of Dumaguete. The case was decided in favor of petitioner. Initially Lourdes
appealed the decision of the RTC, however, she later withdrew the appeal, which in turn turned the decision final and
executory. It was on August 20, 1997, the Entry of Judgment was issued and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of
Judgments. However despite the finality of the decision it was never executed.
Petitioners claim that their counsel at the Public Attorney’s Office, Dumaguete City, was never informed that the entry of
judgment had already been issued. They explained that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma.
Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment
before she resigned from PAO sometime in November 1997.
She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of the said development. When petitioners followed up with PAO-Dumaguete,
it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent was still pending. In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from
the date when the RTC-43 decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the
said decision had become final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment. On December
5, 2007, petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment which was raffled to RTC-42. On
February 28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, RTC-42 granted her Motion to Dismiss
and ordered petitioners’ case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION CAN BE SUBJECT OF REVIVAL UNDER THE RULES OF COURT?
HELD: YES. While generally, as provided by Rule 39 Section 6, once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If
the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is
reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10)
years from the time the judgment becomes final.
However, due to the events that transpired, the Court find it proper to relax the rules and allow the revival of judgment.
To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that
respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed
to petitioners.
52 Cometa v. Court of Appeals, February 6, 2001 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
FACTS: This case rooted from a case for damages between the petitioner and the private respondent for the amount of
P57,396.85. The judgement of the CFI became final and a subsequent writ of execution was issued thus three lots of the
herein petitioner has been levied and was then sold in a public auction. However a complaint to annul said sale was filed
by the petitioner corporation which was denied.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 140, a motion for issuance of writ of possession. Cometa
opposed the motion on the ground that there was pending before another Regional Trial Court an action for annulment
of levy and sale of the properties in question however respondent’s motion was denied. In the Intermediate Appellate
Court the decision was reversed. Hence this case.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONERS CAN STILL REDEEM THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION?
HELD: NO. Stated differently, the legal perspective within which the right to redeem can still be availed of or not must be
viewed in the light of the dictum that the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat the right of redemption. In short,
the statute, being remedial, is to be construed liberally to effectuate the remedy and carry out its evident spirit and
purpose. Thus, the Court allowed parties in several cases to perfect their right of redemption even beyond the period
prescribed therefor. We can do no less vis-a-vis the prevailing facts of this case for the following reasons
First, we are confronted with the grossly and patently iniquitous spectacle of petitioners being made to pay a money
judgment amounting to P57,396.85 with their two (2) parcels of prime land conservatively valued at that time at
P500,000.00, on account of the lapse of the period given for exercising their right despite their apparent willingness and
ability to pay the money judgment. Although this was the very fact in issue in the second case, the gross disparity of the
money judgment to the value of the levied real properties was not lost on the Court when, in Cometa v. IAC.
Second, while there is no dispute that mere inadequacy of the price per se will not set aside a judicial sale of real property,
nevertheless, where the inadequacy of the price is purely shocking to the conscience, such that the mind revolts at it and
such that a reasonable man would neither directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it, the same will be set aside, Thus,
in one case, the judicial sale of land worth P60,000.00 for P867.00 was considered shocking to the conscience.
So also, the sale of properties at around 10% of their values, as when a radio worth P1,000.00 was sold for P100.00 and a
matrimonial bed costing P500.00 was sold for P50.00, the price was held to be grossly inadequate. How much more the
judicial sale of two (2) prime commercial lots located in Guadalupe, Makati, conservatively valued at P500,000.00 in 1987,
to satisfy a money judgment of P57,396.85? Next, the questionable manner in which the said lots were levied upon and
sold at public auction has, likewise, caught the attention of the Court. The manner of execution of money judgments is
governed by Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was then in force, also in relation to Section 19 Rule 39, the
subject lots were sold en masse, not separately as above provided.
The unusually low price for which they were sold to the vendee, not to mention his vehement unwillingness to allow
redemption therein, only serves to heighten the dubiousness of the transfer. For laches, its essence is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Lastly, petitioners have demonstrated, albeit tardily, an earnest and sincere desire to redeem the subject properties when
Cometa’s heirs, on December 4, 1997, consigned with the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Makati, the sum of P38,761.05
as purchase price for the lots, plus interest of P78,762.69 and P1,175.25 as realty tax. The rule on redemption is liberally
construed in favor of the original owner of the property and the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat him in the
exercise of his right of redemption. Thus, we allowed parties in several cases to perfect their right of redemption even
beyond the period prescribed therefor.
53 Guiang v. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004 Manalili, Mart
FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint against the respondent and Deputy Sheriff Medina for the redemption of foreclosed
properties. Petitioner alleged that when the respondent filed her complaint in Civil Case No. 0809, her account amounted
to P112,574.00. She further alleged that she had been offering to pay the said amount to the respondent, but that the
latter rejected her offers; she, likewise, offered the said amount to Medina after the sale of her properties at public
auction, but the latter rejected the same, and told her that she should remit P308,701.00, the purchase price of the
properties. She further alleged that she was depositing with the court the amount of P112,574.00.
After the petitioner failed to redeem the properties, Deputy Sheriff Medina executed a Deed of Final Sale over the said
properties in favor of the respondent.
RTC dismissed the complaint. As a result, the petitioner filed a petition in the CA captioned, "for annulment of the writ of
execution" against the respondent and Deputy Sheriff Medina
The petitioner alleged therein that the deputy sheriff violated Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court when he levied on
and sold at public auction her thirty (30) parcels of land, instead of selling only such part of the properties as was amply
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs. Further, the petitioner also alleged that Section 21, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, provides that when the sale is of real property consisting of several home lots, they must be sold separately.
However, in this case, the deputy sheriff sold the thirty (30) parcels of land all at the same time, and for a lump sum.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE REMEDY AVAILED OF BY PETITIONER WAS PROPER?
HELD: NO. Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to a petition to annul a judgment or final order and resolution
in civil actions, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction or due process. A final order or resolution is one
which is issued by a court which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. The rule does
not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction of petitioner's properties or the certificate of sale
executed by the deputy sheriff over said properties. Neither does it apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because
a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement
of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.
54 De los Reyes v. Ramnani, June 18, 2010 Manliclic, Marianne P.
FACTS: On October 11, 1977, the trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 24858 in favor of respondent Josephine
Anne B. Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. On June 6, 1978, then Branch Sheriff Pedro
T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
480537 (subject property) during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was
executed in her favor on even date. On November 17, 1978, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court. On March
8, 1990, the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. 480537. Thereafter, the taxes due on the sale of the
subject property were paid on September 26, 2001.
On February 17, 2004, respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to
execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not
accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial court’s October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is
barred by prescription. The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable
in this case. Petitioner did not exercise his right to redeem the subject property within one year from said registration.
Thus, what remains to be done is the issuance of the final certificate of sale which was, however, not promptly
accomplished at that time due to the demise of the trial court’s sheriff. The issuance of the final certificate of sale is a
ministerial duty of the sheriff in order to complete the already enforced judgment. CA denied the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION, LACHES OR ESTOPPEL?
HELD: NO. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right. It is, likewise, not
disputed that petitioner failed to redeem the subject property within one year from the annotation of the certificate of
sale on TCT No. 480537. The expiration of the one-year redemption period foreclosed petitioner’s right to redeem the
subject property and the sale thereby became absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final certificate of sale is a mere
formality and confirmation of the title that is already vested in respondent. Thus, the trial court properly granted the
motion for issuance of the final certificate of sale.
As to petitioner’s claim that the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, the CA correctly ruled that the
subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted
upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the
issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the
subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to
oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner
cannot, therefore, validly claim that he was denied his day in court.
55 Solidum v. Court of Appeals, June 22, 2006 Mercado, Ralph Louie
FACTS: Petitioner avers that there are other plain, adequate and speedy remedies available to Insular under the ordinary
course of law. Hence, respondent court should have dismissed the petition. He further contends that being a mere
garnishee, Insular is not a party to the case and cannot avail of the writ of certiorari.
The instant case originated from a complaint for collection for a sum of money which petitioner filed against Unified
Capital Management Corporation (UNICAP) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati – Branch 135. Petitioner obtained
favorable judgment on May 20, 1999 but was not able to get full payment from UNICAP. Thus, he went after UNICAP’s
debtors. It appears that one of the debtors, Susan Yee Soon, executed on September 17, 1997 two (2) Deeds of Relative
Assignment to UNICAP.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT GARNISHEE INSULAR DESPITE OF THE FACT THAT SAID GARNISHEE IS NOT A PARTY IN
THE CASE, BUT A THIRD[-]PARTY CLAIMANT?
HELD: YES, Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to a judgment debtor
which may be found owing to such debtor by a third person. It cites some stranger to the litigation who is debtor to one
of the parties to the action. Such debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor, and the court, having acquired jurisdiction
over his person by means of citation, requires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who
is creditor in the main litigation. It is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another.
In the case at bar, it is plain that private respondent Insular, as garnishee, did not avail any of the remedies provided by
the rules. After it was impleaded as garnishee, it wrote letters to the trial court, initially not contesting petitioner’s right
to the basic proceeds of Susan Yee Soon’s insurance policies. Later on, however, it changed its stance and resisted payment
by filing an Omnibus Motion and Motions for Reconsideration of the orders of the trial court. It even appealed to
respondent court via a petition for certiorari.
We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a third-party
claim. Pursuant to [Section 17,31 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court], a third-party claimant has two remedies, such as,
an action for damages against the sheriff to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond, and a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim to the property. In the case at bar, petitioner's and intervenor's remedy against
the bond proved to be unavailing because of the disputed order of the respondent Judge cancelling the indemnity bond.
Such an order as well as the order denying a motion to reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party
claims. What then would the remedy be of the third-party claimants?
From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a creditor, neither an appeal nor a
petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. The remedy of petitioner would be to file a separate and independent action
to determine the ownership of the attached property or to file a complaint for damages chargeable against the bond filed
by the judgment creditor in favor of the provincial sheriff.
56 Rural Bank v. Manila Mission, GR 130223, August 19, 2009 Navarro, Bryan Christopher
57 Spouses de Mesa v. Spouses Acera, January 16, 2012 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa jointly purchased a parcel of land while they were still merely
cohabiting before their marriage. A house was constructed in the said property which the petitioners then occupied as
their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987. In September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from
Claudio D. Acero, Jr. in the amount of Php100,000.00 which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As
payment, Araceli issued a check which was later on dishonoured.
The petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s subsequent demand for payment. Respondent Claudio Acero filed a complaint for
violation of (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. The RTC acquitted the petitioners but ordered them to pay Claudio the
amount of Php100,000.00 from the date of demand until fully paid. The house and lot was sold in the public auction and
Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted in payment for several years.
Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and
Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contended that they are the rightful owners of the property. The
MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time
the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the
regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly
issued. Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject
property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly
levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, WHICH IS A FAMILY HOME, MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION?
HELD: YES. The subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt from
execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming
such privilege. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, were
summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted
as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt
from execution.
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed
to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Here, the subject property became a family
residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married.
There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution.
58 Golden Sun Finance Corp. v. Albano, 654 SCRA 375 Oliveros, Keisha Camille
59 Cayton v. Zeonnix Trading Corp., October 9, 2009 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.
60 Teves v. Integrated Credit, GR 216714, April 4, 2018 Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC. III
FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank extended various loans to petitioners Godfrey and Ma. Teresa Teves. As security,
petitioners mortgaged their property. Petitioners defaulted in their loan payments, Standard extrajudicially foreclosed on
the mortgage, and the property was sold to Integrated Credit and Corporate Services Co. ICCS filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession. During the proceedings, ICCS was substituted by respondent Carol Aqui who appears to
have acquired the property from ICCS, and a new certificate of title was issued in his favor.
Sometime later, the RTC issued a Decision ordering the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject property in favor
of ICCS. On July 14, 2010, the RTC issued two orders in which the second order provides that: Sps. Godfrey Teves and
Teresa Teves are hereby ordered to deliver to petitioner and/or deposit with the Court the monthly rentals of the subject
property in the amount of P50,000.00 covering the period from May 24, 2007 up to the time they surrender the possession
thereof to the petitioner. Petitioners filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Second Order, but in a September
2, 2010 Order, the RTC denied the same. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari claiming that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering them to turn over the back rentals to ICCS/Aqui in a petition for a writ of possession wherein
the CA dismissed petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not bank rentals be awarded in an ex parte applications for writ of possession under ART. 3135?
HELD: NO. When the redemption period expired on May 23, 2007, ICCS became the owner of the subject property and
was, from then on, entitled to the fruits thereof. Petitioners ceased to be the owners of the subject property, and had no
right to the same as well as to its fruits. Under Section 32, Rule 39 of the Rules on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of
Judgments, all rents, earnings and income derived from the property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment
obligor, but only until die expiration of his period of redemption.
Thus, if petitioners leased out the property to third parties after their period for redemption expired, as was in fact the
case here, the rentals collected properly belonged to ICCS or Aqui, as the case may be. Petitioners had no right to collect
them. Aqui acquired the subject property from ICCS only in 2010. Thus, Aqui cannot claim the subject rental collections
from 2007, because she was not yet the owner of the subject property at the time; they belonged to ICCS.
She is entitled to rentals collected only from the time she became the owner of the property. However, as the substituted
party in these proceedings, this Court will allow her to collect the award of rentals collected by petitioners but which
pertain to ICCS - with the obligation to remit the same to the latter. After all, she is merely ICCS's successor-in-interest.
Procedurally the RTC should not have allowed Aqui to substitute for ICCS, but should have simply ordered her to be
impleaded as additional necessary party in the proceedings, since ICCS still had a claim for unremitted rentals that was
pending resolution in the case.
On the other hand, it cannot simply be ignored that petitioners unlawfully collected rentals from the property that did not
belong to them, but to ICCS without doubt; between this substantive issue and the court and parties' procedural faux pas,
the latter should be overlooked so that the former may be corrected. The parties' substantive rights weigh more than
procedural technicalities. "In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be conscientiously guided by
the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around."
61 Yap v. Dy Sr., 654 SCRA 593 Reyes, Yna Adrielle
62 Co v. People, July 13, 2009 Saligan, Constantine
FACTS: Petitioner is accused of violating the SSS law for failing to remit compulsory contributions of respondent spouses.
Prior to this criminal action, spouses filed a labor case against petitioner for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of overtime
pay etc. The NLRC ruled that there is no employee-employer relation between petitioner and respondent spouses since
the later were independent contractors. Despite such ruling of the inexistence of employee-employer relationship, the
RTC judge denied petitioner's motion to quash
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION TO QUASH SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED?
HELD: YES. The Doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgement also applies in criminal cases. Under the said doctrine, what is
decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgement preclude by the principle of bar prior
judgement, an aspect of res judicata and even under the doctrine of the “law of the case”, the relitigation of the same
issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them.
When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in
accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness
of the former decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Matters settled by a Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already
settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion.
63 Selga v. Brar, September 21, 2011 Santiago, Melody R.
FACTS: Francisco Entierro died instestate and left a parcel of land to his spouse and their children. On May 1985, The
spouse and her children executed a Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship declaring themselves to have inherited the
parcel of land. This property was sold in favor of Petitioner Spouses Tobias and Ceferina Selga. 7 yrs later, Responded Sony
Brar, represented by her sister-in-law, Marina Entierro, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sales against the Petitioners
claiming that she was one of the children of Francisco and Basilia and the she was unlawfully deprived of her rightful share
in the property when it was sold to Selgas.
Civil Case No. 276, declared the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship and adjudicating Brar as one
of the heirs. Unsatisfied with the decision, Brar filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which she eventually withdraw.
Thus, the decision of Civil Case No. 276 attained finality.
In 1997, Brar informed the Selgas that she was exercising her right to redeem her share in the subject property in property.
However, the Selgas, through counsel, rejected Brar’s demand stating that the decision of the Trial Court did not include
to grant her the right of redemption. This prompted Brar to file a Complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 573. The Trial Court dismissed the case because the case constituted forum shopping and that the decision
was silent as to her right to redeem the subject property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision stating that
the right of redemption is a statutory right provided by law, hence, mere silence does not mean that the same is denied.
ISSUE: WON BRAR’S RIGHT TO REDEMPTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA?
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that Civil Case No. 573 has satisfied the 4 essential requisites of res judicata:
(1) Finality of the former judgement (Civil Case No. 276);

(2) Court rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) Judgment on the merits; and
(4) Identiy of parties, subject matter and causes of actions.
It was not disputed that the first three requisites were present in the Civil Case No. 573. With regard the fourth requisite,
a close study of the said complaint reveal that Brar’s right to redeem the Selga’s share in the subject property also arose
from its sale to the Selgas by the co-heirs and co-owners of Marina, alleged to be without her knowledge or consent.
Therefore, it is the same cause of action as in Civil Case No. 276.
Even if Brar argue that the decision in Civil Case No. 276 was silent about his right to redeem, the silence of the decision
does not mean that the Court then did not take cognizance of the same, rather, it did not deem him entitled to the said
right. Also, it there is any error committed by the said Court could only be reviewed or corrected on appeal.
In the said case, Brar filed initially an appeal of its judgement then was withdrew the same eventually which made the
decision in the Civil Case No. 276 final and executory. Thus, Civil Case No. 573 is dismissed, being barred by res judicata.
64 City of Cebu v. Dedamo, G.R. No. 172852, January 30, 2013 Sibal, Tricia
FACTS: The City of Cebu filed an expropriation case against spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Sps. Dedamo) before
the RTC. The RTC approved the Commissioners report on the amount of just compensation. The RTC Order was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
When the said decision became final and executory, the case was remanded for execution to the RTC, before which, a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo. Hence, the RTC granted and issued a writ of
execution. In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were substituted by respondent Apolonio Dedamo
(Apolonio).
The City of Cebu paid the difference in just compensation. However, Apolonio filed a Manifestation and Motion before
the RTC to order the City of Cebu to pay interest on the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the
lands. The RTC denied the motion ruled that it can no longer amend a final and executory judgment that did not specifically
direct the payment of legal interest. Dedamo appealed to the CA asserting that City of Cebu is liable to pay: (a) 12% legal
interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the property up to
the date of payment of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest from the time the decision awarding just
compensation became final and executory.
As to Apolonio’s first claim, the CA rejected the same since it was belatedly raised but as regard with the second claim,
the CA awarded legal interest accruing from the time of RTCs decision. Both parties appealed the CA’s decision before the
Supreme Court. Apolonio’s petition was docketed as G.R. No. 172942 where he prayed that the 12% interest rate be
reckoned from the date of taking of the property and not from the date of finality of the Decision. The Court denied his
petition. The City of Cebu filed this instant petition questioning the same CA decision in G.R. No. 172942.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE APPEAL MADE BY THE CITY OF CEBU SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE COURSE?
HELD: The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment.
A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised
and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer question the
respondent’s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Court’s determination in G.R. No. 172942 on
the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter
anew through the present recourse.
Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is inextricably related to the
ruling in the former.
65 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica
66 Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 Songco, Ken Felix C
FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married
in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.
She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC QC for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment.
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "failure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.”Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent
with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN RECOGNIZE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN A PROCEEDING
FOR CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT?
HELD: YES. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal
of office.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments.
Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in
a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
67 Dela Cruz-Marisono v. Morisono, G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018 Sy, Exequiel
FACTS: Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono and in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months
but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's
philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda. As such, she and Ryoji submitted a
Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January
17, 2012 and duly recorded on July 1, 2012. She filed a petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by
her and Ryoji before the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to
be able to marry again.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since nobody appeared to oppose
her petition except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation
and absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted as proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.
THE RTC RULING – It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines –
provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the alien. The same does not find application when it
was the Filipino spouse whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan
is not binding in the Philippines;
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC CORRECTLY DENIED LUZVIMINDA'S PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE FOREIGN
DIVORCE DECREE SHE PROCURED WITH RYOJI?
HELD: YES. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a
means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce
decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce
by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the
RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a
remand to the court a quo is warranted.
68 Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018 Viran, Archimedes John
FACTS: Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the
wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving
their marriage. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before
the RTC. In its decision, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective
under Philippine Laws. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its previous
decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is
missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone.
Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the
Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan
was fatal to her cause.
ISSUE: WON THE DIVORCE DECREE SHOULD BE VALID?
HELD: YES. Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title
to the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (50a)
The Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if
it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph
2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce
decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet
to comply with certain guidelines before courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time
and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
RULE 44 (ORDINARY APPEALED CASES)

RULE 46 (ORIGINAL CASES)

RULE 50 (DISMISSAL OF APPEAL)
RULE 52 (MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
RULE 53 (NEW TRIAL)
69 Heirs of JBL Reyes v. CA, 338 SCRA 282 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.
FACTS: Justice JBL Reyes and Dr. Edmundo Reyes (brothers) executed a contract leasing a parcel of land along Taft Aveue
to Manila Builders, subject to certain conditions. However, Manila Builders violated the conditions. And so, the Heirs of
JBL Reyes and the Heirs of Dr. Edmundo Reyes (“the Heirs”) sent notice to Manila Builders terminating the lease and
demanding that they vacate and surrender the premises. The Heirs filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer
based on the breach of contract of lease. The MTC ruled in their favor. The Heirs filed with the MTC a motion for execution
of the judgment of eviction.
Meanwhile, Manila Builders appealed to the RTC. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to file an appeal
memorandum on time. So, Manila Builders elevated the case to the CA. The MTC granted the Heirs’ motion for execution.
The CA allowed the withdrawal of the appeal filed by Manila Builders. Simultaneously, Manila Builders filed with the RTC
an action for annulment of the ejectment judgment, with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary
injunction, but this was denied. Manila Builders filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus questioning the
RTC’s denial of its application for injunctive relief.
The CA issued a resolution restraining the enforcement of the writ of execution. The RTC dismissed the action for
annulment of judgment on the ground that Manila Builders’ remedy was appeal, which when withdrawn, was effectively
abandoned. The CA promulgated a decision setting aside the decision of the MTC. Manila Builders filed an urgent ex-parte
motion for execution pending appeal. The Heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the CA with the SC,
and an urgent motion for execution, with motion to defer consideration due to the pendency of their petition with the SC.
The CA granted the motion for execution, and issued a resolution appointing a special sheriff to execute the decision. The
Heirs were evicted from the premises and Manila Builders was restored to possession of the property.
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS A NEED FOR JUDICIAL RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE BEFORE MMB MAY BE
COMPELLED TO MOVE OUT OF THE LEASED PREMISES?
HELD: NO. The contract provides that in the event of default or breach of any of the conditions of the contract, the lessor
may, in his absolute discretion declare the contract cancelled and terminated.
MMB violated the conditions of the contract:
 To cover all buildings and improvements on the leased premises with insurance
 To maintain the leased premises and all the buildings and improvements thereon in a state of security and first class
repair, in a clean and sanitary condition
 To repair and restore, or reconstruct such damage on destroyed improvements
 To secure the lessor's prior written consent before it may assign or transfer any of its rights under the contacts
There is nothing wrong if the parties to a lease contract agree on certain mandatory provisions (such as the
aforementioned conditions) concerning their respective rights and obligations. Contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties. As long as such agreements are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
or public order they shall have the force of law between them. The law does not prohibit parties from entering into
agreement providing that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without judicial
intervention. This is what petitioners and respondent entered into.
ISSUE: WON THE CA CORRECTLY DECLARED THE HEIRS OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT?
HELD: NO. The CA declared the Heirs guilty of indirect contempt of court because they implemented the writ of execution
of the trial court despite the order of the court to elevate the entire original records, and proceeded to demolish the
improvements on the property without authority of the CA. However, this was because the TRO issued by the CA had
lapsed after 60 days. No more restraining order was in effect until the court decided the case on its merits. Hence,
petitioners acted in good faith in the exercise of their proprietary rights. There was no willful disobedience to a lawful
order. The Heirs were not guilty of contempt.
ISSUE: WON THE CA CORRECTLY IMMEDIATELY ENFORCED ITS DECISION PENDING APPEAL?
HELD: NO. In the first place, the CA has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision.
Discretionary execution under Rule 39, Sec. 2 (a), is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court,
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. A judgment of the CA cannot be executed pending
appeal. Once final and executory, the judgment must be remanded to the lower court, where a motion for its execution
may be filed only after its entry.
In the second place, even in discretionary executions, the same must be firmly founded upon good reasons. The court
must state in a special order the "good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing execution
pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to
the adverse party if the decision is reversed. Jurisprudence teaches us what are "good reasons" that justify a premature
execution of judgment. (ex. the deterioration of commodities subject of litigation, or the deteriorating condition of a
vessel)
In this case, the good reasons given by the CA to support the discretionary execution of its decision are (1) that MMB
would be deprived of income from its business endeavors; (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the CA and the SC are
clogged with cases and it may take some time before the decision in the case may attain its finality; and (3) that petitioners
acted with bad faith and malice.
None of the cited reasons is "good" enough. The assertion that "it is of public knowledge" that the SC is clogged with cases
that may take time to decide mocks the integrity and derides the competence of this Court. Urgency resulting from years
of delay in the disposal of a case is not a good reason for premature execution of the decision.
In the third place, by the mere fact of the filing of the petition for review to the CA, the finality of the CA’s decision was
stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment therein, and, hence, no premature execution could be had. The CA
adopted its resolution granting execution pending appeal on after the petition for review was already filed in the SC. It
thereby encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Worst of all, the CA has no authority to appoint a
special sheriff. It appointed an employee of the mailing section, who was not even bonded as required by law.
CA reversed, RTC reinstated.
70 Suntay v. Keyser Mercantile, Inc., G.R. No. 208462, December 10, 2014 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G

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CIVIL PROCEDURE. FOURTH SYLLABUS.

POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

CASE ASSIGNMENT FOURTH SYLLABUS CIVIL PROCEDURES

# CASE NAME NAME

CASE DIGESTS PROPER

RULE 37, RULES OF COURT

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT LEGARDA SHOULD BE BOUND BY HER COUNSEL’S NEGLIGENCE?

RULE 40, RULES OF COURT

7 Mejillano v. Lucillo, 590 SCRA 1 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.

8 De Grano v. Lacaba, 589 SCRA 148 Domalanta, Marc Denver L

ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER’S ORDINARY APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY?

10 Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 Dulay, Robert Ross

11 Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, July 18, 2012 Esquilona, Veniflor

RULE 41, RULES OF COURT

RULE 45, RULES OF COURT

16 Tan v. People, April 12, 2002 Julian, Jenelyn D.

RULE 56, RULES OF COURT

17 People v. Caruncho, January 23, 1994 Lagasca, James Ellis

18 City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo Lazaro, Ivan Rei

RULE 64, RULES OF COURT

RULE 43, RULES OF COURT

24 Uy v. Public Estates Authority, 589 SCRA 1 Oliveros, Keisha Camille

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPEAL NOT CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY?

27 Orosa v. Roa, 495 SCRA 22 Reyes, Yna Adrielle

APPEALS FROM OTHER QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES

The list of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive.

APPEAL IN CORPORATE REHABILITATION CASES

APPEAL FROM SAC CASES

RULE 38, RULES OF COURT

32 Mesina v. Meer, July 2, 2002 Songco, Ken Felix C

33 Samonte v. S.F. Naguiat Inc., October 2, 2009 Sy, Exequiel

34 Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 6, 2008 Viran, Archimedes John

ISSUE: WON THE PETITION HAS MERIT?

In Ancheta v. Ancheta, the Court ruled:

RULE 47, RULES OF COURT

35 de Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp. Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline B.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION IS A DIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK?

37 Llamas v. Court of Appeals, September 29, 2009 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.

38 Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo, 657 SCRA 20 Bautista, Rey Matthew

40 Barco v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 162 Cruz, Joan mae

41 Villanueva v. Nite, July 25, 2006 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.

RULE 39, RULES OF COURT

44 Urban Bank v. Pena, 659 SCRA 418 Dulay, Robert Ross

BEFORE WHAT COURT DO YOU REVIVE A JUDGMENT IN AN UD/FE CASE?

47 Villeza v. German Management, GR 182937, August 8, 2010 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G

50 Davis v. Davis, G.R. No. 233489, March 7, 2018 Julian, Jenelyn D.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED.

51 Rubio v. Alabata Lagasca, James Ellis

52 Cometa v. Court of Appeals, February 6, 2001 Lazaro, Ivan Rei

ISSUE: WHETHER THE REMEDY AVAILED OF BY PETITIONER WAS PROPER?

54 De los Reyes v. Ramnani, June 18, 2010 Manliclic, Marianne P.

ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION, LACHES OR ESTOPPEL?

55 Solidum v. Court of Appeals, June 22, 2006 Mercado, Ralph Louie

61 Yap v. Dy Sr., 654 SCRA 593 Reyes, Yna Adrielle

62 Co v. People, July 13, 2009 Saligan, Constantine

63 Selga v. Brar, September 21, 2011 Santiago, Melody R.

(1) Finality of the former judgement (Civil Case No. 276);

ISSUE: WON THE DIVORCE DECREE SHOULD BE VALID?

RULE 44 (ORDINARY APPEALED CASES)

RULE 46 (ORIGINAL CASES)

ISSUE: WON THE CA CORRECTLY DECLARED THE HEIRS OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT?

CA reversed, RTC reinstated.

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