WHO MAY APPLY?
NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193443 : April 16, 2012]
JEAN TAN, ROSELLER C. ANACINTO, CARLO LOILO ESPINEDA AND DAISY ALIADO MANAOIS,
REPRESENTED IN THIS ACT BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MA. WILHELMINA E. TOBIAS,
PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Decision [1] dated July 6, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated
August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88995. The facts leading to
its filing are as follows:cralaw
On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application
for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre,
situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920 square meters. [3] The petitioners
alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. [4]
After trial and hearing, the RTC issued a Decision on July 29, 2006, granting the petitioners’ application,
thus:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of
general default, decrees and adjudges Lot No. 9972 consisting of 6,920 square meters,
Cad. 459-D, Indang Cadastre and its technical description as herein above-described
situated in Brgy. Bancod, Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as
amended by P.D. 1529, as it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and
registered in the names of Jean Tan, of legal age, Filipino, single, with postal address at
Room 54 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; Roseller C. Anaci[n]to, of legal age, Filipino,
single, with postal address at Moncario Villag[e], Ampid-1, San Mateo, Rizal; Carlo Loilo
Espineda, of legal age, Filipino, with postal address at Cluster F. Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal
and Daisy Aliado Manaois, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Panghulo Road,
Malabon, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued
by the Administrator, Land Registration Authority.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
The CA gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines. By way of the assailed
Decision, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years. The CA posit:
We now determine if appellees have the right to register their title on such land despite
the fact that their possession commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that
the appellees’ possession over the subject property can be reckoned only from 21 June
1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and
disposable. From said date up to the filing of the application for registration of title over
the subject property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus,
appellees’ possession of the subject property fell short of the requirement of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their
predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to indicate
possession in the concept of owner. The testimonies of appellees’ witnesses regarding
actual possession are belied by the absence of evidence on actual use of or
improvements on the subject property. Appellees presented only various tax
declarations to prove possession. However, except for the Certification, showing
payment of tax due on tax declaration for the year 2003, there are no other evidence
showing that all the taxes due corresponding to the rest of the tax declarations were in
fact paid by appellees or their predecessors-in-interest.
In sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is
characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an
owner. Appellees failed to discharge their duty of substantiating possession and title to
the subject land.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated 29 July 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[6] (citation omitted)
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its August 12, 2010
Resolution.[7]
The petitioners question the conclusion arrived at by the CA, alleging that the evidence they presented
prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
property for more than 30 years. The petitioners claim that the following sufficed to demonstrate that they
acquired title over the subject property by prescription:
1. the testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias, stating that:
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

1. the petitioners have been in actual, notorious and open possession of the subject
property since the time they purchased the same in 1996;
2. the petitioners have regularly paid the taxes due on the subject property;
3. the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Victorio Garcia, Felipe Gatdula and Gregonio
Gatdula, had been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years and had
religiously paid the taxes due thereon; and
4. the subject property is agricultural, alienable and disposable;
8. Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Indang, Cavite, which approved
the reclassification of several lots, including the subject property, from agricultural to
residential/commercial;[12]
9. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform on July 13, 2000, which converted several parcels of land, including the subject
property, from agricultural to residential/commercial; [13]

10. Certificationissued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) –

CALABARZON dated October 29, 2002, stating that “the subject area falls within the Alienable
and Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per LC Map 3091 certified on June 21,
2. the testimony of the caretaker of the subject property, Margarito Pena, stating that: 1983”.[14]

1. he resides near the subject property;

2. he witnessed the execution of the deed of sale that petitioners entered into with Issue
Gregonio Gatdula; and
3. the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years; This Court is faced with the lone issue of whether the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the
benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

3. the testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the Docket Division of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), stating that: Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the “Public Land Act” governs the classification and
disposition of lands forming part of the public domain. Section 11 thereof provides that one of the modes of
disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by “confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
1. no opposition to the petitioners’ application was filed before the LRA; titles”. Section 48 thereof enumerates those who are considered to have acquired an imperfect or
2. an examiner of the LRA found nothing wrong with the petitioners’ application; and incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land.
3. no title covering the subject property was previously issued;
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree”, is
a codification of all the laws relative to the registration of property and Section 14 thereof specifies those
who are qualified to register their incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land under the
Torrens system. Particularly:
4. Tax Declaration Nos. 2935, 2405 and 1823 for the years 1961, 1967 and 1974 in the name of
Victorio Garcia;[8] Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
5. Tax Declaration Nos. 1534 and 3850 for the years 1980 and 1985 in the name of Felipe authorized representatives:
Gatdula;[9]
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
6. Tax Declaration Nos. 22453-A and 2925 for the years 1991 and 1994 in the name of Gregonio
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
Gatdula;[10]
12, 1945, or earlier.

7. Tax Declaration Nos. 21956-A, 22096-A, 22097-A and 97-05078 in the name of the petitioners;[11] (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.
As this Court clarified in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,[15] and Republic of the
Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,[16] Section 14(1) covers “alienable and
disposable lands” while Section 14(2) covers “private property”. Thus, for one’s possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land to give rise to an imperfect title, the same should
have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. On the other, for one to claim that his possession and
occupation of private property has ripened to imperfect title, the same should have been for the
prescriptive period provided under the Civil Code. Without need for an extensive extrapolation, the private
property contemplated in Section 14(2) is patrimonial property as defined in Article 421 in relation to
Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code.
Going further, it was explained in Heirs of Malabanan and East Silverlane, that possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert it
to patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property
remains to be alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529. Thus:
In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable
and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not
automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public
domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for
public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
“which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth” are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is “intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth”. (emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that
the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands
are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that
the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive
prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as
patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the
classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the
completion of the prescriptive period.[17]
The petitioners’ application is obviously anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 as they do not claim
to have possessed, by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest, the subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier. That it was thru prescription that they had acquired an imperfect title over the subject
property is the foundation upon which the petitioners rest their application.
Unfortunately, this Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners to be wanting. The petitioners
failed to demonstrate that they and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the property in the requisite
manner, which this Court explained as follows:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,
notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public
or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.[18]
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of
prescription. More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and random
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

such as in this case. Indeed, how can the petitioners’ claim of possession for the entire prescriptive period
be ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were paid only on eleven (11) occasions within the 40-year SO ORDERED.
period from 1961 to 2001? In Wee v. Republic of the Philippines,[19] this Court stated that:

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957,
1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45
years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax
declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarant’s right to
registration of title.[20] (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

In East Silverlane, it was emphasized that adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of
an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing evidence is on
the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by
proof of actual possession.[21]

While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by testimonial evidence, the same is futile
and frivolous. The testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do not merit consideration
and do not make up for the inherent inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations submitted by the
petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what specific acts of ownership or dominion were performed by
the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest and simply made that general assertion that the latter
possessed and occupied the subject property for more than thirty (30) years, which, by all means, is a
mere conclusion of law. The RTC should have tackled evidence of such nature with a disposition to
incredulity, if not with an outright rejection.

Furthermore, the petitioners’ application was filed after only (1) year from the time the subject property may
be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was
issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive
period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from such
date. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be
acquired by prescription. This is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in Heirs of Malabanan quoted
above and in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo,[22] which states:

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration
because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds
thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.[23]cralaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The July 6, 2009
Decision and August 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision 1 dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2
dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525
square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application,
which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more
particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the
property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latter’s other heirs had waived
their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in
the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As
proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance
survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibañez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED
PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be
within Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965
and 1974 in Isabel’s name – Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 – to prove that she had been in
possession of the property since 1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes
due on the property, Espinosa presented a Certification 6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of
the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 –
Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717 .8
Petitioner opposed Espinosa’s application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosa’s
predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do
not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length
of time required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment 9 granting Espinosa’s petition for registration, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the registration
and the confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters and that upon
the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein
applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that
he complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced,
and so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which
is within the area considered by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
actual, public, continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec.
14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land Registration Act. 11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosa’s failure to prove that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516,
Isabel’s possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section
48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following
the sale that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for
the year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in
possession for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosa’s failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a
sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines 13 and
Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is
mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the application. 15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible
to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable. 16
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision
dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it
commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title over the subject
land and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed
possession of said land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the
application. Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into private property
(Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
218 SCRA 41); and
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra¸ the Supreme Court pronounced that
the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in
cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply
with such requirement is fatal to one’s application for registration. However, such pronouncement need not
be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind
the submission of the tracing cloth plan.
x x x:
xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent evidence like a duly
approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499,
containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the
original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18

b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable:
48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases
result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City,
it is certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable area of the disposable and
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a alienable land of the public domain.19
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more." 17
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13,
2006.
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the
original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be established by other
Petitioner’s Case
competent evidence.

Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CA’s assailed decision and attributes the
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best evidence to identify a
following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable
piece of land for registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration
and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the property in preparation for a
Commission, the court may sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the
judicial proceeding but does not convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section
blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact
L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides further:
metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as
evidence of the identity and location of the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands.
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and
confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land
Issues
Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate against the rights of the applicant.
Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has
been shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both by the The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the
lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of subject property that is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the
land contained therein." following issues:
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No.
1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted
the survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa’s application is anchored on Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence
supposedly showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosa’s allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect
title over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter
provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that
of his predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription.
Therefore, the rule that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts’ disposition of this case stemmed from their failure
to apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section
48(b) of the PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July 26,
1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty
(30)-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation
for a period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA
filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that
dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been acquired under Section
48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who
had already been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years
at the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their possession commenced after June 12,
1945? In Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as follows:
However, as petitioner Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public
Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977,
the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes
place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron’s satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More
clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. 22 (Citations omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must
be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the thirty
(30)-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is
not the case that there is an option between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated under Section 48(b)
that if possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it
is still possible to acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years
at the time of the filing of the application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of
the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property for at least thirty (30) years prior to the time
he filed his application. However, there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to
the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and
occupation of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabel’s
name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from
the time she first came supposedly into possession.
The CA’s reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 23 is misplaced considering that the
application therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can
be said with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals.24 The petition for registration
therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under Section
48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into possession of the property on June
17, 1978 and filed their application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the
individuals from whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or
while the prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of P.D.
No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period was already completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should
apply in this case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things,
that Isabel’s possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945. That in view of the
established fact that Isabel’s alleged possession and occupation started much later, the lower courts
should have dismissed Espinosa’s application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That
there were instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this
case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property
being supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only
those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of national
wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 26 this Court held that there must
be an official declaration to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to
the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion
if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis
supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate
period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit
allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held by the State in its private
capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA
in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For
prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was an official declaration that the
subject property is no longer earmarked for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover,
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
such official declaration should have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be,
prior to the filing of the application for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the
conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of
the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still reserved for public service or the development
of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable, possession and occupation no matter how
lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the State’s if such did not
commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the
inalienable public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v. Republic 30 that the
notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is
not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain. Neither it is
the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey
is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3,
1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the
said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosa’s application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present the original
tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the
advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the subject property if: (a)
it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land
Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the
property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of
the DENR. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the land, its boundaries and location can
be established by other competent evidence apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly executed
blueprint of the survey plan and technical description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to
provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property
applied for registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining
lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present the
original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidence—such as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the property—which
may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to
be registered.33
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as evidence of the identity, location
and the boundaries of the property applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this Court enumerated the documents
that are deemed relevant and sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable public
domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such
copy of the DENR Secretary’s declaration or the President’s proclamation must be certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of such official record.1âwphi1 These facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.35 (Citation omitted)

Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O.
No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1)
of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's
possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and
disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the
property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and
that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered THIRD DIVISION
unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
G.R. No. 202051, April 18, 2016
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS &
No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of title
HIGHWAYS; ENGINEER SIMPLICIO D. GONZALES, DISTRICT ENGINEER, SECOND ENGINEERING
over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby
DISTRICT OF CAMARINES SUR; AND ENGINEER VICTORINO M. DEL SOCORRO, JR., PROJECT
DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
ENGINEER, DPWH, BARAS, CANAMAN, CAMARINES SUR, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ILDEFONSO B.
REGULTO AND FRANCIA R. REGULTO, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution of this Court is the petition for review on certiorari dated July 10, 2012 filed by petitioners,
the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH);
Engineer Simplicio D. Gonzales, District Engineer, Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and
Engineer Victorino M. Del Socorro, Jr., Project Engineer, DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur
assailing the Order1 dated May 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 62, which
ordered herein petitioners to pay respondents spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto
(Spouses Regulto) the amount of Two Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P243,000.00) as just
compensation for the part of their property traversed by the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Project of the DPWH.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Respondents spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R. Regulto are the registered owners of the
property in controversy located at Mabel, Naga City, Camarines Sur consisting of 300 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 086-2010000231.2 The Spouses Regulto acquired the
said property by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by Julian R. Cortes, attorney-in-fact of the
spouses Bienvenido and Beatriz Santos, in February 1994. 3 The subject property originated from a Free
Patent property consisting of 7,759 square meters registered and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 235 dated April 14, 1956.4
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
Sometime in April 2011, the DPWH Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur apprised the Spouses
Regulto of the construction of its road project, the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road, which will traverse their
property and other adjoining properties.5 The DPWH initially offered the spouses the sum of P243,000.00
or P1,500.00 per square meter for the 162 square-meter affected area as just compensation.6
However, in a letter dated May 11, 2006, the DPWH, through District Engr. Rolando P. Valdez, withdrew
the offer, and informed the Spouses Regulto that they were not entitled to just compensation since the title
of their land originated from a Free Patent title acquired under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, known
as the Public Land Act, which contained a reservation in favor of the government of an easement of
right-of-way of twenty (20) meters, which was subsequently increased to sixty (60) meters by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 635, for public highways and similar works that the government or any public
or quasi-public service enterprise may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with payment of
damages for the improvements only.7
The Spouses Regulto, in their letter dated May 30, 2011, protested the findings of the DPWH and ordered
them to cease from proceeding with the construction. 8 They alleged that since their property is already
covered by TCT No. 086-2010000231, it ceased to be a public land.9 They communicated that the market
value of the property is P450,000.00 plus the Zonal Value of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which
is more or less the acceptable just compensation of their property. 10 Furthermore, they requested that they
be furnished, within five (5) days from the receipt of their letter, with a Program of Works and Sketch Plan
showing the cost of the project and the extent or area covered by the road that will traverse their
property.11
The DPWH furnished the Spouses Regulto with the sketch plan showing the extent of the road right-of-way
that will cut across their property.12 It also reiterated its earlier position that the title to the land was
acquired under C.A. No. 141.13
On October 8, 2011, the Spouses Regulto filed a complaint for payment of just compensation, damages
with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC
of Naga City, Branch 62, against herein petitioners Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH;
District Engr. Valdez of the Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and Project Engr. Del Socorro,
Jr. of the DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur.14
The Spouses Regulto averred that the DPWH acted with deceit, misrepresentation and evident bad faith in
convincing them to sign on a paper after relying on the assurance that they would be paid with just
compensation.15 They also alleged that their property is outside the coverage of Section 112, C.A. No. 141
because their land is a private property, and that the same is situated beyond the 60-meter radius or width
from the public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines, airport
runways, and other government structures.16
On August 5, 2011, the petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the Spouses Regulto do not have a cause of action, and that their complaint
failed to state the same.17 Petitioners asseverated that Section 112 of C.A. No. 141 is explicit on the
encumbrance imposed upon lands originally covered by a free patent or any other public land
patent.18Petitioners also alleged that the respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies for not
appealing the findings of the Regional Infrastructure Right-of-Way (IROW) Committee with the DPWH
Regional Director or to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways.19
In an Order dated October 17, 2011, the RTC denied the motion filed by the petitioners citing that the
insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint to sustain a dismissal based
on lack of cause of action.20 In this case, the complaint stated allegations of nonpayment of just
compensation.21 Furthermore, the court mentioned that one of the exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is when the issue is one of law and when circumstances warrant urgency of
judicial intervention, as in the case of the Spouses Regulto whose portion of their property has already
been occupied by the petitioners without just compensation. 22
In the Answer23 dated November 16, 2011, the petitioners reiterated their defense that no legal right has
been violated since C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1361,24 imposes a 60-meter wide lien on the
property originally covered by a Free Patent.25 Petitioners also avowed that Section 5 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulation (IRR) of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 897426 provides that if the private property or
land is acquired under the provisions of C.A. No. 141, the government officials charged with the
prosecution of the projects or their representative is authorized to take immediate possession of the
property subject to the lien as soon as the need arises, and the government may obtain a quitclaim from
the owners concerned without the need for payment for the land acquired under the said quitclaim mode
except for the damages to improvements only. 27 Hence, petitioners maintained that the Spouses Regulto
are not entitled to a just compensation for the portion of their property affected by the construction of the
Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road.28
The petitioners, in a Motion dated December 19, 2011, prayed for the issuance of the writ of possession of
the subject property in their favor for the construction of the project to finally proceed and be completed
without further delay.29
On January 2, 2012, the RTC ordered the respondents spouses to remove the obstructions that they
erected on the subject property within three days, or the petitioners may dismantle the same to proceed
with the construction of the bypass road project. 30 Likewise, the petitioners were ordered to deliver the
check already prepared in the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for payment of the
trees/improvements on the property.31 The petitioners were also ordered to deposit with any authorized
government depository bank the amount of Thirty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P36,450.00)
equivalent to the assessed value of the 162 square meters of the subject property, which was assessed at
P67,500.00 by the 2010 tax declaration, that the road project will traverse. 32
In an Order dated January 27, 2012, the RTC dismissed the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Spouses Regulto, and sustained its earlier order that the petitioners deposit the amount of
P36,450.00.33The RTC also acknowledged the receipt of the Spouses Regulto of the check for the
payment of the improvements on the property affected by the project. 34
Consequently, the RTC, in its Order dated May 24, 2012, ordered the petitioners to pay the Spouses
Regulto the amount of P243,000.00 as just compensation for the affected portion of their property. 35 The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants Engr. Rolando F. Valdez and Engr. Victorino M. del Socorro, Jr., Republic of
the Philippines and the Dept. of Public Works and Highways to pay plaintiffs-spouses
Ildefonso and Francia Regulto the amount of P243,000.00 as just compensation for their
property traversed by the Naga-Milaor Bypass Project.
SO ORDERED.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC concluded that the government waived the encumbrance provided for in C.A. No. 141 when it did
not oppose the further subdivision of the original property covered by the free patent or made an express
intent on making its encumbrance before the residential lots, which are part of the said subdivision, were
sold to other innocent purchasers for value, especially after the 25-year period has lapsed since the free
patent.37
Hence, the petitioners, through the OSG, filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AND IN
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY JUST COMPENSATION DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE LAND WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLIC LAND
AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST BY FREE
PATENT, AND THUS A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT-OF-WAY EXISTS IN FAVOR
OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RATIOCINATION - THAT THE SUBJECT-PROPERTY
HAS IPSO FACTOCEASED TO BE "PUBLIC LAND" AND THUS NO LONGER
SUBJECT TO THE LIEN IMPOSED BY SAID PROVISION OF C.A. NO. 141, BY
VIRTUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BEING ALREADY COVERED BY A
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN THEIR NAME - CONTRAVENES SECTION
44 OF P.D. NO. 1529 AND NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT
OF APPEALS.
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 8 ("EXPROPRIATION"), NOT
SECTION 5 ("QUIT CLAIM"), OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF R.A. NO. 8974 IS THE APPLICABLE PROVISION REGARDING THE MODE OF
ACQUISITION OF RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY.38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court finds the instant petition partially meritorious.
At the outset, it is noted that petitioners filed the instant petition before this Court without appealing the said
case before the Court of Appeals (CA). A strict application of the policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual
but purely legal questions.39 Section 2 (c),40 Rule 41, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
decision or order of the RTC may, as done in the instant petition, be appealed to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions of law. 41
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact are explained in the case of Navy Officers'
Village Association, Inc. (NOVAI) v. Republic of the Philippines42 as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence on a certain state of facts. The issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
the facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists when a doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites the calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses; the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole; and the probability of the situation.
In the case at bar, the petitioners raise questions of law in disputing the denial by the RTC in the
application of C.A. No. 141 to impose the legal easement of right-of-way to the subject property, and the
application of Section 8 (Expropriation) of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 instead of Section 5 (Quit Claim) in the
acquisition of the said property.
Essentially, the issue for resolution of this Court is whether the petitioners are liable for just compensation
in enforcing the Government's legal easement of right-of-way on the subject property which originated
from the 7,759 square-meter of public land awarded by free patent to the predecessor-in-interest of the
Spouses Regulto.
Petitioners allege that a legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the Government since the land in
controversy was originally public land awarded by free patent to the Spouses Regulto's
predecessors-in-interest.
The RTC, however, ruled that the provision of C.A. No. 141 regarding the easement of right-of-way in favor
of the government is not applicable to the subject property since the law is clearly meant for lands granted
gratuitously by the government in favor of individuals tasked to make it agriculturally productive. 43 It ruled
that the subject property is already a private property since the Spouses Regulto acquired the same
through a deed of absolute sale from the spouses Bienvenido and Beatriz Santos in February 1994, and
that the same originated from the property covered by TCT No. 24027. 44
This Court finds that the RTC erroneously ruled that the provisions of C.A. No. 141 are not applicable to
the case at bar. On the contrary, this Court held that "a legal easement of right-of-way exists in favor of the
Government over land that was originally a public land awarded by free patent even if the land is
subsequently sold to another."45 This Court has expounded that the "ruling would be otherwise if the land
was originally a private property, to which just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof
for public use as an easement of right-of-way."46
It is undisputed that the subject property originated from and was a part of a 7,759-square-meter property
covered by free patent registered under OCT No. 235. 47 furthermore, the Spouses Regulto's transfer
certificate of title, which the RTC relied, contained the reservation: "subject to the provisions of the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act, as well as to those of the Mining Law, if the land is
mineral, and subject, further, to such conditions contained in the original title as may be subsisting."48
Jurisprudence settles that one of the reservations and conditions under the Original Certificate of Title of
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
land granted by free patent is that the said land is subject "to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112,
113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended."49
Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, provides that lands granted by patent shall be subjected to a
right-of-way in favor of the Government, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding sixty (60)
meters on width for public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts,
telegraph and telephone lines, airport runways, including sites necessary for terminal
buildings and other government structures needed for full operation of the airport, as
well as areas and sites for government buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers
needed in the prosecution of government-infrastructure projects, and similar works as
the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprise, including mining or
forest concessionaires, may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with
damages for the improvements only.
Government officials charged with the prosecution of these projects or their
representatives are authorized to take immediate possession of the portion of the
property subject to the lien as soon as the need arises and after due notice to the
owners. It is however, understood that ownership over said properties shall immediately
revert to the title holders should the airport be abandoned or when the infrastructure
projects are completed and buildings used by project engineers are abandoned or
dismantled, but subject to the same lien for future
improvements.50ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width
for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or any public
enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be
affected.51
We are not persuaded with the ruling of the RTC that the government waived the encumbrance imposed
by C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act) when it did not oppose the subdivision of the original property covered
by the free patent. The reservation and condition contained in the OCT of lands granted by free patent, like
the origins of the subject property, is not limited by any time period, thus, the same is subsisting. 52This
subsisting reservation contained in the transfer certificate of title of the Spouses Regulto belies such
supposition that the Government waived the enforcement of its legal easement of right-of-way on the
subject property when it did not oppose to the subdivision of the property in 1995.
Petitioners allege that since the property in controversy was originally acquired under the provisions of
special laws, particularly C.A. No. 141, then Section 5 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 should be applied in the
present case. Petitioners insist that the acquisition of the portion of the subject property is through
execution of quitclaims.
Section 5 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8974 provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 5. Quit Claim - If the private property or land is acquired under the
provisions of Special Laws, particularly Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the
Public Land Act, which provides a 20-meter strip of land easement by the government
for public use with damages to improvements only, P.D. No. 635 which increased the
reserved area to a 60-meter strip, and P.D. No. 1361 which authorizes government
officials charged with the prosecution of projects or their representative to take
immediate possession of portion of the property subject to the lien as soon as the need
arises and after due notice to the owners, then a quit claim from the owners
concerned shall be obtained by the Implementing Agency. No payment by the
government shall be made for land acquired under the quit claim
mode.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With the existence of the said easement of right-of-way in favor of the Government, the petitioners may
appropriate the portion of the land necessary for the construction of the bypass road without paying for it,
except for damages to the improvements. Consequently, the petitioners are ordered to obtain the
necessary quitclaim deed from the Spouses Regulto for the 162-square-meter strip of land to be utilized in
the bypass road project.
It is noted that the 162 square meters of the subject property traversed by the bypass road project is well
within the limit provided by the law. While this Court concurs that the petitioners are not obliged to pay just
compensation in the enforcement of its easement of right-of-way to lands which originated from public
lands granted by free patent, we, however, rule that petitioners are not free from any liability as to the
consequence of enforcing the said right-of-way granted over the original 7,759-square-meter property to
the 300-square-meter property belonging to the Spouses Regulto.
There is "taking," in the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, when the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. 54 Using one of
these standards, it is apparent that there is taking of the remaining area of the property of the Spouses
Regulto. It is true that no burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still retained title and
possession of the property. The fact that more than half of the property shall be devoted to the bypass road
will undoubtedly result in material impairment of the value of the property. It reduced the subject property
to an area of 138 square meters.
Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just compensation over the remaining area of the subject property,
with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of possession or the
actual taking until full payment is made.
The case of Republic v. Hon. Jesus M. Mupas55 elucidated just compensation in this language:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On the other hand, the word
"compensation" means "a full indemnity or remuneration for the loss or damage
sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for public use."
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred. To
achieve this monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the
property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the
taking of property, whichever is earlier.56ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Consequently, the case is remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of determining the final just
compensation for the remaining area of the subject property. The RTC is thereby ordered to make the
determination of just compensation payable to the respondents Spouses Regulto with deliberate dispatch.
The RTC is cautioned to make a determination based on the parameters set forth by law and
jurisprudence regarding just compensation.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated July 10, 2012 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines as represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways; Engineer Simplicio D.
Gonzales, District Engineer, Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur; and Engineer Victorino M. Del
Socorro, Jr., Project Engineer, DPWH, Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur, is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 62 for the determination
of the final just compensation of the compensable area consisting of 138 square meters, with interest
thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of writ of possession or the actual taking
until full payment is made.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality
of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said
area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same on April
1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot
4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied
by Doldol.

In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen years
later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the
area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary
Technical School (hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended
projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.

In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for accion
possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's favor and
ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a
quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two
years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.

Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to this Court, claiming
that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the evidence on record, that
respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for
thirty-two years.
THIRD DIVISION
The petition is meritorious.

In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998 No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
provides as follows:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical
School), petitioner, Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
vs. claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent. First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein petitioner's complaint, as well as its
resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
WHO MAY APPLY? NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING, PUBLICATION, ANSWER AND DEFAULT
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the Philippines may
acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for thirty years. Finding Doldol to
have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the former had acquired ownership of the
same, thereby negating Opol National School's claim over the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land.
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would he evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to possess
the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in assuming that the
thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, 2 whichprovided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by
an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant
must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the
District Forester's Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within Project 8, an
alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No.
585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the portion
reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of
lands of the pubic domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of
the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set
by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same
from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that then
President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General:
(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands,
even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject
to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 3
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, and
Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.