CrimPro Compilation

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FIRST JUDICIAL REGION

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 19, Bangui, Ilocos Norte
AMIELA SARMIENTO-SANTOS Criminal Case No 2172-19

Complainant,
-versus- For: Concubinage
JOSEPH JHONLEE D. SANTOS &

QUEEN JAREMY CASTILLO
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
I, AMIELA SARMIENTO-SANTOS, of legal age, married and a resident of

Poblacion 2, Davila, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, under oath, declare that:
1. On March 20, 2016, JOSEPH JHONLEE D. SANTOS, the respondent, and I got
married.
2. On 31 March 2016, I saw the respondents JOSEPH JHONLEE D. SANTOS and

QUEEN JAREMY CASTILLO in Starbucks Bangui, eating together. Having
doubts of my husband’s fidelity, I decided to investigate. I left the establishment,
stayed in my car and saw them leaving the establishment after Jhonlee gave Queen
a kiss on the cheek.
3. On May 25, 2016, I saw credit card receipts in my Husband’s wallet which
shows jewelry, a tennis bracelet, bought from Tiffany and Co by Jhonlee with his
Mastercard. I also saw the same jewelry referred in the receipt in a box beside my
husband’s suitcase inside the closet. A copy of the credit card receipts is hereto
attached as Annex ”A”.€•
4. When I opened my husband’s suitcase, I saw a used roundtrip plane ticket for
MNL-Hongkong-MNL. The tickets were issued under the names of respondents,
for the period of April 18-19, 2016. A copy of the roundtrip plane tickets is hereto
attached as Annex “B.”€•
5. Upon further investigation, I also found receipts showing that respondents had
stayed together in one suite at the Marco Polo Hotel. Their stay together at a hotel
has also persuaded me that they have already had carnal knowledge of one another.
A copy of the receipts showing proof of their stay at the Marco Polo Hotel is
hereto attached as Annex “C”.
6. That I have seen a Sex Video of My Husband Johnlee and Queen in the cell
phone of my husband.
6. In addition, it is most unlikely that Ms. QUEEN JAREMY CASTILLO had not
been aware of my husband’s€ current status as a married man seeing as this affair
has been going on for more than a year. They have been meeting together
discreetly as well as leaving on trips together abroad and meeting with another at
hotels.
7. Based on the foregoing facts, I have logical reason to believe that the
respondents have committed the crime of Concubinage punishable under “Art.
334. Concubinage. — Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, under the
Revised Penal Code.
8. I am executing this sworn statement for the purpose of charging my husband and
his concubine with violating Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes
the crime of concubinage at Pasuquin Ilocos Norte, Philippines. June 25, 2017.
AMIELA SARMIENTO-SANTOS
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, the undersigned prosecutor, this 25th
day of November, 2017 in Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Philippines. I hereby certify that I
have personally examined the above-named affiant and that I am satisfied that the
foregoing statements were given by her voluntarily and of her own free will.
ATTY. BOB-ONG SARMIENTO

IBP O.R. No. 531220
PTR No. 792361
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF ILIGAN …………………….) S.S.
JOINT AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT
We, SPO1 LEOPOLDO BARBON y Marinduque, PO3 MICHAEL MOMO y

Mag-aso and PO2 JONATHAN PALUBON y Iso, all of legal ages, married, PNP
members and residents of Iligan City after having been duly sworn to an oath in
accordance with law do hereby depose and say:
That, we are the elements of Iligan City Public Safety Company (ICPSC)
whose office is situation inside Camp Tomas Cabili, Tipanoy, Iligan City and further
assigned in SWAT respectively;
That, we are the same police officers who assisted the RTC Branch 4 Sheriff
with his demolition team to act as security in the area while the demolition was
conducted at Ludo, Purok 7, Barangay Santiago, Iligan City;
That, at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of March 29, 2011 we,
together with the PINSP WALTER LOMUSAD AGUINID, PINSP SABEN LABITAD
and some other PNP personnel proceeded at the aforementioned place to secure
peace and order while the demolition was conducted. Later, we noticed that
somebody holding their firearms and claiming that they are the members of
Security Sovereignty Force of Hacienda Filipinas headed by HRM SALVACION
LEGASPI Y ESPIRITU SANTO;
That, we (SPO1) BARBON and PO3 MOMO approached them to verify the
pertinent documents of their firearms, but they could not present to us, which we
put them under restraint and confiscated the following firearms: One (1) Caliber
45 pistol bearing series number 738162. (Marked as LBMM1) and one Magazine
(Marked as LBMM2) loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions recovered from the
possession and control of REDJIO MACALISANG y Samson, 36 years old, married,
jobless and resident of Purok 7, Santiago, Iligan City; then a Caliber 38 revolver
bearing serial number 30491. (Marked as LBMM2) loaded with seven (7) live
ammunitions recovered from the possession and control of REDJIO MACALISANG
y Samson, 36 years old, married, jobless and resident of Purok 7, Santiago, Iligan
City; then a Caliber 38 revolver bearing serial number 30491. (marked as LBMM
3) with six )6) live ammunitions, recovered from the possession and control of
BERTOLO TARONDOY y Roman, 51 years old, married, jobless and resident of
Purok 7, Barangay Santiago, Iligan City; and another caliber 38 revolver (Snab
nose) bearing serial number 00104 (Marked as LBMM4) with five (5) live
ammunitions recovered from the possession and control of Edwin Perez Puma,
42 years old, married, Deputy Director of Hacienda Filipinos and resident of Davao
Juna Subd., Palao, Iligan City.
That, I (PO2 JONATHAN PALUBON) also confiscated one (1) 12-gauge
improvised shotgun (SUMPAK) Marked on JPI with two (2) live ammunitions from
the possession and control of ECUARDO NANOL y CABUNGA, 24 years old,
married, vendor and resident of Purok Lourdes, Tubod, Iligan City.
That, the aforementioned suspects were properly informed of their

Constitutional rights under the Miranda Doctrine after they arrested;
That, such recovered firearms and ammunitions together with the arrested
suspects were brought to the Police Station 1 for proper disposition andfiling jof
the appropriate criminal action;
That, we executed this affidavit to attest to the truthfulness of the

foregoing facts and to support our complaint against REDJIO MACALISANG y
Samson, BERTOLD TARONDOY y Ramon, EDWIN MENDEZ y Sapuma and
EDUARDO NANOL y Cabuga for VIOLAION OF PD 1866 AS AMENDED BY RA 8294.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto distributed our signatories in the

th
29 of March 2011 at the City of Iligan, Philippines.
SPO1 LEOPOLDO M BARBON

Affiant
PO3 MICHAEL M MOMO

Affiant
PO2 JONATHAN I. PALUBON
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SOWRN TO Before me on the date and place above written by
thee affiant.
P/CINSP RAFAEL JAMERO LLUISMA

Administering Officer.
Republic of the Philippines)
Province of Davao del Sur ) S.S
City of Digos )
x---------------------------------/
COUNTER AFFIDAVIT
I, LANIE MONTEMAYORES CANOY, of legal age, Filipino,

married and a resident of Purok 4, San Agustin , Digos City, Davao del Sur,
Philippines after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby
depose and states:
That I am the same and identical person who caused the execution of
this instrument;
That I am likewise the respondent of the criminal complaint filed

before the office of the City Prosecutor after I was arrested on February17,
2019 allegedly for illegal gambling;
That I am executing this affidavit in order to deny the allegations of

PO1 Hero Veloso in his affidavit of Poseur Bettor as well as in the Affidavit
of Complaint/Arresting Officer of PO1 Aljon L. Rocete, both dated February
18, 2019 alleging among others that on February 17, 2019 at around past
10:00 A.M., I was arrested on the act of conducting illegal gambling
particularly of collecting bet for illegal numbers game because such
allegations are all lies for the truth of the matter is the following;
That at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of February 17, 2019 I

went to the house of my friend neighbor Adelyn E. Minguito at Purok 4 of
our barangay San Agustin, Digos City in order to collect from her the
payment of the dress I sold to her before considering that I was engaged in
an on line selling business;
That after she gave to me her payment, a man wearing jogging pants,
whom I do not knew before but I just learned later to be PO1 Hero Veloso,
approached us and asked if we knew the person of Roy Tamayo of which I
replied him that we do not know that person of Roy Tamayo and of which
my friend / neighbor Adelyn Minguito likewise said in particular, to quote
“BASI UG TAGA MATTI NA ATE LANIE”;
That however, after Adelyn said those words, the said man, PO1 Hero
Veloso immediately snatched my cellular phone I was holding during that
time who at the same time told me, to quote “UY IKAW GYUD DIAY SI
LANIE NGA NAGA PA LAST TWO (2). NAA RAMAN DIAY KA DIRI”
after which I tried to recover my cellular phone from his hold and told him
ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 5

“UNSAY NAGA PA LAST TWO (2) NGA NAGOLEKTA RA KO SA
AKONG PAUTANG DIRI”;
That I and my friend Adelyn Minguito tried to explain to him that the
money given to me by Adelyn Minguito was a payment to me for the dress
she bought from me but PO1 Hero Veloso and the other man who came to us
after my cellular phone was snatched from me and whom I knew later to be
PO1 Alijon Rocete did not believed us instead they took from me my
wallet containing my money;
That in fact, my neighbor Adelaida Milliones who was washing her

clothes just near to us during that time likewise told them that I was not
engaged in illegal last two but was just collecting from Adelyn for the
payment of the dress but said explanation was never considered;
That if indeed PO1 Veloso acted as poseur bettor prior to my arrest

then he must have shown a cotejo that I was supposed to have issued to him
and the corresponding marked money which he was supposed to be his bet
of his numbers however, no cotejo and marked money as bet of PO1 Veloso
were presented because there was indeed no betting of illegal numbers that
happened during that time;
That what is true was that they, the two policemen, were indeed,
during that time, really looking for a certain Lanie because right after
Adelyn Minguito said “BASI UG TAGA MATTI NA ATE LANIE” the said
man immediately snatched my cellular phone and at the same told me “UY
IKAW GYUD DIAY SI LANIE NGA NAGA PA LAST TWO (2). NAA
RAMAN DIAY KA DIRI” which, by hearing the word “LANIE”, PO1
Veloso was able to confirm upon himself that the woman he was facing and
talking during that time was the “Lanie” they were looking;
That despite of my vehement protest against my unwarranted arrest

they forced me to ride their service multi cab and brought to the Police
Station of Digos City;
Attached hereof and marked as Annex “1”and Annex “2” hereof are
the respective affidavits of Adelyn Minguito and Adelaida Milliones to
prove that there was indeed no illegal last two (2) that happened prior to my
arrest;
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this ______ day of

February, 2019 at Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines.

LANIE MONTEMAYORES CANOY
Affiant/Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN, to before me this __ day of February,

2019 at Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines. I hereby certify that I have
personally examined the herein affiant and that I am convinced that she
voluntarily executed the same and understood all the contents thereof after
translating the same in Bisayan dialect.

Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE
Digos City
CHERRIE MAE DAYUDAC, NPS DOCKET NO. VII-11-12E-

Complainant. 00235-A
-versus-
SPO4 ESDRAS DELOS SANTOS,

Respondent.
X------------------/
SUBPOENA
To:
SPO4 ESDRAS DELOS SANTOS – Purok Pakikisama, Brgy.
Sinawilan, Digos City
GREETINGS:
Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, you are

hereby directed to submit your counter-affidavit and other supporting
documents or affidavits of your witness/es, if any, copy furnished the
complainant. Attached is a copy of the complaint and other evidence
submitted by the complainant.
You are hereby WARNED that failure on your part to comply with
the subpoena within ten (10) days from receipt hereof shall be considered as
a waiver of your right to present your defense and the case shall be
considered submitted for resolution based on the evidence on record.
WITNESS MY HAND this 13th day of May 2013, at Digos City,

Davao del Sur, Philippines.
Return of Service
On this day, I served the foregoing subpoena upon.
Name of person/s served Signature Date of Service

______________________ ________________ _________________
______________________ ________________ _________________

NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
Digos City
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM NPS Docket No. XI-06-INV-

REP. BY: CANDY N. MIGUEL 18H-00150
Complainant.
FOR: VIOLATION OF SSS LAW
-versus-
SAMANTHA LYDIA D. ANGALA,

Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------/
RESOLUTION
This resolves the complaint filed by the Social Security System,

Digos City Branch herein represented by Candy N. Miguel against
respondent Samantha Lydia Angala for the crime of Violation of SSS law.
It appears on record that respondent Samantha Lydia Angala

(Calda Pizza Haus) with business address at Derequito Bldg., in front of
LYR Rizal Avenue, Digos City is registered with the SSS as an employer
with ER ID No. 09-1596096-3. But she has not remitted to the SSS the SS
and EC contributors of her employees covering the period of October 2013
to June 2017 (not inclusive) amounting to P 26,813.42 including the
penalties of 3% per month computed as of July 31,2017. Despite demands
made by the SSS upon respondent, she still failed to remit the delinquent
contributions.
Subpoena was issued directing respondent to submit counter-

affidavit and other controverting evidence within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof; but she failed to comply with the directive prompting this office to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence submitted by the complainant.
Under the set of facts, this office finds probable cause that the crime
of Violation of Sections 18 (a) and 19 (a) in relation to Sections 22 (a) and
28 (e) of the Social Security Law (SSS) has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The records will show that respondent
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously failed and refused to remit to the SSS
the SS and EC contributions of her employees covering the period of
October 2013 to June 2017.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that
corresponding Information for the crime of Violation of Sections 18 (a) and
19 (a) in relation to sections 22 (a) and 28 (a) of the Social Security Law
(SSS) be filed against respondent before the proper court.
Reso cont’n.
SSS vs Angala
For:Viol of SSS Law
Page 2 of 2
x------------------------x
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines, 24 August 2018.
NOE P. LINDONG
nd
2 Assistant City Prosecutor
Approved by:
CHRISTOPHER C. ABARILLA
City Prosecutor
Copy furnished:
Candy Miguel c/o SSS Digos City
Samantha Lydia Angala Calda Pizza Haus, Derequito Bldg. In front
of LYR, Rizal Avenue, Digos City

Digos City, Davao Del Sur
PO1 HERO VELOSO ET, AL, NPS DOCKET NO.

Philippine National Police, TSC Regional XI-066-INQ-19B-00028
Mobile Force Battalion 11,
Complainants,
-versus- FOR: VIOLATION OF

RA 9287
LANIE MONTEMAYOR CANOY

Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------x
INQUEST RESOLUTION
Evidence shows that on February 17, 2019, the police complainants

were ordered to conduct anti-illegal gambling operation on the alleged report
that illegal numbers game is being conducted within Purok 4, Barangay San
Agustin, Digos City, and to make immediate arrest of the violators.
Upon their arrival at the said place, complainant PO1 Veloso saw the
respondent engaged in illegal number games. Thereby he acted as poseur
bettor and he saw her took the bet of another bettor before him, after the
transaction was consummated, complainants arrested the respondent. During
the apprehension, they introduce themselves as police officers, members of
PNP, TSC, RMFB 11, they also inform her of the nature of her offense and
her constitutional rights in dialect known and understood by her. They
likewise confiscated the several gambling paraphernalia for illegal number
game and some cash money to wit:
a. Three (3) pieces one thousand (Php 1,000.00) peso bills;

b. One (1) piece five hundred (Php 500.00) peso bill;
c. Seven (7) pieces one hundred (Php 100.00) peso bill;
d. Eleven (11) pieces fifty (Php 50.00) peso bill;
e. Seventy One (71) pieces twenty (Php 20.00) peso bill;
f. Huawei android cellular phone;
g. One notebook; and
h. One black pen.
On the other hand, the respondent vehemently denied the allegations

in the complaint claiming that on February 17, 2019 she went into the house
of her friend Adelyne E. Minguto at Purok 4, Brgy. San Agustin, Digos City
in order to collect from the latter payments of the dress sold earlier. It was
during that time, just right after Adelyn handed the said payment to the
respondent that Police Officer Veloso intervened and snatched the cellular
phone of the respondent and thereafter, said police officer concluded that the
respondent is the person named Lanie that he is looking for being part of the
illegal gambling called “Last Two”. After the confrontation, Police Officer
Aljon Rocete approached them and arrested the respondent.
The Office rules in negative. The allegations in the complaint together

with other evidence presented is insufficient to establish that an illegal
gambling offense was committed in flagrante delicto. The poseur-bettor did
not actually put that bet on the illegal number game which he was tasked to
do and which shall make him privy to the transaction of illegal gambling,
thus, said police officer has no sufficient knowledge whether or not the
transaction between the respondent and one Adelyn is that one of illegal
gambling or that one as payment of purchase price for a clothing sold earlier
by the respondent to Adelyn. More so, said police officers did not arrest the
alleged bettor Adelyn, who at that time is supposed to be committing the
crime under illegal gambling. There omission to effect the arrest on the
person of Adelyn is indicative of lack of probable cause to make an arrest
thereof.
Between the two conflicting interpretations of the facts and

circumstances involved that one consistent with the innocence of the
respondent is favored. The failure of the police officers to adhere to the rules
on the conduct of entrapment operation is fatal to their case, as the same is
merely an exception to the general rule.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint is

dismissed for insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause. The
officer in custody of the respondent is hereby ordered to release her unless
held for some other lawful case.
SO RESOLVED.
March 1, 2019, Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines.
BLAIR M DURA
Associate Prosecution Attorney II
APPROVED:
City Prosecutor
Copy Furnished:
Chief of Police – Digos City Police Station
PO1 Hero Veloso – C/o TSC, RMFB 11, Catitipan Davao City
Lani Montemayor Canoy – Purok 4, Brgy San Agustin, Digos City
11TH Judicial Region
Branch____
Digos City, Davao del Sur
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIMINAL CASE NO.____

Plaintiff,
-versus- For: FRUSTRATED

HOMICIDE in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610
JAIME MAGAREON,
(of Sitio Mati, Binaton Digos City)
-detained. Accused.
x------------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JAIME
MAGAREON of the felony of Frustrated Homicide in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November 2009, in the City of Digos,
Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with manifest intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use
personal violence upon the person of 15-year old minor child complainant
Alfredo Lambas Jr. (who was born on July 30, 1994), by hacking the head of
said private complainant with the use of a bolo, thereby causing minor child
complainant to sustain “lacerated wound (L) parietal area secondary to
hacking”, thus accused has performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of accused, that
is the immediate intervention of people who prevented further attacks, and
the timely medical attention and treatment given to the minor child
complainant to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Digos City, Davao del Sur. November 20, 2009

SUZETTE C. GALLEMASO-DALUMPINES
3RD Assistant City Prosecutor
Roll of Attorney No. 44868/5-4-00/Marula
IBP Lifetime No. 03514/ Pampanga Chapter
MCLE Compliance No. II-0014123/12-3-08/Pasig C
Info cont’n.
PP vs Magareon
For: Frustrated Homicide
Page 2 of 2
x----------------------------x
APPROVED:
City Prosecutor
MCLE Compliance No. II-0007566/08-28-09/Pasig City

11th Judicial Region
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. ____

Plaintiff,
-versus- For: THEFT
CRISTOM ENDAR y ALUNGAN and

LUNIE ENDAR y ALUNGAN.
Accused.
x----------------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses CRISTOM

ENDAR y ALUNGAN and LUNIE ENDAR y ALUNGAN for the felony
of THEFT defined and penalized under Article 302 (par. 3) of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That within or about the days of February 14 to 15, 2009, in Digos City,
Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and without the consent of the
owner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away the one (1) pig worth TWO THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED PESOS (Php 2,800.00), In Philippine Currency belonging to
private complainant Edwin B. Jurial, to the damage and prejudice of said
private complainant in the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law.
City of San Fernando, Pampanga. March 25, 2009, 2009.
SUZETTE C. GALLEMASO- DALUMPINES

Assistant City Prosecutor
APPROVED:

City Prosecutor
Info cont’n.
PP vs Alungan and Alungan
For: Theft
Page 2 of 2
x--------------------------------x
BAIL RECOMMENDED: P 10,000.00 for each accused
Witnesses:
1. Edwin B. Jurial – Estrada 2nd St., Digos City, Davao del Sur
2. Jaymar E. Awag – Sitio Palkatahan, Brgy. Binaton, Digos City
3. John Philip Gloria – Sitio Batangon, Brgy. Binaton, Digos City
4. And others.
CERTIFICATION
Under oath, this is to certify that the Information was filed pursuant to
Rule 112 Section 9 (a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure wherein
Preliminary Investigation is not required; and that based on the evidence
presented by complaining witnesses, there is reasonable ground to believe
that the crime charged has been committed and that accused is probably
guilty thereof.
City of San Fernando, Pampanga. March 25, 2009.
SUZETTE G. DALUMPINES
Asst. City Prosecutor

National Capital Judicial Region

Branch 147
Makati City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Criminal Case No. 12345

Plaintiff,
-versus- For: Frustrated Murder
AKU SADO,
Accused.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Accused, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court,

respectfully states:
1. That the instant case was file by virtue of an Inquest Proceedings conducted
by Inquest Prosecutor Jeri Koh on February 20, 2014;
2. That the herein accused failed to submit any counter-affidavit or any

controverting evidence in his behalf;
3. That the accused believes that if he will be given an opportunity to answer

the charges against him, the resolution could have been different;
4. That the accused most respectfully prays that a preliminary investigation for
the instant cases be conducted before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor;
5. That this motion is not intended for delay but solely for the above-
mentioned grounds.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial

justice it is humbly prayed that the instant Motion be granted and the records
of the instant case be transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for the conduct of Preliminary Investigation. Movant further prays for the
deferment of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings pending
resolution of preliminary investigation.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.
Respectfully submitted.

City of Makati, February 26, 2014.
ATTY. VX YZ
Counsel for the Accused
NOTICE OF HEARING
THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT

Regional Trial Court, Branch 147
Makati City
Greetings!
Please submit the foregoing motion for the kind consideration and
approval of the Honorable Court upon receipt hereof.
VX YZ
Copy furnished by personal service:

PROSECUTOR WX YZ
Office of the City Prosecutor, Makati City
ATTY. AB CD
Private Prosecutor
2233 Zamora Street, Pasay City

Branch 61
Digos City
Province of Davao del Sur
PALAWAN PAWNSHOP STA. MARIA CRIM.CASE NO._____

Rep. by: SUSANNE ANGELIE G. CAMARA
Plaintiff,
-versus- FOR: FRUS. ESTAFA
RODEL MAMALON ALVAREZ

And LESLIE DASALIA DUMAPE
Accused,
X--------------------------------------X
MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION

COME NOW Accused in the above entitled case and unto this
Honorable Court hereby most respectfully state:
1. That Accused herein have received on the 11th day of October

2016, a Resolution finding probable cause to indict them for the crime of
ESTAFA, the pertinent ruling of the of the Provincial Prosecutor states, to
quote:
“Accordingly, this office resolves to indict respondents for the

crime of Frustrated Estafa (The United States of America vs.
Isaac Dominguez, G.R. No. L-17021 decided February 23,
1921) because all the acts of commission of the crime of
swindling another person are present but because complainant’s
representative took another look and examined the items
whereby she discovered that the same were fake, she wasted no
time to call for police to arrest they were charged for the crime
of Estafa. However, since there was no parting away of money,
the crime committed is only Frustrated Estafa.”
2. That Accused are earnestly asking for the reinvestigation of the

instant Resolution by dismissing the Complaint against both RODEL
MAMALON ALVAREZ and LESLIE DASALIA DUMAPE, taking into
account that they did not commit any felony, and the case filed against them
is clearly fabricated or a figment of imagination on the part of the Private
Complainant;

3. That Rodel Mamalon Alvarez merely appraised the gold necklace
and clearly had no intent in pawning the same considering that he only
verified as to the true and real value of the said necklace, as the proceeds
thereof will be used to finance the wedding he supposed to have with Leslie
Dumape’s aunt, Leah Dumape, which of course, had been derailed due to
Rodel’s imprisonment at PNP – Station, Sta. Maria, Davao Occidental;
4. That likewise, Leslie Dumape have had nothing to do with the

ongoing incident bearing in mind that he only accompanied Rodel Manalon
Alvarez to look for a venue for his wedding with Leah Dumape and for the
corresponding reception thereafter, ex grantia argumenti that Rodel
Manalon Alvarez had committed the crime , there was no proof on the part
of the Private Complaint that both Rodel Manalon Alvarez and Leslie
Dumape acted in concert or conspiring in order to accomplish the crime
sought to be committed as alleged by them. Clearly, Leslie did not take part
in the supposed executed act, for she only accompanied Rodel to the
pawnshop, and there was no positive and conclusive evidence that the two
accused acted in concert, to which, the presence of Leslie with Rodel in the
place of incident, can be considered a conspirator1 and besides, Leslie was
only seated beside Rodel and witnessed the whole duration of the incident2.
The Supreme Court have had an occasion to rule, to quote:
“Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the

commission of the offense itself for it is a facile device by
which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance
tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at
stake is the accused’s liberty.3”
That to set the record straight, Leslie’s presence with Rodel in

the pawnshop, is only incidental with the sole purpose of helping the
latter and Leah Dumape of their wedding, and without any motive nor
scheme to defraud anyone nor confide with Rodel to commit any
crime;
5. That accused went to the establishment in good faith absent of any

ill-motive, to appraise the Gold Necklace as to determine how much
something is worth or to give an official opinion about the value of the said
gold necklace with no intention unto any thought or consideration of
pawning the said item;
6. That to indict the Accused for the crime of frustrated Estafa,

implies that, if an item has been appraised into a pawnshop, which, after the
1
People vs Rico, CA-GR No. 3019-R, Jan. 12, 1950
2
U.S. vs Callapag, 21 Phil. 262
3
Rosie Quidet, vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010
examination of an item resulted into a fake piece of no value, would be
detrimental to those who just wanted to know the value of their piece of
jewelry. Based on the issue hereof, the piece handed to the pawnshop was
for appraisal purposes only, and not to pawn it otherwise. The alleged
intention is unclear, either to whether or not an implied fraudulent act was
present during the appraisal of the item, or to the stage of its commission.
Thus, to any circumstances of doubt in lieu with the two accused intent or
act, due to an insufficiency of evidence, boils down to the benefit of the
accused;
7. That in interposing this plea for Reinvestigation, Accused point or

stress out that the instant Resolution be set aside and reconsider the alleged
involvement of two Accused namely: Rodel Manalon Alvarez and Leslie D.
Dumape.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and reasons, this
Honorable Court is earnestly prayed by the Accused to give or grant due
course of the instant Motion for Reinvestigation by EXONERATING both
Rodel Manalon Alvarez as he merely appraised the stated item and Leslie
D. Dumape by DISMISSING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolution
against her rendered by the said Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Accused pray for other reliefs which are fair, just, and equitable in the
foregoing premises.
Most respectfully submitted.
Padada (for Digos City), Davao del Sur this 20th day of February
2017.
RODEL MAMALON ALVAREZ LESLIE DASALIA DUMAPE

Accused Accused
Assisted by:
WILLIAM GACETA CARPENTERO

Counsel for the Accused
IBP OR No. 1049901-1/13/17-Davao del Sur
PTR No. 6895301-1/09/17-Davao del Sur
TIN: 494613534000-1/09/17-Davao del Sur
Roll No. 65396*Almendras District, Padada, Davao del Sur
THE
CLERK
Branch 61
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion for Reinvestigation immediately upon
receipt for the kind resolution of the Honorable Court.
Thank you.
WILLIAM GACETA CARPENTER

Copy served:
SUSANNE ANGELIE CAMARA

Palawan Pawnshop, Sta. Maria Branch
Brgy. Poblacion, Sta. Maria, Davao Occidental
EXPLANATION
A copy of the Motion for Reinvestigation was sent by way of registered

mail as the residence of Susanne Angelie Camara is far from our residence hereof.
WILLIAM GACETA CARPENTERO

Branch 18
Digos City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. 348(12)

Plaintiff,
-versus- FOR: QUALIFIED THEFT
ALFREDO ARIAS, DENDEN MAGUANA,

BRONIO SINA, GABRIEL BAING and
ROGELIO REID,
Accused.
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /
ALIAS
WARRANT OF ARREST
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

c/o The Chief of Police
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur
You are hereby commanded to arrest ALFREDO ARIAS of

Bonifacio, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur; DENDEN MAGUANA of Balasiao,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur; BRONIO SINA and GABRIEL BAING of
Mendahila Pag-asa, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur; and ROGELIO REID of
Buri, Matanao, Davao del Sur and who stand charged before me with the
crime of Qualified Theft and to bring them forthwith before me as soon as
possible to be dealt with according to law.
The bond for the release of the accused in this case is fixed at
P40,000.00 each which may be furnished by the said accused either by
depositing the amount thereof, with the nearest collector of internal revenue,
or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, or the clerk of court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case, In
accordance with Section 14 (cash bail) or by furnishing a bond approved by
the Judge in accordance with Section 10 (corporate surety) and Section 11
(property bond) of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The peace officers making this arrest are hereby authorized to discharge
from custody the accused after furnishing bail in the manner hereinabove
indicated which must be stated in the return hereof.
Given this 22nd day of August, 2013 at the City of Digos, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines.

CARMELITA SARNO-DAVIN
Acting Presiding Judge
st
1 Indorsement
August 22, 2013
Respectfully referred to the Chief of Police, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur

for service, with the request that the return be made as soon as possible
within ten (10) days from receipt of the warrant.
PEDRITO M. FLORENTINO, JR.

Court Legal Researcher II/OIC
Copy furnished:
The Chief of Police, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur
NBI, Davao City

Fourth Judicial Region
Regional Trial Court
Branch 16
Cavite City
MICHELLE A. VALE CRUZ Special Proceeding No. 14344

Petitioner,
-versus- IN RE: PETITION FOR

HABEAS CORPUS OF THE
MINOR AVELINE OLIVES
LANZ AIDAN L. OLIVES

Respondent.
x-------------------------------x
PETITION
PETITIONER, by counsel, respectfully submits that:
1. Petitioner is the mother of the minor Aveline Olives who was born out
of the valid marriage between petitioner and respondent Lanz Aidan
L. Olives;
2. The petitioner and respondent have been separated de facto since
2014;
3. The minor has been living with the petitioner in the house of the
latter’s mother and the minor’s maternal grandmother since the
petitioner and the respondent separated;
4. Sometime in January 2016, the respondent, unknown to the petitioner,
went to the house where the minor was residing and abducted the
latter and has kept her incommunicado and out of petitioner’s reach;
5. Being below seven (7) years of age, custody of the minor is naturally
presumed to belong to the petitioner, as her mother. Consequently,
respondent’s refusal to allow petitioner to regain custody over the
minor is unlawful and unjustified.
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Habeas
Corpus be issued directing respondent to make a return showing his legal
authority to detain the minor child, subject of this petition, and thereafter,
present the minor child personally before the Court on a date and time it
chooses.
Cavite City, Philippines, April 21, 2016.
ATTY. GRACE MARIELLE CRUZ
Counsel for Petitioner
Cruz & Associates Law Firm
117 Gamboa St., San Lorenzo, Cavite City
FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION
Branch 40, Calapan City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Criminal Case No. CR-06-8525

Plaintiff,
-versus- For: Multiple Murder & Multiple

Frustrated Murder
RUSTOM SIMBULAN, ET AL.

Accused.
x-----------------------------------------x
MOTION TO QUASH/RECALL WARRANT OF ARREST

And MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE
Accused Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr., by counsels, to this

Honorable Court, respectfully states: That –
PREFATORY
The Constitutional duty of the Court in criminal litigations is not only to

acquit the innocent after trial but to insulate, from the start, the innocent
from unfounded charges. For the Court is aware of the strains of a
criminal accusation and the stresses of litigation which should not be
suffered by the clearly innocent. The filing of an unfounded criminal
information in court exposes the innocent to severe distress especially
when the crime is not bailable. Even an acquittal of the innocent will not
fully bleach the dark and deep stains left by a baseless accusation for
reputation once tarnished remains tarnished for a long length of time.
The expense to establish innocence may also be prohibitive and can be
more punishing especially to the poor and the powerless. Innocence ought
to be enough and the business of the Court is to shield the innocent from
senseless suits right from the start.
WHO IS ATTY. REMIGIO D. SALDERO, JR.?
ATTY. REMIGIO D. SALADERO, JR. is a dedicated, prominent and well

recognized labor and human rights lawyer. He is currently the chief legal
counsel of the progressive labor movement Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). He
is also the chairman of the Pro-Labor Legal Assistance Center (PLACE), a
law firm which principally renders legal services to the poor and oppressed
workers and farm workers, conducts paralegal seminars on workers’ rights

and welfare, and engages in advocacy and lobby work for the promotion of
workers’ rights. As a labor lawyer, Atty. Saladero has extended legal
services to the labor unions at San Miguel Corporation, Nestle-Cabuyao,
Monterey, Shoe Mart, Philips Electronics, Dole Philippines, PNB, Hacienda
Luisita, Azucarera de Tarlac, ABS-CBN, Legend Hotel-Subic, Yokohama
Tires, Robina Farms-Rizal, LRT, RFM, Swifts, Cosmos Bottling and
Sulpicio Lines, to name a few. He handles several hundreds of labor cases
involving thousands of employees.
He is also a member of the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL), a

nationwide voluntary association of human rights lawyers in the Philippines,
committed to the defense, protection and promotion of human rights,
especially of the poor and the oppressed.
Atty. Saladero, Jr. was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1985, garnering a
general average of 88.95%4 which landed him on the 17th place. Right after
his admission to the Bar, he worked as Assistant Attorney at the Del Rosario
and Del Rosario Law Offices in Makati City until 1986. From there, he
entered the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)-Department of Justice, Antipolo
District as Public Attorney II from 1987 to 1990.
The Office of the Bar Confidant has certified that he is a lawyer in good
standing, without a pending case against him before the said office as of
October 27, 2008.5 He has also complied with the required Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE), with Compliance No. II-0010357
issued on August 15, 2008.6
He also holds his own law office at 119 Circumferential Road, San Isidro,
Antipolo City, Rizal7. Said Law Office is duly registered with the
Department of Trade and Industry8 and is licensed to operate by the Office
of the City Mayor of Antipolo City, Rizal9.
Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. took his Bachelor of Arts-Major in Political

Science at the Mindanao State University (MSU), Marawi City and
graduated cum laude on April 7, 1979. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws in
San Beda College on April 16, 1983. He has a Diploma in Industrial
4
A copy of the Certification to this effect from the Office of the Bar Confidant dated
March 2, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex “1.”.
5
A copy of the Certification from the Office of the Bar Confidant dated October 27,
2008 is hereto attached as Annex “2.”.
6
A copy of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance issued on August 15, 2008 is
hereto attached as Annex “3.”.
7
Copies of photos of his law office in his residence are hereto attached as
Annexes “4” and “4-1.”.
8
A copy of the DTI Certificate of Business Name Registration issued on July 27,
2007 is hereto attached as Annex “5.”
9
A copy of the Mayor’s permit dated October 8, 2007 is hereto attached as Annex
“6.”.
Relations (April 1987), Master in Industrial Relations (October 1989), and
Master of Public Administration (April 1995) from the University of the
Philippines (Diliman).
Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. was awarded on November 19, 2005 by the
UP Industrial Relations Alumni Association the Natatanging Alumni for
Labor Leadership and Advocacy for his concern in the empowerment of
labor which extends to the shaping of public opinion on the labor sector.
Atty. Saladero, Jr. is a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP)-Antipolo City Chapter, Movement of Attorney’s for Brotherhood,
Nationalism and Integrity, Inc. (MABINI), Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG), Lex Leonum Fraternitas (a fraternity in San Beda College of Law),
and Bayan Muna Party-List in Rizal (as chairman, 2001-2004). He was a
former professor at the Dominican College and Lyceum College of Law.
From 2003 to the present, he writes a column dealing exclusively on labor
issues and cases at Pinoy Weekly on-line, a progressive weekly publication.
CIRUSMTANCES OF HIS ARREST
At around 2:30 P.M. on October 23, 2008, while Atty. Remigio D. Saldero,
Jr. was alone and drafting some pleadings at his office/residence at 119
Circumferential Road, San Isidro, Antipolo City, Rizal, he heard somebody
knocking at the gate.
He initially ignored the knockings as he was not expecting any appointment

for that afternoon, but when the knockings persisted, he decided to check
who it was.
At the gate, Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. noticed a frail-looking man in

civilian clothes, about 20 to 30 years old. When the man told him he was
looking for “Atty. Saladero”, he let the man in.
Once inside, the man told Atty. Saladero about his alleged brother who is
purportedly charged with a drug-related offense. Atty. Saladero advised him
that if the offense is bailable, his brother may post bail; otherwise, he could
file a petition for bail. All the while, Atty. Saladero had noticed that the man
kept on glancing around, as if checking if he had companions.
Then the man told Atty. Saladero that the documents on the case was in his
motor bike which was allegedly parked outside, and asked permission to get
them.
Minutes later, the man came back with two other men in civilian clothes.
One of them suddenly approached Atty. Saladero and asked him “Kayo si
Atty. Saladero?” Then he showed me a document while saying “mga pulis

kami, may warrant kayo, multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder sa
RTC Calapan.”
Atty. Saladero tried to read the document but the man immediately withdrew
it. At a glance, however, Atty. Saladero could read that it was a warrant for
the arrest of one “REMEGIO SALADERO @ KA PATRICK,” issued on
October 6, 2008 by Judge Tomas Leynes.
When Atty. Saladero insisted that the arresting officers made a mistake in
arresting him, the man barked at him, “Sumama kayo nang maayos para
walang mangyaring masama.”
Thereupon, Atty. Saladero took out his cellular phone to call his wife but the
man confiscated it. Another drew his gun and told him to keep quiet. And
the other, who pretended to have a brother charged with a drug-related
offense, handcuffed Atty. Saladero.
Despite Atty. Saladero’s pleas to allow him to call his wife, the men refused,
pulled him out of his house and forced him into a tinted van.
Two other men in civilian clothes, who had been positioned at the gate of the
compound, also went inside his house and took with them Atty. Saladero’s
laptop.
It was only later that Atty. Saladero learned he was arrested by the combined
forces of the RIID 4A, PIB, Rizal PPO 418th PPMG, and that the central
processing unit (CPU) of his computer, pleadings, Daily Calendar of
Activities for the year 2008 containing his scheduled hearings and other
professional commitments were also seized by the arresting team.
Inside the van, Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. was made to sit on the
backseat sandwiched between two of his captors who were armed with long
firearms. The man seated beside the driver was also armed.
When the van passed by the Antipolo Police Station, Atty. Saladero
requested that they drop by, hoping that some policemen in the station would
recognize him. But his captors ignored his request.
Atty. Saladero’s captors began interrogating him inside the van, asking him
several outlandish questions such as how many times he had gone up the
mountains and his code name. He explained to them that they probably got
the wrong man. He also asked them if he could call his lawyers and if he
could get back his cellular phone. But his captors told him that he would be
allowed to make his calls later. The men then started to take his picture,
using their own cellular phones.

The van then stopped at the Rizal Police Provincial Office in Hilltop,
Taytay, Rizal. The armed men disembarked for a while and took pictures of
Atty. Saladero.
When the armed men got back inside the van, they told Atty. Saladero that
they are going to the PNP Regional Office at Canlubang. He remained in
handcuffs throughout the trip.
At around 5:00 P.M., Atty. Saladero was brought to Camp Vicente Lim in
Canlubang, Laguna where he was again photographed and his fingerprints
were taken. Thereafter, he was subjected to a detailed interrogation. His
answers were all taken down by the interrogator. At this point, Atty.
Saladero again requested that he be allowed to call his wife or his lawyers,
but the interrogator ignored his request.
Atty. Saladero was made to answer prying questions ranging from the names
of his parents, his wife’s and those of his relatives. He was even asked about
his membership in organizations, his positions therein and his tasks. He told
his interrogator that his tasks did not include leading or joining the armed
struggle against the government, and that all his actions were all legal and in
accordance with law.
When asked about his involvement with KMU, Atty. Saladero told his
interrogator that as its chief legal counsel, he renders legal assistance to
workers and unions affiliated with the said labor center.
Atty. Saladero was likewise asked about his companions in his office, and
whether he has joined rallies. Atty. Saladero explained that he would
participate in rallies as an exercise of his freedom of expression.
He was also asked about the seminars he has participated in, including its
venues, the topics and the participants. He was also asked about the BKP or
the IKP, to which he answered that he had never participated in such types
of seminars. During the entire interrogation, Atty. Saladero was still
handcuffed.
The interrogation was cut short only by an order sending Atty. Saladero to
the police clinic for examination after which the interrogation resumed. He
remained in handcuffs all throughout these entire process.
Atty. Saladero was allowed to make a call only at 9:00 P.M. after several
hours of interrogation, and after almost eight (8) hours since he was held
incommunicado. Then he was transferred to the detention center where he
spent the night alone.

Upon learning where Atty. Saladero was taken to, his wife and his colleague
in his Quezon City office, Atty. Noel Neri, rushed to Camp Vicente Lim.
They were allowed to see and talk only briefly with Atty. Saladero who was
again left in solitary confinement after the visit.
At 6:30 in the morning of the following day, October 24, 2008, Atty.
Remigio D. Saladero Jr. was loaded by his police escorts in an unmarked
vehicle bearing no license plate, over and above his wife’s insistence and
plea that she be allowed to accompany him during the travel.
Atty. Saladero was brought to Camp Naramo, Calapan City where he was
again photographed and fingerprinted. It was only at 3:00 P.M. that he was
presented to the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Branch 40 before
Judge Tomas Leynes. It was only during that time that he was able to read
the information and saw that the accused was one “REMEGIO SALADERO
alias Ka Patrick of Los Banos, Laguna.”
Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. introduced himself in open court that he is an

attorney and requested that he be furnished with a copy of the records of his
case. However, he was denied access to the records and was told he could
not be provided with a copy allegedly because of the number of accused and
the possibility of flight by the other accused named in the information.
Also on that day, Executive Judge Manuel O. Luna, Jr. issued a

Commitment Order which surprised Atty. Saladero as he heard for the first
time his name correctly spelled and pronounced in court. The Commitment
Order dated October 24, 2008 now bears his name REMIGIO SALADERO,
JR. Y DAMANDAMAN, not “REMEGIO SALADERO” which appears in
the “amended” Information. By virtue of the said Commitment Order, Atty.
Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. was transfrred to the Oriental Mindoro Provincial
Jail at about 3:30 P.M. of the same date, where he remains detained up to the
present.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 24, 2006 Assisting Provincial Prosecutor Dorina H. Joya, with the
approval of Provincial Prosecutor Josephine C. Caranzo – Olivar of Oriental
Mindoro, filed the information in this case accusing a certain “Rustom
Simbulan @ Ka Bobby @ Ka Bayani @ Ka Silang @ Ka Arthur and “John
Does” of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. The information
alleged that the accused Rustom Simbulan of Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro and “John Does” ambushed a group of PNP soldiers in barangay
San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro in the early morning of March
3, 2006 resulting in the death of three and the wounding of two others.

The information listed six witnesses and ten exhibits for the prosecution.
Neither the name of Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. nor any of the seventy-
two accused other than Rustom Simbulan is mentioned in any of the
supporting affidavits and exhibits of the prosecution. Presiding Judge
Tomas C. Leynes issued a warrant of arrest only against Rustom Simbulan.
Parenthetically, the resolution dated July 20, 2006 of investigating
prosecutor Dorina H. Joya, which was approved and signed by Provincial
Prosecutor Josephine C. Caranzo- Olivar, explicitly said that the John Does
in the original information who were allegedly members of the New
People’s Army were “unidentified.” The prosecutor’s resolution explicitly
stated that the “resolution is based solely on the evidence submitted by the
complainant.” The resolution said that only “more than 15 heavily armed
men” headed by Simbulan staged the ambush. We take note of this crucial
finding of prosecutor Joya who conducted the preliminary investigation
against Rustom Simbulan because it contradicts and destroys the credibility
of prosecution witness Vincent Silva, the only witness against Atty. Saladero
and the 70 others who were included in the “amended” information filed by
Prosecutor Humilito A. Dolor without conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation. Both witness Silva and Prosecutor Dolor alleged that seventy-
two (72) heavily-armed members of the New People’s Army staged the
ambush – the seventy-two who were charged in the “amended” information
including a certain Remegio Saladero alias Ka Patrick, some of them
women, many if not most of them are social activists and mass leaders of
sectoral progressive organizations.
In an order dated May 7, 2007 the Presiding judge motu propio ordered that
the case be archived “without prejudice to its subsequent prosecution as soon
as the accused is apprehended.”
On September 29, 2008, more than one year and four months after the case
was archived, another prosecutor, prosecutor Humilito A. Dolor, with the
approval of Provincial Prosecutor Josephine C. Caranzo-Olivar filed an
“amended” information that now includes in addition to Rustom Simbulan
the name “Remegio Saladero aka “Ka Patrick” and seventy others with
corresponding aliases.
During the scheduled arraignment on October 27, 2008 prosecutor Dolor

confirmed by his own admission in open court the decisive facts contained
in the records which are fatal to the prosecution’s case;
He filed the “amended” information without conducting a preliminary

investigation; the seventy-one additional accused who were included in the
“amended” information were not issued any subpoena or notified of the
filing of an “amended” information against them. Therefore, they were
denied their right to present their defense through counter-affidavits; no
motion was filed in court to revive the archived case; the motion to admit

“amended” information, which was approved by Provincial Prosecutor
Caranzo-Olivar was filed ex parte. None of the seventy-one additional
accused was notified or sent copy of the Motion. No hearing on the motion
was conducted by the court;
Prosecutor Humilito Dolor certified under oath that the “amended”

information “was filed on the basis of the affidavit of Vincent Silva,
specifically naming the John Does in the original information.”
In total disregard of the meaning and implication of the public prosecutor’s

oath and certification to the fundamental rights of the accused, and blatantly
committing perjury, Prosecutor Dolor, certified under oath that “a
preliminary investigation was previously conducted in this case and on the
basis of the sworn statements and other evidences on record, the undersigned
(prosecutor Dolor) found a reasonable ground to believe that the crime
complained of has been committed and that the respondents are probably
guilty thereof).” Provincial Prosecutor Caranzo–Olivar administered the
perjurious oath and certification of Prosecutor Dolor.
Erroneously invoking Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal

Procedure, Prosecutor Dolor insisted in his motion that it is “legally proper”
to unilaterally include ex parte seventy –one innocent persons in an
“amended” information for the capital offense of multiple murder and cause
their arrest and incarceration without bail solely on the basis of clearly
fabricated statement of Vincent Silva, a witness who by his own admission,
is being “handled” and under military/police custody. Curiously, the prayer
of the motion to admit “amended” information merely asked the court to
admit the same “to form part of the records of the instant case.”
In an order dated October 3, 2008 the Presiding judge, utterly disregarding

the right to preliminary investigation and in serious violations of the
constitutional right to due process of the accused, granted the motion to
admit “amended” information.
In his order, the Honorable Presiding judge said “the Court hereby adopts
the findings of the preliminary investigation conducted by the investigating
officers that probable cause exists, that the crime had been committed and
that the accused, who are originally named as John Does in the original
information, might probably (sic) guilty thereof, hence the Court finds
reasonable grounds for the necessity of placing herein accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The Presiding
judge issued warrants of arrest against the 71 additional accused including a
certain “Remegio Saladero.”
In short, the Honorable Presiding Judge gave his imprimatur to the

non-existent preliminary investigation and “adopted” the flawed findings of

the public prosecutor that the John Does in the original information are the
seventy-one accused whose names were added by the Prosecutor Dolor in
the “amended” information.
Section 13 Rule 110 of the Rules provides:

“SEC. 13. Duplicity of the offense. – A complaint or information must
charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment
for various offenses. “
In contravention of this rule, the “amended” information charges more

than one offense. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked in
this case because this is not a complex crime.
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
A careful study of the evidence for the prosecution reveals the following:
In the complaint affidavits executed by Police Inspector Wilson Gani and

PO1 Joseph Panes on March 4, 2006 – the following day after the incident –
no mention was made of the number, much less the identity, of any of the
perpetrators. In paragraph 15 of their respective affidavits the two
complainants identically said they executed their affidavits “upang
maipaliwanag ang buong pangyayari.” Two days later, or on March 6,
2006 the two affiants, in answer to a leading question from the police
investigator, claim they overheard during the incident the alias “Ka Bobby”
from one of the perpetrators and concluded that “Ka Bobby” must be
Rustom Simbulan, based on their Order of Battle. Both affiants additionally
claim that the number of perpetrators is “more than fifteen “ (mahigit sa
labing lima). Clearly, this obvious fabrication identifying one alleged
perpetrator was made to support the filing of the original information.
As to the identities of the seventy-one accused whose names were added to

the “amended” information including that of a certain Remegio Saladero
alias “Ka Patrick” the only evidence for the prosecution is the bare,
unsubstantiated and inherently incredible statement of Vincent Silva dated
August 19, 2008 and sworn to before Notary Public Rey Ladaga on
September 2, 2008.
Rule 112 Section 4 of the Rules provide:
“SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. – If the

investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the

accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given
an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.”
Contrary to this mandatory requirement, the records do not show that

Vincent Silva ever appeared before prosecutor Dolor or any other public
prosecutor. The records do not show any sufficient certification made by the
public prosecutor in compliance with this rule. The certification merely
states:
“I HEREBY CERTIFY UNDER OATH, that a preliminary

investigation was previously conducted in this case and on the basis of the
sworn statements and other evidences on record, the undersigned found a
reasonable ground to believe that the crime complained of has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof.
I HEREBY FURTHER CERTIFY that this AMENDED

INFORMATION was filed on the basis of the affidavit of VINCENT
SILVA, specifically naming the JOHN DOE’s in the original information.”
The sworn statement of Vincent Silva is a confession. The law requires that
such confession, to be valid and admissible as evidence, must be made with
the assistance of a lawyer freely chosen by Silva. On the face of the sworn
statement, Silva was not assisted by counsel when he executed his
confession.
There is absolutely no evidence of conspiracy to support such allegation in

the information.
In the affidavit of Vincent Silva, he did not say that Remegio Saladero alias
“Ka Patrick “was a perpetrator or participant in the alleged burning of the
Globe tower or in the alleged ambush of the PNP soldiers. In fact, with the
exception of Simbulan, a certain Miguel Magbata, a certain Jaime Padilla, a
certain Edmar Fernandez and himself Silva did not say that the sixty-seven
others were perpetrators or participants in the two crimes. He was explicit in
his statement that these sixty seven (67) accused only had knowledge or
knew of these incidents. (“may kinalaman,” Q & A Nos. 06 and 09).
Silva confessed that he was one of the perpetrators and explicitly named and
narrated the criminal acts performed by four others in the two incidents. He
was silent on the sixty-seven (67) other accused except his sweeping
statement that they had knowledge of the incidents. In conjunction with the
statements of complaining witnesses Wilson Gani and Joseph Panes that
“more than fifteen heavily armed men” perpetrated the alleged ambush, the
prosecution’s theory and evidence is seriously flawed and inherently

incredible because it seeks to prove that the rest of the seventy-two accused
other than the “more than fifteen heavily armed men” were either “look-
outs,” “on-lookers” or kibitzers during the ambush.
GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTIONS
I. THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED AGAINST HEREIN

ACCUSED ATTY. REMIGIO SALADERO JR. IS VOID AB
INITIO.
No preliminary investigation was conducted in this case in serious

violation of the constitutional right to due process of accused Atty.
Saladero, Jr. Therefore, the proceedings had in this case including the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is null and void.
Section 1 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides, to wit:
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law xxx…xxx.”
Further, Section 14(1) of the same article states, thus:
“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.”
“(D)ue process is comprised of two components -- substantive due process

which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process
which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal”10
(Emphasis supplied.);
One component of procedural due process is the right to preliminary

investigation, a procedure enshrined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
“Sec.3. Procedure.- Except as provided in section 7 hereof, no complaint or

information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be
filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
following manner:
xxx….
10
Sec. of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160
Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating
officer shall either dismiss the same if he found no ground to continue with
the inquiry, or issue subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a
copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents.
Within ten (10) from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-
affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complaint.”
As clearly provided by the above cited provision, the investigating officer,

that is the prosecutor, must issue a subpoena to the respondent to a criminal
complaint should he find ground to continue with the inquiry. Hence, at this
early stage of the proceeding, the respondent is already accorded the right to
be informed of the criminal complaint against him.
The significance of the right to preliminary investigation as a key component

of an accused’s right to due process has been upheld by the Supreme Court
in a long line of cases. “This procedure (in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure) is to be observed in order to assure that a person
undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due process”11.
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court likewise held: “A preliminary
investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells
for an individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing
trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty,
on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary
investigation as not “a mere formal or technical right” but a “substantive”
one, forming part of due process in criminal justice.12
Not only that, the Supreme Court in these cases emphasized that the denial
of the right to preliminary investigation, being a key component of the
accused’s right to due process, invalidates the proceedings had on a case.
In the case of Secretary of Justice v. Lantion13 the Supreme Court also

held, to wit:
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory
proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished
a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and
the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.”
Xxx
11
Cruz, Jr. vs. People, 233 SCRA 439.
12
Ladlad vs. Senior State Prosecutor Velasco, et al., G.R. Nos. 172070-72; G.R. Nos.
172074-76; and G.R. No. 175013, 01 June 2007; Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
101837, 11 February 1992, 206 SCRA 138.
13
322 SCRA 160,
“True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice
and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of
the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
During the last hearing of this case on 27 October 2008, the prosecutor tried
to come up with a lame excuse why the accused was not notified of any
proceeding regarding the filing of the Amended Information and ended up
with a blatant admission that “no subpoena was sent to the parties
particularly to the accused because they have filed the Amended Information
on the sole basis of the affidavit of Vincent Silva naming the other accused”
(page 17, TSN, 27 October 2008) and they merely concluded that the “John
Does” mentioned in the original information included herein accused Atty.
Saladero (ibid.). This is fatal.
The identity of the accused should always find basis in the evidence attached
to the complaint, and the use of the appellation “John Doe” should always be
connected to this identification as set out in the complaint. The “John Doe”
appellation should not be used and abused as a sweeping net by prosecutors
and arresting officers to target just any hapless individual.
The prosecution cannot simply assume that Atty. Saladero is one of the
“John Doe’s” mentioned in the original information without violating his
basic right not only to due process, but also of his right to be free from any
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution, as it is undisputed that up to the
time that a warrant of arrest was issued against one Remegio Saladero, the
prosecution has absolutely no evidence pointing to herein accused Atty.
Remigio Saladero, Jr.
It is well to emphasize the stern reminder of the Supreme Court in the case
of Salonga vs. Cruz Pan o, supra, when it held:
“Infinitely more important that conventional adherence to general rules of

criminal procedure is respect for the citizen’s right to be free not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is
carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face
of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.”

In light of the clear admissions of the public prosecutor himself that no
preliminary investigation was conducted against herein accused Atty.
Remigio Saladero, Jr., one comes to the inevitable conclusion that Atty.
Saladero’s right to due process has been gravely, seriously, and massively
violated;
Because of this grave, serious and massive violation of the accused Atty.
Saladero’s right to due process, the proceedings – starting from the filing of
the “amended” information which led to the arrest of herein accused Atty.
Remigio D. Saladero, Jr., the confiscation of his personal effects, including
the Order committing him to be detained at the Oriental Mindoro Provincial
Jail, are all null and void.
The information, on its face, is a patent nullity. The trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the “multiple” murder and multiple frustrated
murder case. Clearly too, the warrant of arrest issued against accused
Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. is null and void
-------------------------------------------------
Rule 110, Section 13 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires that a
“complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the
law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.” (underscoring is
ours)
The rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in an information

has for its aim to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge
to enable him to prepare his defense. The State should not heap upon the
defendant two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense.
(People vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-8957, April 29, 1957)
This rule is mandatory and failure to comply with it is fatal to the

information if such defect is seasonably raised. The purpose of the rule is to
afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not
be confused in his defense. (People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 62516, March
22, 1990)
Even a mere cursory reading of the questioned amended information will

readily show that it charges the separate offenses of alleged multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder involving six (6) different individual victims
who are all named in the information in violation of the fundamental rule
against duplicity of offenses embodied in the above-quoted Section 13 of
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
The prosecution is in effect charging herein accused, along with the other
accused, with three murders and three frustrated murders of six individual
victims named in the information, in only one amended information, in
flagrant disregard of the above cited proscription by the Rules.

This manifest disregard and deliberate dumping of different offenses in only
one information against the herein accused despite the above-cited rule
being too elementary was clearly designed to confuse and harass him.
For the foregoing reason, we respectfully submit that the assailed

information in the present case which charges the herein accused with
multiple murder” and “multiple frustrated murder” is a patent nullity that
cannot confer jurisdiction and authority upon the presiding judge to issue a
valid warrant of arrest.
The certification in the “Amended Information” is defective, in violation

of the requirements under Section 4, Rule 112.
------------------------------------------------------
Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. – If the

investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,
has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there
is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
x x x (Emphasis is ours.)
This rule explicitly requires that if the investigating prosecutor finds

probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall certify under oath in
the information:
that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer has personally

examined the complainant and his witnesses;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and
that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Contrary to these mandatory requirements, the certification of Prosecutor

Humilito A. Dolor in the “Amended Information “ merely states:
“I HEREBY CERTIFY UNDER OATH, (that) a preliminary investigation

was previously conducted in this case and on the basis of the sworn
statements and other evidences on record, the undersigned found a

reasonable ground to believe that the crime complained of has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof.
I HEREBY FURTHER CERTIFY that this AMENDED INFORMATION

was filed on the basis of the affidavit of VINCENT SILVA, specifically
naming the JOHN DOE’S (sic) in the original Information.”
This certification by Prosecutor Dolor falls short of the plain requirements of

Section 4, Rule 112 because: (a) it did not certify under oath that said
prosecutor as investigating prosecutor, by himself or as shown by the record,
an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; (b) neither were the additional accused, including herein accused-
movant Atty. Saladero, informed of the complaint and the evidence
submitted against them; and (c) nor were said additional accused, including
accused-movant Atty. Saladero, given the opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.
Apparently, the failure of Prosecutor Dolor to comply with the requirements

of Section 4, Rule 112 was not a mere oversight. It was because he could
not have made such a certification to comply with the rule without rendering
himself liable for perjury.
Prosecutor Dolor did not personally examine the complainants, police

officers, and their witnesses, especially Vincent Silva who named and
identified the John Does in the original information. As borne out by the
records, Prosecutor Dolor never summoned or required them to appear
before him, much less held or set a hearing for preliminary investigation
with respect to the additional 71 accused, including accused-movant Atty.
Saladero. He merely took as gospel truth the entire testimony of Vincent
Silva, without determining its veracity, much less its admissibility, and his
credibility as a witness.
Neither was accused-movant Atty. Saladero fully informed of the complaint

and of the evidence submitted against him. He never received a subpoena or
any notice whatsoever from the investigating prosecutor relative to this case.
As accused-movant Atty. Saladero was not informed of the complaint

against him at the minimum, consequently, he was deprived of any
opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
The amended information is a patent nullity for there was no hearing on

the motion to admit Amended Information and there was no
preliminary investigation conducted thereon.
------------------------------------------------------
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides,
to wit:

“SEC.14. Amendment or substitution.- A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to
the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reason in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.”
A careful scrutiny of the above-cited provision no doubt allows the

amendment of information, in form or in substance at any time before the
accused enters his plea and even without leave of court. However, the
second paragraph thereof provides the exception, which is, amendment may
only be made before plea upon motion of the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court when the amendment downgrades the
nature of the offense charged or excludes any accused from the information.
In this case, amendment must be with leave of court, meaning that the
motion must be set for hearing, and the offended party must be notified
thereof.
By parity of reasoning, the second paragraph should likewise apply where

the amendment seeks to include an accused not included at all in the original
information, such as in the instant case. If exclusion of an accused from an
information requires notice to the offended party, with more reason should
such notice be given to the person sought to be included as accused in an
amended information, so that he could adequately prepare for whatever legal
remedies he can avail of under existing laws. And such notice will only be
effective if the motion to admit amended information is set for hearing.
In the instant case, Atty. Saladero was not notified at all of the said
amendment, as the motion of the prosecutor was not set for hearing. And
the judge perfunctorily granted the motion without a hearing, which should
have been conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
In the case of Almeda v. Villaluz,14 it was held, to wit:
“The procedure taken by the respondent fiscal and allowed by the

respondent judge in the amendment of the information does not, however,
merit our approbation. Under section 2 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, "all
motions shall be made in writing except motions for continuance made in
14
66 SCRA 38
the presence of the adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or
trial." A motion to amend the information, after the accused has pleaded
thereto, is certainly one that should be placed in writing and properly set for
hearing. We are loath to give our imprimatur to the kind of shortcut devised
by the respondents, especially as it relates to an alteration in the information.
Considering, however, that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in
court and was in fact given advance warning of the proposed amendment,
although orally, we refrain from disturbing the said amendment.”
And in De Asis v. Romero,15 the Supreme Court held:
“The petitioner, however, stresses that it is the intention of the respondent

fiscal to amend the original information in connection with which the
questioned warrant of arrest was issued. But, even if this intention of the
fiscal is conceded, it is not controverted that he filed in the court a quo, as
the Rules of Court require, a motion to effectuate the amendment desired be
present, oral testimony and other evidence will be add. Naturally, there will
be a hearing on this motion, and in the course of such proceeding, in which
the petitioner De Asis will uced concerning the fact of death and identity of
the alleged kidnapped victim and other related circumstances. The hearing
on the said motion, in our opinion, serves and fulfills the essential purpose
and requirements of a full-blown preliminary investigation for the alleged
crime of murder intended to be added to the original basic charge of
kidnapping as an inextricable part thereof. Thus, if the court a quo finds and
is convinced at the hearing on the motion to amend the information, that
there is prima facie evidence of murder indispensably connected with the
alleged kidnapping, then it is but natural, nay, logical, to expect that it will
grant the said motion. In such event, it is clearly wishful thinking and an
unavailing technicality to require the court a quo to order the release of the
petitioner De Asis and then (or then and there) issue another warrant for his
arrest. Upon the other hand, if the said court believes that the original
information should stand as it is, then for the more reason that the petitioner
should not be ordered released.” (Underscoring supplied)
As can be implied from the above ruling of the Supreme Court, a

preliminary investigation must be had first before the fiscal could properly
file a motion to amend the information. But even without such preliminary
investigation, if the motion was set for hearing, the hearing will serve and
fulfill the essential purpose and requirements of a full-blown preliminary
investigation. But in the instant case, neither preliminary investigation nor
hearing on the motion to amend was conducted, in violation of Atty.
Saladero’s right to due process. Clearly, therefore, the amended information
is a patent nullity and could not serve as valid basis for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest.
15
41 SCRA 235
The Presiding Judge erred in ordering motu propio the revival of the
archived case without any motion to that effect filed by the prosecutor.
In an order dated May 7, 2007, the Presiding Judge motu propio ordered that
the instant case be archived “without prejudice to its subsequent prosecution
as soon as the accused is apprehended.”
On September 29, 2008, more than one year and four months after the case
was archived, another prosecutor, prosecutor Humilito A. Dolor, with the
approval of Provincial Prosecutor Josephine C. Caranzo-Olivar filed an
“amended” information that now includes in addition to Rustom Simbulan
the name “Remegio Saladero aka “Ka Patrick” and seventy others with
corresponding aliases.
During the scheduled arraignment on October 27, 2008, prosecutor Dolor

admitted in open court, among others, that no motion to revive the aforesaid
archived case was filed in court. However, despite the fact that there was no
motion filed to revive the case, the Presiding Judge revised the case by
admitting the ex parte “amended” information filed by the public
prosecutor.
Moreover, perusing from the order of the Presiding Judge dated May 7,
2007, it is explicitly stated that the case be archived “without prejudice to its
subsequent prosecution as soon as the accused is apprehended.” From this
explicit statement, it is apparent that the accused being referred therein was
no other than Rustom Simbulan inasmuch as all the other accused have not
yet been sufficiently identified by prosecution witnesses in the said original
information.
The motion to admit amended information filed by the prosecutor is not akin
to a motion to revive the case as there was no allegation or prayer in the sad
motion praying for the revival of the archived case. More importantly, there
is yet no reason to revive the case due to the fact that the accused named
therein, i.e. Rustom Simbulan, has not yet been arrested.
It is well to stress that a motion to revive an archived case is a litigated

motion which, under the rules, must be set for hearing so that the concerned
parties especially the accused will be given the opportunity to present his
side and oppose the said motion.
The Presiding Judge therefore erred blatantly in reviving the case and in
admitting the “amended” information without taking into consideration the
rules as well as the right of the accused to due process.

Among the accused named in the “Amended Information” is “REMEGIO
SALADERO,” whereas the person arrested is ATTY. REMIGIO D.
SALADERO, JR.”
------------------------------------------------------
In the sworn statement of prosecution witness Vincent Silva, he included as
among the accused a certain “REMEGIO SALADERO @ KA PATRICK
Los Baños, Laguna.” Having made the sole basis of the prosecution in filing
the “Amended Information,” the same name appears as one of the accused in
the said ”Amended Information.”
While the name appearing in the Warrant of Arrest dated October 6, 2008 is
for a certain REMEGIO SALADERO aka KA PATRICK, the person
unlawfully arrested on October 23, 2008 in his residence at 119
Circumferential Road, Brgy. San Isidro, Antipolo City is a lawyer,
REMIGIO SALADERO, JR. y DAMANDAMAN.
In fact, the Commitment Order issued by Executive Judge Manuel C. Luna,

Jr. on October 24, 2008 states that the accused arrested is REMIGIO
SALADERO, JR. y DAMANDAMAN.
The obvious difference between “REMEGIO SALADERO of Los Baños,

Laguna” and REMIGIO SALADERO, JR. y DAMANDAMAN of 119
Circumferential Road, San Isidro, Antipolo City, undoubtedly renders the
indictment against accused Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr., as fatally
defective and subject to outright dismissal especially considering that he has
unnecessarily suffered a deprivation of his liberty because of this
inexcusable blunder of the prosecution.
The warrant of arrest is void ab initio as the Honorable Presiding judge

did not make a personal determination of probable cause but instead
merely “adopted the findings of the preliminary investigation conducted
by the investigating officers”.
------------------------------------------------------
In his Order dated 03 October 2008, the Honorable Presiding judge said:
“the court hereby adopts the finding of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the investigating officers that probable cause exists, that the
crime had been committed and that the accused, who are originally named as
John Does in the original information, might probably guilty thereof, hence
the court finds reasonable grounds for the necessity of placing herein
accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.” The Presiding judge, in view of the said “findings”, immediately
issued the assailed warrant of arrest.
At the outset, it must be remembered that per admission of the prosecutor

who filed the information, there was no preliminary investigation nor any

proceedings conducted in relation to the amended information filed, in
which the name of herein accussed-movant was conveniently inserted.
By such order, the Presiding judge gave his imprimatur to the no-existent
preliminary investigation and “adopted” the flawed finding of the public
prosecutor that the John Does in the original information are the seventy one
accused whose names were just added by Prosecutor Dolor in the
“amended” information and that probable cause exists, which later became
the basis for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against herein accused.
With this important fact, it is evident that the Presiding judge did not make a
personal evaluation of the records of the case to determine whether probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the assailed warrant of arrest. For how
could the Presiding Judge adopt a finding not derived from any proceeding?
The Presiding judge could have known that no preliminary investigation was
conducted as to the amended information had he made a more than cursory
examination of the records of the case. It only goes to show he did not study
personally the records of the case as required by law but perfunctorily issued
the warrant of arrest, relying mainly on the certification of the prosecutor
that probable cause exists, in violation of the constitutional provision that no
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge.
In the case of MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA,,

vs. HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, G.R. No. 118821, 18 February 2000, the
Supreme Court held, thus:
“Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the

performance of his official duties, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance
of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if
he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer.
To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
respondent's examination of the records should be. The extent of the judge's
examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the
circumstances of the case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had
before him two different informations and resolutions charging two different
sets of suspects. In the face of these conflicting resolutions, it behooves him
not to take the certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value. The
circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare
certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents
supporting the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. The inordinate
haste that attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest and respondent's
own admission are circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the
fulfillment of this duty.

Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt
the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has
abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue
of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the
warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.”(underscoring supplied)
Had the Honorable Presiding judge gone over the records of the case as
required by law and the rules, he would have immediately noticed the
glaring irregularities in the certification of the prosecutor, the absurdities in
the affidavits of the witnesses and the utter lack of basis in the inclusion of
the name of herein accused-movant in the amended information. Not a
scintilla of evidence can be found in the documents attached to the amended
information as would have convince an unbiased mind that reasonable
grounds exist to justify the issuance of warrant of arrest against herein
accused.
The Presiding judge, had he made a scrutiny of the records, would have
immediately noticed that the certification itself of the prosecutor already
arouses suspicion that there is something wrong, for it does not state whether
the complainants and his witnesses appeared before him or whether the
respondents were given an opportunity to present counter-affidavits. He
would have likewise noted that the only basis of the prosecutor in filing the
amended information, without a motion to revive at that, was the affidavit of
a certain Silva who even did not appear personally before the prosecutor.
Unfortunately, the Presiding judge took the word of the public prosecutor
hook, line and sinker, so to speak, that probable cause exists and
immediately issued the warrant of arrest. Accused therefore may not be
faulted if he entertains in his mind that the mind that issued the warrant of
arrest against him may not be ‘unbiased’ after all.
II. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED

THE CASE OUTRIGHT FOR THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
AGAINST ACCUSED ATTY. REMEGIO SALADERO JR.
In the landmark case of Allado vs Diokno,16 the Honorable Supreme Court

had occasion to emphasize the concept and implication of probable cause,
the existence of which is necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused
held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a warrant for his arrest.
In the said case, petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza
are both lawyers and partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged
extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they were accused of the
16
232 SCRA 193 (1994)
heinous crime of kidnapping with murder and ordered arrested without bail
by the respondent judge in the said case.
In setting aside the warrant of arrest and in enjoining the respondent judge
from proceeding any further against therein petitioners Allado and Mendoza,
the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:
Xxxx
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence
of probable cause. While it appears in that case that we have granted the
prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude in determining
the existence or absence of probable cause by affirming the long-standing
procedure that they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion
and reasonable belief, yet, this permissiveness should not be interpreted
as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the
determination of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal
question which can result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty
of the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said —
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or

may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain
an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for
the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and
whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can
only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a
conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on
sufficient proof. 28
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy

himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof
that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11
February 1994, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation
of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists; and
therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to
see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly
examined the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On
the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the

evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause
against petitioners.
Xxx
Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less
is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and
be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law
appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts
and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that
they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not
been met.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing

the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not
personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and
his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely
relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far
presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners.
Xxx
In this case, there is nothing on record that would justify the finding of
probable cause by the Honorable Judge. We have examined the records and
we cannot find any support for his conclusion.
On the contrary, we have determined a number of reasons why the

Honorable Judge should have dismissed outright the charges against herein
accused.
There is no evidence of conspiracy to support such allegation in the

Information. A charge of conspiracy should be based on facts and not
on mere conclusions or inferences.
------------------------------------------------------
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.—Conspiracy and proposal

to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially
provides a penalty therefore.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

The elements of a conspiracy, therefore, are: (1) that two or more persons
come to an agreement; (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a
felony; and (3) that the execution of the felony be agreed upon.
Conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence17; it cannot

be founded on mere conjectures, inferences and presumptions;18 It must be
real and not presumptive. 19
As if it could not be made more clear, the Supreme Court ruled in People v.
Ortiz (266 SCRA 641 [1997]) that:
[p]roofs, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered by the

prosecution which would show that appellant had taken part in the planning,
preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to kill the victim.
Otherwise, ‘a careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even
innocent persons who may have (only) been made unwitting tools by the
criminal minds’ really responsible for the crime. (underscoring supplied)
In terms of quantum of proof necessary to establish a conspiracy,

“conspiracy must be shown to exist as convincingly as the commission of
the offense itself in order to uphold the fundamental principle that no one
shall be found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt.”20
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of conspiracy to support such

allegation in the information.
To reiterate, in the affidavit of Vincent Silva, he did not say that Remegio
Saladero alias “Ka Patrick “was a perpetrator or participant in the alleged
burning of the Globe tower or in the alleged ambush of the PNP soldiers. In
fact, with the exception of Simbulan, a certain Miguel Magbata, a certain
Jaime Padilla, a certain Edmar Fernandez and himself Silva did not say that
the sixty-seven others were perpetrators or participants in the two crimes.
He was explicit in his statement that these sixty seven (67) accused only had
knowledge or knew of these incidents. (“may kinalaman,” Q & A Nos. 06
and 09).
Significantly too, Silva confessed that he was one of the perpetrators and
explicitly named and narrated the criminal acts performed by four others in
the two incidents. He was silent on the sixty-seven (67) other accused
except his sweeping statement that they had knowledge of the incidents.
17
People v. Tiongson, 47 SCRA 243; People v. Ancheta, 66 Phil. 638.
18
Orodio v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 316.
19
United States v. Figueras, 2 Phil 491.
20
Pecho v. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996].

Verily, in the absence of any allegation or proof against herein accused, he
should not be implicated in the alleged conspiracy. To reiterate, a charge of
conspiracy should be based on facts and not on mere conclusions or
inferences.
To reiterate too, the statements of complaining witnesses Wilson Gani and

Joseph Panes that “more than fifteen heavily armed men” perpetrated the
alleged ambush seriously flawed and inherently incredible because it seeks
to prove that the rest of the seventy-two accused other than the “more than
fifteen heavily armed men” were either “look-outs,” “on-lookers” or
kibitzers during the ambush.
The extra-judicial confession/ admission of prosecution witness Vincent

U. Silva is inadmissible in evidence under the res inter alios acta rule
embodied in Rule 130, Section 28 of the Rules of Court.
------------------------------------------------------
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court enshrines in our legal system the
doctrine of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet which ordains that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of
another, and that, therefore, an extrajudicial confession or admission is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against others21.
In the case of People v. Tena22, the Honorable Supreme Court said:
Not unexpectedly, therefore, it is this extrajudicial confession on

which Solita Sena centers his attack in the present appellate proceedings,
assigning as errors on the part of the lower court the admission in evidence
of the extrajudicial confession of Adelberto Camota and his conviction on
the sole basis thereof.
But as is made clear by the Solicitor General in his “Manifestation in

Lieu of Appellee’s Brief,” the matter of that confession’s competency need
not be delved into as the issue of accused-appellant’s guilt or innocence may
be resolved by application of the doctrine res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet. Actually, the issue is not so much the admissibility in evidence
of the extrajudicial confession, but rather, even conceding its admissibility,
its use against persons other than the confessant, e.g., herein accused-
appellant.
Use of Camota’s extrajudicial confession is precluded by Section 25

(now Section 28), of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
21
See People v. Buntag, 427 SCRA 190 (2004)
22
215 SCRA 43, 47-48
Section 28. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
In the instant case, the prosecution relies principally on the sworn statement
of witness Vincent U. Silva to indict accused Atty. Saladero and the other
additional accused. In fact, Prosecutor Dolor states in the “Amended
Information” that the same was filed on the basis of Silva’s sworn statement.
Said witness’ sworn statement reads:
x x x x
04. T – Kailan naman isinagawa ng mga NPA and pag-ambush sa mga
RMG kung iyong matatandaan?
S - Noon pong ika-3 ng Marso 2006 din po mga alas siyete ng umaga.
05. T – Nasaan ka ng maganap ang mga bagay na ito

S – Kasama po nila ako sa dalawang insidenteng iyon.
x x x x
T - Nasabi mo na ang mga taong ito ang may kinalaman sa pagsunog sa

Globe Tower sa Brgy. San Isidro, Pto. Galera, sa papaanong paraan naman
nila sinunog ang nasabing tower?
S – Binuhusan po namin ng gasolina paikot ang tower pagkatapos
po ay sinindihan.
x x x x
T – Sa papaanong paraan naman isinagawa ng grupo nina Jaime Padilla at

Rustom Simbulan ang pag-ambush sa grupo ng mga RMG?
S – Nagbaon po sina MIGUEL MAGBATA @ KA AMAN at
RUSTOM SIMBULAN @ KA BOBBY ng landmine at pagtapat po ng
sasakyan nila na Dump truck ay sumabog at pagkatapos po noon ay walang
humpay na naming pinaputukan ang mga pulis na sakay doon. Ako po
ay kasama sa main body bilang Pangalawang platun lider ni EDMAR
FERNANDEZ @ KA HOMER. (Emphasis is ours.)
x x x x
It is clear from his sworn statement that he was part of the alleged
conspiracy to assault the police officers in Brgy. San Isidro, Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro on March 3, 2006 at about 7:00 P.M. Assuming arguendo
that his allegations were true, his extra-judicial confession, however, is
admissible in evidence only as against himself, but not against his alleged
co-conspirators pursuant to the well-settled doctrine of res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet.

In People v. Tena23 and People v. Cui, et al.24, the High Court explained the
rationale for this doctrine or rule, to wit:
x x x The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet, it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should
be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers, neither ought their acts
or conduct be used as evidence against him.
While the res inter alios acta rule admits of certain exceptions, one of which
is found in Section 30 of Rule 130, such exception does not apply in the
present case. As further held in People v. Cui, et al25.:
The res inter alios has exceptions. Thus, Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:
“The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during

its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.”
For this provision to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
“a. that the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself;
that the admission relates to the common objects; and
that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.”
x x x
In the case at bar, the alleged conspiracy among the accused was not priorly
established by independent evidence. Nor was it shown that the
extrajudicial statements of Basingan were made while they were engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy. In truth, the statements were made after the
conspiracy has ended and after the consummation of the crime. They were
not acts or declarations made during the conspiracy’s existence. Since the
extra-judicial admissions were made after the supposed conspiracy, they are
binding only upon the confessant and are not admissible against his co-
accused, as against the latter, the confession is hearsay.
Similarly, in this case, there is absolutely no other evidence, independent of

the extrajudicial confession of prosecution witness Silva, to establish the
23
Supra.
24
314 SCRA 166-168 (1999), citing People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248.
25
Supra.
alleged conspiracy between him and all the accused purportedly to ambush
the police officers.
Thus, stripped of the inadmissible extrajudicial confession/admission of

witness Silva, the entire records are utterly bereft of any other evidence that
would separately and independently establish conspiracy between accused
Atty. Saladero, all the other accused and witness Silva.
Moreover, while the crimes were allegedly committed on March 3, 2006,

curiously, witness Silva executed his sworn statement only on August 19,
2008, when he and the accused were no longer engaged in the alleged
conspiracy and after the consummation of the crime. His reason that
“ngayon lang po ako nabigyan ng pagkakataon na makababa at
makapagreport sa aking handler” is a lame excuse, for he neither gave
details when he allegedly joined the NPA as a DPA and when he left the
same to report to his “handler.” Therefore, Prosecutor Dolor should not
have given any credence to Silva’s sworn statement and made it the basis of
filing the “Amended Information,” and accordingly, the Honorable Presiding
Judge should not have issued the warrant of arrest against accused Atty.
Saladero by perfunctorily adopting the findings of Prosecutor Dolor.
From the foregoing, the extrajudicial confession/admission of prosecution

witness Silva does not qualify as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule,
rendering his confession inadmissible in evidence.
It is worthy of note that without the sworn statement of witness Silva, the
prosecution has absolutely no case at all against accused-movant Atty.
Saladero and the other additional accused. Thus, the dearth of evidence for
the prosecution only strengthens our submission that prosecution witness
Silva fabricated his testimony against accused-movant Atty. Saladero and
the other accused. To reiterate, witness Silva claims to be a deep penetration
agent of the PNP. Hence, his credibility as a prosecution witness is at once
placed under a heavy cloud of doubt, rendering his testimony biased,
polluted, self-serving and patently fabricated. Naturally, his testimony is full
of biased and false allegations that reek of motives to demonize, vilify and
demolish the reputation of the movement he and his principal have been
pursuing for decades, including the reputation and the lives of the people
who they imagine to be members of the NPA, including a practicing labor
lawyer, accused-movant Remigio Saladero, Jr.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in the interest of justice

and to uphold the rule of law, accused Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr.

respectfully prays that the Warrant of Arrest dated October 6, 2008 issued
against him BE QUASHED/ RECALLED; and that this case BE
OUTRIGHLY DISMISSED.
Other forms of relief that are just and equitable under the premises are
also prayed for.
Makati City for Calapan City. 3 November 2008.

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
SAN FERNANDO, CEBU
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES CRIM CASE NO. 3622

Plaintiff,
-versus- FOR: VIOLATION OF

R.A 10586 (ANTI-
DRUNK AND
DRIVING ACT OF
2013)
FERNANDO ALFECHE LOGUIBER

Accused.
x-----------------------------------------------/
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION

OF PROBABLE CAUSE WITH PRAYER FOR OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
ACCUSED,FERNANDO ALFECHE LOGUIBER, (accused, for

brevity) through undersigned counsels unto this Honorable Court, most
respectfully avers :
PREFATORY STATEMENT
“While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a

crime is the sole function of the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in the
protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a
personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not
establish probable cause”26.(Alfredo C. Mendoza, Petitioner, vs People Of
the Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc., Respondents.)
26
Sec. 6.When warrant of arrest may issue.– (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section
7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. chan robles virtual law library
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. – When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section of this
Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be
conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the
AccusedLoguiber Is Not Driving
Under The Influence Of Liquor
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 10586 or the Anti-Drunk and Drugged

Driving Act of 2013 defines driving under the influence of alcohol, to wit:
SEC.3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:
xxxxxxxxxx
(e) Driving under the influence of alcohol refers to the act of

operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol
concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test,
reached the level of intoxication, as established jointly by the
Department of Health (DOH), the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). (Italics supplied)
A simple understanding of the definition under the aforementioned

law of driving under the influence of alcohol would patently establish as to
the process that must be initiated by law enforcement officer before a driver
is considered driving under the influence of liquor and is deemed violated
R.A 10586. It must be shown that driver’s blood alcohol concentration level
has reached the level of intoxication. To determine this, the law further
provides that the driver must be subjected to a breath analyzer test.
A perusal of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Joint Affidavit of Arrest

executed by arresting officers, P02 Cleofas Cabrera Jr. and P02 Edgar
Enclonar as attached to the information27, they believed that accused was
under the influence of liquor and smelled with alcohol when conversed to
them. They, further, attested the fact that they never subjected the accused to
Liquor Test Examination on account of the resistance and refusal of the
accused. They contended that the refusal of the accused to undergo liquor
test examination constitutes high probability of presumption that the latter is
indeed driving under the influence of liquor. This only indicates that the
arresting officers relied merely on presumption instead of following what the
law mandates in order to determine the level of intoxication of accused.
Based on their presumption that the accused is driving under the influence of
liquors, they arbitrarily arrested the accused.
investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this
Rule. If his findings and recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the
Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if
he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
27
Attached as Annex “A” is a copy of the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of P02 Cleofas Cabrera Jr. and P02
Edgar Enclonar.
Sec. 6 of R.A 10586, is clear as to the process that must be conducted
law enforcement officers to determine the level of intoxication of those
believed to be driving under the influence of liquor, to wit:
Sec 6. Conduct of Field Sobriety, Chemical and

Confirmatory Tests
A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a

person is driving under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or
other similar substances by apparent indications and manifestations,
including over speeding, weaving, lane straddling, sudden stops, swerving,
poor coordination or the evident smell of alcohol in a person’s breath or
signs of use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances, shall
conduct field sobriety tests.
If the driver fails in the sobriety tests, it shall be the duty of the law
enforcement officer to implement the mandatory determination of the
driver’s blood alcohol concentration level through the use of a breath
analyzer or similar measuring instrument.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Law enforcement officers and deputized local traffic enforcement

officers shall be responsible in implementing this section. (Emphasis
Supplied)
Thus, the failure of the arresting officers to conduct field sobriety nay
resort to the mandatory determination of the accused blood alcohol
concentration level using a breath analyzer or similar measuring instrument
or to offer any evidence other than their self-assessment and evaluation that
is a manifestation of how remiss they are as to their responsibility to
implement the law.
The absence of any liquor test examination to support that

accused Loguiber’s blood alcohol concentration has reached the level of
intoxication clearly warrants the dismissal of this case. The arresting
officers speculation and conjecture that accused Loguiber was driving under
the influence of alcohol is frail enough to prove that the latter has violated
R.A 10586.
The Arresting Officers

Illegally Arrested Accused
Loguiber

Accused Loguiber was arrested without a benefit of warrant arrest by
the arresting officers who were acting based on instruction of the private
complainant and not based on personal knowledge of the arresting officers
as can be gleaned in paragraph 4 of the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by
the arresting officers.
Basic is that rule on exceptional cases of warrantless arrest under Sec.

5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The warrantless arrest of the accused did not fall in any of the
exceptions provided by law for a lawful arrest without warrant. Accused was
not actually committing, has committed or is attempting to commit a crime
in their presence. In fact, the arresting officers were present in the place
where they arrested the accused because they responded to the report of the
private complainant of vehicular accident. However, there was no traffic
accident sketch supporting the fact of the accident. Verily, the police officers
have no probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that accused was probably guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property. What they did was to heed to the request of
the private complainant to arrest the accused because the private
complainant will be filling a case against the accused. This only shows
partiality and biases of the arresting officer in favor of the private
complainant to the expense of violating the guaranteed constitutional right to
due process of the accused before the latter can be deprived of his liberty.
The Inquest Prosecutor

Haphazardly filed the information
and examination of the documents
to establish probable cause

It bears stressing that the inquest prosecutor has the duty to carefully
examine the documents submitted to sufficiently establish the findings of
probable cause and to warrant the filing of the information in court. Under
Sec 11, Part 2 of Department of Justice Manual for Prosecutors it provides:
SEC.11. Inquest proper. - Where the detained person does not opt for
a or otherwise refuses to execute the required waiver, proceed with the
inquest by examining the sworn the complainant and the witnesses and
other supporting
If necessary, the Inquest Officer shall require the presence of the
complaining witnesses and subject them to an informal and summary
investigation or examination for purposes of determining the existence of
probable cause. (Italics Supplied)
Thus, when the inquest prosecutor filed the information for violation
of R.A 10586 despite the absence of a liquor test examination or any
material proof thereof to prove that the accused blood alcohol concentration
has reached the level of intoxication and is liable of driving under the
influence of alcohol, it cannot be gainsaid that the prosecutor haphazardly
filed the information though there was no probable cause to charge the
accused.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,in the interest of justice and to

uphold the rule of law, accused Fernando Alfeche Loguiber prays for the
outright dismissal of this case.
Other forms of relief that are just and equitable under the premises are
also prayed for.
Cebu City, Philippines. September 07, 2015.
LOON CORPUZ PATIÑO AND ASSOCIATES

(Counsel of the Accused)
G/F GMC Plaza Bldg. Legaspi Extension
Corner M.J Cuenco St, Cebu City, Philippines
Tel No. (032) 254-0453
By:
JURIL B. PATIÑO
Roll of Attorney No. 63966 April 27,2015
PTR OR No. 707854 5-06-15
IBP OR No. 0997508 4-27-15 Cebu City Chapter
MCLE COMPLIANCE No. Exempt-New Passer
Email add: juril.patino@yahoo.com
HABEAS CORPUZ
Roll of Attorney No. 62850 May 06, 2014
PTR OR No. 599058 January 07, 2015 Cebu City
IBP OR No. 966627 January 7, 2015 Cebu City Chapter
MCLE COMPLIANCE No. Exempt-New Passer
Email add: writofhabeascorpuz@gmail.com

NOTICE OF HEARING
Hon. Pepita Jane A. Petralba

Provincial Prosecutor
Province of Cebu
Greetings:
Please take notice that the foregoing Motion for Judicial

Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer for Outright Dismissal of this
Case shall be submitted for the consideration and approval of this Honorable
Court on September 18, 2015 at 8:30 in the morning or as soon as counsel
and matter may be heard.
Juril B.Patiño
REQUEST
Clerk of Court
Municipal Trial Court
San Fernando, Cebu
Please submit the foregoing Motion for Judicial Determination of

Probable Cause with Prayer for Outright Dismissal of this Case for the
Court’s consideration immediately upon receipt thereof.
Juril B. Patiño
EXPLANATION
Copy of this Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

with Prayer for Outright Dismissal of this Case is made through registered
mail due to lack of personnel to effect personal service.
Copy Furnished:
Hon. Pepita Jane E. Petralba

Provincial Prosecutor
Province of Cebu
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
Capitol Site, Cebu City
PNP San Fernando

San Fernando Police Station

Branch 35
Hall of Justice
General Santos City
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES CRIMINAL CASE NO. 5582-15

Plaintiff, (XII-07-INV-14K-00315)
-versus- FOR: MURDER
JULIE MUYCO AGSAMOSAM

a.k.a. Tata Agsamosam /Lok-ad,
Alias Argie and Alias Baak,
Accused.
x--------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR BAIL
Accused, Julie MuycoAgsamosam, by counsel to this Honorable

Court, most respectfully states:
I
He has voluntarily surrendered to the Honorable Court and is
presently detained at the Maitum Detention and Rehabilitation Center, in
Alabel, Sarangani Province.
II
He would like to avail of his constitutional right to bail on the
ground that he is totally innocent of the crime being imputed against him
and the charges were based on hearsay, unsubstantiated suspicious and false
presumptions.
III
He would like to clear his name and honor of this case which is the
reason why he voluntarily surrendered.
IV
He is the only breadwinner of his family which is composed of his
wife and two (2) small children, the eldest being only eight (8) years old
and the youngest being only three (3) years old and an old widowed
weak and sickly mother who lives with then.

V
He needs to be out on bail so he could continue to personally tend
his small farm which is his only livelihood and source of income to support
himself and his family.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, it is

most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to allow the
accused Julie MuycoAgsamosam to avail of his constitutional right
to bail by fixing the amount thereof.
Koronadal City, South Cotabato; June 20, 2018.
CATEDRAL & EMILIO LAW OFFICE

Counsel for the Accused Julie M. Agsamosam
2/F South Cotabato Gym & Cultural Center
Alunan Avenue, Koronadal City, South Cotabato
By:
ERNESTO I. CATEDRAL
PTR NO. 1086195 01/15/2014
Koronadal City, South Cotabato
IBP OR NO. 922105 02/20/2013
SOCGEN CHAPTER
ROLL NO. 32340
TIN No. 114-186-634
MCLE COMPLIACE NO. III- 0020470/04-19-2011
MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. IV & V (under process)
Cell No. 09202736057
The Clerk of Court

Regional Trial Court 35
Hall of Justice
General Santos City
Greetings:
In view of the nature of the foregoing Petition please set the foregoing
motion for the consideration and resolution of the Honorable Court on June
28, 2018 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning and continuously thereafter.
ERNESTO I. CATEDRAL
NOTICE
The Provincial Prosecutor

Hall of Justice
Alabel, Sarangani Province
Sir:
Please take notice that the foregoing Petition is requested to be heard

on June 28, 2018 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning and consciously thereafter
in view of its nature.
ERNESTO I. CATEDRAL
Copy Furnished:
The Provincial Prosecutor

Hall of Justice
Alabel Sarangani Province
Registry Receipt No._________________________
Received by:__________________
Date: ____________________
Explanation: Serve thru registered mail or by personal delivery.

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. ____
-versus- For: CONCUBINAGE
LUZVIMINDO LEONES and

JESSICA D. GALACIO.
Accused.
x-------------------------------------x
MOTION TO REDUCE BAILBOND
COMES NOW, Accused, LUZVIMINDO LEONES and

JESSICA D. GALACIO, thru undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable
Court, most respectfully avers:
1. That accused is facing the above-entitled case before this Honorable

Court;
2. That the bail bond fixed for their temporary liberty is P10, 000.00 for
accused LUZVIMINDO LEONES and P2, 000.00 for accused
JESSICA D. GALACIO;
3. That accused desires to put bail bond but to a reduced amount of P5,
000.00 for accused LUZVIMINDO LEONES and P1, 000.00 for
accused JESSICA D. GALACIO of the total recommended bail bond
considering their present situation and that they have no other source
of income and have no property;
4. That the accused is cordially praying that they will be allowed by this
Honorable Court to post a reduced amount of P5, 000.00 for accused
LUZVIMINDO LEONES and P1, 000.00 for accused JESSICA D.
GALACIO of the total recommended bail bond.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that

this motion be granted citing the afore-stated reason. Other reliefs consistent
with equity and justice are likewise being prayed for.
Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines. April 11, 2018.
Respectfully submitted.
ATTY. HANNA JANE B. PERNES

NOTICE OF SUBMISSION
The Clerk of Court

MTCC-Digos City
Davao del Sur
Greetings:
Please submit forthwith the foregoing motion upon receipt hereof for
the consideration and approval of this Honorable Court without need of
further arguments and sans appearance of the undersigned counsel.
Thank you.
ATTY. HANNA JANE B. PERNES
Cc: The City Prosecutor’s Office – Digos City ____________

Branch 23
th
12 Judicial Region
Kidapawan City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEARCH WARRANT NO.

Plaintiff, 01-S-2019
-versus- FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC.

11 OF R.A. 9165
OPOSA V. FACTORAN,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination

under oath of PO1 Juan P. Dela Cruz and witness PO1 Pedro K. Santos
presently assigned at Kidapawan Police Station, Kidapawan City, that there
is probable cause that the respondent Oposa V. Factoran is violating
Republic Act. No. 9165 for having in his possession, control and custody
undetermined quantity of shabu kept inside his house located at Marang St.,
Brgy. Durian, Kidapawan City as indicated in the sketch map which is made
an integral part of this warrant.
In view thereof, you are commanded to make a search at any time of

the day and night, the house owned by and under the control of the
respondent Oposa V. Factoran including the rooms inside his house,
cabinets, aparadors, drawers, and all sort of containment which are under
and within his premises and under his control and forthwith seize and take
possession of the undetermined quantity of shabu found therein and to bring
them to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
Given this 26th day of July, 2019 at Kidapawan City, Cotabato,

Philippines.
Valid ten (10) days from this date.
SANRIO V. LIM
Presiding Judge

Judicial Region
Cantilan, Surigao del Sur
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Criminal Case No._________

Plaintiff,
For: Violation of Sections 11
-versus- and 12, R. A. No. 9165
VICENTE C. SALON,
Accused.
x-------------------------------x
MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT
COMES NOW, the ACCUSED, through the undersigned Public

Attorney, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully moves for the quashal of
Search Warrant No. 2015-05 issued by the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Marihatag, Surigao del Sur on and dated 24 September 2015 based
on the following considerations:
Search warrant no. 2015-05 was applied for and issued by Honorable
Presiding Judge Cashmere Jo-an Augustia D. Zayas-Cruiz of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) situated in Marihatag, Surigao del Sur after
finding probable cause that a crime subject of the said search warrant was
committed;
The search warrant is seriously

defective for being insufficient
in form and substance.
The search warrant is seriously defective for the reason that the abovenamed
judge issued the said search warrant without examining personally through
searching questions and answers the applicant Police Inspector Amos L.
Moreno and his unidentified witness;
From the wordings of the search warrant, it cannot be determined how the
judge profounded the questions in order to determine personally from the
applicant and his witness, if any, the probable cause of the alleged
commission of the crime. The first paragraph of the search warrant merely
states: “IT APPEARING to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examining under oath the applicant Police Inspector Amos L. Moreno and

his witness, that there is probable cause to believe that possession of illegal
drugs xxx, has been committed xxx.”;
The insufficiency of the statement required by law in a search warrant casts

serious doubt as to the personal determination by the judge of the probable
cause that the alleged crime has been committed and how the applicant and
his witness, if any, were examined. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court states: “A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge xxx.” (Emphasis ours). The omission of the word
“personally” as well as the nature of examination by the judge is very
serious and fatal to the issuance of the search warrant. It must be stated
clearly in the search warrant how the judge examined the applicant and his
witness;
In the case at bar, there is no clear showing that the examination was done
personally and whether it was in a form of searching questions and answers.
Thus, such ambiguity must be strictly construed against the state authorities
who would be enforcing the search warrant and be resolved in favor of the
accused;
The MCTC, Marihatag, Surigao del Sur

that issued the search warrant has no
territorial jurisdiction over the place
where the alleged crime was
committed.
While the Judge who issued the subject search warrant is appointed or
designated in the MCTC of Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, the alleged crime
subject of the said search warrant was committed in Purok 1, Barangay Zone
III, Municipality of Lanuza, Surigao del Sur. This is evidenced by a copy of
search warrant no. 2015-05 that is already part of the records of the case;
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides

thus:
“SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall

be filed. – An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court

within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is
pending.”
As can be gleaned from the above-stated provision of the Rule, the

application of search warrant no. 2015-05 is misplaced and the MCTC
Court of Marihatag, Surigao del Sur issued the said search warrant beyond
its territorial jurisdiction;
This is boost by the Supervisory Circular No. 14, October 22, 1985, issued
by the Supreme Court which says:
“2. Territorial jurisdiction of courts. — (a) Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise
their jurisdiction in the city, municipality or circuit for which the judge
thereof is appointed or designated.” (Emphasis supplied);
The authority to issue search warrant must necessarily be co-extensive with

the court's territorial jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is
determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that
the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to
specific territories. (Malaloan v. CA, G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994,
Justice Davide’s opinion);
In the instant case, it is very clear that the search warrant was issued by the
court without jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed. Hence, said search warrant was null and void;
And, even to say that paragraph (b) of Section 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court is the one applicable in this case, still the application for the issuance
of the search warrant is insufficient for the reason that the application did not
state the compelling reasons why the search warrant was applied for in
MCTC of Marihatag, Surigao del Sur having no jurisdiction of the place or
territory where the alleged crime has been committed, as it does not appear
in the search warrant;
If the application for the search warrant was founded on paragraph (b),
Section 2 of the Rule above, the Rule explicitly requires a compelling reason
to be stated therein why the search warrant is applied in that court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed, and, hence, it must appear in
the search warrant as legal basis thereof. Where compliance therewith
cannot be determined from the records of the application of the search
warrant, as in this case, the search warrant is seriously defective, hence, null
and void;

The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a
statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which
does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the
crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
search warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly
against state authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants. On
this point, then, petitioner’s application for a search warrant was indeed
insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the
compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did
not have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed. (PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND
PETRON CORPORATION VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 189669, February 16, 2015) (Emphasis
supplied);
Therefore, the search warrant being void ab initio must be quashed;
A search warrant shall be issued in

connection with one specific offense.
The search warrant here is a “scatter-

shot warrant” which is unconstitutional.
The subject search warrant commanded any peace officer “to make an
immediate search and take possession of undetermined quantities of illegal
drugs locally known as shabu, and illegal drugs paraphernalia.” This search
warrant was issued for two offenses punishable under Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 9165, namely: (a) possession of undetermined quantities of illegal drugs
locally known as “shabu” penalized under Section 11, R. A. No. 9165; and,
(b) possession of illegal drugs paraphernalia penalized under Section 12 of
the same law. These two offenses being punishable under two different
provisions of R. A. No. 9165 have penalties different and distinct from each
other;
In Section 4, Rules 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is stated that:
“A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in

connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.”

As stated above, a search warrant must be issued in connection with one
specific offense. On the contrary, the search warrant, in the case at bar, was
issued for two offenses having different penalties which violates Sec. 4, Rule
126 above. The said search warrant is a “scatter-shot warrant” that is
proscribed and unconstitutional, and, thus, null and void;
The things and objects allegedly seized from the house of herein accused
Vicente C. Salon located in Purok I, Brgy. Zone III, Lanuza, Surigao del Sur
on September 30, 2015 by virtue of a general search warrant dated
September 24, 2015 issued by the MCTC of Marihatag, Surigao del Sur
having no territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime had
been committed were seized in violation of the accused’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and are, thus, fruits of a poisonous tree
which are inadmissible as evidence against accused Vicente C. Salon.
Hence, under the law, the search warrant is void ab initio and must be
quashed.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that Search Warrant No.

2015-05 be QUASHED and all objects seized under its purported authority
be declared INADMISSIBLE under the exclusionary rule in Article III,
Section 3(2) in relation to section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Cantilan, Surigao del Sur, Philippines. 05 Novemebr 2015.
Atty. JO YECYEC
Counsel for Accused
Notice of Hearing
THE CLERK OF COURT

RTC, Cantilan Surigao del Sur
THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR

Please set the foregoing Motion to Quash Search Warrant for hearing
before this Honorable Court on November 18, 2015 at 8:30 in the morning.
ATTY. JO YECYEC
Copy furnished: (by personal service)


Third Judicial Region
Branch 13
City of Angeles, Pampanga
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM.CASE No.13(12)

Plaintiff,
-versus- For: LIBEL
JOHN DOE
Accused.
x -------------------------------------- x
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE UNLAWFULY SEIZED
The ACCUSED, through the undersigned counsel and unto this

Honorable Court, respectfully moves for the suppression of objects seized on
25 January 2023, based on the following conditions:
1. Search Warrant No. 5678 was served on the 15th day and is, thus,
void.
2. The motor vehicle seized does not fall within the property that may be
lawfully seized. Discussion Search Warrant No. 5678 was served
beyond the 10 day period, thus, should be void 1. Rule 126, Sec. 10 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides expressly that a search warrant
shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be
void.
3. Search Warrant No. 5678 is dated 10 January 2023. It was served on

the accused on the 15th day from its date, which is 25 January 2023.
This is certified to by the Sworn Inventory and Return executed by
Major Juan Dela Cruz, the leader of the searching team (copy of
which is already part of the records). A search was made on the same
day, 25 January 2023; pursuant to said search, certain objects were
seized and delivered to the court. Contrary to law, the Search Warrant
is void and must be quashed.
4. No valid seizure may be made under a void warrant. For this reason,
the following objects must be suppressed: personal computer, printed
material of the published article in question, motor vehicle, and other
write ups.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed for that all object
seized under the void Search Warrant No. 5678 be INADMISSIBLE under
the exclusionary rule in Article III, Section 3(2) in relation to section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
Angeles City, Philippines, February 27, 2023.
Pineda LAW FIRM

Counsel for Accused
101 Marlim Mansion Hotel, Balibago,
Angeles City, Pampanga
By: Glenn Mullet Pineda IBP No. 777777
PTR No. 7777777777 Roll No. 77777
NOTICE OF HEARING/COPY FURNISHED COPY FURNISHED:

Office of the City Prosecutor Hall of Justice Angeles City
JAP LAW FIRM Private Prosecutor Kalayaan Bldg, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga Branch
Clerk of Court
Angeles City
Branch 58
GREETINGS:
Please submit this Motion to Suppress Evidence on March 10, 2023 at

10:00 AM. for the consideration and approval of this Honorable Court.
Joannabie C. Mesina EXPLANATION A copy of the foregoing Motion to
Suppress Evidence was filed and served upon the prosecution via registered
mail on grounds of proximity of the offices of counsels, practicability and
time constraints.
Joannabie C. Mesina

NATIONAL PROSDECUTION SERVICE
DIGOS CITY
PO1 ALBERT R. LAZATIN, NPS Docket No. XI-06-INQ-

Complainant, 198-00028
-versus- FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A.

9287
GLADYS T. DELIMA,
Respondent.
X----------------------------/
MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
COMES NOW, undersigned respondent, and unto this

Honorable Office, most respectfully states:
That the undersigned GLADYS TEMPROSA DELIMA is the

respondent of the above-entitled complaint;
That the above-entitled complaint was already dismissed by this

Honorable Office for insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable
cause through a resolution dated June 03, 2019;
That during the apprehension of the respondent by the

complainant sometime in May 21, 2019 at around 2:00 p.m. at
Barangay San Sebastian, Digos City, Davao Del Sur, Philippines for
allegedly violating the Republic Act 9287, there were certain items
confiscated, to wit:
a) Three (3) pieces of One Thousand Peso Bill

b) Three (3) pieces of five hundred Peso Bill
c) Five (5) pieces of one hundred Peso bill
d) Thirteen (13) pieces of fifty Peso bill
e) Six (6) pieces of twenty Peso bill
f) One (1) Cherry Mobile android cellular phone; and
g) One (1) blue ballpen
That the above- enumerated items are presently under the

custody of the office of the city prosecutor;

That in view of the dismissal of the instant case, respondent
now prays that the above enumerated items confiscated from her
during her arrest on May 21, 2019 at san Sebastian, Digos City,
Davao Del Sur be release and return in favour of the undersigned
respondent;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully

prayed unto the Honorable City Prosecutor that the above-enumerated
items be ordered release and return in favour of the undersigned
respondent;
Other relief just and proper under the prevailing circumstances

is likewise prayed for;
Respectfully Submitted.
July 08, 2019, Digos City, Davao Del Sur, Philippines
GLADY TEMPROSA DELIMA

Respondent/Movant
NOTICE OF SUBMISSION
The Clerk of Office

Office of the City Prosecutor
Digos City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing ex parte motion to the Honorable City

Prosecutor immediately upon receipt hereof for its kind consideration and
approval without further arguments.
Thank you very much.
GLADY TEMPROSA DELIMA

Fourth Judicial Region
Branch ___
Santa Cruz, Laguna
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIMINAL CASE NO. _____

Plaintiff.
‐versus- For: Parricide
LUPE MERCADO Y GUARIN,

Accused.
x-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐----x
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
SUMMARY
That on or about 11:00 am of September 4, 2011, in Brgy. Bubukal, Santa

Cruz, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Lucy
Mercado, his legal wife, by then and there shooting her with a Berretta 22
Automatic Pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the
different parts of the body which was the direct and immediate cause of her
death thereafter.
Stipulation of Facts
Admitted
The Defense Counsel admitted the existence veracity of the

documentary exhibits such as the marriage certificate between Guarin and
Mercado, the death certificate of Lucy Mercado which was marked by the
Prosecution and the identity of the accused.
The Prosecution admitted the existence of the Certification from the

Firearms and Explosive Division of the PNP.
Disputed
Version of the Prosecution
That on or about 11:00 am of September 4, 2011, in the Brgy.

Bubukal, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Lupe Mercado Y Guarin accidentally killed his

legal wife by inflicting four (4) gunshot wounds upon the latter in self –
defense in their scuffle for a gun which the victim poked to the suspect
during their short verbal arguments.
Issues to be resolved
Whether or not the accused committed the crime as charged.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PARTIES
Evidence for the Prosecution
Exhibit “A” – Judicial Affidavit of Lupe Mercado y Guarin

Exhibit A-1 – Page 2 of the Judicial Affidavit of Lupe Mercado y Guarin
Exhibit A-2 – Page 3
Exhibit A-1-1 – Signature of Lupe Mercado y Guarin
Exhibit “B” – Judicial Affidavit of Chararat
Exhibit B-1 – Page 2 of the Judicial Affidavit of Chararat
Exhibit B-2 – Page 3
Exhibit B-1-1 – Signature of Chararat
Exhibit ‘C” – Death Certificate of Lucy Mercado
Exhibit “D” – Marriage Certificate between Guarin and Mercado
Testimonial Evidence
Prosecution will present two (2) witnesses, Paul Cris and Sam Nang.
Evidence for Defense
Exhibit 1 – Judicial Affidavit of Lupe Mercado y Guarin

Exhibit 1-A – Page 2 of the Judicial Affidavit of Lupe Mercado y Guarin
Exhibit 1-B – Page 3
Exhibit 2 – Certification from Firearm and Explosive Unit, PNP
Exhibit 3 – Certificate of Good Moral Character by Mia Klaudette
Testimonial Evidence
The Prosecution will present two (2) witnesses namely, Paul Cris and
Sam Joel.
The Defense will present two (2) witnesses namely, Paul Cris and
Sam Joel.
Hearing Dates

The trial date is on January 26, 2013, February 2, 9, 16, 23, 2013 at
7:30 am.
It is understood that the testimony of the witness should be completed

in the scheduled date of hearing allotted to said witnesses should under One-
day Examination of Witness Rule. The Court however, has the discretion on
whether or not to extend the direct and/ or cross – examination of witnesses
for good cause shown.
Failure of the party or his counsel to comply with the aforementioned

schedule of hearings and deadlines may be a ground for imposition of fines
and other sanctions by the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Santa Cruz, Laguna, January 25, 2013.
Judge Bea Dominique Abe

Judge

Sandiganbayan
Quezon City
FOURTH DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES SB-14-SCA-0001

represented by the OFFICE OF THE (Crim. Case No. 7265)
OMBUDSMAN, MARCIAL
SABANA, and EDITHA
BRANDARES,
Petitioners, Present:
- versus - Quiroz, J., Chairperson.
Cruz, J.
HON. HECTOR B. SALISE, in his Jacinto, J.
capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of
Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, 10th
Judicial Region, Prosperidad, Agusan
Promulgated:
del Sur, and JAIME T. BERNAT, SR.,
Respondents.
x x
DECISION
JACINTO, J:
This a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 6) of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur dated 4 June 2013, 1 dismissing the case
against private respondent Jaime T. Bernat, Sr., and the Order2 dated 6
December 2013, denying the Motion for Reconsideration28 in Criminal
Case No. 7265 entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Jaime
T. Bernat, Sr. and Aileen D. Bastillada, Accused."
The antecedent facts are as follows:
28
1 16-120.
Private respondent Jaime T. Bernat, Sr. (Bernat) and Aileen D.
Bastillada (Bastillada) were charged with Falsification of Public
Documents as defined in Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code
before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao (OMB-Mindanao). 29
The case was raffled to RTC Branch 6, then presided by Judge Dante
Luz N. Viacrusis. Thereafter, private respondent Bernat was arraigned
and trial commenced only as against him, while accused Bastillada
remained at large.
On 23 May 2012, Bastillada filed a Motion to Dismiss 30 on the ground
that there was no probable cause to hold her for trial, and that she was
denied due process by reason of OMB-Mindanao's failure to inform her
of the charges against her. Said motion was denied in an Order dated
27 March 2012, since Bastillada had yet to submit to the trial court's
jurisdiction. However, upon reconsideration, Judge Viacrusis dismissed
the case as against her through a Resolution dated 5 September 2012,31
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby reconsiders and sets

aside its Order dated October 1 7, 2010 finding probable
cause insofar as it included movant/accused AILEEN D.
BASTILLADA. The warrant of arrest issued by virtue
thereof, in so far as it included said movant, is hereby
cancelled and set aside. For lack of probable cause as
against her, accused AILEEN D. BASTILLADA is hereby
dropped from the information in the above entitled case
which shall continue as against the accused Jaime T.
Bernat, Sr. (emphasis in the original)
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
29
Information, Id., pp. 47-48.
30
Id., pp.
89-96. 6
Id., p. 88.
31
97-102.
of
x
x
SO ORDERED
In dismissing the case against Bastillada, the trial court held as follows:
The information charged that although no services
were rendered by the contractor to warrant the second
partial payment in the net amount of P445,324.29,
movant conspired with co-accused Bernat in making an
untruthful statement when she also signed the List of Due
and Demandable Accounts Payable (LDDAP)
warranting that the LDAP was prepared by

her in accordance with listing, budgeting,
accounting and auditing rules and
regulations and with intent to cause damage
to the government, payment was credited by
the DBM to Bros Construction and Supply
Bank Account xxx, to the prejudice of the
government.
Obviously, the subject statement "I hereby warrant

that the above List of Due and Demandable A/Ps was
prepared in accordance with listing, budgeting, accounting
and auditing rules and regulations" is not a narration of
facts but a conclusion of law, as in fact the LDDAP is a
standard form allowing no space for narration of facts like
name of project, location and percentage of completion.
(citations omitted, italics and underscoring in the original).
The said Resolution became final on 10 December 2012, with neither

party filing any motion for reconsideration. In the interim, Judge Dante
Luz N. Viacrucis retired from service and was replaced by respondent,
Judge Salise.

Thereafter, in the course of the prosecution's presentation of
evidence, private respondent Bernat filed a Motion to Dismiss 32 dated
15 April 2013, citing as ground therefor the 5 September 2012
Resolution dismissing the case as against Bastillada.
The People, for its part, filed a Comment/Opposition (Re: Accused's

Motion to Dismiss dated April 15, 2013) dated 6 May 2013. 33
On 4 June 2013, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision,

dismissing the case against private respondent Bernat on the basis of
the earlier dismissal rendered in favor of Bastillada. Respondent Judge
likewise held that, at the said juncture, there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the charge against private respondent, thus -
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the Motion to Dismiss
is hereby granted, it is hereby ordered that this case be
DISMISSED and accused JAIME T. BERNAT, SR., be
ACQUITTED of the crime. The bail bond posted for his
temporary liberty is hereby ordered released to him or his
authorized representative.
SO ORDERED
On 30 September 2013, herein petitioners Sabafia and Brandares

filed a Motion for Reconsideration (DECISION dated June 4, 2013) 34
before the court a quo. Petitioner OMB-Mindanao later on filed a
Manifestation (Re: Motion for Reconsideration), Il stating as follows:
1) In an Order dated 21 October 2013, this

Honorable Court directed the Office Q/ the Ombudsman to
submit its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the private complainants within five (5) days from receipt
thereof, after which the same is deemed submitted for
resolution.
32
Id., pp. 104-1 1 1.
33
1 12-1 15.
34

2) That a reading of the Motion for Reconsideration
would show that the private complainants have extensively
and exhaustively discussed all the issues and arguments for
this Honorable Court to grant the same and reverse its
Decision dated June 4, 2013.
In an Order dated 21 October 2013, respondent Judge denied petitioners

Sabafia and Brandares's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
personality to file the same, and on the ground of double jeopardy. The
relevant portions of the Order read:
This threats (sic) of the motion for reconsideration filed

by private complainants Marcial Sabafia and Editha Brandares
in this case, of which an opposition was submitted by herein
accused.
Required to file its comment, the Office of the

Ombudsman filed a manifestation.
Going over the records of this case, the motion for

reconsideration has to be denied. First, private complainants
have no personality to file said motion. It should be the Office
of the Ombudsman who should have filed it. It never did. It
filed a Manifestation in consonance with the Order of this
Court. It cannot be considered a motion for reconsideration,
and if it is, it is filed out of time.
Petitioners now argue that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of

discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when he dismissed
the case against private respondent during the middle of trial on the basis
of insufficiency of evidence. They also claim that Sabafia and Brandares
had ample personality to file the motion for reconsideration before the
court a quo.

On the other hand, private respondent argues in his Comment to the
Petition for Certiorari 35 that: (i) the petition was filed out of time due to
OMB-Mindanao's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's Decision; (ii) Sabafia and Brandares's motion for reconsideration
before the trial court did not toll the period for the People to file the
present petition since they had no personality to file said motion in the
first place; and, (iii) Sabafia and Brandares are guilty of Usurpation of
Official Functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 28 March 2017, private respondent filed a Supplemental Comment, 13
reiterating his claim that double jeopardy has already set in due to the
finality of the assailed 4 June 2013 Decision. Private respondent attached a
copy of the Certificate of Finality issued by the Branch Clerk of Court.
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds.
The Petition was filed out of time:
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for

certiorari must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment,
order, or resolution being assailed, or from the denial of a motion for
reconsideration, if one is filed.
Petitioner OMB-Mindanao received a copy of the assailed Decision on 16

September 2013. Yet, it did not file a motion for reconsideration, nor did
it adopt the motion filed by petitioners Sabafia and Brandares. Thus, it had
60 days from 16 September 2013, or until 15 November 2013, within which
to file its Petition.
As it turned out, however, the Petition was filed by registered mail only on
24 February 2014 - way beyond the reglementary period.
There is no merit in petitioner OMB-Mindanao's posturing that the

60-day reglementary period should be counted from receipt of the 21
October 2013 Order denying Sabafia and Brandares's motion for
reconsideration. For one, the general rule is that it is only the State that
can assail an order or decision dismissing a criminal case. As held in
Neplumt Inc. v. Orbeso.

In People v. Santiago, the Court has definitely ruled that
in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended
party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State,
through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
undertake such appeal.
In this case, even if Sabafia and Brandares were the ones who filed the
complaint before OMB-Mindanao, they could not be considered as the
private offended parties before the trial court, given that no civil liability
was due to them even if the accused were to be found guilty. This is so
since there is nothing on record that would show that Sabafia and
Brandares represent the government in any capacity, or personally
suffered injury which may be recompensed through payment of civil
liability. Thus, given the factual milieu, the ruling in Perez v. flagonoy Rural
Bank, Inc., 36 relied upon by petitioner OMB-Mindanao - recognizing the
personality of private parties to bring before the appellate courts petitions
for certiorari to assail orders and decisions resulting in either dismissal or
acquittal is inapplicable.
As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, Sabafia and Brandares had no
personality to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Decision
since they were not parties in the proceedings a quo, nor were they the
private offended parties. 37 Necessarily, their participation thereat was
limited to being witnesses. In the same manner, they have no personality
to join in, or file, the present Petition.
OMB-Mindanao, for its part, did not file any motion to assail the trial
court's decision, nor did it adopt Sabafia and Brandares's submission.
Instead, it simply filed outside of the 15-day period to file a motion for
reconsideration - a Manifestation, which neither contained an explanation
for its inaction, nor a prayer to adopt Sabafia and Brandares's motion for
reconsideration.

To reiterate, since the Petition was filed only on 24 February
2014, or nearly 100 days beyond the reglementary period, the Court has
no option but to deny the same. In this connection, it is apropos to
stress that rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
business"17 and the efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions.
The Petition for Certiorari should
have been filed by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
In addition, it is important to point out that the Petition should have

been filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) pursuant to Sec.
4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended, 18 which provides
that petitions for the issuance of the writ of certiorari shall be brought
before this Coun in the name of the People of the Philippines by the
OSP. Thus:
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order
Nos. l, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg 129,

as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. l, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986. (underscoring supplied).
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
17
Landbank of the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities; Inc., G.R.
No. 175163, 19 October 2007. 18 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7975, R.A. No.
8249, and R.A. No. 10660.
The osp, however, merely filed its Entry of Appearance on 23 February

2017 38 simply stating:
Petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by

the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, respectfully enters its appearance as
counsel for petitioner in the above-entitled case pursuant to
Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, and requests that
henceforth, copies of all pleadings, motions, notices, orders
and other legal processes to be filed, issued or served in
connection with the above-entitled case be furnished the
undersigned counsel.
Neither OMB-Mindanao nor the OSP provided any explanation for their
courses of action in order to help justify their disregard for the law and
the rules. In addition to this, the OSP did not move to adopt the petition
filed by the OMB-Mindanao. As such, the said petition remained as a
submission of OMB-Mindanao per se.
This Court is aware that, in several cases, the Supreme Court had ruled
that the courts should maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be
given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
cause.39Courts have always favored a liberal construction of the rules that
are meant to facilitate rather than frustrate the ends of justice. 4041
However, the party invoking the liberal application of the rules must show
the presence of exceptional circumstances that merit its relaxation. None

was provided in this case to justify the actions of OMB-Mindanao before
this Court and the trial court. The OSP is similarly silent in this regard.
As aptly held in Boardwalk Business Ventures Inc. v. Villareal et al. . 22
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a

component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law." This being so, x x x an appealing
party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be
tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult
to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the
orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts
are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be
followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance
cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. x x x
Given that the Petition is dismissible due to obvious procedural and

technical infirmities, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the merits of
petitioners' arguments and private respondent's comment thereto. As
held in Lazaro v. Court ofAppeals.23.
xxxx "Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed." The Court
reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done, "have oft been held as
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and
to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. x x x The reason for
rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts
would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without
rules governing practice x x x. Such rules are a necessary incident to
the proper, efficient and orderly discharge ofjudicial functions."
As noted earlier, petitioners failed to show that this case falls within the
exceptions to warrant the relaxation of procedural rules.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari dated 20
February 2014 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
BAYANI H. JACINTO
Associate Justice
23
G.R. No. 137761, 6 April 2000; citations omitted.
of
of x
-x
WE CONCUR:

Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation with the Justices of the Court's Division.
Chairperson,
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIll of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Presiding Justice

First Judicial Region
REGIONALTRIAL COURT
Branch 14, Laoag City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Crim. Case No. 14674-14

Plaintiff,
-versus- For: Qualified Theft
WINNIE MOLINA Y BAULAN

Accused,
x---------------------------------------x
PLEA-BARGAINING PROPOSAL
The Accused WINNIE B. MOLINA, by and through counsel on

record, most respectfully submits the following Plea Bargaining Proposal for
the Honorable Court’s consideration and approval, and state:
1. That Accused has been charged for QUALIFIED THEFT punishable by

Reclusion Perpetua;
2. That Accused comes before the Honorable Court with this Plea
Bargaining Agreement after the Prosecution is about to rest its case.
Notwithstanding Rule116, Sec 2, which allows the plea to a lesser
offense at the arraignment, the Supreme Court has nonetheless sustained
plea bargaining during trial and even after the Prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
3. Thus, in Daan vs. Sandiganbayan , G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, ,

2008, the Supreme Court ruled for plea bargaining agreement, and in

support thereof cited, among others, People vs. Villarama, G.R. No.
99287, June 23, 210 SCRA246; People vs. Kayanan 172 Phil. 728,729;
People vs Parohinog G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373,
377, in this wise
–“In People vs. Villarama, the Court ruled that the acceptance of
anoffer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable as a
matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the
sound discretion of the trial court, viz
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court

and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yard stick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People vs. Kayanan
(L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules
allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People vs. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February
28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained
clearly and tersely the rationale of the law:
x x x After the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on

which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the
appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty
to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less
than the evidence already in record. The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which aplea for
a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as
a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining. (Emphasis supplied
4. That Accused Winnie B. Molina, hereby withdraws her plea of not

guilty and offers to enter a plea to the lesser offense of SIMPLE THEFT
under Art. 308 of the Revised Penal Code, which is necessarily
included in Qualified Theft, the offense charged under Criminal Case No.
14674-14 with admission of the facts constituting the lesser offense,
but not the offense charged;
5. That the penalty for such offense is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, the value of
stolen property having exceeded P22,000.00, and one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00;
6. That Accused also prays that the circumstance of plea of guilt and
extreme poverty and necessity be appreciated in her favor in the
imposition of the penalty;
7. Thus, in People vs. Macbul , G.R. No. L-48976, October 11, 1943, the

trial court considered extreme poverty and necessity as a mitigating
circumstance falling within Article 13 par. 10 of the Revised Penal
Code, which authorizes the court to consider in favor of an accused "
any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those
above mentioned”.
8. Consequently, Accused by way of restitution/penalty, is willing to

return the stolen property if this plea bargaining proposal is
admitted by the Prosecution and approved by the Honorable Court.
Respectfully and humbly submitted.
September 5, 2016, Laoag City, Philippines.
ROZANNA BIANCA T. PASTOR

Counsel for Accused
At my instance and with my conformity:
WINNIE B. Molina
Accused

CrimPro Compilation

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

CrimPro Compilation

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FIRST JUDICIAL REGION

AMIELA SARMIENTO-SANTOS Criminal Case No 2172-19

JOSEPH JHONLEE D. SANTOS &

I, AMIELA SARMIENTO-SANTOS, of legal age, married and a resident of

2. On 31 March 2016, I saw the respondents JOSEPH JHONLEE D. SANTOS and

ATTY. BOB-ONG SARMIENTO

We, SPO1 LEOPOLDO BARBON y Marinduque, PO3 MICHAEL MOMO y

That, the aforementioned suspects were properly informed of their

That, we executed this affidavit to attest to the truthfulness of the

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto distributed our signatories in the

SPO1 LEOPOLDO M BARBON

PO3 MICHAEL M MOMO

P/CINSP RAFAEL JAMERO LLUISMA

I, LANIE MONTEMAYORES CANOY, of legal age, Filipino,

That I am likewise the respondent of the criminal complaint filed

That I am executing this affidavit in order to deny the allegations of

That at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of February 17, 2019 I

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 5

That in fact, my neighbor Adelaida Milliones who was washing her

That if indeed PO1 Veloso acted as poseur bettor prior to my arrest

That despite of my vehement protest against my unwarranted arrest

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this ______ day of

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 6

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN, to before me this __ day of February,

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 7

CHERRIE MAE DAYUDAC, NPS DOCKET NO. VII-11-12E-

SPO4 ESDRAS DELOS SANTOS,

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, you are

WITNESS MY HAND this 13th day of May 2013, at Digos City,

On this day, I served the foregoing subpoena upon.

Name of person/s served Signature Date of Service

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 8

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM NPS Docket No. XI-06-INV-

SAMANTHA LYDIA D. ANGALA,

This resolves the complaint filed by the Social Security System,

It appears on record that respondent Samantha Lydia Angala

Subpoena was issued directing respondent to submit counter-

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 9

Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines, 24 August 2018.

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 10

PO1 HERO VELOSO ET, AL, NPS DOCKET NO.

-versus- FOR: VIOLATION OF

LANIE MONTEMAYOR CANOY

Evidence shows that on February 17, 2019, the police complainants

a. Three (3) pieces one thousand (Php 1,000.00) peso bills;

On the other hand, the respondent vehemently denied the allegations

The Office rules in negative. The allegations in the complaint together

Between the two conflicting interpretations of the facts and

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint is

March 1, 2019, Digos City, Davao del Sur, Philippines.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIMINAL CASE NO.____

-versus- For: FRUSTRATED

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 13

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 14

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIM. CASE NO. ____

-versus- For: THEFT

CRISTOM ENDAR y ALUNGAN and

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses CRISTOM

City of San Fernando, Pampanga. March 25, 2009, 2009.

SUZETTE C. GALLEMASO- DALUMPINES

ARVIN JAY LEAL – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -CJC LAW SCHOOL 15

BAIL RECOMMENDED: P 10,000.00 for each accused

City of San Fernando, Pampanga. March 25, 2009.