Three gunshots that ended the coup against Amin

Costly mistake. In a continuation from last week, retired Captain

Isaac Bakka, Brig Charles Arube‟s accomplice in the March 1974
attempted coup against president Idi Amin, narrates how Arube
blundered. He says Arube changed the initial plan and ended up in
Amin‟s ambush at his famous command post at Kololo Hill in
Kampala where the president had been trapped, writes Faustin
Mugabe

Once the two architects of the coup, Brig Charles Arube and Lt Col
Elly Aseni, were convinced of loyalty and the undented will from
their soldiers to oust Amin and his foreign officers, the two daring
commanders gave orders to several officers to carry out the coup.

The attempted coup was instigated by Arube‟s desire to rout all

foreigners in the Uganda Army (UA) and Amin who were brutalising
people, especially Ugandans.

The foreigners, who had infiltrated the army, were from Rwanda,
Zaire (DR Congo), Kenya and Sudan not only belittled Ugandan
officers and soldiers, but also brutalised civilians.

Amin and Brig Malera caused Arube‟s to attempt a coup. It was Gen
Amin‟s indecision to act on Brig Hussein Malera‟s misconduct
particularly towards Brig Arube and his close friend Lt Col Elly
Aseni that prompted Arube to attempt to instigate a coup which he
thought was the only solution to end the injustice Ugandans faced.
So how did it start? From Koboko Town, Uganda Army UO: 606
retired Lt Col Moses Galla told Witness how Brig Hussein Malera, a
Sudanese, had provoked Arube to attempt to stage the coup.

Galla, born on July 2, 1948, and joined the UA in April 1966, was a
close friend of both Arube and Aseni. “I knew Arube and Elly [Aseni]
very well. Amin was related to Elly – and he [Aseni] joined the UA in
1963. Arube joined the King‟s African Rifles (KAR) on September 12,
1959, with my elder brother Khemis Poru. They were recruited from
Koboko, trained in Jinja and later taken to Nanyuki in Kenya,”
Galla vividly recalls.

While he could not remember where Arube was posted before 1971,
he recalls: “When Lt Col Arube was appointed army chief of staff, he
was transferred from Gaddafi Garrison [in Jinja] to Kampala where
he had been the commanding officer of the School of Infantry”.

He went on: “So after that, he was sent to the USSR [Russia] for a
military High Command course for about six months and returned
around March 1974. While on course, Col Hussein Malera was
appointed acting chief of staff and promoted to Brigadier. When
Arube returned, Malera, who had been the commanding officer of
the Military Police, refused to hand over the office [of the chief of
staff]”.

Arube reported the matter to president Amin, commander-In Chief,

who told Arube that he would handle the matter but in vain.
Frustrated by president Amin‟s inaction to his concerns, Arube
called his friends and colleagues for a meeting to seek their advice
on the matter concerning Malera‟s refusal to hand over to him the
office.

While he cannot remember the day of the meeting, he recalls that

he was on duty in Fort Portal when Arube called him to Kampala to
attend a meeting. Where was the meeting I asked? “The meeting
was held at the Officer‟s Mess at Nakasero which was Uganda Club
in Obote‟s government,” Galla answered.

Brigadier Arube chaired the meeting. Lt Col Galla reveals that the
meeting started after lunch. The following officers attended the
meeting as far as Galla can recall. Lt Col Elly Aseni, Governor North
Buganda Province, Lt Col Juma Ali Oka aka Butabika, commanding
officer of Malire Mechanised Specialised Reconnaissance Regiment
at Lubiri Kampala, Maj Moses Galla, acting commanding officer
Mountains of the Moon Battalion in Fort Portal, Maj Amin Lomo,
commanding officer of Air and Sea-borne Battalion in Tororo,
Captain Steven Galla, General manager Kilembe Mines, Lt Enoc
Maturima, tank commander of the Mechanised Specialised
Reconnaissance Regiment, Lt Michael Akonyu, the acting
commanding officer of the paratroopers school at Lubiri”.

In his opening remarks Arube said: “The reason for calling this
meeting is, I am back from the course. I was given a 14-day pass
leave; but when I returned, I found Malera in my office and when I
asked him that „please hand over the office to me‟, he refused”,
Galla recalls Arube‟s words.

“Lt Col Elly Aseni was the first to speak. He told him to report the
matter to the commander-In-chief. Then Lt Col Juma Butabika told
him that if Amin refused to listen to him, he should come to him
and tell him. Mine was different. I said, sir you are the chief of staff,
there is another Brigadier, Smuts Guweddeko, why don‟t you
approach him to see if he can talk to Malera. Arube accepted my
advice and said he would give them the answer in the second
meeting. I did not attend the second meeting. I was in Bugungu in
Masindi overseeing the training of the mortal platoon. I was in
Masindi when I received a telephone call from Juma Doka.

He said: “Galla, Arube has committed suicide”. Doka was in Tororo.

But he said he did not know why and how it happened”.

Retired Captain Isaac Bakka who served in the UA recently told the
Sunday Monitor in the series “attempted coups” that Amin shot
Arube dead at his Command Post as the latter entered the house to
arrest or kill Amin himself during the attempted coup. Amin and
Arube were both Kakwa from the neighbouring villages in present
Koboko District.
It is believed it was around 9am of March 23, 1974, when the last
soldiers were informed to act, and the mission was to be executed
in less than three hours.

Wanted dead or alive

Of all the commanding officers in the coup plot, the most risky
mission fell on Capt John Maturima. He was a Lugbara from
Maracha County, in the West Nile sub-region. He was one of the
best tank commanders in the Uganda Army and was based at the
Malire Mechanised Specialised Regiment.

Maturima was ordered by Arube to take Amin, dead or alive, to his

secret location in Kampala where he was coordinating with Lt Col
Elly Aseni, the battle to topple the president. The forces that were to
hunt Amin and his wanted military police commanding officer, Brig
Hussein Malera, were all from the Lubiri-based garrison in
Kampala.

The assignment to capture or kill Malera was given to Second

Lieutenant Moses Mawa who was also from West Nile. With his
men, Mawa was to capture Malera from Makindye Military
Barracks. Luckily, Malera got wind of the orders and escaped to
Kitubulu village near Entebbe Town.

Mawa‟s and his team sealed off the Entebbe Road in case of
reinforcement from Entebbe. Other places under his command were
Nateete, Katwe and areas surrounding the Makindye Barracks.

Capt John Simba from Kabale, Kigezi sub-region, commanded the

forces that blocked the Busega junction, while Capt Birimbo, who is
believed to have either been from Bushenyi or Mbarara, was
assigned to capture the Bank of Uganda, the Post Office and the
immediate buildings and installations.
Lt Mazamir and Sgt Anguyo commanded the forces that captured
Radio Uganda and Uganda Television. They later secured
Wandegeya, Mulago and Nakasero areas.

The team was also in charge of sealing off the Jinja Road junction
[around Airtel House] to block the Bugolobi flats-based marines,
commanded by a Sudanese, Brig Taban Lupayigana, in case the
marines were to come to Amin‟s rescue at his Kololo command post.

Arube blunders

Had Brig Arube not altered the original plan, the coup might have
certainly succeeded.

Initially, Arube had ordered Capt Maturima to bomb Amin‟s

command post if his forces met stiff resistance from Amin‟s special
guards.

“We had agreed before I left that Arube will by no means appear in
the picture, he should be in a hideout somewhere. He should be the
one directing until the whole operation is confirmed successfully
across the country, only then would we take him to Radio Uganda
and make a broadcast declaring that the leadership had from today
[March 23, 1974] changed hands,” Bakka recalls.

As the overall commander of the forces fighting Amin and the

foreigners in the Uganda Army, Arube erred by stopping Capt
Maturima from executing the mission.

According to Bakka, Maturima, who had a special platoon travelling

in Anti-Personnel Carriers with some good weapons, had reached
the Golf Course when Arube called him saying he had decided to
execute that mission himself. Maturima was advancing from Malire
Barracks and heading to Amin‟s house at Kololo Hill.

Within minutes, Arube arrived where Maturima‟s forces were, took

charge and advanced to Amin‟s house.
“I was informed that he [Brig Arube] altered this arrangement
saying Amin was a Field Marshal and so to capture him, according
to military traditions, he should be captured by a senior officer.
Since there was no other Field Marshal or General – the only
General was Mustafa Adrisi who was not near [Adrisi was in West
Nile] – it was Arube, a Brigadier who is nearer to a General in rank,
to bring Amin in dead or alive. But then he changed that. So
changing that cost us the whole plan,” Captain Bakka expressively
regrets.

During the battle at Amin‟s place, Arube entered the house to

search for Amin, leaving his soldiers behind.

And Bakka continues: “Amin was a brave soldier, let us recognise

that. Despite being besieged, he was still struggling to arrest the
situation. He did not attempt to flee. He wanted if he was to be
captured, it must be after a bloody battle. He was prepared for that
and Amin was a good marksman of both the pistol and the rifle.
Therefore, capturing Amin wasn‟t going to be a tea party.

Amin shoots Arube dead

After a few moments of exchange of fire between our men and

Amin‟s men – a full platoon of about 30 soldiers of Amin‟s guards
were totally wiped out. Arube had about 60 soldiers.

“Maturima had been told to go with at least 100 men because Amin
might reduce that. Amin was well guarded; he had surrounded
himself with the best men and best arms – because presidents are
normally guarded by the best soldiers. So the men we sent were
equally very good and that is why they managed to overpower
Amin‟s people.” Bakka says.

In the battle that lasted about 30 minutes, Arube‟s forces had killed
all the Presidential Guard Unit forces at the premises.
After about 10 minutes of total silence, perhaps out of anger than
bravely, Arube made the second mistake, attempting to capture the
Field Marshal by himself.

“Arube decided to enter the house because the door was open. He
entered, moving slowly,” Bakka says. “This I was told by Toburo, a
sergeant related to Elly [Aseni]. Toburo was a younger brother of
Elly. He had been deployed with our men. He survived. He was
among the men who invaded.”

“He told me that as Arube entered, Amin hid behind the main door.
It did not cross his mind that it would be possible [for Amin to take
cover behind the door]. Arube ignored the door and just passed.”

“He thought the target [Amin] was hiding inside other rooms in the
house. His attention was on the other rooms. Unfortunately, he had
left Amin behind. Amin fired three bullets which hit Arube from his
back.”

“He fell face down – meaning the bullets came from behind. The
hole where the bullet comes out is bigger than where it enters from.
I happened to see Arube‟s body at the Mulago hospital mortuary, it
had three bullet holes.”

“Immediately Amin recognised Sgt Toburo, he put him at gun point,

saying „I‟m going to kill you. Where is your brother?”

“Then he said [to Toburo], „you say Arube killed himself. You must
never say I killed him. [You must say] after he [Arube] realised he
couldn‟t succeed, out of fear of embarrassment, he turned the gun
on himself. I want you to maintain that.‟ Now, that is the story
which many people believed.”

Sgt Toburo was taken to Radio Uganda and said what Amin had
told him to say.

After Arube had been killed

It would seem that as soon as the fighting at Amin‟s command post
started, he sent for reinforcement from the marines based at
Bugolobi flats. Because no sooner had he killed Arube, than the
marines arrived.

“Our men could no longer fight because the marines came with
more men and stronger weapons. These soldiers had to surrender.
As they surrendered, the marines came to Radio Uganda and
arrested our men who had taken over Radio Uganda,” Bakka
recounts.

“There, they were able to go on air and make announcement saying

„we have regained control and that some officers, Brig Charles
Arube and a few others still at large, had attempted to overthrow
the government but the loyal troops have overpowered them.
However, they are dangerous and still at large. If seen, shoot on
sight‟.”

“The order to shoot to kill the coup plotters: Col Elly Aseni, 2nd Lt
Mawa, Capt John Maturima and myself, was issued by the
commander-in-chief, Idi Amin, and was read by the minister of
information and broadcasting, Col Juma Oris.