Are Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs Organised Crime Groups?

: an

analysis of the Finks MC

Abstract

Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCG) in Australia are subject to over 30 pieces of legislation

restricting the movement and association of members. The justification for these acts is the

presumption that the OMCG are criminal organisations. This presumption has not been

proven empirically by government agencies nor tested by academic research partly due to

the difficulty in obtaining sufficient information. This paper tests the presumption by

analysing the data contained in the Queensland Police Service’s application to the Supreme

Court to list the Finks MC, Gold Coast, as a criminal organisation.

Keywords: outlaw motorcycle gangs, criminal organisation, organised crime

In recent years, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) have become the focus of controversial

legislation across Australia. Beginning with the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act

2008 (SA), states and territories have legislated to restrict the membership of, and freedom

of association between OMCGs in response to a perceived threat to society. The legislation

has been tested by the High Court and legal and constitutional deficiencies addressed over

the last five years. The latest legislation to be tested is the Vicious Lawless Anti-

Disestablishment Act 2013 from Queensland, which, is now being emulated in South

Australia and Victoria (Doorley 2015a;, Fedorowytsch 2015). These acts presume that the

clubs are criminal organisations; that their primary purpose is organised crime based on and

managed by the club hierarchy, and that this crime involves most if not all club members and

associates (Ayling 2013;, Sarre 2013). Policing agencies name OMCG as major players in

organised crime (ACC, 2013a), however, the gangs’ spokesmen, and some academics,

1
claim that this view is exaggerated, inaccurate, or even constitutes a moral panic (Katz 2011;,

Morgan and Dagistanli 2010;, Quinn and Forsyth 2012;, Veno and van den Eynde 2007;,

Veno and Gannon 2009). While the participation in criminal activity by members of clubs is

not in dispute, there has not been a study to test whether the clubs are criminal

organisations or simply organisations containing criminals.

This paper will address this gap in the knowledge by analysing the history of criminal activity

of the Finks MC on the tourist centre of the Gold Coast, in Queensland, Australia. The data

for this study comes from an application (the Finks Application) made by the Queensland

Police Service (Condon 2012) to the state’s Supreme Court to have the Finks MC listed as a

criminal organisation under section 8 of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld). A decision

was not made as the process was delayed by court action and made redundant by the

Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013. The submission was put together

from intelligence data gathered by Queensland policing agencies and is now on the public

record. It lists every member of the Gold Coast chapter and their criminal records. This data

provides a unique opportunity for the public to examine the criminality of members of an

OMCG.

In addition, this paper will add to the literature by providing empirical data to the broader

debate. The criminal activity of OMCGs has not received the scholarly attention that it

deserves (Barker and Human 2009;, Hopper and Moore 1983;, Montgomery 1976;,

Shamblin 1971). There are very few rigorous academic studies of the topic (Danner and

Silverman 1986;, Lauchs, Bain and Bell 2015). Most sources have not progressed further

than the journalistic treatment begun by Hunter Thompson (1967) in Hell’s Angels, are

descriptive (Barker 2007;, Barker and Human 2009), and do not examine or develop

theoretical explanations for OMCG behaviour. The few studies of the culture of motorcycle

clubs and their lifestyle do not address the question of the range of criminal activity (Danner

and Silverman 1986;, Morselli 2009;, Watson 1980).

2
The paper will commence with a discussion of OMCG culture and the alternative potential

compositions of criminal participation.

Origins and culture of OMCG’s

This section will provide a summary of the origins of OMCG in the USA and the creation of

their homogenous culture. Delaney (2005) discusses three periods of OMCG history in

America: the preformation period from 1901-1948; the formative period 1945-1957; and the

Transformative period from 1958 to the present. The first of these does not concern us as it

is the rise of the social clubs of motorcycle enthusiasts. The second is the post-war period

when ex-servicemen formed clubs together and the rise of hooliganism. This includes the

media creation of the biker mythos through the Life magazine beat-up of the, so called,

‘Hollister riot’ in 1947, leading to some clubs feeding off public fear to become proactively

deviant. There are two key events that set OMCG apart from social biker groups; both of

which have been shown to be both untrue. First it is claimed that the American Motorcycle

Association (AMA) originated the term of the 1%er after a notorious riot in a small town in

California called Hollister. The event received national media attention and created the

archetype of the leather clad, anti-social, violent gang replicated in movies such as The Wild

One. The negative publicity, it was claimed, inspired the AMA to point out that most of its

members were law-abiding citizens and only 1% of enthusiasts were deviant. However,

there is no record of such a statement by the AMA (Dulaney 2005). Similarly, the great riot

which inspired movies and setup the violent persona was a media fabrication (Barker 2016).

But the clubs embraced the media’s negative profile and attempted to live up to it. During the

Transformative Pperiod these clubs develop the internationally recognised culture of

outlawry that they embrace today.

Social researchers have identified a typology of motorcycle enthusiast clubs ranging from

those who simply want to ride, through to lifestyle enthusiasts and, finally, OMCGs

(Thompson 2008). Barker and Human (2009) state that the culture can be divided into either

3
conventional clubs like those of American Motorcycle Association (AMA), or deviant clubs,

the Outlaw clubs, which violate the AMA norms and participate in minor and serious criminal

activities. The weekend warriors’ play at outlawry while maintaining their mainstream,

compliant lifestyles, while the true outlaws place the culture at the centre of their lives

(Thompson 2008). Dulaney (2005) makes a further demarcation of outlaws into those who

are not chartered by the AMA and those who are 1%ers, that is, the group that embrace the

most extreme deviant lifestyle and have been targeted by the Australian criminal

organisation legislation. Whilst Dulaney is correct, the commonly used terminology by

governments and the clubs is to describe such groups as Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs and

excluding the non-1%er clubs from this definition.

There are two recognisable cultures within the OMCG: conservative behaviour which was

developed during the formative period; and radical behaviour which did not appear till the

1970s in the USA and the late 1980s in Australia. Wolf (1991) said conservative bikies

preserve the original saloon culture – uncivilised, violent, hyper-masculinity, seeking trouble,

toughness and autonomy (Watson 1980) - and radical bikers are interested in profit through

criminal activity. The community is concerned by both but the suite of criminal organisation

legislation in Australia is focused on the radical behaviour.

Most of the early OMCG were formed by returned servicemen in the US after WWII who

craved the freedom, excitement, camaraderie and hyper-masculinity they experienced in the

armed forces. They found this through the brotherhood and high-powered motorcycles of the

OMCG while at the same time rejecting mainstream society (Montgomery 1976;, Watson

1980) and devaluing women (Quinn and Forsyth 2011a;, Quinn 1987). They promoted their

deviance and sought conflict with society through confrontational appearance (tattoos and

uniforms) and behaviour, such as violence, drunkenness and various other kinds of

debauchery (Barger, Zimmerman and Zimmerman 2001). This culture and its iconology

(Watson 1980) was emulated in other Western nations with clubs forming independently

around the world in the 1960s. At this time, clubs such as the Finks, Rebels, Black Uhlans

4
and Gladiators were formed across Australia (McNab 2013). By the 1970s, Australian

OMCG had a reputation for extreme violence and social disruption including rape (Canberra

Times 1970), murder (Canberra Times 1973), and affray (Canberra Times 1975). Today the

Australian Crime Commission (ACC) estimates that there are 40 clubs in Australia with over

6000 patched members (ACC, 2013a).

The original American clubs began to expand chapters in the USA and also created

international chapters during the expansion period from 1965 to 1980 (Quinn and Forsyth

2011b). These chapters and locally formed clubs all abide by the same hierarchy and ethos

of the original OMCG:

 An exclusive male membership obtained after a probationary period;

 Operating in self-managed chapters (local branches) usually run by elected officials;

 Strict secrecy and loyalty;

 Commitment to riding high-powered motorcycles; and

 Strict discipline and obedience to club rules and senior members.

The requirements of membership defined how a person lived their life. As Dulaney (2005:11)

explains: “…the demands of the organization are superior to the needs of the individual,

which includes the individual’s family and occupation”.

One aspect of outlaw behaviour is territoriality; they fight over ownership of territory. This is

exacerbated when local clubs also have to compete with the arrival of overseas clubs, or the

incorporation of local clubs into a US club – a patchover – as occurred in 1983 when a

chapter of the Comancheros became the first Australian chapter of the Bandidos (Harvey

and Simpson 2001). These disputes over territory have nothing to do with crime. Quinn &

Forsythe (2011b) spell out the history of inter club violence, or a 'war mentality'; gangs

compete for territory out of a need for prestige and source of members. This competition has

5
led to feuds such as that between the four decade long rivalry between the Hell’s Angels and

Outlaws in the USA (Quinn and Forsyth 2009) and the feud between the Hell’s Angels and

the Mongols (Barker 2011).

In the 1980’s, the expansion of the clubs led to various government agencies focusing on

their illicit activity (Hopper and Moore 1983). Even in the mid-1970s in the USA, they were

known to be involved in drug distribution (Montgomery 1976). There are no rigorous

historical studies of the shift from small scale activity to serious organised crime within any

club. However, by the 1990s, OMCGs became recognised by US law enforcement as “the

new face of organised crime” (Barker and Human 2009:175;, Quinn 2001).

In Australia, widespread participation by OMCG members in serious criminal activity is a

recent phenomenon. Even as recently as the 1980s the gangs spread fear and strife but

were not known as participants on organised crime. The fatal Millpera shootings in 1984

between the Comanchero and Bandidos in Sydney, and their associated social history show

two groups riven with disputes that were personal slights and not battles over criminal

markets (Harvey and Simpson 2001). By the 2000s, OMCG were portrayed by Australian

government agencies and the media as serious organised crime gangs. The ACC describes

them as “one of the most high profile manifestations of organised crime” (ACC, 2013a).

Organised crime is regarded as more dangerous than opportunistic crime as the ongoing

planning and operation leads to greater criminal success. Organised crime is defined as:

three or more people within a group, existing for a period of time, and cooperating with the

aim of committing an offence, in order to achieve financial gain or material benefit

(Schloenhardt 2011:8). There are variations on this definition that change with time and

place (von Lampe 2003). However, in recent years there has been a further definition of

serious organized crime which demarcates sophisticated criminal groups from the smaller,

less well organised gangs. The Australian legislation targets OMCG in this category,

including, until recently, referring to them as Criminal Motorcycle Gangs in Queensland

6
(Robertson 2015). However, this characterisation is at the heart of the current study as it

presumes that the entire club or chapter is involved in serious criminal activity. There are a

number of alternatives to this characterisation.

The criminal records of Australian OMCG members show a more nuanced picture than the

public image. Almost all members of clubs have convictions (Lauchs, Bain and Bell 2015)

but we have to differentiate between organised crime associated offences and saloon culture

offences, including traffic offenses, violence associated with brawling but not extortion or

murder and minor drug and alcohol offenses. Organised crimes, or radical offences, include

major drug offenses such as production, supply or trafficking, extortion, money laundering,

prostitution, murder for hire, etc. Barker (2011) provides an extensive list of such offenses

committed by OMCG in the US. However, participation by members in organized crime is

not a given. Wood (2003) hypothesised that the dynamics of an individual chapter changes

over time swinging between conservative and radical stances. Clubs that reach a

membership of a dozen or more have a tendency to form cliques. He saw the chapters as

containing cliques or factions supporting both conservative and radical behaviour who, like

political parties, each had time in control and were regularly displaced through the politics of

the chapter.

Police sources have suggested that in Australia, the change to radical activity occurred in

the new millennia and was associated with a shift in ethnicity within the clubs which led to a

focus on profit through criminal activity (Kent 2009). The increased wealth is on display as

the Biker fashion changes. The disreputable appearance of old has been replaced with

expensive haircuts and ‘bling’. The Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) stated there

was intelligence that the increased display of gold jewellery may also be the result of theft.

Members also own much more expensive motorcycles and cars than was traditionally the

case (CMC, 2009). However, these theories cannot be supported because, not only is there

no proof of Anglo-exclusivity before 2000, but there are many cases of major criminal activity

from the 1990s without the same fashion changes or arrogant displays of wealth.

7
OMCG members in Australia appear to have commenced their organized crime participation

through drug distribution, specifically with the Hells Angels production and supply of

amphetamines (McNab 2013). Even today members of more than one OMCG are increasing

their involvement in cocaine use, supply and distribution (CMC 2007). However, official

reports do not provide clear evidence that OMCGs are criminal enterprises. Rather, they

claim that OMCG members and associates operate their own networks, in cooperation with

external individuals and groups, separate to the club as opportunities arise. There is

circumstantial evidence that some members are earning large incomes presumably from

illicit activities, such as Alex Vella, the former National President of the Rebels MC (Willacy

2015). In addition, many OMCG members have registered companies and/or own

businesses especially in the fields of security, concreting, motor vehicle sales and repairs,

panel beating and tattoo parlours, which have also been targeted by legislation (CMC 2009).

The ACC stated that OMCGs presented a ‘significant threat to law and order’, especially

through illicit drug operations and links to non-OMCG crime groups (ACC 2011a). The ACC:

 described OMCGs as high-level criminal organizations (ACC 2012);

 who use their social networks to recruit partners in the drug market (ACC 2011a);

 protect their criminal territory with violence (ACC 2011b); and

 are one of the major groups involved in the production, importation and distribution of

methamphetamines (ACC 2011b).

The ACC characterisations of OMCGs also typify government publications insofar as they

refer to OMCGs as if they are a homogenous or even coordinated group. However, the clubs

are in competition and their members have varying degrees of participation which can also

be true of individual chapters; a club may have some chapters with heavy involvement but

others with almost no serious criminal activity (Veno and Gannon 2009). Contradictorily, the

ACC make very clear in other reports that organized crime is conducted by individual

members acting without direction from the clubs’ or chapters’ hierarchy:

8
 OMCG chapters do not engage in organised crime as a collective unit. Rather, their

threat arises from small numbers of members conspiring with other criminals for a

common purpose. These criminally involved members are able to leverage off the

OMCG to aid their criminal activities, ranging from social nuisance in residential

communities through to their involvement in some of the most significant criminal

syndicates in Australia. (ACC, 2013a)

Although the ACC sees the criminality as belonging to members and not the clubs, the scale

of participation by members is significant. For example, in 2013, the police special operation,

Task Force Attero, targeted the Rebels MC and led to the arrest of:

…700 Rebel members or associates and laying more than 1200 charges ranging

from serious assault, stalking and kidnapping to firearms and drug offences. More

than 40 firearms have been seized along with illicit drugs and precursor drugs, with a

combined estimated street value of more than $1 million, and over $1.7 million in

unpaid taxes has been recovered from Rebels associates or members. (ACC,

2013b:87)

The suite of criminal organisation legislation developed in the various states target OMCG

and presume that they are criminal organisations (Bartels 2010). Many states had passed

laws restricting the fortification of clubhouses or the participation by OMCG members in

certain industries. In total, by 2015, there were over 30 pieces of legislation passed by

Australian state governments directed at restricting the activities of OMCG. The acts

proposed limiting association between members in an attempt to pre-empt organised

criminal activity. South Australia passed the Serious and Organised Crime Control Act 2008

which gave the Attorney-General power to declare groups as criminal organizations if they

associated for the purpose of serious criminal activity and were a risk to public safety

(s.10(1)). New South Wales passed the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009

which gave the power to the judge to make the declaration of a group. Without going into the

9
minutia of the cases, both acts lost appeals to the High Court on the grounds that they

breached the constitutional independence of the judiciary (South Australia v Totani (2010)

242 CLR 1; Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181). This leg was overcome by

the Queensland Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (the COA 2009); the act under which the

application being reviewed in this study was made. All of these acts have been criticised for

conflicting with human rights obligations, specifically freedom of association and the reversal

of the onus of proof, and as prejudging guilt of members (Anaian-Welsh and Williams 2014;,

Ayling 2011a,; Ayling 2011b;, Barnes 2008;, Cash 2012;, Cowdery 2009).

The ACC is also concerned about the OMCG ‘culture of violence’ including extreme violence

and murder: ‘If violence between crime groups is increasingly played out in the public space,

the risk increases that members of the public will become unintended “collateral” victims of

this violence’ (ACC, 2013b:18). Legislation has been driven by public displays of extreme

violence between OMCG including the ‘Ballroom Blitz’ of 2006 (Bedo 2016), the Sydney

Airport Brawl of 2009 (Clennell, Welch and Ramachandran 2009), and the 2013 Broadbeach

Brawl (Ravn, Westthorp and Laughlin 2013). While many police try to explain the violence as

links to organised crime, there is a long history of violence simply linked to the clubs’ war

mentality. Thus, while violence is an issue and can cause ‘collateral’ damage to innocent

members of the public, it is not necessarily an indicator of criminal organisation within clubs.

However, violence by OMCG accounts for a miniscule portion of the overall street violence in

the community (Lauchs 2013).

The literature leaves us with three possibilities. First, OMCG are criminal organisations; a

view supported by some academics on the basis that senior members of chapters have

been arrested for radical offences (Barker 2007;, Barker and Human 2009). They argue that

if the senior members are involved then they use their authority within the club to direct

criminal activity by other members and associates. Thereby, the club has serious criminal

activity as its goal.

10
Second, as mentioned above, it is theorised that there are cliques within OMCG chapters

that support conservative or radical culture. These cliques may coexist by alternating in

power of a chapter with varying acceptance and rejection of organised criminal activity. For

example, the leadership of each chapter may shift between barbarian and radical factions or

they complement one another with the conservatives supporting but not participating in

organised crime behaviour. These conservative versus radical factions may be open with

their attitudes and compete with each other for control of the chapter. Quinn and Forsyth

(2011b:217) point out that the two states of mind are compatible and interchangeable:

Purists are not necessarily anti-entrepreneurial; nor are entrepreneurs seeking a

different way of life for themselves or their brothers. The difference is one of priorities.

Purists put the biker values… first, and are willing to limit club and enterprise growth

to protect these values. Entrepreneurs see the financial power attained through

enterprises and growth as essential to the preservation of the club and subculture.

They reason that if the club falls, its version of the subculture values will fall with it

and then even the purist goal is lost. Therefore minor and hopefully temporary

sacrifices of values are acceptable to them if they serve the greater purpose of

advancing the club and its values.

It is also possible that conservative cliques support the profits that come from radical activity

as it funds the arms race between competing clubs, which creates a vicious circle

demanding even greater organised criminal activity (Quinn 2001). It is possible that both

motivations exist side by side. Conservative activity is the original raison d’etre of OMCG

and is the core of the attraction for people to join. If a person simply wished to participate in

organised crime, they will have had sufficient opportunities without going through the difficult

and lengthy process of obtaining membership in an OMCG. Thus they simply like and are

attracted to barbarian behaviour. An interest in profit need not displace barbarian activity.

Conversely, the strength of the OMCG criminal business model is the power of the patch,

the violent reputation of OMCG members, as a tool of intimidation (Barker 2011). The brand

11
and image are a marketable commodity that increases their power (Quinn and Koch 2003).

In other words, the fear generated from the traditional activity provides a tool that supports

the radical organised criminal activity. Quinn and Koch (2003) point out a further

complicating factor in that the Big 4 (The Hells Angels, the Pagans, the Outlaws and the

Bandidos) have elite subgroups responsible for lethal violence; a practice emulated by the

Finks MC. Conservative activity is the basis of this power. Therefore, organised criminal

activity is largely premised on the continuation of conservative activity to provide the cultural

power and reputation of the patch. Thus it is in the interest of the radicals to continue the

barbarian activity.

Finally, there may be semi-independent operators amongst the membership who run their

own organised crime activity in association with outsiders, with the knowledge and

acquiescence of the chapter hierarchy (Liddick 2008). Radicals can rely on the power of the

patch, however, as noted above, violence is equally useful to both conservative and radical

cultures (Quinn and Forsyth 2007).

Methodology

A content analysis was conducted of the Finks Application (Condon 2012) and of newspaper

articles relating to the club’s activity on the Gold Coast after the application. The Finks were

formed in Australia, in Adelaide, in 1969. They quickly became involved in violent activity in

clashes with other gangs including the Hells Angels (Canberra Times 1973). The Gold Coast

chapter has been in place since the 1970s. They were conservative bikies until the late

1990s when members became involved in serious drug offences. By the time of the

Application under the COA 2009, chapters members had accumulated over 175 years of jail

sentences (Robertson and Kyriacou 2012). In 2013, they ‘patched over’ to the Mongols in an

attempt to avoid the jurisdiction of the VLAD Act. While they have a national presence the

actions of the Gold Coast chapter appear to be independent of any instruction from a mother

12
chapter elsewhere in the country. Thus this document does not need to be supported by

research of activity outside Queensland.

The analysis distinguishes between the conservative actions and the organized criminal

actions of the radicals. Quinn and Koch (2003:296) developed a typology of biker criminal

actions:

- Spontaneous expressive acts: in which one or a few members participate in violent

crime within the saloon society rather than as part of organized crime activity

- Planned aggressive acts: activity against rivals which is planned by cliques within, or

by the senior management of, the chapter or club to advance the club’s priorities

- Short-term instrumental acts: activity, either planned or spontaneous, by members to

take advantage of an opportunity such as a theft.

- Ongoing instrumental enterprises: planned long-term activity designed to produce a

profit for the club

Organized crime falls under the last of these categories. The other three are mainly

associated with conservative activity although; however, planned aggressive acts may be

used to support ongoing instrumental enterprises. But they will not be counted as radical

offences unless there is clear evidence of a connection to an organised crime offence, for

example, violence associated with an extortion attempt. Crimes will be distinguished

between traditional barbarian offenses and organized crime offenses. Offences are

distinguished as follows:

 Conservative offences: traffic offences, drunk and disorderly and small scale drug

offences;

 Potentially conservative or radical: assault, grievous bodily harm, affray, homicide or

weapons offences;

13
  Radical: extortion, serious drug offences, prostitution and money laundering.

The cross-over offences recognise that violence can be employed to further the aims of both

cultures.

Evidence of the criminal acts of individual chapter members was extracted from the Finks

Application. Each member was recorded by age, rank, Terror Team membership and

criminal history for radical offences, which essentially meant serious drug offences. Separate

lists were created for current members, nominees and former members. There were 44

patched members, three nominees and seventeen former members, of whom three were

deceased. The seniority of the club only included a sergeant-at-arms, treasurer and

secretary. There was no President. The office bearers of the club were Inch, Shipton and

Munro (Condon 2012).

Members ranged in age from 23 to 68, with an average age of 46. Nominees were aged

from 27-39 and past members from 28 to 59, with one deceased members being 71 at the

time of his death; a time when he was still a member. Four of the past members were in

prison at the time of the Finks Application or appear to have left the club whilst in prison at

an earlier date, including McCabe, Michail, Nicholson and Hudson. Hudson had left and

joined the Hells Angels; an action which sparked the Ballroom Blitz affray in 2006 (Brisbane

Times 2008).

Possible outcomes for the study were:

 The Finks MC Gold Coast chapter is a criminal organisation. This is the claim made

by the Application. If this were true then the office holders of the club would have

convictions for radical offences and/or there would be evidence of such members

directing the activity of junior members and nominees;

 There is criminal activity within the Finks MC Gold Coast chapter separate to the

management. This is the Liddick (2008) alternative. This scenario would be

14
 demonstrated by either individuals or cliques within the chapter participating in

repeated serious criminal activity. These members could include nominees but would

not include senior members; or

 There is a criminal organisation within the membership supported by other club

members but with the majority being non-participants. This is the Quinn and Forsythe

(2011b) alternative where the conservatives tolerate radical activity and provide the

blind support of members without participating in serious criminal activity themselves.

Analysis

The Finks Application claims that “The members habitually, both individually and collectively,

engage in serious criminal activity” (Condon 2012:7). This activity includes violence, but also

drug offences, and “extortion, robbery, stalking, burglary; enter premise with intent;

deprivation of liberty; unlawful use and possession of motor vehicles/vessels…; receiving’

possession and supply of firearms” (Condon 2012:7). Of these offences, only extortion and

the drug offences are clearly radical in nature. The Application does not provide any analysis

or supporting argument to establish the claim or link the members to their respective

offending. All that is provided is an uncollated list of offences in a section entitled: “The

members associate for the purpose of engaging in or conspiring to engage in serious

criminal activity and the organisation is an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare and order

of the community” (Condon 2012:59).

The Application contains a breakdown of every member of the chapter and their rank. It also

includes nominees of the chapter, those who are waiting for full membership, and past

members both living and dead. Each member is discussed individually with the intelligence

demonstrating their rank and some information on criminal history. The latter is vague mostly

spelling out the states and territories in which they have a criminal history. This information is

only clarified to the extent that it is described under the ‘serious criminal activity’ section.

Many of the members have Commonwealth criminal histories which primarily relate to failure

15
to cooperate with coercive hearings held by the ACC. Once again, these merely indicate a

deviant refusal to assist the police and remain loyal to the club by not disclosing internal

matters. They are not proof of organised crime activity.

One additional point of reference was membership of the Finks Terror Team, “whose major

function is the extortion of money by a system known as “Finks Fines” (Condon 2012:6).

However, there is no direct evidence in the Finks Application, or in the press, showing a link

between being a Terror Team member and any act of extortion.

All members, past and present, and nominees have traffic offences. This is not surprising

given the nature of police attention and the deviance of members. However, only two

members and one past member have no other criminal convictions other than traffic. There

are many drug offences that only involve small amounts, even of home grown cannabis, that

do not result in serious convictions. In most cases a conviction was not recorded or if it was,

there was no sentence of imprisonment. These cases are characteristic of minor drug use or

production for associates in the club. They are not cases of radical behaviour and have no

evidence of connections to the major drug cases listed below.

Serious drug convictions do appear but there is no evidence linking the events to each other.

The convictions include:

 In 1997, Bowden for trafficking in cocaine;

 From 1998-99, Nicholson for trafficking in amphetamines, ecstasy, lysergide and

cannabis;

 In 2000, Kris Spizzirri for possession of 9 grams of meth and 370g of cannabis;

 From 2002-03, Graeme Keating for trafficking and supplying cannabis;

 In 2003, Moir for trafficking and supplying ecstasy;

 In 2003, Kris Spizzirri for possession of 792 ecstasy tablets;

 In 2004, Nicholson for trafficking cocaine;

16
  In 2004, Sharman for in possession of cocaine ‘for a commercial purpose’;

 In 2006, Bakir for importing precursor chemicals for the manufacture of gamma

hydroxybutyric acid (GBH);

 In 2009, Kris Spizzirri for possessing 200ml of gamma hydroxybutyric acid;

 In 2009, Moir for trafficking meth; and

 In 2010-11, Dion Spizzirri for trafficking meth.

There is only one matter in the Finks Application which relates to a radical activity involving

more than one member. Operation Foxtrot Creed, from 2007-09, investigated a meth and

ecstasy supply and trafficking network, led to charges against seven individuals including

one nominee. However, Watson, Main and Nachouki were the only ones charged with a

drug offence, and Nachouki and Chapman were charged with extortion. The others were

charged with failure to answer questions before a coercive hearing (Condon 2012). None of

these men were office bearers.

It is possible to imply connections from this list. This is given greater credence when

consideration is given to two very successful drug traffickers with connections to the chapter.

 Charlie Cannon left the chapter in the 1990s and set up a drug network. He was

convicted of drug offences in the 2000s, and had his assets seized. Police took over

$26 million in cash and property including two luxury yachts and a waterfront home

(Kyriacou 2015).

 Dean ‘Dino’ Spizzirri, a ‘bricklayer’ and reputed drug “Godfather of the Glitter Strip”, is

the father of Finks member Kris Spizzirri and his brother Dion, a nominee (Robertson

2014). Dean lost his $2 million home, $650,000 Gold Coast unit and $620,000 in

seized assets after being caught with 1.5kg of meth and pleading guilty of drug

production. In 2014, after the Finks Application had been made, Kris and Dion, both

Finks associates, pleaded guilty to production of crystal methamphetamine (Carson

2015).

17
Also further involvement was uncovered by police after the Finks Application. Nick ‘the Knife’

Forbes, a Fink who became a Mongol, was arrested 22 June 2015, along with 10 members

and 30 other people, in relation to an alleged $100,000 per week drug production and

distribution network (ABC News 2015;, Cartwright and Weymes 2015;, Doorley 2015b).

The only other criminal conspiracy involved McGarry and two non-Finks who ran an

operation relating to "the ongoing theft and disposal of heavy vehicles and their parts”

(Condon 2012:68). This did not involve any connections with other members or nominees of

the Finks.

No details are provided about the extortion charges under Operation Foxtrot Creed. Other

cases of extortion do not involve the classic case of a stand over racket to extract funds.

Rather they concern one Finks member. In 2004, Michail demanded $100 compensation

from a business associate of his wife for a failed deal, stating that the Finks “ran the Coast”

(Condon 2012:71;, Robertson and Stolz 2014). Later in 2005, he demanded priority

treatment for his wife at the Gold Coast Hospital or “30 other Finks would attend the hospital”

(Condon 2012:74). The only related incident is not extortion but debt enforcement. In 2009,

Main, who has many violence convictions, and Barns assaulted a man whilst pursuing a debt

owed to Kris Spizzirri. Both were convicted of assault and ordered to pay compensation

(Condon 2012). The only instances of Terror Team activity, which is purported by the Finks

Application to have extortion as its purpose, relate to enforcement of a code of silence. For

example, in 2007 Watson assaulted a man after forcing his way into the man’s residence

saying “’I’ve heard you’ve been talking about my club… I’m here to fuck you up’” (Condon

2012:78). While completely unacceptable, this is conservative behaviour and not the radical

behaviour theoretically targeted by the legislation.

There are many instances of violence listed in the Finks Application, including random acts,

for example, in 2008 as Forbes and an associate “walked down the [Broadbeach] mall, they

18
began indiscriminately assaulting people, both male and female on the street” (Condon

2012:78). But again this has no relation to radical activity.

Many of the older members who had been in the club have little involvement in drugs. The

average age of current and former members and nominees involved in drugs is 38, well

below the average age of members at 46, and included only three members aged over 40.

Conversely, the average age of those with no drug conviction of any type is 52 and only

includes five members aged under 40. This possibly indicates a trend of involvement

reflecting a generational change. However, the number of members with serious convictions

is eleven members, former members and nominees, or only 17% of those mentioned in the

Finks Application. So this is far more indicative of individuals acting alone or cliques, rather

than a faction within the club.

But of those involved in drugs, two held senior positions, including:

 Michail, a former sergeant-at-arms, and

 Greg Keating the last sergeant-at-arms, who was charged with drug offences after

the Finks Application.

But Inch, another sergeant-at-arms and later secretary, and one of the oldest members, had

no involvement in serious crime. Also none of the other office bearers at the time of the

Finks Application were involved in serious criminal activity. In fact, the last Treasurer,

Harrison, had no convictions.

Turning to the three possible scenarios:

1. There is no evidence of office bearers controlling serious criminal activity or any

participation by the majority of men to hold these positions. A possible answer to this,

often suggested by the police, is that the office bearers have others, especially

nominees and associates, carry out the crimes on their behalf. But the Finks

Application neither suggests this nor supplies any evidence that it may have been the

19
 case. So it can be concluded that the Finks MC, Gold Coast, was not a criminal

organisation.

2. This is evidence of cliques and individuals participating in radical activity. As well as

the group involved in the crimes surrounding Operation Foxtrot Creed, there is a

history of serious drug supply and trafficking with possible links to external players

such as the father of the Spizzirri brothers, however, the Finks Application does not

make this case. Further, Cannon had left the chapter and club before setting up his

drug enterprise, thus indicating that it was not a fertile environment from which to run

the criminal network. Individuals such as Main and McGarry also worked on their own

or with external associates.

3. There is evidence that conservatives tolerated the criminal activity of other club

members by not cooperating with law enforcement agencies. This is most notable in

the case of the four members being willing to go to prison rather than answer at

coercive hearings during Operation Foxtrot Creed.

Conclusion

It is reasonable to assume that when the Queensland Police Service prepared the Finks

Application under the COA 2009, they had selected their best case to prove that an OMCG

on the Gold Coast was a criminal organisation. There was no timeline demanding an

application be made, thus when it was submitted it must have been done at a time that no

better brief could have been produced to make the case required by the Act. They needed to

prove that “The members associate for the purpose of engaging in or conspiring to engage

in serious criminal activity and the organisation is an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare

and order of the community” (Condon 2012:59). This requirement mirrors the claims made

by Australian politicians in most states. It has formed the basis of all the Australian anti-

association legislation produced and targeted at OMCG. However, this case shows that, at

least for the group who were formerly known as the Finks MC, Gold Coast chapter, it is

untrue.

20
On the basis of the Finks Application, the Finks MC’s Gold Coast chapter were not a criminal

organisation. The office bearers did not use their positions to direct criminal activity. The

majority, 83%, of members, nominees and past members mentioned in the Finks Application

had no involvement in radical activity. Of those that did participate, there is no evidence that

they were directed to do so as members of the club and no indication that membership was

a necessary part of that activity. The only benefit presented is that other members would

maintain the code of silence and not report their activity to law enforcement agencies. Using

the terminology of the academic literature, this chapter is primarily a conservative group

heavily involved in violence and other forms of deviance that meet the cultural goals of the

OMCG 1%er lifestyle. While they are for the most part criminals, the greatest threat to

society is the performance of almost random acts of violence that may be directed at

innocent civilians, but it more likely to be used against rival OMCGs. The big organised

crime drug networks in the region were run by Cannon and Spizzirri Snr, but were not a part

of the Finks and were uncovered by good police work assisted by well-resourced agencies.

Similar skill and resourcing has routinely uncovered serious drug trafficking by the minority of

members of the Finks who chose to engage in it.

There are serious policy implications for this study. If the results can be extrapolated to other

clubs, labelling an OMCG as a criminal organisation and restricting the movement of its

members is not a good use of resources and an unnecessary foray into controversial areas

of human rights. Further, the Finks Application was not released to the public. It was

obtained through a Freedom of Information request by Channel 7 News and released by that

company. Governments must be accountable as well as producers of good quality policy.

Legislation must be supported by evidence and the government must be able to make the

case that justifies all policy and especially when there are questions of breaches of

fundamental legislative principles.

There are also policy issues for the OMCG. An organisation that allows serious criminal

activity to be disguised by placing greater value on preserving the group’s culture cannot be

21
surprised when the public misconstrues apparent organised criminal activity carried on under

a club’s banner as the business of the club. OMCG have effectively kicked an ‘own goal’

when the conservatives protect the radicals. The suites of legislation around Australia are

targeted at the radicals. If the clubs do not expel them from their group and activity hide

them, they cannot be surprised if they attract unwanted attention from the law enforcement

agencies.

Future research in this area is necessary but is hampered by the difficulty in obtaining data.

Legal judgements are rarely available and the code of silence exercised by the clubs

prevents ethnographic or other qualitative research. The best data would come from the

courts and it would be advantageous for governments around the nation to support the

publication of this material.

22
ABC News. 2015. "Alleged Queensland Mongols Boss Nick Forbes Arrested Along with 50 Others in
Queensland Drug Raids." in ABC News. Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
Anaian-Welsh, Rebecca and George Williams. 2014. "The New Terrorists: The Normalisation and
Spread of Anti-Terror Laws in Australia." Melbourne University Law Review 38(2):362-408.
Australian Crime Commission (ACC). 2011a. Annual Report 2010-11. Canberra: Australian Crime
Commission.
Australian Crime Commission (ACC). 2011b. Organised Crime in Australia 2011. Canberra: Australian
Crime Commission.
Australian Crime Commission (ACC). 2012. Assessment of Organised Crime in Australia 2011-12.
Canberra: Australian Crime Commission.
Australian Crime Commission (ACC). 2013a, "Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs": Australian Crime
Commission. Retrieved 7 August 2014,
(www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/intelligence-products/crime-profile-fact-
sheets/outlaw-motorcycle-gangs).
Australian Crime Commission (ACC). 2013b. Organised Crime in Australia 2013. Canberra: Australian
Crime Commission.
Ayling, Julie. 2011a. "Criminalising Organisations: Towards Deliberative Law Making." Law & Policy
33(2):149-78.
Ayling, Julie. 2011b. "Pre-Emptive Strike: How Australia Is Tackling Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs."
American Journal of Criminal Justice 36(3):250-64.
Ayling, Julie. 2013. "Haste Makes Waste: Deliberative Improvements for Serious Crime Legislation."
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 46(1):12-31.
Barger, Ralph, Keith Zimmerman and Kent Zimmerman. 2001. Hell's Angel: The Life and Times of
Sonny Barger and the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. Great Britain: Fourth Estate.
Barker, Thomas. 2007. Biker Gangs and Organized Crime. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing.
Barker, Thomas and Kelly Human. 2009. "Crimes of the Big Four Motorcycle Gangs." Journal of
Criminal Justice 37(2):174-79.
Barker, Thomas. 2011. "American Based Biker Gangs: International Organized Crime." American
Journal of Criminal Justice 36(3):207-15.
Barker, Thomas. 2016. "Motorcycle Clubs or Criminal Gangs on Wheels." in Understanding Outlaw
Motorcycle Gangs: International Perspectives, edited by A. Bain and M. Lauchs. Durham, NC:
Carolina Academic Press.
Barnes, Greg. 2008. "South Australia Abandons Due Process in Face of Imaginary Bikie Threat."
Review 60:3.
Bartels, Lorana. 2010. The Status of Laws on Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in Australia. Canberra:
Australian Institute of Criminology.
Bedo, Stephanie. 2016. "The Moment the Bikie Ballroom Blitz Brokeout." in Gold Coast Bulletin. Gold
Coast: News Ltd.
Brisbane Times. 2008. "Finks Admit 'Ballroom Blitz' Bloodbath." in Brisbane Times. Brisbane: Fairfax.
Canberra Times. 1970. "Bikies' Leader Gaoled." in Canberra Times. Canberra: Fairfax Ltd.
Canberra Times. 1973. "Woman 'Heard Man Admit Shooting'." in Canberra Times. Canberra: Fairfax
Ltd.
Canberra Times. 1975. "Charged over Brawl." in Canberra Times. Canberra: Fairfax Ltd.
Carson, Vanda. 2015. "Gangster's Paradise." in The Courier Mail. Brisbane: Newscorp Ltd.
Cartwright, Lexie and Meagan Weymes. 2015. "Mongol Associates Arrested, Police Say, as Bikie
Raids Go on as Gold Coast Police Begin Second Day of Operation." in Gold Coast Bulletin.
Gold Coast: Newscorp Ltd.
Cash, Amy. 2012. "First They Came for The Bikies... A Look into South Australia's Anti Bikie
Legislation." Perspective 6:17-22.

23
Clennell, Andrew, Dylan Welch and Arjun Ramachandran. 2009. "Hells Angels Raided as 'Bikie Bill'
Introduced." Pp. 2 in The Sydney Morning Herald, Vol. 6 May 2009. Sydney: John Fairfax
Holdings Ltd.
Condon, Michael. 2012. Originating Application for a Criminal Organisation Declaration Pursuant to
the Criminal Organisation Act 2009. Brisbane: Queensland Police Service.
Cowdery, Nicholas. 2009. "A Threat to the Rule of Law: The New South Wales Crimes (Criminal
Organisations Control) Act 2009." Current Issues in Criminal Justice 21(2):321-24.
Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC). 2007. The Cocaine Market in Queensland: A Strategic
Assessment. Brisbane: Crime and Misconduct Commission.
Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC). 2009. Money Laundering and Organised Crime: A
Strategic Assessment. Brisbane: Crime and Misconduct Commission.
Danner, Terry A and Ira J Silverman. 1986. "Characteristics of Incarcerated Outlaw Bikers as
Compared to Non-Biker Inmates." Journal of Crime and Justice 9(1):43-70.
Doorley, Neil. 2015a. "Victorian Police Eye Queensland's Anti-Gang Laws with Envy as Bikies Move
South." in The Courier Mail. Brisbane: Newscorp Ltd.
Doorley, Neil. 2015b. "Decimated Bikies Put on Ice." in The Courier Mail. Brisbane: Newscorp Ltd.
Dulaney, William. 2005. "A Brief History Of "Outlaw" Motorcycle Clubs." International Journal of
Motorcycle Studies November 2005.
Fedorowytsch, Tom. 2015. "Anti-Bikie Legislation Passes South Australian Parliament." in ABC News.
Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
Harvey, Sandra and Lindsay Simpson. 2001. Brothers in Arms: The inside Story of Two Bikie Gangs.
Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Hopper, Columbus B and Johnny Moore. 1983. "Hell on Wheels: The Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs."
Journal of American Culture 6(2):58-64.
Katz, Karen. 2011. "The Enemy Within: The Outlaw Motorcycle Gang Moral Panic." American Journal
of Criminal Justice 36:231-49.
Kent, Paul. 2009. "Outlaw Bikie War Fuelled by Rage, Greed and Speed." in Daily Telegraph. Sydney:
Newscorp Ltd.
Kyriacou, Kate. 2015. "Drug Dealer's Last Laugh on the Taxpayer." in The Courier Mail. Brisbane:
Newscorp Ltd.
Lauchs, Mark. 2013. "The Great Bikie Beat-Up: Why We Shouldn't Confuse Crime Lords with
Boofheads on Bikes." in The Conversation. Sydney: The Conversation Media Group.
Lauchs, Mark, Andy Bain and Peter Bell. 2015. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: A Theorectical Perspective.
Houndsmill, UK: Palgrave Pivot.
Liddick, Don. 2008. "Nontraditional Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs." in Organized Crime:
From Trafficking to Terrorism, edited by F. Shanty. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
McNab, Duncan. 2013. Outlaw Bikers in Australia: The Real Story. Sydney: Pan McMillan.
Montgomery, Randal. 1976. "The Outlaw Motorcycle Subculture." The Canadian Journal of
Criminology and Corrections 18(1):332-42.
Morgan, George and Selda Dagistanli. 2010. "Global Fears, Local Anxiety: Policing, Counterterrorism
and Moral Panic over 'Bikie Gang Wars' in New South Wales." Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Criminology 43(3):580-99.
Morselli, Carlo. 2009. "Hell's Angels in Springtime." Trends in Organized Crime 12(2):145-58.
Quinn, James and Craig J Forsyth. 2007. "Evolving Themes in the Subculture of the Outlaw Biker."
The International Journal of Crime, Criminal Justice and Law 2(2):145-59.
Quinn, James and Craig J Forsyth. 2011a. "Women in the One-Percent Subculture." Pp. 132-56 in
Devilz Dollz: The Secret World of Women in the Outlaw Biker Subculture, edited by K. Katz.
Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing.
Quinn, James and Craig J Forsyth. 2012. "Coordinated Chaos: The Psychology and Structure of
Organized Crime among One Percent Bikers." Pp. 187-204 in North American Criminal Gangs:

24
 Street, Prison, Outlaw Motorcycle and Drug Trafficking Organizations, edited by T. Baker.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Quinn, James F. 1987. "Sex Roles and Hedonis among Member Of "Outlaw" Motorcycle Gangs."
Deivant Behaviour 8(1):47-63.
Quinn, James F. 2001. "Angels, Bandidos, Outlaws and Pagans: The Evolution of Organized Crime
Amongh the Big Four Motorcycle Clubs." Deviant Behaviour 22(4):379-99.
Quinn, James F and D Shane Koch. 2003. "The Nature of Criminality within One-Percent Motorcycle
Clubs." Deviant Behaviour 24(3):281-305.
Quinn, James and Craig J Forsyth. 2007. "Evolving Themes in the Subculture of the Outlaw Biker."
The International Journal of Crime, Criminal Justice and Law 2(2):145-59.
Quinn, James F and Craig J Forsyth. 2009. "Leathers and Rolexs: The Symbolism and Values of the
Motorcycle Club." Deviant Behaviour 30(3):235-65.
Quinn, James and Craig J Forsyth. 2011a. "Women in the One-Percent Subculture." Pp. 132-56 in
Devilz Dollz: The Secret World of Women in the Outlaw Biker Subculture, edited by K. Katz.
Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing.
Quinn, James F and Craig J Forsyth. 2011b. "The Tools, Tactics and Mentality of Outlaw Biker Wars."
American Journal of Criminal Justice 36(3):216-30.
Quinn, James and Craig J Forsyth. 2012. "Coordinated Chaos: The Psychology and Structure of
Organized Crime among One Percent Bikers." Pp. 187-204 in North American Criminal Gangs:
Quinn, James F and Craig J Forsyth. 2009. "Leathers and Rolexs: The Symbolism and Values of the
Motorcycle Club." Deviant Behaviour 30(3):235-65.
Quinn, James F and Craig J Forsyth. 2011b. "The Tools, Tactics and Mentality of Outlaw Biker Wars."
American Journal of Criminal Justice 36(3):216-30.
Ravn, Mackenzie, Tanya Westthorp and Shaya Laughlin. 2013. "Eighteen Bikies Arrested after
Broadbeach Brawl." in Gold Coast Bulletin. Gold Coast: News Ltd.
Robertson, Josh and Kate Kyriacou. 2012. "Court Documents Reveal How Finks Motorcycle Club
Evolved into Most Feared Criminal Gang on the Gold Coast." in The Courier Mail. Brisbane:
Newscorp Ltd.
Robertson, Josh. 2014. "The Downfall of Gold Coast Drug Kingpin Dino Spizzirri." in The Courier Mail.
Brisbane: Newscorp Ltd.
Robertson, Josh and Greg Stolz. 2014. "Terror Team' Bikies Face Court." in The Courier Mail. Brisbane:
Newscorp Ltd.
Robertson, Joshua. 2015. "Queensland Police Drop Term 'Criminal Motorcycle Gangs' for Bikies." in
The Guardian. Sydney: Guardian News and Media Ltd.
Sarre, Rick. 2013. "Reducing the Influence of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: Some Reflections on Current
Australian Legislation." Australasian Policing 5(2):7-8.
Schloenhardt, Andreas. 2011. "Mafias &Amp; Motorbikes: New Ways to Fight Organised Crime." Vol.:
The Winston Churchill Memborial Trust of Australia.
Shamblin, Don H. 1971. "Brotherhood of Rebels: An Exploratory Analysis of a Motorcycle Outlaw
Contraculture." Doctor of Philosophy, State University of New York.
Thompson, Hunter S. 1967. Hell's Angels: The Strange and Terrible Saga of the Outlaw Motor-Cycle
Gangs of California. London: Penguin.
Thompson, William. 2008. "Pseudo-Deviance and The "New Biker" Subculture: Hogs, Blogs, Leathers,
and Lattes." Deviant Behavior 30(1):89-114.
Veno, Arthur and Julie van den Eynde. 2007. "Moral Panic Neutralization Project: A Media-Based
Intervention." Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 17:490-506.
Veno, Arthur and Edward Gannon. 2009. The Brotherhoods. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
von Lampe, Klaus. 2003. "Criminally Exploitable Ties: A Network Approach to Organized Crime." in
Transnational Organized Crime: Myth, Power, and Profit, edited by E. C. Vianno, J.
Magallanes and L. Bridel. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

25
Watson, J Mark. 1980. "Outlaw Mortorcyclists: An Outgrowth of Lower Class Cultural Concerns."
Deviant Behavior 2(1):31-48.
Willacy, Mark. 2015. "Alex Vella: From Poverty to President of Australia's Feared Rebels Motorcycle
Club." in ABC News. Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission.
Wolf, Daniel R. 1991. The Rebels: A Brotherhood of Outlaw Bikers. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Wood, John. 2003. "Hell's Angels and the Illusion of Counterculture." The Journal of Popular Culture
37(3):336-51.

26